

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0492-2008

for

MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66

from

MaskTech International GmbH

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Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0492-2008

MRTD inlay with ICAO application

MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66

from MaskTech International GmbH

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application“, Basic Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP-0017-2005)

Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2



Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 04 November 2008

For the Federal Office for Information Security



SOGIS - MRA

Joachim Weber
Head of Division

L.S.

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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

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A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG²
- BSI Certification Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)⁵
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
- Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

² Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC became effective on 03 March 1998.

This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF), and ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of Security Measures) that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21 October 2008. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the applicant is: MaskTech International GmbH

The product was developed by: MaskTech International GmbH

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5 Publication

The product MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <http://www.bsi.bund.de>) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁷ MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 16
90411 Nürnberg

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B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1 Executive Summary

Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] resp. [9] is the Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Basic Access Control Application.

The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control [10].

The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [11] and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO document [12]. The TOE will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.

The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) of the TOE are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.

The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 5.3.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC)	
SF_ALEAS_A	Unpredictable Number Generation Support
SF_SKCS_A	Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
SF_ADMINIS_A	Security violation administrator
SF_PHT_A	Physical tampering security function
SF_OBS_A	Unobservability
SF_TEST_A	Test of the TOE
SF_INT_A	TOE logical integrity
TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES)	
F.Access_Control	Regulation of all access
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF	Limitation of the available commands in the different life cycles
F.Identification_Authentication	Identification and Authentication of user roles
F.Initialization_Prepersonalization	TSF performed by the pre-personalization agent in phases 2b (initialization) and 2c (pre-

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
	personalization)
F.Personalization	TSF performed by the personalization agent in phase 3
F.Retry_Counter	Retry Counter (RTC)
F.Secure_Messaging	Implementation of a secure communication channel
F.Verification	TSF ensures correct operation

Table 1: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 6.1.

The claimed TOE's Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 5.1 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 consisting of

- the ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B secure dual-interface controller
- the embedded software operation system MTCOS Pro 2.0 (Version 8.0) and
- a file system in the context of the ICAO application.

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW / SW	MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 (MRTD inlay with ICAO application)	MTOCS Pro 2.0, Version 8.0	Card Inlay delivery
2	DOC	MTCOS Pro Version 2.0 ICAO User Guidance [15]	Version 1.0, 11.10.2007	electronically

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
3	DOC	Chapter 1 Filesystem and Security Architecture [16]	Version 1.17, 14.09.2007	electronically
4	DOC	Chapter 2 Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging [17]	Version 1.03, 14.09.2007	electronically
5	DOC	Chapter 3 Specification Active Authentication [18]	Version 3.01, 17.09.2007	electronically
6	Secret Key data	EF.PERS (for most steps of personalization) and EF.DCM (final LC switching)	Individual	Text file in hexadecimal format

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the Protection Profile MRTD BAC PP [10].

Delivery is performed from the initialization facility (MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany) to the personalization facility by as a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures as described in the MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO User Guidance [15] have to be followed.

3 Security Policy

The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [10] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE- Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

- Personalization of the MRTD’s chip,
- Inspection Systems for global interoperability.

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 3.2.

5 Architectural Information

The TOE is an RFID device according to ICAO technical reports [11] and [12] supporting Basic Access Control. It is implemented as an embedded software on a smart card chip, in this case the CC EAL 5+ certified ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B secure dual-interface controller.

The TOE comprises

- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system MTCOS Pro 2.0, Version 8.0)
- the MRTD application (dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system on the chip) and
- the associated guidance documentation.

The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:

- Storage of the MRTD data, e. g. data groups and signature.
- Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files.
- Mutual Authentication and Secure Messaging as specified in TrPKI [12] for Basic Access Control.
- Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443.
- Protection of data against modification.
- Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID and Basic Access Control.

The TSF of the software uses the hardware via evaluated hardware interfaces. External interface of the composite TOE used in the MRTD application is a specific set of commands operating on a defined file-system of the application. This interface is available to the inspection system via the contactless chip interface.

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

Developer tests, independent evaluator tests and penetration tests were performed using MRTD chips MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO composed of the the ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B secure dual-interface controller, its dedicated software, the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.0 and a file-system for the ICAO application. TOEs in the configuration LDS (Logical Data Structure) and BAC (Basic Access Control) were tested.

The developer performed functional tests with a TOE in the personalization phase and in the operational phase. All security functions were tested including their subfunctions. The test coverage analysis and the test depth analysis gave evidence that the TOE was systematically tested on the level of the functional specification and on subsystem level.

The test cases based on the security functionality specified in the functional specification showed the conformance to the expected behaviour of the TOE in the personalization and operational phase. The tests were performed using a smart card simulator and real chips with the TOE software and the ICAO file-system.

The evaluator repeated developer tests by sampling. The sample covered all security functions and was performed by using real chips. The TOE operated as specified.

Independent evaluator tests were performed during completion of the smart card operating system, initialisation and personalization of the MRTD and the operational phase of the MRTD. The tests confirmed the expected behaviour as specified.

The evaluators penetration tests confirmed the effectiveness of all security functions of the TOE. During these tests the different life cycle phases were considered. The penetration tests were performed based on the developers vulnerability analysis and based on the independent vulnerability analysis of the evaluator. Potential vulnerabilities were assessed upon their exploitability by analysis and tests. Analysis results and tests results showed that potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended operational environment of the TOE and that the TOE is resistant against low attack potential AVA_VLA.2 as specified.

8 Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 consisting of

- the ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B secure dual-interface controller
- the embedded software operation system MTCOS Pro 2.0 (Version 8.0) and
- a file system in the context of the ICAO application.

The TOE is delivered in form of an initialised and tested inlay module. This corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 as described in the Protection Profile MRTD BAC PP [10].

All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary after delivery are described in the Guidance document [15].

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the class ASE
- All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)

- The components
ADV_IMP.2 – Implementation of the TSF
ALC_DVS.2 – Sufficiency of security measures
augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017-2005 [10]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
- The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
SF_ALEAS_A - Unpredictable Number Generation Support
SF_SKCS_A - Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
F.Identification_Authentication - Identification and Authentication of user roles
F.Secure_Messaging - Implementation of a secure communication channel

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:

- SF_ALEAS_A - Unpredictable Number Generation Support
- SF_SKCS_A - Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
- F.Identification_Authentication - Identification and Authentication of user roles
- F.Secure_Messaging - Implementation of a secure communication channel

10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE

The operational documents [15], [16], [17] and [18] contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.

The TOEs implemented security functions meet the claimed strength of function SOF-high from design and construction point of view. The strength of function available in a specific system context where the TOE is used depends on the selection of the data used to set up the communication to the TOE. Therefore the issuing state or organisation is responsible for the strength of function that can be achieved in a specific system context. This has to be assessed in the specific system context. Then, the administrator (personalizer) is in collaboration with the issuing state or organisation responsible to provide keys with sufficient entropy, as required by the specific system context.

Only chips from the production sites (waferfabs, module and inlay production sites) as outlined in the certification report for the ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B secure dual-interface controller (DCSSI 2006/27, [13]) shall be used.

The Personalization Agent has to verify that they got the correct version of the TOE.

Defect chips and invalid passports including a chip must be destroyed in a way that the chip itself is destructed.

11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])

12 Definitions

12.1 Acronyms

APDU	Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC	Basic Access Control
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES	Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC	Document
EAC	Extended Access Control
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES	Embedded Software
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IC	Integrated Circuit
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS	Logical Data Structure
MRTD	Machine Readable Travel Document
PP	Protection Profile
RAM	Random Access Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory

SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy
Triple-DES	Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy
TSS	TOE Summary Specification

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

13 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August 2005
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.⁸
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0492-2008, Version 1.1, 25.10.2007, Security Target - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application and Basic Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document)
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.10, 15.10.2008, Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0492, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
- [8] Configuration List for the TOE, Version 1.2, 15.07.2008, ACM: MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO Configuration Management Plan, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document)
- [9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0492-2008, Version 1.0, 27.10.2008, Security Target lite - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application and Basic Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66, MaskTech GmbH, (sanitised public document)

⁸ specifically

- AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
- AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
- AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
- AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results

- [10] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017-2005, Version 1.0, 18 August 2005, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
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- [12] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, 01 October 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organisation
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- [17] MTCOS Standard & Pro V2.0: Chapter 2 Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging, MaskTech International GmbH, Version 1.03, 14.09.2007
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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance results (chapter 7.4)

„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

- **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.

plus one of the following:

- **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
- **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

- **PP Conformant** - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.“

CC Part 3:

Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)

“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	TOE description (APE_DES)
	Security environment (APE_ENV)
	PP introduction (APE_INT)
	Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
	IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)

Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”

Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)

“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE evaluation.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	TOE description (ASE_DES)
	Security environment (ASE_ENV)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
	PP claims (ASE_PPC)
	IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)

Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”

Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)

“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 1.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management	CM automation (ACM_AUT)
	CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
	CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation	Delivery (ADO_DEL)
	Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development	Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
	High-level design (ADV_HLD)
	Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
	TSF internals (ADV_INT)
	Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
	Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
	Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents	Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
	User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support	Development security (ALC_DVS)
	Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
	Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
	Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests	Coverage (ATE_COV)
	Depth (ATE_DPT)
	Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
	Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
	Misuse (AVA_MSU)
	Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
	Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)

Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)

“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Evaluation Assurance Level Components							by
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7	
Configuration management	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2	
	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	
	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3	
Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3	
	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Development	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5	
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3	
	ADV_INT					1	2	3	
	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2	
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3	
Guidance documents	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Life cycle support	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	
	ALC_FLR								
	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3	
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	
	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3	
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_CCA					1	2	2	
	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3	
	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4	

Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary"

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 11.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)**“Objectives**

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 11.7)**“Objectives**

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)**“Objectives**

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 11.9)

“Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)

“Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)

"Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

"Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”

“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”

D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment

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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0492-2008

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 04 November 2008, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance Requirements

- ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
- ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
- ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

- (a) MaskTech International GmbH, Germany Development, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg (Embedded Software Development, TOE Completion and Initialisation)

For development and production sites regarding the ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B secure dual-interface controller refer to the certification report 2006/27, Courtesy Translation, Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (DCSSI), 08 December 2006.

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target (Security Target - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application and Basic Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66 [6]).

The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] resp. [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

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