

National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report Google Pixel Devices on Android 16

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 solution provided by Google LLC. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in May 2026. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the *PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrolment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients*, Version 1.0, 16 August 2023 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-WLANC_V1.0) which includes the Base PP: *Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals*, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDFPP33) with the *collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module]*, Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11), the *PP-Module for Bluetooth*, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10), the *PP-Module for MDM Agents*, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10), and the *PP-Module for WLAN Clients*, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) with the *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11).

The TOE is the Google Pixel Devices on Android 16. The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.

The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the *Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 – Security Target*, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	Google Pixel Devices on Android 16
Protection Profile	<i>PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrolment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients</i> , Version 1.0, 16 August 2023 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-WLANC_V1.0) which includes the Base PP: <i>Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals</i> , Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDFPP33) with the <i>collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module]</i> , Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11), the <i>PP-Module for Bluetooth</i> , Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10), the <i>PP-Module for MDM Agents</i> , Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10), and the <i>PP-Module for WLAN Clients</i> , Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) with the <i>Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</i> , Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11)
ST	<i>Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 – Security Target</i> , Version 1.0, May 4, 2026
Evaluation Technical Report	<i>Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16</i> , Version 0.3, May 12, 2026
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 5

Item	Identifier
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor	Google LLC
Developer	Google LLC
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators	Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Jaemond Reyes, Lori Sarem

3 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.

The TOE is Google Pixel Devices on Android 16. All the included phones have the following information in common:

Android OS Version	Device Policy Version	Architecture	Security Patch Level
Android 16	144	ARMv8	December 2025

The TOE consists of the specific devices found in Section 8.

Google manufactures some of the phones in multiple variants, differing in size (the designations vary, from the “base” device not having any, and other models having something like “a” or “Pro”) or build materials (entry and premium). The primary differences between variants of a given device are build materials, screen type and size, battery capacity, cameras, RAM and Flash storage. The Pro phones are normally physically larger and have larger screen sizes, battery capacity and possibly RAM, while the “a” phones may have a smaller screen or different build materials (an “a” device may also use a processor that is common to a different base device). Storage options vary with each release and may be selectable by the customer of the device at purchase. Biometric sensors and Wi-Fi chips may vary between models as noted in the ST.

The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to both 802.11 Wi-Fi and 5G/4G LTE/3G/2G mobile data networks). The TOE supports using client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with 802.1x/EAP-TLS or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.

The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including those provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management APIs.

3.1 TOE Description

The TOE is a mobile device to support enterprises and individual users alike.

Some features and settings must be enabled for the TOE to operate in its evaluated configuration. The following features and settings must be enabled:

1. Enable a password screen lock
2. Do not use Smart Lock
3. Enable encryption of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth secrets (NIAP mode DPM API)
4. Do not use USB debugging
5. Do not allow installation of applications from unknown sources
6. Enable security logging

7. Disable 'Usage & Diagnostic' settings
8. Disable Captive Portal Checking
9. Loaded applications must be implemented utilizing the NIAPSEC library

Doing this ensures that the phone complies with the MDFPP33 requirements. Please refer to the Admin Guide on how to configure these settings and features.

3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms

Details regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.

3.3 TOE Architecture

The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an application the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the application requires (or to grant applications access at runtime).

The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption, including all user and mobile application data stored in the user's data partition. The TOE uses a key hierarchy that combines a REK with the user's password to provide protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.

The TOE includes an additional hardware security chip (the Titan M2) that provides dedicated key storage. The TOE makes this secure, hardware key storage available to mobile applications through the StrongBox extensions to the Android Keystore. Currently, the StrongBox extension is not used for any system keys but remains an option for applications to use should they desire the protection it provides.

Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system to allow enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device so as to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies (for example, restricting use of a corporate provided device's camera, forced configuration of maximum login attempts, pulling of audit logs off the TOE, etc.) as well as policies governing enterprise applications and data. An MDM is made up of two parts: the MDM Agent and MDM Server. The MDM Agent is installed on the phone as an administrator with elevated permissions (allowing it to change the relevant settings on the phone) while the MDM Server is used to issue the commands to the MDM Agent. The TOE includes an MDM Agent as part of the evaluated configuration. A user may choose to install a third-party MDM Agent, which is out-of-scope for this evaluation.

The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest) hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android's bootloader, and Android's user space, which provides APIs allowing applications to leverage the cryptographic functionality of the device

3.4 Physical Boundaries

The TOE's physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs Android as its software/OS, executing on the Google Tensor processors. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system but does include controls

that limit application behavior. Further, the device provides a built-in MDM Agent (downloadable MDM Agents are not considered in-scope) to be installed to limit or permit different functionality of the device.

The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.

4 Security Policy

This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:

1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels

4.1 Security audit

The TOE implements the SecurityLog and logcat that are stored in circular memory buffers. An MDM agent can read/fetch the logs (both the SecurityLog and logcat) and then handle appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the MDM server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in MDFPP33.

4.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their application meets the required criteria to remain compliant to MDFPP33 standards.

4.3 User data protection

The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The TOE's evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide additional separation between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise profiles.

4.4 Identification and authentication

The TOE supports several features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited. When a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper- and lower-case characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters are supported. The TOE can also be configured to utilize a biometric authentication factor (fingerprints or face depending on the device) to unlock the device (this only works after the password has been entered after the device powers on).

The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use and validate X.509v3 certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.

4.5 Security management

The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise applications and remove MDM policies.

4.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements several features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable using the application processor's hardware. The TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key (REK) and retains all keys derived from the REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software can only use keys derived from the REK by reference and receive the result. The TEE is a Separate Execution Environment (SEE), running outside the Android operating system on the device.

The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modification by applications as well as isolating the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital

signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).

4.7 TOE access

The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the TOE's MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after reboot.

The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.

4.8 Trusted path/channels

The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.

5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope

5.1 Assumptions

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following documents:

- *Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals*, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDFPP33)
- *collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device* - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11)
- *PP-Module for Bluetooth*, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10)
- *PP-Module for MDM Agents*, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10)
- *PP-Module for WLAN Clients*, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10)
- *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11)

That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

5.2 Clarification of scope

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the Biometric, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients Modules and the TLS Package and performed by the Evaluation team).
- This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
- Apart from the Admin Guide identified in Section 6, additional customer documentation for the specific Mobile Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.

- This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.

6 Documentation

The following document was available with the TOE for evaluation:

- *Google Pixel Phones on Android 16 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026*

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.

Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.

7 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived from information contained in the proprietary *Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16*, Version 0.3, 05/12/26 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation *Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16*, Version 0.3, 05/12/2026 (AAR).

7.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The Evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 including the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in section 3.4.1 provides a list of test tools and has a diagram of the test environment.

In addition, a remote testing request was approved by NIAP for testing that required proprietary hardware. Remote testing occurred on February 19, 2026, with representatives from the Evaluation team, Validation team, and NIAP observing the testing.

Additional information on both the Lab's test environment and the remote test execution can be found in the proprietary DTR.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the following devices:

Google Product	Model #	SoC	Kernel
Pixel 10 Pro XL	G45RY, GUL82, GYPW4	Google Tensor G5	6.6
Pixel 10 Pro	GEHN3, G4QUR, GN4F5	Google Tensor G5	6.6
Pixel 10	GK2MP, GL066, GLBW0	Google Tensor G5	6.6
Pixel 10 Pro Fold	GU0NP, GM66V	Google Tensor G5	6.6
Pixel 10a	G4H7L, GV0BP, GE1GQ	Google Tensor G4	6.1
Pixel 9 Pro XL	GZC4K, GQ57S, GGX8B	Google Tensor G4	6.1
Pixel 9 Pro	GEC77, GWVK6, GR83Y	Google Tensor G4	6.1
Pixel 9	GUR25, G1B60, G2YBB	Google Tensor G4	6.1
Pixel 9 Pro Fold	GGH2X, GC15S	Google Tensor G4	6.1
Pixel 9a	GXQ96, GTF7P, G3Y12	Google Tensor G4	6.1
Pixel 8 Pro	G1NMW, GC3VE	Google Tensor G3	6.1
Pixel 8	GKWS6, G9BQD	Google Tensor G3	6.1
Pixel 8a	G5760D, G6GPR, G8HHN	Google Tensor G3	6.1
Pixel Tablet	GTU8P	Google Tensor G2	6.1
Pixel Fold	G9FPL, G0B96	Google Tensor G2	6.1
Pixel 7 Pro	GVU6C, G03Z5, GQML3	Google Tensor G2	6.1
Pixel 7	GE2AE, GFE4J, GP4BC	Google Tensor G2	6.1
Pixel 7a	GWKK3, GHL1X, G82U8, G0DZQ	Google Tensor G2	6.1
Pixel 6 Pro	GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G	Google Tensor	6.1
Pixel 6	GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B	Google Tensor	6.1
Pixel 6a	GX7AS, GB62Z, G1AZG, GB17L	Google Tensor	6.1

9 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Pixel Devices on Android 16 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11.

9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.

9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the Evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.

The Validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.

9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation

was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.

9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.

9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.

The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.

MITRE CVE Database, National Vulnerability Database, and CVE details (<https://www.cve.org/>, <https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search>, and <https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php>) and Known Vulnerability Exploit Catalog (<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) on 5/7/2026 (from 4/1/2025) with the following search terms: "Google", "Google LLC", "BoringSSL", "Android Locksettings Service KBKDF", "Titan M2", "Google Tensor", "Google Tensor G2", "Google Tensor G3", "Google Tensor G4", "Google Tensor G5", "Tensor UFS Inline Storage Engine", "Google Trusty TEE", "Android 16", "Android", "Pixel 6", "Pixel 6a", "Pixel 6 Pro", "Pixel 7", "Pixel 7a", "Pixel 7 Pro", "Pixel Fold", "Pixel Tablet", "Pixel 8", "Pixel 8a", "Pixel 8 Pro", "Pixel 9", "Pixel 9a", "Pixel 9 Pro", "Pixel 9 Pro XL", "Pixel 9 Pro Fold", "Pixel 10a", "Pixel 10", "Pixel 10 Pro", "Pixel 10 Pro XL", and "Pixel 10 Pro Fold".

The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.

9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team's testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the *Google Pixel Phones on Android 16 Administrator Guidance Documentation*, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 and any additional guidance that it references. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.

Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

Note that Section 1.4 of the ST lists features and settings that must be enabled for the TOE to operate in its evaluated configuration, including disabling USB debugging. The Admin Guide should be consulted on how to configure these features and settings. In addition, Per NIAP/CCEVS Publication #6, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is encouraged between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such updates properly installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration.

11 Annexes

Not applicable

12 Security Target

The Security Target is identified as: *Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 – Security Target, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026.*

13 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL).** An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
- **Conformance.** The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation.** The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
- **Evaluation Evidence.** Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE).** A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation.** The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body.** A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- [1] *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model*, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [2] *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components*, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [3] *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components*, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [4] *Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals*, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDFPP33).
- [5] *collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module]*, Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11).
- [6] *PP-Module for Bluetooth*, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10).
- [7] *PP-Module for MDM Agents*, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10).
- [8] *PP-Module for WLAN Clients*, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10).
- [9] *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11).
- [10] *Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 - Security Target*, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 (ST).
- [11] *Google Pixel Phones on Android 16 Administrator Guidance Documentation*, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 (AGD).
- [12] *Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16*, Version 0.3, May 12, 2026 (AAR).
- [13] *Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16*, Version 0.3, May 12, 2026 (DTR).
- [14] *Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16*, Version 0.3, May 12, 2026 (ETR).