



# Certification Report

**Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik**

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0367-2006**

for

**BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0  
Version 2.0.2.1**

from

**OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG**

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn  
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# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik



Bundesamt für Sicherheit  
in der Informationstechnik

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0367-2006**

Signature application component

## **BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 Version 2.0.2.1**

from

### **OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG**



Common Criteria Arrangement  
for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the *Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0* extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 for conformance to the *Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999)* and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.

#### **Evaluation Results:**

Functionality: **Product specific Security Target  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended**

Assurance Package: **Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL4 augmented by  
AVA\_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states  
AVA\_VLA.4 – Highly resistant**

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.

Bonn, March 28<sup>th</sup> 2006

The President of the Federal Office  
for Information Security

Dr. Helmbrecht.

L.S.



SOGIS - MRA

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The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

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<sup>1</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

## **Contents**

Part A: Certification

Part B: Certification Results

Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria

## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1<sup>5</sup>
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
  - Part 1, Version 0.6
  - Part 2, Version 1.0
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
- Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2, Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria recognition arrangement committees.

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<sup>2</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445

## **2 Recognition Agreements**

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

### **2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates**

The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).

### **2.2 CC - Certificates**

An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.

This evaluation contains the components AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.



### 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0323-2005 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by BSI.

The sponsor and distributor is:

OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG  
Zugerstrasse 76 B  
CH 6341 Baar, Switzerland

The certification is concluded with

- the comparability check and
- the production of this Certification Report.

This work was completed by the BSI on March 28<sup>th</sup> 2006.

The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report.

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

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<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

## 4 Publication

The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30.

The product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: [http:// www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-mentioned website.

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<sup>7</sup> OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG  
Zugerstrasse 76 B  
CH 6341 Baar, Switzerland

## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

## Contents of the certification results

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## 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) is the software application BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1<sup>8</sup>.

BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 is an electronic signature application compliant to the German electronic signature law<sup>9</sup> and ordinance on electronic signatures<sup>10</sup>. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries.

The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 were developed for the use on the operating systems from Microsoft since Microsoft Windows 98 SE. In the IT-security environment a smart card terminal with secure pin entry mode as well as a smart card are required to run the required cryptographic operations in the process of electronic signature creation.

The product does provide additional cryptographic functionality like data encryption based on symmetric encryption algorithms. These product capabilities are not part of the Common Criteria evaluation of this product.

The TOE itself is limited to the creation of hash values, using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160 algorithms and the RSA-Algorithm for signature validation. It is therefore able to check and ensure the integrity as well as the trustworthiness of signed data based on the components responsible for CRL-processing, OCSP-processing, timestamp processing and PDF processing.

The TOE can be used as a standalone application or can be integrated into third party products. For third party products the TOE includes an API<sup>11</sup> (called BKK OPENLiMiT Job Interface or OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK<sup>12</sup> v2.0) that allows access to the following core functionality of the TOE provided by the BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager:

- Computation of hash values implementing the algorithms mentioned above.
- Creation of electronic signatures.
- Timestamp processing.
- Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for OCSP processing in the process of electronic signature creation.

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<sup>8</sup> Also named BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 in this report.

<sup>9</sup> see [13]

<sup>10</sup> see [14]

<sup>11</sup> API=Application Programming Interface

<sup>12</sup> SDK=Software development kit

- Electronic signature verification.
- Integrity protection of the installed product.

Furthermore, the TOE provides a legal binding displaying unit (BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer) for the Text, TIFF and PDF format. The displaying unit of the TOE allows the examination of the files content in order to ensure that the user is assured about the content to be signed or the content of the signed file.

The IT product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1 was evaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 27. March 2006. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>13</sup> recognised by BSI.

The sponsor, vendor and distributor is

OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG  
Zugerstrasse 76 B  
CH 6341 Baar, Switzerland

The developer of the Software is

OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH  
Saarbrücker Str. 38 a  
10405 Berlin, Germany

## 1.1 Assurance package

The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report, or [1], part 3 for details).

The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows the augmented assurance components.

Requirement	Identifier
EAL4	TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: AVA_MSU.3	Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4	Highly resistant

Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

<sup>14</sup> In accordance with the German Signature Law (SigG) §17 paragraph 2 and the ordinance on electronic signatures (SigV) §15 paragraph 2 and paragraph 4.

## 1.2 Functionality

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.

The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:

Security Functional Requirement	Addressed issue
<b>FCS</b>	Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation,
<b>FDP</b>	User data protection
FDP_DAU.2	Data authentication with identity of guarantor
FDP_ITC.1	Import of user data without security attributes
<b>FMT</b>	Security management
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
<b>FPT</b>	Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_ITC	Inter-TSF trusted channel

Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2

The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:

Security Functional Requirement	Addressed issue
FDP_SVR.1	Secure Viewer

Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended

Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6], chapter 5.1.

The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-Environment of the TOE:

Security Functional Requirement	Addressed issue
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation,

Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment

Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more details and application notes please refer to the ST, chapter 5.3.

These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
SF.1	Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature creation process using certificates, smart-card terminals and

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
	<p>secure signature creation devices.</p> <p>The user can optionally include OCSP-responses for the validation of certificates and add timestamps to a digital signature. Furthermore, the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 allow the creation of more than one signature without entering the PIN for every document. This feature is only available for the BKK OPENLiMiT Job Interface and not for the graphical user interface included in the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0.</p>
SF.2	<p>Verification of hash values and electronic signatures using certificate revocation lists, OCSP responses (optional) and timestamps (optional)</p> <p>Apart from the extraction of the original and the comparison with the calculated hash value the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 verify the certificate chain using the chain model or RFC 3280.</p>
SF.3	<p>Program module manipulation detection</p> <p>The files and libraries constituting the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 are digitally signed. Each time the application starts a specific module is responsible for verifying these signatures mathematically.</p>
SF.4	<p>Unambiguous presentation of the data to be signed</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 present the data to be signed unambiguously to the user. To accomplish this, a parser determines whether the format of the data to be signed complies to the Adobe PDF-, the TIFF-standard or is a text file. The data is checked for active content, unknown tags and elements or control characters that cannot be displayed. If any irregularities are detected the user is informed with appropriate error messages or warnings.</p>
SF.5	<p>Protection against hash value manipulation</p> <p>Before the electronic signature is initiated, the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 compute the hash value of the data to be signed. After the electronic signature creation process the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 verify the electronic signature using the public key of the given signer certificate. If the original hash value and the hash value encoded in the electronic signature are not identical, the signature is discarded.</p>
SF.6	<p>Assurance of the TOE's integrity</p> <p>For the integrity check the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 comprise a JAVA-applet that is provided online. When assessing this applet it calculates the hash value of each file belonging to the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 and compares it to the values that were initially calculated by the manufacturer. If any value does not match, an error message is displayed.</p>
SF.7	<p>Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 is able to process OCSP-responses. First the mathematical correctness of the signature of the OCSP-response is checked. If the OCSP-response is used for the validation of a certificate, the complete</p>



TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
	chain for the signing certificate of the OCSP-response is verified.
SF.8	<p>Application of Timestamps</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 apply timestamps to files if the timestamp is electronically signed and the certificate belonging to the signature of the timestamp is already available. Otherwise the timestamp is not imported.</p>
SF.9	<p>Validation of Timestamps</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 validate the electronic signature of a timestamp mathematically. Furthermore, the certificate underlying the electronic signature of the timestamp is validated according to the chain model or RFC 3280. A prerequisite for this security function is that the signing certificate of the timestamp is already available.</p>
SF.10	<p>Management of Security Functions depending on licenses</p> <p>The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 support different licenses. E.g. for the verification of electronic signatures no special license key must be purchased, whereas the creation of embedded PDF-signatures requires the availability of the most comprehensive license</p>

Table 5: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.

### 1.3 Strength of Function

The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed SOF-high<sup>15</sup>.

The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

### 1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product

The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are specified in the Security Target [6] and can be summarised as follows.

It is assumed that the attacker is a human being with high attack potential or a process acting on behalf of him.

The objects that must be protected are

- the document that should be signed
- a signature that must be verified

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<sup>15</sup> In accordance with the appendix 1 of the ordinance on electronic signatures.

- the files and libraries the TOE consists of.

The following threats to these assets were identified in the Security Target:

- Manipulation of a user file
- Manipulation of a signed file
- Manipulation of the TOE and of its files
- Manipulation of a file before the users decision to sign the file
- Creation of a falsified electronic signature
- Downgrading of TOE's manageable capabilities.

The Security Target does not contain any organisational security policies.

## 1.5 Special configuration requirements

The TOE is a software application that does not require a special configuration. The TOE has to be configured in accordance with the Security Target and the respective guidance documents. This means among other aspects that for the application of qualified electronic signatures a smartcard reader and a secure signature creation device must be used that was approved in accordance with the German signature law [13]. The Security Target names the products the TOE can be used with.

Further information about the configuration of the TOE and the technical environment is available in

- the Security Target [6],
- chapter 1.6, chapter 4.2 and chapter 8 of this report,
- the user guidance [10],
- and the guidance of the API provided by the TOE [11].

## 1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment

For a secure operation of the TOE the following assumptions must be taken in account:

- The product must be installed on a Intel 586 compatible computer with 64 MB RAM and 60 MB free hard disk capacities.
- A Microsoft Windows operating system from Windows 98 SE onwards must be installed.
- The user utilizes one of the secure signature creation devices and one of the smart card readers that were specified in the Security Target.
- Apart from trustworthy users the integrity of the product is checked according to the rules mentioned in the user guidance.

- Appropriate virus scanners for the detection of malware, trojan horses or other compromising software are required. If the computer is connected to the internet, attacks through the Internet must be averted by appropriate means like e.g. the utilization of a firewall.
- The environment of the computer where the TOE is installed on ensures that a user has full control over the computer and shared network storage. It is not possible to gain unauthorised access to the computer via existing network connections.

### 1.7 Disclaimers

The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1

The following table summarises the evaluated configuration.

No.	Type	Description	Version	Date	Delivery
1.	Software (Setup)	BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0	2.0.2.1	23.03.2006	File
2.	Documentation	OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.0 – User Guidance (German)	2.0.2.1	23.03.2006	chm-File
3.	Software (BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool, Applet)	SiqCfg.jar		23.03.2006	File
4.	Documentation	OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.0 Documentation	0.9	23.03.2006	PDF-File
5.	Header File	siqSDK.h		17.03.2006	File
6.	Library File	siqSDK.lib		20.03.2006	File

No.	Type	Description	Version	Date	Delivery
7.	Header File	siqVendorSDK.h		20.03.2005	File
8.	Documentation	Developer Documentation OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK,	1.6	06.10.2005	PDF-File

Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE deliverables No.1 to No.3 are provided for a customer, who purchases the TOE as a standalone application.

The TOE deliverables No.4 - 6 are delivered additionally and have to be purchased separately. They are intended for developers who want to integrate the API provided by the TOE into their own application.

The TOE deliverables No. 7 and No.8 are intended for internal use only and not shipped to any customer at all.

To identify the Header and Library Files of the API shipped to a customer and the BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool the SHA-1 values of these files are listed in the next table.

No.	File	SHA-1-value
1.	siqSDK.h	d574186d11a0d591f8516b78b035d13609365187
2.	siqSDK.lib	0d7029d0afd70838bcbb9e6e5093f46f19db2d38
3.	SiqCfg.jar	b9dbcf3728f15342de0472d773a2203ce97c5ce5

Table 7: Hash Values of TOE deliverables

The developer delivers the TOE to the distributor (OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG) either on a CD-ROM (Master-CD) or provides the TOE online in a way that only the distributor can download the archive. The distributor creates copies of the Master-CD and delivers them to resellers or ships them directly to the customer. The TOE is available from the webpages of the distributor as well.

The setup-program enclosed in the distribution enables the user to install the deliverables as required. After the installation of the product an enduser must download the BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool from the webpage

<https://www.openlimit.com/integritytool/index.htm>

to check the integrity of the installation. If the integrity check is successful the enduser can be sure that the version being subject of this certificate is installed on the computer.

### 3 Security Policy

The BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1 is a signature application component compliant to the German signature law and ordinance on electronic signature and thus enforces the following security policies:

- The TOE clearly indicates the creation of a qualified electronic signature and enables the user to unambiguously identify the data to be signed.
- The TOE ensures that the identification data are not disclosed and are stored only on the relevant secure signature creation device. The application enforces the rule that a signature is provided only at the initiation of the authorized signing person.
- The TOE shows, to which data the signature refers, whether the signed data are unchanged and to which signature-code owner the signature is to be assigned.
- The TOE presents the contents of the qualified certificate on which the signature is based, the appropriate qualified attribute certificates and the results of the subsequent check of certificates.
- If data to be signed or data already signed is displayed by the TOE certain rules for the treatment of not readable signs are enforced.
- For the verification of a qualified electronic signature the TOE reliably verifies the correctness of a signature and displays this fact appropriately.
- Using the TOE it can be clearly determined whether the verified qualified certificates were present in the relevant register of certificates at the given time and were not revoked.
- The TOE ensures, that security-relevant changes in the technical components are apparent to the user.

## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 4.1 Usage assumptions

According to the ST [6], chapter 3.1, the following assumption for the usage of the TOE is made:

- **A.Personnel**  
The user, the administrator and the maintenance staff are trustworthy and follow the user guide of the TOE. Especially the user verifies the integrity of the TOE as described in the user documentation.

### 4.2 Environmental assumptions

The ST mentions the following assumptions for the IT environment in chapter 3.1:

- **A.Platform**  
The user utilizes an Intel 586 compatible computer as hardware platform, which contains at least 64 MB of RAM and 60 MB of free disk space.  
On the computer is one of the following operating systems installed:

- Windows 98 SE
- Windows ME
- Windows NT 4 SP 6
- Windows 2000 SP 2
- Windows 2003
- Windows XP Home
- Windows XP Professional
- Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
- Windows XP 64 Bit Edition

In addition to these requirements, the Internet Explorer version 5.01 or higher is installed. Moreover, the Microsoft smart card base components are installed on the computer<sup>16</sup>.

In addition to that, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is installed on the computer, which complies at least with the Java Runtime Environment v1.4.

The user ensures, that all components of the operating system are correct. The user ensures that no malicious or harmful program is installed on the system.

The user utilizes a secure signature creation system, which consists of a smart-card terminal with secure pin entry capabilities together with a smart card. The user utilizes one of the following SigG approved smart cards:

- OPENLiMiT card
- TeleSec E4 NetKey Card
- TeleSec PKS Card v2.0 and v3.0
- Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v1.0
- Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v2.0
- Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.0
- Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.1
- Signature card D-TRUST Card\_MS version 1.0
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.0
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.10
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.20
- STARCOS SPK 2.3 v7.0 with digital signature application StarCert v2.2

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<sup>16</sup> The manual installation of the Microsoft SmartCard base components is required for Microsoft Windows 98 SE, Microsoft Windows ME and Microsoft Windows NT 4.0.

- STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (limited signature generation configuration)
- STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (unlimited signature generation configuration)
- Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
- ACOS EMV-A03 based smart card from A-Trust
- ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient<sup>17</sup>
- ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient<sup>18</sup>
- ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
- S-TRUST signature card release 3 (SPK 2.3 based)

The ACOS EMV-A03 based smart card from A-TRUST is only supported for the purpose of advanced signatures. The qualified signature is not supported for that smart card.

In addition to the listed smart cards, the user utilizes any smart card that provides a PKCS #15 interface or a SigG-application for qualified electronic signatures.

The user utilizes one of the following smart-card terminals:

- Cherry Model ST 2000
- Cherry G83-6700 LQ
- Cherry G83-6744 LU
- Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB
- Kobil Systems KAAN SecOVID Plus
- Kobil Standard Plus
- Kobil KAAN Advanced
- SCM Microsystems SPRx32
- Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
- Omnikey Cardman 3621
- Omnikey Cardman 3821

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<sup>17</sup> The approval has not yet been published by the Bundesnetzagentur.

<sup>18</sup> The approval has not yet been published by the Bundesnetzagentur.

- Omnikey Cardman 8630

The used components are approved components according to the German signature law<sup>19</sup>. The certificates can be obtained from the Bundesnetzagentur ([www.bundesnetzagentur.de](http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de)).

- **A.Network**

The computer, where the TOE is installed, may have Internet access. In this case a firewall is used to ensure, that no system services or components are compromised through internet attacks. In addition to this, the user utilizes a virus scanner, which is able to detect virus programs as well as backdoor programs and root kits. At least the virus scanner is able to inform the user about attacks or detected malicious programs.

- **A.Access**

The computer, on which the TOE is installed, is located in an environment, where the user has full control about inserted storage devices and shared network storage places. The TOE is protected in such way, that it is not possible to access parts of the TOE or the TOE as a whole through existing network connections.

### 4.3 Clarification of scope

The TOE cannot assure the correctness of the following functions:

- Private Key material. The secure signature creation device must assure the correctness and integrity of the private key material.
- Assurance of the operating system integrity. The TOE does not contain any capabilities for ensuring the integrity of the operating system and its environment. The user must assure, that sufficient actions are undertaken to avoid, that the operating system may be compromised.
- Strength and security of cryptographic operations. The TOE uses libraries for hash value creation and the RSA algorithm for signature validation. Therefore the TOE can only assure the compliance to given standardization documentation and test vectors but must not make any statement about the strength of the cryptographic operations.

The capability characteristics of the TOE are limited to the computation of hash values and the usage of secure signature creation devices for electronic signature creation and the usage of the RSA algorithm for signature verification. Manipulations on the IT-security environment cannot be recognized or even prevented by the TOE.

Applications that use the TOE via the evaluated API are **not** in the focus of this evaluation.

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<sup>19</sup> with exception of the following ones: Kobil KANN Advanced, Omnikey Cardman 8630.



**Restrictions and Exceptions**

There are some combination between operating system, smart card and smart card terminal that do not work together. Those are listed below.

Windows NT does not support the following smart card terminals:

Cherry G83-6744 LU, Cherry ST 2000, Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB, Kobil KAAAN Advanced, Reiner SCT Cyber Jack pinpad v2.0, Reiner SCT cyberJack Version 3.0, Omnikey Cardman 3621, Omnikey Cardman 3821

Windows 2003 does not support the following smart card terminals:

Cherry G83-6700 LQ

Windows XP 64 Bit Edition does not support the following smart card terminals:

Cherry G83-6700 LQ, Cherry G83-6744 LU, Cherry ST 2000, Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB, Kobil Systems KAAAN SecOVID Plus, Kobil Standard Plus, Kobil KAAAN Advanced, SCM Microsystems SPRx32/ChipDrive pinpad, Reiner SCT Cyber Jack e-com v2.0, Reiner SCT Cyber Jack pinpad v2.0, Omnikey Cardman 8630

**Those combinations of smard card readers and operating systems are not included in the evaluation and therefore not included in the certificate.**

The following combinations between smart card reader and smart cards could not be tested successfully due to discrepancies of the smart card to their specification:

Smart Card Terminal	Smart Cards
Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
Reiner SCT cyber jack ecom	Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.1
	Signature card D-TRUST Card_MS version 1.0
Cherry G83-6700 LQ	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
	ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
	ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
Cherry ST 2000	ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH

Smart Card Terminal	Smart Cards
	ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
Kobil B1 Professional	Signature card DATEV e:securecard v1.20
	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
Kobil Systems KAAN SecOVID Plus	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
Kobil Standard Plus	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
Kobil KAAN Advanced	Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0	Signature card DTRUST Card_MS version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Omnikey Cardman 8630	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Omnikey Cardman 3621	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1
Omnikey Cardman 3821	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.0
	Signature card DTRUST card version 1.1

Table 8: incompatible combinations of smart card readers and smart cards

**Consequently, the evaluation results do not include the combinations mentioned in Table 3.**

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a signature application component compliant to the German electronic signature law and ordinance on electronic signatures. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries. This means that BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 may be used as a single application but also may be integrated into third party products.

The software-design of the TOE distinguishes three different subsystems that provide the security functionality described in chapter [1.2]:

- the BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager
- the BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer
- the BKK OPENLiMiT Integrity Tool

The first two parts represent the main components (subsystems) of the TOE whereas the Integrity Tool is a separate application implemented as a Java Applet. The Integrity Tool is used to allow the user to check the integrity of the installed product.

The figure below provides an overview of the subsystems and their interfaces as described in the High-Level Design. For the sake of clarity the Integrity Tool is not depicted in this figure.




Figure 1: Decomposition of the TOE in subsystems

In Figure 1 the lined boxes represent the subsystems of the TOE whereas the arrows indicate the interfaces between them. Dashed boxes refer to external subsystems that are part of the IT environment of the TOE (see chapters 4.1 and 4.2 in this report).

The BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer is a software component for displaying signed data or data to be signed according to the signature law §17 paragraph 2. The BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer is able to display TIFF documents following the Adobe TIFF specification, PDF documents that follow the PDF 1.6 document format as well as documents that contain ASCII characters. If the user decides to sign the document that is currently displayed with the BKK OPENLiMiT Viewer, he can start the process of electronic signature creation using the BKK OPENLiMiT

Viewer as an indirect interface to that functionality provided by the BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager.

The BKK OPENLiMiT Security Environment Manager (including the BKK OPENLiMiT Tray Application) provides the following functionality that may be accessed in parts or completely through the use of the BKK OPENLiMiT Job API:

- Computation of hash values using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160 algorithms.
- Creation of electronic signatures using a smart card and a secure pin entry device.
- Timestamp processing during the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for OCSP processing during the electronic signature creation.
- Electronic signature verification including OCSP and CRL processing as well as timestamp processing. The use of attribute certificates is supported.
- API's for applications/product parts that want to use the provided functionality.
- Ensuring the integrity and correctness of the SignCubes base components installed on the users computer.
- Providing graphical interfaces in the process of signature creation, verification and product configuration

## 6 Documentation

The product BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 is provided with the following documentation:

The user guidance [10] contains important instruction about the operation of the TOE, installation, errors and usage. It is available in German only. The guidance of the OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK [11] provides the information that developers of third party products need to use the provided API correctly in a secure manner. Further functionality only intended for internal use and their secure usage of the vendor is described in a separate document [12].

In the ST [6] the user finds information about the security objectives of the TOE, threats and security functions to avert these threats. The Security Target is publicly available but not automatically shipped with the TOE.

## 7 IT Product Testing

### 7.1 Developer tests

The tests of the developer were conducted with the smart cards, smart card terminals and operating systems listed below in accordance with the ST [6]. All additional prerequisites mentioned in the assumptions on the operating environment (see chapter 1.6 and chapter 4.2 in this report) concerning the installation of modules of the operating systems (e.g. the correct version of the Internet explorer) or firewalls and virus scanners were fulfilled for the computers of the testbed.

#### 7.1.1 Testconfiguration for the developer tests

The following combinations of smartcards, smartcard readers and operating systems were involved in the developer tests.

##### Smart cards

- OPENLiMiT card
- TeleSec E4 NetKey Card
- TeleSec PKS Card v2.0 and v3.0
- Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v1.0
- Signtrust signature card SEA-Card v2.0
- Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.0
- Signature card D-TRUST card version 1.1
- Signature card D-TRUST Card\_MS version 1.0
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.0
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.10
- Signature card DATEV e:secure-card v1.20
- STARCOS SPK 2.3 v7.0 with digital signature application StarCert v2.2
- STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (limited signature generation configuration)
- STARCOS SPK2.3 with Digital Signature Application StarCert (unlimited signature generation configuration)
- Siemens CardOS V4.3 B
- ACOS EMV-A03 based smart card from A-Trust
- ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient

- ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
- S-TRUST signature card release 3 (SPK 2.3 based)

#### **Smart card terminals**

- Cherry Model ST 2000
- Cherry G83-6700 LQ
- Cherry G83-6744 LU
- Kobil Systems B1 Pro USB
- Kobil Systems KAAN SecOVID Plus
- Kobil Standard Plus
- Kobil KAAN Advanced
- SCM Microsystems SPR x32
- Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
- Omnikey Cardman 3621
- Omnikey Cardman 3821
- Omnikey Cardman 8630

#### **Operating systems**

- Windows 98 SE
- Windows ME
- Windows NT 4 SP 6
- Windows 2000 SP 2
- Windows 2003
- Windows XP Home
- Windows XP Professional
- Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
- Windows XP 64 Bit Edition

#### **7.1.2 Test coverage**

All tests of the developer were conducted with the same version of the TOE that is listed in the configuration list [8].The test description demonstrates that the

developer performed his testing on an adequate level for the evaluation assurance level EAL4+. According to the verdict of the evaluator mentioned in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7], the test effort of the developer demonstrate that the security functionalities defined in the ST [6] have been implemented as required.

## 7.2 Evaluator tests

Due to the evaluation assurance level EAL4+ the ITSEF is obliged to repeat a subset of the developer tests as well as conduct independent and penetration tests.

The repetition of the developer tests was conducted on all operating systems that were specified in the Security Target. The evaluator chose a sampling strategy to cover around 20% of the developer tests on the different operating systems. For these tests the testbed of the developer was used in the configuration described in chapter 7.1.1.

The independent evaluator tests follow two different test approaches. On the one hand tests are derived from the developer tests to examine the behaviour of the TOE in a broader approach. This kind of tests strengthen the confidence of the evaluators in the test approach of the developer. On the other hand the evaluators developed new tests of their own to examine special reactions of the TOE. Due to this probing the existing of certain vulnerabilities can be eliminated.

For the penetration testing and the independent evaluator tests at the ITSEF facility in Bonn the following configuration was employed:

- Computer with Windows 2000, Service Pack 4 and JRE 1.4.2\_08
- Card readers-SCM Microsystems SPR x32 and Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
- Smart cards OPENLiMiT card, TeleSec E4 NetKey Card and ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient

## 7.3 Test results

The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected. The depth of testing is adequate for the evaluation assurance level chosen (EAL4+). The TOE has successfully passed independent testing.

The penetration tests performed by the evaluators confirmed that under the given assumptions no vulnerabilities can be exploited.



## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 was evaluated in the configuration as described in the Evaluation Technical Report [7] and summarized in chapter 2 of this report.

The TOE allows only one mode of operation though several different functionalities are bound to purchasing a corresponding license. Depending on the license, the user may use only parts of the functionality evaluated and certified. In any case, the evaluation and the certificate cover all functionalities that the purchase of the most comprehensive license provides.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical with EAL4+. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4 augmented by AVA\_VLA.4 and AVA\_MSU.3 and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table.

Assurance classes and components		Verdict
Security Target evaluation	CC Class ASE	PASS
TOE description	ASE_DES.1	PASS
Security environment	ASE_ENV.1	PASS
ST introduction	ASE_INT.1	PASS
Security objectives	ASE_OBJ.1	PASS
PP claims	ASE_PPC.1	PASS
IT security requirements	ASE_REQ.1	PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements	ASE_SRE.1	PASS
TOE summary specification	ASE_TSS.1	PASS
Configuration management	CC Class ACM	PASS
Partial CM automation	ACM_AUT.1	PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures	ACM_CAP.4	PASS
Development tools CM coverage	ACM_SCP.2	PASS
Delivery and operation	CC Class ADO	PASS
Detection of modification	ADO_DEL.2	PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures	ADO_IGS.1	PASS

Assurance classes and components		Verdict
Development	CC Class ADV	PASS
Fully defined external interfaces	ADV_FSP.2	PASS
Security enforcing high-level design	ADV_HLD.2	PASS
Implementation of the TSF	ADV_IMP.1	PASS
Descriptive low-level design	ADV_LLD.1	PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration	ADV_RCR.1	PASS
Informal TOE security policy model	ADV_SPM.1	PASS
Guidance documents	CC Class AGD	PASS
Administrator guidance	AGD_ADM.1	PASS
User guidance	AGD_USR.1	PASS
Life cycle support	CC Class ALC	PASS
Identification of security measures	ALC_DVS.1	PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model	ALC_LCD.1	PASS
Well-defined development tools	ALC_TAT.1	PASS
Tests	CC Class ATE	PASS
Analysis of coverage	ATE_COV.2	PASS
Testing: high-level design	ATE_DPT.1	PASS
Functional testing	ATE_FUN.1	PASS
Independent testing – sample	ATE_IND.2	PASS
Vulnerability assessment	CC Class AVA	PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states	AVA_MSU.3	PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation	AVA_SOF.1	PASS
Highly resistant	AVA_VLA.4	PASS

Table 9: Verdicts for the assurance components

The evaluation has shown that:

- Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented by AVA\_VLA.4 and AVA\_MSU.3

The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). The hash functions used by the TOE fulfill the strength of function claim as they are approved by the Bundesnetzagentur for the application of qualified digital signatures (see below).

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0, Version 2.0.2.1 in the configuration defined in the Security Target [6] and summarised in this report (see chapter 2, chapter 4 and chapter 8).

The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.

## 10 Comments/Recommendations

The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains important information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into account. Therefore a user has to follow the guidance in these documents.

As outlined in chapter 5 of this report and in the Security Target the TOE uses the hashfunctions SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160. For the verification of digital signatures the TOE uses the RSA-Algorithms with bitlengths between 1024-2048 bits. According to the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur, these algorithms are considered to be suitable for the application of qualified electronic signatures with respect to the German Signature Law (SigG) and ordinance on electronic signatures.

The following table describes the validity period of hash functions according to the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur.

Hash function	Valid until end of
SHA-1	2009
RIPEMD 160	2010
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2011

Table 10: Validity period of hash functions

As the BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 implement certain cryptographic algorithms for the verification of electronic signatures, the following table summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published by the Bundesnetzagentur.

Algorithm with bitlength	Valid until end of
RSA 1024	2007
RSA 1280	2008
RSA 1536	2009
RSA 1728	2010

Algorithm with bitlength	Valid until end of
RSA 1976	2011

Table 11: Validity period of cryptographic algorithms

A bitlength of 2048 Bits is recommended for an acceptable long term security level.

Detailed information about suitable algorithms for the application of qualified electronic signatures can be obtained from the websites of the Bundesnetzagentur (see [www.bundesnetzagentur.de](http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de)).

## 11 Annexes

None

## 12 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document.

## 13 Definitions

### 13.1 Acronyms

<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>CRL</b>	Certificate Revocation List
<b>CT</b>	Card Terminal
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>OSCP</b>	Online Certificate Status Protocol
<b>PC/SC</b>	Personal Computer/Smart Card
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>SF</b>	Security Function
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SOF</b>	Strength of Function
<b>SSCD</b>	Secure Signature Creation Device
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation

<b>TSC</b>	TSF Scope of Control
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functions
<b>TSP</b>	TOE Security Policy

## 13.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Protection Profile** - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

**Security Function** - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

**Security Target** - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Strength of Function** - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

**SOF-basic** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

**SOF-medium** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

**SOF-high** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

**Subject** - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

**Target of Evaluation** - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

**TOE Security Functions** - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

**TOE Security Policy** - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

**TSP Scope of Control** - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

## 14 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1, August 1999
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0, August 1999
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0367-2006, Version 1.2, 24.02.2006, Security Target (ST) Electronic Signature Application BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 Version 2.0.2.1, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 27.03.2006, Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0367 BSI.02073.TE.XX.2006 (confidential document)
- [8] Configuration list for BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 documents, 23.03.2006, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
- [9] Configuration list for BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 sources, 24.03.2006, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG

### Guidance documentation

- [10] User Guidance, Version 2.0.2.1, 23.03.2006, BKK OPENLiMiT base components 2.0 – User Guidance (German), OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
- [11] API Documentation, Version 0.9, 23.03.2006, OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.0 Documentation, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG

- [12] Internal API Documentation, Version 1.6, 06.10.2006, Developer Documentation OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG (confidential document)

### Legal regulations

- [13] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz - SigG)<sup>1</sup>) vom 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. I S. 876) zuletzt geändert durch Art. 1 des Ersten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Signaturgesetzes (1. SigÄndG), 04. January 2005, BGBl. volume 2005 part I p. 2
- [14] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung - SigV), 16.11.2001, BGBl. Jahrgang 2001 Teil I S. 876
- [15] Maßnahmenkatalog für technische Komponenten nach dem Signaturgesetz, Stand 15. Juli 1998, Hrsg. RegTP
- [16] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), 01/02/2006, published on the web-pages of the Bundesnetzagentur ([www.bundesnetzagentur.de](http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de)).

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## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

### **Caveats on evaluation results** (chapter 5.4) / **Final Interpretation 008**

The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

**Part 2 conformant** - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2

**Part 2 extended** - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in Part 2

plus one of the following:

**Part 3 conformant** - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3

**Part 3 extended** - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

**Package name Conformant** - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

**Package name Augmented** - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

**PP Conformant** - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.

## CC Part 3:

**Assurance categorisation** (chapter 2.5)

"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 2.1."

<b>Assurance Class</b>	<b>Assurance Family</b>	<b>Abbreviated Name</b>
Class ACM: Configuration management	CM automation	ACM_AUT
	CM capabilities	ACM_CAP
	CM scope	ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and operation	Delivery	ADO_DEL
	Installation, generation and start-up	ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development	Functional specification	ADV_FSP
	High-level design	ADV_HLD
	Implementation representation	ADV_IMP
	TSF internals	ADV_INT
	Low-level design	ADV_LLD
	Representation correspondence	ADV_RCR
	Security policy modeling	ADV_SPM
	Administrator guidance	AGD_ADM
Class AGD: Guidance documents	User guidance	AGD_USR
	Development security	ALC_DVS
Class ALC: Life cycle support	Flaw remediation	ALC_FLR
	Life cycle definition	ALC_LCD
	Tools and techniques	ALC_TAT
	Coverage	ATE_COV
Class ATE: Tests	Depth	ATE_DPT
	Functional tests	ATE_FUN
	Independent testing	ATE_IND
	Covert channel analysis	AVA_CCA
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment	Misuse	AVA_MSU
	Strength of TOE security functions	AVA_SOF
	Vulnerability analysis	AVA_VLA

Table 12: Assurance family breakdown and map

## Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)

"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility."

### Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)

Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by *substitution* of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the *addition* of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of "augmentation" allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an "EAL minus a constituent assurance component" is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Configuration management	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2
	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3
Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3
	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Development	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3
	ADV_INT					1	2	3
	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3
Guidance documents	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle support	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_CCA					1	2	2
	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3
	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4

Table 13: Evaluation assurance level summary

**Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested** (chapter 6.2.1)**"Objectives**

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats."

**Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested** (chapter 6.2.2)**"Objectives**

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited."

**Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked** (chapter 6.2.3)**"Objectives**

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering."

**Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed** (chapter 6.2.4)**"Objectives**

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs."

**Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested** (chapter 6.2.5)**"Objectives**

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques."

**Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested** (chapter 6.2.6)**"Objectives**

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs."

**Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 6.2.7)

"Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis."

**Strength of TOE security functions (AVA\_SOF)** (chapter 14.3)**AVA\_SOF** Strength of TOE security functions

## "Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim."

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VLA)** (chapter 14.4)**AVA\_VLA** Vulnerability analysis

## "Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users."

## "Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis."

"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA\_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA\_VLA.3) or high (for AVA\_VLA.4) attack potential."