

# Certification Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0559-2012**

for

**Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0**

from

**Continental Automotive GmbH**

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn  
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111



# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## BSI-DSZ-CC-0559-2012

### Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381

Release 2.0

from Continental Automotive GmbH  
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version  
1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010  
Functionality: PP conformant  
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant  
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.5



Common Criteria  
Recognition  
Arrangement  
for components up to  
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 and according to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1360/2002 Annex 1(B) adapting to Council Regulation (EC) No. 3821/85 amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 432/2004 of 5 March 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2009 of 23 January 2009, Commission Regulation (EU) No 1266/2009 of 16 December 2009 on recording equipment in road transport.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 14 June 2012

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski  
Head of Department

L.S.



for components up  
to EAL 4

This page is intentionally left blank.

## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

---

<sup>1</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

## Contents

A Certification.....	7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.....	7
2 Recognition Agreements.....	7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).....	7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....	8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification.....	8
4 Validity of the Certification Result.....	9
5 Publication.....	9
B Certification Results.....	11
1 Executive Summary.....	12
2 Identification of the TOE.....	13
3 Security Policy.....	15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....	16
5 Architectural Information.....	16
6 Documentation.....	17
7 IT Product Testing.....	17
8 Evaluated Configuration.....	18
9 Results of the Evaluation.....	18
9.1 CC specific results.....	18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment.....	19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....	19
11 Security Target.....	20
12 Definitions.....	20
12.1 Acronyms.....	20
12.2 Glossary.....	21
13 Bibliography.....	22
C Excerpts from the Criteria.....	25
D Annexes.....	35

## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1<sup>5</sup> [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

### 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

#### 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

---

<sup>2</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

## 2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This evaluation contains the components ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

## 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 13 June 2012. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Continental Automotive GmbH.

The product was developed by: Continental Automotive GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

---

<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility



## 4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

## 5 Publication

The product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

---

<sup>7</sup> Continental Automotive GmbH  
Heinrich-Hertz-Strasse 45  
78052 Villingen-Schwenningen



## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

# 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 is a vehicle unit (VU) in the sense of Annex IB of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by CR (EC) No.10 1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EU) No. 1266/2009 intended to be installed in road transport vehicles. Its purpose is to record, store, display, print and output data related to driver activities. It is connected to a motion sensor with which it exchanges vehicle's motion data.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [7].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.5.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 9. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Services:

TOE Security Services	Addressed issue
TOE_SS.Identification_Authentication	<p>Identification and Authentication</p> <p>The TOE provides this security service of identification and authentication of the motion sensor, of users by monitoring the tachograph cards.</p>
TOE_SS.Access	<p>Security Service of Access Control</p> <p>The TOE provides this security service of access control for access to functions and data of the TOE according to the mode of operation selection rules.</p>
TOE_SS.Accountability	<p>Security Service of Accountability</p> <p>The TOE provides this security service of accountability for collection of accurate data in the TOE.</p>
TOE_SS.Audit	<p>Service of Audit</p> <p>The TOE provides this security service of audit related to attempts to undermine the security of the TOE and provides the traceability to associated users.</p>
TOE_SS.Object_Reuse	<p>Service of Object Reuse</p> <p>The TOE provides this security service of object reuse to ensure that temporarily stored sensitive objects are destroyed.</p>
TOE_SS.Reliability	<p>Service of Reliability of Service</p> <p>The TOE provides this security service of reliability of service: self-tests, no way to analyse or debug software in the field, detection of specified hardware sabotage and deviations from the specified voltage values including cut-off</p>

TOE Security Services	Addressed issue
	of the power supply
TOE_SS.Accuracy	Security Service of Accuracy of stored Data The TOE provides this security service of accuracy of stored data in the TOE.
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange	Security Service of Data Exchange The TOE provides this security service of data exchange with the motion sensor and tachograph cards and connected entities for downloading.
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support	Security Service of Cryptographic Support The TOE provides this security service of cryptographic support using standard cryptographic algorithms and procedures.

Table 1: TOE Security Services

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 10.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2 to 6.4.

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 For details refer to chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

### Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

Item No.	Delivery	Part	Version	Date	Form of Delivery
1	Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0	entire device as Vehicle Unit (Manufacturing option)	a) SW-Version of the Tachograph Application: 02.00.30,	-	separate unit in a closed case (Manufacturing)

Item No.	Delivery	Part	Version	Date	Form of Delivery
			displayed as: 02.00.30 on display, 2030 on print out, 2030 in download file, 020.030 -> via diagnostic interface;  b) SW-Version of the Software Upgrade Module (SWUM): 01.20;  displayed as : 01.20 on display;  d) HW version (Type plate): 1381 Rel. 2.0		option)
2	Documentation: Technical Description Manual [13]	(manufacturing option as well as SW-Upgrade option) Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 2.0, Technische Beschreibung, TD00.1381.20 101 101	TD00.1381.20 101 101 – 40507250 OPM 000 AA	Edition 04/2012	Paper or PDF-file
3	Documentation: Operating Instructions for drivers / co-drivers and forwarding companies [14]	(manufacturing option as well as SW-Upgrade option) Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 1.4x – 2.0, Betriebsanleitung Unternehmer &	BA00.1381.20 101 101 – 40507248 OPM 000 AA	Edition 04/2012	Paper or PDF-file

Item No.	Delivery	Part	Version	Date	Form of Delivery
		Fahrer, BA00.1381.20 101			
4	Documentation: Operating Instructions for the control authorities and control officers [15]	(manufacturing option as well as SW-Upgrade option) Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 1.4 – 2.0, Leitfaden für die Kontrollorgane, BA00.1381.20 201 101	BA00.1381.20 201 101 – 40507249 OPM 000 AA	Edition 04/2012	Paper or PDF- file
5	Documentation: Software Upgrade Manual [16]	Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381 ab Release 2.0, Software Upgrade, TD00.1381.20 600 101	TD00.1381.20 600 101 – 40507251 OPM 000 AA	Edition 04/2012	Paper or PDF- file

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The version number and the authenticity of the delivered TOE can be checked after start up. All necessary information will be shown on the display integrated. For this reason please refer to table 2.

### 3 Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

The main security of the VU aims to protect

- the data recorded and stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to and manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts,
- the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the vehicle unit,
- the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording equipment and the tachograph cards, and
- the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded (locally and remotely).

For detailed information please refer to ST [6, chapter 9.3.1]

## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The Generic Security Target [14] does not define any dedicated assumption, but measures; these measures will be reflected in the current ST in form of the security objectives for the TOE environment below. Hence, it is to define some assumptions in the current ST being sensible and necessary from the formal point of view (to reflect those environmental measures from [14]).

A.Activation	Vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops activate the TOE after its installation before the vehicle leaves the premises where installation took place.
A.Approved_Workshops	The Member States approve, regularly control and certify trusted fitters and workshops to carry out installations, calibrations, checks, inspections, repairs.
A.Card_Availability	Tachograph cards are available to the TOE users and delivered by Member State authorities to authorised persons only.
A.Card_Traceability	Card delivery is traceable (white lists, black lists), and black lists are used during security audits.
A.Controls	Law enforcement controls will be performed regularly and randomly, and must include security audits and (as well as visual inspection of the equipment).
A.Driver_Card_Uniqueness	Drivers possess, at one time, one valid driver card only.
A.Faithful_Calibration	Approved fitters and workshops enter proper vehicle parameters in recording equipment during calibration.
A.Faithful_Drivers	Drivers play by the rules and act responsibly (e.g. use their driver cards; properly select their activity for those that are manually selected) <sup>8</sup>
A.Regular_Inspections	Recording equipment will be periodically inspected and calibrated.

## 5 Architectural Information

The whole Vehicle Unit, as defined in [10], is the TOE, as claimed in [12]. The software which includes the whole tachograph application and the software upgrade module is running in a distributed environment of three microcontrollers. Firstly this is the SLE88CFX4001P (DSO-20, A1, DSO20, EPROM, 32bit) produced by Infineon, secondly it is the microcontroller ST10F273M produced by STMicroelectronics and thirdly it is the microcontroller PIC16F689 produced by Microchip. The SFR enforcing parts of the system are exclusively implemented on the secure microcontroller SLE88CFX4001P produced by

---

<sup>8</sup> The assumption A.Faithful\_Drivers taken from the Generic Security Target seems not to be realistic and enforceable, because the driver is the person, who has to be controlled and surveyed (see the Council Regulation. This assumption is made in the current ST only for the sake of compatibility with the GST and is necessary from *functional* point of view.



Infineon. There is only one configuration of the vehicle unit that is delivered to the approved workshops. For more details about the architectural structure please refer to the ST [6, chapter 4.3.4].

## 6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

## 7 IT Product Testing

The evaluated configuration of the TOE is:

- Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 (with its application version 02.00.30),
- Software Update Module, Version 01.20

The evaluators spent adequate testing effort for the desired resistance of the TOE against attackers with a high attack potential. The evaluators spent several days each for analysing the test specification and ensuring that the specification has been correctly implemented in the test scripts,

- for creating ideas for independent evaluator tests,
- for ensuring that the test environment delivers correct test results, and
- for repeating developer tests as well as carrying out independent tests.

The following tests and penetration tests have been performed by the Evaluators:

Independent Tests: The evaluators conducted independent testing at the developer's site. The evaluator tests have been carried out against the following TOE configurations: The TOE was brought in every production control state. A simulator for the motion sensor was used. Furthermore every card type (Driver card, workshop card, control card, and company card). For the company card also the remote authentication was in the focus of the tests.

Penetration Tests: The penetration testing was performed using the developer's testing environment. All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. On the basis of the methodical vulnerability analysis some potential vulnerabilities have been identified by the evaluator. These potential vulnerabilities have been analysed, if they are exploitable in the planned operational environment. For every potential vulnerability which was identified to be a candidate to be exploitable in the planned operational environment the evaluator devised and conducted penetration tests. The side channel attacks like power, timing, fault analysis haven been performed on 3DES. All other side channel attacks have been taken from the hardware certification procedure on Infineon chip (see certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0632-2011 at the BSI website).

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 is an electronic device, consisting of hardware and software, and additionally of documentations (see table 2). The TOE was tested with the following software versions:

- Tachograph application, version 02.00.30 and
- Software Update Module, version 01.20

The software which includes the whole tachograph application and the software upgrade module is running in a distributed environment of three microcontrollers. Firstly this is the SLE88CFX4001P (DSO-20, A1, DSO20, EPROM, 32bit) produced by Infineon, secondly it is the microcontroller ST10F273M produced by STMicroelectronics and thirdly it is the microcontroller PIC16F689 produced by Microchip. The SFR-enforcing parts of the system are implemented exclusively on the secure microcontroller SLE88CFX4001P produced by Infineon. There is only one configuration of the vehicle unit that is delivered to the approved workshops. The configurations at delivery, as well as the further steps to be taken in order to activate and calibrate the TOE in a vehicle are described in [13]. The correct input of the calibration parameters is guaranteed by the trustworthiness of the accredited work shops.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

### 9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- (i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
- (ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards

(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 32, AIS 34, AIS 36) were used.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [7]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant  
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant

- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.5

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

## 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The evaluation facility has examined that the analysis of used cryptographic algorithm (Triple and RSA) and SHA-1 meets all the requirements with regard to the specification of Annex 1B defined by the European Commission [10]. The cryptographic algorithms, mentioned above, are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

## 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The operator of the digital tachograph system has to make sure, that the organisational measures being relevant for him and defined in [12, chapter 4.2] there are adequately implemented. These are at least the following measures:

- OE.Sec\_Data\_Generation<sup>9</sup>,
- OE.Sec\_Data\_Transport<sup>10</sup>,
- OE.Sec\_Data\_Strong<sup>11</sup>
- OE.Card\_Availability<sup>12</sup>,
- OE.Card\_Traceability<sup>13</sup>,
- OE.Approved\_Workshops<sup>14</sup>, and

<sup>9</sup> Security data generation algorithms must be accessible to authorised and trusted persons only.

<sup>10</sup> Security data must be generated, transported, and inserted into the VU, in such a way to preserve its appropriate confidentiality and integrity.

<sup>11</sup> Security data inserted into the TOE shall be cryptographically strong as required by [1].

<sup>12</sup> Tachograph cards must be available and delivered to authorised persons only.

<sup>13</sup> Card delivery must be traceable (white lists, black lists), and black lists must be used during security audits.

<sup>14</sup> Installation, calibration and repair of recording equipment must be carried by trusted and approved fitters or workshops.

## OE.SW\_Upgrade<sup>15</sup>

Such measures could be defined e.g. by the National Policy (MSA Policy) and enforced by accreditation and audit procedures.

It must be assured by organisational measures that the certificates and key pairs respectively for a successful device authentication are only granted to trustworthy tachograph cards. Furthermore this tachograph cards must be able to protect these secrets in a sufficient manner and be evaluated and certified in accordance with [12] and [11].

It must be assured by organisational measures that the necessary data for the pairing process are only granted to trustworthy motion sensors. Furthermore the motion sensors must be able to protect these data in a sufficient manner and they must be evaluated and certified in accordance with [12] and [11].

The evaluator advises the operator of the digital tachograph system, that the control officers will be fit out with equipment, which can download data from the tachograph and then analyse it efficiently. Such automated data analysis will remarkably facilitate the search of important events.

The evaluator advises the operator of the digital tachograph system, that he should recommend to forwarding companies using of such Fleet Management Systems which ensure completeness of the 'Company Activity Data' in their own event logs at the remote data download. The background of this recommendation is the fact that the current specification [Digital Tachograph, Specification for remote company card authentication and remote data downloading, Index H, Heavy Truck Electronic Interfaces Working Group – DTCO, 31.01.2008] does not arrange either for reading the 'Card Identification' from the remotely connected Company Card with subsequent storing the 'Company Activity Data' in the Vehicle Unit event log or for writing the 'Company Activity Data' back to the remotely connected Company Card at the remote data download.

The evaluator advises the operator of the digital tachograph system, that tachograph cards being used with the TOE must be configured by their issuer in that way that the card expiry date does not exceed the expiry date of all certificates to be verified.

If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security.

## 11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

## 12 Definitions

Please refer for the definitions in ST [6, chapter 3.1].

### 12.1 Acronyms

**AIS** Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme

<sup>15</sup> Software revisions shall be granted security certification before they can be implemented in the TOE.

<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>BSIG</b>	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
<b>CCRA</b>	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>CEM</b>	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>ITSEC</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>SAR</b>	Security Assurance Requirement
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionalities
<b>VU</b>	Vehicle Unit

## 12.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Protection Profile** - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

**Security Target** - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Subject** - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

**Target of Evaluation** - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

**TOE Security Functionality** - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs

## 13 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,  
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009  
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009  
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),  
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE<sup>16</sup>.
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also  
in the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target DTCO 1381, Release 2.0, Digital Tachograph – Vehicle Unit,  
Revision. 1.8, Continental Automotive AG, 09.05.2012
- [7] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-  
0057-2010
- [8] Evaluation Technical Report, Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0  
Continental VDO, Version 1.00 from 12 June 2012 (confidential document)
- [9] Digitaler Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release. 2.0, Konfigurationsliste (Stückliste),  
Revision 1.2, Continental Automotive GmbH, 15.05.2012 (confidential document)
- [10] Annex IB of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by CR (EC) No.  
1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EU) No. 1266/2009
- [11] Joint Interpretation Library (JIL): Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital  
Tachographs, JIL interpretation of the Security Certification according to  
Commission Regulation (EC) 1360/2002, Annex 1B, Version 1.12, June 2003
- [12] Appendix 10 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 - Generic  
Security Targets
- [13] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 2.0, Technische Beschreibung,  
TD00.1381.20 101 101
- [14] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 1.4x – 2.0, Betriebsanleitung  
Unternehmer & Fahrer, BA00.1381.20 101

---

<sup>16</sup>specifically

- AIS25: Joint Interpretation Library -Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 7,  
30.06.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- AIS26: Joint Interpretation Library -Evaluations Methodologie für in Hardware Integrierte  
Schaltungen, Version 8, 08.06.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- AIS 32: CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 08.06.2011, Bundesamt  
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+  
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
- AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC  
Supporting Document

- [15] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381, Release 1.4 – 2.0, Leitfaden für die Kontrollorgane, BA00.1381.20 201 101
- [16] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 1381 ab Release 2.0, Software Upgrade, TD00.1381.20 600101



This page is intentionally left blank.

## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

### Conformance Claim (Release 3 = chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
  - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
  - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
  - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
  - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- **PP Conformant** - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Conformance Statement (Only for PPs)** - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

**Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation** (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

**Class ASE: Security Target evaluation** (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

**Security assurance components (chapter 7)**

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support	
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage	
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures	
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures	
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation	
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model	
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts	
	ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation	
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing	
	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete	
	AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Assurance class decomposition

## **Evaluation assurance levels** (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

### **Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview** (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

**Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested** (chapter 8.3)

## “Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

**Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested** (chapter 8.4)

## “Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

**Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked** (chapter 8.5)

## “Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”



**Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed**  
(chapter 8.6)**“Objectives**

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested** (chapter 8.7)**“Objectives**

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

**Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 8.8)**“Objectives**

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 8.9)

## "Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis."

**Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment** (chapter 16)

"The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE."

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VAN)** (chapter 16.1)

## "Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users."

This page is intentionally left blank

## **D Annexes**

### **List of annexes of this certification report**

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development  
and production environment

37

This page is intentionally left blank.

## Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0559-2012

### Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 2.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 14 June 2012, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC\_CMC.4, ALC\_CMS.4, ALC\_DEL.1, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1, ALC\_TAT.1)

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

Company	Site	Activity
Continental Automotive GmbH	78052 Villingen, Heinrich-Hertz-Str. 45	HW development SW development HW and SW tests Manufacturing the final TOE Delivery of the final TOE
Continental Automotive GmbH	300724 Timisoara, Calea Martirilor 1989 Nr. 1, Romania	Specification Implementation Module tests
Siemens Information Systems Ltd. (SISL)	No. 39, 41, 42, Keonics Electronics City, Hosur Road, Bangalore - 560 100, India	SW tests
Siemens CT IC 3	81730 München, Otto-Hahn-Ring 6, Geb. 10, Flur 3	SW development
Tieto Corporation	Ul. Legnicka 55F, 54203 Wroclaw, Polen  or Wroclaw (2 <sup>nd</sup> address for same building) Ul. Rysia 1a, 53656 Wroclaw, Polen	SW development

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.