



Security Target

Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1

Document Version 1.7

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Prepared For:



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Abstract

This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.

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1 Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), conformance claims, Security Target organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated product.

1.1 ST Reference

ST Title	Security Target: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ST Revision	1.6
ST Publication Date	January 30, 2014
Author	Apex Assurance Group

1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Reference	Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1 Build 4.8.1.253
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1.3 Document Organization

This Security Target follows the following format:

SECTION	TITLE	DESCRIPTION
1	Introduction	Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the hardware and software that make up the TOE as well as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE
2	Conformance Claims	Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where applicable
3	Security Problem Definition	Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational security policies that affect the TOE
4	Security Objectives	Defines the security objectives for the TOE/operational environment and provides a rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives satisfy the threats
5	Extended Components Definition	Describes extended components of the evaluation (if any)

6	Security Requirements	Contains the functional and assurance requirements for this TOE
7	TOE Summary Specification	Identifies the IT security functions provided by the TOE and also identifies the assurance measures targeted to meet the assurance requirements.

Table 1-1 – ST Organization and Description

1.4 Document Conventions

The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those used in Version 3.1 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in Part 2 of the Common Criteria are *refinement*, *selection*, *assignment* and *iteration*.

- The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)].
- The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by **bold text**. Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: ~~TSF~~).
- The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by *underlined italicized* text.
- Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by appending to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component.

Italicized text is used for both official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text.

1.5 Document Terminology

The following table provides a list of terms and acronyms used within this document:

TERM	DEFINITION
Administrator	An operator responsible for installation, configuration, and User management
AV	Antivirus
CC	Common Criteria version 3.1 (ISO/IEC 15408)
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FW	Firewall

IDS	Intrusion Detection System
Operator	An individual utilizing the functions of the TOE as an Administrator or User
OS	Operating System
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
SIM	Security Information Manager
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SOF	Strength Of Function
SSIM	Symantec Security Information Manager
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSP	TOE Security Policy
User	An operator responsible for management of incidents, reports, and correlation rules
VPN	Virtual Private Network

Table 1-2 – Document Terms and Acronyms

1.6 TOE Overview

The TOE is the Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1, providing real-time event correlation and data archiving to protect against security threats and to preserve critical security data. The TOE collects, analyzes, and archives information from security devices, critical applications, and services to help recognize and respond to threats in the enterprise.

Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1 enables organizations to collect, store, and analyze log data as well as monitor and respond to security events to meet IT risk and compliance requirements. It can collect and normalize a broad scope of event data and correlate the impact of incidents based on the criticality to business operations or level of compliance to various mandates. Incidents are prioritized using its built-in asset management function, which is populated using scanning tools and allows confidentiality, integrity, and response ratings and policies to be assigned to help prioritize incidents.

In addition to establishing priority to events, Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1 can provide recommended best practices for response and remediation efforts. Automated updates from Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network provide real time information to the correlation process on the latest vulnerabilities and threats that are occurring across the rest of the world.

Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1 can enable organizations to produce executive, technical, and audit-level reports that are highly effective at communicating risk levels and the security posture of the organization. Over 300 out-of-the-box queries can create custom reports via Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1. Real-time correlation of network and host security breaches with Symantec’s trusted global security intelligence makes it the vehicle for a world-class

Security Target: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1

incident response system promoting the integrity of business-critical information assets. Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1 can deliver a framework that automates the real-time collection, monitoring and assessment of audit mechanisms and security controls and can dramatically lower costs and improve the effectiveness of managing activities related to IT security and compliance risks.

Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1 may hereafter also be referred to as Security Information Manager, Information Manager or the TOE. The TOE is of the type “Network and Network-Related Devices and Systems”

In order to comply with the evaluated configuration, the following software components must be used:

TOE COMPONENT	VERSION/MODEL NUMBER
TOE Software	Version 4.8.1

Table 1-3 – Evaluated Configuration for the TOE

The TOE components must run on one of the following supported Operating Systems:

TOE COMPONENT	VERSION/MODEL NUMBER
Management Console	Windows-XP 32-bit SP3 and 64-bit SP2 Windows Server 2003 32-bit and 64-bit SP2 Windows Server 2008 32-bit and 64-bit SP2 Windows Vista 32-bit and 64-bit SP2 Windows 7 32-bit and 64-bit
SSIM Server	RedHat Enterprise Linux 6.4 x86 64-bit OS

Table 1-4 – Supported Operating Systems for the TOE

Below are the supported web browsers for the Management Console.

TOE COMPONENT	VERSION/MODEL NUMBER
Management Console	Microsoft Internet Explorer 7.x, 8.x, 9.0 Mozilla Firefox 3.x, 4.x Google Chrome 14

Table 1-5 – Supported Web Browsers

Please note that hardware/software described in Table 1-4 – Supported Operating Systems for the TOE for the TOE are to be provided by the end user. The administrator should also provide the following hardware:

TOE COMPONENT	HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS
Management Console	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Minimum screen resolution setting of 1024 x 768 (1280 x 1024 recommended)• 103 MB disk space• 512 MB RAM (1 GB recommended)
SSIM Server	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Base Unit: Dual Core Xeon Processor 5150 4MB Cache, 2.66GHz, 1333MHz FSB or better• Processor: Dual Core Xeon 2nd Processor 5150, 4MB Cache, 2.66GHz 1333MHz FSB or better• Memory: 8GB 533MHz (4x2GB), Dual Ranked DIMMs or better• Hard Drive: 146GB, SAS, 3.5-inch 15K RPM Hard Drive or better• Hard Drive Controller: PERC 5/i, x6 Backplane Integrated Controller Card• NIC: Embedded GigabitEthernet NIC• CD-ROM or DVD-ROM Drive: DVD-ROM• Additional Storage Products: 146GB, SAS, 3.5-inch 15K RPM Hard Drive• Feature: Integrated SAS/SATA RAID 1/RAID 5• Misc: 4x300GB, SAS, 3.5-inch 10K RPM Hard Drives

Table 1-6 – Supported Hardware Requirements for the TOE

1.7 TOE Description

Security information management provides the ability to analyze historical security events and generate reports on security metrics in support of satisfying security policy compliance needs. Symantec Security Information Manager provides real-time event correlation and data archiving to protect against security threats and to preserve critical security data. Information Manager collects, analyzes, and archives

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information from security devices, critical applications, and services, such as the following:

- Firewalls
- Routers, switches, and VPNs
- Enterprise Antivirus solutions
- Intrusion detection and intrusion prevention devices
- Vulnerability scanners
- Authentication servers
- Windows and UNIX system logs

Symantec Security Information Manager provides the following features to help recognize and respond to threats in the enterprise:

- Normalization and correlation of events from multiple vendors to recognize threats from all areas of the enterprise.
- Event archives to retain events in both their original and normalized formats.
- Distributed event filtering and aggregation to ensure that only relevant security events are correlated.
- Real-time security intelligence updates from Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network to keep the operator apprised of global threats and to allow correlation of internal security activity with external threats.
- Customizable event correlation rules to fine-tune threat recognition and incident creation for the environment.
- Security incident creation, ticketing, tracking, and remediation for quick response to security threats. Information Manager prioritizes incidents based upon the security policies associated with the affected assets.
- An event archive viewer that allows an operator to mine large amounts of event data and perform network operations on the machines that are associated with each event.
- A Management Console (also referred to as “the console”) to view all incidents and drill down to the related event details, including affected targets, associated vulnerabilities, and recommended corrective actions.
- Pre-defined and customizable queries to help demonstrate compliance with the security and data retention policies in the enterprise.

The following sections describe events, conclusions, and incidents.

1.7.1 Events

Network-attached devices and operating systems generate several kinds of events. Some events are informational, such as a user logging on, and others may indicate a security threat, such as antivirus software being disabled. The Information Manager Event Collector captures events from various network-attached devices and forwards the information to the Correlation Engine, where the events are

then compared against a correlation rule pattern.

1.7.2 Conclusions

A conclusion occurs when one or more events match a correlation rule pattern. Information Manager normalizes events from multiple products and looks for patterns that indicate potential threats.


1.7.3 Incidents

An incident is the result of one or more conclusions that are identified as a type of an attack, and there can be many conclusions mapped to a single incident. For example, if a single attacker causes a number of different patterns to be matched, those are grouped into a single incident. Similarly, if a vulnerability scan uncovers a machine that suffers from a number of different vulnerabilities, these are all grouped into a single incident. Or, if a number of different machines report the same virus, Information Manager creates a single outbreak incident.

1.7.4 Physical Boundaries

The TOE is a software TOE and is defined as the Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1.

Figure 1 – TOE and Operational Environment Boundary provides an illustration of the boundaries for the TOE and for the Operational Environment:

**Figure 1 – TOE and Operational Environment Boundary**

Individual sensor components receive events from a Point Product deployed in the network. Each Event Collector is configured for a specific technology type and can receive information from multiple sensors. For example, in the figure above, *Point Product₁* and *Point Product₂* are similar devices (e.g., each is a firewall).

The table below provides a summary of each subcomponent in the TOE boundary as referenced in Figure 1 – TOE and Operational Environment Boundary:

COMPONENT	DESCRIPTION
-----------	-------------

COMPONENT	DESCRIPTION
Agent	Facilitates communicating configuration information and event data between the Event Service and the Event Collector.
Configuration Service	Responsible for configuration for the TOE
Correlation Engine	Provides filters rules to generate correlations in multiple events and creates incidents when a rule is fired. This component also provides all incident management functions.
Database	Stores configuration information, event logs, and reports in addition to events, correlated events, conclusions, and incidents
Event Collector	Receives inbound events from sensors and forwards to the Agent for processing
Event Service	Communicates with Agent to push updated configurations and to receive events for processing and forwarding to the Correlation Engine
Management Console	Allows configuration as well as review of configuration settings and reports. There are two console management interfaces: one is web based and the other is Java-based. The Web-based console is used to configure local items specific to the TOE (such as network settings, date/time, etc.). The Java-based console is used to view incidents, tickets, events and is also used in user & role administration. This application is part of the Information Manager software and downloaded to a workstation via a Web-browser.
Sensor	Receives events from point products attached to the network and forwards to the Event Collector for aggregation.

Table 1-7 – Summary of Components within the TOE Boundary

1.7.5 Logical Boundaries

This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following sections.

TSF	DESCRIPTION
Security Audit	The TOE generates reports on the event analysis activities. Additionally, the TOE supports the provision of log data from each system component, such as user login/logout and incident/ticket management actions. It also records security events such as failed login attempts, etc. Audit trails can be stored for later review and analysis. Audit data is also collected by the Information Manger from the various devices that send

TSF	DESCRIPTION
	event data, and the TOE analyzes this information against a set of correlation rules and filters.
Identification and Authentication	The TOE enforces individual I&A in conjunction with group/role based I&A mechanisms. Operators must successfully authenticate using a unique identifier and password prior to performing any actions on the TOE.
Security Management	<p>The TOE provides administrators with the capabilities to configure, monitor and manage the TOE to fulfill the Security Objectives. Security Management principles relate to management of access control policies as well as management of incidents and tickets.</p> <p>The TOE also allows the administrator to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • review/query audit data, • modify the behavior of data collection, and • restrict access to TOE data to the appropriate authorized user/authorized role. <p>Administrators configure the TOE with the Management Console via Web-based connection.</p> <p>The TOE normalizes events from multiple security products and looks for patterns that indicate potential threats. Incidents can be created and tracked to resolution.</p>

Table 1-8 - Logical Boundary

The TOE also includes the following product documentation from Symantec:

- Symantec™ Security Information Manager 4.8.1 Installation Guide
- Symantec™ Security Information Manager 4.8.1 Administrator Guide
- Symantec™ Security Information Manager 4.8.1 User Guide
- Symantec™ Security Information Manager 4.8.1 Release Notes

1.7.6 TOE Security Functional Policies

The TOE supports the following Security Functional Policy:

1.7.6.1 Administrative Access Control SFP

The TOE implements an access control SFP named *Administrative Access Control SFP*. This SFP determines and enforces the privileges associated with operator roles. An authorized administrator can define specific services available to administrators and users via the Management Console.

2 Conformance Claims

2.1 CC Conformance Claim

The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 3 (July 2009) Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant at Evaluation Assurance Level 2 and augmented with ALC_FLR.2.

2.2 PP Claim

The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.

2.3 Package Claim

The TOE claims conformance to the EAL2 assurance package defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 3 (July 2009). The TOE does not claim conformance to any functional package.

2.4 Conformance Rationale

No conformance rationale is necessary for this evaluation since this Security Target does not claim conformance to a Protection Profile.

3 Security Problem Definition

In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this section describes the following:

- Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which the TOE is intended to be used
- Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or its environment is required
- Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply

3.1 Threats

The TOE and Operational Environment address the threats identified in the following sections.

3.1.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE and the Operational Environment

The TOE addresses the following threats:

T.NO_AUTH	An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the TOE configuration.
T.NO_PRIV	An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned security privileges resulting in unauthorized modification of the TOE configuration and/or data.

3.2 Organizational Security Policies

The organizational security policies relevant to the operation of the TOE are as follows:

P.EVENTS	All events from network-attached devices shall be monitored and reported.
P.INCIDENTS	Security events correlated and classified as incidents should be managed to resolution.

3.3 Assumptions

This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used. The assumptions are ordered into three groups: personnel, physical environment, and operational assumptions.

The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirements documentation for delivery, operation, and user/administrator guidance. The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is

employed.

3.3.1 Personnel Assumptions

- | | |
|----------|--|
| A.MANAGE | Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE in a secure and trusted manner. |
| A.NOEVIL | Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation. |

3.3.2 Physical Environment Assumptions

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| A.LOCATE | The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be located within a facility that provides controlled access. |
| A.PROTECT | The processing platforms on which the TOE resides and the TOE software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification. |

3.3.3 Operational Assumptions

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| A.CONFIG | The TOE is configured to receive all events from network-attached devices. |
| A.TIMESOURCE | The TOE has a trusted source for system time via the system clock. |

4 Security Objectives

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE's operating environment. The security objectives are divided between TOE Security Objectives (i.e., security objectives addressed directly by the TOE) and Security Objectives for the Operating Environment (i.e., security objectives addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means).

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below:

- O.CAPTURE_EVENT The TOE shall collect data (in the form of events) from security and non-security products and apply analytical processes to derive conclusions about events.
- O.MANAGE INCIDENT The TOE shall provide a workflow to manage incidents.
- O.SEC_ACCESS The TOE shall ensure that only those authorized users and applications are granted access to security functions and associated data.

4.2 Security Objectives for the IT Operational Environment

The IT security objectives for the Operational Environment are addressed below:

- OE.ENV_PROTECT The Operational Environment shall provide mechanisms to isolate the TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that TSF components cannot be tampered with or bypassed.
- OE.TIME The Operational Environment shall provide a system clock to provide a trusted source of time to the TOE
- OE.PERSONNEL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance and must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a manner that maintains the TOE security objectives. Any operator of the TOE must be trusted not to disclose their authentication credentials to any individual not authorized for access to the TOE.
- OE.PHYSEC The facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE resides must provide a controlled means of access into the facility.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the

addressed assumptions, threats, and Organizational Security Policies.

THREATS/ ASSUMPTIONS \ OBJECTIVE	O.CAPTURE_EVENT	O.MANAGE INCIDENT	O.SEC_ACCESS	OETIME	OENV PROTECT	OPERSONNEL	OPHYSEC
A.CONFIG					✓		
A.MANAGE					✓		
A.NOEVIL					✓		
A.LOCATE							✓
A.PROTECT					✓		
A.TIMESOURCE			✓		✓		
T.NO_AUTH		✓		✓	✓	✓	
T.NO_PRIV		✓					
P.EVENTS	✓		✓		✓		
P.INCIDENTS		✓	✓			✓	

Table 4-1 – Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, and OSPs to Security Objectives

4.3.1 Rationale for Security Objectives of the TOE

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| T.NO_AUTH | This threat is countered by the following: |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users and applications. |
| T.NO_PRIV | This threat is countered by O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users and applications. |
| P.EVENTS | This organizational security policy is enforced by O.CAPTURE_EVENT, which ensures that the TOE collects security events from security products and non- |

security products deployed within a network and applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events.

P.INCIDENTS This organizational security policy is enforced by O.MANAGE INCIDENT, which ensures that the TOE will provide the capability to provide workflow functionality to manage the resolution of incidents.

4.3.2 Rationale for Security Objectives of the Operational Environment

The IT security objectives for the Operational Environment are addressed below:

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| A.TIMESOURCE | This assumption is addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures the provision of an accurate time source. |
| A.PROTECT | This assumption is addressed by OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components cannot be tampered with or bypassed. |
| T.NO_AUTH | This threat is countered by OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components cannot be tampered with or bypassed. |
| P.EVENTS | OE.TIME provides support for enforcement of this policy by ensuring the provision of an accurate time source. |
| P.INCIDENTS | OE.TIME provides support for enforcement of this policy by ensuring the provision of an accurate time source. |
| A.MANAGE | This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate the TOE in a secure manner. |
| A.NOEVIL | This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate the TOE in a secure manner. |
| A.CONFIG | This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate the TOE in a secure manner. |

A.LOCATE	This assumption is addressed by OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the TOE is operated in an environment that will protect it from unauthorized access and physical threats and attacks that can disturb and corrupt the information generated.
T.NOAUTH	This threat is countered by the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed and administered in a secure manner by competent and security aware personnel in accordance with the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate the TOE in a secure manner.• OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the TOE is operated in an environment that will protect it from unauthorized access and physical threats and attacks that can disturb and corrupt the information generated.
P.EVENTS	OE.PERSONNEL provides support for the enforcement of this policy by ensuring that the TOE is managed and administered in a secure manner by competent and security aware personnel in accordance with the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate the TOE in a secure manner.
P.INCIDENTS	OE.PERSONNEL provides support for the enforcement of this policy by ensuring that the TOE is managed and administered in a secure manner by competent and security aware personnel in accordance with the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate the TOE in a secure manner.

5 Extended Components Definition

5.1 Incident Management (SIM) Class of SFRs

The purpose of this class of requirements is to address the unique nature of the incident management products and provide for the requirements about detecting and responding to incidents on protected IT resources.

5.1.1 SIM_ANL.1 Event Analysis (EXP)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

SIM_ANL.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of actions] analysis function(s) on data collected.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Configuration of the actions to be taken.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:

- a) Basic: Action taken in response to detection of an event.

5.1.2 SIM_RES.1 Incident Resolution (EXP)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies

SIM_RES.1.1 The TSF shall provide a means to track work items that are necessary to resolve an incident.

Management:

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit:

There are no auditable events foreseen.

6 Security Requirements

The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the Operational Environment are specified in this section of the ST.

The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following components from Part 2 of the CC, and those that were extended, all of which are summarized in the following table.

CLASS HEADING	CLASS_FAMILY	DESCRIPTION
Security Audit	FAU_GEN.1	Audit Data Generation
	FAU_SAR.1	Audit Review
User Data Protection	FDP_ACC.1	Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1	Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FDP_ITC.1	Import of User Data without Security Attributes
Identification and Authentication	FIA_UAU.2	User Authentication before Any Action
	FIA_UID.2	User Identification before Any Action
Security Management	FMT_MSA.1	Management of Security Attributes
	FMT_MSA.3	Static Attribute Initialization
	FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions
	FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles
Incident Management	SIM_ANL.1 (EXP)	Event Analysis
	SIM_RES.1 (EXP)	Incident Resolution

Table 6-1 – TOE Security Functional Requirements

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs defined in this section are derived from Part 2 of the CC unless otherwise noted with "(EXP)" following the requirement description. Rationale for the extended requirements can be found in Section 6.5 - Rationale for Extended Security Requirements.

6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

- FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;

- b) All auditable events for the *not specified* level of audit; and
- c) [Startup and shutdown of TOE services
- d) Operator authentication attempts
- e) Incident management events

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [no other information].

6.1.1.2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review

FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the Administrator] with the capability to read [Incident management events] from the audit records.

FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

6.1.2.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] on [
Subjects: All operators
Objects: Reports¹, audit logs, TOE configurations, operator account attributes
Operations: all operator actions].

6.1.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control

FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following: [
Subjects: All operators
Objects: Reports², audit logs, TOE configurations, operator account attributes
Operations: all operator actions].

FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [See Table 7-5 – Roles and Functions].

¹ Reports that have been marked for distribution are not subject to access control

² Reports that have been marked for distribution are not subject to access control

- FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [no additional rules].
- FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [no additional explicit denial rules].

6.1.2.3 FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without Security Attributes

- FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside the TOE.
- FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.
- FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [no additional importation control rules].

6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

6.1.3.1 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action

- FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

6.1.3.2 FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action

- FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

6.1.4 Security Management (FMT)

6.1.4.1 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

- FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to modify and delete the security attributes [Accounts, privileges] to [an authorized administrator].

6.1.4.2 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization

- FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
- FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Administrator] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

6.1.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

- FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:

- [Create accounts]
 - Modify accounts
 - Define privilege levels
 - Determine the behavior of the Administrative Access Control SFP
 - Modify the behavior of the Administrative Access Control SFP
 - Manage security incidents
 - Manage rules
 - Manage event
-].

6.1.4.4 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, User].

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.1.5 Incident Management (SIM)

6.1.5.1 SIM_ANL.1 Event Analysis (EXP)

SIM_ANL.1.1 The TSF shall perform [filtering and correlation] analysis function(s) on data collected.

6.1.5.2 SIM_RES.1 Incident Resolution (EXP)

SIM_RES.1.1 The TSF shall provide a means to track work items that are necessary to resolve an incident.

6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are derived from Part 3 of the CC. These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2). The assurance components are summarized in the following table:

CLASS HEADING	CLASS_FAMILY	DESCRIPTION
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1	Security Architecture Description
	ADV_FSP.2	Security-enforcing Functional Specification
	ADV_TDS.1	Basic Design

CLASS HEADING	CLASS_FAMILY	DESCRIPTION
AGD: Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative Procedures
ALC: Lifecycle Support	ALC_CMC.2	Use of a CM System
	ALC_CMS.2	Parts of the TOE CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery Procedures
ASE: Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1	Evidence of Coverage
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional Testing
	ATE_IND.2	Independent Testing - Sample
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability Analysis

Table 6-2 – Security Assurance Requirements at EAL2

6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

6.3.1 Summary of TOE Security Requirements

The following table provides the correspondence mapping between security objectives for the TOE and the requirements that satisfy them.

OBJECTIVE	O.CAPTURE_EVENT	O.MANAGE INCIDENT	O.SEC_ACCESS
SFR			
FAU_GEN.1	✓	✓	

SFR	OBJECTIVE	O.CAPTURE_EVENT	O.MANAGE INCIDENT	O.SEC_ACCESS
FAU_SAR.1		✓	✓	
FDP_ACC.1				✓
FDP_ACF.1				✓
FDP_ITC.1		✓	✓	
FIA_UAU.2				✓
FIA_UID.2				✓
FMT_MSA.1				✓
FMT_MSA.3				✓
FMT_SMF.1			✓	
FMT_SMR.1			✓	
SIM_ANL.1 (EXP)		✓		
SIM_RES.1 (EXP)			✓	

Table 6-3 – Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives

6.3.2 Sufficiency of Security Requirements

This section confirms that the security requirements are sufficient to satisfy the TOE security objectives, whether in a principal or supporting role.

OBJECTIVE	ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
O.CAPTURE_EVENT	<p>The objective to ensure that the TOE will collect events from security products and non-security products deployed within a network and applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events is met by the following security requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for events and administrative access control and requires that authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret data stored in the audit logs

OBJECTIVE	ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FDP_ITC.1 allows the import of user data from outside the TSC (such as threat, vulnerability, and attack activity information provided by Symantec Global Intelligence Network) to help ensure the latest vulnerabilities and threats are reported. • SIM_ANL.1 (EXP) ensures that the TOE performs analysis on all security events received from network devices
O.MANAGE INCIDENT	<p>The objective to ensure that the TOE provides a workflow to manage incidents is met by the following security requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for incidents and administrative access control and requires that authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret data stored in the audit logs • FDP_ITC.1 allows the import of user data from outside the TSC (such as threat, vulnerability, and attack activity information provided by Symantec Global Intelligence Network) to help ensure the latest vulnerabilities and threats are reported. • FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 support the security functions relevant to the TOE and ensure the definition of an authorized administrator role • SIM_RES.1 (EXP) ensures that the TOE provides the capability to manage status and track action items in the resolution of incidents
O.SEC ACCESS	<p>This objective ensures that the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users and applications.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FDP_ACC.1 requires that all user actions resulting in the access to TOE security functions and configuration data are controlled • FDP_ACF.1 supports FDP_ACC.1 by ensuring that access to TOE security functions, configuration data, audit logs, and account attributes is based on the user privilege level and their allowable actions • FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 require the TOE to enforce identification and authentication of all users prior to configuration of the TOE • FMT_MSA.1 specifies that only privileged administrators can access the TOE security functions and related configuration data • FMT_MSA.3 ensures that the default values of security attributes are restrictive in nature as to enforce the access control policy for the TOE

OBJECTIVE	ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
OE.TIME	<p>The objective to ensure that the TOE operating environment provides an accurate timestamp is met by the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A.TIMESOURCE assumes the TOE has a trusted source for system time via the system clock
OE.ENV_PROTECT	<p>The objective to ensure that the TOE Environment provides mechanisms to isolate the TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assures that TSF components cannot be tampered with or bypassed is met by the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A.PROTECT assumes the processing platforms on which the TOE resides and the TOE software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
OE.PERSONNEL	<p>The objective to ensure that authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance and that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a secure manner is met by the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A.MANAGE assumes Administrators of the TOE are appropriately trained to undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE in a secure and trusted manner. • A.NOEVIL assumes the Administrator is not careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation. • A.CONFIG assumes that the TOE is configured to receive all events from network-attached devices.
OE.PHYSEC	<p>The objective to ensure that the facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE resides provides a controlled means of access into the facility is met by the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A.LOCATE assumes the processing platform on which the TOE resides is assumed to be located within a facility that provides controlled access.

Table 6-4 – Sufficiency of Security Requirements

6.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

The following table provides a mapping of Security Functional Requirements to IT Security Functions:

IT SECURITY FUNCTION TOE SFR	SECURITY AUDIT	IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION	SECURITY MANAGEMENT
FAU_GEN.1	✓		
FAU_SAR.1	✓		
FDP_ACC.1			✓
FDP_ACF.1			✓
FDP_ITC.1			✓
FIA_UAU.2		✓	
FIA_UID.2		✓	
FMT_MSA.1			✓
FMT_MSA.3			✓
FMT_SMF.1			✓
FMT_SMR.1			✓
SIM_ANL.1 (EXP)	✓		
SIM_RES.1 (EXP)			✓

Table 6-5 – Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to IT Security Functions

6.4.1 Sufficiency of IT Security Functions

This section provides appropriate justification that the IT Security Functions are suitable to meet the TOE Security Functional Requirement and that when implemented, contributes to meeting that requirement.

SFR	RATIONALE TO SUPPORT SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY FUNCTION
FAU_GEN.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Audit function, which generates audit logs and summary reports various security events.
FAU_SAR.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Audit function by enabling only authorized users to review and query the audit logs and reports.

FDP_ACC.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Management function, which permits each user to be assigned a privilege level and the respective privileges for that level and only allow access to event and incident management functions for which the user is authorized.
FDP_ACF.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Management function by permitting TOE access based on the privileges assigned a specific privilege level.
FDP_ITC.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Management function, which process the information entering the system. The TOE allows the import of user data from outside the TSC (in this case, information from Symantec Global Intelligence Network) to help ensure the latest threats and vulnerabilities are detected and recorded.
FIA_UAU.2	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Identification and Authentication security function by requiring operators to successfully authenticate themselves using a unique identifier and password prior to performing any action on the TOE.
FIA_UID.2	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Identification and Authentication security function by requiring operators to successfully identify themselves using a unique identifier.
FMT_MSA.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by Security Management functions, which provide the TOE Administrators with authority and ability to modify and delete user accounts and their privileges. These security functions also provide control (via configuration) over the security functions of the TOE.
FMT_MSA.3	This TOE SFR is satisfied by Security Management function, which allows the TOE Administrator to change default settings for each operator and privilege level.
FMT_SMF.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by Security Management function by providing the TOE Administrator the capability for the administrator to select the type of information structure with respect to selected services to be monitored and processed, and the ability to install and configure the TOE services. The Security Management function also provides the capability to modify operator accounts and privilege levels.
FMT_SMR.1	This TOE SFR is satisfied by Security Management function, which assigns each operator to the role of Administrator or User, the latter of which has a subset of Administrator services. These subset services are defined by the Administrator at the time the account is created.
SIM_ANL.1 (EXP)	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Audit security function, which provides mechanisms to collect, correlate, and view audit data from network-attached devices.
SIM_RES.1 (EXP)	This TOE SFR is satisfied by the Security Management security function, which provides mechanisms to report and manage incidents and track their

	resolution.
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Table 6-6 – Sufficiency of IT Security Functions

6.5 Rationale for Extended Security Requirements

A family of Security Information Management (SIM) requirements was created to specifically address the data collected, analyzed, and managed by a SIM solution. The purpose of this family is to address the unique nature of SIM solutions and provide requirements about collecting events and managing incidents. These requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the necessary security functions.

6.6 Rationale for IT Security Requirement Dependencies

This section of the ST demonstrates that the identified SFRs include the appropriate hierarchy and dependencies. The following table lists the TOE SFRs and the SFRs each are hierarchical to, dependent upon and any necessary rationale.

SFR	HIERARCHICAL TO	DEPENDENCY	RATIONALE
FAU_GEN.1	No other components	FPT_STM.1	See note below table
FAU_SAR.1	No other components	FAU_GEN.1	Satisfied
FDP_ACC.1	No other components	FDP_ACF.1	Satisfied
FDP_ACF.1	No other components	FDP_ACC.1	Satisfied
		FMT_MSA.3	Satisfied
FDP_ITC.1	No other components	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	Satisfied
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	Satisfied by FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2	FIA_UID.1	None	Not applicable
FMT_MSA.1	No other components	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	Satisfied
FMT_MSA.3	No other	FMT_SMR.1	Satisfied

SFR	HIERARCHICAL TO	DEPENDENCY	RATIONALE
	components	FMT_MSA.1	
FMT_SMF.1	No other components	None	Not applicable
FMT_SMR.1	No other components	FIA_UID.1	Satisfied by FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1
SIM_ANL.1 (EXP)	No other components	None	Not applicable
SIM_RES.1 (EXP)	No other components	None	Not applicable

Table 6-7 – TOE SFR Dependency Rationale

Note: Although the FPT_STM.1 requirement is a dependency of FAU_GEN.1, it has not been included in this TOE because the timestamping functionality is provided by the Operational Environment (OE.TIME). The audit mechanism within the TOE uses this timestamp in audit data, but the timestamp function is provided by the operating system in the Operational Environment.

6.6.1 Security Assurance Requirements

This section identifies the Lifecycle , Development, Test, and Guidance measures applied to satisfy CC assurance requirements.

SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT	ASSURANCE MEASURES / EVIDENCE TITLE
ADV_ARC.1: Security Architecture Description	Architecture Description: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ADV_FSP.2: Security-Enforcing Functional Specification	Functional Specification: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ADV_TDS.1: Basic Design	Basic Design: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance	Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures Supplement: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures	Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures Supplement: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ALC_CMC.2: Use of a CM System	Configuration Management Processes and Procedures: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1

SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT	ASSURANCE MEASURES / EVIDENCE TITLE
ALC_CMS.2: Parts of the TOE CM Coverage	Configuration Management Processes and Procedures: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ALC_DEL.1: Delivery Procedures	Delivery Procedures: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Reporting	Flaw Reporting: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ATE_COV.1: Evidence of Coverage	Security Testing: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1
ATE_FUN.1: Functional Testing	Security Testing: Symantec™ Security Information Manager Version 4.8.1

Table 6-8 – Security Assurance Measures***6.6.1.1 Rationale for TOE Assurance Requirements Selection***

The TOE stresses assurance through vendor actions that are within the bounds of current best commercial practice. The TOE provides, via review of vendor-supplied evidence, independent confirmation that these actions have been competently performed.

The general level of assurance for the TOE is:

1. Consistent with current best commercial practice for IT development and provides a product that is competitive against non-evaluated products with respect to functionality, performance, cost, and time-to-market.
2. The TOE assurance also meets current constraints on widespread acceptance, by expressing its claims against EAL2 from part 3 of the Common Criteria.
3. Consistent with current best practice for tracking and fixing flaws as well as providing fixes to customers.

7 TOE Summary Specification

This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE and the Assurance Measures applied to ensure their correct implementation.

7.1 TOE Security Functions

The security functions described in the following subsections fulfill the security requirements that are defined in Section 6.1 – TOE Security Functional Requirements. The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows:

- Security Audit
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management

7.1.1 Security Audit

The TOE provides two types of audits:

1. Security events – aggregation and correlation of event data received from security products deployed in the network and
2. System events – audit data relating to the management and general function of the TOE.

The sections below describe each type of audit in more detail.

7.1.1.1 Security Events

Reports are available to operators (e.g., Administrators and Users) through the Dashboard, a function of the Management Console that provides an at-a-glance summary of the status of security products on the network. Operators can access canned reports or can create queries to generate custom reports using one or more queries.

The following table shows how queries are grouped in the Information Manager console and describes each query group:

QUERY GROUP	DESCRIPTION
All	This general category currently contains only one query: <i>Event Counts by Severity Last 7 Days</i> .
Compliance Templates	This group contains event queries to generate specific event views.
Product Queries	This group contains subgroups of queries, one subgroup for each collector that is installed, for example, Symantec Client Security.
SSIM	These queries are specific to Information Manager, and they are organized into product function subgroups.

QUERY GROUP	DESCRIPTION
Security Queries	This group contains event queries, which are grouped by device types that report the events, for example, intrusion devices.

Table 7-1 – Default Query Groups

Information Manager allows customization of the appearance of the output. Additionally, reports can remain private or can be published and distributed for use by other security analysts. When publishing a report, the operator can define whether the published report should be distributed immediately, or they can specify a time or recurring time interval for distribution.

7.1.1.2 *Reviewing Events*

Information Manager provides the following search templates, allowing basic queries on the event archives:

PARAMETER	RESULT
Recent Events	Displays a table that contains the most recent event information in table form.
IP Address Activity	Displays a search template to query for event records that include a specific IP address.
Host Activity	Displays a search template to query for event records that include a specific host name.
User Activity	Displays a search template to query for event records that include a specific user name.
Port Activity	Displays a search template to query for event records that include a specific port number.

Table 7-2 – Default Event Search Queries

Users also have the ability to create custom queries to search events.

The following table summarizes the event correlation rules supported by the TOE:

CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
Rules List	Displays the list of default rules in the System Rules folder and custom rules in the User Rules folder. The User can use the checkboxes to turn rules on and off.
Conditions	Displays the event criteria that are used by rules to declare a security incident. When creating a custom rule, the User can add or remove event criteria from this pane.

CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
Actions	Lets the User specify the follow-up actions that are required to resolve the incident. The User can also specify the user or team who will be assigned to investigate and resolve the incident.
Testing	Lets the User test rules with saved event data, so they can evaluate whether the rule declares incidents when it should. This tool helps fine-tune a rule to filter out events that cause false positives. The User can also debug errors that are preventing the rule from declaring incidents when it should.
History	Shows the date and time when a User last edited a rule.

Table 7-3 – Event Correlation Rules**7.1.1.3 System Events**

The TOE also supports robust system logging capability; Users can monitor the health and performance of the TOE from the Management Console. The following table summarizes the system event data available:

CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
System Status	Displays the memory and CPU utilization, the database statistics, and the status of any database jobs, such as backup or purge.
System	Displays processing rate statistics for system processes such as correlating events, declaring conclusions, and inserting incident data into the Information Manager database.
Filters	Displays filtering statistics for the correlation engine. Users can monitor the Filter tab to determine how many events are being excluded from the correlation engine.
Rules	Displays trigger statistics for each correlation rule. Users can monitor the Rules tab to confirm that rules are being triggered as expected.
Event Service	Displays rate statistics for the following event services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Events received • Event relays • Event normalization • Event archiving • Event correlation forwarding
Administration	View and maintain administrative information, such as User accounts and roles, policies, and paging services.
TOE	Manage event archiving options, such as determining how long to save

Configurations	events before purging the archive.
Product Configurations	Displays a list of all the security products that can be managed on the network.
Visualizer	Displays an illustration that represents the Information Manager network.

Table 7-4 – System Event Descriptions

The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FAU_GEN.1
- FAU_SAR.1
- SIM_ANL.1 (EXP)

7.1.2 Identification and Authentication

The TOE enforces individual identification and authentication and provides a centralized authentication mechanism. Operators with management access must successfully authenticate themselves using a unique identifier and authenticator prior to performing any actions on the TOE (whether those actions are reviewing reports/component logs, managing operator accounts, or configuring TOE components). Identification and Authentication occurs via management GUI interfacing with the SSIM Server.

The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FIA_UAU.2
- FIA_UID.2

7.1.3 Security Management

7.1.3.1 Access Control

The TOE maintains the operator roles described in the following table. The individual roles are categorized into two main roles: the Administrator and the User. **Only the User Administrator has the ability to modify and delete user accounts and privileges.**

ROLE	MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
Administrator	
SES Administrator	Maintains full authority over all of the domains in the environment
Domain Administrator	Maintains full authority over one specific domain in the environment

ROLE	MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
System Administrator	Manages Information Manager. Verifies that events are flowing into the system and that the system is functioning normally
User Administrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates correlation rules and collection filters • Performs user and device administration
User	
Incident Manager	Views all incidents, events, reports, and actions
Report Writer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Views incidents, events, and reports for assigned devices • Reviews and validates incident response • Provides attestation of incident review and response by administrators to GAO and others
Report User	Views events and reports for assigned devices
Rule Editor	Creates, edits, and deploys rules

Table 7-5 – Roles and Functions**7.1.3.2 Incident Management**

The TOE facilitates management of security incidents and alerting (non-security) incidents. An incident is derived from one or more events that are logged in the event database. For example, when a firewall-down event occurs, an alerting incident could be generated. A security incident might be created when an internal port sweep event occurs. The term "incidents" includes both security incidents and alerting incidents.

Incident management begins when an incident is created. Information Manager provides two methods of incident creation:

1. Automatic incident creation – the Correlation Engine creates incidents from events, and then the events are assigned according to automatic assignment rules.
2. Manual incident creation – the User determines which events are related and manually correlates the events by grouping them as a single incident.

After an event or group of events is selected and identified as an incident, the incident is assigned to an analyst for investigation and resolution. Information Manager provides the analyst with recommended actions to be completed. A history log tracks any changes to the incident and lets the analyst note important facts.

The following incident management activities are available to an authorized User:

Incident Management Functions
View incidents
Create or modify incidents

Filter incidents
Create tickets from incidents
Close incidents

Table 7-6 - Incident Management Functions

As Users work through the incidents that are logged in the TOE, products affected by the incident may require specific tasks to resolve the incident or to prevent further incidents.

The TOE supports the import of user data without security attributes. Imported user data includes existing/emerging vulnerability, threat, and risk information that is downloaded from Symantec Global Intelligence Network, a comprehensive collection of vendor-neutral security data sources of information about known and emerging vulnerabilities, threats, risks and global attack activity. This user data is imported from Symantec Global Intelligence Network via SSL session to the Correlation Engine component of the TOE.

The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FDP_ACC.1
- FDP_ACF.1
- FDP_ITC.1
- FMT_MSA.1
- FMT_MSA.3
- FMT_SMF.1
- FMT_SMR.1
- SIM_RES.1 (EXP)