

DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 328X
Security Target v1.0C

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DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 328X

Security Target

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Chapter 1 – ST Introduction

1.1 ST Reference

Title: DigiSAFE Data Diode model 328X Security Target

ST Version: 1.0C

ST Date: 7 Jul 2018

Author: Wu YongCong

1.2 TOE Reference

The TOE is uniquely identified as DigiSAFE Data Diode model 3282 version 2.2, model 3283 version 2.2, and model 3284 version 2.2.

Version number is based on the following format: Version <X>.<Y>

- <X> represents the OS version running on the TOE
- <Y> represents the software application version running on the TOE.

This TOE consists of 3 different hardware model. They are using the same OS and software.

1.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a network gateway that ensures physical layer one-way data transmission through the TOE.

The TOE is used to connect two independent networks together, denoted as the Sending Network and Receiving Network. Sending Network connects to TOE via InterfaceLAN (Sender) interface while Receiving Network connects to TOE via the InterfaceLAN (Receiver) interface. Figure 1 illustrates the network configuration which is also the evaluated TOE configuration.





Figure 1: TOE network configuration

The TOE ensures data can only flow from the Sending Network to the Receiving Network but not in the reverse direction. The TOE block diagram is illustrated in Figure 2.



*Power Supply (Sender) module supplies power to all modules in the Sender Motherboard. Similarly, Power Supply (Receiver) module supplies power to all modules in the Receiver Motherboard. The connections between the Power supply modules and their corresponding modules are omitted in the diagram to keep the diagram readable.

Figure 2: TOE Block Diagram


The TOE consists of two subsystems i.e. Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard. These two subsystems are physically separated from each other and are powered by independent power supplies. The one-way data transmission property is achieved by the pair of customized SFP+ (see Figure 2) that are implemented on the Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard respectively. The SFP+ (Sender) on the Sender Motherboard consists of only an optical transmitter and does not have any external interface to receive optical signals while the SFP+ (Receiver) on the Receiver Motherboard consists of only an optical sensor and does not have optical transmitter; data can only be optically transmitted from SFP+ (Sender) to the SFP+ (Receiver) by virtue of the physical implementation.

Do note that the Port Management and File System modules in both Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard are SFR-non-interfering modules though they are considered part of the TOE.

The physical layer one-way data transmission property of the TOE can address two security problems:

- It prevents information leak from Receiving Network to Sending Network.
- It prevents the integrity of the data residing in the Sending Network from being compromised by processes running in the Receiving Network.

The TOE consists of three model i.e. 3282, 3283 and 3284 that implements the same design and one-way data transmission property as illustrated in Figure 2. The differences between the models are further described in Table 1 below.

Model Number	Picture of TOE	Description
3282		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consists of one physical unit • The pair of customized SFP+ are contained within the TOE <p>Non-TOE external interfaces</p> <p>Sender Motherboard</p>



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 x SFP port <p>Receiver Motherboard</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 x SFP port
3283		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consists of one physical unit The pair of customized SFP+ are exposed external interfaces <p>Non-TOE external interfaces</p> <p>Sender Motherboard</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 x VGA ports 2 x USB ports 2 x RJ45 ports <p>Receiver Motherboard</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 x VGA ports 2 x USB ports 2 x RJ45 ports
3284		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consists of two physical unit. Each unit contains the Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard respectively The pair of customized SFP+ are exposed as external interfaces. <p>Non-TOE external interfaces</p> <p>Sender Motherboard</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 x Console port 1 x USB 8 x Switch ports <p>Receiver Motherboard</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 x Console port 1x USB 8 x Switch ports

Table 1: Differences between TOE models

1.3.1 TOE Type

The TOE is physical layer unidirectional network gateway.

1.4 TOE Description

1.4.1 Physical Scope

1.4.1.1 TOE Hardware, and Software

Hardware

As illustrated in Figure 2, the TOE consists of two subsystems i.e. Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard. These two motherboards are physically separate from each other and are connected to each other only via the pair of customised SFP+. The following provides a brief description of the motherboards and customized SFP+.

- **Sender Motherboard;**
This motherboard connects to Sending Network. It only connects to Receiver Motherboard via the pair of customized SFP+.
- **Receiver Motherboard;**
This motherboard will be connected to Receiving Network. It only connect to Sender motherboard via the pair of customized SFP+.
- **SFP+ (Sender)**
This is a module that is part of the Sender Motherboard. It consists of an optical transmitter but does not contain any external interface to receive optical signals; it is unable to receive optical signals from external.
- **SFP+ (Reciever)**
This is a module that is part of the Receiver Motherboard. It only consists of an optical sensor but not an optical transmitter; it is unable to transmit optical signals.
- **Power Supply (Sender) and Power Supply (Receiver)**
Both module are independent power supplies that supply power to the respective Sender Motheboard and Recevier Motherboard.

Software

Both the Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard operates on Linux operating system (OS). The following describes the software modules runs on the respective Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard.

- **Sender Motherboard**
 - Sender Service
 - Receives data from Sending Network via standard networking protocol, such as TCP, UDP, SYSLOG.
 - Data Diode Client
 - Converts the standard protocol to the proprietary protocol
 - Sends the data to SFP+ (Sender) module.
 - Port Management
 - Provides the Management Portal interface for users to configure the expected networking protocol on the InterfaceLAN (Sender).

- File System:
 - Stores the required configuration and log files that is read and generated by the Sender Service module.
- **Receiver Motherboard**
 - Data Diode Server
 - Receives data from SFP+ (Receiver) module.
 - Converts the proprietary protocol to standard networking protocol
 - Receiver Service
 - Sends the data to Receiving Networking using standard networking protocol
 - Port Management
 - Provides the Management Portal interface for users to configure the expected networking protocol on the InterfaceLAN (Receiver).
 - File System:
 - Stores the required configuration and log files that is read and generated by the Receiver Service module.

All of the software in Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard are not able to compromise the physical layer one-way data transmission (Layer 1), as the software resides in Layer 2 and above of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.

Operating System

- Sender Motherboard OS: Linux
- Receiver Motherboard OS: Linux

1.4.1.2 Delivery method of TOE and its user guidance

The TOE is delivered to the customer's address by the company staff for local delivery or trusted courier services for overseas delivery.

The user guides are available in the following documents in PDF format. The user guides are delivered to the users via email:

- DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 3282 version 2.2 Setup Guide v2.3
- DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 3283 version 2.2 Setup Guide v2.3
- DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 3284 version 2.2 Setup Guide v2.3
- DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 328X Acceptance Test v2.0
- DigiSAFE Data Diode Model 328X Management Portal User Guide v2.2

1.4.2 Logical Scope of the TOE

The TOE allows data to flow from the Sending Network to the Receiving Network but does not allow data to flow in the reverse direction by virtue of the physical implementation of customized SFP+ pair on the respective Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard; SFP+ (Sender) does not have external interface to receive optical signal while SFP+ (Receiver) does not have an optical transmitter, therefore, it is physically not possible for data to flow from the Receiving Network to the Sending Network via the TOE.




Figure 3: TOE Data Flow

The following sequence describes the data flow through the TOE:

1. The Sender Motherboard receives data from the Sending Network via the InterfaceLAN (Sender).
2. The Sender Motherboard then converts the data packets from a standard networking protocol to a proprietary one. The converted data packets are then forwarded to the Receiver Motherboard via the customized SFP+ pair.
3. The Receiver Motherboard receives proprietary data packets from the Sender Motherboard and converts them to standard networking protocol. The converted data packets are then forwarded to the Receiving Network via InterfaceLAN (Receiver).

Chapter 2 – Conformance Claims

2.1 Conformance Claims

The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. The TOE and ST are CC Part 2 conformant and CC Part 3 conformant.

The ST is package conformant to the CC EAL2 assurance package.

2.2 Conformance Rationale

None.

Chapter 3 – Security Problem Definition

This TOE addresses the data leakage from Receiving Network to Sending Network.

3.1 Threats

This section describes the threats that are addressed by the TOE:

T.RCVDATALEAK: A user or process on the Receiving Network that accidentally or deliberately breaches the confidentiality of data by transmitting data through TOE to the Sending Network.

3.2 Organizational Security Policies

There are no Organizational Security Policies with which the TOE must comply.

3.3 Assumptions

The assumptions made about the TOE's intended environment are:

A.PHYSICAL: The TOE shall be installed and operated in an environment which prevents unauthorized physical access.

A.USER: The users are trusted; the users shall not maliciously compromise the security functionality of the TOE. The users are well-trained; the user shall comply to the operating procedures stipulated in the user guidance.

A.NETWORK: The information flow between Sending Network and Receiving Network must pass through the TOE and there will be no other network connection between Sending Network and Receiving Network.

Chapter 4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

O.ONEWAY: The TOE shall allow the data to flow from the Sending Network to the Receiving Network but not in the reverse direction i.e. Receiving Network to the Sending Network.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following security objectives are required to assist the TOE in correctly providing its one-way data transmission security function. These objectives are satisfied through application of procedural or administrative measures.

OE.PHYSICAL: The TOE shall be installed and operated in a physically secure environment which prevents unauthorized physical access.

OE.USER: The users are trusted; the users shall not maliciously compromise the security functionality of the TOE. The users are well-trained; the user shall comply to the operating procedures stipulated in the user guidance.

OE.NETWORK: The information flow between Sending Network and Receiving Network shall pass through the TOE and there shall not be any other network connectivity between Sending Network and Receiving Network.

Application Notes: It is recommended to use independent power supplies and network infrastructure for the Sending Network and Receiving Network

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

Table 2 maps security objectives to threats and assumptions described in Chapter 3. The table illustrates that each threat is countered by at least one security objective, that each assumption is upheld by at least one security objective, and that each objective counters at least one threat or upholds at least one assumption.

This is then followed by explanatory text providing justification for each defined threat that if all security objectives that trace back to the threat are achieved, the threat is removed, sufficiently diminished, or that the effects of the threat are sufficiently mitigated. In addition, each defined assumption is shown to be upheld if all security objectives for the operational environment that trace back to the assumption are achieved.

Threats and Assumptions \ Security objectives	T.RCVDATALEAK	A.PHYSICAL	A.USER	A.NETWORK
O. ONEWAY	√			
OE.PHYSICAL	√	√		
OE.USER	√		√	
OE.NETWORK	√			√

4.3.1 T.RCVDATALEAK

T.RCVDATALEAK: A user or process on the Receiving Network that accidentally or deliberately breaches the confidentiality of data by transmitting data through TOE to the Sending Network.

O.ONEWAY ensures that data is only allowed to flow from the Sending Network to the Receiving Network but not in the reverse direction

OE.PHYSICAL ensures that the TOE is deployed in a physically secure environment i.e. only authorized users are permitted physical access to the TOE. This prevents the implementation and the configuration of the TOE from being tampered, thus bypassing or modifying the one-way data transmission SFP

OE.USER ensures that users are trusted; users will not maliciously bypass or tamper the security functionality of the TOE. It also ensures that the user are well-trained; users will not unknowingly misconfigure the TOE which may lead to compromising the TOE security functionality.

OE.NETWORK ensure that all network connections between the Sending Network and Receiving Network passes through the TOE so that the one-way data transmission SFP is preserved.

4.3.2 A.PHYSICAL

A.PHYSICAL: The TOE will be installed and operated in environment which prevents unauthorized physical access.

OE.PHYSICAL directly upholds A.PHYSICAL.

4.3.3 A.USER

A.USER: The users are trusted; the users shall not maliciously compromise the security functionality of the TOE. The user is well-trained; the user shall comply to the operating procedures stipulated in the user guidance

OE.USER directly upholds A.USER.

4.3.4 A.NETWORK

A.NETWORK: The information flow between Sending Network and Receiving Network must pass through the TOE and there will be no other network connection between Sending Network and Receiving Network.

OE.NETWORK directly upholds A.NETWORK

Chapter 5 Security Requirement

5.1 Security Functional Requirements

The TOE uses two subjects: Sending Network and Receiving Network. These subjects are connected to the TOE via InterfaceLAN (Sender) and InterfaceLAN (Receiver) respectively. These subjects have no attributes.

This statement of SFRs does not define other subjects, objects, operations, security attributes or external entities.

5.1.1 Complete Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC.2)

FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control

Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the **one-way data transmission in physical layer SFP on any information from Sending Network to Receiving Network through the TOE** and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

FDP_IFC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

5.1.2 Simple Security Attributes (FDP_IFF.1)

FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation¹

FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **one-way data transmission in physical layer SFP** based on the following types of subject and information security attributes:

Subject: Sending Network , Receiving Network.

Information security attribute: Subject Identity²

FDP-IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:

¹ FMT_MSA.3 is not applicable as there is no security attributes to initialise

² The subject identity is defined as the Sending Network and Receiving Network

- a) **The TSF shall allow the data from Sending Network to flow to the Receiving Network.**
- b) **The TSF shall deny data from the Receiving Network to flow to Sending Network.**

FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the **None**

FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: **None**.

FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: **None**

5.1.3 Extended Components Definition

There are no extended components defined in this ST.

5.1.4 Security Requirement Rationale

5.1.4.1 Tracing between SFRs and the security objectives for the TOE

The following table provides a mapping between security requirements and security objectives of TOE.

Security Objectives	O.ONEWAY
SFR	
FDP_IFC.2	√
FDP_IFF.1	√

Table 3 Tracing of SFRs to Security Objectives

5.1.4.2 Justification for Sufficiency

The security objective of TOE:

O.ONEWAY: The TOE shall allow the data to flow from the Sending Network to the Receiving Network but not in the reverse direction i.e. Receiving Network to the Sending Network.

FDP_IFF.1 requires that all information flowing through the TOE be covered by the one-way data transmission in physical layer SFP. This ensures that no information flows, whether explicit or covert, are exempt from the one-way data transmission in physical layer SFP

FDP_IFC.2 requires that data can only flow from the Sending Network to the Receiving Network and not in the reverse direction i.e. Receiving Network to the Sending Network.

5.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 2.

Assurance Class

Assurance Component

ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
	ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ASE: Security target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Analysis of coverage
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis

Table 4 Security Assurance Requirement

5.2.1 Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements

The evaluation assurance package selected for the evaluation of the TOE is EAL2 assurance package. EAL2 assurance package was chosen to provide resistance against Basic attack potential that is consistent with commercial products for applications in the government. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment (physical protection by the environment, limited interface and access to the TOE).

5.3 Security Requirement Dependency Table

Table 5 depicts the satisfaction of all security requirement dependencies. For each security requirement included in the ST, the CC dependencies are identified in the column “CC dependency”, and the satisfied dependencies are identified in the “ST dependency” column.

ST SFR	ST Dependency	CC Dependency	Justification
FDP_IFC.2	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1	
FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFC.2	FDP_IFC.1 FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.3 is not applicable because there is no security attributes to initialize.

Table 5 Security Requirement Dependency Table

5.4 TOE Summary Specification

The TOE addresses two security functional requirements: FDP_IFC.2 and FDP_IFF.1. They work together to satisfy the security objective for TOE. The following provides a description of the general technical mechanisms that the TOE uses to satisfy each SFR defined. It includes the description of security functionality given in each SFR by reference and provides a high-level view of their implementation in the TOE

FDP_IFC.2 : The TOE consists of two subsystems i.e. the Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard. Both the Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard are entirely independent, each with its own independent power and network interfaces, each enclosed in enclosure that does not admit electrical or optical signals via any other than the described interfaces. Based on the user guidance (stated in Chapter 1), the Sender Motherboard is only connected to the Sending Network and is not connected to the Receiving Network. Conversely, the Receiver Motherboard is connected only to the Receiving Network.

The Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard are connected by only a single fiber-optic cable. This fiber-optic cable is connected to each of the Sender Motherboard and Receiver Motherboard via their respective customised SFP+ i.e. SFP+ (Sender) and SFP+ (Receiver). This ensures that all data flowing through the TOE must flow through the fiber-optic cable and are thereby covered by the one-way data transmission SFP.

FDP_IFF.1:The SFP+ (Sender) module converts incoming electrical signals into optical signals while SFP+ (Receiver) module converts incoming optical signals into electrical signals. The SFP+ (Sender) module contains an optical transmitter and not an optical sensor that can receive optical signals externally. Conversely, the SFP+ (Receiver) module contains only an optical sensor and not an optical transmitter. Hence, SFP+ (Sender) and SFP+ (Receiver) together physically only allow data to flow from the Sending Network to Receiving Network but not in the reverse direction.

References

1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology, April 2017, Verson 3.1 Revision 5.