# AE45C1 (HD65145C1) Version 01

# Smartcard Security Target

# (Public Version)

**Renesas Technology Corp.**

Version 2.0

17 December, 2003

**⌐RENESAS**

## **Revision**

| Version | Date | Section | Description |
|---------|------|---------|-------------|
| Ver. 1.0 | 28 Nov., 2003 | — | Public Version |
| Ver. 2.0 | 17 Dec., 2003 | 0.4 | Reference updated. |
| | | 2.1 | Table 1 updated. |

# 0    Preface

## 0.1    Objectives of Document

This document defines the Security Target for evaluation of the Renesas AE45C1. It is intended to comply with the BSI-PP-0002 Protection Profile (see [BSI-PP-0002]). Although no evaluated conformance claim is made, it is also intended to conform as far as possible with the requirements of the IC package of the SCSUG Protection Profile, and to provide support for operating system and application software that aims to meet SCSUG requirements.

## 0.2    Scope of Document

This document defines the Security Target as required by [CC/1].  This is a Public version of the document used in the evaluation process.

This document also reflects the transfer of Hitachi, Ltd.'s Smart Card IC business to Renesas Technology Corp.

## 0.3    Intended Readership

- Developers concerned with certification of the AE45C1

- Developers of Smartcard Embedded Software to run on the AE45C1

- Evaluators and certifiers of the AE45C1.

## 0.4    Related Documents

[BSI-PP-0002]    Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, v1.0, Eurosmart, July 2001

[BSI-RN]    Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators, AIS 31, v3.1 (part of Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme), Certification Body of the BSI

[CC/1]    ISO/IEC 15408-1 Information Technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security – Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 2.1, August 1999, CCIMB-99-031

[CC/2]    ISO/IEC 15408-2 Information Technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security – Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 2.1, August 1999, CCIMB-99-032

[CC/3]    ISO/IEC 15408-3 Information Technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security – Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 2.1, August 1999, CCIMB-99-033

Note: the combination of all 3 parts of ISO 15408 is also referred to in this document as "Common Criteria" or "CC".

[PA]        Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, v1.0, Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies & Philips Semiconductors, March 2002

[CCF]       Hitachi Single-Chip Microcomputer AE-4 Series AE45C1 (HD65145C1) Current Control Functions, Rev. 1.0, Hitachi Ltd., 17 June 2002

[HM]        Hitachi Single-Chip Microcomputer AE-4 Series AE45C1 (HD65145C1) Hardware Manual, Rev. 1.0, Hitachi Ltd., 10 March 2003

[Opt]       Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for HD65145C1 [AE45C1]), Version 1.2R, Hitachi Ltd. (issued under the name of Renesas Technology Corp.), 10 March 2003

[UGM]       Guidelines for Using the AE45C1, Version 4.0, Renesas Technology Corp., 30 October 2003

A reference of the form [*REF, n*] refers to section *n* of *REF*.

## 0.5    Document Structure

This document follows the structure set out in [CC/1].

Note that sub-sections are structured to show parts that originate from [BSI-PP-0002], [PA] and other sources.

## 0.6    Outstanding Issues

None.

## 0.7    Glossary

| Term | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining<br><br>A mode of DES encryption. |
| CC | Common Criteria (ISO 15408) |
| COT | Chip-on-Tape - an IC packaged in a form suitable for embedding into a plastic card to form a smart card. |
| DES | Data Encryption Standard |
| DPA | Differential Power Analysis |
| ECB | Electronic Code Book<br><br>A mode of DES encryption. |
| EEPROM | Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory |

| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Embedded Software | Software held in the AE45C1, having been developed by users of the AE45C1. Such software generally includes an operating system and may include all or part of applications. There are two types of Embedded Software: <br><br>• Hard-coded – held in ROM <br><br>• Soft-coded – held in EEPROM or RAM. <br><br>The AE45C1 does not depend on such software, and Embedded Software is not part of the TOE. However, hard-coded Embedded Software will be included in the ROM of any issued AE45C1 at manufacturing time. <br><br>Note that Embedded Software includes all software on an other than the IC Dedicated Software. <br><br>Embedded Software is also referred to as 'Smartcard Embedded Software' (especially in [BSI-PP-0002]). |
| EWE | An interrupt generated by the AE45C1 whenever an attempt is made to write to EEPROM. |
| FMU | Firewall Management Unit – a feature of the AE45C1 that limits the memory areas available. |
| Hitachi | Refers to Hitachi Ltd. Development completed prior to April 1st 2003 will have been documented under Hitachi's procedures. |
| IC | Integrated Circuit |
| IC Dedicated Software | Software developed by Renesas and embedded in the IC. (Adopted from [BSP-PP-0002]) |
| IC Dedicated Test Software | Software developed by Renesas for testing the AE45C1 during manufacture. This software is part of the TOE, but is not available for general use by operating systems, applications or users in phase 7 of the lifecycle (see section 2.3). |
| Manufacturing Identification Data | Some basic data injected into EEPROM, enabling traceability of an IC to the lot and line in which it was manufactured, the Smartcard Embedded Software present, and the versions of masks and specifications applicable. |

| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Option List | A form supplied by Renesas and filled in by an AE45C1 customer, specifying various options for the manufacture of AE45C1 ICs for that customer. The aspects of particular interest to this security target are:<br><br>• Selection of whether pre-personalisation data injection is required<br><br>• Selection of whether the watchdog timer should be active.<br><br>The options list also describes the content and structure of the manufacturing identification data that Renesas will inject (see section 2.4.2). |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| RAM | Random Access Memory |
| Renesas | Short for Renesas Technology Corp. Development completed after April 1st 2003, and revisions after this date are documented under the Renesas company name. |
| Reset state | A state in which the AE45C1 does not execute instructions or engage in input/output. The AE45C1 can exit the reset state by receiving an external or internal reset.<br><br>See also section 6.1. |
| RNG | Random number generator |
| ROM | Read-Only Memory |
| RSA | Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm, named after its inventors. |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| Smartcard | (as used in [BSI-PP-0002]) Composition of the TOE, the Smartcard Embedded Software, User Data and the package (the smartcard carrier). |
| ST | Security Target |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TOE Delivery | The point at which the TOE is delivered, as shown in section 2.3. This may be either in the form of wafers (at the end of phase 3) or as packaged modules (at the end of phase 4). |
| TOE Manufacturer | (As defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.7]) The IC developer and manufacturer. If the TOE is delivered after phase 4 (i.e. as packaged modules, rather than wafers) then this is also the packager.<br><br>For the AE45C1 the TOE Manufacturer refers to Renesas. |
| TSC | TSF Scope of Control |
| TSF | TOE Security Functions |

| Term | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| TSF Data | Data created by and for the TOE and that might affect the operation of the TOE. |
| UART | Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter – accordance with ISO/IEC7816-3. |
| UDF | An interrupt generated by the AE45C1 at regular intervals as part of the operation of the Watchdog Timer (WDT). |
| User Data | All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context. User data comprises all data in the final smartcard IC except for the TSF data. |
| User Mode | The AE45C1 mode of operation after TOE Delivery. The AE45C1 is set to this mode just before delivery, which renders the IC dedicated test software permanently unavailable. |
| WDT | Watchdog Timer – a feature of the AE45C1 that enables embedded software to be regularly executed during the operation of the IC. This allows checks to be made on the execution environment to help detect potential attacks or insecure conditions. |

# Table of Contents

# 1.    ST Introduction

The ST aims to provide potential users of the AE45C1 with

- A definition of the main properties of the IC that are evaluated and certified independent of any software

- Confidence in IC properties that can be used to build an integrated TOE (i.e. IC + operating system + other application software).

## 1.1    ST Identification

Title:          AE45C1 (HD65145C1) Version 01 Smartcard Security Target– Public version

Version:      2.0

Provided by:    Renesas Technology Corp.

This Security Target applies to the Renesas AE45C1 integrated circuit, version 01 (as defined in detail in the configuration list for the evaluation).

*This public version of the AE45C1 Security Target (also known as "ST-lite") is abridged from the evaluated version of the full Security Target (version 2.0) with the approval of the Certification Body.*

## 1.2    ST Overview

This document is the Security Target (ST) for the Renesas AE45C1 integrated circuit (IC) product, intended for use as a smart card IC. The Renesas AE45C1 complies with the Eurosmart Protection Profile developed by the Secure Semiconductor Vendor Group [BSI-PP-0002]. However, the AE45C1 also provides a number of additional security features that have been based on a long history of assisting software developers to implement secure Smartcard Embedded Software. These AE45C1-specific security features have been added to the ST.

The AE45C1 is ideally suited for high security applications. Security has been built in from the start, forming an integral part of the whole Smartcard design concept. The whole development process (including secure chip design environment, secured production facilities and secure handling during shipment to the customer) is constantly reviewed in order to maximise the overall security package. The AE45C1 TOE can be delivered either in the form of wafers, or as packaged modules ready for embedding into a plastic card.

Many security features such as integrated sensors, distributed layout, random number generation, watchdog timer, DES engine and power analysis attack protection are all included providing a strong on-chip hardware security structure.

Uniquely, Renesas smartcard devices are fabricated using a MONOS (Metal Oxide Nitride Oxide Silicon) EEPROM structure. MONOS advantages compared to standard EEPROM structures are high resistance to radiation disturbance, high reliability and endurance.

A high performance modular multiplication coprocessor is complementary to the design concept ensuring final operating system efficiency, application integrity and performance that meet tomorrow's needs today.

The AE45C1 fulfils the requirements of Smart Card applications requiring large memory, high security and high speed secure authentication, data encryption or electronic signature. Examples include: Public Key (PKI), WAP, m-commerce, digital signature, USIM/UMTS, and credit card.

Where public key is a core requirement, a high speed modular multiplication coprocessor able to process arithmetical data in a time frame that ensures a fast and free flowing application environment is required. The AE45C1 modular multiplication coprocessor ensures the high performance required by today's high security applications.

Applications such as Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) and e-m-commerce are ever expanding in scope and consequently the need for greater memory storage for both data and program code is ever increasing. The AE45C1 provides a significant increase in ROM for program storage over previous devices whilst ensuring a balance of EEPROM for data storage.

The move from single to multi-application on a single component is also rising due in part to new systems such as WAP and e-m-commerce. This requires not only additional memory for application data storage but also features such as Firewall management units (FMU) in order to provide data integrity between applications.

## 1.3      CC Conformance Claim

This ST is compliant with [CC/1], [CC/2] and [CC/3].

Because the ST conforms to the BSI-PP-0002 PP, it includes extended functionality classes defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 8]. The ST is therefore [BSI-PP-0002] conformant, [CC/2] extended and [CC/3] conformant.

The Assurance level is EAL4 augmented (for augmentations see section 5.1.4).

The strength of function is SOF-High.

# 2.      TOE Description

## 2.1      AE45C1 Product Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the AE45C1 single-chip microcomputer unit, for use as a smartcard integrated circuit. The TOE consists of the hardware shown in Figure 1, along with IC Dedicated Test Software, some embedded software, and reference and guidance documents. IC Dedicated Test Software is used in IC production only, and is not available to users.

As well as the functional interfaces, the IC surface is also considered as a TOE interface for some potential physical attacks, as described in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.3].

A block diagram of the AE45C1 is shown in Figure 1 below:



*Figure 1: Internal block diagram of the AE45C1*

The TOE configuration is summarised in the table below:

| Item Type | Item | Version | Form of delivery |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hardware | AE45C1 (HD65145C1) single-chip microcomputer | 01 | Wafer or packaged module (see section 2.3) |
| Software | Test ROM software | 01 (defined by hardware version) | Included in AE45C1 test ROM |
| Software | RNG online test software | (defined by the version of [UGM]) | Implemented by customer (Source code is given in [UGM, 6].) |
| Document | Hardware Manual [HM] | See section 0.4 | Hardcopy |
| Document | Current Control Functions [CCF] | See section 0.4 | Hardcopy |
| Document | User Guidance [UGM] | See section 0.4 | Hardcopy |

*Table 1: TOE Configuration*

### 2.1.1        Hardware

The AE45C1 is a single-chip microcomputer (MCU) based around the high-speed AE-4 CPU core (derived from Renesas' widely used H8/300H general purpose core). As can be seen from the block diagram in Figure 1, the MCU comprises the following major blocks in addition to the CPU: ROM, RAM, EEPROM, random number generator (RNG), modular multiplication coprocessor, DES coprocessor, UART, two interval timers, watchdog timer (WDT), firewall management unit (FMU), and two I/O lines.

**CPU:** the AE45C1 CPU can operate with either a 3V or 5V supply and a maximum internal clock frequency of 10MHz (at 3V) and is upwards compatible with the H8/300 core (as used in Renesas' AE-3 series of smartcard ICs):

- The instruction set is implemented with 16-bit variable instruction lengths (2 to 10 bytes) and permits register to register arithmetic and logic operations.

- A linear address space of up to 16 Mbytes is possible.

- Signed or unsigned multiply instruction (8 x 8 or 16 x 16-bits)

- Signed or unsigned divide instruction (16 ÷ 8 or 32 ÷ 16-bits)

- Special EEPROM write instruction and high-speed block transfer instruction

**Memory:** the AE45C1 has a memory mapped architecture and allows the EEPROM to be used for both data and program storage. There is a special block of RAM dedicated for coprocessor use, that can be used as normal RAM when not required by the coprocessor:

- ROM: 196 kbytes

- RAM: 6 kbytes + 512 bytes of coprocessor RAM

- EEPROM: 36 kbytes

    o on-chip charge pump and independent oscillator

    o special write instruction, and interrupt generation on writing

    o page write/erase

    o individual page protection

**RNG:** this can generate 16-bit random numbers. Using the RNG enables a unique value to be generated inside the chip, which improves the system security.

**Modular multiplication coprocessor:** this unit consists of the control unit and 512 bytes Copro RAM. The control unit is intended to form the basis for efficient implementations of asymmetric cryptography by providing high speed modular multiplication in hardware with a programmable data length from 160 – 1024 bits. *As no cryptographic software or algorithm is provided by Renesas for the TOE, the functionality of this coprocessor is included in the evaluated hardware configuration, but its specific use in cryptographic software is not included.*

**DES coprocessor:** this hardware engine can be used to provide either DES or triple-DES functions to the users' software with very little software overhead. Countermeasures against information leakage have been integrated into the coprocessor unit to make it highly resistant to such attacks with minimal software overheads or execution time penalties. These countermeasures are always active and make no additional requirements on Smartcard Embedded Software.

**Interval timer:** the AE45C1 has interval timer 1 and interval timer 2. These timers are identical and issue an interrupt at intervals which user determined.

**WDT:** the watchdog timer is a powerful tool to help the user software detect and respond to unauthorised program execution

**FMU:** this memory management function monitors memory access permissions for the user software and enables the limiting of program execution from RAM and EEPROM.

**I/O:** I/O comprises I/O-1/IRQ and I/O-2/IRQ (see Figure 1). As well as the ISO 7816 standard I/O pin, a further I/O pin is provided for additional use. These pins, together with the power and clock pins, form the electrical interface of the TOE.

**UART:** half-duplex asynchronous mode that conforms to the ISO/IEC standard 7816-3.

**System control logic:** System control logic generates a signal to control the interface between the CPU subsystem and each other subsystem.

**Security logic:** the IC incorporates specialised security logic to help to ensure the correct operation of the TOE.

Some security features, such as watchdog timer or FMU, allow the Smartcard Embedded Software to determine the events to be monitored and the actions to be taken; many of them however are independent of software and are designed to operate automatically when required, to return the TOE to a secure state. The IC also provides protection features to resist leakage attacks such as DPA. The evaluation of the TOE assumes that all relevant user selectable security functions, as detailed in Renesas' user documents, are enabled when required to ensure the security of operation.

Physical security of the IC is enhanced by the presence of shielding over critical areas, and by the use of design techniques that obscure the function and operation of the physical layout.

Full details of the operation of the AE45C1 and guidance for its use are given in [HM], [CCF] and [UGM].

### 2.1.2        Software

The TOE includes the following software:

- The IC Dedicated Test Software is only used for testing during IC production, and is not available to users.

- The RNG On-line Test Software is provided to perform the on-line test for randomness, as required in [BSI-RN]. To enable users to deploy the software as necessary, this software is supplied as a listing in [UGM, 6]. Note that the use of this software is part of the intended method of use of the TOE under certain conditions, and it is therefore part of the evaluated configuration.

All other Smartcard Embedded Software (e.g. an operating system) is outside the scope of the TOE. Smartcard Embedded Software to be stored in ROM is supplied to Renesas by the customer in a secure manner, and is then protected by Renesas' secure production environment.

### 2.1.3        Documents

The AE45C1 Hardware Manual [HM] is supplied as the basic reference for users who are developing Smartcard Embedded Software. Additional security features and their use are described in the Current Control Functions [CCF] document. Guidance for the secure use of the AE45C1 in applications is given in the User Guidance Manual [UGM].

## 2.2        AE45C1 Intended Usage

The AE45C1 is intended for use in a range of high security applications, including high speed secure authentication, data encryption or electronic signature. Examples include: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), WAP, m-commerce, digital signature, USIM/UMTS, and credit card.

## 2.3    TOE Lifecycle

The design and manufacturing lifecycle for the AE45C1 is shown in Figure 2 (and in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.1.1]). The TOE can be delivered either at the end of phase 3, or at the end of phase 4, as shown in the figure.



*Figure 2: Design and manufacturing lifecycle*

The stages shown are as listed below. This Security Target addresses phases 2-3 in Figure 2. When the TOE is delivered by Renesas as modules rather than in wafer form, phase 4 is also covered under this Security Target.

- Phase 1: Smartcard Embedded Software development – this phase is outside the scope of the TOE, but the results of the software development are inputs to the manufacture of a customer-specific instance of the TOE. Renesas deliver information about the AE45C1 (such as [HM] and [CCF]) to the embedded software developer to enable the Smartcard Embedded Software to be written. Development tools (such as emulators) and IC samples are also available to developers. Information and tools are released only under Non-Disclosure Agreement to ensure their distribution is controlled and limited (this ensures, for example, secure disposal of scrap).

  The embedded software for incorporation in the AE45C1 ROM mask is sent via a secure delivery method from the software developer to Renesas, and its secure handling is then ensured by Renesas. Similarly, pre-personalisation data is sent by a secure route to Renesas for injection during the manufacturing stage. Injection of data is described further in section 2.4.2. Secure receipt and handling of this data by Renesas is included within the scope of this security target.

- Phase 2: IC design, IC Dedicated Software development, and mask fabrication – this includes system design through logic, circuit and layout design. The Dedicated Test Software is also developed in this phase, to enable testing of the IC at various phases of its manufacture. The masks used to manufacture the various IC layers are created from the layout design during this phase; ROM masks for the Smartcard Embedded Software in a particular instance of the AE45C1 are fabricated after receipt of the software from phase 1.

  The security of the development environments for the IC and its dedicated software, along with the secure fabrication and handling of masks are primary concerns of this security target.

- Phase 3: IC wafer manufacturing – in this phase, wafers containing AE45C1 dies with Smartcard Embedded Software are produced. At the end of this process each die is tested and has its pre-personalisation data injected into EEPROM (see section 2.4.2).

  The security of manufacture, including handling of masks, test software, and pre-personalisation data are primary concerns of this security target.

  The TOE may be delivered at this stage as wafers (in which case each die will be set to User Mode). Alternatively, the TOE may be packaged by Renesas and delivered in COT form at the end of phase 4. If the TOE is to be delivered in COT form then at the end of phase 3 it is set to a constrained Test Mode, instead of User Mode, to allow testing of the IC after module manufacturing in phase 4.

  This security target covers TOE Delivery at either point, but where wafers are delivered at the end of phase 3, secure handling in phase 4 is a customer responsibility. Note that in all cases the TOE will be set to User Mode before TOE Delivery.

- Phase 4: IC Packaging – each wafer is cut into individual dies and its protective packaging applied, along with its contacts. The resulting module is then tested in Test Mode to ensure correct operation, after which it is set to User Mode. This leaves the IC ready for insertion into a plastic card.

- Phases 5-7: Smartcard finishing, personalisation and end-usage – these stages, and their security features, are determined by the customer, and are outside the scope of this security target.

### 2.3.1       Test and User Modes

During manufacturing and production (phases 2-4), the AE45C1 makes some mode transitions which affect the interface presented. These modes are as follows:

- Test mode makes the IC Dedicated Test Software available, which is used to ensure that only correctly working ICs are delivered.

- User mode makes the IC Dedicated Test Software unavailable and the TOE now provides only the functionality described in [HM]. The software interface presented will be determined by the Smartcard Embedded Software.

As explained under the individual lifecycle phases above, the AE45C1 is always in test mode in phases 2 and 3. If TOE Delivery takes place at the end of phase 4, then the AE45C1 will be in test mode during phase 4, making a limited set of test functions available to test the correct operation of modules after packaging. However, the TOE is always in User Mode at the point of TOE Delivery, and the transition to User Mode is irreversible.

### 2.3.2       TOE Delivery

As noted above, the AE45C1 may be delivered at the end of either phase 3 or phase 4, as requested by the customer. In either case, the AE45C1 will be delivered in User Mode, and Renesas will apply secure delivery procedures for the transport of the TOE from Renesas premises.

## 2.4        TOE Environments

### 2.4.1        Development Environment

Renesas' development environment for the AE45C1 has implemented security measures specifically to ensure the security of the AE45C1 and of Smartcard Embedded Software and injection data used in manufacturing ICs for customers. As indicated in section 2.3, there are three areas of the development environment:

- Design sites

- Mask manufacture site

- Manufacturing sites

These provide the following main security properties:

- Design sites

    - Confidentiality and integrity of AE45C1 logical and physical design

    - Testing of AE45C1 security functionality

    - Confidentiality and integrity of IC Dedicated Software

    - Confidentiality and integrity of customer ROM code and injection data (i.e. the Smartcard Embedded Software for an instance of the AE45C1)

- Mask manufacture site

    - Confidentiality and integrity of customer ROM code and mask

    - Confidentiality and integrity of AE45C1 design and base masks

- Manufacturing sites

    - Confidentiality and integrity of AE45C1 base masks

    - Confidentiality and integrity of customer ROM mask

    - Confidentiality and integrity of test software

    - Confidentiality and integrity of injection data

    - Production of authentic AE45C1 ICs, correctly implementing the design and including the customer Smartcard Embedded Software in ROM.

Security issues for each of these areas are addressed by processes and procedures put in place by Renesas and within the scope of evaluation. The security measures include IT security to protect information stored on Renesas computer systems, as well as physical security

measures for secure storage to ensure that design and manufacturing information and objects are only accessible to authorised staff with a need to know the information. Renesas' integrated security concept (ISC) covers the entire development process, from specification, through design and implementation to manufacturing and shipping. ISC is implemented through the use of standards and procedures that form part of the quality system at the heart of Renesas' business. The rigorous adoption and adherence to procedures, including those relating to security, is an integral part of the quality system at the heart of Renesas' business.

The security of the IC Dedicated Software at design and manufacturing sites is ensured by the same level of security measures as for the hardware design. This ensures that only authorised persons have access to the software and its related information.

Smartcard Embedded Software is received from customers via a secure delivery procedure. Once received by Renesas, this software is also handled with the same level of security as for design information. As a further measure, the group handling customer software is separate from the IC design team.

### 2.4.2        Injection of Manufacturing Identification and Secret Data

In general, although there will be a substantial amount of operating system and application software held in ROM, an IC will also require software to be added after it leaves the manufacturing environment. Operating system software may require additional parts or patches to be loaded, and increasingly applications are expected to be loaded and deleted after a smart card has been issued to users. In order to enable such addition (and deletion) of software to be done securely, there is a generic requirement for identification data and secret data, determined by the IC purchaser, to be injected during manufacture.

The AE45C1 supports this requirement by injecting identification data during the manufacturing process; this data uniquely identifies each IC. In addition, customers may choose to inject further data. The details of the data content and its location in memory are shown in [Opt].

# 3.      TOE Security Environment

## 3.1      Assets

This section defines the primary and secondary assets to be protected by the TOE. [BSI-PP-0002, 3.1] gives the assets relating to the threats, and these are summarised below.

The primary assets to be protected are classified as:

- User Data – this includes injection/pre-personalisation data and data generated and managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software (subject to adequate protection by the software, see A.Key-Function, A.Plat-Appl and A.Resp-Appl in section 3.2)

- Smartcard Embedded Software, comprising

  - Hard-coded Embedded Software (stored in ROM) – this is fixed and generally consists of parts or all of the operating system, and parts or all of a number of applications

  - Soft-coded Embedded Software (stored in RAM or EEPROM) – this may include parts of the operating system or applications.

Both of these types of asset need to have their confidentiality and integrity protected.

A further primary asset is:

- Correct operation of the TOE (including its random number generator).

In particular this means that the Smartcard Embedded Software will be correctly executed, which includes the correct operation of the TOE's functions.

Because random numbers are likely to be used by embedded software for generating cryptographic keys, another primary assets is:

- the random numbers generated by the TOE[1]

Secondary assets are critical information about the TOE, including logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software and TSF data.

In addition, the following will also contain information about the TOE.

- Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and characterisation related data, material for software development support, and photomasks.

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[1] The confidentiality of random numbers is generally protected by embedded software (which is responsible for requesting random numbers). However, it is important that random numbers should not be subject to leakage (cf. T.Leak-Inherent), because of their potential role in cryptographic key generation.

Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the primary assets.

Assets relating specifically to the Organisational Security Policy P.Process-TOE and Assumption A.Process-Card are given in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.1].

## 3.2        Assumptions

### 3.2.1        Assumptions from [BSI-PP-0002]

The following assumptions are made:

**A.Process-Card**        Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

It is assumed that security procedures are used by the recipient after delivery of the TOE by Renesas up to delivery to the end-user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

The exact requirements of this assumption will depend on the Smartcard Embedded Software. This means that the phases after TOE Delivery (refer to section 2.3) are assumed to be protected appropriately. For a preliminary list of assets to be protected, see [BSI-PP-0002, 3.1].

**A.Plat-Appl**        Usage of Hardware Platform

The Smartcard Embedded Software is designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met:

(i)        The AE45C1 hardware manual [HM], current control supplement [CCF] and the hardware application notes

(ii)        Findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

**A.Resp-Appl**        Treatment of User Data

All User Data are owned by Smartcard Embedded Software. Therefore, it is assumed that security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Smartcard Embedded Software as defined for the specific application context.

This assumption requires that the Smartcard Embedded Software define and positively manage its security relevant User Data, in the manner required by the application context. Without this, the protection provided by the AE45C1 itself may be of no use if the Smartcard Embedded Software itself allows data to be compromised.

Examples of embedded software security concerns are given in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.2].

### 3.2.2       Assumptions from [PA]

**A.Key-Function**       Usage of Key-dependent Functions

Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).

Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including cryptographic keys.

An example of the type of attack relevant to this assumption would be analysis of the power consumption of the IC during the cryptographic operation (i.e. DPA).

Note here that the functions considered in this assumption are part of the Smartcard Embedded Software; T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address the cryptographic functions that are part of the AE45C1

For example, the RSA encryption system may be implemented in Smartcard Embedded Software, using the modular arithmetic functions of the modular multiplication coprocessor. In this case the leakage characteristic of the implementation will depend partly on the hardware characteristics of the AE45C1 and its modular multiplication coprocessor, and partly on the ways in which the embedded software uses the hardware. The properties of the AE45C1 hardware are assessed under this Security Target, but the software implementation is clearly outside the scope of the AE45C1 evaluation.

To assist embedded software developers to implement leak-resistant code, guidance on secure software implementation is given in [UGM, 3].

### 3.2.3       Other Assumptions

A variety of keys and other security-critical data may be injected for use by Smartcard Embedded Software. These may include shared private keys, public/private key pairs, etc. This information could contribute to a cloning attack, or to breaking the security of an instance of the TOE (e.g. by compromising its keys). The integrity of this data is also vital to ensuring the security of the TOE (e.g. preventing unauthorised changes to mask code, IC design or keys). All data supplied for injection/pre-personalisation is assumed to be supported off-card in a secure manner:

**A.InjDatSupp**       Injected Data Support

Data for injection/pre-personalisation will be supplied from the various bodies controlling the operations of the system in which the TOE is functioning. It is assumed that the generation, distribution, maintenance, and destruction of this data is adequately secure.

## 3.3      Threats

### 3.3.1          Threats defined in [BSI-PP-0002]

This section adopts the threats to ICs defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.3].

The AE45C1 has the following high-level security concerns, as in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.3]:

SC1    manipulation of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories).

SC2    disclosure of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while being processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories).

SC3    deficiency of random numbers.

These high-level security concerns are refined below by defining specific threats. Note that manipulation of the TOE is only a means to threaten User Data or the Smartcard Embedded Software and does not in itself represent a successful attack.

These security concerns are derived from considering the end-usage phase (phase 7) since

- Phase 1 and phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6 are covered by assumptions, and

- The development and production environment starting with phase 2 and ending with TOE Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy

### 3.3.1.1          Threats derived from SC1-SC3

See [BSI-PP-0002, 3.3], and the example attack scenarios in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.3]. For completeness, the threats are summarised below.

**T.Leak-Inherent**              Inherent Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the Smartcard in order to disclose confidential data (User Data or TSF Data).

No direct contact with the Smartcard internals is required here. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is an example of an attack based on the inherent leakage threat.

**T.Phys-Probing**          Physical Probing

An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order to:

(i)     disclose User Data

(ii)    disclose/reconstruct the Smartcard Embedded Software

(iii)   disclose other critical operational information especially TSF data.

Physical probing requires direct contact with the AE45C1 circuit structures. Before attacks based on this threat can be mounted, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design, including treatment of User Data, may also be a pre-requisite.

**T.Phys-Manipulation**     Physical Manipulation

An attacker may physically modify the Smartcard in order to

(i)     modify security features or functions of the TOE

(ii)    modify security functions of the Smartcard Embedded Software

(iii)   modify User Data.

Modification may be achieved through techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse-engineering. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. As with T.Phys-Probing, before attacks based on this threat can be mounted, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data may be a pre-requisite. Changes to circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

In contrast to malfunctions (see T.Malfunction), the attacker needs to gather significant knowledge about the TOE's internal construction in order to launch a manipulation attack.

**T.Malfunction**           Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

An attacker may cause a malfunction of the TSF or of the Smartcard Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to

(i)     deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE

(ii)    deactivate or modify security functions of the Smartcard Embedded Software.

This may be achieved by operating the IC outside its normal operating conditions.

Unlike T.Phys-Manipulation, attacks based on environmental stress can be launched without significant knowledge of the IC's internal construction on the part of the attacker. However, to exploit the attack, the attacker needs information about the functional operation.

**T.Leak-Forced**          Forced Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the smartcard in order to disclose confidential data (User Data or TSF Data), even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker.

This threat pertains to attacks where methods described in "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" (T.Malfunction) and/or "Physical Manipulation" (T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets.

Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is an example of an attack based on the forced leakage threat.

**T.Abuse-Func**          Abuse of Functionality

An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery in order to

(i)          disclose or manipulate User Data

(ii)         manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or of the Smartcard Embedded Software

(iii)        enable an attack.

For the AE45C1, T.Abuse-Func concerns the threat of unauthorised access to the IC Dedicated Test Software, which is rendered inaccessible by placing the IC into User Mode before TOE Delivery (see section 2.3).

**T.RND**          Deficiency of Random Numbers

An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers generated by the TOE, for instance because of a lack of entropy of the random numbers provided.

An attacker may gather information about the random numbers produced.

Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered as they may assist in giving the attacker information about random numbers.

Attacks on random number generation are significant because the random numbers generated may be used as secrets - e.g. to generate cryptographic keys.

Under the threat T.RND, the attacker is assumed to take advantage of statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the TOE without specific knowledge about the RNG itself.

### 3.3.2    Other Threats

The AE45C1 makes available facilities that are useful for embedded software to use in addressing the threats that it may face. This introduces an additional high-level security concern for the AE45C1:

SC4    attacks on the Smartcard Embedded Software may be made, and the software may not be able to detect or respond to the attacks.

**T.NoSWDetect**    Inability of the TOE to detect an attack

In a multi-layered or multi-application software environment, there may be attacks on one part of the Smartcard Embedded Software arising from another part.  Smartcard Embedded Software execution may also be attacked via various means, with the intention of corrupting software execution in a specific or random way. If the TOE cannot detect such attacks, then it cannot apply any countermeasures to protect itself.

The AE45C1 is concerned in particular to detect the following:

(i)    Attempts to access memory outside an area defined for the software being executed

(ii)    Attempts to make an illegal access

(iii)    Attempts to execute code from a type of memory not permitted by the software environment[2]

(iv)    Attempts to write to EEPROM addresses containing data that should not be changed

(v)    Attempts to execute an illegal instruction code

(vi)    Attempts to alter registers controlling the operation of the TOE.

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[2] The "software environment" is a term used to capture the definition of acceptable memory use for the software system using the AE45C1. This would usually be at the level of operating system software.

For the purposes of this threat, an illegal access is one that is marked "×" in the tables titled "Access" in the AE45C1 memory map ([HM, 5]). In addition, among the accesses marked "?" in the tables, if a type of access allowed is noted under the circle, an access other than the allowed type of access is also an illegal access.

This threat applies whether the "attack" is deliberate or due to errors, but all the attacks covered are launched from software. Inducing errors by external means, as covered in T.Phys-Manipulation, may also give rise to the same sort of error conditions as listed for T.NoSWDetect.

**T.NoSWResponse**    Inability of Smartcard Embedded Software to respond to an attack

If Smartcard Embedded Software cannot detect a potential attack, or other dangerous condition, and has no ability to take action when such a condition is detected then there is a danger that it will not be able to prevent the attack continuing.

This threat does not address the particular details of individual attacks, but recognises that Smartcard Embedded Software may make checks on its own state to enhance protection against a variety of attacks (including those aimed at inducing errors by software or external means). For such checks to be useful, there must also be ways for the software to respond to the attack (e.g. by preventing further processing).

## 3.4 Organisational Security Policies

The following policy requirement is taken from [BSI-PP-0002, 3.4].

**P.Process-TOE**    Protection during TOE Development and Production

The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the Smartcard Integrated Circuit (Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery) is secure so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. For example, the confidentiality and integrity of design information and test data shall be guaranteed; access to samples, development tools and other material shall be restricted to authorised persons only; scrap will be destroyed etc. This not only pertains to the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software and therefore especially to the Smartcard Embedded Software itself. This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures for Phase 1 and the Phases after TOE Delivery as far as they can be controlled by the TOE Manufacturer.

An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.

Assets relating specifically to P.Process-TOE are given in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.1].

Renesas implement the security measures to satisfy this policy requirement, and these are assessed as part of evaluation and certification against this ST. However, since they are not directly relevant to users of the TOE, the detailed measures and processes that implement the policy are not given here.

Note that the inclusion of identification information in EEPROM is described in more detail in section 2.4.2. This part of the policy establishes a basis for evaluation and security of software running on the AE45C1, by ensuring that an AE45C1 can be identified. Note that procedural measures (including Renesas' secure delivery procedures) will generally be required to ensure that AE45C1 ICs are genuine, unless the Smartcard Embedded Software contains functionality to authenticate the IC[3].

P.Process-TOE covers identification of hard-coded Embedded Software (via identification of the ROM mask); soft-coded Embedded Software will generally need to provide its own identification.

As an additional policy, the AE45C1 provides specific security functionality which can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software for cryptographic algorithm implementation. The policy P.Add-Functions is therefore adopted from [PA]. In the following policy, specific security functionality is listed which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE's environment because it can only be decided in the context of the smartcard application, against which threats the Smartcard Embedded Software will use the specific security functionality.

**P.Add-Functions**     Additional Specific Security Functionality

The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Data Encryption Standard (DES).

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[3] For example, a hash or digital signature over a known area of memory might be provided by software.

# 4. Security Objectives

## 4.1 TOE Security Objectives

### 4.1.1 Objectives from [BSI-PP-0002]

The AE45C1 shares the following high-level security considerations from [BSI-PP-0002, 4.1]:

SG1    maintain the integrity of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (when being executed/processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories).

SG2    maintain the confidentiality of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (when being processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories).

SG3    provide random numbers.

These high-level security considerations are refined below by defining security objectives as required by the Common Criteria. Note that maintaining the integrity of the TOE is a means to achieve these objectives.

**O.Leak-Inherent**    Protection against Inherent Information Leakage

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data or TSF Data) stored and/or processed in the smartcard IC by measurement and analysis of

- The shape and amplitude of signals (for example on the power, clock, or I/O lines)

- the time between events found by measuring signals (for example on the power, clock, or I/O lines).

This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing whereas O.Phys-Probing is about direct measurements on elements on the chip surface.

Note that this objective relates to security features provided by the AE45C1 itself, and Smartcard Embedded Software should ensure that the security features are appropriately used in conjunction with any additional leakage countermeasures implemented in software (cf. A.Plat-Appl and A.Resp-Appl in section 3.2.1).

**O.Phys-Probing**    Protection against Physical Probing

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of User Data, against the disclosure/reconstruction of the Smartcard Embedded Software, and against the disclosure of other critical operational information. This includes protection against

- measuring through galvanic contacts, which is direct physical probing on the chip's surface other than on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current)

- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis).

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

O.Phys-Probing assumes that the attacker has first performed reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

**O.Malfunction**          Protection against Malfunctions

The TOE must ensure its correct operation.

The TOE must prevent itself from being operated outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include voltage, clock frequency, temperature, or external energy fields.

An attacker may also attempt to cause the AE45C1 to malfunction by using a direct galvanic contact on elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (see O.Phys-Manipulation) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE's internal construction is required and the attack is performed in a controlled manner.

**O.Phys-Manipulation**          Protection against Physical Manipulation

The TOE must provide protection against physical manipulation of the TOE (including its software and TSF data), the Smartcard Embedded Software and User Data. This includes protection against

- reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its properties and functions)

- manipulation of the hardware and any data

- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data).

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

**O.Leak-Forced**          Protection against Forced Information Leakage

The Smartcard must be protected against disclosure of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) processed in the Card (using methods as described under O.Leak-Inherent) even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker

- by forcing a malfunction (cf. O.Malfunction) and/or

- by a physical manipulation (cf. O.Phys-Manipulation).

This objective includes resistance to attacks where T.Phys-Manipulation and T.Leak-Inherent are combined.

**O.Abuse-Func**          Protection against Abuse of Functionality

The TOE must prevent abuse of IC Dedicated Test Software (which may not be used after TOE Delivery) that would

(i)        disclose critical User Data

(ii)       manipulate critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software

(iii)      manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software

(iv)      bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

**O.Identification**      TOE Identification

The TOE must provide a means to store Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.

The AE45C1 identification data is described in section 2.4.2.

**O.RND**                 Random Numbers

The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance, random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy.

The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker since they might be used, for instance, to generate cryptographic keys.

### 4.1.2        Objectives based on [PA]

This section includes an objective for the AE45C1 to provide a DES function, which is based on O.Add-Functions in [PA]. The modular arithmetic functions that are the basis for implementation of RSA and other asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in Smartcard

Embedded Software are part of the AE45C1 functionality, but because they do not directly implement RSA (or other asymmetric systems), they are not included as cryptographic functions here.

**O.Add-Functions**     Additional Specific Security Functionality

The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Data Encryption Standard (DES).

Note that to achieve an adequate strength of function for an application context, Smartcard Embedded Software may require use of triple-DES. The AE45C1 enables this using repeated application of the DES coprocessor – this is discussed in [HM, 13.3.2] and in section 5.1.2.1.

### 4.1.3     Other Objectives

The AE45C1 offers additional facilities to protect embedded software from corrupted, erroneous, or malicious software. The same facilities may protect from some results of attempts at physical manipulation (cf. O.Phys-Manipulation).

A further high-level security consideration is therefore derived from SC4 in section 3.3.2.

SG4    software should be given the ability to detect and respond to attacks.

This leads to objectives that

**O.SWDetect**     Detection of potential attacks by the TOE

The following conditions shall be detected as an aid to identifying potential attacks:

(i)     Attempts to access memory outside an area defined for the software being executed

(ii)    Attempts to make an illegal access

(iii)   Attempts to execute code from a type of memory not permitted by the software environment[4]

(iv)    Attempts to write to EEPROM addresses containing data that should not be changed

(v)     Attempts to execute an illegal instruction code

(vi)    Attempts to alter registers controlling the operation of the TOE.

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[4] The "software environment" is a term used to capture the definition of acceptable memory use for the software system using the AE45C1. This would usually be at the level of operating system software.

The Smartcard Embedded Software itself will determine the memory area for (i), the types of memory permitted for (iii), and the protected EEPROM addressed for (iv).

**O.SWResponse**     Response to potential attacks by Smartcard Embedded Software

The AE45C1 shall allow Smartcard Embedded Software to:

(i)     periodically interrupt processing to execute a known piece of Smartcard Embedded Software

(ii)     cause the processor to enter the reset state.

Executing a known piece of embedded software periodically gives embedded software the ability to check the execution state for any conditions that it wishes to monitor (in addition to those indicated under O.SWDetect above) and stop execution, or take some other action, if it detects a potential attack or other dangerous condition.

## 4.2     Environment Security Objectives

### 4.2.1     Environment Security Objectives from [BSI-PP-0002]

**Phase 1**

**OE.Plat-Appl**     Usage of Hardware Platform

The Smartcard Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met:

(i)     The AE45C1 hardware manual [HM], current control supplement [CCF] and the TOE application notes

(ii)     Findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant to the Smartcard Embedded Software.

Because the AE45C1implements additional specific security functionality (as in O.Add-Functions), OE.Plat-Appl covers the use of these functions by Smartcard Embedded Software as follows:

If required, the Smartcard Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software are just being executed, the Smartcard Embedded Software must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data) stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the methods described under "Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)" and "Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)".

**OE.Resp-Appl**          Treatment of User Data

> Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Smartcard Embedded Software as required by the security needs of the specific application context.

Because the AE45C1 implements additional specific security functionality (as in O.Add-Functions), OE.Resp-Appl covers the use of these functions by Smartcard Embedded Software as follows:

> By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Smartcard Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.

> This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is not possible to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment.

**From Phase 2 until TOE Delivery**

**OE.Process-TOE**          Protection during TOE Development and Production

> The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the Smartcard Integrated Circuit (Phases 2 and 3 up to TOE Delivery) is secure so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. For example, the confidentiality and integrity of design information and test data must be guaranteed, access to samples, development tools and other material must be restricted to authorised persons only, scrap must be destroyed. This not only pertains to the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software and therefore especially to the Smartcard Embedded Software itself. This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures for Phase 1 and the Phases after TOE Delivery as far as they can be controlled by the TOE Manufacturer.

> An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification. In order to make this practical, electronic identification shall be possible.

Assets relating specifically to the Organisational Security Policy P.Process-TOE (which is the source of this objective) are given in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.1].

**From TOE Delivery until the beginning of Phase 7**

**OE.Process-Card**    Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

        Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

        This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 must be protected appropriately.

Assets relating specifically to the assumption A.Process-Card (which is the source of this objective) are given in [BSI-PP-0002, 3.1].

The precise nature of the protection required will depend on the application context.

### 4.2.2      Other Environment Security Objectives

For injected/pre-personalisation data, the sources and holders of the data need to support its security requirements.

**OE.InjDatSupp**    Injected Data Support

        All data for injections/pre-personalisation shall be generated, distributed, maintained and destroyed in an adequately secure fashion. In general, the data shall be protected for both confidentiality and integrity.

Renesas ensures a secure interface with suppliers of this data by using the injection approach in section 2.4.2. Transmission of data to Renesas is secured by a variety of measures dependent on the transmission medium (e.g. ROM data may be sent by encrypted e-mail). The data is securely stored within the Renesas environment according to the medium.

# 5.       IT Security Requirements

## 5.1       TOE Security Requirements

The functional requirements for the TOE come from 3 sources:

- [BSI-PP-0002]      These SFRs cover the core smart card IC requirements:

  - operating state – FRU_FLT.2 describes the usual operating conditions and requires the TOE to maintain a secure state; FPT_FLS.1 requires a secure response to exceptional operating conditions; FPT_SEP.1 requires the TOE to ensure that the secure responses to operating conditions are independent of software (since, for example,  some software could be malicious)

  - controls over IC Dedicated Test Software – FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 require that the use of IC Dedicated Test Software for manufacturing tests must not allow security to be compromised after TOE Delivery

  - storage of identification/pre-personalisation data – FAU_SAS.1 requires that the TOE be capable of storing such data

  - protection against physical attacks – FPT_PHP.3 requires the TOE to be protected against physical tampering attacks

  - Protection against leakage – FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1 require protection of data against leakage as it moves between components on the IC, and FDP_IFC.1 provides the policy of protection for data

  - Random number generation – FCS_RND.1 requires generation of good quality random numbers

- [PA]      This SFR covers DES cryptographic requirements.

  - DES – FCS_COP.1 requires the implementation of DES in ECB mode

- AE45C1 features   Some SFRs introduced from [BSI-PP-0002] are given a wider scope to reflect additional security features of the AE45C1 and functions which support secure features in embedded software:

  - Additional failure detection – the scope of FPT_FLS.1 includes additional software failure conditions trapped by the AE45C1, support to embedded software to run tests at certain points during execution (enabling measures such as state integrity tests) and the

ability of embedded software to cause a hardware reset (this is covered under FPT_FLS.1 in section 5.1.1.1).

- Controlled writes – FDP_ACC.1 [CRP] is added to represent the way in which some AE45C1 registers are protected against changes other than from embedded software executing in ROM; FDP_ACC.1 [WPP] specifies the ability to prevent writing to chosen EEPROM pages.

Note that all SFRs are drawn from [CC/2] except for FCS_RND.1, FMT_LIM.1 & 2, and FAU_SAS.1, which are all defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 8].

### 5.1.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements from [BSI-PP-0002]

In the specifications of SFRs listed below, 'Refinement' sections are taken from [BSI-PP-0002]; 'Application Notes' add information specific to the AE45C1.

### 5.1.1.1 Operating Conditions

The AE45C1 implements a pair of security functional requirements that ensure it operates within conditions under which it can maintain a secure state. This is represented in [BSI-PP-0002, fig 14], reproduced below:



Erroneous software conditions (some of which could arise from corruptions due to operating conditions) are dealt with under FPT_FLS.1.

**FRU_FLT.2    Limited fault tolerance**

Hierarchical to:  FRU_FLT.1

FRU_FLT.2.1    The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following failures occur: *exposure to operating conditions which are not*

*detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).*

Dependencies:    FPT_FLS.1

Refinement:      The term "failure" above means "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above.

FRU_FLT.2 thus states the condition for normal secure operation of the AE45C1 functions (including coprocessors) within its expected operating conditions.

**FPT_FLS.1      Failure with preservation of secure state**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FPT_FLS.1.1

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: *exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.*

Dependencies:    ADV_SPM.1

Refinement 1:    The term "failure" above also covers "circumstances". Then the TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above.

The refinement above is defined in [BSI-PP-0002]. An additional refinement is made here to capture features specific to the AE45C1.

Refinement 2:    The term "failure" above also covers the following:

   (i)  Attempts to access memory outside an area defined for the software being executed

   (ii)  Attempts to make an illegal access

   (iii)  Attempts to execute code from a type of memory not permitted by the software environment[5]

   (iv)  Attempts to execute an illegal instruction code

   (v)  Processor halted by Smartcard Embedded Software

---

[5] The "software environment" is a term used to capture the definition of acceptable memory use for the software system using the AE45C1. This would usually be at the level of operating system software.

Application notes:

1. The AE45C1 is required to implement a periodic interrupt, and an interrupt whenever a write to EEPROM takes place, to enable detection of failure conditions and preservation of a secure state by Smartcard Embedded Software.

**FPT_SEP.1        TSF Domain Separation**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FPT_SEP.1.1       The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.

FPT_SEP.1.2       The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.

Dependencies:     No dependencies.

Refinement:       The components supporting the SFRs Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) shall be protected from interference of the Smartcard Embedded Software.

**5.1.1.2          Protection Against Abuse of Functionality**

The AE45C1 controls access to test mode. Following [BSI-PP-0002], this is specified using the extended functional family FMT_LIM, defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.5].

**FMT_LIM.1       Limited capabilities**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FMT_LIM.1.1       The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) the following policy is enforced: *Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attack*s.

Dependencies:     FMT_LIM.2.

Application notes:

1. The "capabilities" referred to in FMT_LIM.1 are the functions implemented in the IC Dedicated Test Software.

**FMT_LIM.2       Limited availability**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FMT_LIM.2.1       The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) the following policy is

enforced: *Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attack*s.

Dependencies:   FMT_LIM.1.

Application notes:

1. The "capabilities" referred to in FMT_LIM.2 are the functions implemented in the IC Dedicated Test Software.

### 5.1.1.3          Storage of Production Data

The AE45C1 stores identification/pre-personalisation data as described in section 2.4.2. This is included in [BSI-PP-0002] as the CC Part 2 extended functional component FAU_SAS.1, replacing FAU_GEN.1, and defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.6].

**FAU_SAS.1     Audit storage**

Hierarchical to:   No other components

FAU_SAS.1.1    The TSF shall provide *test personnel before TOE Delivery* with the capability to store *the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software* in the audit records.

Dependencies:   No dependencies

Application notes:

1. The data covered by "*Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software*" is as identified in section 2.4.2.

The function Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) is subject to the limitations as specified by Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) above.

### 5.1.1.4          Protection against Physical Manipulation and Probing

**FPT_PHP.3**     Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to:   No other components

FPT_PHP.3.1    The TSF shall resist *physical manipulation and physical probing* to the *TSF* by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.

Dependencies:   No dependencies

Refinement:      The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these

attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, "automatic response" means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

### 5.1.1.5          Protection against Leakage

**FDP_ITT.1          Basic internal transfer protection**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FDP_ITT.1.1    The TSF shall enforce the *Data Processing Policy* to prevent the *disclosure* of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

Dependencies:    [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

Refinement:    The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.

The *Data Processing Policy* is defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.

**FPT_ITT.1          Basic internal TSF data transfer protection**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FPT_ITT.1.1    The TSF shall protect TSF data from *disclosure* when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Dependencies:    No dependencies.

Refinement:    The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.

This requirement is analogous to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User Data. Therefore, it should be understood to refer to the same *Data Processing Policy* defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.

**FDP_IFC.1          Subset information flow control**

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FDP_IFC.1.1    The TSF shall enforce the *Data Processing Policy* on *all confidential data when they are processed or transferred by the TOE or by the Smartcard Embedded Software*.

Dependencies:    FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.

**Data Processing Policy**     User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Smartcard Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via such an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only, but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the Smartcard Embedded Software.

### 5.1.1.6 Cryptographic Support

The AE45C1 generates random numbers that can be used for cryptographic key generation. To capture the functional requirement, the family FCS_RND, defined in [BSI-PP-0002, 8.4] is used.

**FCS_RND.1**     Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1     The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet *the requirements of the monobit, poker, runs, long run, and autocorrelation tests in [BSI-RN].*

### 5.1.2 Security Functional Requirements based on [PA]

### 5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Support

The AE45C1 provides a DES coprocessor, which can be used to implement single or triple DES.

**FCS_COP.1**     Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components

**<u>DES Encryption and Decryption</u>**

FCS_COP.1.1     The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *Data Encryption Standard (DES)* and cryptographic key sizes *of 56 bit* that meet the following *list of standards*:

> *U.S. Department of Commerce / National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard (DES), FIPS PUB 46-3, 1999 October 25*

Dependencies:     [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

Application note:

1. Although the AE45C1 provides a DES coprocessor, DES is only ever used as an encryption function in the context of particular Smartcard Embedded Software, and for

this reason it is noted that application software may need to use triple DES to achieve a suitable strength. In this case, Smartcard Embedded Software shall use the TOE to implement triple DES, as described in the guidance for software developers in [HM, 13.3.2].

**Modular Arithmetic for Asymmetric Encryption and Decryption**

The AE45C1 also provides a modular multiplication coprocessor (see [HM,14]) which can be used for the implementation of RSA (or other asymmetric algorithms) in Smartcard Embedded Software. This can be used to build other FCS_COP functions in software.

Because the AE45C1 provides this generic functionality, rather than a specific cryptographic function such as RSA encryption or signature, the coprocessor functionality is covered under FRU_FLT.2.

### 5.1.3        Other TOE Security Functional Requirements

**FDP_ACC.1    Subset access control**

FDP_ACC.1 is iterated here to address both the control over attempts to write to certain controlled registers (FDP_ACC.1 [CRP]) and attempts to write to protected pages of EEPROM memory (FDP_ACC.1 [WPP]).

Hierarchical to:  No other components

FDP_ACC.1 [CRP]

> The TSF shall enforce the *Controlled-Register Policy* on *any attempt to set bits in defined, security-relevant registers.*

**Controlled-Register Policy** The ability to set the values in the controlled registers is restricted to software instructions executed in ROM.

Application Note:

1.  The controlled registers are those defined in FDP_ACC.1.1.

FDP_ACC.1 [WPP]

> The TSF shall enforce the *Write-Protect Policy* on *any attempt to write to EEPROM.*

**Write-Protect Policy**        An attempt to write to EEPROM shall fail, leaving the previous memory contents unaltered if the relevant EEPROM page is write protected.

Once a page is write-protected, this protection cannot be removed.

Dependencies:   FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Application Notes:

1.  The setting of write protection is described in [HM, 8.5].

2.  All modes of EEPROM write (see [HM, 8.4]) are covered by this policy.

### 5.1.4        TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL4 augmented, as in [BSI-PP-0002, 5.1.2].

The augmentations to EAL4 are:

*   ADV_IMP.2 - this adds the full implementation representation of the security functions to the evaluation scope

*   ALC_DVS.2 - this increases the confidence in the vital area of developer security measures to the highest CC level

*   AVA_MSU.3 - this adds evaluator testing of the potential for misconfiguration of the TOE within the evaluation scope

*   AVA_VLA.4 - this increases the scope of vulnerability analysis and penetration testing to the highest CC level.

The minimum strength of function is SOF-High. In addition, the quality of the mechanism contributing to the DPA resistance of the DES coprocessor can be analysed using probabilistic methods based on measurement of the power consumption of the TOE - SOF-High is also claimed for this mechanism.

Refinements of the assurance requirements required by [BSI-PP-0002], and implemented by Renesas for the AE45C1, are described in [BSI-PP-0002, 5.1.3].

## 5.2        Security Requirements for the Environment

### 5.2.1        Security Requirements for the IT Environment

In [BSI-PP-0002, 5.2.1], only non-IT security requirements are placed on the environment (see section 5.2.2). Although these requirements are applicable to Smartcard Embedded Software, it is not necessary or appropriate to place specific functional requirements.

However, the following requirements for the environment are adopted from [PA].

The security functional requirement "Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)" met by the TOE has the following dependencies

-        [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FCS_CKM.1
         Cryptographic key generation],

-        FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,

-        FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes.

These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified cryptographic function. All requirements concerning key management shall be fulfilled by the environment since the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed for a specific application context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE. Note that, however, for FCS_COP.1, the operations are deliberately uncompleted and dependencies unfulfilled because the environment is unknown (it is an issue for the user of the chip of course).

The environment shall meet the requirement "Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)" or "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" as specified below. Note that, however, for FDP_ITC.1, the operations are deliberately uncompleted and dependencies unfulfilled because the environment is unknown (it is an issue for the user of the chip of course).

**FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes**

Hierarchical to:        No other components.

FDP_ITC.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP and/or information flow control SFP] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.

FDP_ITC.1.2  The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TSC.

FDP_ITC.1.3  The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: [assignment: additional importation control rules].

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

**FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation**

Hierarchical to:          No other components.

FCS_CKM.1.1          The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

The environment shall meet the requirement "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)" as specified below. Note that, however, for FCS_CKM.4, the operations are deliberately uncompleted and dependencies unfulfilled because the environment is unknown (it is an issue for the user of the chip of course).

**FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction**

Hierarchical to:          No other components.

FCS_CKM.4.1          The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

The environment shall meet the requirement "Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)" as specified below. Note that, however, for FMT_MSA.2, the operations are deliberately uncompleted and dependencies unfulfilled because the environment is unknown (it is an issue for the user of the chip of course).

**FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes**

Hierarchical to:          No other components.

FMT_MSA.2.1          The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.

Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model

[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

**5.2.2          Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment**

As in [BSI-PP-0002, 5.2.2], this ST applies the following requirements:

**RE.Phase-1**      Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software

The developers shall design and implement the Smartcard Embedded Software in such way that it meets the requirements from the following documents:

(i)        The AE45C1 hardware manual [HM], current control supplement [CCF], user guidance manual [UGM], and the hardware application notes

(ii)       Major findings of the hardware evaluation reports relevant for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

The developers shall implement the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that it protects security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) as required by the security needs of the specific application context.

In particular, the Smartcard Embedded Software shall not disclose secret User Data to unauthorised users or processes as defined for the application context. Similarly the Smartcard Embedded Software shall not allow unauthorised users or processes to use or modify security relevant User Data.

**RE.Process-Card**      Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

The Card Manufacturer (after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6) shall use adequate security measures to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

[BSI-PP-0002, 8.2.2] gives examples of ways in which Smartcard Embedded Software may implement security issues. The AE45C1 does not itself require any of these functions to be implemented in software – this is entirely a decision to be based on the software context. However, the AE45C1 aims to provide support for software implementation of FDP_SDI.1 and FPT_AMT.1 (the examples given in [BSI-PP-0002]) through features such as the Watchdog Timer and EWE interrupt – cf. FPT_FLS.1 in section 5.1.1.1 and SF.ESFunctions in section 6.1.

For implementation of cryptographic functions in Smartcard Embedded Software, the following requirement is included:

**RE.Cipher** Cipher Schemes

The developers of Smartcard Embedded Software must not implement routines in a way which may compromise keys when the routines are executed as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. Performing functions which access cryptographic keys could allow an attacker to misuse these functions to gather information about the key which is used in the computation of the function.

Keys must be kept confidential when they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is not possible to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that an appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment.

# 6.        TOE Summary Specification

## 6.1        TOE Security Functions

1. SF.HWProtect

   The AE45C1 is protected from attacks on the operation of the IC hardware. The protection features include detection of out-of-range supply voltages, frequencies or temperatures, detection of illegal address or instruction, and physical security.

   Detection of an error causes the AE45C1 to enter a reset state.

   Correct operating ranges are defined in [HM] and [CCF].

2. SF.LeakProtect

   The AE45C1 protects against leakage of information from the IC. The protection features include:

   • Functions designed to alter the power consumption of the device

   • DES protection - the DES coprocessor contains additional measures to resist DPA attacks.

3. SF.RNG

   The AE45C1 includes a physical random number generator designed to produce random numbers for the generation of cryptographic keys and for other critical uses. This random number generator meets the requirements of application class P2 (as specified in [BSI-RN]).

   The AE45C1 can be used to generate 16-bit random numbers which satisfy the requirements of the monobit, poker, runs, long run, and autocorrelation tests in [BSI-RN].

   Application Notes

   1. The AE45C1 provides a tamper resistant hardware random number generator [HM, 9]. However, in order to provide additional assurance to the User software that the hardware is functioning, this [BSI-RN] requires the use of an on-line test of the RNG. A suitable test routine is given in [UGM, 6].

4. SF.DES

   The AE45C1 provides a DES coprocessor that carries out DES encryption and decryption in ECB mode, according to the following standard:

   a) U.S. Department of Commerce / National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 46-3, 1999 October 25.

Application Notes

1. The AE45C1 DES coprocessor implements single DES encrypt and decrypt operations, and has been optimised to allow easy implementation of triple-DES (as described in the standard) in Smartcard Embedded Software, as described in [HM, 13.3.2].

2. Although the AE45C1 provides a DES coprocessor, DES is only actually used as an encryption function in the context of particular Smartcard Embedded Software For some application contexts, triple DES (as described in [HM, 13.3.2]) may be required in order to achieve a suitable strength of function if the Smartcard Embedded Software is to be evaluated[6] – this is a matter for the Smartcard Embedded Software security target.

3. The AE45C1 implements ECB mode - software can implement other modes such as CBC.

4. To provide secure embedded software, the software developer is required to ensure that the DES and (where used in a cryptographic algorithm) modular multiplication coprocessors are used in a way that does not compromise the key or plain text (see A.Plat-Appl, A.Resp-Appl and A.Key-Function). Guidance for the implementation of secure Smartcard Embedded Software is given in [UGM, 3.6.1].

5. SF.FMU

The AE45C1 firewall management unit enables software to control addresses that can be accessed in the following two ways:

   a) The FMU checks that a target address used in any instruction is within specified limits.

      If a target address is not within the limits then the AE45C1 enters the reset state.

   b) In addition, the FMU may enforce a policy that the AE45C1 may not execute code in either EEPROM or RAM, or both.

      Changes to these policies can only be made by software executing in ROM.

Application Note:

1. The accessible address registers are defined in [HM, 11.2].

6. SF.ESFunctions

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[6] Although strength of cryptographic functions is beyond the scope of a Common Criteria evaluation, triple DES would probably be required to achieve SoF-High for Smartcard Embedded Software.

The scope of the AE45C1 evaluation includes correct operation of aspects such as the CPU instructions, memory functions and standard peripherals such as memories, registers, I/O interfaces, timers, and UART as specified in [HM]. In addition, the AE45C1 offers hardware facilities that are designed to enable Smartcard Embedded Software to address threats to its correct operation by taking control of the operating environment. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer can rely on the following AE45C1 functionality that has been specifically evaluated as part of the TOE:

a)  EWE Interrupt

Every time the AE45C1 writes to EEPROM, it generates a non-maskable interrupt (the EWE interrupt). When this interrupt occurs, execution is passed to a user-definable address held in the EWE vector. A user can therefore add code at this location to carry out a variety of checks, for example to confirm the integrity of data, or the context in which certain areas of EEPROM are being written.

If a new EWE interrupt is received before the previous one has been cleared then the AE45C1 enters the reset state.

b)  Watchdog Timer

At software-defined intervals, the AE45C1 generates a non-maskable interrupt (the UDF interrupt), and transfers control to a user-specified address held in the UDF vector. A user can therefore add code at this location to carry out a variety of checks, for example to confirm the integrity of data, or the context in which certain areas of EEPROM are being written.

The UDF interrupt interval can only be set by software executing in ROM (see [HM, 10.2.3]).

If either a second UDF interrupt or an EWE interrupt (cf. SF.ESFunctions) is received before the previous one has been cleared then the AE45C1 enters the reset state.

c)  CPU Halt

When the Halt bit is set by user software, the AE45C1 will stop execution until an external reset is received.

Application Note

1.  As noted in [UGM, 3.8.1], when ordering ICs, the watchdog timer needs to be selected using [Opt].

7.  SF.TestModeControl

Once the AE45C1 has been set to user mode, test mode functions are no longer accessible.

8.  SF.EEPAccess

The AE45C1 allows any page of EEPROM to have writes (or erase) disallowed by setting the page to have a protected state. If a write is attempted to a protected page then it will leave the page content unaltered.

Protection of a page against writes is permanent once set.

9.  SF.Inject

During manufacture, each AE45C1 is injected with data that uniquely identifies the individual IC. If specified for the Smartcard Embedded Software included, then additional data (some of it IC-specific) may also be injected during manufacture.

HW.Copro

The AE45C1 provides a coprocessor that carries out modular multiplication according to the specification as in [HM, 14].

This forms the basis for software implementation of algorithms such as RSA.

HW.Copro refers to a critical function of the IC, but it is not specifically evaluated as a security function because the AE45C1 provides generic modular arithmetic functionality, rather than a specific cryptographic function such as RSA encryption or signature.

The Reset State

The reset state is referred to in several of the Security Functions above. In the reset state, the AE45C1 stops execution until a reset signal is received on the RES line. When a reset occurs, the following actions are carried out:

•  The CPU resets to its initial state

•  Registers are set to their initial values (as defined in [HM])

•  Execution begins at the location in the reset vector (as defined in [HM]).

## 6.2      Assurance Measures

The AE45C1 meets the requirements for EAL4 (as defined in [CC/3]) and the following augmentations:

•  ADV_IMP.2

•  ALC_DVS.2

•  AVA_MSU.3

•  AVA_VLA.4

It also meets the requirements of the refinements made to the assurance requirements in [BSI-PP-0002, 5.1.3].

The table below maps assurance requirements to the documents describing the relevant requirements:

| Document | [CC/3] evidence item | Related assurance components |
|---|---|---|
| Security Function Overview | Security Function | ADV_FSP |
| Hardware Manual | Functional Specification | |
| User Guidance Manual | User Guidance | AGD_USR |
| Correspondence Mapping | Correspondence analysis between TOE Summary Specification and functional specification, high level design, low level design and implementation | ADV_RCR |
| | Security Policy Model | ADV_SPM |
| High-Level and Low-Level Design Documentation Set | High-level design, low-level design | ADV_HLD, ADV_LLD |
| Source Code | Implementation | ADV_IMP |
| Test Documentation Set | Testing, test depth and test coverage documentation | ATE |
| Site Procedures, Life Cycle Support Product Flow Summary, Development Security, Tools List | Development tools documentation | ALC, ADO_IGS |
| Configuration Management Summary | Configuration management documentation | ACM |
| Delivery Procedures | Delivery procedures | ADO_DEL |
| No document required | Administrator guidance documentation | AGD_ADM |
| Misuse Analysis | Misuse Analysis | AVA_MSU |
| Strength of Function Analysis | Strength of Function Analysis | AVA_SOF |
| Vulnerability Analysis | Vulnerability Analysis | AVA_VLA |

*Table 2: Documents meeting assurance requirements*

# 7.    PP Claims

## 7.1    PP Reference

This ST conforms to [BSI-PP-0002].

Note that [PA] is used to define additional requirements relating to cryptographic functions.

## 7.2    PP Tailoring

FCS_RND.1 is completed with a quality metric – see section 5.1.1.6.

## 7.3    PP Additions

The inclusions from [BSI-PP-0002] are clearly shown in the relevant section titles. All other assumptions, threats, objectives and SFRs, in sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.3.2, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.2, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.2.1 are additional to those in the PP.

# 8. Rationale

## 8.1 Security Objectives Rationale

The way in which [BSI-PP-0002] assumptions, organisational security policy and threats are met by objectives is given in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1]. The table below includes the mapping from [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1] and adds the rationale for the additional assumptions, policy and threats in this Security Target.

| Assumption/Threat/ Organisational Security Policy | Addressed by Objective |
|---|---|
| A.Key-Function | OE.Plat-Appl, OE.Resp-Appl |
| A.Plat-Appl | OE.Plat-Appl |
| A.Process-Card | OE.Process-Card |
| A.Resp-Appl | OE.Resp-Appl |
| A. InjDatSupp | OE.InjDatSupp |
| P.Add-Functions | O.Add-Functions |
| P.Process-TOE | OE.Process-TOE, O.Identification |
| T.Leak-Inherent | O.Leak-Inherent |
| T.Phys-Probing | O.Phys-Probing |
| T.Phys-Manipulation | O.Phys-Manipulation |
| T.Malfunction | O.Malfunction |
| T.Leak-Forced | O.Leak-Forced |
| T.Abuse-Func | O.Abuse-Func |
| T.NoSWDetect | O.SWDetect |
| T.NoSWResponse | O.SWResponse |
| T.RND | O.RND |

*Table 3: Coverage of security assumptions, policies and threats by objectives*

A.Key-Function is enforced by OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl, which directly requires the embedded software to use the features in AE45C1 documentation (including, for example, the DPA countermeasures noted in [CCF]) to take measures to ensure that keys are not compromised by the way in which the TOE's cryptographic functions are used. Note that this recognises the fact that measures in hardware are only part of the solution for software TOEs, which must also ensure that their algorithms protect keys.

A.Plat-Appl is enforced by a directly corresponding requirement on the environment in OE. Plat-Appl. (Note that as in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1] this applies to Phase 1 of the lifecycle.)

A.Process-Card is enforced by a directly corresponding requirement on the environment in OE.Process-Card. (Note that as in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1] this applies to Phases 4-6 of the lifecycle.)

A.Resp-Appl is enforced by a directly corresponding requirement on the environment in OE.Resp-Appl. (Note that as in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1] this applies to Phase 1 of the lifecycle.)

A.InjDatSupp is enforced by a directly corresponding requirement on the environment in OE.InjDatSupp.

OE.Process-TOE requires the TOE Manufacturer to implement those measures assumed in P.Process-TOE. Therefore, the organisational security policy is covered by this objective, as far as organisational measures are concerned. The only issue not completely covered by these measures is the fact that the TOE has to support the possibility of unique identification. This is the content of O.Identification. Therefore, the organisational security policy is covered by OE.Process-Card and O.Identification. (Note that as in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1] this applies to Phases 2-3 of the lifecycle.)

The basic rationale for T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys-Probing, T.Phys-Manipulation T.Malfunction, T.Leak-Forced, and T.Abuse-Func is given in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.1]: for all threats the corresponding objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Malfunction, O.Leak-Forced, and O.Abuse-Func are stated in a way, which directly corresponds to the description of the threat. It is clear from the description of each objective, that the corresponding threat is removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method successfully is countered, if the objective holds.

Since O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-Functions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective. The text below gives further rationale from [PA]

Compared to [BSI-PP-0002] a clarification has been made for the security objective "Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)": If required the Smartcard Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. In addition, the Smartcard Embedded Software must implement functions which perform operations on keys (if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data. This addition ensures that the assumption A.Plat-Appl is still covered by the objective OE.Plat-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to O.Add-Functions.

Compared to [BSI-PP-0002] a clarification has been made for the security objective "Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)": By definition, encryption data, plain text data, and cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Smartcard Embedded Software will protect such data if required, and the keys and functions are used appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Quality and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment. These measures make sure that the

assumption A.Resp-Appl is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Functions.

The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumption show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

Smartcard Embedded Software may implement measures using the ability given by the AE45C1 to embedded software to detect and respond to the results of attacks based on these threats, in O.SWDetect and O.SWResponse. This can help address some of the core threats – T.Phys-Manipulation, T.Malfunction and T.Abuse-Func by detecting the results of attempts to tamper with the operation of the IC, and using additional defensive measures at the level of the target of the attack[7]. However, since no assumptions are made about the content of Smartcard Embedded Software (and hence the use made of these features), these objectives are not included for the core threats in the table above.

T.NoSWDetect and T.NoSWResponse are directly addressed by O.SWDetect and O.SWResponse respectively.

## 8.2      Security Requirements Rationale

The way in which [BSI-PP-0002] objectives are implemented by SFRs and requirements on the environment is given in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2]. The table below includes the mapping from [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2] and adds the rationale for the additional SFRs in this Security Target.

| Objective | Addressed by SFR | Security Requirements for the Environment |
|---|---|---|
| O.Leak-Inherent | FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 | RE.Phase-1 |
| O.Phys-Probing | FPT_PHP.3 | RE.Phase-1 |
| O.Phys-Manipulation | FPT_PHP.3 | RE.Phase-1 |
| O.Malfunction | FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1 | |
| O.Leak-Forced | FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1, FPT_PHP.3 | RE.Phase-1 |

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[7] An attacker only stands to gain in a material sense if the applications themselves are attacked, since these represent the only assets that yield direct benefits to the attacker.

| Objective | Addressed by SFR | Security Requirements for the Environment |
|---|---|---|
| O.Abuse-Func | FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1 | |
| O.Identification | FAU_SAS.1 | |
| O.RND | FCS_RND.1, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1 | RE.Phase-1 |
| O.Add-Functions | FCS_COP.1 | RE.Phase-1 RE.Cipher |
| O.SWDetect | FPT_FLS.1, FDP_ACC.1 [CRP], FDP_ACC.1 [WPP] | |
| O.SWResponse | FPT_FLS.1 | |
| OE.Plat-Appl | | RE.Phase-1 |
| OE.Process-TOE | FAU_SAS.1 | |
| OE.Process-Card | | RE.Process-Card, possibly supported by RE.Phase-1 |
| OE.Resp-Appl | FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2 | RE.Phase-1 |
| OE.InjDatSupp | | RE.Phase-1 |

*Table 4: Coverage of objectives by SFRs*

Reference is made to [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2] for the basic rationale. The remainder of this section deals with the additional parts of the rationale introduced for this Security Target.

It is noted that the features covered by FDP_ACC.1 address potential physical manipulation and malfunction attacks because they constrain the ways in which execution can occur. Furthermore, these access control measures directly protect parameters controlling some of the other security measures provided under FPT_FLS.1 from external attacks (e.g. only Smartcard Embedded Software in ROM can set watchdog timer and firewall management unit parameters, hence attacks based on changing these parameters in other conditions induced by attackers will be prevented).

O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Malfunction can be further addressed by Smartcard Embedded Software by using the AE45C1's features that allow embedded software to detect and respond to execution states that could represent attacks (included under FPT_FLS.1). However, this depends on the Smartcard Embedded Software and is therefore beyond the scope of the TOE.

The DES requirement of O.Add-Functions is directly implemented by FCS_COP.1.1. Additional security requirements on the environment, relating to the use of this functionality, are included in RE.Phase-1 and RE.Cipher. Rationale for this is excerpted from [PA] as follows.

The security functional requirement "Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)" exactly require those functions to be implemented which are demanded by O.Add-Functions. Therefore, FCS_COP.1 is suitable to meet the security objective.

Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the application context. These issues are addressed by the requirement RE.Phase-1 and more specifically by the security functional requirements specified below.

- [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],

- FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,

- FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes.

which will be fulfilled in the environment and the details are not known.

The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality. However, key-dependent functions could be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software. In this case RE.Cipher requires that these functions ensure that confidential data (User Data) can not be disclosed while they are just being processed by the Smartcard Embedded Software. Therefore, with respect to the Smartcard Embedded Software the issues addressed by the objectives just mentioned are addressed by the requirement RE.Cipher.

The use of cryptographic algorithms requires use of appropriate keys - otherwise they do not provide security. The requirement RE.Cipher addresses these specific issues since cryptographic keys and other data are provided by the Smartcard Embedded Software.

RE.Cipher requires that keys must be kept confidential. They must be unique with a very high probability, cryptographically strong etc. If keys are imported into the TOE (usually after TOE Delivery), it must be ensured that quality and confidentiality is maintained. Therefore, with respect to the environment the issues addressed (i) by the objectives just mentioned and (ii) implicitly by O.Add-Functions, are addressed by the requirement RE.Cipher.

The justification of the security objective O.Add-Functions and the additional requirements (both for the TOE and its environment) show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

O.SWDetect is implemented by the exception conditions recognised under FPT_FLS.1 and the opportunities provided to test for violations of secure state (or to maintain velocity check parameters) by the watchdog timer and EEPROM write interrupts in FPT_FLS.1. As noted for O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Malfunction above, the access control provisions in FDP_ACC.1 provide protection for the ways in which these detection features are used.

O.SWResponse is implemented by the ability of Smartcard Embedded Software to cause a reset (by setting the Halt bit to halt the processor, as noted under FPT_FLS.1), and the opportunity for other protective measures as part of the Watchdog Timer and EWE interrupt routines provided under FPT_FLS.1.

The assignment/selection operations performed on the SFRs drawn from [BSI-PP-0002] are shown in [BSI-PP-0002] itself. The additional operations performed in this ST are as follows:

| SFR | Operation required | Operation performed |
|---|---|---|
| FCS_RND.1 | [assignment: a defined quality metric] | The requirements of the monobit, poker, runs, long run, and autocorrelation tests in [BSI-RN]. |
| FCS_COP.1 | [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] | Encryption and decryption |
| | [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] | DES |
| | [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] | 56 bit |
| | [assignment: list of standards] | U.S. Department of Commerce / National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard (DES), FIPS PUB 46-3, 1999 October 25 |
| FDP_ACC.1 [CRP] | [assignment: access control SFP] | Controlled-Register Policy |
| | [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]. | Any attempt to set bits in defined, security-relevant registers |
| FDP_ACC.1 [WPP] | [assignment: access control SFP] | Write-Protect Policy |
| | [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]. | Any attempt to write to EEPROM. |

*Table 5: Completion of SFRs*

### 8.2.1    Dependencies

The basic dependencies are shown in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2.2] and are applicable to this ST – these are summarised in the table below:

| SFR | Dependencies | Fulfilled by Security Requirements in [BSI-PP-0002]? |
|---|---|---|
| FRU_FLT.2 | FPT_FLS.1 | Yes |
| FPT_FLS.1 | ADV_SPM.1 | Yes (Part of EAL4) |
| FPT_SEP.1 | None | No dependency |
| FMT_LIM.1 | FMT_LIM.2 | Yes |
| FMT_LIM.2 | FMT_LIM.1 | Yes |
| FAU_SAS.1 | None | No dependency |
| FPT_PHP.3 | None | No dependency |
| FDP_ITT.1 | FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 | Yes |
| FDP_IFC.1 | FDP_IFF.1 | See discussion in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2.2] |
| FPT_ITT.1 | None | No dependency |
| FCS_RND.1 | None | No dependency |

*Table 6: Dependencies from [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2.2]*

The additional dependencies relating to the new SFRs introduced in this ST are analysed below.

| SFR | Dependencies | Fulfilled by Security Requirements in this ST? |
|---|---|---|
| FCS_COP.1 | [FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4 FMT_MSA.2 | Yes (by the environment) |
| FDP_ITC.1 | [FDP_ACC.1, or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_MSA.3 | No additional requirement – see discussion below |
| FCS_CKM.1 | FCS_CKM.4 FMT_MSA.2 | No additional requirement – see discussion below |
| FCS_CKM.4 | [FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1] FMT_MSA.2 | No additional requirement – see discussion below |

| SFR | Dependencies | Fulfilled by Security Requirements in this ST? |
|---|---|---|
| FMT_MSA.2 | ADV_SPM.1<br>[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]<br>FMT_MSA.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | No additional requirement – see discussion below |
| FDP_ACC.1 [CRP] | FDP_ACF.1 | No additional requirement – see discussion below |
| FDP_ACC.1 [WPP] | FDP_ACF.1 | No additional requirement – see discussion below |

*Table 7: Additional SFR dependencies*

The dependencies defined for FCS_COP.1 in [CC/2] are discharged by requirements on the environment, as described in [PA].

Hence there is no further functional requirement on the TOE arising from the dependencies of FCS_COP.1.

The dependencies defined for FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, and FMT_MSA.2 are not resolved because they will be fulfilled in the environment, where the appropriate decisions will be made.

The dependency defined for FDP_ACC.1 in [CC/2] is discharged as follows:

- FDP_ACF.1 (subset access control) is invoked because it is assumed in [CC/2] that FDP_ACC.1 specifies the requirement for application of access control using rules separately specified under FDP_ACF.1. However, once again the AE45C1 situation is much simpler and the TOE simply applies certain simple and easily defined restrictions on writing to certain registers (FDP_ACC.1 [CRP]) or EEPROM pages (FDP_ACC.1 [WPP]). Hence in this ST it is considered sufficient to define the rules as part of the SFR itself.

The dependency defined for FDP_ACF.1 in [CC/2] is discharged as follows:

- FDP_ACF.1 depends on the component FMT_MSA.3 (static attribute initialisation) of the family management of security attributes (FMT_MSA). Since FDP_ACC.1 already contains the necessary rules by itself and no access control rule is contained in FDP_ACF.1, the dependency FMT_MSA.3 is discharged.

The discussion in sections 8.2 and 8.3, and the rationale in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2], show how the security functional requirements support each other in meeting the security objectives of this ST. Together with the discussion of dependencies above this shows that the security functional requirements build a mutually supportive whole.

## 8.3        TOE Summary Specification Rationale

The table below shows the ways in which the SFRs are implemented by AE45C1 security functions.

| SFR | TOE Security Function |
|---|---|
| FRU_FLT.2 | SF.HWProtect, SF.FMU, SF.ESFunctions |
| FPT_FLS.1 | SF.HWProtect, SF.FMU, SF.ESFunctions, SF.EEPAccess |
| FPT_SEP.1 | SF.HWProtect, SF.FMU, SF.ESFunctions, SF.EEPAccess |
| FMT_LIM.1 | SF.TestModeControl |
| FMT_LIM.2 | SF.TestModeControl |
| FAU_SAS.1 | SF.Inject |
| FPT_PHP.3 | SF.HWProtect, SF.FMU, SF.ESFunctions, SF.EEPAccess |
| FDP_ITT.1 | SF.LeakProtect |
| FPT_ITT.1 | SF.LeakProtect |
| FDP_IFC.1 | SF.LeakProtect |
| FCS_RND.1 | SF.RNG |
| FCS_COP.1 | SF.DES |
| FDP_ACC.1 [CRP] | SF.FMU, SF.ESFunctions |
| FDP_ACC.1 [WPP] | SF.EEPAccess |

*Table 8: SFR mapping to AE45C1 Security Functions*

Details of the TOE summary specification rationale are not given in this version of the Security Target.

## 8.4        Assurance Requirements and Strength of Function Rationale

This ST follows the rationale given in [BSI-PP-0002, 7.2.3] for the choice of EAL4, assurance augmentations and the strength of function SOF-high.

## 8.5        Mutual Support and Internal Consistency

The discussion of security functional requirements, TOE Summary Specification and assurance components in the sections above shows that mutual support and consistency are present for both groups of requirements. The arguments given for the adequacy of the assurance components for the TOE functionality also shows that the functional and assurance requirements support each other and that there are no inconsistencies between these groups.

For the additional functionality included in O.Add-Functions, the security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the cryptographic algorithms implemented according to the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1. Therefore, these security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS_COP.1.

## 8.6        PP Claims Rationale

This ST implements all of the requirements of [BSI-PP-0002] by inclusion (as shown in each of the relevant sections), and hence no further rationale is required.

**End of Document**