



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-06

Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.1 Version 02.10

from

intellic GmbH



Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to EAL4



The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target, the Evaluation Technical Report and the Assurance Continuity Maintenance Reports of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012, BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-02 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-04.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to a new production site.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 dated 09 January 2012 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 and the Assurance Continuity Maintenance Reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-02 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-04.

Bonn, 4 June 2013



for components up to
EAL4

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3] as well as the Assurance Continuity Maintenance Reports [4] and [5].

The vendor for the Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.1 Version 02.10, intellic GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to the replacement of the existing production site by a new one.

According to [1] the evaluation facility SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH conducted a subset evaluation for the assurance class ALC. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by the certification body of BSI.

The result of the subset evaluation was that the Common Criteria assurance requirements

ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_COMP.1)

are fulfilled for the following site used for TOE production:

Melecs EWS GmbH & Co KG
Magyarországi Fióktelepe,
Berkenyefa sor 2,
9027 Győr,
Hungary

Conclusion

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to a new production site. The changes only have effect on assurance class ALC. As a result of the changes the configuration list for the TOE has been updated [7].

The Security Target [6] is still valid for the TOE.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 dated 09 January 2012 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

As a result of this maintenance procedure, the Evaluation Technical Report [8] was partially updated concerning the ALC aspects.

Additional obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3] and the Assurance Continuity Maintenance Reports [4] and [5].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, Version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] EFAS-4.1 V02.10 Impact Analysis Report, Version 03, 27 May 2013 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 for Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02 from intellic GmbH, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 09 January 2012
- [4] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-02 for Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.1 Version 02.01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 17 September 2012
- [5] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012-MA-04 for Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.1 Version 02.10, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 20 December 2012
- [6] Security Target EFAS-4.0, Version 18, 10 November 2011
- [7] Konfigurationsliste - EFAS-4.1 V02.10, Version 27, 27 May 2013 (confidential document)
- [8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 28.05.2013, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)