



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013-MA-01

TCOS Identity Card Version 1.1 Release 1/P60D144

from

T-Systems International GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013.

The certified product itself did not change. The change is related to including an additional production site that was certified within the scope of the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013 dated 20 March 2013 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4

Bonn, 9 December 2014

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the TCOS Identity Card Version 1.1 Release 1/P60D144, T-Systems International GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The changes are related to including an additional production site that was certified within the scope of the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014 [6]. The Common Criteria assurance requirements:

ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)

are fulfilled for the following site additional used for inlay embedding:

Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Oranienstrasse 91, 10969 Berlin, Germany (Initialisation and inlay embedding)

Conclusion

The change to the TOE is at the level of including an additional production site. The change has no effect on assurance. As a result of the change the configuration list for the TOE has been updated [5].

The Security Target [4] is still valid for the TOE.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013 [3] dated 20 March 2013 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Additional obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] Auswirkungsanalyse zum Antrag auf Maintenance eines bestehenden IT-Sicherheitszertifikates auf eine geänderte Version von TCOS Identity Card Version 1.1 Release 1/P60D144. Initialisierung bisheriger Inlays am neuen Standort, Version 0.1, 21.11.2014, T-Systems International GmbH
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013 for TCOS Identity Card Version 1.1 Release 1/P60D144, 20 March 2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0817-2013, Version 1.1.1, 11 October 2012, Specification of the Security Target TCOS Identity Card Version 1.1 Release 1/P60D144, T-Systems International GmbH
- [5] Konfigurationsliste von TCOS Identity Card Version 1.1 Release 1/NXP P60D144, Version 1.2, 05.12.2014, T-Systems International GmbH (Confidential document)
- [6] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014 for STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C2R, 17 November 2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik