Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007-MA-02

NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B with specific IC Dedicated Software

from

NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification

Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements,* version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007.

The change to the certified product is at the level of generation of specific new TOE configurations before TOE delivery. A new version of the data sheets is considered. The changes have no effect on assurance. The identification of the new configurations of the product is indicated by the product name P5CD040V0B.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007.

Common Criteria

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Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified TOE [3], the Security Target Lite [4], Security Target [5] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B with additional delivery form MOB6, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The wafer thickness changed to 75 µm for P5CD040V0B is a standard delivery type for the TOE P5CD040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CD012V0B certified under reference BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 and BSIDSZ-CC-0404-2007-MA-01. Furthermore, it can be concluded that this thickness can be regarded as already covered and now additionally used for this new module MOB6. This means that the security relevant investigations have been performed already in that context. This change is therefore not security relevant. The ISO14443A contact-less interface and the S^2C interface are enabled and the ISO7816 contact interface is enabled. For the identification of a specific NXP P5CD040V0B chip, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used: The value 25 hex in Device Coding Byte stored in the EEPROM. As the TOE functionality did not change, it is indicated by the chip identifier T036B (see [3]). An already delivered configuration list [6] is still valid.

Conclusion

The change to the TOE is at the level of generation of specific new TOE configurations before TOE delivery, a change that has no effect on assurance. The changes have no effect on assurance or the information taken over was already evaluated. Examination of the evidence indicates that the changes required are limited to the identification of configuration information. The Security Target [5] is still valid for the changed TOE. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

[1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 1.0, February 2004

[2] Impact Analysis Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Revision 1.0, 5. November 2007, Evaluation of the P5CD040/P5CC040/P5CD020/P5CC021/P5CD012 V0B Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential document)

[3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 5 July 2007

[4] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Version 1.0, 21 March 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD040/P5CC040/P5CD020/ P5CC021 V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (sanitised public document)

[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Version 1.2, 7. March 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD040/P5CC040/P5CD020/ P5CC021 V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (Confidential Document)

[6] Configuration List, BSI-DSZ-CC-0404/0410/0411, Version 1.2, 10th September 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144 family of Secure Smart Card Controllers NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)