



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021-MA-03

SE5000-8, version K

from

Stoneridge Electronics AB



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021-MA-02 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021, dated 25.01.2022 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Bonn, 29 June 2022

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the SE5000-8, Stoneridge Electronics AB, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The SE5000-8 was changed due to a new hologram on the tamper label. The Security of the new tamper label was evaluated and confirmed by the ITSEF Deutsche Telecom Security GmbH. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from SE5000-8, version J to SE5000-8, version K.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of a new hologram on the tamper label. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. The evaluation was limited to the security of the changed tamper label. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021 dated 25.01.2021 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] Impact Analysis SE5000-8, Rev. 19, Date: 2022-04-27 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021 for SE5000-8 version H from Stoneridge Electronics AB, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 25.01.2021
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V5-2021, Version 10, 25 November 2020, SE5000-8 Security Target vehicle unit, Stoneridge Electronics AB
- [5] SE5000 Configuration List, Revision no: 22, Stoneridge Electronics (confidential document)
- [6] Tamper Label Delta Test Report v1.0, dated 31.05.2022, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (confidential document)