

Supporting Document Mandatory
Technical Document
*Evaluation Activities for collaborative PP-Module for
Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking
the device - [BIOSD]*

Version 1.0, May 11, 2020

Table of Contents

Foreword	1
Technical Editor	1
Revision History	1
General Purpose	1
Field of special use	1
Acknowledgements	2
1. Introduction	3
1.1. Supporting Document Reference	3
1.2. Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document	3
1.3. Structure of the Document	3
1.4. Terminology	4
1.4.1. Glossary	4
1.4.2. Acronyms	4
2. Evaluation Activities for SFRs	5
2.1. Structure of EAs	5
2.2. Justification for EAs for SFRs	6
2.3. Identification and Authentication (FIA)	6
2.3.1. EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.1	6
2.3.2. EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.2	7
2.3.3. EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.1	10
2.3.4. EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.2	12
2.4. Protection of the TSF (FPT)	14
2.4.1. EA for FPT_BDP_EXT.1	14
2.4.2. EA for FPT_BDP_EXT.2	15
2.4.3. EA for FPT_BDP_EXT.3	17
2.4.4. EA for FPT_PBT_EXT.1	18
3. Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based Requirements	20
4. Evaluation Activities for Optional Requirements	21
4.1. Identification and Authentication (FIA)	21
4.1.1. EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.3	21
4.1.2. EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.3	22
4.2. User data protection (FDP)	23
4.2.1. EA for FDP_RIP.2	23
5. Evaluation Activities for SARs	24
6. Evaluation Activities for PAD testing	25
6.1. Introduction	25
6.1.1. Presentation Attack Instrument (artefact) species	25
6.2. EAs for ATE_IND.1 (Independent testing - conformance)	26

6.2.1. Independent test activities using Toolbox	26
6.2.2. Justification for EAs for ATE_IND.1	26
6.3. EA for AVA_VAN.1 (Vulnerability survey)	26
6.3.1. Penetration test activities using Toolbox	26
6.3.2. Justification for EAs for AVA_VAN.1	30
7. Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy	31
7.1. Requirements for the performance report	31
7.2. Summary of contents	31
7.3. Reporting items description	32
7.3.1. Overview of the performance testing	32
7.3.2. Target application and influential factors	34
7.3.3. Test subject selection	35
7.3.4. Test instructions and training	35
7.3.5. Test subject management	36
7.3.6. Test procedure	36
8. Requirement for the number of test subject, transaction and samples	38
8.1. Recommendations	38
8.1.1. Test scenario for biometric verification	38
8.1.2. Maximum number of templates	39
8.1.3. Maximum number of samples per test subject	39
8.1.4. Maximum number of transactions per test subject	39
8.1.5. Statistical certainty for FAR/FMR	39
8.1.6. Statistical certainty for FRR/FNMR	39
8.2. Example – fingerprint verification	40
9. Attack Potential and TOE resistance	41
9.1. Calculating attack potential for generic biometric system	41
9.1.1. Identification and exploitation of attacks	41
9.1.2. Factors to be considered	42
9.1.3. Calculation of attack potential	45
9.1.4. Rating of vulnerabilities and TOE resistance	46
9.2. Application notes for [BIOPP-Module]	47
9.2.1. Application note for Elapsed time for Identification	48
9.2.2. Application note for Window of Opportunity (Access to TOE) for Identification	48
9.2.3. Application note for Window of Opportunity (Access to TOE) for Exploitation	48
9.3. Pass/Fail criteria for EAs for PAD testing (FIA_MBE_EXT.3 and FIA_MBV_EXT.3)	48
9.3.1. Pass/Fail criteria	48
9.3.2. Additional application notes for AGD Class	49
10. Related Documents	51

Foreword

This is a Supporting Document, intended to complement the Common Criteria (CC) version 3 and the associated Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

This Supporting Document is a "Mandatory Technical Document", whose application is mandatory for evaluations and only those certificates issued as a result of its application are mutually recognized under the CCRA.

This Supporting Document has been developed by the Biometric Security iTC (BIO-iTC) and is designed to be used to support the evaluations of TOEs against the PP-Module identified in [Section 1.2, "Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document"](#).

Technical Editor

Biometric Security international Technical Community (BIO-iTC)

(<https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/communities/Bio.cfm>)

Revision History

Table 1. Revision history

Version	Date	Description
0.1	March, 2018	Initial release for internal review
0.2	August 2018	Second release for internal review
0.3	May 1, 2019	Third release for internal review
0.4	August 5, 2019	Updates based on Public Review Draft 1 comments
0.5	December 5, 2019	Updates to make PAD optional
0.92	December 20, 2019	Public Review Draft 2
0.95	March 13, 2020	Proposed Release
1.0	May 11, 2020	Public Release

General Purpose

See [Section 1.2](#).

Field of special use

This Supporting Document applies to the evaluation of TOEs claiming conformance with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [[BIOPP-Module](#)].

Acknowledgements

This Supporting Document was developed by the Biometric Security international Technical Community with representatives from industry, Government agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Supporting Document Reference

- Supporting Document Reference: Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOSD]
- Supporting Document Version: 1.0
- Supporting Document Date: May 11, 2020

1.2. Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document

This Supporting Document (BIOSD) defines the Evaluation Activities (EAs) associated with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module] that is intended for use with the base PP identified in the appropriate PP-Configuration.

This BIOSD is mandatory for evaluations of TOEs that claim conformance to [BIOPP-Module].

The Biometric Security technical area has a number of specialised aspects, such as those relating to the biometric enrolment and verification, and to the particular ways in which the TOE optionally needs to be assessed across a range of different artificial artefact instruments (specifically artificial, not natural, Presentation Attack Instruments). This degree of specialisation, and the associations between individual SFRs in [BIOPP-Module], make it important for both efficiency and effectiveness that EAs are given more specific interpretations than those found in the generic CEM activities.

Although EAs are defined mainly for the evaluator to follow, the definitions in this BIOSD aim to provide a common understanding for developers, evaluators and users as to what aspects of the TOE are tested in an evaluation against [BIOPP-Module], and to what depth the testing is carried out. This common understanding in turn contributes to the goal of ensuring that evaluations against [BIOPP-Module] achieve comparable, transparent and repeatable results. In general, the definition of EAs will also help developers to prepare for evaluation by identifying specific requirements for their TOE. The specific requirements in EAs may in some cases clarify the meaning of SFRs, and may identify particular requirements for the content of Security Targets (STs) (especially the TOE Summary Specification (TSS)), AGD guidance, and possibly supplementary information (e.g. for biometric performance testing – see [Chapter 7, Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy](#)).

1.3. Structure of the Document

EAs can be defined for both SFRs and SARs. These are defined in separate sections of this BIOSD.

If any EA cannot be successfully completed in an evaluation then the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'fail'. In rare cases there may be acceptable reasons why an EA may be modified or

deemed not applicable for a particular TOE, but this must be agreed with the Certification Body for the evaluation.

In general, if all EAs (for both SFRs and SARs) are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict when the EAs have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the EAs were not sufficient for that TOE.

1.4. Terminology

1.4.1. Glossary

For definitions of standard CC terminology see [\[CC1\]](#). For definitions of biometrics and the computer, see [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) and the base PP.

1.4.2. Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
BAF	Biometric Authentication Factor
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP	collaborative Protection Profile
EA	Evaluation Activity
iTC	International Technical Community
NBAF	(Non-Biometric) Authentication Factor
PAI	Presentation Attack Instrument (artefact)
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
BIOSD	Supporting Document
SEE	Secure Execution Environment
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target Of Evaluation
TSFI	TOE Security Functions Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification

Chapter 2. Evaluation Activities for SFRs

2.1. Structure of EAs

All EAs for SFRs defined in this Section include the following items to keep consistency among EAs.

a. Objective of the EA

Objective defines the goal of the EA. Assessment Strategy describes how the evaluator can achieve this goal in more detail and Pass/Fail criteria defines how the evaluator can determine whether the goal is achieved or not.

b. Dependency

Where the EA depends on completion of another EA then the dependency and the other EA is also identified here.

c. Tool types required to perform the EA

If performing the EA requires any tool types in order to complete the EA then these tool types are defined here.

d. Required input from the developer or other entities

Additional detail is specified here regarding the required format and content of the inputs to the EA.

e. Assessment Strategy

Assessment Strategy provides guidance and details on how to perform the EA. It includes, as appropriate to the content of the EA;

1. How to assess the input from the developer or other entities for completeness with respect to the EA
2. How to make use of any tool types required (potentially including guidance for the calibration or setup of the tools)
3. Guidance on the steps for performing the EA

f. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator uses these criteria to determine whether the EA has demonstrated that the TOE has met the relevant requirement or that it has failed to meet the relevant requirement.

g. Requirements for reporting

Specific reporting requirements that support transparency and reproducibility of the Pass/Fail judgement are defined here.

2.2. Justification for EAs for SFRs

EAs in this BIOSD provide specific or more detailed guidance to evaluate the biometric system, however, it is the CEM work units based on which the evaluator shall perform evaluations.

This Section explains how EAs for SFRs are derived from the particular CEM work units identified in Assessment Strategy to show the consistency and compatibility between the CEM work units and EAs in this BIOSD.

Assessment Strategy for ASE_TSS requires the evaluator to examine that the TSS provides sufficient design descriptions and its verdicts will be associated with the CEM work unit ASE_TSS.1-1. Evaluator verdicts associated with the supplementary information will also be associated with ASE_TSS.1-1, since the requirement to provide such evidence is specified in ASE in the base PP from which SARs of [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) are inherited.

Assessment Strategy for AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP requires the evaluator to examine that the AGD guidance provides sufficient information for the administrators/users as it pertains to SFRs, its verdicts will be associated with CEM work units ADV_FSP.1-7, AGD_OPE.1-4, and AGD_OPE.1-5.

Assessment Strategy for ATE_IND requires the evaluator to conduct testing of the TOE that the BIO-ITC has determined is necessary in the context of the associated SFR. While the evaluator is expected to develop tests, there may be instances where it is more practical for the developer to construct tests, or where the developer may have existing tests. Therefore, it is acceptable for the evaluator to witness developer-generated tests in lieu of executing the tests. In this case, the evaluator must ensure the developer's tests are executing both in the manner declared by the developer and as mandated by the EA. The CEM work units that derive those EAs are: ATE_IND.1-3, ATE_IND.1-4, ATE_IND.1-5, ATE_IND.1-6, and ATE_IND.1-7.

2.3. Identification and Authentication (FIA)

2.3.1. EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.1

2.3.1.1. Objective of the EA

The evaluator shall verify that the TOE enrolls a user only after successful authentication of the user by his/her NBAF. Security requirements for the NBAF mechanism are defined in the base PP and out of scope of this EA.

2.3.1.2. Dependency

There is no dependency to other EAs defined in this BIOSD.

2.3.1.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

2.3.1.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FIA_MBE_EXT.1 at high level description
- b. AGD guidance shall provide clear instructions for a user to enrol to the biometric system

AGD guidance may include online assistance, errors, prompts or warning provided by the TOE during the enrolment attempt.

2.3.1.5. Assessment Strategy

2.3.1.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to understand how the TOE enrolls a user and examine the AGD guidance to confirm that a user is required to enter his/her valid NBAF before the biometric enrolment.

2.3.1.5.2. Strategy for ATE_IND

The evaluator shall perform the following steps to verify that the TOE performs the biometric enrolment correctly.

1. The evaluator shall try to enrol without setting a NBAF and confirm that it is not possible to enrol.
2. The evaluator shall set a NBAF and confirm that enrolment is not possible without entering the NBAF correctly beforehand.

2.3.1.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. Information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS and AGD guidance
- b. Only users authenticated by a NBAF can enrol and any attempts to enrol without the authentication are rejected through the independent testing

2.3.1.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

2.3.2. EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.2

2.3.2.1. Objective of the EA

Biometric verification performance depends on quality of samples from which templates are generated. The evaluator shall examine that the TOE checks the quality of samples to create enrolment and authentication templates based on the assessment criteria so that the TOE can verify a user with an adequate reliability.

If the TOE doesn't create authentication templates, this EA is only applicable to enrolment templates.

The evaluator shall keep in mind that the assessment criteria for different biometric modalities

may not be the same. The evaluator shall evaluate each biometric modality separately if the ST author selects multiple biometric modalities in FIA_MBV_EXT.1.1.

2.3.2.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.1 first to confirm the biometric enrolment can be done correctly.

2.3.2.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

Developer shall provide a test platform for the evaluator to conduct the test described in the Assessment Strategy.

2.3.2.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FIA_MBE_EXT.2 at high level description
- b. AGD guidance shall provide clear instructions for a user to enrol to the biometric system
- c. Supplementary information (Assessment criteria for samples) shall describe assessment criteria for creating samples

AGD guidance may include online assistance, prompts or warning provided by the TOE during the enrolment attempt.

2.3.2.5. Assessment Strategy

2.3.2.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

Enrolment templates

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to understand how the TOE generates templates of sufficient quality from samples at enrolment. The evaluator shall also examine the AGD guidance about how the TOE supports a user to enrol correctly and how the TOE behaves when low quality samples are presented to the TOE for enrolment.

The evaluator shall examine the [assessment criteria for samples](#) to determine how the TOE creates the templates from samples based on this assessment criteria. The [assessment criteria for samples](#) may include;

- a. Quality requirements for the biometric sample to ensure that a sufficient amount of distinctive features is available
- b. Method to quantify the quality of samples (e.g. method to generate quality score)
- c. Assessment criteria to accept the sample of sufficient quality (e.g. compare quality score to quality threshold)
- d. Quality standard that the TOE uses to perform the assessment if the TOE follows such standard (e.g. NFIQ for fingerprint)

Authentication templates

If the TOE creates authentication templates, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to understand how the TOE generate sufficient quality of authentication templates.

The evaluator shall examine the [assessment criteria for samples](#) to determine how the TOE creates the authenticate templates from samples based on its assessment criteria. The [assessment criteria for samples](#) may include a) – d) in [Section 2.3.2.5.1, “Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP”](#) and;

- e. Additional assessment criteria to applied to creation of authentication templates

2.3.2.5.2. Strategy for ATE_IND

Enrolment templates

The evaluator shall perform the following test to verify that the TOE generates templates of sufficient quality.

The following test steps require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

1. The evaluator shall perform biometric enrolment that results in creation of samples from which templates will be created that do not satisfy the assessment criteria described in [assessment criteria for samples](#) (e.g. presenting biometric samples of low quality)
2. The evaluator may examine feedback messages shown (e.g. “Finger too wet” in case of fingerprint verification) to understand how the evaluator can present a biometric characteristic that does not meet the [assessment criteria for samples](#)
3. The evaluator may ask the developer how low quality samples can be created if the TOE does not show any feedback messages
4. The evaluator shall check the TOE internal data (e.g. quality scores and quality threshold) to confirm that the TOE does not create enrolment templates from samples that do not meet the assessment criteria specified in the [assessment criteria for samples](#)
5. The evaluator shall check the TOE internal data (e.g. quality scores and quality threshold) to confirm that any enrolment templates are created by TOE from samples that meet the assessment criteria specified in the [assessment criteria for samples](#) correctly

Authentication templates

The evaluator shall perform the following test to verify that the TOE generates authentication templates of sufficient quality only if the evaluator judges that creating authentication templates is feasible.

The following test steps require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

1. The evaluator shall enrol to the biometric system
2. The evaluator shall present biometric samples repeatedly to trigger the TOE to create authentication templates
3. The evaluator shall check the TOE internal data (e.g. quality scores and quality threshold) to

confirm that the TOE does not create authentication templates from samples that do not meet the assessment criteria specified in the [assessment criteria for samples](#)

4. The evaluator shall check the TOE internal data (e.g. quality scores and quality threshold) to confirm that any authentication templates created by TOE from samples that meet the assessment criteria specified in the [assessment criteria for samples](#) correctly

2.3.2.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. Information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS, AGD guidance and [assessment criteria for samples](#)
- b. The TOE creates only templates from samples that pass the [assessment criteria](#) through the independent testing

2.3.2.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

2.3.3. EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.1

2.3.3.1. Objective of the EA

The evaluator shall verify that the TOE implements the biometric verification mechanism whose error rates is equal or lower than the claimed error rates (i.e. value of FAR/FMR and FRR/FNMR specified in FIA_MBV_EXT.1.2).

The evaluator shall solely rely on the supplementary information (developer's [performance report](#)) to achieve this objective following instruction defined in Assessment Strategy.

[\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) assumes that the biometric verification is not used for the security sensitive services and the TOE operational environment also limits the maximum number of failed verification attempts in succession. Therefore, risk of zero-effort impostor attempts is low and the developer may not follow the statistical method (e.g. Rule of 3 or Rule of 30) to measure the biometric verification performance.

2.3.3.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EAs for FIA_MBE_EXT.1 and FIA_MBE_EXT.2 first to confirm the biometric enrolment can be done correctly.

2.3.3.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

2.3.3.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FIA_MBV_EXT.1 at high level description
- b. AGD guidance shall provide clear instructions for a user to verify one's biometric to unlock the computer
- c. Supplementary information (developer's performance report) shall describe the developer's performance test protocol and result of testing

AGD guidance may include online assistance, errors, prompts or warning provided by the TOE during the verification attempt.

2.3.3.5. Assessment Strategy

2.3.3.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to understand how the TOE verifies a user with his/her biometric characteristics. The evaluator shall also examine the guidance about how the TOE supports a user to verify one's biometric correctly and how the TOE behaves when biometric verification is succeeded or failed.

The evaluator shall examine developer's [performance report](#) to verify that the developer conducts the objective and repeatable performance testing. Minimum requirements for conducting performance testing are defined in [Chapter 7, Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy](#).

Requirements defined in [Chapter 7, Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy](#) are based on ISO/IEC 19795. This standard specifies requirements on performance test protocol, recording and reporting of results based on the best practices developed by relevant organizations. The evaluator shall confirm that developer's [performance report](#) meets all requirements in [Chapter 7, Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy](#) and seek a rationale if the developer's [performance report](#) does not meet any requirements and determine whether the rationale is valid or not.

Finally, the evaluator shall check that the measured error rates (FRR/FAR or FNMR/FMR) reported in the developer's [performance report](#) is equal or lower than the error rates specified in the FIA_MBV_EXT.1.2.

2.3.3.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. Information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS and AGD guidance
- b. Developer's [performance report](#) meets all requirements in [Chapter 7, Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy](#) and valid rationale is provided by developer if the developer's [performance report](#) doesn't meet any requirements
- c. FRR/FAR or FNMR/FMR measured by the developer's performance testing is equal or lower than "defined value" specified in FIA_MBV_EXT.1.2

2.3.3.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of the result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

The evaluator shall also report a justification why evaluator determines the rationale provided by developer is valid if the developer's [performance report](#) does not meet any requirements in [Chapter 7, Developer's performance report and its assessment strategy](#).

2.3.4. EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.2

2.3.4.1. Objective of the EA

Biometric verification performance depends on quality of samples that is compared to templates. The evaluator shall examine that the TOE checks the quality of samples based on the assessment criteria to verify a user with an adequate reliability.

The evaluator shall keep in mind that the assessment criteria for different biometric modalities may not be the same. The evaluator shall evaluate each biometric modality separately if the ST author selects multiple biometric modalities in FIA_MBV_EXT.1.

The evaluator shall also keep in mind that assessment criteria used for templates defined in [Section 2.3.2.5.1, "Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP"](#) and samples defined in this section may not be the same. Assessment criteria for samples defined in [Section 2.3.2.5.1, "Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP"](#) may be stricter than the one for samples defined in this section.

2.3.4.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EAs for FIA_MBE_EXT.1, FIA_MBE_EXT.2 and FIA_MBV_EXT.1 first to confirm the biometric enrolment and verification can be done correctly.

2.3.4.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

Developer shall provide a test platform for the evaluator to conduct the test described in the Assessment Strategy.

2.3.4.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FIA_MBV_EXT.2 at high level description
- b. AGD guidance shall provide clear instruction for a user to verify one's biometric
- c. Supplementary information (Assessment criteria for samples) shall describe assessment criteria for creating samples

AGD guidance may include online assistance, errors, prompts or warning provided by the TOE during the verification attempt.

2.3.4.5. Assessment Strategy

2.3.4.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to understand how the TOE checks quality of samples captured. The evaluator shall also examine the guidance, including online assistance or prompts provided by the TOE, about how the TOE supports a user to verify one's biometric correctly and how the TOE behaves when low quality samples are presented to the TOE.

The evaluator shall examine the [assessment criteria for samples](#) to check how the TOE checks the quality of samples based on its assessment criteria. The [assessment criteria for samples](#) may include;

- a. Quality requirements for the biometric sample to ensure that a sufficient amount of distinctive features is available
- b. Method to quantify the quality of samples (e.g. method to generate quality score)
- c. Assessment criteria to accept the sample of sufficient quality (e.g. compare quality score to quality threshold)
- d. Quality standard that the TOE uses to perform the assessment if the TOE follows such standard (e.g. NFIQ for fingerprint)

2.3.4.5.2. Strategy for ATE_IND

The evaluator shall perform the following test to verify that the TOE checks the quality of samples based on the assessment criteria.

The following test steps require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

1. The evaluator shall present biometric samples of low quality for biometric verification that do not satisfy the assessment criteria described in [assessment criteria for samples](#)
2. The evaluator may examine feedback messages shown (e.g. "Finger too wet" in case of fingerprint verification) to understand how the evaluator can present a biometric characteristic that does not meet the [assessment criteria for samples](#)
3. The evaluator may ask the developer how low quality samples can be created if the TOE doesn't show any feedback messages
4. The evaluator shall present biometric samples of acceptable quality for biometric verification that satisfy the assessment criteria described in [assessment criteria for samples](#)
5. The evaluator shall check the TOE internal data (e.g. quality scores and quality threshold) to confirm that the TOE rejects any samples that do not meet the assessment criteria specified in the [assessment criteria for samples](#)
6. The evaluator shall check the TOE internal data (e.g. quality scores and quality threshold) to confirm that any samples accepted by TOE meet the assessment criteria specified in the [assessment criteria for samples](#) correctly

2.3.4.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. Information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS, AGD guidance and [assessment criteria for samples](#)
- b. The TOE accepts only samples that pass the [assessment criteria](#) through the independent testing

2.3.4.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of the result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

2.4. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

2.4.1. EA for FPT_BDP_EXT.1

2.4.1.1. Objective of the EA

[[BIOPP-Module](#)] assumes that the computer provides the Secure Execution Environment (SEE), an operating environment separate from the main computer operating system. Access to the SEE is highly restricted and may be made available through special processor modes, separate security processors or a combination to provide this separation.

Evaluation of this SEE is out of scope of [[BIOPP-Module](#)] and the evaluator does not need to evaluate this environment itself. However, the evaluator shall examine that the TOE processes any plaintext biometric data within the security boundary of the SEE. The SEE is responsible for preventing any entities outside the environment from accessing plaintext biometric data.

FPT_BDP_EXT.1 applies to plaintext biometric data being processed during biometric enrolment and verification. Protection of transmitted and stored biometric data is out of scope of this EA and covered by FPT_BDP_EXT.2 and FPT_BDP_EXT.3 respectively.

2.4.1.2. Dependency

There is no dependency to other EAs defined in this BIOSD.

2.4.1.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

2.4.1.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FPT_BDP_EXT.1 at high level description

2.4.1.5. Assessment Strategy

2.4.1.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS

As depicted in Figure 1 of [BIOPP-Module], biometric characteristics are captured by a biometric capture sensor and then sent to the processors in the computer for signal processing, PAD and comparison and the decision outcome is returned. This is a typical process flow of biometric verification; however, a biometric capture sensor may do all the tasks within the sensor. In either case, all TSF modules (i.e. biometric capture sensor and any software running in biometric capture sensor and the computer processors) that process plaintext biometric data must be separated from any entities outside the SEE. Any plaintext biometric data must not be accessible from any entities outside the SEE.

In any case, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that;

- a. All TSF modules run within the SEE and any entities outside the SEE including the computer operating system can't interfere with processing of these modules
 - If a biometric capture sensor returns plaintext biometric data, any entities outside the SEE can't access the sensor and data captured by the sensor
- b. All plaintext biometric data is retained in volatile memory within the SEE and any entities outside the SEE including the computer operating system can't access these data. Any TSFIs do not reveal plaintext biometric data to any entities outside the SEE

The evaluator shall keep in mind that the objective of this EA is not evaluating the SEE itself. This EA is derived from ASE_TSS.1.1 which requires that the TSS to provide potential consumers of the TOE with a high-level view of how the developer intends to satisfy each SFR. The evaluator shall check the TSS to seek for a logical explanation how the above criteria are satisfied considering this scope of the requirement.

2.4.1.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS

2.4.1.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

2.4.2. EA for FPT_BDP_EXT.2

2.4.2.1. Objective of the EA

The intention of this requirement is to prevent the logging, backing up or sending of plaintext biometric data to a service that transmits the information outside the security boundary of the SEE.

For example, the TOE may transmit biometric data to the developer's server for diagnostic purpose with the consent of the user. However, the TOE must encrypt the plaintext biometric data before sending it to the developer's server for diagnostic purposes.

In any case, the evaluator shall determine that the TOE does not transmit any plaintext biometric

data outside the security boundary of the SEE.

2.4.2.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EAs for FPT_BDP_EXT.1 first to confirm the TSF processes any plaintext biometric data within the security boundary of the secure execution environment.

2.4.2.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

2.4.2.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FPT_BDP_EXT.2 at high level description
- b. AGD guidance shall describe all functions that transmit biometric data

2.4.2.5. Assessment Strategy

2.4.2.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and AGD guidance to identify any functions that transmit biometric data to any entities outside the SEE and type of biometric data that is transmitted.

If the TOE transmits biometric data, the evaluator shall examine the activities that happen on data transmission to confirm that;

- a. The TOE requires an explicit user consent and user authentication to enable the transmission
- b. The TOE never transmits plaintext biometric data to outside the SEE. This means;
 1. The TOE encrypts plaintext biometric data to be transmitted using the cryptographic functions evaluated based on the base PP within the SEE
 2. If the TOE stores the encrypted biometric data outside the SEE for transmission, the TOE deletes such data after the transmission
 3. If the TOE displays the plaintext biometric data to the user to seek approval for transmission, such process is performed within the SEE
- c. The TOE disables the transmission immediately after the TOE achieves its purpose

2.4.2.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS and AGD guidance

2.4.2.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

2.4.3. EA for FPT_BDP_EXT.3

2.4.3.1. Objective of the EA

Plaintext biometric data, especially templates, are highly sensitive personal data because biometric characteristics may be recovered from them. Plaintext biometric data shall be processed within the SEE as required by FPT_BDP_EXT.1. However, part of plaintext biometric data including templates may need to be stored in the computer for biometric verification. Protection of such stored biometric data is not covered by FPT_BDP_EXT.1.

The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE encrypts plaintext biometric data within the SEE before storing it in any non-volatile memory that is accessible to entities outside the SEE. If the evaluator confirms that the TOE does not store plaintext biometric data outside the SEE (e.g. biometric capture sensor processes biometric data within the sensor and return only decision outcome to the TSF modules running inside the SEE) during performing the EA of FPT_BDP_EXT.1, this requirement is deemed satisfied.

2.4.3.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EAs for FPT_BDP_EXT.1 first to confirm the TSF processes any plaintext biometric data within the security boundary of the SEE.

2.4.3.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

Developer shall provide a test platform for the evaluator to conduct the test described in the Assessment Strategy.

2.4.3.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FPT_BDP_EXT.3 at high level description
- b. Supplementary information (file list/format and cryptographic algorithm) shall list storage locations and the format of files that contain biometric data, and the cryptographic algorithms used to encrypt those files

2.4.3.5. Assessment Strategy

2.4.3.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to understand the activities that happen on biometric enrolment and verification relating to encrypting and storing biometric data. The evaluator shall confirm that;

- a. The TSS lists the type of biometric data that the TOE stores in non-volatile memory outside the SEE
- b. The TOE encrypts all plaintext biometric data listed in the TSS within the SEE before storing it in the non-volatile memory
- c. The TOE uses cryptographic functions evaluated based on the base PP to encrypt the data

2.4.3.5.2. Strategy for ATE_IND

The evaluator shall perform the following test to verify that the TOE encrypts plaintext biometric data if the TOE stores the data in non-volatile memory outside the SEE.

The following test steps require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

1. The evaluator shall check that all cryptographic algorithms listed in “file list/format and cryptographic algorithm” are successfully evaluated based on the base PP
2. The evaluator shall load an application onto the computer. This application shall attempt to traverse over all file systems and report any newly created files
3. The evaluator shall perform biometric enrolment and verification and run the app to list new files
4. The evaluator shall compare files reported by the application and ones listed in “file list/format and cryptographic algorithm”
5. If evaluator finds newly created files not listed in “file list/format and cryptographic algorithm”, the evaluator shall confirm that those files do not include plaintext biometric data with the support from developer
6. For all files listed in “file list/format and cryptographic algorithm”, the evaluator shall display the contents of files and check that the files are encrypted. The evaluator can assume that encryption is done correctly because the TOE uses cryptographic algorithms evaluated based on the base PP. The evaluator shall compare the content of files to the format defined in “file list/format and cryptographic algorithm” to check that the files do not follow the defined format to implicitly assume files are encrypted.

2.4.3.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. Information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS.
- b. The TOE encrypts any plaintext biometric data before storing it outside the SEE through the independent testing

2.4.3.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

2.4.4. EA for FPT_PBT_EXT.1

2.4.4.1. Objective of the EA

Only an authenticated user can add one’s own templates during biometric enrolment as defined in the FIA_MBE_EXT.1 and those templates are not stored outside the SEE without encryption as required by the FPT_BDP_EXT.3. However, the TOE may provide functions (e.g. revocation of templates) to access the templates. The evaluator shall confirm that only an authenticated user

using a NBAF as specified by the ST author can access the templates through the TSFI provided by the TOE.

2.4.4.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.1 first to confirm the biometric enrolment can be done correctly.

2.4.4.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

2.4.4.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FPT_BDP_EXT.1 at high level description
- b. AGD guidance shall describe how the user can access the templates

2.4.4.5. Assessment Strategy

2.4.4.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and AGD guidance to identify any TSFI through which the user can access (e.g. revoke) the templates. The evaluator shall confirm that those TSFI requires using a NBAF as specified by the ST author.

2.4.4.5.2. Strategy for ATE_IND

The evaluator shall perform the following test steps to verify that the TOE protects the templates as specified in TSS and AGD guidance.

1. The evaluator shall perform functions through the TSFIs that access the templates
2. The evaluator shall check that the TSFI requires using a NBAF as specified by the ST author.

2.4.4.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. Information necessary to perform this EA is described in the TSS and AGD guidance
- b. The TOE protects the templates using a NBAF as specified by the ST author

2.4.4.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

Chapter 3. Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based Requirements

The [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) does not contain any selection-based requirements.

Chapter 4. Evaluation Activities for Optional Requirements

4.1. Identification and Authentication (FIA)

4.1.1. EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.3

4.1.1.1. Objective of the EA

The evaluator shall verify that the TOE prevents use of artificial artefacts during biometric enrolment. This section defines EAs derived from ASE_TSS.1, AGD_OPE.1 and ADV_FSP.1.

The main part of EA for FIA_MBE_EXT.3 is evaluator's testing using the artefact. [Chapter 6, Evaluation Activities for PAD testing](#) defines EAs for ATE_IND.1 and AVA_VAN.1 in detail that the evaluator shall perform for PAD testing during the biometric verification. The same EAs can be applied to PAD testing during the biometric enrolment.

4.1.1.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EAs for FIA_MBE_EXT.1 and FIA_MBE_EXT.2 first to confirm the biometric enrolment can be done correctly.

4.1.1.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

4.1.1.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FIA_MBE_EXT.3 at high level description. TSS may only state that the TOE implements PAD mechanism and may not disclose any information about the PAD mechanism itself in detail because such information is beyond the scope of assurance level claimed by [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) and may also be exploited by attackers
- b. AGD guidance may provide information about how the TOE reacts when the artefact is detected

4.1.1.5. Assessment Strategy

4.1.1.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and AGD guidance to check that the TSS or AGD guidance states that the TOE prevents the use of the artefact during biometric enrolment.

The main part of the EA is the evaluator's testing defined in [Chapter 6, Evaluation Activities for PAD testing](#). The evaluator should not require a detailed design description of PAD from the developer because it's beyond the scope of assurance level claimed in [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#).

4.1.1.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. TSS or AGD guidance states that the TOE prevents the use of the artefact during biometric enrolment

4.1.1.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

4.1.2. EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.3

4.1.2.1. Objective of the EA

The evaluator shall verify that the TOE prevents use of artificial artefacts during biometric verification. This section defines EAs derived from ASE_TSS.1, AGD_OPE.1 and ADV_FSP.1.

The main part of EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.3 is the evaluator's testing using the artefact. The [Chapter 6, Evaluation Activities for PAD testing](#) defines EAs for ATE_IND.1 and AVA_VAN.1 in detail that the evaluator shall perform during the testing.

4.1.2.2. Dependency

The evaluator shall perform the EAs for FIA_MBE_EXT.1, FIA_MBE_EXT.2, FIA_MBV_EXT.1 and FIA_MBV_EXT.2 first to confirm the biometric enrolment and verification can be done correctly.

4.1.2.3. Tool types required to perform the EA

No tool is required for this EA.

4.1.2.4. Required input from the developer or other entities

Following input is required from the developer.

- a. TSS shall explain how the TOE meets FIA_MBV_EXT.3 at high level description. TSS may only states that the TOE implements PAD mechanism and may not disclose any information about the PAD mechanism itself in detail because such information is beyond the scope of assurance level claimed by [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) and may also be exploited by attackers
- b. AGD guidance may provide information about how the TOE reacts when the artefact is detected

4.1.2.5. Assessment Strategy

4.1.2.5.1. Strategy for ASE_TSS and AGD_OPE/ADV_FSP

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and AGD guidance to check that the TSS or AGD guidance states that the TOE prevents the use of the artefact during biometric verification.

The main part of the EA is the evaluator's testing defined in [Chapter 6, Evaluation Activities for PAD testing](#). The evaluator should not require a detailed design description of PAD from the developer

because it's beyond the scope of assurance level claimed in [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#).

4.1.2.6. Pass/Fail criteria

The evaluator can pass this EA only if the evaluator confirms that:

- a. TSS or AGD guidance states that the TOE prevents the use of the artefact

4.1.2.7. Requirements for reporting

The evaluator shall report the summary of result of EA defined above, especially how the evaluator reaches the Pass/Fail judgement based on the Pass/Fail criteria.

4.2. User data protection (FDP)

4.2.1. EA for FDP_RIP.2

The evaluator shall refer the EA in the base PP to perform evaluation of this SFR (e.g. EA for FCS_CKM_EXT.4 in [\[PP_MD_V3.3\]](#)).

Chapter 5. Evaluation Activities for SARs

[[BIOPP-Module](#)] does not define any SARs beyond those defined within the base PP to which it can claim conformance. However, additional application notes or EAs for SARs are defined in the appropriate PP-Configuration.

Chapter 6. Evaluation Activities for PAD testing

6.1. Introduction

The evaluator shall perform the following two types of EAs or testing to evaluate the FIA_MBE_EXT.3 (**Presentation attack detection for biometric enrolment**) and FIA_MBV_EXT.3 (**Presentation attack detection for biometric verification**). The following section defines EAs for FIA_MBV_EXT.3 however, the evaluator can replace "verification" with "enrolment" and apply the EAs to FIA_MBE_EXT.3.

- a. EAs for ATE_IND.1 (Independent testing - conformance)
- b. EAs for AVA_VAN.1 (Vulnerability survey)

ATE_IND.1 requires the evaluator to demonstrate that the TOE operates in accordance with its design representations described in TSS or AGD guidance because [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) does not require a formal or complete specification of PAD interface.

However, [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) does not require such design representations about PAD (e.g. how the TOE checks the liveness of the object) in TSS or AGD because those information is beyond the scope of assurance level claimed by [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#). Therefore, this BIOSD does not also require the evaluator to test the functional aspects of PAD based on those design representations.

Instead, this BIOSD requires the evaluator to conduct ATE_IND.1 evaluation (i.e. independent testing) in a black-box manner. However, the problem of black-box testing for PAD, as described in [\[ISO30107-3\]](#), is that it is very difficult to have a comprehensive model of all possible artefacts. Therefore, it may be possible that different evaluators could use a different set of artefacts and see different test results for the same TOE.

To solve this issue, the Biometric Security iTC (BIO-iTC) created and maintains the PAD [\[Toolbox\]](#). [\[Toolbox\]](#) defines the common artefacts for PAD testing based on publicly available information (e.g. research papers), experiences and knowledge shared among the BIO-iTC members.

[\[Toolbox\]](#) includes a collection of test items for each biometric modality. Each test item describes the procedure to create artefacts and the method to present them to the TOE in sufficient detail to enable the test to be repeatable.

The same [\[Toolbox\]](#) can also be used for AVA_VAN.1 evaluation (i.e. penetration testing) because AVA_VAN.1 requires the evaluator to devise tests based on information available in the public domain. However, [\[Toolbox\]](#) should be used in a different manner for AVA_VAN.1 evaluation. The following section explains how [\[Toolbox\]](#) should be used in EAs for ATE_IND.1 and AVA_VAN.1.

6.1.1. Presentation Attack Instrument (artefact) species

There are many types of Presentation Attack Instruments that can be used to test a PAD system. The [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) specifically defines the artefacts that are to be used as artificial, and not natural. Natural artefacts, such as a dead eye, are not considered in scope for this evaluation. When

searching for new artefact species, only artificial species should be considered.

6.2. EAs for ATE_IND.1 (Independent testing - conformance)

6.2.1. Independent test activities using Toolbox

As described in previous section, [Toolbox] defines test items to create a representative set of artefacts that the evaluator shall use for the testing. During ATE_IND.1 evaluation, the evaluator shall conduct all test items in [Toolbox] for the selected modalities without any change. The evaluator is not allowed to skip any test items in the [Toolbox] to maintain compatibility between different evaluations.

During the independent testing, the evaluator may find artefacts that are incorrectly matched to the enrolled target user however, the evaluator may not be able to reliably reproduce a successful presentation attack.

[Toolbox] defines the Pass/Fail criteria, maximum imposter attack presentation match rate for artefacts. The evaluator shall follow the [Toolbox] criteria for the number of artefact presentations and confirm that the TOE's match rate is below the specified criteria during the independent testing. The evaluator shall assign a fail verdict to those TOE that do not satisfy the criteria.

The artefacts that pass the criteria but show the higher imposter attack presentation match rate will be tested again during the AVA_VAN.1 evaluation.

[Toolbox] does not necessarily cover all biometric modalities. If the developer wants to evaluate modalities not currently included in [Toolbox], the developer and evaluator shall contact the BIO-iTC to work together to extend [Toolbox]. Upon the BIO-iTC approval of this extension, the evaluator can proceed with PAD evaluation for the new modality.

6.2.2. Justification for EAs for ATE_IND.1

The EAs presented in this section are derived from ATE_IND.1-3, ATE_IND.1-4 and ATE_IND.1-7 and their verdicts will be associated with those work units.

[Toolbox] describes a test subset and test documentation that is sufficiently detailed to enable the tests to be reproducible (ATE_IND.1-3 and ATE_IND.1-4). [Toolbox] also defines Pass/Fail criteria that support evaluator's decision (ATE_IND.1-7).

6.3. EA for AVA_VAN.1 (Vulnerability survey)

6.3.1. Penetration test activities using Toolbox

This Section describes EAs for AVA_VAN.1 step by step following the order of AVA_VAN.1 CEM work units.

6.3.1.1. Search for new artefacts

The evaluator shall search publicly available information that is published after the publication date of [Toolbox] to look for new artefact species. New artefact species are those artefacts that are out of scope of [Toolbox] and need to be made in a completely different way with significantly different materials that are not covered by [Toolbox].

Those new artefact species that can be made by slightly modifying test items in [Toolbox] are covered by Section 6.3.1.3.1, “No new artefacts found test plan”.

6.3.1.2. Identify candidate artefacts for testing

The evaluator shall perform EAs in Section 6.3.1.2.1, “No new artefacts found” if there is no new artefact species found at the previous step. Otherwise, follow Section 6.3.1.2.2, “New artefacts found”.

6.3.1.2.1. No new artefacts found

If the evaluator can't find such new artefact species, the evaluator does not need to devise new test items in addition to those defined in [Toolbox] because the BIO-iTC develops test items based on all publicly available information published by the publication date of [Toolbox]. The BIO-iTC also verifies that test items cover all existing artefact species that are within the scope of Basic attack potential defined in Chapter 9, *Attack Potential and TOE resistance*. Therefore, the evaluator does not need to repeat this process.

6.3.1.2.2. New artefacts found

If the evaluator can find new artefact species, the evaluator shall consider the following factors to examine whether those new artefact species can be used in the actual operational environment or not.

a. Attacker's motivation

For enhanced security that is easy to use, the TOE implements biometric verification on a device once it has been “unlocked”. The initial unlock is generally done by a NBAF which is required at startup (or possibly after some period of time), and after that the user is able to use a registered biometric characteristic to unlock access to the computer. The BIOSD assumes that the biometric verification is being used in accordance with USE CASE 1: Biometric verification for unlocking the computer.

Attacker may use any tools or materials that are normally available at home and normal office environment such as laptop PC or office printer to attack the TOE. Attacker may also use any services (e.g. printing services to print a high-resolution photo of target users to create a face artefact) if such services are available at low cost.

b. Assumptions in [BIOPP-Module]

[BIOPP-Module] defines **A.User** and the evaluator shall assume that the computers are configured securely by users. The evaluator shall make the following assumptions:

1. A user has enrolled following guidance provided by the TOE

2. The computer is securely configured, and maximum number of unsuccessful biometric authentication attempts is limited

For efficiency, the evaluator can increase the maximum number of unsuccessful biometric authentication attempts to conduct the testing. However, as the computer shall be evaluated in the evaluated configuration, any attack needs to succeed within the allowed number of biometric authentication attempts defined in the ST to be considered a successful attack.

[[BIOPP-Module](#)] also defines **A.Protection** and the evaluator shall assume that biometric data is adequately protected. Especially the evaluator shall make the following assumptions:

1. Attacker can not access the results of PAD subsystem, so they can not tune the artefacts based on the PAD score
2. Attacker can not gain access to the templates from the computer to create the artefacts

c. Attack potential

The evaluator is not expected to determine the exploitability for new artefact species beyond those for which a Basic attack potential is required to create and present. Therefore, the evaluator shall determine that attack potential required to use new artefact species is within the scope of the Basic attack potential referring [Chapter 9, Attack Potential and TOE resistance](#).

6.3.1.3. Produce test plan

The evaluator shall perform EAs in [Section 6.3.1.3.1, “No new artefacts found test plan”](#) if there is no new artefact species found in previous step. Otherwise, follow [Section 6.3.1.3.2, “New artefacts found test plan”](#).

6.3.1.3.1. No new artefacts found test plan

The evaluator shall select those artefacts that show higher imposter attack presentation match rate at the independent testing. The evaluator shall test them extensively during the penetration testing.

If there are no such artefacts, the evaluator should select “higher quality” artefacts. “Higher quality” means that artefacts are closer in resemblance to the biometric characteristics of the target user (e.g. higher resolution photo for face artefact).

The evaluator may recreate the artefacts selected for penetration testing to improve their quality taking following approaches.

a. Modify the creation process of artefacts

The evaluator may modify the process in [\[Toolbox\]](#) to improve the artefacts.

For example, in case of finger or palm vein verification, the evaluator needs to capture the vein pattern from a target user using a NIR-camera and print it out to create the artefact (i.e. printed vein pattern). However, quality of the vein pattern may vary depending on configuration of tools (e.g. intensity of NIR light for NIR-camera) or type of materials (e.g. type of paper).

During the penetration testing, the evaluator may change those various factors to recreate artefacts with clearer vein pattern for the penetration testing.

However, the evaluator shall recreate the artefact at the similar cost and time as required for the original artefact to stay within the Basic attack potential.

b. Change test subjects

The evaluator may follow the same procedure in [\[Toolbox\]](#) to recreate artefacts, however, from different test subjects from ones used for the independent testing.

For example, men normally have thicker blood vessels than women. In the case of finger or palm vein verification, the evaluator may change to a test subject who has thicker blood vessels to capture a clearer vein pattern.

c. Improve presentation method

The evaluator may also increase time for artefact presentation training and habituation to find the better presentation method.

For example, in case of finger or palm vein verification, quality of vein pattern gained from the sensor (NIR-camera) of the TOE may vary depending on the distance between the artefact and sensor, and how to present the artefact to the TOE. However, it's not possible for the evaluator to know the best distance or presentation method for the artefact in advance because this BIOSD requires the evaluator to test the TOE in a black-box manner. The evaluator may simply increase the number of attempts to find the best distance or presentation through trial and error process.

6.3.1.3.2. New artefacts found test plan

If the evaluator can find a new artefact species that can be used for penetration testing, the evaluator shall produce the test item for those new artefact species and add them to [\[Toolbox\]](#). The evaluator shall create those new test items at the same format and level of detail as existing items in [\[Toolbox\]](#).

Those new test items are out of scope of the independent testing, so the evaluator shall test them first during the penetration testing as described in [Section 6.3.1.4.1, "Testing the new artefacts"](#).

The evaluator shall compare and select best candidates from artefacts in [\[Toolbox\]](#) and new ones so the evaluator shall apply EAs in [Section 6.3.1.3.1, "No new artefacts found test plan"](#) to both artefacts.

The evaluator shall inform the BIO-iTC if one can find those new artefacts that are worthwhile to test because the BIO-iTC is responsible for maintaining [\[Toolbox\]](#).

6.3.1.4. Conduct the penetration testing

6.3.1.4.1. Testing the new artefacts

This section is only applicable when the evaluator can find new artefacts at [Section 6.3.1.1, "Search for new artefacts"](#).

The evaluator shall test those test items created for new artefacts first following the same procedure as the one used for the independent testing and add them to the final test plan based on the result of this testing, as described in [Section 6.3.1.3.2, “New artefacts found test plan”](#).

6.3.1.4.2. Final penetration testing

The evaluator shall conduct the penetration testing based on the final test plan updated in the previous step.

The evaluator shall select those artefacts that may succeed the attack at higher probability as described in [Section 6.3.1.3, “Produce test plan”](#) for the penetration testing.

In order to place bounds on the effort involved related to the attack potential calculations for PAD functionality, the independent and penetration testing is expected to be finished within a single week, considering the assurance level claimed by [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#).

6.3.1.5. Determine Pass/Fail of penetration testing

The evaluator shall determine that the TOE, in its operational environment, is resistant to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential. The evaluator shall make this determination based on guidance provided in [Section 9.3, “Pass/Fail criteria for EAs for PAD testing \(FIA_MBE_EXT.3 and FIA_MBV_EXT.3\)”](#) and maximum allowable error rates defined in [\[Toolbox\]](#).

6.3.2. Justification for EAs for AVA_VAN.1

The EAs presented in this section are derived from AVA_VAN.1-3, AVA_VAN.1-4, AVA_VAN.1-5, AVA_VAN.1-6, AVA_VAN.1-7 and AVA_VAN.1-10 and their verdicts will be associated with those work units.

EAs in the [Section 6.3.1.1, “Search for new artefacts”](#) and [Section 6.3.1.2, “Identify candidate artefacts for testing”](#) complements evaluator’s action for searching publicly available information and identifying potential vulnerabilities (e.g. new artefact) (AVA_VAN.1-3, AVA_VAN.1-4 and AVA_VAN.1-5).

EAs in [Section 6.3.1.3, “Produce test plan”](#) and [Section 6.3.1.4, “Conduct the penetration testing”](#) complements evaluator’s action for creating the test plan and conducting the penetration testing for PAD (AVA_VAN.1-6 and AVA_VAN.1-7).

EAs in [Section 6.3.1.5, “Determine Pass/Fail of penetration testing”](#) provides specific guidance for pass or failure of the testing (AVA_VAN.1-10).

Chapter 7. Developer’s performance report and its assessment strategy

This Section describes requirements for the developer’s [performance report](#) and its assessment strategy.

The developer shall create the performance report to report the result of performance testing (e.g. FRR/FAR or FNMR/FMR).

The evaluator shall examine the performance report following the Assessment Strategy defined in [Section 2.3.3, “EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.1”](#) to verify that the developer’s performance test was done in an objective and repeatable manner to check the trustworthiness of the measured error rates.

The requirements defined in this Section are created based on [\[ISO19795-1\]](#) and [\[ISO19795-2\]](#).

7.1. Requirements for the performance report

The developer shall provide the performance report for CC evaluations that claim a conform to [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#). This Section defines required content of the performance report that is inputted to the EA for FIA_MBV_EXT.1.

The performance report is most likely a separate confidential document and not part of the ST for public release.

7.2. Summary of contents

[Table 2, “Reporting items”](#) shows items that shall be reported in the performance report. The name or structure of performance report does not need to follow [Table 2, “Reporting items”](#). However, all items in [Table 2, “Reporting items”](#) shall be written somewhere in the performance report. Also, if some items are not included in the performance report, the developer shall provide a rationale for such exclusion to the evaluator.

Table 2. Reporting items

Section	Item
Section 7.3.1	Overview of the performance testing
Section 7.3.2	Target application and influential factors
Section 7.3.3	Test subject selection
Section 7.3.4	Test instructions and training
Section 7.3.5	Test subject management
Section 7.3.6	Test procedure

7.3. Reporting items description

This Section describes each item in [Table 2, “Reporting items”](#) in detail. All items are created based on [\[ISO19795-1\]](#) and [\[ISO19795-2\]](#) however some of them are modified to adjust to the CC evaluation.

7.3.1. Overview of the performance testing

The developer shall report following general information about the performance testing.

a. Performance test configuration

The performance report shall report the following information to uniquely identify the test configuration of the performance testing. Information stated here shall be consistent with the ST.

1. TOE reference

Information that uniquely identifies the TOE shall be reported. [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) is intended to be used with the base PP and reference for the computer can be used as the TOE reference only if the reference for the computer also uniquely identifies the biometric system embedded in the computer

Modification to the TOE for performance testing, if any, shall be reported (e.g. the TOE is modified to export biometric data for off-line testing). The rationale that such modification does not affect the TOE performance shall also be provided. For example, the developer may claim that the performance is not affected because modified code is not executed during biometric verification or the developer may run regression tests to verify that modification does not change the result of verification (e.g. similarity score).

2. TOE configuration

Any configurable parameters or settings of the TOE that may affect the performance shall be reported. The value of each parameter set for the testing shall also be provided. For example, if the threshold (e.g. decision threshold and image quality threshold) is configurable by users, the value of the threshold set for the testing shall be reported.

3. Type of verification algorithm

Type of verification algorithm, symmetric or asymmetric, shall be provided. As explained in [Section 8.1.5, “Statistical certainty for FAR/FMR”](#), cross-comparison of attempts/templates of ordered pairs is not allowed for symmetric verification algorithm.

4. Performance test tools

Information that uniquely identifies all testing tools (e.g. SDK) used for the performance testing shall be reported.

b. Result of the performance testing

The performance report shall report the following items to provide the result of testing:

1. Test period and location

Timeline for the performance testing (samples or templates may be collected over multiple sessions) and location of testing shall be reported.

2. Modality used for biometric verification

The performance testing shall be done for all modalities selected in FIA_MBV_EXT.1. The results of testing for each modality shall be reported separately.

3. Definition of genuine and imposter transaction

If FAR/FRR is selected in FIA_MBV_EXT.1, the performance report shall clearly define what constitutes the transaction based on the guidance provided in [Chapter 8, Requirement for the number of test subject, transaction and samples](#) and the same rule shall be applied consistently throughout the performance testing.

4. Number of test subjects, templates and samples

The following numbers used for calculating FMR/FNMR or FAR/FRR shall be reported. See [Chapter 8, Requirement for the number of test subject, transaction and samples](#) for requirements for number of test subjects, enrolment templates and samples.

This Section assumes that at least the FMR or FAR is measured through offline testing (i.e. cross-comparison) to achieve the maximum number of attempts or transactions. FNMR or FRR may be measured through online or offline testing.

- Test subjects

Number of test subjects who participated in the testing shall be reported.

- Enrolment templates

Number of enrolment templates used for testing shall be reported.

Note all test subjects may not generate the templates successfully and total number of templates may be less than (number of test subjects) × (number of body parts of a test subject).

- Samples

Number of samples collected for each body part and total number of samples collected from all test subjects shall be reported.

Note all test subjects may not generate the samples successfully and total number of samples may be less than (number of test subjects) × (number of body parts of a test subject) × (number of samples collected for each body part).

5. Result of testing

Error rates measured by the performance testing shall be reported.

If FAR and FRR is selected in FIA_MBV_EXT.1, number of genuine and imposter transaction shall also be reported.

If FMR and FNMR is selected in FIA_MBV_EXT.1, number of genuine and imposter attempts shall also be reported.

7.3.2. Target application and influential factors

The performance report shall specify a target application modelled in the test, such as biometric verification in an indoor office environment with a habituated crew.

The performance report shall also report influential factors that may influence performance, measures to control such factors and under what factors the performance testing was conducted.

Influential factors can be determined by referring to appropriate documents (e.g. [\[ISO19795-3\]](#)) or referring the product datasheet (e.g. operating temperature). These factors should be consistent with the target application.

The following factors are examples of controlling factors for finger/hand vein verification. The developer shall define these factors properly, for example, based on [\[ISO19795-3\]](#). Any information that is useful in the context of the used biometric modality shall be considered by the developer to determine the factors.

It is recommended to control all influential factors appropriately because different error rates may be measured under different influential factors.

a. Test subject demographics

1. Age

The age distribution ratio by the following age groups: [0-19], [20-34], [35-49], [50-64], [65-99].

2. Gender

Female/Male ratio

3. Ethnicity

The distribution ratio by the ethnic background of the participants.

The breakdown can be by one of two measures: [UN geographical regions](#) or by a measure of ethnicity defined in the nation where testing has taken place. One of these categorizations must be used in the reporting of demographic information.

b. Posture and positioning

Posture of test subject or positioning of his/her hand/finger (e.g. Orientation of hand/finger in relation to the sensor or distance to the sensor). Such information should be consistent with the

TOE operational guidance or automated feedback provided by the TOE.

c. Indoor or outdoor

Indoor or outdoor environment in which testing is to be conducted. In case of outdoor environment, other factors affecting the performance (e.g. environmental illumination) should also be reported.

d. Temperature

Range of temperature at which the testing is to be conducted (e.g. “Testing was conducted in an air-conditioned environment where temperature was kept between X and Y degrees”).

e. Time interval

Time interval (e.g. minimum, maximum and average time) between enrolment and verification.

f. Habituation

The degree to which the test subject is familiarized with the TOE (e.g. frequency of use of the TOE)

g. Template adaptation

How much template adaptation may occur prior to measuring the FMR/FAR and FNMR/FRR if the TOE is able to adapt the templates over time with the aim to reduce the error rates

7.3.3. Test subject selection

The selection method of test subjects shall be reported (e.g. gather test subjects from developer’s employees or recruit them from public). It is recommended that the demographics of test subjects follow the target application.

7.3.4. Test instructions and training

Instructions and training given to the test subjects shall be reported. The same instructions and training shall be given to the all test subjects.

a. Test information and general test instructions

Test information and general test instructions given to a test subject prior to or after biometric data collection shall be reported. Such instructions shall be consistent to automated guidance or feedback given by the TOE or instructions described in the TOE operational guidance. Testing shall not be adjusted to the TOE specification that is not described in the TOE operational guidance

b. Confirmation of habituation

Methods for how to confirm the level of subject habituation prior to biometric data collection shall be reported. If the habituation was confirmed through training, the method to ensure the consistency of training among test subjects and the tools used for training shall be reported (e.g.

developer can prepare the script for training in advance and apply it to all test subjects to ensure the consistency)

7.3.5. Test subject management

The following information about test subject management shall be reported. Proper management is necessary to avoid human errors that may occur during the testing.

a. Management processes

Biometric data can be corrupted by human error during the collection process (e.g. using a middle finger when the index finger is required). The test subject management processes to avoid such errors shall be reported. Management processes shall cover the following processes

1. Method of initial test subject registration
2. Method of ensuring test subject uniqueness
3. Method of avoiding data collection errors (e.g. Use of data collection software minimizing the amount of data requiring keyboard entry)

7.3.6. Test procedure

A test protocol for the testing shall be reported. The following items shall be covered.

a. Type of attempt or transaction

Whether the attempt or transaction is executed online or offline shall be reported. Online means that enrolment and verification is executed at the time of image submission. Offline means that enrolment and verification is executed separately from image submission.

b. Test flow

Details of the flow of genuine and imposter attempts or transactions to measure the error rates shall be reported. The same flow shall be applied to all test subjects.

The developer shall maintain a log file in which each interaction with the TOE is recorded. The log shall include all test attempts, preparative or practice attempts, set-up procedure (e.g. setting a threshold) and maintenance activities (e.g. cleaning a sensor). Such a log file can be very useful to make sure the testing was conducted following the test flow.

c. Sample exclusion criteria

Criteria for sample exclusion shall be reported. The test operator shall not manually discard nor use an automated mechanism to discard collected samples unless the samples conform to documented exclusion criteria. The number of excluded samples shall be reported. If transactions failed because of such excluded samples, the number of such failed transactions shall also be reported.

d. Advice or remedial action

Advice or remedial actions to test subjects who fail to complete transactions or sample

collections shall be reported. Such advice or remedial actions shall be limited to the minimum amount necessary because [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#) assumes that the computer is used by the single user without any support. The same advice or remedial actions shall be given to all test subjects with the same conditions.

Chapter 8. Requirement for the number of test subject, transaction and samples

The developer shall follow recommendations or minimum requirements below to conduct the performance testing to measure FAR/FMR and FRR/FNMR. The developer may exclude, modify or add some recommendations however, the developer shall show a clear rationale why such modifications could produce more accurate estimate of the performance.

8.1. Recommendations

8.1.1. Test scenario for biometric verification

The developer shall follow the guidance in this Section to define the transaction if the developer selects FAR and FRR in FIA_MBV_EXT.1 or to define the number of samples per each test subject if the developer selects FMR and FNMR in FIA_MBV_EXT.1.

The user may use the biometric verification in a different way.

Suppose the computer provides both a NBAF and a BAF and the user can use either factor to unlock the device. One user may try to unlock the device with the BAF until allowable maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts is exceeded. Another user may try to unlock the device with the BAF only three times and switch to the NBAF if all three attempts were failed.

It may also be possible for user to enrol multiple body parts (e.g. index and thumb fingerprint) or single body part for biometric verification.

However, it is not possible to evaluate all these scenarios to measure the performance but the developer shall refer the ST that claims conformance to the base PP to define the scenario.

For example, if the ST sets the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for fingerprint verification to five, the developer shall assume that the attacker makes all five fingerprint unlock attempts in succession to try to unlock the computer.

This means that if FAR and FRR are selected, the developer shall define that the genuine and imposter transaction is consists of up to five unlock attempts and only one transaction can be run by each user.

If FMR and FNMR are selected, the developer may follow the same scenario and collect five samples from each test subject. However, FMR/FNMR is a comparison subsystem measure while FAR/FRR is a system level measure, therefore FAR/FRR should be selected in FIA_MBV_EXT.1 if the developer considers the specific test scenario to measure the performance.

The developer shall also select the most common scenario among users to conduct the performance testing. For example, if the user can enrol multiple fingerprints, the developer should assume that the user enrolls index and thumb fingerprint if such enrolment is most common. FAR may increase and FRR may decrease if the user enrolls multiple fingerprints however, performance of widely used configuration should be measured.

8.1.2. Maximum number of templates

Only one template can be generated from each body part (e.g. right index fingerprint, left hand vein or face) of test subject and used for the performance testing.

The quality of the template may have a significant impact on the biometric verification performance. This BIOSD assumes that the user is familiar with the computer's operation and enrolls correctly following the AGD guidance provided by the developer. The test subject may make enough practice attempts to become familiar with the device operation before the final enrolment transaction.

8.1.3. Maximum number of samples per test subject

The developer shall define the maximum number of samples per test subject to be collected following the guidance provided in [Section 8.1.1, "Test scenario for biometric verification"](#).

8.1.4. Maximum number of transactions per test subject

Only one transaction can be run by each test subject because the computer locks the biometric verification as required by the base PP after the certain number of attempts are failed.

8.1.5. Statistical certainty for FAR/FMR

FMR/FAR shall be estimated following rule of 3 or 30 because these errors are most relevant to the security of the TOE and the trustworthiness of those values shall be evaluated statistically. While the rule of 3 would require that one test subject is only involved in one impostor transaction, it is commonly agreed that the statistical loss of computing all possible cross-comparisons between test subjects is acceptable. This BIOSD allows full cross-comparison to estimate FAR/FMR.

This BIOSD also allows cross-comparison of attempts/templates of ordered pairs if there is no explicit reason that this cross-comparison hinders the accuracy of the result of performance testing. Cross-comparison of attempts/templates of ordered pairs allows the comparison between user A's template and user B's sample and user A's sample and user B's template separately. However, if the TOE's verification algorithm is symmetric and make no distinction between the ordered pairs, this assumption can not be used. The type of verification algorithm used by the TOE is reported in the developer's performance report [Section 7.3.1, "Overview of the performance testing"](#).

This BIOSD doesn't allow intra-individual comparison that is a comparison between one body part and another body part of the same test subject (e.g. comparison between right and left iris of the same user).

8.1.6. Statistical certainty for FRR/FNMR

The rule of 3 requires no error occurred for all attempts/transactions and the rule of 30 may require too many attempts/transactions if the FNMR/FRR is quite low. Therefore, the developer may calculate FNMR/FRR directly from the result of performance testing without considering the statistical confidence.

8.2. Example – fingerprint verification

The developer defines that fingerprint verification consists of 5 attempts using both right index and thumb fingerprints to unlock the computer and specifies 0.01% FAR and 1% FRR in FIA_MBV_EXT.1.

As described in the previous Section, the genuine and imposter transaction consists of up to five unlock attempts using either of finger against each template for index and thumb finger and only one transaction can be run by each user.

In this scenario, at least 30,000 imposter transactions shall be conducted with no error to achieve this performance goal if the rule of 3 is applied. To run more than 30,000 imposter transactions, at least 174 test subjects shall be gathered ($173 * 174 = 30,102$) if cross-comparison of ordered pairs is allowed. If number of test subjects is 174, only 1 genuine transaction can be failed to achieve 1% FRR ($2/174 = 0.011 > 1\%$).

If the developer specifies 0.01% FMR and 1% FNMR in FIA_MBV_EXT.1, at least 30,000 imposter attempts shall be made with no errors. To run more than 30,000 imposter attempts, at least 78 test subjects shall be gathered ($77 * 78 * 5 = 30030$) if cross-comparison of ordered pairs is allowed. If number of test subjects is 78, the total number of genuine attempts is $78 * 5 = 390$ and 3 genuine attempts can be failed to achieve 1% FNMR ($4/390 = 0.0102 > 1\%$).

Chapter 9. Attack Potential and TOE resistance

9.1. Calculating attack potential for generic biometric system

Attack potential is a function of expertise, resources and motivation, as is written in [CEM]. [CEM] provides general guidance for calculating attack potential for all type of IT products and doesn't take any specific characteristics of biometrics into account. The iTC, building on the expertise of the membership, ongoing work at ISO and the [BEAT] project, has tailored the guidance more specifically for biometrics.

This section introduces a method for calculating attack potential for generic biometric systems.

9.1.1. Identification and exploitation of attacks

9.1.1.1. Identification of attacks

Identification corresponds to the effort required to create the attack, and to demonstrate that it can be successfully applied to the TOE (including setting up or building any necessary test equipment). The demonstration that the attack can be successfully applied needs to consider any difficulties in expanding a result shown in the laboratory to create a useful attack. One of the outputs from identification could be a script that gives a step-by-step description of how to carry out the attack. This script is assumed to be used in the exploitation phase.

9.1.1.2. Exploitation of attacks

Exploitation corresponds to achieving the attack on an instance of the TOE in its exploitation environment using the analysis and techniques defined in the identification phase. It could be assumed that a different attacker carries out the exploitation, the technique (and relevant background information) could be available for the exploitation in the form of a script or set of instructions defined during the identification phase. This type of script is assumed to identify the necessary equipment and, for example, mathematical techniques used in the analysis, or presentation attack methods. Furthermore, this same information may also reduce the exploitation requirement to one of time measurement, whereas the identification phase may have required reverse engineering of hardware or software information hence the expertise requirement may be reduced.

Application Note 1

For the evaluator, the work of the identification phase has to be fully performed: developing hardware and software, creating artefacts if any, etc. The rating of this phase corresponds to the "real spending" in defining the attack. For the exploitation, it is not necessary to perform the work again and the rating could correspond to an evaluation of the necessary effort for each factor.

Application Note 2

Exploitation consists of applying scripts, so it is expected that some factor values will be reduced from the identification phase, in particular "Elapsed Time" and "Expertise". For the same reason, the "Knowledge of the TOE" factor is not applicable in the exploitation phase (all the knowledge is scripted).

9.1.2. Factors to be considered

As in [CEM], the factors to be considered consist of *Elapsed time*, *Expertise*, *Knowledge of the TOE*, *Window of opportunity*, and *Equipment*. But *Window of opportunity* is divided into two subfactors *Window of opportunity (Access to the TOE)* and *Window of opportunity (Access to biometric characteristics)*.

Elapsed time is the total amount of time taken by the attacker.

In the identification phase, elapsed time corresponds to the time required to create the attack, and to demonstrate that it can be successfully applied to the TOE (including setting up or building any necessary hardware or software equipment). The demonstration that the attack can be successfully applied needs to consider any difficulties in expanding a result shown in the laboratory to create a useful attack. One of the outputs from identification is, for instance, a script that gives a step-by-step description of how to carry out the attack. This script is assumed to be used in the exploitation part.

In the exploitation phase, elapsed time corresponds to the time necessary to apply the "script" to specific biometric characteristics. For example, for a presentation attack to a fingerprint capture device, it corresponds to the time required to create an artefact from an image of a print (and not the acquisition of this image which is taken into account in the factor *Window of opportunity (Access to biometric characteristics)*).

Potential difficulties to have an access to the TOE in exploitation environment are taken into account in the factor *Window of opportunity (Access to the TOE)*.

Expertise refers to the level of proficiency required by the attacker and the general knowledge that he possesses, not specific of the system being attacked. The levels are as follows:

- a. *Layman* is the level no real expertise needed and such that any person with a regular level of education is capable of performing the attack. For example, creating an artefact in a known (published) way without specific difficulties (difficult to buy materials) is considered at this level of expertise.
- b. *Proficient* is the level such that some advanced knowledge in certain specific topics (biometrics) is required as well as good knowledge of the state-of-the-art of attacks. An attacker of this level is capable of adapting known attack methods to his needs. For example, adapting a known attack type (published) by the choice of specific (not published and sometimes difficult to find) materials in order to bypass a presentation attack detection mechanism and/or finding a non-evident way to present this artefact to the system can be considered at this level of expertise.
- c. *Expert* is the level such that a specific preparation in multiple areas such as pattern recognition, computer vision or optimization is needed in order to carry out the attack. An attacker of this level is capable of generating his own new attacking algorithms. For example, finding a new

(unpublished) way of creating an attack type using new and specific materials (unpublished) to counter an advanced presentation attack detection mechanism, can be considered at this level. In addition, this level can be associated with specific equipment (bespoke)

- d. *Multiple Experts* is the level such that the attack needs the collaboration of several people with high level expertise in different fields (e.g., electronics, cryptanalysis, physics, etc.). It has to be noticed that a specific competence in biometrics is not considered as "multiple expertise". For example, building a "hill climbing" attack by gaining access to the comparison scores requires additional expertise to electrically attack and penetrate the TOE, which can be considered to constitute a "multi expertise" level.

Application Note 3

As previously noted, exploitation expertise is usually lower than identification expertise. Layman or Proficient can be considered as typical value for expertise in the exploitation phase. For the same reason, the multiple expert level is excluded from the exploitation phase.

Application Note 4

As all the factors, higher rating would require specific justifications from the evaluator.

Knowledge of the TOE refers to the amount of knowledge of the system required to perform the attack. For instance, format of the acquired samples, size and resolution of acquisition systems, specific format of templates, but also specifications and implementation of countermeasures are knowledge that could be required to set up an attack.

This information could be publicly available at the website of the capture device manufacturer or protected (distributed to stakeholders under non-disclosure agreement or even classified inside the company). The levels are as follows:

- a. *Public information* which is fairly easy to obtain (e.g., on the web).
- b. *Restricted information* which is only shared by the developer and organizations which are using the system, usually under a non-disclosure agreement.
- c. *Confidential information* which is only available within the organization that develops the system and is in no case shared outside it.
- d. *Critical information* which is only available to certain people or groups within the organization which develops the system.

Special attention should be paid in this point to possible countermeasures that may be implemented in the system and whether it is necessary or not to have knowledge of their existence in order to be successful in a given attack.

It is assumed that all the knowledge required to perform the attack is gained during the identification phase and "scripted" for the exploitation. Therefore, this factor is not used for the exploitation phase.

Window of opportunity (Access to the TOE) refers to measuring the difficulty to access the TOE either to prepare the attack or to perform it on the target system.

For the identification phase, elements that should be taken into account include the easiness to buy the same biometric equipment (with and without countermeasures).

For exploitation phase, both technical (such as known/unknown tuning) and organizational measures (presence of a guard, ability to physically modify the target, limited number of tries, etc.) should be taken into account.

The number and the level of equipment requested to build the attack is also taken into account in this factor.

This factor is not expressed in terms of time. The levels are as follows:

- a. *Easy*: For identification phase, there is no strong constraint for the attacker to buy the TOE (reasonable price) to prepare its attack. For exploitation phase, there is no limit in the number of tries and the presentation attack is difficult to detect.
- b. *Moderate*: For identification phase, specialised distribution schemes exist (not available to individuals). For exploitation phase, either a tuning of the attack for the final system is required (unknown parameterization of countermeasures for example) or there is a supervision of the biometric system emitting, for example, an alert in case of numerous fail presentations.
- c. *Difficult*: For identification phase, the system is not available except for identified users and access requires compromising of one of the actors. For exploitation phase, for example artefacts must be adapted to the (unknown) specific tuning, or there is a strong supervision (for example a guard), or the system needs physical modification (for example physically accessing a hidden signal significant to the comparison score). Compromising one actor involved in the use of the system (guard, administrator, and maintenance) is often required.

Window of opportunity (Access to biometric characteristics) refers to measuring the difficulty to access the target biometric characteristics either to prepare the attack or to perform it on the target system

Security evaluations of CC are dedicated to evaluate the intrinsic resistance of a system. Due to the potential number of attack paths (with or without the cooperation of an enrolled subject for example) the evaluation does not take into account the way a real biometric characteristic is acquired. For presentation attack detection, the vulnerability analysis is based on the hypothesis that a real "image" is available, and the rating only concerns the creation and the presentation of an artefact.

However, it is important to be able to compare the resistance of various systems, even based on different biometrics. In addition, getting a real "image" to build an artefact is clearly part of an attack and it is of interest, for the final user of the TOE and the pertinence of a certificate to add a factor related to this aspect.

The levels are as follows:

- a. *Without notice* is for making an artefact with samples that can be collected without any contact with an enrolled subject. For example, 2D face images uploaded on the Internet and latent fingerprint images on a glass can be collected without notice of the subject.
- b. *Non-cooperative* is for making an artefact with samples that need to be collected directly from an enrolled subject in a short period of time without full cooperation from the subject. For example, iris or vein images need to be acquired with a high resolution or infrared camera, however, such images can be taken in a moment without full control of the subject.

- c. *Cooperative* is for making an artefact with samples that need to be collected directly from an enrolled subject with full cooperation from the subject. For example, the acquisition of a detailed 3D face scan of the subject takes time and requires full cooperation from the subject.

Application Note 5

Rating the resistance of a system is based on rating the successful attacks and verifying that no successful attack is found at the targeted level. Some attacks do not need real biometric data to be available, for example, attacks based on synthetic images or template generation. In such a case, this factor has to be considered to be *Without notice*.

Equipment refers to the type of equipment required to perform the attack. This includes the biometric databases used (if any). The levels are follows:

Standard equipment is an orderable, easy to obtain and simple to operate equipment (e.g., computer, video cameras, mobile phones, "do it yourself" material, and artistic leisure materials).

Specialised equipment refers to fairly expensive equipment, not available in standard markets and which require of some specific formation to be used (e.g., laboratory equipment, advanced printer specific materials and inks, and advanced oscilloscopes).

Bespoke equipment refers to very expensive equipment with difficult and controlled access; for example, research printing systems with specific ink definition and flexible support adaptation. In addition, if more than one specialised equipment is required to perform different parts of the attack, this value should be used. Before using this level, it has to be carefully checked that no service is available (renting, limited time access, etc.). If such service exists, the level has to be moved down to Specialised level.

9.1.3. Calculation of attack potential

Table 3, “Calculation of attack potential for general biometric system” identifies the factors discussed in the previous Section and associates numeric values with the total value of each factor.

Table 3. Calculation of attack potential for general biometric system

Factor	Value	
	Identification	Exploitation
Elapsed Time		
⇐ one day	0	0
⇐ one week	1	2
⇐ two weeks	2	4
⇐ one month	4	8
> one month	8	16
Expertise		
Layman	0	0
Proficient	2	4

Factor	Value	
Expert	4	8
Multiple experts	8	Not applicable
Knowledge of TOE		
Public	0	Not applicable
Restricted	2	Not applicable
Sensitive	4	Not applicable
Critical	8	Not applicable
Window of Opportunity (Access to TOE)		
Easy	0	0
Moderate	2	4
Difficult	4	8
Window of Opportunity (Access to Biometric Characteristics)		
Without notice	Not applicable	0
Non-cooperative	Not applicable	2
Cooperative	Not applicable	4
Equipment		
Standard	0	0
Specialised	2	4
Bespoke	4	8

In order to calculate the attack potential value of the entire attack, the evaluator shall add all the values of all the factors in identification phase and exploitation phase. However, [Table 3](#) is intended as a guide. Evaluator may modify the table with a proper justification.

9.1.4. Rating of vulnerabilities and TOE resistance

The "Values" column of [Table 4](#), “[Rating of vulnerabilities and TOE resistance](#)” indicates the range of attack potential values (calculated using [Table 3](#), “[Calculation of attack potential for general biometric system](#)”) of an attack scenario that results in the SFRs being undermined.

Table 4. Rating of vulnerabilities and TOE resistance

Values	Attack potential required to exploit scenario:	TOE resistant to attackers with attack potential of:	Meets assurance components:	Failure of components:
< 10	Basic	No rating	-	AVA_VAN.1, AVA_VAN.2, AVA_VAN.3, AVA_VAN.4, AVA_VAN.5
10-19	Enhanced-Basic	Basic	AVA_VAN.1, AVA_VAN.2	AVA_VAN.3, AVA_VAN.4, AVA_VAN.5
20-29	Moderate	Enhanced-Basic	AVA_VAN.1, AVA_VAN.2, AVA_VAN.3	AVA_VAN.4, AVA_VAN.5
30-39	High	Moderate	AVA_VAN.1, AVA_VAN.2, AVA_VAN.3, AVA_VAN.4	AVA_VAN.5
⇒40	Beyond-High	High	AVA_VAN.1, AVA_VAN.2, AVA_VAN.3, AVA_VAN.4, AVA_VAN.5	-

9.2. Application notes for [BIOPP-Module]

The attack potential table [Table 3](#), “Calculation of attack potential for general biometric system” defined in previous Section does not consider specific restrictions introduced by [BIOPP-Module]. For example, [BIOPP-Module] assumes that allowable maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts is limited that influence the calculation of *Window of Opportunity*

(Access to TOE) for exploitation phase.

The evaluator shall take the following application notes into account to calculate the attack potential for [\[BIOPP-Module\]](#), especially calculating the attack potential for presentation attacks during performing EAs for FIA_MBE_EXT.3 and FIA_MBV_EXT.3.

9.2.1. Application note for Elapsed time for Identification

The evaluator shall select one week at maximum because the evaluator shall finish the penetration testing within one week.

9.2.2. Application note for Window of Opportunity (Access to TOE) for Identification

The evaluator shall select “Easy” because the TOE is a computer that anyone can purchase.

9.2.3. Application note for Window of Opportunity (Access to TOE) for Exploitation

The evaluator shall select “Moderate” because the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for biometric verification is limited, and biometric verification becomes unusable if the number of failure attempts exceed the limit.

9.3. Pass/Fail criteria for EAs for PAD testing (FIA_MBE_EXT.3 and FIA_MBV_EXT.3)

As required by CC, the evaluator shall determine that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential based on [Table 3, “Calculation of attack potential for general biometric system”](#). However, the table doesn’t provide any guidance for the probability of success or failure of presentation attack.

The evaluator may have enough confidence to assign fail verdict to the TOE if the evaluator find the artefacts that succeed the attack repeatably or at high probability (e.g. almost 100%).

However, the evaluator can’t make an objective decision if the probability of success decreases at certain level because the computer limits the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for biometric verification and the attacker can not present the artefact to the TOE so many times in the actual operational environment.

This Section provides the Pass/Fail criteria for EAs for PAD testing taking this particular aspect into account so that the evaluator can make consistent and objective decision.

9.3.1. Pass/Fail criteria

The computer limits the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for biometric verification, as required by the base PP. Therefore, the attacker must succeed the presentation attack at least one time within this limit.

This BIOSD assumes that the attacker actually performs the presentation attack only if the attacker can create the “Reliable artefacts”. “Reliable artefacts” are those artefacts that succeed on at least one attack within the allowable number of attempts (i.e. succeed to unlock the computer) at more than 80% of probability. This BIOSD selects this probability based on the use case assumed in [BIOPP-Module].

The probability of a successful presentation attack for one attempt p needs to satisfy the following equation to satisfy the above condition.

$$1-(1-p)^n > 0.8 \text{ (n = allowable number of unsuccessful attempts)}$$

The following table shows that example of pairs (maximum p for particular n) that satisfy the above equation.

Table 5. Example of (n, p) pair

n	p
4	0.33 (33%)
6	0.23 (23%)
8	0.18 (18%)

If the base PP is [PP_MD_V3.3], the evaluator shall set n based on the assignment in FIA_AFL_EXT.1 in the ST. If the ST assigns 5 to the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts for biometric verification, n should be 5. If the ST states that this number is configurable from 5 to 10, the evaluator shall assume the worst-case scenario and n should be 10.

The evaluator shall assign a pass verdict to the TOE only if the evaluator can not find those artefacts that the probability of successful attack is more than p .

The evaluator shall make at least 3 artefacts from three test subjects following the same creation process and perform at least 10 attempts for each artefact to calculate p (i.e. minimum number of attempts for calculation of p for each artefact is $3 * 10 = 30$).

The evaluator should focus on a few artefacts that show highest error rate at the independent testing or hold highest quality for the penetration testing and spend enough time for training before conducting the final testing to measure p for those artefacts.

9.3.2. Additional application notes for AGD Class

CEM work unit AGD_OPE.1-1 requires the evaluator to examine the AGD guidance to determine that it describes appropriate warnings for secure use of the TOE.

The evaluator shall examine that appropriate warnings is provided in the AGD guidance if the evaluator can find those artefacts that pass the penetration test however whose p is higher than 7%.

Those artefacts can succeed at least one presentation attack (and succeed to unlock the computer) at 25% of probability when allowable number of unsuccessful attempts is 4 (i.e. $n = 4$).

Example of warnings is that the AGD guidance may warn that the biometric verification is less

secure than a NBAF and recommend using a NBAF for security sensitive services.

Chapter 10. Related Documents

- [CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [addenda] CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs, Version 0.5, May 2017.
- [PP_MD_V3.3] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version:3.3.
- [PPC-MDF] PP-Configuration for Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals and collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device -, May 11, 2020, Version 0.99 - [CFG-MDF-BIO].
- [BIOPP-Module] collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device -, May 11, 2020, Version 1.0 - [BIOPP-Module].
- [Toolbox] Toolbox Overview, May 11, 2020, Version 1.0.
- [ISO/IEC 19795-1] Biometric performance testing and reporting - Part 1: Principles and framework, First edition.
- [ISO/IEC 19795-2] Biometric performance testing and reporting - Part 2: Testing methodologies for technology and scenario evaluation, First edition.
- [ISO/IEC 19795-3] Biometric performance testing and reporting - Part 3: Modality-specific testing, First edition.
- [ISO/IEC 19989-1] Criteria and methodology for security evaluation of biometric systems – Part 1: Framework, Under development.
- [ISO/IEC 30107-3] Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 3: Testing and reporting, First edition.
- [BEAT] Biometrics Evaluation and Testing, <https://www.beat-eu.org>