
Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer Security Target

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1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer provided by Galleon Embedded Computing. The TOE is being evaluated as a full drive encryption solution.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- Conformance Claims (Section 2)
- Security Objectives (Section 3)
- Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
- Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)

Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
 - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
 - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [***selected-assignment***]).
 - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [***selection***]).
 - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., "... **all** objects ..." or "... ~~some~~ **big** things ...").
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

1.1 Security Target Reference

ST Title – Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer Security Target

ST Version – Version 2.2

ST Date – May 15, 2026

1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Identification – Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer

TOE Developer – Galleon Embedded Computing

Evaluation Sponsor – Galleon Embedded Computing

1.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer version 1.1 running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.5.

Galleon's SW-layer FDE was evaluated against the FDE collaborative protection profiles, which pertain to data at rest encryption. Network security is outside the scope of an FDE evaluation, and thus only local administration was evaluated.

The TOE provides software Full Drive Encryption of removable drives and the software can be installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux on various Galleon computing platforms (including XSR, G1, G2, HPR, and ARINC models). All of Galleon's models use Intel 64-bit CPUs, and Galleon offers the G1 with a single CPU model while offering the XSR with a range of CPUs to allow customers to tailor the system to their needs. The following table summarizes the CPU options available (bold denotes the models used during evaluation testing, while italics denotes equivalent models). Because the Red Hat operating system provides a hardware abstraction layer, the TOE software executes identically irrespective of the underlying CPU.

Model	Processor
XSR	Intel Xeon E3-1505Lv6 (Kaby Lake)
<i>XSR</i>	<i>Intel Xeon E-2276ME (Coffee Lake)</i>
<i>XSR</i>	<i>Intel Xeon W-11865MRE (Tiger Lake)</i>
<i>HPR</i>	<i>Intel Xeon D-1732TE (Ice Lake)</i>
G1	Intel Atom C2758 (Rangeley)
<i>G2</i>	<i>Intel Atom C3708 (Deverton)</i>
<i>ARINC</i>	<i>Intel Atom x6211E (Elkhart Lake)</i>

1.4 TOE Description

The TOE is a software application that provides Full Drive Encryption (FDE) of drives within the system in which the software executes. The TOE has been evaluated on various different computing environments including Galleon's XSR, HPR, G1, G2, and ARINC computing environments. These products/environments can act in multiple different capacities (Network Attached Storage [NAS], data recorder, general server, etc.) and allow for encryption of the drives attached to the system (including a Removable Data Module [RDM]). The XSR model supports encryption of one RDM (at a time), up to 4 internal SSDs, and its internal, non-removable mSATA SSD. The G1 model also supports encryption of one RDM (at a time) and up to 2 internal SSDs. TOE securely encrypts all user data stored on the protected drives.

The TOE software executes in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Release 9.5 operating system running on the computing hardware, and the TOE provides software-based Full Disk Encryption (FDE) of data drives (both internal drives and the RDM).

In addition to the software-based FDE layer, some models of Galleon's computing products include a separate, hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to further encrypt the drives; however, this hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation.

The TOE supports encrypting data stored by software applications running in the RHEL operating system. The RHEL operating system might include software to support protocols including CIFS and NFS, might include the vendor's data recording software, might even include customer provided software applications, or might include additional software running within KVM virtualized guest. The RHEL administrator can enable, disable, or install additional (accessing the system directly) desired protocols, software applications, and KVM guests to support their use-case and application.

1.4.1 TOE Architecture

The TOE provides a software Full Drive Encryption solution that can encrypt a Removable Data Module (RDM) which contain a data drive within as well as additional internal SSDs.

1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries

The TOE's physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).

1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF

1.4.1.2.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.

1.4.1.2.2 User data protection

The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on all partitions on the drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.

1.4.1.2.3 Security management

The TOE provides each of the required management services to manage the full drive encryption using a command line interface.

1.4.1.2.4 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.

1.4.2 TOE Documentation

Galleon SW Encryption Layer Certifiable Encryption, Version 1.1.2, May 13, 2026 [Admin Guide]

2. Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
 - Part 2 Extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
 - Part 3 Conformant
- PP-Configuration Reference:

This PP-Configuration is identified as follows:

- PP-Configuration for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition and Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine, Version 1.0
- As a shorthand reference, it can be identified as "CFG_CPP_FDE_AA-CPP_FDE_EE_V1.0"
- PP-Configuration Components Statement

This PP-Configuration includes the following components:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019 (FDEAAcPP20E)
- collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019 (FDEEEcPP20E)
- Technical Decisions:

Package	Technical Decision	Applied	Notes
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0458 - FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1 evaluation activities	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0606 - FIT Technical Recommendation for Evaluating a NAS against the FDE AA and FDEE	Yes	NAS
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0766 - FIT Technical Decision for FCS_CKM.4(d) Test Notes	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0765 - FIT Technical Decision for FMT_MOF.1	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0760 - FIT Technical Decision for FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3, FCS_COP.1(f)	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0759 - FIT Technical Decision for FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0767 - FIT Technical Decision for FMT_SMF.1.1	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0769 - FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1	Yes	
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E	TD0929 - FIT Technical Decision: Clarification to FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1	Yes	
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E	TD0464 - FIT Technical Decision for FPT_PWR_EXT.1 compliant power saving states	Yes	
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E	TD0460 - FIT Technical Decision for FPT_PWR_EXT.1 non-compliant power saving states	Yes	
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E	TD0458 - FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1 evaluation activities	Yes	
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E	TD0606 - FIT Technical Recommendation for Evaluating a NAS against the FDE AA and FDEE	Yes	NAS
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E	TD0766 - FIT Technical Decision for FCS_CKM.4(d) Test Notes	Yes	
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E	TD0769 - FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1	Yes	

Table 1: Technical Decisions

2.1 Conformance Rationale

The ST conforms to the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.

3. Security Objectives

The Security Problem Definition may be found in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and this section reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for the operational environment for reader convenience. The FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

In general, the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E has defined Security Objectives appropriate for Full Drive Encryption and as such are applicable to the Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer TOE.

3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage device free of protected data in areas not targeted for encryption.

OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH An authorized administrator will be responsible for ensuring that the passphrase authorization factor conforms to guidance from the Enterprise using the TOE.

OE.PHYSICAL The Operational Environment will provide a secure physical computing space such that an adversary is not able to make modifications to the environment or to the TOE itself.

OE.PLATFORM_I&A The Operational Environment will provide individual user identification and authentication mechanisms that operate independently of the authorization factors used by the TOE.

OE.PLATFORM_STATE The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected) is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.

OE.POWER_DOWN Volatile memory is cleared after power-off so memory remnant attacks are infeasible.

OE.SINGLE_USE_ET External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used for no other purpose than to store the external token authorization factor.

OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO The Operating Environment will provide a cryptographic function capability that is commensurate with the requirements and capabilities of the TOE and Appendix A.

OE.TRAINED_USERS Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance for securing the TOE and authorization factors.

OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL Communication among and between product components (i.e., AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure.

4. Extended Components Definition

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this ST the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.

Extended SFRs:

- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor Acquisition
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining (Initiator)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2: Key Chaining (Recipient)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: Protection of Data on Disk
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update

5. Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The refinements and operations already performed in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.

The SARs are also drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.

5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer TOE.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic support	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor Acquisition
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b): Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c): Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining (Initiator)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2: Key Chaining (Recipient)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
	FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
	FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
FDP: User data protection	FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: Protection of Data on Disk
FMT: Security management	FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1: Management of Functions Behavior
	FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
	FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
	FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1: Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF	FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
	FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
	FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
	FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
	FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
	FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
	FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
	FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
	FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
	FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update

Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components

5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)

5.1.1.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors: [- *a submask derived from a password authorization factor conditioned as defined in FCS_PCC_EXT.1*].

5.1.1.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition from any Compliant power saving state specified in FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access to plaintext data.

5.1.1.3 Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1.1(b)

Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [**256 bit**] that meet the following: no standard.

5.1.1.4 Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1.1(c)

Refinement: The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation method [
- generate a DEK using the RBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]
 and specified cryptographic key sizes [*256 bits*].

5.1.1.5 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(a)

Refinement: The TSF shall [*erase*] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: a key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM.4(d).

5.1.1.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(a)

The TSF shall [*erase*] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: a key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.6.

5.1.1.7 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage) - per TD0766 (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(d)

Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [
- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [removal of power to the memory],
- For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying platform that [o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]]
 that meets the following: no standard.

5.1.1.8 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage) - per TD0766 (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(d)

Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [removal of power to the memory],
For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying platform that [logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]]
 that meets the following: no standard.

5.1.1.9 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)

The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.

5.1.1.10 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)

The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.

5.1.1.11 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)

Refinement: The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in plaintext when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.

5.1.1.12 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)

The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in plaintext when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.

5.1.1.13 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6)

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1

The TSF shall use [*FCS_CKM.4(d)*] key destruction methods.

5.1.1.14 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(a)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (verification) in accordance with a [*Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater*] that meet the following: [*FIPS PUB 186-5, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-384]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA schemes*].

5.1.1.15 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(a)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (verification) in accordance with a [*Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater*] that meet the following: [*FIPS PUB 186-5, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-384]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA schemes*].

5.1.1.16 Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(b)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*SHA-384*] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

5.1.1.17 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(b)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*SHA-384*] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

5.1.1.18 Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(c)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-SHA-384*] and cryptographic key sizes [*384*] that meet the following: [*ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC Algorithm 2'*].

5.1.1.19 Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(c)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-SHA-384*] and cryptographic key sizes [*384-bit keys used in [HMAC]*] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC Algorithm 2'.

5.1.1.20 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(f)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [*XTS*] mode and cryptographic key sizes [*256 bits*] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [*XTS as specified in IEEE 1619*].

5.1.1.21 Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g))

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(g)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform key encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [*CBC*] mode and cryptographic key sizes [*256 bits*] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [*CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116*].

5.1.1.22 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g))

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(g)

Refinement: The TSF shall perform key encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [*CBC*] mode and cryptographic key sizes [*256 bits*] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [*CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116*].

5.1.1.23 Cryptographic Key Derivation (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall accept [*a conditioned password submask*] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [*NIST SP 800-132*] , using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.

5.1.1.24 Cryptographic Key Derivation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall accept [*a conditioned password submask*] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [*NIST SP 800-132*] , using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.

5.1.1.25 Key Chaining (Initiator) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [*intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV using the following method(s): [key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1]*] while maintaining an effective strength of [*256 bits*] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of [*not applicable*] for asymmetric keys.

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall provide at least a [*256 bit*] BEV to [*the encryption engine*] [- *without validation taking place*].

5.1.1.26 Key Chaining (Recipient) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2)

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall accept a BEV of at least [256 bits] from the AA.

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall maintain a chain of intermediary keys originating from the BEV to the DEK using the following method(s): [- *key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(g)*] while maintaining an effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of [*not applicable*] for asymmetric keys.

5.1.1.27 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1

A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor shall enable at least[511] characters in the set of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and [*all ASCII printable characters*] and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[*SHA-384*], with [*between 1,150,000 and 3,400,000 iterations*], and output cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: NIST SP 800-132. (TD0929 applied)

5.1.1.28 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [*ISO/IEC 18031:2011*] using [*CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*one software-based noise source(s)*] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.1.1.29 Random Bit Generation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [*ISO/IEC 18031:2011*] using [*CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*one software-based noise source(s)*] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.1.1.30 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [*salts that are generated by a [DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]*].

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall use [*no nonces*].

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [
- *CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable*
- *XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer*].

5.1.1.31 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [*salts that are generated by a [DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]*].

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall use [*no nonces*].

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [

- *CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable*

- *XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer*].

5.1.1.32 Validation (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform validation of the [*BEV*] using the following methods: [*hash the [BEV] as specified in [FCS_COP.1(c)] and compare it to a stored hashed [BEV]*].

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require validation of the BEV prior to forwarding the BEV to the EE.

FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall [*institute a delay such that only [4320 attempts] can be made within a 24 hour period*].

5.1.1.33 Validation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform validation of the BEV using the following method(s): [*- hash the BEV as specified in [FCS_COP.1(c)] and compare it to a stored hashed value*].

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require the validation of the BEV prior to allowing access to TSF data after exiting a Compliant power saving state.

FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall [

- *institute a delay such that only [4320 attempts] can be made within a 24 hour period*].

5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)

5.1.2.1 Protection of Data on Disk (FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform Full Drive Encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f), such that the drive contains no plaintext protected data.

FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.

5.1.3 Security management (FMT)

5.1.3.1 Management of Functions Behavior (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behaviour of the functions use of Compliant power saving state to authorized users.

5.1.3.2 Specification of Management Functions (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- a) forwarding requests to change the DEK to the EE,
- b) forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE,
- c) allowing authorized users to change authorization factors or set of authorization factors used,
- d) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
- e) [*no other functions*]

5.1.3.3 Specification of Management Functions (FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- a) change the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.1, when reprovisioning or when commanded,
- b) erase the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.4(a),
- c) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
- d) [*no other functions*].

5.1.3.4 Security Roles (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles authorized user.

FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.1.4.1 Protection of Key and Key Material (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [*only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d), or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)*].

5.1.4.2 Protection of Key and Key Material (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [*only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d), or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)*].

5.1.4.3 Power Saving States (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [**G3**].

5.1.4.4 Power Saving States (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [**G3**].
(TD0464 applied)

5.1.4.5 Timing of Power Saving States (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2)

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1

For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:

- user-initiated request,

[*shutdown*].

5.1.4.6 Timing of Power Saving States (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2)

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1

For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:

user-initiated request,
[*shutdown*].

5.1.4.7 TSF Testing (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self- tests [*during initial start-up (on power on)*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [*Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests and health test*].

5.1.4.8 TSF Testing (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self- tests [*during initial start-up (on power on)*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [*Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests and health test*].

5.1.4.9 Trusted Update (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1

Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE [*software*].

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2

Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to initiate updates to TOE [*software*].

FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3

Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a digital signature as specified in FCS_COP.1(a) by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.

5.1.4.10 Trusted Update (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1

Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE [*software*].

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2

Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to initiate updates to TOE [*software*].

FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3

Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE [*software*] using a [*digital signature as specified in FCS_COP.1(a)*] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.

5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1: Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1: Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability survey

Table 3 Assurance Components

5.2.1 Development (ADV)

5.2.1.1 Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)

ADV_FSP.1.1d

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

ADV_FSP.1.2d

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

ADV_FSP.1.1c

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.2c

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.3c

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV_FSP.1.4c

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

ADV_FSP.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_FSP.1.2e

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)

5.2.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)

AGD_OPE.1.1d

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

AGD_OPE.1.1c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

AGD_OPE.1.2c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.

AGD_OPE.1.3c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

AGD_OPE.1.4c

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD_OPE.1.5c

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD_OPE.1.6c

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_OPE.1.7c

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

AGD_OPE.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)

AGD_PRE.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.1c

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.2c

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_PRE.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD_PRE.1.2e

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)

5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)

ALC_CMC.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

ALC_CMC.1.1c

The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.

ALC_CMC.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.3.2 TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

ALC_CMS.1.1d

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

ALC_CMS.1.1c

The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC_CMS.1.2c

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMS.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.4 Security Target (ASE)**5.2.4.1 Security Target (ASE_TSS.1)**

ASE_TSS.1.1c

Refinement: The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR, including a proprietary Key Management Description (Appendix E), and [*Entropy Essay*].

5.2.5 Tests (ATE)**5.2.5.1 Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1)**

ATE_IND.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

ATE_IND.1.1c

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

ATE_IND.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE_IND.1.2e

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)**5.2.6.1 Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)**

AVA_VAN.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

AVA_VAN.1.1c

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

AVA_VAN.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA_VAN.1.2e

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

AVA_VAN.1.3e

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF

6.1 Cryptographic support

The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: The TOE supports password authorization factor, and the password may be between 15 and (up to) 511 characters in length and can be composed of all ASCII printable characters.
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: The TOE does not have any power-saving states beyond power-off. After transitioning from the power-off state, the user must authenticate using a password before the TOE will allow data to be read from or written to the drive.
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b)/(c): The TOE generates 256-bit DEKs (Master Keys) using its AES-256 CTR_DRBG. Because the DRBG has a security strength of 256 bits, the DEKs generated are sufficient for the TOE's 256-bit AES data encryption/decryption. The TOE stores these keys encrypted in dedicated headers on the drives (in the first few megabytes of an unpartitioned, drives or at the start of each partition).
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): When the TOE powers off (as the TOE has no other power states other than off (G3)), all values in memory drain to a zero state.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): The XSR and HSR models of TOE has between 16GB and 128GB of RAM, while the G1 model has 8GB of RAM, and this serves as the working memory in which the TOE temporarily stores working copies of key material (for example, the Derived Key [DerKey], which is derived from the user's password and salt using PBKDFv2 and the Master Keys (DEKs) currently in use (if any). The TOE clears keys from memory by a removal of power.

Additionally, the TOE stores encrypted DEKs in a header for the encrypted drive partitions. The TOE's RHEL operating system supports SATA interface drives that support block addressing. The TOE clears these keys through an internal call using the CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM pattern, which draws random data from the TOE's CTR_DRBG.

- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): The TOE clears the DerKey and DEKs from userspace memory immediately after the operation for which it is needed, while DEKs will be held in kernel memory while the drive is accessible. If the user logs out, then the TOE will clear any in-use DEKs from kernel memory.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): The TOE has no Compliant power saving states other than power off (G3).
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: The TOE clears its keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4(d).
- FCS_COP.1: The TOE performs cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the following NIST standards and has received the following CAVP algorithm certificates.

The TOE uses its Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer User Space cryptographic implementation (version 3.2.2 for RHEL 9.5) to support its user space FDE functionality.

SFR	Algorithm	NIST Standard	Cert#
FCS_COP.1(a) (Verify)	ECDSA P-384 w/ SHA-384 Verify	FIPS 186-5, ECDSA	A7684
FCS_COP.1(b) (Hash)	SHA-384 Hashing	FIPS 180-4	A7684
FCS_COP.1(c) (Keyed Hash)	HMAC-SHA-384	FIPS 198-1 & 180-4	A7684
FCS_COP.1(g) (AES)	AES-256 CBC Encrypt/Decrypt	FIPS 197	A7684

SFR	Algorithm	NIST Standard	Cert#
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random)	AES-256 CTR_DRBG	SP 800-90A	A7684
FCS_CKM.1(b) (Key generation)			
FCS_CKM.1(c) (Key generation)			

Table 4 GEC SW Encryption Layer User Space Cryptographic Algorithms

The TOE uses its Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer Kernel cryptographic implementation (version 5.14.0 for RHEL 9.5) to support its kernel FDE functionality.

SFR	Algorithm	NIST Standard	Cert#
FCS_COP.1(f) (AES)	AES-256 XTS Encrypt/Decrypt	FIPS 197	A7680

Table 5 GEC SW Encryption Layer Kernel Cryptographic Algorithms

- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): The TOE utilizes ECDSA P-384 w/ SHA-384 signatures to verify the authenticity of firmware updates. Upon receiving a candidate update and the accompanying signature file, the TOE uses the vendor's public key (see FPT_TUD_EXT.1 below) to verify the ECDSA signature against the received RPM. The verification uses SHA-384 and follows the FIPS 186-5 ECDSA format.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): The TOE's cryptographic library provides the SHA-384 algorithm and uses that algorithm as for PBKDFv2 password-based key derivation, respectively. The TOE's cryptographic library (against which RPM links) also provides the SHA-384 hashing algorithm used to verify signatures during trusted updates.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): The TOE implements HMAC-SHA-384 using 256-bit keys, the SHA-384 hash algorithm, a 1024-bit block size, and an output MAC length of 384 bits. The TOE uses HMAC-SHA-384 as part of all PBKDF (NIST SP 800-132) key management operations.
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): The TOE uses an AES XTS cryptographic implementation dedicated to drive encryption/decryption. This implementation uses AES- 256 bit keys.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): The TOE has an AES CBC implementation used for key managements operations (decryption of the encrypted DEKs). This implementation uses AES- 256 bit keys.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: The TOE handles the user passwords as a null terminated ASCII string and subjects that string (without any additional padding) to 800-132 (PBKDFv2) with HMAC-SHA-384 and a number of iterations and a 256 bit salt to transform the operator's password into a Derived Key for decrypting the encrypted DEKs. The number of iterations is determined by the specified number of milliseconds (2000 milliseconds) multiplied by the number of PBKDF operations per/second to achieve a delay specified by the administrator. The TOE has an empirically determined benchmark for PBKDF2 of 573,619 and 1,696,724 iterations per second for a 256-bit key, and thus the TOE uses a count between ~1.1 million to ~3.4 million iterations to achieve a 2 second delay across different CPUs.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1/2: The TOE uses PBKDFv2 to transform the operator's password into a 256-bit BEV, and then uses that BEV to AES decrypt the DEKs stored in the header(s) stored on the drive.
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: The TOE allows passwords up to 511 characters in length, and the TOE allows uppercase/lowercase letters, numbers, and ASCII printable characters. The TOE will truncate any password longer than 511 characters to the first 511 characters entered. The TOE will reject a password containing other characters. The TOE conditions passwords by combining them with a 256-bit salt using PBKDFv2.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The TOE includes an AES-256 CTR_DRBG that it seeds with at least 256-bits of entropy from one software-based noise sources.

- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: The TOE generates its salts and AES-CBC IVs using its CTR_DRBG. The TOE generates no nonces but generates its 256-bit AES XTS tweaks (used for data partition encryption) also using its CTR_DRBG.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: The TOE validates the operator's password by first subjecting the password and salt to PBKDFv2 to form the Derived Key (DerKey). The TOE uses the DerKey to decrypt the masterKey stripes and reconstitutes the masterKey; however, before using the masterKey, the TOE first performs iterative HMAC-SHA-256 using the operator's password, the masterKey salt, masterKey iterations, and masterKey as inputs, and then compares the resulting value to the stored masterKey's digest stored in the header to ensure the two match.

The TOE uses a counter to track consecutive failed authentication attempts and if the TOE detects more than three, consecutive, incorrect passwords, then the TOE will delay any further authentication attempts for a period of one minute.

6.2 User data protection

The User data protection function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: The TOE provides FDE that encrypts the entirety of the drive or drive partitions through AES-XTS block based encryption. The Admin Guide describes the TOE's initialization process and setup for the SW-layer. The TOE maintains a separate, unencrypted, system drive where the RHEL-operating system resides. That system drive contains no user/NAS data, as the TOE stores all user/NAS data on the RMC drives that the TOE encrypts. When the administrator configures an RMC drive for use, the TOE encrypts the entire drive (with a small area reserved for the Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) header).

6.3 Security management

The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1: The TOE claims no Compliant power saving states beyond power off. Only the authorized administrator can issue the shutdown command.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides each of the required management services with no additional ones. Because the TOE fulfills the AA and EE requirements together, the TOE need not "forward" requests to change the DEK or cryptographically erase the DEK. The TOE supports changing of the authorization factors (the administrator can remove a partition and recreate it to change the associated password). The Admin Guide describes updating the TOE's software through loading and installation of an RPM update (the TOE relies upon RHEL OS to verify the signature, and (if the signature verifies successfully) install the RPM update). The TOE does not provide any manageable power-saving states.
- FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1 – The TOE's RHEL OS maintains an administrator role that can administer the TOE.

6.4 Protection of the TSF

The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: The TOE stores encrypted DEKs in the header of each drive partition.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1/2: The TOE provides no compliant power-saving state beyond G3, mechanical off (also referred to as power-off). The TOE enters this state when the operator shuts off the device. The TOE must be fully rebooted from this state.
- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE includes the following power-up Known Answer Tests (KATs) to ensure that each of its cryptographic algorithms operates correctly.
 - ECDSA verify test

- SHA-256/384 hashing tests
- HMAC-SHA tests
- AES-256 CBC/XTS encrypt/decrypt test
- AES-256 CTR_DRBG test

For each cryptographic function listed above, the TOE utilizes known inputs (key, plaintext, ciphertext, seed state, etc.) to perform the cryptographic operation (sign, verify, hashing, HMAC, encryption/decryption, and deterministic random number generation), and compares the output to the expected/known value. The TOE includes the section 11.3 health tests (which effectively consist of a series of three, combined KATs to test the DRBG implementation of instantiation, reseed, and generate operations) that use a known DRBG seed to instantiate the DRBG, then reseed the DRBG with additional known data, and finally request the output from the DRBG to compare against the known/correct output

There are no non-cryptographic functions that affect the correct operation of the TSF.

- FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE can display its current software version (queried using `cat /etc/galleon/sw-version`) and an administrator can update the TOE software using signed RPM update files. The TOE's RHEL OS will verify the signature on the RPM software update files (using its cryptographic library in conjunction with the Galleon's public key, previously loaded by the RHEL administrator and stored in the RPM database in `/var/lib/rpm`, to verify the ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 signature) before installing it, and will reject any update with an invalid signature. The TOE relies upon the RHEL operating system protections for RPM updates, namely that only root can read or write any files and databases in the `/var/lib/rpm` directory, and thus, only the RHEL root administrator has the ability to access, update, or remove the public keys used to verify RPMs during installation. Only Galleon can sign TOE RPM updates (as Galleon is the only authorized source possessing the Galleon private signing key) and RHEL automatically verifies RPM signature by using the pre-installed `gec-install-signed-update` utility and will not install the update package if the embedded digital signature in the update cannot be verified.

7. Key Management Description

The key management description explains each key, crypto module and overall encryption architecture. Each key is identified in the table below.

Key Identifier	Storage Location	How Key Protected	How key Derived	Strength of Key	When Key Destroyed
User Passphrase	Memory - transient	N/A	N/A	N/A	Immediately after use
Derived Key	Memory - transient	N/A	The TOE uses 800-132 KDF in counter mode using HMAC-SHA-384 and a number of iterations and a 256 bit salt to transform the operator's password into a Derived Key	256 bits	Immediately after use
DEK (Master Key)	Memory - transient	N/A	Generated from approved DRBG	256 bits	Immediately after use
DEK (Master Key)	Partition Header - persistent	AES CBC Encrypted	Generated from approved DRBG	256 bits	When partition closed or when partition no longer encrypted

Table 6 Key Identification

The TOE derives the Derived Key when the operator enters their passphrase. The TOE uses the Derived Key to decrypt the Master Key (and in turn calculate a digest of the Master Key to verify the operator's password). Immediately after using the Derived Key, the TOE clears/zeroizes it.

Keys are destroyed through zeroization or overwrite when no longer needed. The data encryption engine is based on LUKS, and is comprised of both a userspace component and a kernel-level component. The userspace component handles derivation of the Derived Key from the user's password and the subsequent decryption of the Master Key (DEK) with the Derived Key. The kernel-level component receives the DEK from the userspace component and then encrypts/decrypts data written to/read from the encrypted partition/drive. The TOE uses PBKDFv2 to transform the operator's password into a 256-bit BEV, and then uses that BEV to AES decrypt a Master Key (DEK) stored in the header stored on the drive. The data encryption software runs atop the RHEL 9.5 software (running on the vendor's Network Attached Storage (NAS) device hardware), where the software executes on the main processor, with the software stored in a dedicated OS/system drive. While the TOE does not encrypt its system drive, it provides no access to it, and only exposes the encrypted Removable Memory Cartridge (drive) and mSATA storage card (present on the XSR) to network-attached NAS clients and to applications running on the TOE. The TOE ensures that access to the RMC/drive is always encrypted, and does not permit plaintext access to protected partitions or drive. TOE only provides access to the RMC/drive once fully initialized and after receiving the administrator's password.

The Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer cryptographic implementation uses cryptographic from three crypto modules:

1. OpenSSL – used for all LUKS key management (but not encrypting/decrypting drive data) and for verification of trusted updates
2. Kernel – used for encrypting data on the partition