



Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004-MA-01

**Philips P5CC009V0M and P5CD009V0M
Secure Smart Card Controller
with updated IC Dedicated Software**

from

**Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification**



Common Criteria Arrangement

The IT products identified in this report were assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004.

The change to the certified product P5CC009V0M is at the level of coding of the IC dedicated software in Boot ROM, Test ROM and Mifare OS. A new version of the data sheets and of the guidance manual is considered. In addition, the product P5CD009V0M is derived based on a different configuration setting at the end of the production process for 12 kbytes EEPROM size and the contactless interface activated. The changes have no effect on assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004.

Bonn, 14 March 2005



Assessment

The IT products identified in this report were assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified TOE [3], the Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Philips P5CC009V0M and P5CD009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line Identification, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

The IC dedicated software of the Philips P5CC009V0M and P5CD009V0M was changed due to error correction of specific operational aspects in dedicated Mifare OS configurations and due to production process reasons for testing.

The data sheet of the P5CC009V0M was changed for editorial reasons, minor clarification of descriptions of the TOE operation and including the content of the document *Anomaly Sheet* mentioned in the certification report [3].

The product P5CD009V0M configured at the end of the production process can be accepted under the scope of the certification because memory configuration as well as the contactless interface were already evaluated within the P5CT072 certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004, a TOE having the same hardware platform indicated by the nameplate T023M.

For the P5CD009V0M the first revision of the data sheet was generated and derived from the approved P5CT072 data sheet revision 3.1 as maintained under BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004-MA01.

Due to the product P5CD009V0M the guidance manual was changed. The added description related to the contactless interface was taken from the evaluated guidance manual of the P5CT072 chip (see BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004).

The TOE hardware indicated by the chip identifier T023M and the instruction set document mentioned in [3] were not changed.

The identification of the maintained products compared to the certified product is indicated by new version numbers of the IC dedicated software parts of the TOE, of the data sheets and of the guidance manual. For identification of a specific Philips P5CC009V0M or P5CD009V0M chip, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used: The value 0C hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the configuration P5CC009, the value 13 hex identifies the configuration P5CD009. An updated configuration list [8] and the configuration lists for the composite evaluation [9] - [11] were provided.

The following table shows the updated deliverables provided for a customer who purchases the TOE Philips P5CC009V0M and P5CD009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller. The item numbers in this table are taken from the certification report [3]:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Date	Form of Delivery
2	SW	Test ROM Software (<i>the IC dedicated test software</i>)	47		Included in Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_47.lst)
3	SW	Boot ROM Software (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software)	1.11	11 Nov. 2004	Included in Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_47.lst)
4	SW	Mifare Operating System (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software)	1.17	4 Nov. 2004	Included in Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_47.lst) ¹
5	DOC	Data Sheet, P5CC009, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller, Product Specification	3.0	21 Sept. 2004	Electronic document [5]
		Data Sheet, P5CD009, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller, Product Specification	3.0	27 Jan. 2005	Electronic document [6]
7	DOC	Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CC009 ²	1.3	9 Feb. 2005	Electronic document [7]

Table 1: Updated deliverables of the TOE for both, Philips P5CC009V0M and P5CD009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller

Conclusion

The changes to the TOE are at the level of only very specific coding of IC dedicated software, minor document changes or taking over information from other evaluated documents and generating new products with differing configurations settings out of already evaluated parts. The changes have no effect on assurance or the information taken over was already evaluated. Examination of the evidence indicates that the changes required are limited to the identification of specific source code files of the IC dedicated software, configuration information, data sheet documents and guidance manuals and thus of the TOE. The Security Target [4] is still valid for the changed TOE. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for these versions of the products. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 1.0, February 2004

¹ Although the software is implemented on the chip it is deactivated and cannot be executed in the P5CC009 configuration.

² This guidance manual covers also the information needed for the P5CD009 configuration.

- [2] Impact Analysis Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231, Version 1.1, 23 February 2005, Evaluation of the Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 for Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller from Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line Identification, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 6 September 2004
- [4] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0231, Version 1.0, 18 May 2004, Evaluation of Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
- [5] Data Sheet, P5CC009, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller, Product Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 3.0, 21 September 2004 (confidential document)
- [6] Data Sheet, P5CD009, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller, Product Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 3.0, 27 January 2005 (confidential document)
- [7] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CC009, BSI-DSZ-CC-0231, Version 1.3, Philips Semiconductors, 9 February 2005 (confidential document)
- [8] Configuration List, BSI-DSZ-CC-0227³, Version 1.4, 9 February 2005, Evaluation of the Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)
- [9] Configuration List for composite evaluation, Version 1.0, 9 February 2005, Evaluation of the Philips P5CC009V0M Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)
- [10] Configuration List for composite evaluation, Version 1.0, 9 February 2005, Evaluation of the Philips P5CD009V0M Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)
- [11] Customer specific Appendix of the Configuration List (template), Version 1.0, 23 February 2005, Philips P5CXYYYV0M Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)

³ This configuration list includes also the information relevant for the P5CC009V0M and the P5CD009V0M