



## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012-MA-01**

**STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R**

from

**Giesecke & Devrient GmbH**



Common Criteria Recognition  
Arrangement  
for components up to EAL4



The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012.

The change to the certified product is at the level of the underlying hardware platform. The change has no effect on assurance. The identification of the product and the certified product itself did not change. The change is related to the integration of an additional design step of the hardware platform.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012 dated 31 January 2012 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012.

Bonn, 23 March 2012



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R was changed due to the integration of an additional design step of the hardware platform. The embedded software of the certified product did not change. The hardware platform of the TOE can be identified as described in the guidance document [6].

## Conclusion

The change to the TOE is at the level of the underlying hardware platform. The change has no effect on assurance. As a result of the changes the configuration list for the TOE has been updated [5].

The Security Target [7] and the guidance document [6] were editorially updated.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012 dated 31 January 2012 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

### **Additional obligations and notes for the usage of the product:**

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] Impact Analysis Report STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R, Version 0.2, 12.03.2012, Giesecke & Devrient (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012 for STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 31 January 2012
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012, Version 1.5, 12.03.2012, STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R Security Target, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (Confidential document)
- [5] Configuration List STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R, Version 0.6, 12.03.2012, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (Confidential document)
- [6] Guidance Documentation for the Initialisation Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R, Version 1.2, 12.03.12, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
- [7] Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012, Version 1.5, 12.03.2012, STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1R Security Target lite, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH