THE DOCUMENT COMPANY
**FUJI XEROX**

Fuji Xerox

ApeosPort 750 I/650 I,

DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series

Data Security Kit

Security Target

26 July 2006

Version: V1.03

This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese

Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.

Revision History

| No. | Date | Version | Description |
|-----|------|---------|-------------|
| 1 | June 9, 2006 | V1.00 | First draft. |
| 2 | June 21, 2006 | V1.01 | Responded to the remarks and reports (ASE-001-01), etc. |
| 3 | July 3, 2006 | V1.02 | Changed the name of Documents, etc. |
| 4 | July 26, 2006 | V1.03 | Changed the name of Documents, etc. |
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# 1. ST Introduction

## 1.1. ST Identification

(1) ST identification

| | |
|---|---|
| **ST identification** | ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Data Security Kit Security Target |
| **Version** | V1.03 |
| **Creator** | Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. |
| **Date** | July 26, 2006 |
| **CC identification** | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version2.1, August 1999<br>CCIMB Interpretations (as of 01 December 2003) |
| **PP identification** | None |
| **Keyword** | Digital multifunction machine, copy, printer, scanner, hard disk drive, to overwrite and erase, and password |

(2) TOE identification

| | |
|---|---|
| **TOE identification** | ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific |
| **Version** | Controller ROM Ver1.101.2 |
| **Manufacturer** | Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. |

This Security Target conforms to JIS X5070 and ISO/IEC 15408 (1999).

JIS X5070 is the Japanese translated version of ISO/IEC15408 (1999).

## 1.2. ST Overview

This Security Target describes security-related specifications of Data Security Kit, which is an optional product of ApeosPort 750 I, ApeosPort 650 I, DocuCentre 750 I and DocuCentre 650 I (digital multifunction machines with copy, printer and scanner functions).

Data Security Kit is a product to protect document data that is stored on the hard disk drive after being processed by ApeosPort 750 I, ApeosPort 650 I, DocuCentre 750 I or DocuCentre 650 I (hereafter "used document data") from being disclosed illicitly.

This product provides the following security functions:

- HDD overwriting for residual data

- HDD data encryption

- Key-operator authentication

- Customer engineer operation restriction

## 1.3. Evaluation Assurance Level

Evaluation Assurance Level of TOE: **EAL2**

Reason: TOE is to be used in facilities of organizations such as SOHO, general offices, government and municipal offices, and universities. The users are limited to those who are related to the organization.

## 1.4. Applicable PP

There is no applicable Protection Profile.

## 1.5. Related ST

There is no related Security Target.

## 1.6. CC Conformance

This TOE conforms to the following evaluation standards for information security:
 - JIS X5070 Part 2 (CC Version 2.1 Part 2)
 - JIS X5070 Part 3 (CC Version 2.1 Part 3)
 - JIS X5070 EAL2

## 1.7. Abbreviated Terms

The following abbreviated terms are used in this ST.

| Abbreviation | Definition |
|---|---|
| CC | Common Criteria. |
| CE | Customer Engineer. |
| CWIS | CentreWare Internet Service. |
| DC | Digital Copier. |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level. |
| IIT | Image Input Terminal. |
| IOT | Image Output Terminal. |
| IT | Information Technology. |
| NVRAM | Non-volatile Random Access Memory. |
| PDL | Page Description Language. |
| PP | Protection Profile. |
| SEEPROM | Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory. |
| SF | Security Function. |
| SFP | Security Function Policy. |
| SOF | Strength of Function. |
| ST | Security Target. |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation. |
| TSC | TSF Scope of Control. |
| TSF | TOE Security Function. |
| TSFI | TSF Interface. |
| TSP | TOE Security Policy. |
| UI | User Interface. |

## 1.8. Terms

The following terms are used in this ST:

**ApeosPort/DocuCentre**

In this ST, ApeosPort 750 I, ApeosPort 650 I, DocuCentre 750 I and DocuCentre 650 I are generically described as ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

**General User**

One who uses copy and printer functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

**Key Operator**

One who manages ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

**Customer Engineer**

Fuji Xerox's engineer who maintains and repairs ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

**Attacker**

One who uses TOE with malicious intention.

**Control Panel**

Panel on which the buttons, lamps, and touch panel display that are necessary for operating ApeosPort/DocuCentre are arranged.

**User's Client**

Client that is used by general user. General user uses printer functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre by using printer driver that is installed on the user's client.

**Key-operator's Client**

Client that is used by key operator. Key operator checks and rewrites TOE setting data for ApeosPort/DocuCentre using the Web browser.

**CentreWare Internet Service**

Provides functions for key operator to check and rewrite TOE setting data for ApeosPort/DocuCentre using the Web browser.

**Printer Driver**

Software that converts data on user's client to print data described in page description language (PDL) that can be interpreted by ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Used on user's client.

**Print Data**

Data described in page description language (PDL) that can be interpreted by ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Print data is converted to bitmap data by decomposing function of TOE.

**Bitmap Data**

Data that is converted by decomposing function from the data scanned in copy function or the print data sent from user's client in printer function. Bitmap data is compressed using the Fuji Xerox's unique method and stored on the hard disk drive.

**Decomposing Function**

Function to parse print data described in page description language (PDL) and convert it to bitmap data.

**Decompose**

To parse data described in page description language (PDL) and convert it to bitmap data using decomposing function.

**Network Scanner Utility**

Software to access document data stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Used on user's client.

**Printer Function**

Function to decompose and print out print data sent from user's client.

**Printer Control Function**

Function to control the equipment to realize printer function.

**Storage Print**

Print method in printer function. In this method, bitmap data created by decomposing print data is once stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and printed according to the general-user's instruction from the control panel or when the designated time comes. There are following five methods:

- Security print
- Sample print
- Authentication print
- Time designation print
- Print that uses mailbox

**Security Print**

Storage print method, in which the print is enabled by setting a password from the printer driver on user's client and entering the password at the control panel.

**Sample Print**

Storage print method, in which the first copy is normally printed out for checking the print result and then the remaining copies are printed according to the instruction from the control panel.

**Authentication Print**

Storage print method for when authentication function is used. In this method, print jobs that failed in authentication are stored and then the print is performed according to the instruction from the control panel.

**Time Designation Print**

Storage print method, in which print-start time is designated from the printer driver on user's client and the print is performed when the designated time comes.

**Print that uses Mailbox**

Storage print method, in which decomposed bitmap data is stored in an expanded mailbox and printed according to the instruction from the control panel. Compared to security print and sample print, functions to make settings on stapling, punching, and paper size when printing are added.

**Spool**

Method used in printer function, in which decomposing is started after all the print data sent from user's client is received in the internal memory.

Print data from multiple user's-clients can be received simultaneously using this method.

**Hard-disk-drive Spool**

Uses a hard disk drive as an internal memory for spool.

**Memory Spool**

Uses a volatile memory as an internal memory for spool.

**Non-spool**

Method used in printer function, in which decomposing is performed while print data sent from user's client is being received. In this method, print data from multiple user's-clients cannot be received simultaneously.

**Original**

Texts, pictures, photographs, and others that are scanned in IIT in copy function.

**Copy Function**

Function to scan an original in IIT and print out from IOT, according to the general-user's instruction from the control panel. When multiple copies of the same original are instructed to be printed, the document data is

1) scanned in IIT,

2) stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre,

3) read from the internal hard disk drive for the same number of times as the number of designated copies, and printed out.

**Copy Control Function**

Function to control the equipment to realize copy function.

**Scanner Function**

According to the general-user's instruction from the control panel, scans an original in IIT and stores it in an expanded mailbox created in the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. The stored document data is retrieved by network scanner utility on user's client.

**Scanner Control Function**

Function to control the equipment to realize scanner function.

**Expanded Mailbox**

Logical box created in the hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. The following can be stored in this box: the document data scanned by scanner function and the document data for the print that uses an expanded mailbox.

**Document Data**

In this ST, "document data" is used as a generic term for the data including all the image information that pass the inside of ApeosPort/DocuCentre when general user uses copy, printer and scanner functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

The following are included:

- Bitmap data that is printed in IOT when using copy function.

- Print data sent from user's client and bitmap data created by decomposing the data, when using printer function.

- Bitmap data that is stored on the internal hard disk drive when using scanner function.

**Used Document Data**

Document data of which use is finished after being stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

**Control Data**

Data that are communicated as a command and its response in the communication performed between hardware units that compose ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

**Deletion from Hard Disk Drive**

In this ST, "deletion from hard disk drive" means deletion of administrative information. When document data is deleted from the hard disk drive, the deleted document data cannot be accessed in theory because the corresponding administrative information is deleted. However, the document data itself is not cleared. The document data itself remains on the hard disk drive as used document data until new data is written on the same area.

**To Overwrite and Erase**

To overwrite the data area with the specific data when document data stored on the hard disk drive is to be deleted.

**Cryptographic Seed Key**

12-digit alphanumeric characters that are entered by user. Cryptographic key is generated from this key.

**Cryptographic Key**

128-bit data that is automatically generated from cryptographic seed key. Encryption is performed using this cryptographic key.

### 1.9. Reference

The following are references for this ST:

| | |
|---|---|
| [JIS X5070-1] | JIS X5070 Information technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 1: Introduction and general model |
| [JIS X5070-2] | JIS X5070 Information technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 2: Security functional requirements |
| [JIS X5070-3] | JIS X5070 Information technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 3: Security assurance requirements |
| [CC Part 1] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part1:Introduction and general model Version2.1, August 1999 CCIMB-99-031 |
| [CC Part 2] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part2: Security functional requirements Version2.1, August 1999 CCIMB-99-032 |
| [CC Part 3] | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part3: Security assurance requirements Version2.1, August 1999 CCIMB-99-033 |
| [CEM Part 1] | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Part1: Introduction and General Model Version0.6, November 1997 |
| [CEM Part 2] | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Part2: Evaluation and Methodology Version1.0, August 1999 |
| [PDTR15446] | Information Technology Security techniques Guide for the production of protection profiles and security targets Proposed Draft, April 2000 |
| [Interpretations] | CCIMB Interpretations (as of 01 December 2003) |

# 2. TOE Description

### 2.1. Type of TOE

TOE is a data security kit that is installed on a digital multifunction machine. This kit is a firmware product to protect used document data, which is stored on the hard disk drive after being processed by digital multifunction machine, from being disclosed illicitly.

TOE is offered as an optional product of Fuji Xerox's digital multifunction machines, ApeosPort 750 I ApeosPort 650 I  DocuCentre 750 I and DocuCentre 650 I.

## 2.2. Usage Environment of TOE

TOE is assumed to be used in the condition where the machine is connected to internal network and user's clients.

Assumed usage environment of TOE is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Assumed Usage Environment of TOE

The following are connected to internal network:

- User's Client:

    Printer driver and network scanner utility are installed.

    Requests ApeosPort/DocuCentre to print and retrieve document data.

- Key-operator's Client:

    Checks and rewrites TOE setting data for ApeosPort/DocuCentre using the Web browser.

- Mail Server:

    ApeosPort/DocuCentre sends/receives document data to/from mail server using mail protocol.

- FTP Server:

    ApeosPort/DocuCentre sends document data to FTP server using FTP.

- SMB Server:

    ApeosPort/DocuCentre sends document data to SMB server using SMB.

To protect each device on internal network, the connection to external network is made through a

firewall.

## 2.3. Purpose of Using TOE

To protect the used document data that is stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre from being disclosed illicitly.

## 2.4. Configuration of TOE

### 2.4.1. Physical Configuration

Each unit in ApeosPort/DocuCentre and physical boundaries within TOE are shown in Figure 2.

ApeosPort/DocuCentre consists of two board-units: controller board and control panel.

Controller board and control panel are connected via the internal interface where control data are communicated.

In each of the following sets, the two are connected via the internal interface where document data and control data are communicated:

- controller board and IIT
- controller board and IOT

Controller board is a circuit board to control copy, printer and scanner functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. This board has a network interface (Ethernet) and local interfaces (IEEE1284 and USB), and is connected to IIT and IOT.

Control panel is for operating / making settings on copy, printer and scanner functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

TOE is a set of programs that are recorded in the system ROM that is mounted on the controller board. Programs recorded in the ROM, which is a physical configuration item of TOE, are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Physical Configuration Item of TOE

| Configuration item | Stored program |
|---|---|
| System ROM | Programs to control ApeosPort/DocuCentre are recorded in the system ROM, and the following functions are provided:<br>- Copy control function<br>- Printer control function<br>- Scanner control function<br>- Control-panel control function<br>- Key-operator authentication function<br>- HDD overwriting function for residual data<br>- HDD data encryption function<br>- CWIS |

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ApeosPort/DocuCentre                                    ┌─────────┐      │
│                                                          │  TOE    │      │
│  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐     └─────────┘      │
│  │ Control Panel │ Button │ Lamp │ Touch-panel Display │  Key-operator's Client │
│  └────────────────────────────────────────────────┘     User's Client    │
│                          ↕                               Mail Server      │
│  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐       FTP Server       │
│  │ Controller Board                             │        SMB Server       │
```



Figure 2: Each Unit in ApeosPort/DocuCentre and Physical Boundaries within TOE

**2.4.2.** Logical Configuration

Logical configuration of ApeosPort/DocuCentre is shown in Figure 3.

ApeosPort/DocuCentre provides copy, printer and scanner functions for general users.

<Copy function>

Copy function is a function to scan an original in IIT and print out from IOT according to the general-user's instruction from the control panel.

<Printer function>

Printer function is a function to parse print data sent from user's client, convert it to bitmap data (decompose), and print it out from IOT. There are two types of printer functions. One is normal print, in which data is printed out from IOT without being stored on the hard disk drive. The other is storage print, in which bitmap data is once stored on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and then printed out from IOT according to the general-user's instruction

from the control panel.

In printer functions, there are two types of decomposing methods. One is spool method, in which the print data sent from user's client is temporarily received in an memory (internal memory or internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre) and then decomposed. The other is non-spool method, in which decomposing is performed while print data sent from user's client is being received in an internal memory of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

<Scanner function>

Scanner function is a function to scan an original in IIT and store the data on the internal hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre according to the general-user's instruction from the control panel. Stored document data can be retrieved using network scanner utility on user's client, and can be transferred to an external server according to the information set to ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

<Control-panel control function>

Control-panel control function is a function to send the information that is entered by key operator or customer engineer at the control panel to the "customer-engineer operation restriction function" or the "key-operator authentication function." When authenticated as a customer engineer or a key operator, he or she can access TOE setting data.

<CWIS>

CWIS sends the information that is entered at the key-operator's client using the Web browser to the "key-operator authentication function." When authenticated as a key operator, he or she can access TOE setting data.

ApeosPort/DocuCentre has a single internal hard disk drive. When the document data stored on the hard disk drive is to be deleted after being used, only the administrative information is deleted and the stored data itself is not cleared. Therefore, the data remains on the hard disk drive as used document data.

TOE provides the following security functions for this used document data stored on the hard disk drive:

<HDD overwriting for residual data>

Overwrites and erases used document data stored on the hard disk drive after the operation of copy, printer and scanner functions.

<HDD data encryption>

Encrypts document data when storing the data on the hard disk drive at the time of operation of copy, printer and scanner functions.

To assure the operations of the above security functions, TOE provides the following security functions:

<Key-operator authentication>

Identifies and authenticates key operator via the control panel or the key-operator's client, and enables only the key operator to make settings on security functions of TOE.

<Customer-engineer operation restriction>

Key-operator's setting function to restrict customer engineer from referring to / changing settings related to TOE security functions.

Figure 3: Logical Configuration of TOE

TOE setting data that are stored on NVRAM and SEEPROM on controller board of ApeosPort/DocuCentre are described in Table 2.

Table 2: TOE Setting Data in ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and Memory Location

| Setting data | Memory location |
| --- | --- |
| Setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data | NVRAM |
| Setting for using password | |
| Key-operator's password | |
| Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function | |
| Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID | |
| Setting for HDD data encryption function | SEEPROM |
| Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive | |

In "setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data," the number of overwriting and erasing used document data recorded on the hard disk drive can be set to one of those described below:

- Not perform:   Does not overwrite nor erase.

Set when security functions of TOE are not used. Lowering of process speed of copy and printer functions, which occurs due to overwriting and erasing, can be avoided.

- Perform

 (one time):   Overwrites and erases with data "0" once.

Overwriting and erasing makes the recovery of used document data difficult. Has less effect of lowering process speed of copying and printing than three-time overwritings and erasings. Protects used document data by being set in combination with the setting for HDD data encryption function.

- Perform

 (three times):   Overwrites and erases with data "random numbers" twice, and with data "0" once. Recommended setting value. Although the recovery of used document data is difficult after one-time overwriting and erasing, three-time overwritings and erasings make the recovery more difficult. Protects used document data by being set in combination with the setting for HDD data encryption function.

"Setting for using password" can be set to either of those described below:

- Not perform:   Does not use password.

In authentication of key operator, requests entering of only the user ID of key operator and authenticates him or her as a key operator when the entered user ID matches the information recorded on NVRAM of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Used when convenience is desired, although the security level is low.

- Perform:   Uses password.

In authentication of key operator, requests entering of user ID and password of key operator and authenticates him or her as a key operator when the entered user ID and password match the information recorded on NVRAM of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.

In "setting for HDD data encryption function," cryptographic operation on document data stored on the hard disk drive can be set to either of those described below:

- Not perform:   Does not encrypt.

Set when security functions of TOE are not used. Lowering of process speed

due to the encryption can be avoided.

- Perform:          Encryption makes the parsing of document data difficult. Protects used

document data by being set in combination with the setting for HDD overwriting

function for residual data.

Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive becomes valid when the "setting for

HDD data encryption function" is "Perform." In this condition, user can enter 12-digit alphanumeric

characters that are used for generating cryptographic key to encrypt document data recorded on

the hard disk drive.

"Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function" can be set to either of those described

below:

- Not perform:     Does not use restriction of customer-engineer's operation.

Set when security functions of TOE are not used. Customer engineer can refer

to / change settings related to security functions of TOE.

- Perform:          Uses restriction of customer-engineer's operation.

Restricts customer engineer from referring to / changing settings related to

security functions of TOE.

"Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID" can be set to either of those

described below:

- Not perform:     Does not restrict the number of errors in authentication of key operator.

- Perform:          The allowable number of failures in authentication of key operator. Can be set

in the range of 1 to 10. When "1" is set, the second or later authentications are

not accepted after the first authentication fails.

## 2.5.  Persons Related to TOE

In this ST, the following related persons are assumed.

| Related person | Description |
|---|---|
| Organization's person in charge | Person in charge in the organization where ApeosPort/DocuCentre is used and operated. |
| General user | User of copy and printer functions provided by ApeosPort/DocuCentre. |
| Key operator | Person who manages ApeosPort/DocuCentre machine. Has a special authority such as to make settings for operations of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Manages machine using the control panel of ApeosPort/DocuCentre or the Web browser of key-operator's client. |
| Customer engineer | Makes settings for operations of ApeosPort/DocuCentre using the interface only for customer engineer. This interface only for customer engineer is for the maintenance of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. |

**2.6.** Assets protected by TOE

Assets protected by TOE are the used document data stored on the hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre and the TOE setting data stored on NVRAM and SEEPROM.

There are two types of document data; one is bitmap data stored by copy function, and the other is print data that is sent from user's client and stored. Print data is firstly converted to bitmap data by decomposing function of TOE, and then stored, and printed out. There are two types of used document data; one is used bitmap data and the other is used print data.

Contents, storage mediums, and types of assets protected by TOE are described in Table 3.

Table 3: Contents, Storage Mediums, and Types of Protected Assets

| Protected asset | Description |
|---|---|
| **R.DOCDATA (used document data stored on the hard disk drive)** | [Asset contents]<br>Used document data that is stored on the hard disk drive when using copy, printer or scanner function.<br><br>[Storage mediums]<br>Stored on the hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre.<br><br>[Asset types]<br>Types of used document data when using copy function:<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when the copying instructed by general user from the control panel is completed.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when cancel is instructed by general user from the control panel during copying.<br>Types of used document data when using printer function:<br>　- Print data in spool, of which use is finished when printing of the print data set from user's client is completed in normal print of hard-disk-drive spool method.<br>　- Print data in spool, of which use is finished when cancel is instructed by general user from the control panel during printing in normal print of had-disk-drive spool method.<br>　- Print data in spool, of which use is finished when cancel is instructed by user's client during sending of the print data from user's client in normal print or storage print of hard-disk-drive spool method.<br>　- Print data in spool, of which use is finished when bitmap data is stored on the hard disk drive after being decomposed in storage print of hard-disk-drive spool method.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when printing of the stored document data is instructed by general user from the control panel and the printing is completed in storage print.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when the printing started at the designated time is completed in storage print.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when cancel is instructed by general user from the control panel during printing of the document data for storage print.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when the deletion of the stored document data is instructed by general user from the control panel in storage print.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when printing of the print data sent from user's client is completed.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when cancel is instructed by general user from the control panel during printing.<br>Types of used document data when using scanner function:<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when retrieving of the stored document data is finished by network scanner utility on user's client.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when transferring of the stored document data to FTP server, mail server, or SMB server is finished.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when deletion of the stored document data is instructed by general user from the control panel.<br>　- Bitmap data of which use is finished when cancel is instructed by general user from the control panel during scanning. |

| R.CONFDATA (TOE setting data) | [Asset contents]<br>  - Setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data<br>  - Setting for using password<br>  - Key-operator's password<br>  - Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function<br>  - Setting for HDD data encryption function<br>  - Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive<br>  - Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID<br><br>[Storage mediums]<br>The following are stored on NVRAM*:<br>  - Setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data<br>  - Setting for using password<br>  - Key-operator's password<br>  - Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function<br>  - Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID<br><br>The following are stored on SEEPROM*:<br>  - Setting for HDD data encryption function<br>  - Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive |
|---|---|

\* Although data other than those described in Table 3, such as setting data for power-saving time, are stored on NVRAM and SEEPROM of ApeosPort/DocuCentre, these data are not the assets to be protected because they are not related to the security functions of TOE.

## 2.7. Functions of TOE

### 2.7.1. Security Functions of TOE

TOE provides the following security functions.

| Function classification | Description |
|---|---|
| HDD overwriting function for residual data | Function to perform specific-pattern overwriting and erasing of the used document data stored on the hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. When the overwriting of the used document data is not finished such as due to power shutdown, the used document data is automatically overwritten and erased according to the "setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data" at the next power-on. |
| HDD data encryption function | Function to encrypt document data stored on the hard disk drive of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. |
| Key-operator authentication function | Function to identify and authenticate key operator and to enable only the key operator to make settings on TOE setting data. Denies the authentication when authentication fails the set number of times. |
| Customer-engineer operation restriction function | Used when customer engineer refers to / changes TOE setting data. Function to make the only-for-customer-engineer interface unavailable. This function can be set by key operator. By enabling this function, attacker who pretends to be a customer engineer becomes unable to refer to / change TOE setting data using the interface only for customer engineer. |

### 2.7.2. Non-Security Function of TOE

TOE provides the following non-security functions.

| Function classification | Description |
|---|---|
| Copy control function | Function to control copy operation of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Document data scanned in IIT is converted to image data such as through digital filter and printed out by IOT. |
| Printer control function | Function to control printer operation of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Print data |

| | described in page description language (PDL) is sent from user's client. This data is converted to bitmap data by decomposing function so that it can be printed, and printed out by IOT. |
|---|---|
| Decomposing function | Used in printer function. Function to parse print data that is described in page description language (PDL) and sent from user's client and to convert the data to bitmap data so that it can be printed out. |
| Scanner control function | Function to control scanner operation of ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Document data scanned in IIT is converted to image data such as through digital filter and stored on the hard disk drive. |
| CWIS | Function to check the status of consumables etc. of ApeosPort/DocuCentre using the Web browser and to read/write various setting data. |

## 2.8. How to Use TOE

TOE setting data is set by key operator. After being authenticated by entering the default key-operator's user ID, which is set at the shipment, at the control panel, key operator makes settings on the setting items described below. Only the "changing of key-operator's password" described below can be set from key-operator's client.

### - Setting for using password

Set to "Perform."

### - Changing of key-operator's password

Set 7 to 12 alphanumeric characters other than the default password.

### - Setting for access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID

Set to "5."

### - Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function

Set to "Perform."

### - Setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data

Set to "Perform (one time)" or "Perform (three times)."

### - Setting for HDD data encryption function

Set to "Perform."

### - Setting for cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive

Set 12 alphanumeric characters. (When 11 or fewer characters are set, "0" is automatically set for the shortage.)

When general user uses copy and printer functions of ApeosPort/DocuCentre, used document data is stored on the hard disk drive that is built into ApeosPort/DocuCentre as described in Table 4. Security functions of TOE operate for this stored used document data according to the key-operator's setting before general user knows.

Flows of control data and document data between respective units in each function of ApeosPort/DocuCentre are described in Table 4.

Table 4: Data Flow in Each Function of ApeosPort/DocuCentre

| Function | Data type | Data flow |
|---|---|---|

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Copy | Normal copy | Control data | Control panel→Controller board IOT |
| | | Document data | IIT→Controller board→Hard disk drive→Controller board→IOT |
| Printer | Normal print (non-spool) | Control data | User's client→Controller board→IOT |
| | | Document data (print data) | User's client→Controller board<br>↓(Creates bitmap data by decomposing at the controller board.) |
| | | Document data (bitmap data) | Controller board→IOT |
| | Normal print (hard-disk-drive spool) | Control data | User's client→Controller board→Hard disk drive→Controller board→IOT |
| | | Document data (print data) | User's client→Controller board→Hard disk drive→Controller board<br>(Creates bitmap data by decomposing at the controller board.)<br>↓ |
| | | Document data (bitmap data) | Controller board→IOT |
| | Storage print (non-spool) | Control data | 1) Storage of document data on the hard disk drive<br>User's client→Controller board→Hard disk drive<br>2) Printing out of document data<br>(Started by operation at the control panel.)<br>Hard disk drive→Controller board→IOT |
| | | Document data (print data) | 1) Storage of document data on the hard disk drive<br>User's client→Controller board<br>↓(Creates bitmap data by decomposing at the controller board.) |
| | | Document data (bitmap data) | Controller board→Hard disk drive<br><br>2) Printing out of document data<br>(Started by operation at the control panel.)<br>Hard disk drive→Controller board→IOT |
| | Storage print (hard-disk-drive spool) | Control data | 1) Storage of document data on the hard disk drive<br>User's client→Controller board→Hard disk drive→Controller board→Hard disk drive<br>2) Printing out of document data<br>(Started by operation at the control panel.)<br>Hard disk drive→Controller board→IOT |
| | | Document data (print data) | 1) Storage of document data on the hard disk drive<br>User's client→Controller board→Hard disk drive→Controller board<br><br>↓(Creates bitmap data by decomposing at the controller board.) |
| | | Document data (bitmap data) | Controller board→Hard disk drive<br><br>2) Printing out of document data<br>(Started by operation at the control panel.)<br>Hard disk drive→Controller board→IOT |
| Scanner | Scan storage | Control data | Control panel→Controller board→IIT |
| | | Document data | IIT→Controller board→Hard disk drive |
| | Scan retrieval | Control data | User's client→Controller board |
| | | Document data | Hard disk drive→Controller board→User's client |

| Operation at the control panel | Control data (operation) | Control panel→Controller board |
|---|---|---|
| Operation of key-operator's client | Control data (operation) | Key-operator's client (Web browser)→Internal network→Controller board |

# 3. TOE Security Environment

## 3.1. Assumptions

Assumptions related to the operation and use of this TOE are described in Table 5.

Table 5: Assumptions

| Assumption | Contents |
|---|---|
| **A.SECMODE** | <Protection mode><br>When operating TOE, key operator makes settings as follows:<br>   Key-operator's password: 7 to 12 characters<br>   Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function: "Perform"<br>   Setting for using password: "Perform"<br>   Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID:<br>     "Perform" and five times<br>Additionally, key-operator's password is managed so that it is prevented from being guessed or disclosed. |
| **A.ADMIN** | <Trust in key operator><br>Key operator has knowledge necessary to fulfill the assigned role and does not conduct improperly with malicious intention. |
| **A.NET** | <Network connection condition><br>ApeosPort/DocuCentre that TOE is installed on is connected to an internal network. This internal network constitutes an environment where interceptions are not made.<br>Even when this internal network is connected to an external network, ApeosPort/DocuCentre cannot be accessed from the external network. |

## 3.2. Threats

Key operator and customer engineer, who are given special access authority to TOE, do not fall under "attacker" because they are reliable. Security threats and attackers to this TOE are described in Table 6.

Attackers are thought to have low-level attack capability.

Table 6: Security Threats

| Threat | Contents | Attacker | Protected asset |
|---|---|---|---|
| **T.RECOVER** | **<Illicit recovery of used document data>**<br>General user and the person who is not related to TOE might recover used document data such as by removing the hard disk drive and connecting it directly to a tool. | - General user<br>- Non-related person | R.DOCDATA |
| **T.CONFDATA** | **<Illicit access to TOE setting data>**<br>General user and the person who is not related to TOE might change settings by accessing TOE setting data from the control panel or key-operator's client. This setting data is allowed to be accessed only by key operator. | - General user<br>- Non-related person | R.CONFDATA |

## 3.3. Organizational Security Policies

There is no organizational security policy.

# 4. Security Objectives

## 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

Security objectives for the TOE are described in Table 7.

Table 7: Security Objectives for the TOE

| Objective | Description |
|---|---|
| **O.RESIDUAL** | TOE must make the recovery of used document data stored on the hard disk drive impossible by overwriting. |
| **O.DECIPHER** | TOE must make the parsing of used document data stored on the hard disk drive difficult by encryption. |
| **O.MANAGE** | TOE must enable only the authenticated key-operator to change TOE setting data. |

## 4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment

### 4.2.1. Security Objectives for IT Environment

There is no security objective for IT environment.

### 4.2.2. Security Objectives for Operation and Management

Security objectives for operation and management are described in Table 8.

Table 8: Security Objectives for Operation and Management

| Objective | Description |
|---|---|
| **OE.AUTH** | Key operator must manage "key-operator's password" to prevent it from being guessed or disclosed. Specifically, he or she must not set the key-operator's password to the alphanumeric characters that can be easily guessed nor store the data in the area where attacker can see it.<br>Also, key operator must operate TOE, satisfying the following:<br>- "Key-operator's password" is set to 7 to 12 alphanumeric characters.<br>- "Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID" is set to five times in the condition where "customer-engineer operation restriction function" and "setting for using password" are set to function. |
| **OE.FUNCON** | Key operator must operate TOE in the condition where "HDD overwriting function for residual data" and "HDD data encryption function" are set to function. |
| **OE.ADMIN** | To assure that key operator has knowledge necessary to fulfill the assigned role and does not conduct with malicious intention, organization person in charge must select suitable member and provide management and education. |
| **OE.NET** | ApeosPort/DocuCentre that TOE is installed on is connected to an internal network. On this internal network, organization person in charge installs the devices that realize the environment where interceptions are not made, and performs the proper management and operation to prevent interceptions.<br>Organization person in charge installs the devices to shut down the access to this internal network from the external network, and properly makes settings to shut down the access. |

# 5. IT Security Requirements

## 5.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements

Specifies security functional requirements provided by TOE.

### 5.1.1. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

**FCS_CKM.1    Cryptographic Key Generation**

Hierarchical to:    No other components.

FCS_CKM.1.1    The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

**assignment: list of standards**

None

**assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm**

Fuji Xerox's unique FXOSENC method

**[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]**

128 bits

Dependencies:    FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution

or

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

**FCS_COP.1    Cryptographic Operation**

Hierarchical to:    No other components.

FCS_COP.1.1    The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

**assignment: list of standards**

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

**assignment: cryptographic algorithm**

Rijndael Algorithm

**[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]**

128 bits

**[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]**

  Encryption of document data stored on the hard disk drive

  Decryption of document data stored on the hard disk drive

Dependencies: FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes

  or

  FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

  FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

  FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

**5.1.2.** Class FDP: User Data Protection

**FDP_RIP.1**  **Subset Residual Information Protection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

 FDP_RIP.1.1  The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: list of objects].

 **selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from**

  Deallocation of the resource from

**[assignment: list of objects]**

  Used document data file stored on the hard disk drive

Dependencies: None

**5.1.3.** Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

**FIA_AFL.1**  **Authentication failure handling**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FIA_AFL.1.1  The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], "an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]"] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events]".

 **[assignment: list of authentication events]**

  Key-operator authentication function

 **[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], "an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]"]**

  Positive integral value from 1 to 10 that can be set by key operator

FIA_AFL.1.2  When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

 **[assignment: list of actions]**

Transition to the authentication-denial status.

There is no function to cancel the authentication-denial status.

Dependencies:   FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication



**FIA_UID.2        User Identification before Any Action**

Hierarchical to:   FIA_UID.1

FIA_UID.2.1    The TSF shall require [Refinement: key operator] to identify itself before allowing

any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the [Refinement: key operator].

**FIA_UAU.2        User authentication before any action**

Hierarchical to:   FIA_UAU.1

FIA_UAU.2.1    The TSF shall require [Refinement: key operator] to be successfully authenticated

[Refinement: by key-operator's password] before allowing any other

TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the [Refinement: key operator].

Dependencies:    FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification



**FIA_UAU.7        Protected Authentication-feedback**

Hierarchical to:   No other components.

FIA_UAU.7.1    The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the

authentication of [Refinement: key-operator's password for key-operator

authentication] is in progress.

**[assignment: list of feedback]**

Asterisks ('*') of the same number as the characters entered as key-operator's

password

Dependencies:    FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication


**5.1.4.**  Class FMT: Security Management


**FMT_MOF.1 (1)  Management of security functions behaviour (1)**

Hierarchical to:   No other components.

FMT_MOF.1.1   The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of,

disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of

functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment: list of functions]**

HDD overwriting function for residual data

**[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior**

**of]**

Determine the behavior of

Disable

Enable

**[assignment: the authorized identified roles]**

Key operator

Dependencies:　FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT_MOF.1 (2)　Management of security functions behaviour (2)**

Hierarchical to:　No other components.

FMT_MOF.1.1　The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment: list of functions]**

HDD data encryption function

**[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of]**

Disable

Enable

**[assignment: the authorized identified roles]**

Key operator

Dependencies:　FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT_MOF.1 (3)　Management of security functions behaviour (3)**

Hierarchical to:　No other components.

FMT_MOF.1.1　The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment: list of functions]**

Key-operator authentication function

**[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of]**

Determine the behavior of

**[assignment: the authorized identified roles]**

Key operator

Dependencies:　FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT_MTD.1(1)　Management of TSF data (1)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment: list of TSF data]**

Setting for using password

Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID

**[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]**

Query

Modify

**[assignment: the authorized identified roles]**

Key operator

Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT_MTD.1(2)    Management of TSF data (2)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment: list of TSF data]**

Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive

**[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]**

Modify

**[assignment: the authorized identified roles]**

Key operator

Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT_MTD.1(3)    Management of TSF data (3)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment: list of TSF data]**

Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function

**[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]**

Modify

[**assignment: the authorized identified roles**]

Key operator

Dependencies:  FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT_SMF.1        Specification of Management Functions**

Hierarchical to:  No other components.

FMT_SMF.1.1  The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF].

[**assignment   list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF**]

Functions to manage the management items described in Table 9.

Table 9: Functions to Manage Management Items

| Functional requirement | Management requirement | Management item |
|---|---|---|
| FCS_CKM.1 | Management of change of cryptographic-key attribute | None. (Management of change in cryptographic-key attribute is not necessary because the size of cryptographic key is fixed and there is no attribute other than the key size). |
| FCS_COP.1 | There is no expected management activity. | None |
| FDP_RIP.1 | Selection of when to perform residual information protection (i.e. upon allocation or deallocation) becomes able to be set in TOE. | Fixed to the time to delete document data. |
| FIA_AFL.1 | Management of threshold value for failed authentication attempt Management of action that is taken in authentication-failure event | Number of key-operator authentication errors Authentication-denial status |
| FIA_UID.2 | Management of user-identification information | Key-operator's user ID |
| FIA_UAU.2 | Management of authentication data by key operator and by the user who is related to this data | Key-operator's password |
| FMT_MOF.1 (1) | Management of the group with a role that has a possibility of having interinfluence with TSF function | Fixed to key operator. |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | Management of the group with a role that has a possibility of having interinfluence with TSF function | Fixed to key operator. |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | Management of the group with a role that has a possibility of having interinfluence with TSF function | Fixed to key operator. |
| FMT_MTD.1(1) | Management of the group with a role that has a possibility of having interinfluence with TSF data | Fixed to key operator. |
| FMT_MTD.1(2) | Management of the group with a role that has a possibility of having interinfluence with TSF data | Fixed to key operator. |
| FMT_MTD.1(3) | Management of the group with a role that has a possibility of having interinfluence with TSF data | Fixed to key operator. |
| FMT_SMR.1 | Management of user group that is a part of the roles | Fixed to key operator. (Only the person who knows key-operator's password can be a key |

| | | operator.) |
|---|---|---|

As for FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1(1), FMT_MTD.1(2), FMT_MTD.1(3), and FMT_SMR.1, only the key operator who is authenticated by key-operator's password is managed, and management of group is not performed.

Dependencies: None

**FMT_SMR.1　　Security roles**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT_SMR.1.1　The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

**[assignment　the authorized identified roles]**

Key operator

FMT_SMR.1.2　The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

### 5.1.5. Class FPT: TSF Protection

**FPT_RVM.1　　Non-bypassability of the TSP**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT_RVM.1.1　The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.

Dependencies: None

## 5.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements

Evaluation assurance level of TOE is EAL2. Components of EAL2 assurance package provided in [CC Part3] are described below.

Table 10: EAL2 Assurance Requirements

| Assurance class | Assurance component ID | Assurance component | Dependencies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Configuration management | ACM_CAP.2 | Configuration item | None |
| Delivery and operation | ADO_DEL.1 | Delivery procedure | None |
| | ADO_IGS.1 | Installation, generation, and start-up procedures | AGD_ADM.1 |
| Development | ADV_FSP.1 | Informal functional specification | ADV_RCR.1 |
| | ADV_HLD.1 | Descriptive high-level design | ADV_FSP.1 ADV_RCR.1 |
| | ADV_RCR.1 | Informal correspondence demonstration | None |
| Guidance document | AGD_ADM.1 | Administrator guidance | ADV_FSP.1 |
| | AGD_USR.1 | User guidance | ADV_FSP.1 |
| Test | ATE_COV.1 | Analysis of coverage | ADV_FSP.1 ATE_FUN.1 |
| | ATE_FUN.1 | Functional test | None |

| | ATE_IND.2 | Independent testing - sample | ADV_FSP.1<br>ADV_ADM.1<br>AGD_USR.1<br>ATE_FUN.1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability assessment | AVA_SOF.1 | Evaluation of TOE security function strength | ADV_FSP. 1<br>ADV_HLD.1 |
| | AVA_VLA.1 | Developer vulnerability analysis | ADV_FSP.1<br>ADV_HLD.1<br>AGD_ADM.1<br>AGD_USR.1 |

## 5.3. Security Functional Requirement for IT Environment

There is no security functional requirement provided by IT environment of TOE.

## 5.4. Claim of TOE Security Function Strength

Minimum function strength level of TOE security functions is SOF-basic. TOE security functional requirements that use probabilistic or permutational mechanisms are FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.2.

# 6. TOE Summary Specification

## 6.1. TOE Security Functions

This TOE has the following security functions to satisfy TOE security functional requirements:

- HDD overwriting function for residual data (SF.OVERWRITE)

- HDD data encryption function (SF.ENCRYPTION)

- Key-operator authentication function (SF.MANAGE)

- Customer-engineer operation restriction function (SF.CEREST)

Relations between each TOE security function and security functional requirement are described in Table 11.

Table 11: Relations between TOE Security Functions and Security Functional Requirements

| TOE security function / Security functional requirement | SF.OVERWRITE | SF.ENCRYPTION | SF.MANAGE | SF.CEREST |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FCS_CKM.1 | | O | | |
| FCS_COP.1 | | O | | |
| FDP_RIP.1 | O | | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 | | | O | |
| FIA_UID.2 | | | O | |
| FIA_UAU.2 | | | O | |
| FIA_UAU.7 | | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1(1) | | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(1) | | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(2) | | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(3) | | | | O |
| FMT_SMF.1 | | | O | |
| FMT_SMR.1 | | | O | |
| FPT_RVM.1 | O | O | O | |

O: Shows that it is the security function that satisfies the security functional requirement.

## 6.1.1. HDD Overwriting Function for Residual Data (SF.OVERWRITE)

According to the "setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data" that is set by key operator, this function overwrites and erases the used document data in the hard disk drive using the way described in Table 12.

List of the used document data that are to be overwritten and erased is on the hard disk drive. When the existence of the used document data is shown in this list at the time of booting the system, this function overwrites and erases the used document data.

This function is configured to certainly operate because it is realized by unique software that does not have bypass measures.

Table 12: Control of Overwriting

| Number of overwritings | Data to overwrite with |
|---|---|
| One time | 0 |
| Three times | First time: random number<br>Second time: random number<br>Third time: 0 |

### 6.1.2. HDD Data Encryption Function (SF.ENCRYPTION)

According to the "setting for HDD data encryption function" that is set by key operator, this function encrypts document data stored on the hard disk drive. At the time of booting, TOE generates 128-bit cryptographic key using the Fuji Xerox's unique FXOSENC method algorithm and "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" that is set by key operator. (When "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" is the same, the same cryptographic key is generated.)

When storing document data on the hard disk drive, TOE stores the document data after performing encryption using the cryptographic key generated at the time of booting. When reading the stored document data, TOE also performs decryption using the cryptographic key generated at the time of booting. The cryptographic key generated at the time of booting is stored on DRAM (volatile memory) on the controller board in ApeosPort/DocuCentre. Cryptographic key is lost when the power of the mainframe of ApeosPort/DocuCentre is shut down.

This function is configured to certainly operate because it is realized by unique software that does not have bypass measures.

This function also uses the encryption mechanism (encryption with Rijndael Algorithm) as a security mechanism.

### 6.1.3. Key-operator Authentication Function(SF.MANAGE)

This function controls the operation of TOE setting data so that the operation can be performed by the authenticated key-operator. Before allowing the operation of TOE setting data, this function identifies and authenticates key operator with "key-operator's user ID" and "key-operator's password" entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator's client. While "key-operator's password" is being entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator's client, asterisks ("*") of the same number as the characters of the entered password are displayed in the "password" input field of the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator's client.

When the "key-operator's user ID" and "key-operator's password" entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator's client are correct and the identification/authentication of

key operator succeeds, this function allows the operation of TOE setting data. When either of the "key-operator's user ID" or "key-operator's password" entered at the control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator's client is incorrect and the identification/authentication of key operator fails, this function displays identification/authentication error. When authentication fails the same number of times as that set in the "access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID," this function denies authentication. Only the key operator who is authenticated in the above-described way can set:

- "HDD overwriting function for residual data" to "Not perform," "Perform (one time)," or "Perform (three times)."
- "setting for using password" to "Not perform" or "Perform."
- "HDD data encryption function" to "Not perform" or "Perform."
- "key-operator's password" to 7 to 12 alphanumeric characters.
- "access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID" to "Not perform" or "Perform (1 to 10 times)."
- "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" to 12 alphanumeric characters.

This function is configured to certainly operate because it is realized by unique software that does not have bypass measures.

### 6.1.4. Customer-Engineer Operation Restriction Function (SF.CEREST)

This function controls the operation of the TOE setting data for "setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function" so that the operation can be performed by the authenticated key-operator.
Although "setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function" can be set to "Not perform" or "Perform," "Perform" must be set when using TOE. By setting to "Perform," customer engineer can be restricted from referring to / changing settings on TOE security functions. This function is configured to certainly operate because it is realized by unique software that does not have bypass measures.

### 6.1.5. Function that is Realized using Probabilistic or Permutational Mechanisms
Among the TOE security functions, the function that is realized using probabilistic or permutational mechanisms is the key-operator authentication function (SF.MANAGE). Strength level of this function is SOF-basic.

## 6.2. Assurance Measures
### 6.2.1. 750 I Series Configuration Management Description (AS.CONFIGURATION)
The following are described in the "750 I Series Configuration Management Description":
- Function and usage of configuration management system

- Naming rule for the unique identification of TOE

- Configuration items that are included in TOE

- Unique identifier of each configuration item

- How to track the changing history of TOE configuration items

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

   ACM_CAP.2

### 6.2.2. 750 I Series TOE Configuration List (AS.CONFIGURATIONLIST)

The following are described in the "750 I Series TOE Configuration List":

- TOE configuration items that correspond to the evidential materials

- Version for uniquely identifying TOE configuration items

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

   ACM_CAP.2

### 6.2.3. Delivery, Introduction, and Operation Procedure Description (AS.DELIVERY)

The following are described in the "Delivery, Introduction, and Operation Procedure Description":

- Procedure to identify TOE and maintain the integrity of TOE in transit

- All procedures that are applied from the creation environment to the delivery to user, for maintaining the security of TOE

- Method to check that TOE is correct when user receives it

- Notes on the security of introduction, installation, and booting, and method to check the correct introduction, installation, and booting

- Exceptional events and measures to deal with such events

- Minimum system requirement that is necessary for the safe introduction and installation

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

   ADO_DEL.1

   ADO_IGS.1

### 6.2.4. 750 I Series Functional Specification (AS.FUNCSPEC)

The following are described in the "750 I Series Functional Specification":

- All security functions of TOE, and its external interfaces (only when such interfaces exist)

- Purpose, function, and usage (including parameter, exceptional item, and error message) of the above-described external interfaces

- Complete description of TOE security functions

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

ADV_FSP.1

**6.2.5.** 750 I Series High-Level Design Specification (AS.HIGHLDESIGN)

The following are described in the "750 I Series High-level Design Specification":

- TOE security functions' configuration as seen from the subsystems

- Purpose and usage (including exceptional item and error message) of the interfaces among all
  the subsystems

- Identification of the subsystems that provide security functions and those that do not

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

ADV_HLD.1

**6.2.6.** 750 I Series Correspondence Analysis Description (AS.REPRESENT)

The following is described in the "750 I Series Correspondence Analysis Description":

- Analysis of the accurate and complete reflection of security functions in all the design phases

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

ADV_RCR.1

**6.2.7.** ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide (AS. GUIDANCE)

In the development of TOE, Fuji Xerox creates manuals ("ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide") and reviews the following in the development department, product evaluation department, and technical support department.

<Review contents>

- Checks the manual's description of the influence on the security, the policy for maintaining the
  security, the operation mode, and the contents of the following:

  · what to do after the occurrence of the trouble of the hardware or software related to TOE

  · what to do after the occurrence of misoperation

  · what to do at the time of initial setting

  · what to do at the recovery from the trouble

- Checks the unified terminology in all the manuals

- Checks the clarity, rationality, and consistency of the description in the manual

- Checks the consistency among the descriptions in TOE 750 I Series functional specification,

test specification, and manual

"ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide" are common to key operator and general user.
The following are described in these user guides.

<Description for key operator>
- Management functions that are used by key operator, and its interfaces
- How to manage TOE by ensuring the security
- Notes on the functions that should be managed in the environment where the security is ensured, and notes on authority
- Notes on all the security-related parameters under the management of key operator, and notes on the parameter values
- Types of all the security events that are related to management functions
- Assumptions about key-operator's responsibility and behavior
- Contents of warning messages to key operator, and clear indication of specific measures to be taken

<Description for general user>
- How to use the security functions that can be used by general user
- Functions that are used by general user, and its interfaces
- Notes on the functions that should be used in the environment where the security is ensured, and notes on authority
- Assumptions about general-user's responsibility and behavior
- Contents of the warning messages to general user, and clear indication of the specific measures to be taken
Corresponding security assurance requirement:
  ADO_DEL.1
  ADO_IGS.1
  AGD_ADM.1
  AGD_USR.1

**6.2.8.** 750 I Series Test Plan and Report (AS.TEST)

The following are described in the "Test Plan and Report":

- Overall plan in which the schedule, skills necessary for testers, and configuration of the system
  used for the test are described
- Test items
- Test coverage analysis that verifies that all the functions described in the "750 I Series Functional
  Specification" are tested with the test items
- Purpose of each test item
- How to conduct each test item
- Expected result of each test item
- Date of conducting each test item, and the name of the test conductor
- Result of each test item

Corresponding security assurance requirement:

    ATE_COV.1
    ATE_FUN.1
    ATE_IND.2

**6.2.9.** 750 I Series Vulnerability Analysis (AS.VULNERABILITY)

"750 I Series Vulnerability Analysis" is created to check and evaluate the security strength and vulnerability of TOE.

The following are described in the "750 I Series Vulnerability Analysis." This document verifies that the TOE's

security strength and identified vulnerability are not problematic in an assumed environment.

    <Security strength>
- Result of analyzing that the security strength of TOE security function is the same or more of the
  minimum strength specified in this ST and the same or more of the strength specified in each
  specification
- Result of checking that strength analysis is conducted to all the functions that use the techniques
  of probability theory, permutation, combination, and others
- Result of verifying the validity of the hypothesis of security strength analysis
    <Vulnerability>
- Confirmation of vulnerability analysis being conducted using the information on general security
  issues and all the materials provided for the evaluation
- Result of testing that all the identified vulnerability is not problematic in an assumed operation
  environment
- Result of checking that notes on vulnerability related to TOE configuration and settings for

functions' operation-conditions are described in the manual

Corresponding security assurance requirement:
AVA_SOF.1
AVA_VLA.1

# **7.** PP Claims

## **7.1.** PP Reference

There is no referred PP.

## **7.2.** PP Tailoring

There is no refinement to PP.

## **7.3.** PP Additions

There is no addition to PP.

# 8. Rationale

## 8.1. Security Objectives Rationale

Correspondences between security objectives and threats/assumptions are described in Table 13.

### (1) Necessity

Rationale for the necessity of security objectives is described below.

As described in Table 13, all the security objectives correspond to one or more threats/assumptions.

Table 13: Correspondences between Security Objectives and Threats/Assumptions

| Threat/assumption<br><br><br>Security objective | T.RECOVER | T.CONFDATA | A.SECMODE | A.NET | A.ADMIN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O.RESIDUAL | O | | | | |
| O.DECIPHER | O | | | | |
| O.MANAGE | | O | | | |
| OE.ADMIN | | | | | O |
| OE.AUTH | | | O | | |
| OE.FUNCON | O | | | | |
| OE.NET | | | | O | |

O: Shows that it is the threat or assumption that the security objective corresponds to.

### (2) Sufficiency

The following describes the rationales that show that the sufficient measures against all the threats to TOE and those for all the assumptions are taken.

As described in Table 13, one or more security objectives correspond to a threat. Threat can be countered when the corresponding security objective is satisfied.

As described in Table 13, one of the security objectives corresponds to an assumption. Assumption is assured when the corresponding security objective is satisfied.

Table 14 describes the rationales that show that the measures against threats to TOE and those for assumptions are taken by satisfying the security objectives.

Table 14: Sufficiency of Security Objectives

| Threat/<br>assumption | Security objective |
|---|---|
| **T.RECOVER** | To counter this threat, all of the following need to be satisfied:<br>- TOE security functions are enabled.<br>- TOE security functions are operated so that they are completely performed.<br>- Recovery of used document data stored on the hard disk drive is made impossible.<br><br>By satisfying the following objectives, **T.RECOVER** can be countered:<br>- **O.RESIDUAL** and **O.DECIPHER**<br>  By satisfying **O.RESIDUAL** and **O.DECIPHER**, TOE makes the recovery of used document data stored on the hard disk drive impossible. |

| | |
|---|---|
| | Print data is included in the used document data that is stored on the hard disk drive when using printer function. This print data is sometimes described in text format and is relatively easy to be parsed. Therefore, TOE makes the recovery of used document data stored on the hard disk drive impossible by encrypting the document data stored on the hard disk drive by satisfying **O.DECIPHER** and then overwriting and erasing the data by satisfying **O.RESIDUAL**.<br>- **OE.FUNCON**<br>  By satisfying **OE.FUNCON**, key operator operates TOE security functions ("HDD overwriting function for residual data" and "HDD data encryption function") in the condition where these functions are enabled and completely performed. |
| **T.CONFDATA** | To counter this threat, the person who changes TOE setting data needs to be limited to the authenticated key-operator.<br>By satisfying the following objective, **T.CONFDATA** can be countered:<br>- **O.MANAGE**<br>  By satisfying **O.MANAGE**, only the authenticated key-operator becomes able to change TOE setting data. |
| **A.SECMODE** | By satisfying the following objective, **A.SECMODE** can be realized:<br>- **OE.AUTH**<br>  By satisfying **OE.AUTH**, key operator operates TOE by:<br>  - managing "key-operator's password" so that it is prevented from being guessed or disclosed.<br>  - setting "key-operator's password" to 7 to 12 alphanumeric characters.<br>  - setting "access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID" to 5-time in the condition where "customer-engineer operation restriction function" and "setting for using password" are set to function. |
| **A.ADMIN** | By satisfying the following objective, **A.ADMIN** can be realized:<br>- **OE.ADMIN**<br>  By satisfying **OE.ADMIN**, organization person in charge selects suitable member for key operator and provides management and education. |
| **A.NET** | In this assumption, the conditions such as the following are assumed:<br>- Interceptions on the internal network that ApeosPort/DocuCentre is connected to are not made.<br>- Attacks by attackers from the external network are not made.<br><br>By satisfying the following objective, **A.NET** can be realized:<br>- **OE.NET**<br>  In **OE.NET**, the devices are installed to realize the environment where interceptions on the internal network are not made. In **OE.NET**, the proper environment-settings to avoid interception are assumed to be made by taking measures such as encryption of the communication between client PC and ApeosPort/DocuCentre. And in **OE.NET**, the devices to shut down the access from the external network to ApeosPort/DocuCentre are specified to be properly installed so that the external access is shut down. |

## 8.2. Security Requirements Rationale

### 8.2.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale

**(1) Necessity**

Relations between security functional requirements and security objectives are described in Table 15.

Each TOE security functional requirement corresponds to at least one security objective.

Incorrect subject does not exist in TOE.

Table 15: Correspondences between Security Functional Requirements and Security Objectives

| Security functional requirement \ Security objective | O.RESIDUAL | O.MANAGE | O.DECIPHER |
|---|---|---|---|
| FCS_CKM.1 | | | O |
| FCS_COP.1 | | | O |
| FDP_RIP.1 | O | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 | | O | |
| FIA_UID.2 | | O | |
| FIA_UAU.2 | | O | |
| FIA_UAU.7 | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (1) | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(1) | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(2) | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(3) | | O | |
| FMT_SMF.1 | | O | |
| FMT_SMR.1 | | O | |
| FPT_RVM.1 | O | O | O |

O: Functional requirement for TOE

**(2) Sufficiency**

Table 16 describes that the functional requirements assures all the security objectives for TOE.

Table 16: Sufficiency of Objectives

| Security objective | Functional requirement | Sufficiency |
|---|---|---|
| **O.RESIDUAL** | **FDP_RIP.1** **FPT_RVM.1** | By the following security functional requirements, the security objective **O.RESIDUAL** in which TOE makes the recovery of used document data stored on the hard disk drive impossible can be realized by overwriting: - **FDP_RIP.1** By **FDP_RIP.1**, the previous information of the used document data file stored on the hard disk drive is made unavailable. - **FPT_RVM.1** By **FPT_RVM.1**, TOE security functions are certainly invoked and not bypassed. |
| **O.DECIPHER** | **FCS_CKM.1** **FCS_COP.1** | By the following security functional requirements, the security objective **O.DECIPHER** in which TOE makes the parsing of used |

| | FPT_RVM.1 | document data stored on the hard disk drive difficult can be realized by encryption:<br>- **FCS_CKM.1**<br>　By **FCS_CKM.1**, the cryptographic key of the specified cryptographic key size is generated.<br>- **FCS_COP.1**<br>　By **FCS_COP.1**, the document data stored on the hard disk drive is encrypted and then decrypted when the data is read, in accordance with the determined cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size.<br>- **FPT_RVM.1**<br>　By **FPT_RVM.1**, TOE security functions are certainly invoked and not bypassed. |
|---|---|---|
| **O.MANAGE** | **FIA_AFL.1**<br>**FIA_UID.2**<br>**FIA_UAU.2**<br>**FIA_UAU.7**<br>**FMT_MOF.1 (1)**<br>**FMT_MOF.1 (2)**<br>**FMT_MOF.1 (3)**<br>**FMT_MTD.1(1 )**<br>**FMT_MTD.1(2 )**<br>**FMT_MTD.1(3 )**<br>**FMT_SMF.1**<br>**FMT_SMR.1**<br>**FPT_RVM.1** | By the following security functional requirements, **O.MANAGE** can be realized:<br>- **FIA_AFL.1**<br>　By **FIA_AFL.1**, successive attacks are prevented because the power needs to be cycled when key operator fails in authentication the set number of times.<br>- **FIA_UID.2** and **FIA_UAU.2**<br>　By **FIA_UID.2** and **FIA_UAU.2**, identification and authentication are performed before the operation from the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator's client when key-operator's identification and authentication is needed for the operation.<br>- **FIA_UAU.7**<br>　By **FIA_UAU.7**, illicit leakage of the authentication information is prevented because the authentication feedback is protected.<br>- **FMT_MTD.1(1)**, **FMT_MTD.1(2)**, **FMT_MTD.1(3)**, **and FMT_MOF.1 (1)**<br>　"HDD overwriting function for residual data" can be set only by key operator because:<br>　　- by **FMT_MTD.1(1)**, **FMT_MTD.1(2)**, and **FMT_MTD.1(3)**, the person who queries and modifies the setting values of the TOE setting data for "setting for using password," "access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID," "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive," and "setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function" is limited only to the key operator.<br>　　- by **FMT_MOF.1 (1)**, the person who makes settings for the number of overwritings and erasings of / disables the function of / enables the function of the TOE security function "HDD overwriting function for residual data" is limited to key operator.<br>- **FMT_MOF.1 (2)**<br>　By **FMT_MOF.1 (2)**, "HDD data encryption function" can be set only by key operator because the person who disables and enables the TOE security function "HDD data encryption function" is limited to key operator.<br>- **FMT_MOF.1 (3)**<br>　By **FMT_MOF.1 (3)**, password use of the "key-operator authentication function" can be set only by key operator because the person who makes the setting for using password of the TOE security function "key-operator authentication function" is limited to key operator.<br>- **FMT_SMR.1**<br>　By **FMT_SMR.1**, the role related to the security is limited to key operator by maintaining the role of key operator as a user who has special authority.<br>- **FMT_SMF.1**<br>　By **FMT_SMF.1**, security management functions to manage key-operator's password are provided.<br>- **FPT_RVM.1**<br>　By **FPT_RVM.1**, TOE security functions are certainly invoked and not bypassed. |

## (3) Validity of Security Function Strength Level

Attack capability of the attackers assumed for this TOE is low level. Therefore, "SOF-basic" being the minimum function strength level is appropriate. The security function strength necessary for TOE is satisfied because all the probabilistic and permutational mechanisms in FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.2 are SOF-basic.

**(4) Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements**

Functional requirements that are depended on by security functional requirements and those that are not are described in Table 17.

Table 17: Dependencies of Functional Requirements

| Component | Component that is depended on | Component that is not depended on |
|---|---|---|
| FCS_CKM.1 | FCS_COP.1 | FCS_CKM.4<br>  Cryptographic key is generated when booting ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). Cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the power of the mainframe of ApeosPort/DocuCentre is shut down. Therefore, the dependency on FCS_CKM.4 does not need to be satisfied.<br>FMT_MSA.2<br>  TOE automatically generates the cryptographic key of the fixed 128-bit size from the TOE setting data for "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" that is set by key operator.<br>  It is not necessary to assure that only the secure value is accepted because the size of this cryptographic key that is automatically generated by TOE is fixed to 128-bit. TOE always uses the automatically-generated cryptographic key, and the security attribute other than the key size does not exist.<br>  Therefore, the dependency on FMT_MSA.2 does not need to be satisfied. |
| FCS_COP.1 | FCS_CKM.1 | FCS_CKM.4<br>  Cryptographic key is generated when booting ApeosPort/DocuCentre, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). Cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the power of the mainframe of ApeosPort/DocuCentre is shut down. Therefore, the dependency on FCS_CKM.4 does not need to be satisfied.<br>FMT_MSA.2<br>  TOE automatically generates the cryptographic key of the fixed 128-bit size from the TOE setting data for "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" that is set by key operator.<br>  It is not necessary to assure that only the secure value is accepted because the size of this cryptographic key that is automatically generated by TOE is fixed to 128-bit. TOE always uses the automatically-generated cryptographic key, and the security attribute other than the key size does not exist.<br>  Therefore, the dependency on FMT_MSA.2 does not need to be satisfied. |
| FDP_RIP.1 | None | None |
| FIA_AFL.1 | FIA_UAU.2 | FIA_UAU.1<br>  The dependency on FIA_ UAU.1 is satisfied because FIA_UAU.2 is the security functional requirement that is an upper hierarchy of FIA_ UAU.1. |
| FIA_UID2 | None | None |
| FIA_UAU.2 | FIA_UID.2 | FIA_UID.1<br>  The dependency on FIA_UID.1 is satisfied because FIA_UID.2 is the security functional requirement that is an |

| | | upper hierarchy of FIA_UID.1. |
|---|---|---|
| FIA_UAU.7 | FIA_UID.2 | FIA_UID.1<br>The dependency on FIA_UID.1 is satisfied because FIA_UID.2 is the security functional requirement that is an upper hierarchy of FIA_UID.1. |
| FMT_MOF.1 (1) | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | None |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | None |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | None |
| FMT_MTD.1(1) | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | None |
| FMT_MTD.1(2) | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | None |
| FMT_MTD.1(3) | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | None |
| FMT_SMF.1 | None | None |
| FMT_SMR.1 | FIA_UID.2 | FIA_UID.1<br>The dependency on FIA_UID.1 is satisfied because FIA_UID.2 is the security functional requirement that is an upper hierarchy of FIA_UID.1. |
| FPT_RVM.1 | None | None |

## (5) Interactions among Security Functional Requirements

Interactions among security functional requirements are verified in Table 18.

Table 18: Interactions among Security Functional Requirements

| Security functional requirement | Circumvention | Deactivation |
|---|---|---|
| FCS_CKM.1 | FPT_RVM.1 | FMT_MOF.1 (2) |
| FCS_COP.1 | FPT_RVM.1 | FMT_MOF.1 (2) |
| FDP_RIP.1 | FPT_RVM.1 | FMT_MOF.1 (1) |
| FIA_AFL.1 | FPT_RVM.1 | N/A |
| FIA_UID.2 | FPT_RVM.1 | N/A |
| FIA_UAU.2 | FPT_RVM.1 | FMT_MOF.1 (3) |
| FIA_UAU.7 | FPT_RVM.1 | N/A |
| FMT_MOF.1 (1) | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_MTD.1(1) | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_MTD.1(2) | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_MTD.1(3) | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_SMF.1 | N/A | N/A |
| FMT_SMR.1 | N/A | N/A |
| FPT_RVM.1 | N/A | N/A |

N/A: There is no security functional requirement that performs mutual support.

Circumvention

FPT_RVM.1

The TOE security functions (FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1) are configured by unique software that does not have bypass measures, and cannot be replaced with other modules. The functions are also configured to be always performed. Therefore, cryptographic-key generation and cryptographic operation cannot be circumvented, and non-bypassability is ensured.

The TOE security function (FDP_RIP.1) is configured by unique software and cannot be

replaced with another module. It is configured so that, when overwriting and erasing is interrupted such as by power shutdown, re-overwriting and re-erasing is performed at the next power-on. Therefore, non-bypassability is ensured.

The TOE security function (FIA_AFL.1) is configured by unique software that does not have bypass measures, and cannot be replaced with another module. The function to cancel authentication-denial status does not exist. Therefore, non-bypassability is ensured.

The TOE security functions (FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, and FIA_UAU.7) are configured by unique software that does not have bypass measures, and cannot be replaced with other modules. Also, function of identification and authentication is always performed when TOE setting data is accessed. Therefore, "user identification before any action," "user authentication before any action," and "protected authentication-feedback" cannot be circumvented, and non-bypassability is ensured.

Deactivation

FMT_MOF.1 (1)

FMT_MOF.1 (1) assures the protection of the HDD overwriting function for residual data (FDP_RIP.1) from being deactivated by a user other than key operator.

FMT_MOF.1 (2)

FMT_MOF.1 (2) assures the protection of the HDD data encryption function (FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1) from being deactivated by a user other than key operator.

FMT_MOF.1 (3)

FMT_MOF.1 (3) assures the protection of the key-operator authentication function (FIA_UAU.2) from being deactivated by a user other than key operator.

### 8.2.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

Attacker has low-level attack capability and attacks using TOE's external interfaces such as control panel or Web browser of key-operator's client. Therefore, evaluation assurance level EAL2 is appropriate because TOE needs to counter low-level attack by an attacker.

### 8.3. TOE Summary Specification Rationale

#### 8.3.1. Function Summary Specification Rationale

**(1) Necessity**

Correspondences between security functional requirements and TOE security functions are described in Table 19.

TOE security functions correspond to security functional requirements.

All TOE security functions are necessary to realize the security functional requirements.

Table 19: Correspondences between Security Functional Requirements and TOE Security Functions

| TOE security function / Security functional requirement | SF.OVERWRITE | SF.ENCRYPTION | SF.MANAGE | SF.CEREST |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FCS_CKM.1 | | O | | |
| FCS_COP.1 | | O | | |
| FDP_RIP.1 | O | | | |
| FIA_AFL.1 | | | O | |
| FIA_UID.2 | | | O | |
| FIA_UAU.2 | | | O | |
| FIA_UAU.7 | | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (1) | | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | | | O | |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(1) | | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(2) | | | O | |
| FMT_MTD.1(3) | | | | O |
| FMT_SMF.1 | | | O | |
| FMT_SMR.1 | | | O | |
| FPT_RVM.1 | O | O | O | |

O: Shows that it is the security function that satisfies the security functional requirement.

**(2) Sufficiency**

Table 20 describes that TOE security functions sufficiently realize TOE security functional requirements.

Table 20: Sufficiency of Security Functional Requirements

| Functional requirement | Security function |
|---|---|
| **FCS_CKM.1** | By the following security function, **FCS_CKM.1**, the cryptographic-key generation, can be assured:<br>- **SF.ENCRYPTION**<br> By **SF.ENCRYPTION** , TOE generates 128-bit cryptographic key using the Fuji Xerox's unique FXOSENC method algorithm and "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" set by key operator, at the time of booting. Fuji Xerox's unique FXOSENC method algorithm is a secure algorithm that has sufficient complexity. |

| FCS_COP.1 | By the following security function, **FCS_COP.1**, the cryptographic operation, can be assured:<br>- **SF.ENCRYPTION**<br>　By **SF.ENCRYPTION**, TOE encrypts document data stored on the hard disk drive using the automatically-generated cryptographic key. |
|---|---|
| FDP_RIP.1 | By the following security function, **FDP_RIP.1**, the subset residual information protection, can be assured:<br>- **SF.OVERWRITE**<br>　By **SF.OVERWRITE**, TOE overwrites and erases used document data file stored on the hard disk drive.<br>　In **SF.OVERWRITE**, one-time overwriting (overwriting with "0") or three-time overwritings (overwriting with random number, again with random number, and then with "0") can be selected as the control of overwriting and erasing so that process efficiency or security strength can be prioritized depending on the usage environment of the multifunction machine.<br>　When process efficiency is prioritized, the number of overwritings and erasings is "one." One-time overwriting and erasing is appropriate because it has less effect of lowering process speed and can counter the low-level attack to recover data.<br>　When security strength is prioritized, the number of overwiritngs and erasings is "three." Three-time overwritings and erasings are appropriate because it is more robust (recommended number of overwritings and erasings) and can sufficiently counter the low-level attack to recover data, although process speed is lower than one-time overwriting and erasing. |
| FIA_AFL.1 | By the following security function, **FIA_AFL.1**, the handling in failure of authentication, can be assured:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>　By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE denies authentication when key operator fails in authentication the set number of times. |
| FIA_UID.2 | By the following security function, **FIA_UID.2**, the user identification before any action, can be assured:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>　By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE requests key operator to enter the user ID before allowing key-operator's operations from the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator's client, and verifies that the entered key-operator's name matches the key-operator's user ID registered on TOE. This identification and the authentication (FIA_UAU.2) are simultaneously performed and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed. |
| FIA_UAU.2 | By the following security function, **FIA_UAU.2**, the user authentication before any action, can be assured:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>　By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE requests key operator to enter the password before allowing key-operator's operations from the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator's client, and verifies that the entered password matches the key-operator's password registered on TOE. This authentication and the identification (FIA_UID.2) are simultaneously performed and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed. |
| FIA_UAU.7 | By the following security function, **FIA_UAU.7**, the protected authentication-feedback, can be assured:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>　By **SF. MANAGE**, asterisks ('*') of the same number as the characters entered as key-operator's password are displayed by TOE on the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator's client at the time of key-operator's authentication. |
| FMT_MOF.1 (1) | By the following security function, **FMT_MOF.1 (1)**, the security-function behavior management (1), can be assured because the person who changes the TOE setting data for "HDD overwriting function for residual data" is limited to key operator:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>　By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE allows the authenticated key-operator to change the TOE setting data for "HDD overwriting function for residual data." |
| FMT_MOF.1 (2) | By the following security function, **FMT_MOF.1 (2)**, the security-function behavior management (2), can be assured because the person who changes the TOE setting data for "HDD data encryption function" is limited to key operator:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>　By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE allows the authenticated key-operator to change the TOE setting data for "HDD data encryption function." |
| FMT_MOF.1 (3) | By the following security function, **FMT_MOF.1 (3)**, the security-function behavior management (3), can be assured because the person who changes the security function "key-operator authentication function" is limited to key operator: |

| | |
|---|---|
| | - **SF. MANAGE**<br>  By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE allows the authenticated key-operator to<br>  define and change the key-operator's password related to the determination of the<br>  behavior of the TOE security function "key-operator authentication function." |
| **FMT_MTD.1(1)** | By the following security function, **FMT_MTD.1(1)**, the TSF data management, can be assured because the person who changes the TOE setting data for "setting for using password" and "access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID" is limited to key operator:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>  By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE allows the authenticated key-operator to change the TOE setting data for "setting for using password" and "access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator's ID." |
| **FMT_MTD.1(2)** | By the following security function, **FMT_MTD.1(2)**, the TSF data management, can be assured because the person who changes the TOE setting data for "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive" is limited to key operator:<br>- **SF. MANAGE**<br>  By **SF. MANAGE**, TOE allows the authenticated key-operator to change the TOE setting data for "cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive." |
| **FMT_MTD.1(3)** | By the following security function, **FMT_MTD.1(3)**, the TSF data management, can be assured because the person who changes the TOE setting data for "setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function" is limited to key operator:<br>- **SF. CEREST**<br>  By **SF. CEREST**, TOE restricts customer engineer from changing the TOE setting data for "setting for customer-engineer operation restriction function." |
| **FMT_SMF.1** | - **MANAGE**<br>  By **MANAGE**, TOE allows the authenticated key-operator to change TOE setting data. |
| **FMT_SMR.1** | By the following security function, **FMT_SMR.1**, the security management roles, can be assured:<br>- **SF.MANAGE**<br>  By **SF.MANAGE**, the role of key operator is maintained and user is associated with roles. |
| **FPT_RVM.1** | By the following security functions, **FPT_RVM.1**, the non-bypassability of TSP, can be assured:<br>- **SF.ENCRYPTION**, **SF.OVERWRITE**, **SF.MANAGE**, and **SF.CEREST**<br>  **SF.ENCRYPTION**, **SF.OVERWRITE**, **SF.MANAGE**, and **SF.CEREST** are configured to certainly operate because they are configured by unique software that does not have bypass measures. |

**(3) Security Function Strength**

Among TOE security functions, the function that is realized using probabilistic or permutational mechanisms is the key-operator authentication function (SF.MANAGE). Its function strength is SOF-basic. This satisfies the minimum function strength level SOF-basic that is claimed in "5.4. Claim of TOE Security Function Strength."

**8.3.2.** Assurance Measures Rationale

Rationales for the necessity and sufficiency of assurance measures are described below.

**(1) Necessity**

The following describes that all the assurance measures described in 6.2. are necessary to realize the security assurance requirements.

All assurance measures are necessary to realize EAL2 security assurance requirements.

Table 21: Correspondences between Assurance Measures and Security Assurance Requirements

| | AS.CONFIGURATION | AS.CONFIGURATIONLIST | AS.DELIVERY | AS.FUNCSPEC | AS.HIGHLDESIGN | AS.REPRESENT | AS.GUIDANCE | AS.TEST | AS.VULNERABILITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACM_CAP.2 | O | O | | | | | | | |
| ADO_DEL.1 | | | O | | | | O | | |
| ADO_IGS.1 | | | O | | | | O | | |
| ADV_FSP.1 | | | | O | | | | | |
| ADV_HLD.1 | | | | | O | | | | |
| ADV_RCR.1 | | | | | | O | | | |
| AGD_ADM.1 | | | | | | | O | | |
| AGD_USR.1 | | | | | | | O | | |
| ATE_COV.1 | | | | | | | | O | |
| ATE_FUN.1 | | | | | | | | O | |
| ATE_IND.2 | | | | | | | | O | |
| AVA_SOF.1 | | | | | | | | | O |
| AVA_VLA.1 | | | | | | | | | O |

O: Shows that it is the assurance measure that satisfies the security assurance requirement.

**(2) Sufficiency**

Assurance measures that correspond to each security assurance requirement and the sufficiency of the measures to satisfy the requirement are described below.

**1. ACM_CAP.2    Configuration items**

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following documents are provided. By these documents, the requirements such as naming rule for identifying TOE version, list of configuration items, and unique identifier of each configuration item can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Configuration Management Description" (AS. CONFIGURATION)
- "750 I Series TOE Configuration List" (AS. CONFIGURATIONLIST)

**2. ADO_DEL.1    Delivery Procedures**

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following documents are provided. By these documents, the requirements such as TOE identification and maintenance of the integrity of TOE in transit, details of delivery procedures, and key-operator's TOE checking method can be satisfied:

- "Overseas model Delivery, Introduction, and Operation Procedure Description" (AS. DELIVERY)
- "ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide" (AS. GUIDANCE)

### 3. ADO_IGS.1　Installation, Generation, and Start-up Procedures

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following documents are provided. By these documents, the requirements such as procedure / checking method for TOE installation/activation and how to deal with exceptional event can be satisfied:

- "Overseas model Delivery, Introduction, and Operation Procedure Description" (AS. DELIVERY)
- "ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide" (AS. GUIDANCE)

### 4. ADV_FSP.1　Informal Functional Specification

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirements such as consistent/complete description of TOE security functions and its external interfaces and detail description of external interfaces can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Functional Specification" (AS.FUNCSPEC)

### 5. ADV_HLD.1　Descriptive high-level design

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirements such as consistent description of TOE security functions' configuration, identification/description of interfaces among subsystems, and identification of subsystems that provide security functions can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series High-level Design Specification" (AS.HIGHLDESIGN)

### 6. ADV_RCR.1　Informal Correspondence Demonstration

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirements such as TOE security functions' complete correspondence in each level (TOE summary specification, functional specification, and configuration design specification that are described in this ST) can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Correspondence Analysis Description" (AS.REPRESENT)

### 7. AGD_ADM.1　Administrator Guidance

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following documents are provided. By these documents, the requirements such as description of management functions / interfaces that can be used by key operator, assumption about key-operator's responsibility and behavior, and measures to deal with warning messages can be satisfied:

- "ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security

Kit Supplementary Guide" (AS. GUIDANCE)

## 8. AGD_USR.1　User Guidance

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following documents are provided. By these documents, the requirements such as description of security functions / interfaces that can be used by general user, assumption about general-user's responsibility and behavior, and measures to deal with warning messages can be satisfied:

- "ApeosPort C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I, ApeosPort 750 I/650 I, ApeosPort 550 I/450 I/350 I, DocuCentre C7550 I/C6550 I/C5540 I/, DocuCentre 750 I/650 I, DocuCentre 550 I/450 I Security Kit Supplementary Guide" (AS. GUIDANCE)

## 9. ATE_COV.1　Evidence of coverage

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirement of sufficiency/integrity of TOE security function test can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Test Plan and Report" (AS.TEST)

## 10. ATE_FUN.1　Functional testing

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirement that TOE security functions are certainly tested can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Test Plan and Report" (AS.TEST)

## 11. ATE_IND.2　Independent Testing -Sample-

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirements of recreation of the environment for testing TOE security functions and provision of test materials can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Test Plan and Report" (AS.TEST)

## 12. AVA_SOF.1　Strength of TOE security function evaluation

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirement of sufficiency of TOE security strength can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Vulnerability Analysis" (AS.VULNERABILITY)

## 13. AVA_VLA.1　Developer Vulnerability Analysis

[Corresponding assurance measure]

The following document is provided. By this document, the requirement for checking that the

identified vulnerability of TOE is not illicitly used in an assumed environment can be satisfied:

- "750 I Series Vulnerability Analysis" (AS.VULNERABILITY)

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## 8.4. PP Claims Rationale

There is no applicable PP.