



Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006-MA-01

Smartcard with Java Card Platform

Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31 v2.2)

from

IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH



Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006.

The change to the certified product is at the level of a security irrelevant change of the hardware and reconfiguration of the Embedded Software, a change that has no effect on assurance. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006.



Bonn, 01. September 2006

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified TOE [3], the Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31 v2.2), IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

The Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) was changed due to change of the Hardware platform and associated reconfiguration of the JCOP operating system.

The change of the hardware platform from P5CT072V0P (certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006) to P5CD072V0Q (certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006) was a change on top layer for modified module packaging requirements and additional package types including passport inlay package and the disabled USB Interface and AES coprocessor as outlined in the hardware certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006 [6, part B chapter 1].

The Embedded Software running on the P5CT072V0P (resulting in the composite product P541G072V0P) is identical with the Embedded Software running on the P5CD072V0Q (resulting in the composite product P531G072V0Q). The difference is related to the availability (accessibility) of the USB interface and the AES coprocessor configured as part of the configuration process at the end of the production testing phase. Relevant configuration data are defined in [5]. The ROM mask identification and the EEPROM code identification for the TOE did not change.

The Security Target and the Security Target lite documents were editorially updated (see [7] and [8]).

The change is not significant from the standpoint of security, however Configuration Management procedures required a change in the version number from P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) to P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31 v2.2).

Conclusion

The change to the TOE is at the level of a security irrelevant change of the hardware and reconfiguration of the Embedded Software, a change that has no effect on assurance. Examination of the evidence indicates that the changes required are limited to the identification of the software configuration data [5] and thus of the TOE. Changed configuration items related to the hardware are covered by the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] Impact Analysis Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0294, Version 1.1, 23. June 2006, Evaluation of the Philips P541G072V0P Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006 for Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) from IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 31. August 2006
- [4] Security Target lite Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41, v2.2) Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.0, 21. August 2006, IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH (sanitized public document)
- [5] Customer specific Appendix of the configuration list, Version 1.0, 23. June 2006, Philips P5CD072V0Q Secure Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors (confidential document)
- [6] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006 for Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx each with specific IC Dedicated Software from Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line Identification, Version 1.0, 28. March 2006, BSI
- [7] Security Target, Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31, v2.2) Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.0, 22. June 2006, IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH (confidential document)
- [8] Security Target lite Philips P531G072V0Q (JCOP 31, v2.2) Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.0, 21. August 2006, IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH (sanitized public document)