Security Target

SMGW Version 1.1

Version Date Author		Author	Comments		
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108 **1** Introduction

109	1.1 ST and TOE	reference
110	Title:	Security Target, SMGW Version 1.1
111	Sponsors:	OpenLimit SignCubes AG, Power Plus Communications AG
112	Editors:	OpenLimit SignCubes AG, Power Plus Communications AG
113	CC-Version:	3.1 Revision 5
114	Assurance Level:	EAL 4+, augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
115	General Status:	Final
116	Document Version:	4.5
117	Document Date:	20.10.2020
118	TOE:	SMGW Version 1.1
119	Certification ID:	BSI-DSZ-CC-0831_v2
120	This document contair	ns the security target of the SMGW Version 1.1.
121	This security target c	laims conformance to the Smart Meter Gateway protection profile
122	[PP_GW].	
123	1.2 TOE referen	ce
124	The TOE described in t	his security target is the SMGW Version 1.1.
125	The TOE is part of the	device "Smart Meter Gateway". It consists of "SMGW Software Version

- 126 *1.1"* and *"SMGW Hardware"* where the hardware version can be identified according to 127 Table 1.
- 128 The following classifications of the product *"Smart Meter Gateway"* contain the TOE:
- 129 BPL Smart Meter Gateway (BPL-SMGW), SMGW-B-1A-111-00 or SMGW-B-1B-111-00
- 130 CDMA Smart Meter Gateway (CDMA-SMGW), SMGW-C-1A-111-00
- 131 ETH Smart Meter Gateway (ETH-SMGW), SMGW-E-1A-111-00 or SMGW-E-1B-111-00
- 132 GPRS Smart Meter Gateway (GPRS-SMGW), SMGW-G-1A-111-30





133	• LTE Smart Meter Gateway (LTE-SMGW), SMGW-L-1A-111-30, SMGW-L-1A-111-10, SMGW-					
134	L-1B-111-30 or SMGW-L-1B-111-10					
135	• powerWAN-ETH Smart Meter Gateway (pWE-SMGW), SMGW-P-1B-111-00					
136	The TOE comprises the following parts:					
137	• hardware device according to Table 1, including the TOE's main circuit board, a					
138	carrier board, a power-supply unit and a radio module for communication with					
139	wireless meter (included in the hardware device "Smart Meter Gateway")					
140	• firmware including software application "SMGW Software Version 1.1" (loaded into					
141	the circuit board according to Table 1), identified by the value 31416-31435					
142	which comprises of two revision numbers of the underlying version control system					
143	for the TOE, where the first part is for the operating system and the second part is					
144	for the SMGW application					
145	manuals					
146	 "Handbuch f ür Verbraucher, Smart Meter Gateway" [AGD_Consumer], 					
147	identified by the SHA-256 hash value					
148	6c468b8a36c9c15583aa33fbe970cc0be7c5f3e6ef0dcfb98f0e0c7b96507a2f					
149	\circ "Handbuch für Service-Techniker, Smart Meter Gateway" [AGD_Techniker],					
150	identified by the SHA-256 hash value					
151	a25a0ca0f5155b06e88d76e0a22b15b52de2e08f3a7f741d5e1a09bca804250d					
152	 "Handbuch f ür Hersteller von Smart-Meter Gateway-Administrations- 					
153	Software, Smart Meter Gateway" [AGD_GWA], identified by the SHA-256					
154	hash value					
155	229d5e2fe3f88c56950c9c753283fc6c1127469e73541bdd84a4ba20d6400bb5					
156	 "Logmeldungen, SMGW Version 1.1" [SMGW_Logging] identified by the SHA- 					
157	256 hash value					
158	9f1bcfc3c7bf7edba364d44d145dea8dbbb49e760525b825fd40e1c0ac257b79					
159	\circ "Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Sichere Auslieferung,					
160	SMGW Version 1.1" [AGD_SEC], identified by the SHA-256 hash value					
161	dbf82120d484e7225a931433c7b8d9d0b3efd4262396d8f338e5b4b68b38657f					





The hardware device "Smart Meter Gateway" includes a secure module with the product 162 name "TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE" which is not 163 part of the TOE but has its own certification id "BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016". Moreover, a 164 hard-wired communication adapter is connected to the TOE via [USB] as shown in Figure 3 165 166 which is not part of the TOE (but always an inseparable part of the delivered entity). This communication adapter can be either a LTE communication adapter, a BPL communication 167 adapter, a GPRS communication adapter, a CDMA communication adapter, a powerWAN-168 Ethernet communication adapter, or an ethernet communication adapter. 169

The following table shows the different TOE product classifications applied on the case of the

170

171

TOE:

#	Characteristic	Value	Description
1	Product family	SMGW	each classification of a type start with this value
2		-	Delimiter
3	Communication	В	Product Type "BPL Smart Meter Gateway"
	Technology	С	Product Type "CDMA Smart Meter Gateway"
		E	Product Type "ETH Smart Meter Gateway"
		G	Product Type "GPRS Smart Meter Gateway"
		L	Product Type "LTE Smart Meter Gateway"
		Р	Product Type "powerWAN-ETH Smart Meter Gateway"
4		-	Delimiter
5	Hardware	1A	Identification of hardware generation; version 1.0 of
	generation		main circuit board "SMGW Hardware"
		1B	Identification of hardware generation; version 1.0.1 of
			main circuit board "SMGW Hardware" (with new power
			adapter)
6		-	Delimiter
7	HAN Interface	1	Ethernet
8	CLS Interface	1	Ethernet
9	LMN Interface	1	Wireless and wired
10		-	Delimiter
11	SIM card type	0	none
		1	SIM card assembled at factory
		3	SIM slot only
12	reserved	0	

172

Table 1: TOE product classifications





173 **1.3 Introduction**

174 The increasing use of *green energy* and upcoming technologies around e-mobility lead to an 175 increasing demand for functions of a so called smart grid. A smart grid hereby refers to a 176 commodity¹ network that intelligently integrates the behaviour and actions of all entities 177 connected to it – suppliers of natural resources and energy, its consumers and those that are 178 both – in order to efficiently ensure a more sustainable, economic and secure supply of a 179 certain commodity (definition adopted from [CEN]).

180 In its vision such a smart grid would allow to invoke consumer devices to regulate the load 181 and availability of resources or energy in the grid, e.g. by using consumer devices to store 182 energy or by triggering the use of energy based upon the current load of the grid². Basic 183 features of such a smart use of energy or resources are already reality. Providers of electricity 184 in Germany, for example, have to offer at least one tariff that has the purpose to motivate 185 the consumer to save energy.

186 In the past, the production of electricity followed the demand/consumption of the 187 consumers. Considering the strong increase in renewable energy and the production of 188 energy as a side effect in heat generation today, the consumption/demand has to follow the 189 – often externally controlled – production of energy. Similar mechanisms can exist for the gas 190 network to control the feed of biogas or hydrogen based on information submitted by 191 consumer devices.

An essential aspect for all considerations of a smart grid is the so called *Smart Metering System* that meters the consumption or production of certain commodities at the consumers' side and allows sending the information about the consumption or production to external entities, which is then the basis for e.g. billing the consumption or production.

¹ Commodities can be electricity, gas, water or heat which is distributed from its generator to the consumer through a grid (network).

² Please note that such a functionality requires a consent or a contract between the supplier and the consumer, alternatively a regulatory requirement.





196	This Security Target defines the security objectives, corresponding requirements and their
197	fulfilment for a Gateway which is the central communication component of such a Smart
198	Metering System (please refer to chapter 1.4.2 for a more detailed overview).
199	The Target of Evaluation (TOE) that is described in this document is an electronic unit
200	comprising hardware and software/firmware ³ used for collection, storage and provision of
201	Meter Data ⁴ from one or more Meters of one or multiple commodities.
202	The Gateway connects a Wide Area Network (WAN) with a Network of Devices of one or
203	more Smart Metering devices (Local Metrological Network, LMN) and the consumer Home
204	Area Network (HAN), which hosts Controllable Local Systems (CLS) and visualization devices.
205	The security functionality of the TOE comprises
206	 protection of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity of data and
207	information flow control

208 mainly to protect the privacy of consumers, to ensure a reliable billing process and to protect
209 the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale infrastructure of the smart grid.
210 The availability of the Gateway is not addressed by this ST.

1.4 TOE Overview

212 **1.4.1 Introduction**

The TOE as defined in this Security Target is the Gateway in a Smart Metering System. In the following subsections the overall Smart Metering System will be described first and afterwards the Gateway itself.

There are various different vocabularies existing in the area of Smart Grid, Smart Metering and Home Automation. Furthermore, the Common Criteria maintain their own vocabulary.

³ For the rest of this document the term "firmware" will be used if the complete firmware ist meant. For the application including its services the term "software" will be used.

⁴ Please refer to chapter 3.2 for an exact definition of the term "Meter Data".




224 225



The Protection Profile [PP_GW, chapter 1.3] provides an overview over the most prominent terms used in this Security Target to avoid any bias which is not fully repeated here.

1.4.2 Overview of the Gateway in a Smart Metering System

The following figure provides an overview of the TOE as part of a complete Smart Metering System from a purely functional perspective as used in this ST.⁵



⁵ It should be noted that this description purely contains aspects that are relevant to motivate and understand the functionalities of the Gateway as described in this ST. It does not aim to provide a universal description of a Smart Metering System for all application cases.





226 As can be seen in Figure 1, a system for smart metering comprises different functional units 227 in the context of the descriptions in this ST: 228 The Gateway (as defined in this ST) serves as the communication component between the components in the local area network (LAN) of the consumer and the 229 outside world. It can be seen as a special kind of firewall dedicated to the smart 230 231 metering functionality. It also collects, processes and stores the records from 232 Meter(s) and ensures that only authorised parties have access to them or derivatives thereof. Before sending meter data⁶ the information will be encrypted and signed 233 using the services of a Security Module. The Gateway features a mandatory user 234

The Meter itself records the consumption or production of one or more commodities 236 237 (e.g. electricity, gas, water, heat) and submits those records in defined intervals to 238 the Gateway. The Meter Data has to be signed and encrypted before transfer in order to ensure its confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. The Meter is 239 240 comparable to a classical meter⁷ and has comparable security requirements; it will 241 be sealed as classical meters according to the regulations of the calibration authority. 242 The Meter further supports the encryption and integrity protection of its connection 243 to the Gateway⁸.

interface, enabling authorised consumers to access the data relevant to them.

The Gateway utilises the services of a Security Module (e.g. a smart card) as a cryptographic service provider and as a secure storage for confidential assets. The Security Module will be evaluated separately according to the requirements in the corresponding Protection Profile (c.f. [SecModPP]).

248 **Controllable Local Systems** (CLS, as shown in Figure 2) may range from local power 249 generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household 250 appliances ("white goods") to applications in home automation. CLS may utilise the services

⁶ Please note that readings and data which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer.

⁷ In this context, a classical meter denotes a meter without a communication channel, i.e. whose values have to be read out locally.

⁸ It should be noted that this ST does not imply that the connection between the Gateways and external components (specifically meters and CLS) is cable based. It is also possible that the connections as shown in Figure 1 are realised deploying a wireless technology. However, the requirements on how the connections shall be secured apply regardless of the realisation.





251 of the Gateway for communication services. However, CLS are not part of the Smart 252 Metering System.

The following figure introduces the external interfaces of the TOE and shows the cardinality of the involved entities. Please note that the arrows of the interfaces within the Smart Metering System as shown in Figure 2 indicate the flow of information. However, it does not indicate that a communication flow can be initiated bi-directionally. Indeed, the following chapters of this ST will place dedicated requirements on the way an information flow can be initiated⁹.




Figure 2: The logical interfaces of the TOE

⁹ Please note that the cardinality of the interface to the consumer is 0...n as it cannot be assumed that a consumer is interacting with the TOE at all.





The overview of the Smart Metering System as described before is based on a threat model that has been developed for the Smart Metering System and has been motivated by the following considerations:

- The Gateway is the central communication unit in the Smart Metering System. It is
 the only unit directly connected to the WAN, to be the first line of defence an
 attacker located in the WAN would have to conquer.
- The Gateway is the central component that collects, processes and stores Meter
 Data. It therewith is the primary point for user interaction in the context of the Smart
 Metering System.
- To conquer a Meter in the LMN or CLS in the HAN (that uses the TOE for communication) a WAN attacker first would have to attack the Gateway successfully.
 All data transferred between LAN and WAN flows via the Gateway which makes it an ideal unit for implementing significant parts of the system's overall security functionality.
- Because a Gateway can be used to connect and protect multiple Meters (while a Meter will always be connected to exactly one Gateway) and CLS with the WAN, there might be more Meters and CLS in a Smart Metering System than there are Gateways.
- All these arguments motivated the approach to have a Gateway (using a Security Module for cryptographic support), which is rich in security functionality, strong and evaluated in depth, in contrast to a Meter which will only deploy a minimum of security functions. The Security Module will be evaluated separately.
- 283 **1.4.3 TOE description**


The Smart Metering Gateway (in the following short: Gateway or TOE) may serve as the communication unit between devices of private and commercial consumers and service providers of a commodity industry (e.g. electricity, gas, water, etc.). It also collects, processes and stores Meter Data and is responsible for the distribution of this data to external entities.





Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer¹⁰ of the commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring the consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable access to Controllable Local Systems (e.g. power generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household appliances).

- 293 The TOE has a fail-safe design that specifically ensures that any malfunction can not impact
- the delivery of a commodity, e.g. energy, gas or water¹¹.
- 295 The following figure provides an overview of the product with its TOE and non-TOE parts:



296 297

Figure 3: The product with its TOE and non-TOE parts

The TOE communicates over the interface IF_GW_SM with a security module and over the interfaces *USB_P*, *USB_N* and *Module Reset* with one of the possible communication

¹⁰ Please note that it is possible that the consumer of the commodity is not the owner of the premises where the Gateway will be placed. However, this description acknowledges that there is a certain level of control over the physical access to the Gateway.

Indeed, this Security Target assumes that the Gateway and the Meters have no possibility at all to impact the delivery of a commodity. Even an intentional stop of the delivery of a certain commodity is Not within the scope of this Security Target. It should, however, be noted that such a functionality may be realised by a CLS that utilises the services of the TOE for its communication.





adapters according to chapter 1.2. The communication adapters, which are not part of the
 TOE, transmit data from the USB interface to the WAN ethernet interface and vice versa.

302 **1.4.4 TOE Type definition**

At first, the TOE is a communication Gateway. It provides different external communication interfaces and enables the data communication between these interfaces and connected IT systems. It further collects, processes and stores Meter Data and is responsible for the distribution of this data to external parties.

- Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer of the commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring the consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable access to Controllable Local Systems (e.g. power generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household appliances). Roles respectively External Entities in the context of the TOE are introduced in chapter 3.1.
- The TOE described in this ST is a product that has been developed in partnership between 313 Power Plus Communication AG and OpenLimit SignCubes AG. It is a communication product 314 315 which complies with the requirements of the Protection Profile "Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System" [PP_GW]. Moreover, the TOE postulates compliance 316 317 to the technical guideline [TR-03109] which is not part of this security evaluation and certification¹². The basis for the conformity check to [TR-03109] will be the functional and 318 319 security related tests performed during the security evaluation. The TOE consists of hardware and software including the operating system. The communication with more than one meter 320 is possible. 321
- The TOE is implemented as a separate physical module which can be integrated into more complex modular systems. This means that the TOE can be understood as an OEM module

¹² The TOE deviates from the technical guideline [TR-03109] in the following points: The TOE only supports wireless meter in operational mode S1 and T1 and the SML commands *SML_PublicOpen.**, *SML_PublicClose.**, *SML_GetProcParameter.**, *SML_SetProcParameter.Req* with parameters *serverId*, *parameterTreePath*, *parameterTree* only, and *SML_Attention.Res*.





324	which provides all required physical interfaces and protocols on well defined interfaces.					
325	Because of this, the module can be integrated into communication devices and directly into					
326	meters.					
327	The TOE-design includes the following components:					
328	• The security relevant components compliant to the Protection Profile.					
329	Components with no security relevance (e.g. communication protocols and					
330	interfaces).					
331	The TOE evaluation does not include the evaluation of the Security Module. In fact, the TOE					
332	relies on the security functionality of the Security Module but it must be security evaluated in					
333	a separate security evaluation ¹³ .					
334	The hardware platform of the TOE mainly consists of a suitable embedded CPU, volatile and					
335	non-volatile memory and supporting circuits like Security Module and RTC.					
336	The TOE contains mechanisms for the integrity protection for its firmware.					
337	The TOE supports the following communication protocols:					
338	• OBIS according to [IEC-62056-6-1] and [EN 13757-1],					
339	 DLMS/COSEM according to [IEC-62056-6-2], 					
340	• SML according to [IEC-62056-5-3-8],					
341	 unidirectional and bidirectional wireless M-Bus according to [EN 13757-3], 					
342	[EN 13757-4], and [IEC-62056-21].					
343	The TOE provides the following physical interfaces for communication					
344	• Wireless M-Bus (LMN) according to [EN 13757-3],					
345	• RS-485 (LMN) according to [EIA RS-485],					
346	• Ethernet (HAN) according to [IEEE 802.3], and					
347	RMII (WAN) according to [IEEE 802.3].					

¹³ Please note that the Security Module is physically integrated into the Gateway even though it is not part of the TOE.





- 348 The physical interface for the WAN communication is the RMII (Reduced Media Independent 349 Interface) interface. The communication is protected according to [TR-03109].
- 350 The communication into the HAN is also provided by the Ethernet interface. The protocols
- 351 HTTPS and TLS proxy are therefore supported.

HAN	LMN			WAN
Proxy HTTPS/XML	SML/COSEM	wM-Bus		Webservices
	AES + CMAC	TLS		
TCP IP Ethernet	IP HDLC WI			
RJ-45	RS-485		RF	BPL

355

Figure 4: The TOE's protocol stack

- 354 The TOE provides the following functionality:
 - Protected handling of Meter Data compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.1 and 1.4.6.2]
- Integrity and authenticity protection e.g. of Meter Data compliant to [PP_GW,
 chapter 1.6.4.3]
- Protection of LAN devices against access from the WAN compliant to [PP_GW,
 chapter 1.4.6.4]
- Wake-Up Service compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.5]
- Privacy protection compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.6]
- Management of Security Functions compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.7]
- 363 Cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module compliant to [PP_GW, chapter
 364 1.4.8]





365	1.4.5	TOE logical boundary
366	The log	ical boundary of the Gateway can be defined by its security features:
367	٠	Handling of Meter Data, collection and processing of Meter Data, submission to
368		authorised external entities (e.g. one of the service providers involved) where
369		necessary protected by a digital signature
370	٠	Protection of authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data temporarily or
371		persistently stored in the Gateway, transferred locally within the LAN and transferred
372		in the WAN (between Gateway and authorised external entities)
373	•	Firewalling of information flows to the WAN and information flow control among
374		Meters, Controllable Local Systems and the WAN
375	•	A Wake-Up-Service that allows to contact the TOE from the WAN side
376	•	Privacy preservation
377	٠	Management of Security Functionality
378	•	Identification and Authentication of TOE users
379	The fol	lowing sections introduce the security functionality of the TOE in more detail.
380	1.4.5.1	Handling of Meter Data ¹⁴
381	The Ga	teway is responsible for handling Meter Data. It receives the Meter Data from the
382	Meter(s), processes it, stores it and submits it to external entities.
383	The TC	DE utilises Processing Profiles to determine which data shall be sent to which
384	compo	nent or external entity. A Processing Profile defines:
385	•	how Meter Data must be processed,
386	•	which processed Meter Data must be sent in which intervals,
387	•	to which component or external entity,
388	٠	signed using which key material,
389	•	encrypted using which key material,

¹⁴ Please refer to chapter 3.2 for an exact definition of the various data types.





390	 whether processed Meter Data shall be pseudonymised or not, and
391	• which pseudonym shall be used to send the data.
392	The Processing Profiles are not only the basis for the security features of the TOE; they also
393	contain functional aspects as they indicate to the Gateway how the Meter Data shall be
394	processed. More details on the Processing Profiles can be found in [TR-03109-1].
395	The Gateway restricts access to (processed) Meter Data in the following ways:
396	consumers must be identified and authenticated first before access to any data may
397	be granted,
398	• the Gateway accepts Meter Data from authorised Meters only,
399	• the Gateway sends processed Meter Data to correspondingly authorised external
400	entities only.
401	The Gateway accepts data (e.g. configuration data, firmware updates) from correspondingly
402	authorised Gateway Administrators or correspondingly authorised external entities only. This
403	restriction is a prerequisite for a secure operation and therewith for a secure handling of
404	Meter Data. Further, the Gateway maintains a calibration log with all relevant events that
405	could affect the calibration of the Gateway.
406	These functionalities:
407	• prevent that the Gateway accepts data from or sends data to unauthorised entities,
408	• ensure that only the minimum amount of data leaves the scope of control of the
409	consumer,
410	• preserve the integrity of billing processes and as such serve in the interests of the
411	consumer as well as in the interests of the supplier. Both parties are interested in an
412	billing process that ensures that the value of the consumed amount of a certain
413	commodity (and only the used amount) is transmitted,
414	• preserve the integrity of the system components and their configurations.
415	The TOE offers a local interface to the consumer (see also IF_GW_CON in Figure 2) and allows
416	the consumer to obtain information via this interface. This information comprises the billing-



1.4.5.2 Confidentiality protection



417	relevant data (to allow the consumer to verify an invoice) and information about which
418	Meter Data has been and will be sent to which external entity. The TOE ensures that the
419	communication to the consumer is protected by using TLS and ensures that consumers only
420	get access to their own data. Therefore, the TOE contains a web server that delivers the
421	content to the web browser after successful authentication of the user.

423	The TOE protects data from unauthorised disclosure
424	• while received from a Meter via the LMN,
425	 while received from the administrator via the WAN,
426	• while temporarily stored in the volatile memory of the Gateway,
427	• while transmitted to the corresponding external entity via the WAN or HAN.
428	Furthermore, all data, which no longer have to be stored in the Gateway, are securely erased
429	to prevent any form of access to residual data via external interfaces of the TOE. These
430	functionalities protect the privacy of the consumer and prevent that an unauthorised party is
431	able to disclose any of the data transferred in and from the Smart Metering System (e.g.
432	Meter Data, configuration settings).
433	The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for aspects of this functionality.
434	1.4.5.3 Integrity and Authenticity protection
435	The Gateway provides the following authenticity and integrity protection:
436	• Verification of authenticity and integrity when receiving Meter Data from a Meter via
437	the LMN, to verify that the Meter Data have been sent from an authentic Meter and
438	have not been altered during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of its
439	Security Module for aspects of this functionality.
440	• Application of authenticity and integrity protection measures when sending
441	processed Meter Data to an external entity, to enable the external entity to verify





442	that the processed Meter Data have been sent from an authentic Gateway and have		
443	not been changed during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of its Security		
444	Module for aspects of this functionality.		
445	• Verification of authenticity and integrity when receiving data from an external entity		
446	(e.g. configuration settings or firmware updates) to verify that the data have been		
447	sent from an authentic and authorised external entity and have not been changed		
448	during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for aspects		
449	of this functionality.		
450	These functionalities		
451	• prevent within the Smart Metering System that data may be sent by a non-authentic		
452	component without the possibility that the data recipient can detect this,		
453	• facilitate the integrity of billing processes and serve for the interests of the consumer		
454	as well as for the interest of the supplier. Both parties are interested in the		
455	transmission of correct processed Meter Data to be used for billing,		
456	• protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale Smart Grid		
457	infrastructure by preventing that data (e.g. Meter Data, configuration settings, or		
458	firmware updates) from forged components (with the aim to cause damage to the		
459	Smart Grid) will be accepted in the system.		
460	1.4.5.4 Information flow control and firewall		

461 The Gateway separates devices in the LAN of the consumer from the WAN and enforces the 462 following information flow control to control the communication between the networks that 463 the Gateway is attached to:

only the Gateway may establish a connection to an external entity in the WAN¹⁵;
 specifically connection establishment by an external entity in the WAN or a Meter in
 the LMN to the WAN is not possible,

¹⁵ Please note that this does not affect the functionality for a CLS to establish a secure channel to a party in the WAN. Technically however, this channel is established by the TOE who acts as a proxy between the CLS and the WAN.





467	 the Gateway can establish connections to devices in the LMN or in the HAN,
468	• Meters in the LMN are only allowed to establish a connection to the Gateway,
469	• the Gateway shall offer a wake-up service that allows external entities in the WAN to
470	trigger a connection establishment by the Gateway,
471	 connections are allowed to pre-configured addresses only,
472	• only cryptographically-protected (i.e. encrypted, integrity protected and mutually
473	authenticated) connections are possible. ¹⁶
474	These functionalities
475	• prevent that the Gateway itself or the components behind the Gateway (i.e. Meters
476	or Controllable Local Systems) can be conquered by a WAN attacker (as defined in
477	section 3.4), that processed data are transmitted to the wrong external entity, and
478	that processed data are transmitted without being
479	confidentiality/authenticity/integrity-protected,
480	• protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale infrastructure in
481	two ways: by preventing that conquered components will send forged Meter Data
482	(with the aim to cause damage to the Smart Grid), and by preventing that widely
483	distributed Smart Metering Systems can be abused as a platform for malicious
484	software/firmware to attack other systems in the WAN (e.g. a WAN attacker who
485	would be able to install a botnet on components of the Smart Metering System).
486	The communication flows that are enforced by the Gateway between parties in the HAN,

LMN and WAN are summarized in the following table¹⁷:

Source(1st column)	WAN	LMN	HAN
Destination (1st row)			
WAN	- (see following list)	No connection	No connection

¹⁶ To establish an encrypted channel the TOE may use the required protocols such as DHCP or PPP. Beside the establishment of an encrypted channel no unprotected communication between the TOE and external entities located in the WAN or LAN is allowed.

¹⁷ Please note that this table only addresses the communication flow between devices in the various networks attached to the Gateway. It does not aim to provide an overview over the services that the Gateway itself offers to those devices nor an overview over the communication between devices in the same network. This information can be found in the paragraphs following the table.





		establishment allowed	establishment allowed
LMN	No connection establishment	- (see following list)	No connection
	allowed		establishment allowed
HAN	Connection establishment is	No connection	- (see following list)
	allowed to trustworthy, pre-	establishment allowed	
	configured endpoints and via		
	an encrypted channel only ¹⁸		

488 Table 2: Communication flows between devices in different networks

489	For communications within the different networks the following assumptions are defined:
490	1. Communications within the WAN are not restricted. However, the Gateway is not
491	involved in this communication,
492	2. No communications between devices in the LMN are assumed. Devices in the LMN
493	may only communicate to the Gateway and shall not be connected to any other
494	network,
495	3. Devices in the HAN may communicate with each other. However, the Gateway is not
496	involved in this communication. If devices in the HAN have a separate connection to
497	parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this connection is assumed to be
498	appropriately protected. It should be noted that for the case that a TOE connects to
499	more than one HAN communications between devices within different HAN via the
500	TOE are only allowed if explicitly configured by a Gateway Administrator.
501	Finally, the Gateway itself offers the following services within the various networks:
502	 the Gateway accepts the submission of Meter Data from the LMN,
503	• the Gateway offers a wake-up service at the WAN side as described in chapter
504	1.4.6.5 of [PP_GW],
505	• the Gateway offers a user interface to the HAN that allows CLS or consumers to
506	connect to the Gateway in order to read relevant information.

¹⁸ The channel to the external entity in the WAN is established by the Gateway.





507	1.4.5.5 Wake-Up-Service		
508	In order to protect the Gateway and the devices in the LAN against threats from the WAN		
509	side the Gateway implements a strict firewall policy and enforces that connections with		
510	external entities in the WAN shall only be established by the Gateway itself (e.g. when the		
511	Gateway delivers Meter Data or contacts the Gateway Administrator to check for updates) ¹⁹ .		
512	While this policy is the optimal policy from a security perspective, the Gateway Administrator		
513	may want to facilitate applications in which an instant communication to the Gateway is		
514	required.		
515	In order to allow this kind of re-activeness of the Gateway, this ST allows the Gateway to		
516	keep existing connections to external entities open (please refer to [TR-03109-3] for more		
517	details) and to offer a so called wake-up service.		
518	The Gateway is able to receive a wake-up message that is signed by the Gateway		
519	Administrator. The following steps are taken:		
520	1. The Gateway verifies the wake-up packet. This comprises		
521	i. a check if the header identification is correct,		
522	ii. the recipient is the Gateway,		
523	iii. the wake-up packet has been sent/received within an acceptable period of		
524	time in order to prevent replayed messages,		
525	iv. the wake-up message has not been received before,		
526	2. If the wake-up message could <u>not</u> be verified as described in step #1, the message		
527	will be dropped/ignored. No further operations will be initiated and no feedback is		
528	provided.		
529	3. If the message could be verified as described in step #1, the signature of the wake-up		
530	message will be verified. The Gateway uses the services of its Security Module for		
531	signature verification.		

Please note that this does not affect the functionality for a CLS to establish a secure channel to a party in the WAN. Technically however, this channel is established by the TOE who acts as a proxy between the CLS and the WAN.





- 5324. If the signature of the wake-up message cannot be verified as described in step #3533the message will be dropped/ignored. No feedback is given to the sending external534entity and the wake-up sequence terminates.
- 535 5. If the signature of the wake-up message could be verified successfully, the Gateway 536 initiates a connection to a pre-configured external entity; however no feedback is 537 given to the sending external entity.
- 538 More details on the exact implementation of this mechanism can be found in [TR-03109-1, 539 "Wake-Up Service"].

540 **1.4.5.6 Privacy Preservation**

- 541 The preservation of the privacy of the consumer is an essential aspect that is implemented by 542 the functionality of the TOE as required by this ST.
- 543 This contains two aspects:

544 The Processing Profiles that the TOE obeys facilitate an approach in which only a minimum 545 amount of data have to be submitted to external entities and therewith leave the scope of 546 control of the consumer. The mechanisms "encryption" and "pseudonymisation" ensure that 547 the data can only be read by the intended recipient and only contains an association with the 548 identity of the Meter if this is necessary.

On the other hand, the TOE provides the consumer with transparent information about the 549 550 information flows that happen with their data. In order to achieve this, the TOE implements a consumer log that specifically contains the information about the information flows which 551 552 has been and will be authorised based on the previous and current Processing Profiles. The 553 access to this consumer log is only possible via a local interface from the HAN and after 554 authentication of the consumer. The TOE does only allow a consumer access to the data in 555 the consumer log that is related to their own consumption or production. The following 556 paragraphs provide more details on the information that is included in this log:





557 Monitoring of Data Transfers

558 The TOE keeps track of each data transmission in the consumer log and allows the consumer 559 to see details on which information have been and will be sent (based on the previous and 560 current settings) to which external entity.

561 Configuration Reporting

562 The TOE provides detailed and complete reporting in the consumer log of each security and 563 privacy-relevant configuration setting. Additional to device specific configuration settings, 564 the consumer log contains the parameters of each Processing Profile. The consumer log 565 contains the configured addresses for internal and external entities including the CLS.

566 Audit Log and Monitoring

567 The TOE provides all audit data from the consumer log at the user interface IF_GW_CON. 568 Access to the consumer log is only possible after successful authentication and only to 569 information that the consumer has permission to (i.e. that has been recorded based on 570 events belonging to the consumer).

571 **1.4.5.7 Management of Security Functions**

- 572 The Gateway provides authorised Gateway Administrators with functionality to manage the 573 behaviour of the security functions and to update the TOE.
- 574 Further, it is defined that only authorised Gateway Administrators may be able to use the 575 management functionality of the Gateway (while the Security Module is used for the 576 authentication of the Gateway Administrator) and that the management of the Gateway 577 shall only be possible from the WAN side interface.

578 System Status

579 The TOE provides information on the current status of the TOE in the system log. Specifically 580 it shall indicate whether the TOE operates normally or any errors have been detected that 581 are of relevance for the administrator.





582 **1.4.5.8 Identification and Authentication**

583 To protect the TSF as well as User Data and TSF data from unauthorized modification the TOE 584 provides a mechanism that requires each user to be successfully identified and authenticated 585 before allowing any other actions on behalf of that user. This functionality includes the 586 identification and authentication of users who receive data from the Gateway as well as the 587 identification and authentication of CLS located in HAN and Meters located in LMN.

588 The Gateway provides different kinds of identification and authentication mechanisms that 589 depend on the user role and the used interfaces. Most of the mechanisms require the usage 590 of certificates. Only consumers are able to decide whether they use certificates or username 591 and password for identification and authentication.

592 **1.4.6 The logical interfaces of the TOE**

593 The TOE offers its functionality as outlined before via a set of external interfaces. Figure 2 594 also indicates the cardinality of the interfaces. The following table provides an overview of 595 the mandatory external interfaces of the TOE and provides additional information:

Interface Name	Description	
IF_GW_CON	Via this interface the Gateway provides the consumer ²⁰ with the possibility to review information that is relevant for billing or the privacy of the consumer. Specifically the access to the consumer log is only allowed via this interface.	
IF_GW_MTR	Interface between the Meter and the Gateway. The Gateway receives Meter Data via this interface. ²¹	
IF_GW_SM	The Gateway invokes the services of its Security Module via this interface.	
IF_GW_CLS	CLS may use the communication services of the Gateway via this interface. The implementation of at least one interface for CLS is mandatory.	
IF_GW_WAN	The Gateway submits information to authorised external entities via this interface.	
IF_GW_SRV	Local interface via which the service technician has the possibility to review information that are relevant to maintain the Gateway. Specifically he has read	

²⁰ Please note that this interface allows consumer (or consumer's CLS) to connect to the gateway in order to read consumer specific information.

²¹ Please note that an implementation of this external interface is also required in the case that Meter and Gateway are implemented within one physical device in order to allow the extension of the system by another Meter.





access to the system log only via this interface. He has also the possibility to view non-TSF data via this interface.

596 **Table 3: Mandatory TOE external interfaces**

- 1.4.7 The cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module 597

598 Parts of the cryptographic functionality used in the upper mentioned functions is provided by a Security Module. The Security Module provides strong cryptographic functionality, random 599 number generation, secure storage of secrets and supports the authentication of the 600 Gateway Administrator. The Security Module is a different IT product and not part of the TOE 601 602 as described in this ST. Nevertheless, it is physically embedded into the Gateway and protected by the same level of physical protection. The requirements applicable to the 603 Security Module are specified in a separate PP (see [SecModPP]). 604

605 The following table provides a more detailed overview on how the cryptographic functions 606 are distributed between the TOE and its Security Module.





Aspect	TOE	Security Module
Communication with external entities Communication with the consumer Communication with the Meter	 encryption decryption hashing key derivation MAC generation MAC verification secure storage of the TLS certificates encryption decryption hashing key derivation MAC generation MAC generation MAC generation MAC verification Secure storage of the TLS certificates encryption decryption decryption MAC generation MAC verification secure storage of the TLS certificates encryption decryption 	Security Module Key negotiation: • support of the authentication of the external entity • secure storage of the private key • random number generation • digital signature verification and generation Key negotiation: • support of the authentication of the consumer • secure storage of the private key • digital signature verification and generation • random number generation and generation • random number generation • secure storage of the private key • digital signature verification and generation • random number generation • random number generation
	 hashing key derivation MAC generation MAC verification secure storage of the TLS certificates 	 meter secure storage of the private key digital signature verification and generation random number generation
Signing data before submission to an external entity	 hashing 	Signature creationsecure storage of the private key
Content data encryption and integrity protection	 encryption decryption MAC generation key derivation secure storage of the public Key 	 Key negotiation: secure storage of the private key random number generation

Table 4: Cryptographic support of the TOE and its Security Module





610	1.4.7.1 Content data encryption vs. an encrypted channel
611	The TOE utilises concepts of the encryption of data on the content level as well as the
612	establishment of a trusted channel to external entities.
613	As a general rule, all processed Meter Data that is prepared to be submitted to external
614	entities is encrypted and integrity protected on a content level using CMS (according to
615	[TR-03109-1-I]).
616	Further, all communication with external entities is enforced to happen via encrypted,
617	integrity protected and mutually authenticated channels.
618	This concept of encryption on two layers facilitates use cases in which the external party
619	that the TOE communicates with is not the final recipient of the Meter Data. In this way,
620	it is for example possible that the Gateway Administrator receives Meter Data that they
621	forward to other parties. In such a case, the Gateway Administrator is the endpoint of
622	the trusted channel but cannot read the Meter Data.
623	Administration data that is transmitted between the Gateway Administrator and the TOE is
624	also encrypted and integrity protected using CMS.
625	The following figure introduces the communication process between the Meter, the TOE and
626	external entities (focussing on billing-relevant Meter Data).
627	The basic information flow for Meter Data is as follows and shown in Figure 5:
628	1. The Meter measures the consumption or production of a certain commodity.
629	2. The Meter Data is prepared for transmission:
630	a. The Meter Data is typically signed (typically using the services of an integrated
631	Security Module).
632	b. If the communication between the Meter and the Gateway is performed
633	bidirectional, the Meter Data is transmitted via an encrypted and mutually
634	authenticated channel to the Gateway. Please note that the submission of this
635	information may be triggered by the Meter or the Gateway.
636	or






	c. If a unidirectional communication is performed between the Meter and the
	Gateway, the Meter Data is encrypted using a symmetric algorithm (according to
	[TR-03109-3]) and facilitating a defined data structure to ensure the authenticity
	and confidentiality.
3.	The authenticity and integrity of the Meter Data is verified by the Gateway.
4.	If (and only if) authenticity and integrity have been verified successfully, the Meter
	Data is further processed by the Gateway according to the rules in the Processing
	Profile else the cryptographic information flow will be cancelled.
5.	The processed Meter Data is encrypted and integrity protected using CMS (according
	to [TR-03109-1-I]) for the final recipient of the data ²² .
6.	The processed Meter Data is signed using the services of the Security Module.
7.	The processed and signed Meter Data may be stored for a certain amount of time.
8.	The processed Meter Data is finally submitted to an authorised external entity in the
	WAN via an encrypted and mutually authenticated channel.
	4. 5. 6. 7.

²² Optionally the Meter Data can additionally be signed before any encryption is done.















653	1.4.8	TOE life-cycle
654	The life	-cycle of the TOE can be separated into the following phases:
655	1.	Development
656	2.	Production
657	3.	Pre-personalization at the developer's premises (without Security Module)
658	4.	Pre-personalization and integration of Security Module
659	5.	Installation and start of operation
660	6.	Personalization
661	7.	Normal operation
662	A deta	iled description of the phases #1 to #4 and #6 to #7 is provided in [TR-03109-1-VI],
663	while p	hase #5 is described in the TOE manuals.
664	The TC	DE will be delivered after phase "Pre-personalization and integration of Security
665	Module	e". The phase "Personalization" will be performed when the TOE is started for the first
666	time af	ter phase "Installation and start of operation". The TOE delivery process is specified in
667	[AGD_S	SEC].





668	2 Conformance Claims
669	2.1 CC Conformance Claim
670	• This ST has been developed using Version 3.1 Revision 5 of Common Criteria [CC].
671	• This ST is [CC] part 2 extended due to the use of FPR_CON.1.
672	• This ST claims conformance to [CC] part 3; no extended assurance components have
673	been defined.
674	
675	2.2 PP Claim / Conformance Statement
676	This Security Target claims strict conformance to Protection Profile [PP_GW].
677	
678	2.3 Package Claim
679	This Security Target claims an assurance package EAL4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and
680	ALC_FLR.2 as defined in [CC] Part 3 for product certification.
681	
682	2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
683	This Security Target claims strict conformance to only one PP [PP_GW].
684	This Security Target is consistent to the TOE type according to [PP_GW] because the TOE is a
685	communication Gateway that provides different external communication interfaces and
686	enables the data communication between these interfaces and connected IT systems. It
687	further collects processes, and stores Meter Data.
688	This Security Target is consistent to the security problem defined in [PP_GW].
689	This Security Target is consistent to the security objectives stated in [PP_GW], no security
690	objective of the PP is removed, nor added to this Security Target.
691	This Security Target is consistent to the security requirements stated in [PP_GW], no security
692	requirement of the PP is removed, nor added to this Security Target.
693	





3 Security Problem Definition

695 **3.1 External entities**

The following external entities interact with the system consisting of Meter and Gateway.
Those roles have been defined for the use in this Security Target. It is possible that a party
implements more than one role in practice.

Role	Description
Consumer	The authorised individual or organization that "owns" the Meter Data.
	In most cases, this will be tenants or house owners consuming
	electricity, water, gas or further commodities. However, it is also
	possible that the consumer produces or stores energy (e.g. with their
	own solar plant).
Gateway	Authority that installs, configures, monitors, and controls the Smart
Administrator	Meter Gateway.
Service Technician	The authorised individual that is responsible for diagnostic purposes.
Authorised External	Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the
Entity / User	TOE boundary. In the context of this ST, the term <i>user</i> or <i>external entity</i>
	serve as a hypernym for all entities mentioned before.
	Table 5: Roles used in the Security Target

699

700 **3.2 Assets**

The following tables introduces the relevant assets for this Security Target. The tables focus on the assets that are relevant for the Gateway and does not claim to provide an overview over all assets in the Smart Metering System or for other devices in the LMN. The following Table 6 lists all assets typified as "user data":

705





Asset	Description	Ne	eed for Protection
Meter Data	Meter readings that allow calculation of the quantity of a commodity, e.g.	•	According to their specific need (see below)
	electricity, gas, water or heat consumed		20.000
	over a period.		
	Meter Data comprise Consumption or		
	Production Data (billing-relevant) and		
	grid status data (not billing-relevant).		
	While billing-relevant data needs to		
	have a relation to the Consumer, grid		
	status data do not have to be directly related to a Consumer.		
System log data	Log data from the	•	Integrity
System log data	 system log. 		Confidentiality (only authorised
	- system log.		SMGW administrators and Service
			technicians may read the log data)
Consumer log	Log data from the	•	Integrity
data	• consumer log.	•	Confidentiality (only authorised
			Consumers may read the log data)
Calibration log	Log data from the	•	Integrity
data	 calibration log. 	•	Confidentiality (only authorised
			SMGW administrators may read the
			log data)
Consumption Data	Billing-relevant part of Meter Data.	•	Integrity and authenticity
	Please note that the term <i>Consumption</i>		(comparable to the classical meter
	Data implicitly includes Production		and its security requirements)
	Data.	•	Confidentiality (due to privacy
		_	concerns)
Status Data	Grid status data, subset of Meter Data	•	Integrity and authenticity
	that is not billing-relevant ²³ .		(comparable to the classical meter
			and its security requirements) Confidentiality (due to privacy
		1	concerns)

Please note that these readings and data of the Meter which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer(s).





Supplementary	The Gateway may be used for	•	According to their specific need
Data			According to their specific freed
Data	the LMN or HAN. It may be that the		
	functionality of the Gateway that is		
	used by such a device is limited to pure		
	(but secure) communication services.		
	Data that is transmitted via the Gateway		
	but that does not belong to one of the		
	aforementioned data types is named		
Data	Supplementary Data.	_	
Data	The term <i>Data</i> is used as hypernym for	•	According to their specific need
	Meter Data and Supplementary Data.		
Gateway time	Date and time of the real-time clock of	•	Integrity
	the Gateway. Gateway Time is used in	•	Authenticity (when time is adjusted
	Meter Data records sent to external		to an external reference time)
	entities.		
Personally	Personally Identifiable Information	•	Confidentiality
Identifiable	refers to information that can be used		
Information (PII)	to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a		
	single person or can be used with other		
	sources to uniquely identify a single		
	individual.		

706

Table 6: Assets (User data)

707 Table 7 lists all assets typified as "TSF data":

Meter config (secondary asset)	Configuration data of the Meter to control its behaviour including the Meter identity. Configuration data is transmitted to the Meter via the Gateway.	•	Integrity and authenticity Confidentiality
Gateway config (secondary asset)	Configuration data of the Gateway to control its behaviour including the Gateway identity, the Processing Profiles and certificate/key material for authentication.	•	Integrity and authenticity Confidentiality
CLS config (secondary asset)	Configuration data of a CLS to control its behaviour. Configuration data is transmitted to the CLS via the Gateway.	•	Integrity and authenticity Confidentiality
Firmware update (secondary asset)	Firmware update that is downloaded by the TOE to update the firmware of the TOE.	•	Integrity and authenticity





	Ephemeral keys (secondary asset)	Ephemeral cryptog by the TOE for cryp operations.		Integrity and authenticityConfidentiality
708	Table 7: Assets (TSF data)			
709				
710	3.3 Ass	umptions		
711	In this thre	eat model the follo	owing assumptions ab	out the environment of the components
712	need to be	taken into account	in order to ensure a s	ecure operation.
713	A.External	Privacy	It is assumed that	authorised and authenticated external
714			entities receiving an	y kind of privacy-relevant data or billing-
715			relevant data and	the applications that they operate are
716			trustworthy (in the o	context of the data that they receive) and
717			do not perform u	nauthorised analyses of this data with
718			respect to the corres	sponding Consumer(s).
719	A.TrustedA	Admins	It is assumed that th	e Gateway Administrator and the Service
720			Technician are trust	worthy and well-trained.
721	A.Physical	Protection	It is assumed that	the TOE is installed in a non-public
722			environment within	the premises of the Consumer which
723			provides a basic lev	el of physical protection. This protection
724			covers the TOE, th	e Meter(s) that the TOE communicates
725			with and the comm	unication channel between the TOE and
726			its Security Module.	
727	A.ProcessP	Profile	The Processing Profi	iles that are used when handling data are
728			assumed to be trust	worthy and correct.
729	A.Update		It is assumed that fir	mware updates for the Gateway that can
730			be provided by an a	uthorised external entity have undergone





731		a certification process according to this Security Target
732		before they are issued and can therefore be assumed to be
733		correctly implemented. It is further assumed that the
734		external entity that is authorised to provide the update is
735		trustworthy and will not introduce any malware into a
736		firmware update.
737	A.Network	It is assumed that
738		a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability
739		and bandwidth for the individual situation is available,
740		• one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the
741		system time are available in the WAN,
742		• the Gateway is the only communication gateway for
743		Meters in the LMN ²⁴ ,
744		• if devices in the HAN have a separate connection to
745		parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this connection
746		is appropriately protected.
747	A.Keygen	It is assumed that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) is
748		generated securely according to [TR-03109-3] and brought
749		into the Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway
750		Administrator.
751	Application Note 1:	This ST acknowledges that the Gateway cannot be completely
752		protected against unauthorised physical access by its
753		environment. However, it is important for the overall security
754		of the TOE that it is not installed within a public environment.
755		The level of physical protection that is expected to be
756 757		provided by the environment is the same level of protection that is expected for classical meters that operate according to
		נוומנ וז באשבנופט וטו נומזזונמו ווופנפוז נוומנ טשפומנפ מננטרטוווצ נט

Please note that this assumption holds on a logical level rather than on a physical one. It may be possible that the Meters in the LMN have a physical connection to other devices that would in theory also allow a communication. This is specifically true for wireless communication technologies. It is further possible that signals of Meters are amplified by other devices or other Meters on the physical level without violating this assumption. However, it is assumed that the Meters do only communicate with the TOE and that only the TOE is able to decrypt the data sent by the Meter.





758 759		the regulations of the national calibration authority [TR-03109-1].
760	Application Note 2:	The Processing Profiles that are used for information flow
761		control as referred to by A.ProcessProfile are an essential
762		factor for the preservation of the privacy of the Consumer.
763		The Processing Profiles are used to determine which data
764		shall be sent to which entity at which frequency and how
765		data are processed, e.g. whether the data needs to be related
766		to the Consumer (because it is used for billing purposes) or
767		whether the data shall be pseudonymised.
768		The Processing Profiles shall be visible for the Consumer to
769		allow a transparent communication.
770		It is essential that Processing Profiles correctly define the
771		amount of information that must be sent to an external
772		entity. Exact regulations regarding the Processing Profiles and
773		the Gateway Administrator are beyond the scope of this
774		Security Target.
775		

776 **3.4 Threats**

The following sections identify the threats that are posed against the assets handled by the Smart Meter System. Those threats are the result of a threat model that has been developed for the whole Smart Metering System first and then has been focussed on the threats against the Gateway. It should be noted that the threats in the following paragraphs consider two different kinds of attackers:

- Attackers having physical access to Meter, Gateway, a connection between these components or local logical access to any of the interfaces (local attacker), trying to disclose or alter assets while stored in the Gateway or while transmitted between Meters in the LMN and the Gateway. Please note that the following threat model assumes that the local attacker has less motivation than the WAN attacker as a successful attack of a local attacker will always only impact one Gateway. Please further note that the local attacker includes authorised individuals like consumers.
- An attacker located in the WAN (WAN attacker) trying to compromise the confidentiality
 and/or integrity of the processed Meter Data and or configuration data transmitted via



800



- 791the WAN, or attacker trying to conquer a component of the infrastructure (i.e. Meter,792Gateway or Controllable Local System) via the WAN to cause damage to a component793itself or to the corresponding grid (e.g. by sending forged Meter Data to an external794entity).
- The specific rationale for this situation is given by the expected benefit of a successful attack. An attacker who has to have physical access to the TOE that they are attacking, will only be able to compromise one TOE at a time. So the effect of a successful attack will always be limited to the attacked TOE. A logical attack from the WAN side on the other hand may have the potential to compromise a large amount of TOEs.
- 801 T.DataModificationLocal A local attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert, 802 replay or redirect) Meter Data when transmitted between 803 Meter and Gateway, Gateway and Consumer, or Gateway 804 and external entities. The objective of the attacker may be to 805 alter billing-relevant information or grid status information. The attacker may perform the attack via any interface (LMN, 806 807 HAN, or WAN). 808 In order to achieve the modification, the attacker may also
- 809try to modify secondary assets like the firmware or810configuration parameters of the Gateway.
- 811T.DataModificationWANA WAN attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert,812replay or redirect) Meter Data, Gateway config data, Meter813config data, CLS config data or a firmware update when814transmitted between the Gateway and an external entity in815the WAN.
- 816When trying to modify Meter Data, it is the objective of the817WAN attacker to modify billing-relevant information or grid818status data.





819		When trying to modify config data or a firmware update, the
820		WAN attacker tries to circumvent security mechanisms of the
821		TOE or tries to get control over the TOE or a device in the LAN
822		that is protected by the TOE.
823	T.TimeModification	A local attacker or WAN attacker may try to alter the
824		Gateway time. The motivation of the attacker could be e.g. to
825		change the relation between date/time and measured
826		consumption or production values in the Meter Data records
827		(e.g. to influence the balance of the next invoice).
828	T.DisclosureWAN	A WAN attacker may try to violate the privacy of the
829		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data or configuration data
830		(Meter config, Gateway config or CLS config) or parts of it
831		when transmitted between Gateway and external entities in
832		the WAN.
833	T.DisclosureLocal	A local attacker may try to violate the privacy of the
833 834	T.DisclosureLocal	A local attacker may try to violate the privacy of the Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the
	T.DisclosureLocal	
834	T.DisclosureLocal	Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the
834 835	T.DisclosureLocal	Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if
834 835 836	T.DisclosureLocal T.Infrastructure	Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one
834 835 836 837		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway.
834 835 836 837 838		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway. A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways,
834 835 836 837 838 839		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway. A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN attacker
834 835 836 837 838 839 840		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway. A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN attacker to cause damage to Consumers or external entities or the
834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway. A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN attacker to cause damage to Consumers or external entities or the grids used for commodity distribution (e.g. by sending wrong
 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway. A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN attacker to cause damage to Consumers or external entities or the grids used for commodity distribution (e.g. by sending wrong data to an external entity).
 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 		Consumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one Gateway. A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN attacker to cause damage to Consumers or external entities or the grids used for commodity distribution (e.g. by sending wrong data to an external entity). A WAN attacker may also try to conquer a CLS in the HAN





847		travelled through the Gateway before and which are no
848		longer needed by the Gateway (i.e. Meter Data, Meter config,
849		or CLS config).
850	T.ResidentData	A WAN or local attacker may try to access (i.e. read, alter,
851		delete) information to which they don't have permission to
852		while the information is stored in the TOE.
853		While the WAN attacker only uses the logical interface of the
854		TOE that is provided into the WAN, the local attacker may
855		also physically access the TOE.
856	T.Privacy	A WAN attacker may try to obtain more detailed information
857		from the Gateway than actually required to fulfil the tasks
858		defined by its role or the contract with the Consumer. This
859		includes scenarios in which an external entity that is primarily
860		authorised to obtain information from the TOE tries to obtain
861		more information than the information that has been
862		authorised as well as scenarios in which an attacker who is
863		not authorised at all tries to obtain information.

3.5 Organizational Security Policies

This section lists the organizational security policies (OSP) that the Gateway shall comply with:

867	OSP.SM	The TOE shall use the services of a certified Security I	Module
868		for	
869		 verification of digital signatures, 	
870		• generation of digital signatures,	
871		• key agreement,	
872		key transport,	
873		• key storage,	





874		٠	Random Number Generation,
875		The S	Security Module shall be certified according to
876		[SecMo	lodPP] and shall be used in accordance with its relevant
877		guidan	nce documentation.
878	OSP.Log	The TC	OE shall maintain a set of log files as defined in [TR-
879		03109-	9-1] as follows:
880		1.	A system log of relevant events in order to allow an
881			authorised Gateway Administrator to analyse the
882			status of the TOE. The TOE shall also analyse the
883			system log automatically for a cumulation of security
884			relevant events.
885		2.	A consumer log that contains information about the
886			information flows that have been initiated to the
887			WAN and information about the Processing Profiles
888			causing this information flow as well as the billing-
889			relevant information.
890		3.	A calibration log (as defined in chapter 6.2.1) that
891			provides the Gateway Administrator with a possibility
892			to review calibration relevant events.
893		The TC	OE shall further limit access to the information in the
894		differe	ent log files as follows:
895		1.	Access to the information in the system log shall only
896			be allowed for an authorised Gateway Administrator
897			via the IF_GW_WAN interface of the TOE and an
898			authorised Service Technician via the IF_GW_SRV
899			interface of the TOE.
900		2.	Access to the information in the calibration log shall
901			only be allowed for an authorised Gateway





902	Administrator via the IF_GW_WAN interface of the
903	TOE.
904	3. Access to the information in the consumer log shall
905	only be allowed for an authorised Consumer via the
906	IF_GW_CON interface of the TOE. The Consumer
907	shall only have access to their own information.
908	The system log may overwrite the oldest events in case that
909	the audit trail gets full.
910	For the consumer log the TOE shall ensure that a sufficient
911	amount of events is available (in order to allow a Consumer
912	to verify an invoice) but may overwrite older events in case
913	that the audit trail gets full.
914	For the calibration log, however, the TOE shall ensure the
915	availability of all events over the lifetime of the TOE.





916 **4 Security Objectives**

917 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

918	O.Firewall	The TOE shall serve as the connection point for the
919		connected devices within the LAN to external entities within
920		the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to
921		protect the devices of the LMN and HAN (as long as they use
922		the Gateway) and itself against threats from the WAN side.
923		The firewall:
924		shall allow only connections established from HAN or
925		the TOE itself to the WAN (i.e. from devices in the
926		HAN to external entities in the WAN or from the TOE
927		itself to external entities in the WAN),
928		 shall provide a wake-up service on the WAN side
929		interface,
930		• shall not allow connections from the LMN to the
931		WAN,
932		 shall not allow any other services being offered on
933		the WAN side interface,
934		shall not allow connections from the WAN to the LAN
935		or to the TOE itself,
936		shall enforce communication flows by allowing traffic
937		from CLS in the HAN to the WAN only if
938		confidentiality-protected and integrity-protected and
939		if endpoints are authenticated.
940	O.SeparatelF	The TOE shall have physically separated ports for the LMN,
941		the HAN and the WAN and shall automatically detect during





942		its self	test whether connections (wired or wireless), if any,
943		are wro	ongly connected.
944		Applica	tion Note 3: O.SeparatelF refers to physical interfaces
945		and mu	ust not be fulfilled by a pure logical separation of one
946		physica	Il interface only.
947	O.Conceal	To prot	ect the privacy of its Consumers, the TOE shall conceal
948		the co	mmunication with external entities in the WAN in
949		order t	o ensure that no privacy-relevant information may be
950		obtaine	ed by analysing the frequency, load, size or the
951		absence	e of external communication. ²⁵
952	O.Meter	The TO	E receives or polls information about the consumption
953		or prod	luction of different commodities from one or multiple
954		Meters	and is responsible for handling this Meter Data.
955		This inc	cludes that:
956		٠	The TOE shall ensure that the communication to the
957			Meter(s) is established in an Gateway Administrator-
958			definable interval or an interval as defined by the
959			Meter,
960		•	the TOE shall enforce encryption and integrity
961			protection for the communication with the Meter ²⁶ ,
962		•	the TOE shall verify the integrity and authenticity of
963			the data received from a Meter before handling it
964			further,

²⁵ It should be noted that this requirement only applies to communication flows in the WAN.

²⁶ It is acknowledged that the implementation of a secure channel between the Meter and the Gateway is a security function of both units. The TOE as defined in this Security Target only has a limited possibility to secure this communication as both sides have to sign responsible for the quality of a cryptographic connection. However, it should be noted that the encryption of this channel only needs to protect against the Local Attacker possessing a basic attack potential and that the Meter utilises the services of its Security Module to negotiate the channel.





965		 the TOE shall process the data according to the
966		definition in the corresponding Processing Profile,
967		• the TOE shall encrypt the processed Meter Data for
968		the final recipient, sign the data and
969		 deliver the encrypted data to authorised external
970		entities as defined in the corresponding Processing
971		Profiles facilitating an encrypted channel,
972		 the TOE shall store processed Meter Data if an
973		external entity cannot be reached and re-try to send
974		the data until a configurable number of unsuccessful
975		retries has been reached,
976		the TOE shall pseudonymize the data for parties that
977		do not need the relation between the processed
978		Meter Data and the identity of the Consumer.
978 979	O.Crypt	Meter Data and the identity of the Consumer. The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows:
	O.Crypt	
979	O.Crypt	The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows:
979 980	O.Crypt	The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows:authentication, integrity protection and encryption of
979 980 981	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in
979 980 981 982	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in the WAN,
979 980 981 982 983	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in the WAN, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of
979 980 981 982 983 984	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in the WAN, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication to the Meter,
979 980 981 982 983 984 985	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in the WAN, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication to the Meter, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of
979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in the WAN, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication to the Meter, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication to the Consumer,
979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987	O.Crypt	 The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as follows: authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication and data to external entities in the WAN, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication to the Meter, authentication, integrity protection and encryption of the communication to the Consumer, replay detection for all communications with external

The encryption of the persistent memory shall support the protection of the TOE against local attacks.





991		In addition, the TOE shall generate the required keys utilising
992		the services of its Security Module ²⁸ , ensure that the keys are
993		only used for an acceptable amount of time and destroy
994		ephemeral ²⁹ keys if not longer needed. ³⁰
995	O.Time	The TOE shall provide reliable time stamps and update its
996		internal clock in regular intervals by retrieving reliable time
997		information from a dedicated reliable source in the WAN.
998	O.Protect	The TOE shall implement functionality to protect its security
999		functions against malfunctions and tampering.
1000		Specifically, the TOE shall
1001		 encrypt its TSF and user data as long as it is not in
1002		use,
1003		 overwrite any information that is no longer needed
1004		to ensure that it is not longer available via the
1005		external interfaces of the TOE ³¹ ,
1006		 monitor user data and the TOE firmware for integrity
1007		errors,
1008		• contain a test that detects whether the interfaces for
1009		WAN and LAN are separate,
1010		 have a fail-safe design that specifically ensures that
1011		no malfunction can impact the delivery of a
1012		commodity (e.g. energy, gas, heat or water) ³² ,

Please refer to chapter 1.4.7 for an overview on how the cryptographic functions are distributed between the TOE and its Security Module.

²⁹ This objective addresses the destruction of ephemeral keys only because all keys that need to be stored persistently are stored in the Security Module.

³⁰ Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this objective applies to.

³¹ Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this objective applies to.

³² Indeed this Security Target acknowledges that the Gateway and the Meters have no possibility at all to impact the delivery of a commodity. Even an intentional stop of the delivery of a certain commodity is not within the scope of this Security Target. It





 make any physical manipulation within the scope of
the intended environment detectable for the
Consumer and Gateway Administrator.
ent The TOE shall only provide authorised Gateway
Administrators with functions for the management of the
security features.
The TOE shall ensure that any change in the behaviour of the
security functions can only be achieved from the WAN side
interface. Any management activity from a local interface
may only be read only.
Further, the TOE shall implement a secure mechanism to
update the firmware of the TOE that ensures that only
authorised entities are able to provide updates for the TOE
and that only authentic and integrity protected updates are
applied.
The TOE shall maintain a set of log files as defined in [TR-
03109-1] as follows:
1. A system log of relevant events in order to allow an
authorised Gateway Administrator or an authorised
Service Technician to analyse the status of the TOE.
The TOE shall also analyse the system log
automatically for a cumulation of security relevant
events.
2. A consumer log that contains information about the
information flows that have been initiated to the
WAN and information about the Processing Profiles
causing this information flow as well as the billing-

should however be noted that such a functionality may be realised by a CLS that utilises the services of the TOE for its communication.





1040	relevant information and information about the
1041	system status (including relevant error messages).
1042	3. A calibration log that provides the Gateway
1043	Administrator with a possibility to review calibration
1044	relevant events.
1045	The TOE shall further limit access to the information in the
1046	different log files as follows:
1047	1. Access to the information in the system log shall only
1048	be allowed for an authorised Gateway Administrator
1049	via IF_GW_WAN or for an authorised Service
1050	Technician via IF_GW_SRV.
1051	2. Access to the information in the consumer log shall
1052	only be allowed for an authorised Consumer via the
1053	IF_GW_CON interface of the TOE and via a secured
1054	(i.e. confidentiality and integrity protected)
1055	connection. The Consumer shall only have access to
1056	their own information.
1057	3. Read-only access to the information in the calibration
1058	log shall only be allowed for an authorised Gateway
1059	Administrator via the WAN interface of the TOE.
1060	The system log may overwrite the oldest events in case that
1061	the audit trail gets full.
1062	For the consumer log, the TOE shall ensure that a sufficient
1063	amount of events is available (in order to allow a Consumer
1064	to verify an invoice) but may overwrite older events in case
1065	that the audit trail gets full.
1066	For the calibration log however, the TOE shall ensure the
1067	availability of all events over the lifetime of the TOE.





1068	O.Access	The TOE shall control the access of external entities in WAN,
1069		HAN or LMN to any information that is sent to, from or via
1070		the TOE via its external interfaces ³³ . Access control shall
1071		depend on the destination interface that is used to send that
1072		information.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

1074	OE.ExternalPrivacy	Authorised and authenticated external entities receiving any
1075		kind of private or billing-relevant data shall be trustworthy
1076		and shall not perform unauthorised analyses of these data
1077		with respect to the corresponding consumer(s).
1078	OE.TrustedAdmins	The Gateway Administrator and the Service Technician shall
1079		be trustworthy and well-trained.
1080	OE.PhysicalProtection	The TOE shall be installed in a non-public environment within
1081		the premises of the Consumer that provides a basic level of
1082		physical protection. This protection shall cover the TOE, the
1083		Meters that the TOE communicates with and the
1084		communication channel between the TOE and its Security
1085		Module. Only authorised individuals may physically access
1086		the TOE.
1087	OE.Profile	The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data
1088		shall be obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source only.
1089	OE.SM	The environment shall provide the services of a certified
1090		Security Module for
1091		• verification of digital signatures,

³³ While in classical access control mechanisms the Gateway Administrator gets complete access, the TOE also maintains a set of information (specifically the consumer log) to which Gateway Administrators have restricted access.





1092		 generation of digital signatures,
1093		key agreement,
1094		key transport,
1095		key storage,
1096		Random Number Generation.
1097		The Security Module used shall be certified according to
1098		[SecModPP] and shall be used in accordance with its relevant
1099		guidance documentation.
1100	OE.Update	The firmware updates for the Gateway that can be provided
1101		by an authorised external entity shall undergo a certification
1102		process according to this Security Target before they are
1103		issued to show that the update is implemented correctly. The
1104		external entity that is authorised to provide the update shall
1105		be trustworthy and ensure that no malware is introduced via
1106		a firmware update.
1106 1107	OE.Network	a firmware update. It shall be ensured that
	OE.Network	
1107	OE.Network	It shall be ensured that
1107 1108	OE.Network	It shall be ensured that • a WAN network connection with a sufficient
1107 1108 1109	OE.Network	It shall be ensured that • a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation
1107 1108 1109 1110	OE.Network	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available,
1107 1108 1109 1110 1111	OE.Network	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available, one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the
1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112	OE.Network	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available, one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the WAN,
1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113	OE.Network	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available, one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the WAN, the Gateway is the only communication gateway for
1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114	OE.Network	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available, one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the WAN, the Gateway is the only communication gateway for Meters in the LMN,
1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115	OE.Network	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available, one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the WAN, the Gateway is the only communication gateway for Meters in the LMN, if devices in the HAN have a separate connection to
1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116	OE.Network OE.Keygen	 It shall be ensured that a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual situation is available, one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the WAN, the Gateway is the only communication gateway for Meters in the LMN, if devices in the HAN have a separate connection to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this





1120	also be ensured that the keys are brought into the Gateway
1121	in a secure way by the Gateway Administrator.

1122 4.3 Security Objective Rationale

1123 **4.3.1 Overview**

1124 The following table gives an overview how the assumptions, threats, and organisational

security policies are addressed by the security objectives. The text of the following sectionsjustifies this more in detail.

	O.Firewall	O.SeparatelF	O.Conceal	0.Meter	O.Crypt	O.Time	O.Protect	O.Management	0.Log	O.Access	OE.SM	OE.ExternalPrivacy	OE.TrustedAdmins	OE.PhysicalProtection	OE.Profile	OE.Update	OE.Network	OE.Keygen
T.DataModificationLocal				х	Х		Х	Х					Х	Х				
T.DataModificationWAN	х				Х		Х	Х					Х					
T.TimeModification					Х	Х	Х	Х					Х	Х				
T.DisclosureWAN	х		х		Х		Х	Х					Х					
T.DisclosureLocal				х	Х		Х	Х					Х	х				
T.Infrastructure	х	х		х	Х		Х	Х					Х					
T.Residual Data							Х	Х					Х					
T.Resident Data	х				Х		Х	Х		Х			Х	Х				
T.Privacy	х		х	х	Х		Х	Х					Х		Х			
OSP.SM					Х		Х	Х			Х		Х					
OSP.Log							х	х	х	х			х					
A.ExternalPrivacy												х						
A.TrustedAdmins													х					
A.PhysicalProtection														Х				





A.ProcessProfile								х			
A.Update									Х		
A.Network										Х	
A.Keygen											Х

```
1127
```

Table 8: Rationale for Security Objectives

1128

1129 4.3.2 Countering the threats

The following sections provide more detailed information on how the threats are countered 1130 1131 by the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.

1132

1133 4.3.2.1 General objectives

1134 The security objectives **O.Protect**, **O.Management** and **OE.TrustedAdmins** contribute to counter each threat and contribute to each OSP. 1135

1136 **O.Management** is indispensable as it defines the requirements around the management of 1137 the Security Functions. Without a secure management no TOE can be secure. Also 1138 OE.TrustedAdmins contributes to this aspect as it provides the requirements on the 1139 availability of a trustworthy Gateway Administrator and Service Technician. O.Protect is present to ensure that all security functions are working as specified. 1140

1141 Those general objectives will not be addressed in detail in the following paragraphs.

- 1142
- 4.3.2.2 T.DataModificationLocal 1143

1144 The threat **T.DataModificationLocal** is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1145 O.Meter, O.Crypt, O.Log and OE.PhysicalProtection.

1146 **O.Meter** defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption of communication when receiving 1147 Meter Data from the Meter. **O.Crypt** defines the required cryptographic functionality. The





- objectives together ensure that the communication between the Meter and the TOE cannot
- be modified or released.
- 1150 **OE.PhysicalProtection** is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited.
- 1151 4.3.2.3 T.DataModificationWAN
- 1152The threat **T.DataModificationWAN** is countered by a combination of the security objectives1153**O.Firewall** and **O.Crypt**.
- 1154**O.Firewall** defines the connections for the devices within the LAN to external entities within1155the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to protect the devices of the LMN1156and HAN (as long as they use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the WAN side.1157**O.Crypt** defines the required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives together ensure1158that the data transmitted between the TOE and the WAN cannot be modified by a WAN1159attacker.
- 1160 **4.3.2.4 T.TimeModification**
- 1161 The threat **T.TimeModification** is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1162 **O.Time, O.Crypt** and **OE.PhysicalProtection**.
- 0.Time defines that the TOE needs a reliable time stamp mechanism that is also updated
 from reliable sources regularly in the WAN. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic
 functionality for the communication to external entities in the WAN. Therewith, O.Time and
 O.Crypt are the core objective to counter the threat T.TimeModification.
- **OE.PhysicalProtection** is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited.

1168 **4.3.2.5 T.DisclosureWAN**

1169 The threat **T.DisclosureWAN** is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1170 **O.Firewall**, **O.Conceal** and **O.Crypt**.





- 0.Firewall defines the connections for the devices within the LAN to external entities within
 the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to protect the devices of the LMN
 and HAN (as long as they use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the WAN side.
 0.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives together ensure
 that the communication between the Meter and the TOE cannot be disclosed.
 0.Conceal ensures that no information can be disclosed based on additional characteristics
- 1177 of the communication like frequency, load or the absence of a communication.
- 1178 **4.3.2.6 T.DisclosureLocal**
- 1179 The threat **T.DisclosureLocal** is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1180 **O.Meter**, **O.Crypt** and **OE.PhysicalProtection**.
- **O.Meter** defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption and integrity protection of
 communication when polling or receiving Meter Data from the Meter. **O.Crypt** defines the
 required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives together ensure that the
 communication between the Meter and the TOE cannot be disclosed.
- 1185 **OE.PhysicalProtection** is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited.

1186 **4.3.2.7 T.Infrastructure**

- 1187The threat **T.Infrastructure** is countered by a combination of the security objectives1188**O.Firewall, O.SeparatelF, O.Meter** and **O.Crypt**.
- 1189**O.Firewall** is the core objective that counters this threat. It ensures that all communication1190flows to the WAN are initiated by the TOE. The fact that the TOE does not offer any services1191to the WAN side and will not react to any requests (except the wake-up call) from the WAN is1192a significant aspect in countering this threat. Further the TOE will only communicate using1193encrypted channels to authenticated and trustworthy parties which mitigates the possibility1194that an attacker could try to hijack a communication.
- **0.Meter** defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption and integrity protection for thecommunication with the Meter.
- 1197 **O.SeparatelF** facilitates the disjunction of the WAN from the LMN.





0.Crypt supports the mitigation of this threat by providing the required cryptographicprimitives.

1200 **4.3.2.8 T.ResidualData**

1201 The threat **T.ResidualData** is mitigated by the security objective **O.Protect** as this security 1202 objective defines that the TOE shall delete information as soon as it is not longer used. 1203 Assuming that a TOE follows this requirement an attacker cannot read out any residual 1204 information as it does simply not exist.

1205 **4.3.2.9 T.ResidentData**

- 1206 The threat **T.ResidentData** is countered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Access**, 1207 **O.Firewall, O.Protect** and **O.Crypt**. Further, the environment (**OE.PhysicalProtection** and 1208 **OE.TrustedAdmins**) contributes to this.
- 1209 **O.Access** defines that the TOE shall control the access of users to information via the external1210 interfaces.
- 1211 The aspect of a local attacker with physical access to the TOE is covered by a combination of 1212 **O.Protect** (defining the detection of physical manipulation) and **O.Crypt** (requiring the 1213 encryption of persistently stored TSF and user data of the TOE). In addition, the physical 1214 protection provided by the environment (**OE.PhysicalProtection**) and the Gateway 1215 Administrator (**OE.TrustedAdmins**) who could realise a physical manipulation contribute to 1216 counter this threat.
- 1217 The aspect of a WAN attacker is covered by **O.Firewall** as this objective ensures that an 1218 adequate level of protection is realised against attacks from the WAN side.

1219 **4.3.2.10 T.Privacy**

1220 The threat **T.Privacy** is primarily addressed by the security objectives **O.Meter**, **O.Crypt** and 1221 **O.Firewall** as these objective ensures that the TOE will only distribute Meter Data to external 1222 parties in the WAN as defined in the corresponding Processing Profiles and that the data will





- be protected for the transfer. **OE.Profile** is present to ensure that the Processing Profiles areobtained from a trustworthy and reliable source only.
- 1225 Finally, **O.Conceal** ensures that an attacker cannot obtain the relevant information for this 1226 threat by observing external characteristics of the information flow.

1227 4.3.3 Coverage of organisational security policies

1228 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objectives 1229 for the environment and the TOE cover the organizational security policies.

1230 **4.3.3.1 OSP.SM**

1231 The Organizational Security Policy **OSP.SM** that mandates that the TOE utilises the services of 1232 a certified Security Module is directly addressed by the security objectives **OE.SM** and 1233 **O.Crypt**. The objective **OE.SM** addresses the functions that the Security Module shall be 1234 utilised for as defined in **OSP.SM** and also requires a certified Security Module. **O.Crypt** 1235 defines the cryptographic functionalities for the TOE itself. In this context, it has to be 1236 ensured that the Security Module is operated in accordance with its guidance 1237 documentation.

1238 **4.3.3.2 OSP.Log**

- 1239 The Organizational Security Policy **OSP.Log** that mandates that the TOE maintains an audit 1240 log is directly addressed by the security objective for the TOE **O.Log**.
- O.Access contributes to the implementation of the OSP as it defines that also Gateway
 Administrators are not allowed to read/modify all data. This is of specific importance to
 ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the log data as is required by the OSP.Log.

1244 **4.3.4 Coverage of assumptions**

1245 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objectives 1246 for the environment cover the assumptions.





1247 **4.3.4.1 A.ExternalPrivacy**

1248 The assumption **A.ExternalPrivacy** is directly and completely covered by the security 1249 objective **OE.ExternalPrivacy**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are 1250 drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

1251 4.3.4.2 A.TrustedAdmins

1252 The assumption **A.TrustedAdmins** is directly and completely covered by the security 1253 objective **OE.TrustedAdmins**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are 1254 drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

1255 **4.3.4.3 A.PhysicalProtection**

1256 The assumption **A.PhysicalProtection** is directly and completely covered by the security 1257 objective **OE.PhysicalProtection**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are 1258 drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

1259 4.3.4.4 A.ProcessProfile

1260 The assumption **A.ProcessProfile** is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1261 **OE.Profile**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that 1262 the correspondence is obvious.

1263 **4.3.4.5 A.Update**

1264 The assumption **A.Update** is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1265 **OE.Update**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that 1266 the correspondence is obvious.

1267 **4.3.4.6 A.Network**

1268 The assumption **A.Network** is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1269 **OE.Network**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1270 that the correspondence is obvious.





1271 4.3.4.7 A.Keygen

1272 The assumption A.Network is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1273 **OE.Network**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1274 that the correspondence is obvious.

Extended Component definition 5 1275

5.1 Communication concealing (FPR_CON) 1276

1277 The additional family Communication concealing (FPR_CON) of the Class FPR (Privacy) is defined here to describe the specific IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE 1278 1279 shall prevent attacks against Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of the Consumer that 1280 may be obtained by an attacker by observing the encrypted communication of the TOE with 1281 remote entities.

5.2 Family behaviour 1282

1283 This family defines requirements to mitigate attacks against communication channels in which an attacker tries to obtain privacy relevant information based on characteristics of an 1284 encrypted communication channel. Examples include but are not limited to an analysis of the 1285 1286 frequency of communication or the transmitted workload.

5.3 **Component levelling** 1287

1288

FPR_CON: Communication concealing

5.4 Management 1289

1290 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: 1291 a. Definition of the interval in FPR_CON.1.2 if definable within the operational phase of 1292 the TOE.

1





1293 **5.5 Audit**

1294 There are no auditable events foreseen.

1295 **5.6 Communication concealing (FPR_CON.1)**

1296 Hierarchical to: No other components.

1297 Dependencies: No dependencies.

- 1298FPR_CON.1.1The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow1299policy] in order to ensure that no personally identifiable1300information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis of1301[assignment: characteristics of the information flow that1302need to be concealed].
- 1303FPR_CON.1.2The TSF shall connect to [assignment: list of external1304entities] in intervals as follows [selection: weekly, daily,1305hourly, [assignment: other interval]] to conceal the data1306flow.





1307	6 Security Requirements
1308	6.1 Overview
1309	This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which have to
1310	be fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components from part 2 of
1311	[CC] and the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 from
1312	part 3 of [CC].
1313	The following notations are used:
1314	• Refinement operation (denoted by bold text): is used to add details to a
1315	requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. In case that a word has been
1316	deleted from the original text this refinement is indicated by crossed out bold text .
1317	• Selection operation (denoted by <u>underlined text</u>): is used to select one or more
1318	options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
1319	• Assignment operation (denoted by <i>italicised text</i>): is used to assign a specific value to
1320	an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password.
1321	• Iteration operation: are identified with a suffix in the name of the SFR (e.g.
1322	FDP_IFC.2/FW).
1323	It should be noted that the requirements in the following chapters are not necessarily be
1324	ordered alphabetically. Where useful the requirements have been grouped.

1325 The following table summarises all TOE security functional requirements of this ST:

Class FAU: Security Audit	
FAU_ARP.1/SYS	Security alarms for system log
FAU_GEN.1/SYS	Audit data generation for system log
FAU_SAA.1/SYS	Potential violation analysis for system log
FAU_SAR.1/SYS	Audit review for system log
FAU_STG.4/SYS	Prevention of audit data loss for the system log
FAU_GEN.1/CON	Audit data generation for consumer log
FAU_SAR.1/CON	Audit review for consumer log
FAU_STG.4/CON	Prevention of audit data loss for the consumer log
FAU_GEN.1/CAL	Audit data generation for calibration log
FAU_SAR.1/CAL	Audit review for calibration log
FAU_STG.4/CAL	Prevention of audit data loss for the calibration log





FAU_GEN.2	User identity association			
FAU STG.2	Guarantees of audit data availability			
Class FCO: Communication				
FCO NRO.2	Enforced proof of origin			
Class FCS: Cryptographic S				
FCS CKM.1/TLS	Cryptographic key generation for TLS			
FCS_COP.1/TLS	Cryptographic operation for TLS			
FCS_CKM.1/CMS	Cryptographic key generation for CMS			
FCS_COP.1/CMS	Cryptographic operation for CMS			
FCS_CKM.1/MTR	Cryptographic key generation for Meter communication encryption			
FCS_COP.1/MTR	Cryptographic operation for Meter communication encryption			
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction			
FCS COP.1/HASH	Cryptographic operation for Signatures			
FCS_COP.1/MEM	Cryptographic operation for TSF and user data encryption			
Class FDP: User Data Prote				
FDP_ACC.2	Complete Access Control			
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control			
 FDP_IFC.2/FW	Complete information flow control for firewall			
FDP_IFF.1/FW	Simple security attributes for Firewall			
FDP_IFC.2/MTR	Complete information flow control for Meter information flow			
FDP_IFF.1/MTR	Simple security attributes for Meter information			
FDP_RIP.2	Full residual information protection			
FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity monitoring and action			
Class FIA: Identification an	d Authentication			
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition			
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication failure handling			
FIA_UAU.2	User authentication before any action			
FIA_UAU.5	Multiple authentication mechanisms			
FIA_UAU.6	Re-Authenticating			
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action			
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding			
Class FMT: Security Manag				
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behaviour			
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions			
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles			
FMT_MSA.1/AC	Management of security attributes for Gateway access policy			
FMT_MSA.3/AC	Static attribute initialisation for Gateway access policy			
FMT_MSA.1/FW	Management of security attributes for Firewall policy			
FMT_MSA.3/FW	Static attribute initialisation for Firewall policy			
FMT_MSA.1/MTR	Management of security attributes for Meter policy			
FMT_MSA.3/MTR	Static attribute initialisation for Meter policy			





Class FPR: Privacy			
Communication Concealing			
Pseudonymity			
he TSF			
Failure with preservation of secure state			
Replay Detection			
Reliable time stamps			
TSF testing			
Passive detection of physical attack			
channels			
Inter-TSF trusted channel for WAN			
Inter-TSF trusted channel for Meter			
Inter-TSF trusted channel for User			

1326 Table 9: List of Security Functional Requirements

1327 6.2 Class FAU: Security Audit

1328 **6.2.1 Introduction**

1329The TOE compliant to this Security Target shall implement three different audit logs as1330defined in **OSP.Log** and **O.Log**. The following table provides an overview over the three audit1331logs before the following chapters introduce the SFRs related to those audit logs.

	System-Log	Consumer-Log	Calibration-Log
Purpose	 Inform the Gateway Administrator about security relevant events Log all events as defined by Common Criteria [CC] for the used SFR Log all system relevant events on specific functionality Automated alarms in case of a cumulation of certain events Inform the Service Technician about the status of the Gateway 	 Inform the Consumer about all information flows to the WAN Inform the Consumer about the Processing Profiles Inform the Consumer about other metering data (not billing-relevant) Inform the Consumer about all billing-relevant data needed to verify an invoice 	 Track changes that are relevant for the calibration of the TOE relevant data needed to verify an invoice





Data	•	As defined by CC part 2 Augmented by specific events for the security	•	Information about all information flows to the WAN Information about the	•	Calibration relevant data only
		functions	•	current and the previous Processing Profiles Non-billing-relevant Meter Data		
			•	Information about the system status (including relevant errors) Billing-relevant data needed to verify an invoice		
Access	•	Access by authorised Gateway Administrator and via IF_GW_WAN only	•	Read access by authorised Consumer and via IF_GW_CON only to the data related to the current	•	Read access by authorised Gateway Administrator and via IF_GW_WAN
	•	Events may only be deleted by an authorised Gateway Administrator via IF_GW_WAN		consumer		only
	•	Read access by authorised Service Technician via IF_GW_SRV only				
	•	Ring buffer. The availability of data has to be ensured for a sufficient amount of time	•	Ring buffer. The availability of data has to be ensured for a sufficient amount of time.	•	The availability of data has to be ensured over the lifetime of the TOE.
	•	Overwriting old events is possible if the memory is full.	•	Overwriting old events is possible if the memory is full Retention period is set by authorised Gateway Administrator on request by consumer, data older than		
				this are deleted.		

1332

Table 10: Overview over audit processes





1333 6.2.2 Security Requirements for the System Log

1334 6.2.2.1 Security audit automatic response (FAU_ARP)

1335 **6.2.2.1.1 FAU_ARP.1/SYS: Security Alarms for system log**

- 1336FAU_ARP.1.1/SYSThe TSF shall take inform an authorised Gateway Administrator and
create a log entry in the system log 34 upon detection of a potential
security violation.
- 1339 Hierarchical to: No other components
- 1340 Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
- 1341 6.2.2.2 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN)

1342 **6.2.2.2.1 FAU_GEN.1/SYS: Audit data generation for system log**

1343 1344 1345 1346 1347	FAU_GEN.1.1/SYS	 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the <u>basic</u>³⁵ level of audit; and c) other non privacy relevant auditable events: none ³⁶.
1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354	FAU_GEN.1.2/SYS	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST ³⁷ , other audit relevant information: none ³⁸ .
1355	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1356	Dependencies:	FPT_STM.1

^{34 [}assignment: list of actions]

^{35 [}selection, choose one of: *minimum, basic, detailed, not specified*]

^{36 [}assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]

^{37 [}refinement: *PP/ST*]

^{38 [}assignment: other audit relevant information]





1357	6.2.2.3 Security audit analysis (FAU_SAA)			
1358	6.2.2.3.1 FAU_SAA.1/SYS: Potential violation analysis for system log			
1359 1360 1361	FAU_SAA.1.1./SYS	The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.		
1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369	FAU_SAA.1.2/SYS	 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events: a) Accumulation or combination of Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions all auditable events for the basic level of audit all types of failures in the TSF as listed in FPT_FLS.1 ³⁹ known to indicate a potential security violation. b) any other rules: none ⁴⁰. 		
1370	Hierarchical to:	No other components		
1371	Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1		

- 6.2.2.4 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1372 6.2.2.4.1 FAU_SAR.1/SYS: Audit Review for system log 1373 FAU_SAR.1.1/SYS The TSF shall provide only authorised Gateway Administrators via the 1374 1375 IF_GW_WAN interface and authorised Service Technicians via the IF_GW_SRV interface ⁴¹ with the capability to read all information ⁴² 1376 from the system audit records ⁴³. 1377 FAU_SAR.1.2/SYS The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the 1378 1379 user to interpret the information. Hierarchical to: 1380 No other components 1381 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1
 - 39 [assignment: subset of defined auditable events]
 - 40 [assignment: *any other rules*]
 - 41 [assignment: *authorised users*]
 - 42 [assignment: list of audit information]
 - 43 [refinement: *audit records*]





1382	6.2.2.5 Security aud	6.2.2.5 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG)		
1383	6.2.2.5.1 FAU_STO	6.2.2.5.1 FAU_STG.4/SYS: Prevention of audit data loss for system log		
1384 1385 1386	FAU_STG.4.1/SYS	The TSF shall <u>overwrite the oldest stored audit records</u> ⁴⁴ and other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure: none ⁴⁵ if the system audit trail ⁴⁶ is full.		
1387	Hierarchical to:	FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss		
1388	Dependencies:	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage		
1389 1390	Application Note 4:	The size of the audit trail that is available before the oldest events get overwritten is configurable for the Gateway Administrator.		
1391	6.2.3 Security Re	quirements for the Consumer Log		
1392	6.2.3.1 Security aud	lit data generation (FAU_GEN)		
1393	6.2.3.1.1 FAU_GE	6.2.3.1.1 FAU_GEN.1/CON: Audit data generation for consumer log		
1394 1395 1396 1397 1398	FAU_GEN.1.1/CON	 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the <u>not specified⁴⁷ level of audit; and</u> c) all audit events as listed in Table 11 and additional events: none ⁴⁸. 		
1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405	FAU_GEN.1.2/CON	 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST⁴⁹, additional information as listed in Table 11 and additional events: none ⁵⁰. 		

⁴⁴ [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]

45 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]

^{46 [}refinement: *audit trail*]

^{47 [}selection, choose one of: *minimum*, *basic*, *detailed*, *not specified*]

^{48 [}assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]

^{49 [}refinement: PP/ST]

^{50 [}assignment: other audit relevant information]





1406 Hierarchical to: No other components

1407 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1

Event	Additional Information				
Any change to a Processing Profile	The new and the old Processing Profile				
Any submission of Meter Data to an external entity	The Processing Profile that lead to the submission				
	The submitted values				
Any submission of Meter Data that is not billing-	-				
relevant					
Billing-relevant data	-				
Any administrative action performed	-				
Relevant system status information including	-				
relevant errors					

1408

Table 11: Events for consumer log

1409	6.2.3.2 Security audit review (FAU_SAR)			
1410	6.2.3.2.1 FAU_SAR.1/CON: Audit Review for consumer log			
1411 1412 1413	FAU_SAR.1.1/CON	The TSF shall provide <i>only authorised Consumer via the IF_GW_CON interface</i> ⁵¹ with the capability to read <i>all information that are related to them</i> ⁵² from the consumer audit records ⁵³ .		
1414 1415	FAU_SAR.1.2/CON	The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.		
1416	Hierarchical to:	No other components		
1417	Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1		
1418 1419 1420	Application Note 5:	FAU_SAR.1.2/CON shall ensure that the Consumer is able to interpret the information that is provided to him in a way that allows him to verify the invoice.		

^{51 [}assignment: *authorised users*]

^{52 [}assignment: *list of audit information*]

^{53 [}refinement: *audit records*]





1421	6.2.3.3 Security aud	lit event storage (FAU_STG)	
1422	6.2.3.3.1 FAU_STG.4/CON: Prevention of audit data loss for the consumer log		
1423 1424 1425	FAU_STG.4.1/CON	The TSF shall <u>overwrite the oldest stored audit records</u> and <i>interrupt metrological operation in case that the oldest audit record must still be kept for billing verification</i> ⁵⁴ if the consumer audit trail is full.	
1426	Hierarchical to:	FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss	
1427	Dependencies:	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	
1428 1429	Application Note 6:	The size of the audit trail that is available before the oldest events get overwritten is configurable for the Gateway Administrator.	
1430	6.2.4 Security Re	quirements for the Calibration Log	
1431	6.2.4.1 Security aud	lit data generation (FAU_GEN)	
1432	6.2.4.1.1 FAU_GEN.1/CAL: Audit data generation for calibration log		
1433 1434 1435 1436 1437	FAU_GEN.1.1/CAL	 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the <u>not specified</u> ⁵⁵ level of audit; and c) all calibration-relevant information according to Table 12⁵⁶. 	
1438 1439 1440 1441 1442	FAU_GEN.1.2/CAL	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and	

- 56 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
- 57 [refinement: *PP/ST*]
- 58 [assignment: other audit relevant information]

⁵⁴ [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]

^{55 [}selection, choose one of: *minimum, basic, detailed, not specified*]





1445	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1446	Dependencies:	FPT_STM.1
1447 1448	Application Note 7:	The calibration log serves to fulfil national requirements in the context of the calibration of the TOE.

Event / Parameter	Content		
National calibration authority	National calibration authority or certification body identifier (in German ,Prüfstellenbezeichnung'), and year of calibration (,Eichjahr'), year number of CE sign, and all changes of these MUST be logged in calibration log.		
Commissioning	Commissioning of the SMGW MUST be logged in calibration log.		
Calibration, diagnosis-test	Cases of (re-)calibration, look-up, or diagnosis-test MUST be logged in calibration log.		
Event of self-test	Initiation of self-test MUST be logged in calibration log.		
New meter	Connection and registration of a new meter MUST be logged in calibration log.		
Meter removal	Removal of a meter from SMGW MUST be logged in calibration log.		
Change of tarification profiles	Every change (incl. parameter change) of a tarification profile according to [TR-03109-1, 4.4], provided the parameter is relevant for calibration regulations (see below) as well as new storage or removal of tarification profiles MUST be logged in calibration log.		
	Parameter relevant for calibration regulations are:		
	 Device-ID of a meter - Unique identifier of the meter, which send the input values for a TAF 		
	 OBIS value of the measured variable of the meter - Unique value for the measured variable of the meter for the used TAF 		
	Metering point name - Unique name of the metering point		
	Billing period - Period in which a billing should be doneConsumer ID		
	• Validity period - Period for which the TAF is booked		
	 Definition of tariff stages - Defines different tariff stages and associated OBIS values. Here it will be defined which tariff stage is valid at the time of rule set activation 		
	• Tariff switching time - Defines to the split second the switching of tariff stages. The time points can be defined as periodic values		
	 Register period - Time distance of two consecutive measured value acquisitions for meter readings 		





 calibration log according to 0 - no error 1 - Warning, no action to be done according to calibration authority, meter value valid 2 - Temporal error, send meter value will be marked as invalid, the value in meter field ('Messwertfeld') could be used according to the rules of [VDE4400] resp. [G865] as replacement value ('Ersatzwert') in backend. 3 - Temporal error, send meter value is invalid; the value in the meter field ('Messwertfeld') cannot be used as replacement value in backend. 4 - Fatal error (meter defect), actual send value is invalid and all future values will be invalid. 	F	
 Device-ID - Unique identifier of the meter according to DIN 43863-5 Key material - Public key for inner signature (dependent on the used meter in LMN) Register period - Interval during receipt of meter values Disploying interval ('Anzeigeintervall') - Interval during which the actual meter value (only during display) must be updated in case of bidirectional communication between meter and SMGW Balancing ('Saldierend') - Determines if the meter is balancing ('Saldierend') - Determines if the meter is balancing ('Saldierend') and meter values can grow and fall OBS values - OBIS values according to IEC-62056-6-1 resp. EN 13757-1 Converter foctor ('Wandlerfaktor') - Value is 1 in case of directly connected meter. In usage of converter counter (Wandlerzähler') the value may be different. Software update Every update of the code which touches calibration log. Firmware update Every firmware update (incl. operating system update if applicable) MUST be logged in calibration log. Firmware update Every firmware update (incl. operating system update if applicable) MUST be logged in calibration log. Firm messages of a meter All FATAL messages of a connected meter MUST be logged in calibration authority, meter value valid Temporal error, send meter value will be marked as invalid, the value in meter field ('Messwertfeld') could be used according to the rules of [VDE4400] resp. [G865] as replacement value ('Ersatzwert') in backend. Temporal error, send meter value is invalid; the value in the meter field ('Messwertfeld') cannot be used as replacement value in backend. Fatal error (meter defect), actual send value is invalid and all future values will be invalid. including the device-ID. 	Change of meter profiles	[TR-03109-1, 4.4], provided the parameter is relevant for calibration regulations (see below) as well as new storage or removal of meter
43863-5 • Key material - Public key for inner signature (dependent on the used meter in LMN) • Register period - Interval during receipt of meter values • Displaying interval ('Anzeigeintervall') - Interval during which the actual meter value (only during display) must be updated in case of bidirectional communication between meter and SMGW • Balancing ('Saldirerend') - Determines if the meter is balancing ('Saldirerend') - Determines if the meter is balancing ('Saldirerend') - Determines if the meter is balancing ('Saldirerend') - Value is 1 in case of directly connected meter. In usage of converter counter ('Wandlerzähler') the value may be different. Software update Every update of the code which touches calibration regulations (serialized COSEM-objects, rules) MUST be logged in calibration log. Firmware update Every firmware update (incl. operating system update if applicable) MUST be logged in calibration log. Error messages of a meter All FATAL messages of a connected meter MUST be logged in calibration log. 2 - Temporal error, send meter value will be marked as invalid, the value in meter field ('Messwertfeld') could be used according to the rules of VDE44000 resp. [G865] as replacement value ('Frsatzwert') in backend. 3 - Temporal error, send meter value is invalid; the value in the meter field ('Messwertfeld') cannot be used as replacement value in backend. 4 - Fatal error (meter defect), actual send value is invalid and all future values will be invalid. including the device-ID. <tr< td=""><td></td><td>Parameter relevant for legal metrology are:</td></tr<>		Parameter relevant for legal metrology are:
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Error messages of a SMGW All self-test and calibration regulations relevant errors MUST be logged in calibration log.		
logged in calibration log.		including the device-ID.
Table 12: Content of calibration log	Error messages of a SMGW	_
		Table 12: Content of calibration log





1450	6.2.4.2 Security audit	t review (FAU_SAR)
1451	6.2.4.2.1 FAU_SAR.	1/CAL: Audit Review for the calibration log
1452 1453 1454	FAU_SAR.1.1/CAL	The TSF shall provide only authorised Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface ⁵⁹ with the capability to read all information ⁶⁰ from the calibration audit records ⁶¹ .
1455 1456	FAU_SAR.1.2/CAL	The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
1457	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1458	Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1
1459	6.2.4.3 Security audit	t event storage (FAU_STG)

1460 **6.2.4.3.1 FAU_STG.4/CAL: Prevention of audit data loss for calibration log**

1461FAU_STG.4.1/CALThe TSF shall ignore audited events62 and stop the operation of the1462TOE and inform a Gateway Administrator63 if the calibration audit1463trail64 is full.

- 1464 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
- 1465 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
- 1466Application Note 8:As outlined in the introduction it has to be ensured that the events of1467the calibration log are available over the lifetime of the TOE.

59 [assignment: *authorised users*]

60 [assignment: list of audit information]

61 [refinement: *audit records*]

63 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]

64 [refinement: *audit trail*]

⁶² [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]





1468 **6.2.5 Security Requirements that apply to all logs**

1469 6.2.5.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN)

1470 **6.2.5.1.1 FAU_GEN.2: User identity association**

1471FAU_GEN.2.1For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF1472shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of1473the user that caused the event.

1474 Hierarchical to: No other components

- 1475
 Dependencies:
 FAU_GEN.1

 1476
 FIA_UID.1
- 1477Application Note 9:Please note that FAU_GEN.2 applies to all audit logs, the system log,1478the calibration log, and the consumer log.
- 1479 **6.2.5.2 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG)**

1480 **6.2.5.2.1 FAU_STG.2: Guarantees of audit data availability**

- 1481FAU_STG.2.1The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the all audit trails 651482from unauthorised deletion.
- 1483FAU_STG.2.2The TSF shall be able to prevent 66 unauthorised modifications to the1484stored audit records in **the all** audit trails 67.
- 1485FAU_STG.2.3The TSF shall ensure that all 68 stored audit records will be1486maintained when the following conditions occur: audit storage1487exhaustion or failure 69.

1488 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

1489 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1

1490Application Note 10:Please note that FAU_STG.2 applies to all audit logs, the system log,1491the calibration log, and the consumer log.

- 66 [selection, choose one of: *prevent, detect*]
- 67 [refinement: *audit trail*]
- 68 [assignment: metric for saving audit records]
- 69 [selection: *audit storage exhaustion, failure, attack*]

^{65 [}refinement: *audit trail*]





1492	6.3 Class FCO: C	ommunication		
1493	6.3.1 Non-repudi	ation of origin (FCO_NRO)		
1494	6.3.1.1 FCO_NRO.2:	3.1.1 FCO_NRO.2: Enforced proof of origin		
1495 1496	FCO_NRO.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted <i>Meter Data</i> ⁷⁰ at all times.		
1497 1498 1499	FCO_NRO.2.2	The TSF shall be able to relate the <i>key material used for signature</i> ^{71,72} of the originator of the information, and the <i>signature</i> ⁷³ of the information to which the evidence applies.		
1500 1501 1502	FCO_NRO.2.3	The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to <u>recipient, Consumer</u> ⁷⁴ given <i>limitations of the digital signature according to TR-03109-1</i> ⁷⁵ .		
1503	Hierarchical to:	FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin		
1504	Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification		
1505 1506 1507 1508 1509	Application Note 11:	FCO_NRO.2 requires that the TOE calculates a signature over Meter Data that is submitted to external entities. Therefore, the TOE has to create a hash value over the Data To Be Signed (DTBS) as defined in FCS_COP.1/HASH. The creation of the actual signature however is performed by the Security Module.		

- 73 [assignment: list of information fields]
- 74 [selection: originator, recipient, [assignment: list of third parties]]
- 75 [assignment: limitations on the evidence of origin]

^{70 [}assignment: *list of information types*]

^{71 [}assignment: *list of attributes*]

⁷² The key material here also represents the identity of the Gateway.





1510 **6.4 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support**

- 1511 6.4.1 Cryptographic support for TLS
- 1512 6.4.1.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM)

1513 **6.4.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/TLS: Cryptographic key generation for TLS**

1514	FCS_CKM.1.1/TLS	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
1515		specified cryptographic key generation algorithm TLS-PRF with SHA-
1516		256 or SHA-384 ⁷⁶ and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 256
1517		bit or 384 bit 77 that meet the following: [RFC 5246] in combination
1518		with [FIPS Pub. 180-4] and [RFC 2104] ⁷⁸ .
1519	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1520	Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
1521		FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by FCS_COP .1/TLS
1522		FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
1523	Application Note 12:	The Security Module is used for the generation of random numbers
1524		and for all cryptographic operations with the private key of a TLS
1525		certificate.

- 1526Application Note 13:The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and algorithms as1527described in [TR-03109-3].
- 1528 6.4.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP)

1529 **6.4.1.2.1 FCS_COP.1/TLS: Cryptographic operation for TLS**

FCS_COP.1.1/TLS 1530 The TSF shall perform TLS encryption, decryption, and integrity protection ⁷⁹ in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 1531 TLS cipher suites TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256, 1532 1533 TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 1534 and TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384⁸⁰ using elliptic 1535 1536 BrainpoolP256r1, BrainpoolP384r1, BrainpoolP512r1 curves

76 [assignment: key generation algorithm]

77 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

78 [assignment: list of standards]

79 [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]

80 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]





1537 1538 1539 1540 1541	Hierarchical to:	(according to [RFC 5639]), NIST P-256, and NIST P-384 (according to [RFC 5114]) and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit or 256 bit ⁸¹ that meet the following: [RFC 2104], [RFC 5114], [RFC 5246], [RFC 5289], [RFC 5639], [NIST 800-38A], and [NIST 800-38D] ⁸² . No other components.
1542 1543 1544 1545 1546	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
1547 1548	Application Note 14:	The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3].
1549	6.4.2 Cryptograph	nic support for CMS
1550	6.4.2.1 Cryptograph	ic key management (FCS_CKM)
1551	6.4.2.1.1 FCS_CKM	1.1/CMS: Cryptographic key generation for CMS
1552 1553 1554 1555	FCS_CKM.1.1/CMS	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <i>ECKA-EG</i> ⁸³ and specified cryptographic key sizes <i>128 bit</i> ⁸⁴ that meet the following: <i>[X9.63] in combination with [RFC 3565]</i> ⁸⁵ .
1556	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1557 1558 1559	Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/CMS FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
1560 1561 1562	Application Note 15:	The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for the generation of random numbers and for all cryptographic operations with the private asymmetric key of a CMS certificate.
1563 1564	Application Note 16:	The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3].

81 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

82 [assignment: list of standards]

83 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]

- 84 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 85 [assignment: *list of standards*]





1565	6.4.2.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP)			
1566	6.4.2.2.1 FCS_COP.1/CMS: Cryptographic operation for CMS			
1567 1568 1569 1570 1571	FCS_COP.1.1/CMS	The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption, decryption and integrity protection in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES-CBC-CMAC or AES-GCM ⁸⁶ and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit ⁸⁷ that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197], [NIST 800-38D], [RFC 4493], [RFC 5084], and [RFC 5652] in combination with [NIST 800-38A] ⁸⁸ .		
1572	Hierarchical to:	No other components.		
1573 1574 1575 1576 1577	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CMS FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction		
1578 1579	Application Note 17:	The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3].		
1580	6.4.3 Cryptograph	nic support for Meter communication encryption		
1581	6.4.3.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM)			
1582	6.4.3.1.1 FCS_CKM	1.1/MTR: Cryptographic key generation for Meter		
1583	communi	ication (symmetric encryption)		
1584 1585 1586 1587	FCS_CKM.1.1/MTR	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <i>AES-CMAC</i> ⁸⁹ and specified cryptographic key sizes <i>128 bit</i> ⁹⁰ that meet the following: <i>[FIPS Pub. 197], and [RFC 4493]</i> ⁹¹ .		
1588	Hierarchical to:	No other components.		
1589	Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or		

- 86 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
- 87 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 88 [assignment: *list of standards*]
- 89 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
- 90 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 91 [assignment: *list of standards*]





1590 1591		_	L Cryptographic operat I Cryptographic key des		CS_COP.:	1/MTR
1592 1593	Application Note 18:		ises only cryptograph n [TR-03109-3].	ic specifications	and algo	prithms as
1594	6.4.3.2 Cryptograph	ic operatior	n (FCS_COP)			
1595	6.4.3.2.1 FCS_COP	.1/MTR:	Cryptographic	operation	for	Meter
1596	communi	ication enc	ryption			
1597 1598 1599 1600 1601	FCS_COP.1.1/MTR	protection AES-CBC-C	hall perform <i>symmetr</i> ⁹² in accordance with MAC ⁹³ and cryptogra ing: [FIPS Pub. 197] an] ⁹⁵ .	a specified crypt phic key sizes 12	ographic 28 <i>bit</i> ⁹⁴	algorithm that meet
1602	Hierarchical to:	No other c	omponents.			
1603 1604 1605 1606 1607	Dependencies:	FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM. FCS_CKM.	Import of user data wi Import of user data wi 1 Cryptographic key ge 1/MTR I Cryptographic key des	th security attrib neration], fulfille	utes, or	or
1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615	Application Note 19:	communica 1. If 2. If A the pro FCS	lows different scenar ation encryption. Those a TLS encryption neration/negotiation is NES encryption is being e Gateway via a mana ocess for the Meter S_COP.1/MTR.	e are: n is being as defined by FC used, the key has gement function (see FMT_SMF	used, S_CKM.1, s been br during t .1) as d	the key /TLS. ought into he pairing efined by
1616 1617 1618 1619	Application Note 20:	communication use of a second	nection between the Me ation between the Me symmetric AES encryp ne Meter and the TOE	eter and the TOE ption. If a bidire	is secur ctional c	ed by the connection

92 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

93 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

94 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

95 [assignment: list of standards]





1620 1621 1622		secured by a TLS channel as described in chapter 6.4.1. As the TOE shall be interoperable with all kind of Meters, both kinds of encryption are implemented.
1623 1624	Application Note 21:	The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3].

1625 6.4.4 General Cryptographic support

1626 6.4.4.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM)

1627 **6.4.4.1.1 FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic key destruction**

1628 1629 1630	FCS_CKM.4.1	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <i>Zeroisation</i> ⁹⁶ that meets the following: <i>none</i> ⁹⁷ .
1631	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1632 1633 1634 1635	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/TLS and FCS_CKM.1/CMS and FCS_CKM.1/MTR
1636 1637 1638 1639	Application Note 22:	Please note that as against the requirement FDP_RIP.2, the mechanisms implementing the requirement from FCS_CKM.4 shall be suitable to avoid attackers with physical access to the TOE from accessing the keys after they are no longer used.

^{96 [}assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]

^{97 [}assignment: *list of standards*]





1640	6.4.4.2	Cryptographic operation (FCS_(COP)
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1641 **6.4.4.2.1 FCS_COP.1/HASH: Cryptographic operation, hashing for signatures**

1642 1643 1644 1645	FCS_COP.1.1/HASH	The TSF shall perform <i>hashing for signature creation and verification</i> ⁹⁸ in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512</i> ^{99, 100} and cryptographic key sizes <i>none</i> ¹⁰¹ that meet the following: [<i>FIPS Pub. 180-4</i>] ¹⁰² .
1646	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1647 1648 1649 1650	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation ¹⁰³] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
1651 1652 1653 1654	Application Note 23:	The TOE is only responsible for hashing of data in the context of digital signatures. The actual signature operation and the handling (i.e. protection) of the cryptographic keys in this context is performed by the Security Module.
1655 1656	Application Note 24:	The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3].

1657 **6.4.4.2.2 FCS_COP.1/MEM: Cryptographic operation, encryption of TSF and user**

1658	data	
1659 1660	FCS_COP.1.1/MEM	The TSF shall perform TSF and user data encryption and decryption 104 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES-XTS 105 and

104 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

^{98 [}assignment: list of cryptographic operations]

^{99 [}assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

¹⁰⁰ The cryptographic algorithm SHA-512 is included but not used in the TOE (it is reserved for future use)

^{101 [}assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

^{102 [}assignment: *list of standards*]

¹⁰³ The justification for the missing dependency FCS_CKM.1 can be found in chapter 6.12.1.3.

^{105 [}assignment: cryptographic algorithm]





1661 1662		cryptographic key sizes 128 bit 106 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197] and [NIST 800-38E] 107 .
1663	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1664 1665 1666 1667	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], not fulfilled s. Application Note 25 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
1668 1669	Application Note 25:	Please note that for the key generation process an external security module is used during TOE production.
1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675	Application Note 26:	The TOE encrypts its local TSF and user data while it is not in use (i.e. while stored in a persistent memory). It shall be noted that this kind of encryption cannot provide an absolute protection against physical manipulation and does not aim to. It however contributes to the security concept that considers the protection that is provided by the environment.

1676 6.5 Class FDP: User Data Protection

1677 **6.5.1 Introduction to the Security Functional Policies**

1678 The security functional requirements that are used in the following chapters implicitly define a set of 1679 Security Functional Policies (SFP). These policies are introduced in the following paragraphs in more 1680 detail to facilitate the understanding of the SFRs:

- The Gateway access SFP is an access control policy to control the access to objects under the
 control of the TOE. The details of this access control policy highly depend on the concrete
 application of the TOE. The access control policy is described in more detail in [TR-03109-1].
- The Firewall SFP implements an information flow policy to fulfil the objective O.Firewall. All
 requirements around the communication control that the TOE poses on communications
 between the different networks are defined in this policy.
- The Meter SFP implements an information flow policy to fulfil the objective O.Meter. It
 defines all requirements concerning how the TOE shall handle Meter Data.

^{106 [}assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

^{107 [}assignment: *list of standards*]





1689	6.5.2	Gateway	Access SFP

1690 6.5.2.1 Access control policy (FDP_ACC)

1691 **6.5.2.1.1 FDP_ACC.2: Complete access control**

1692 1693 1694 1695 1696	FDP_ACC.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Gateway access SFP</i> ¹⁰⁸ on <i>subjects: external entities in WAN, HAN and LMN</i> <i>objects: any information that is sent to, from or via the TOE and any</i> <i>information that is stored in the TOE</i> ¹⁰⁹ and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
1697 1698 1699	FDP_ACC.2.2	The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
1700	Hierarchical to:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
1701	Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

1702 **6.5.2.1.2 FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control**

1703 1704 1705 1706 1707	FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Gateway access SFP</i> ¹¹⁰ to objects based on the following: subjects: external entities on the WAN, HAN or LMN side objects: any information that is sent to, from or via the TOE attributes: destination interface ¹¹¹ .
1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716	FDP_ACF.1.2	 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: an authorised Consumer is only allowed to have read access to his own User Data via the interface IF_GW_CON, an authorised Service Technician is only allowed to have read access to the system log via the interface IF_GW_SRV, the Service Technician must not be allowed to read, modify or delete any other TSF data, an authorised Gateway Administrator is allowed to interact with the TOE only via IF_GW_WAN,

108 [assignment: access control SFP]

109 [assignment: *list of subjects and objects*]

^{110 [}assignment: access control SFP]

¹¹¹ [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]





1717 1718 1719 1720 1721		 only authorised Gateway Administrators are allowed to establish a wake-up call, additional rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects or none: none ¹¹². ¹¹³
1722 1723	FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none</i> ¹¹⁴ .
1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729	FDP_ACF.1.4	 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: the Gateway Administrator is not allowed to read consumption data or the Consumer Log, nobody must be allowed to read the symmetric keys used for encryption ¹¹⁵.
1730	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1731 1732	Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

1733 6.5.3 Firewall SFP

1734 **6.5.3.1** Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC)

1735 **6.5.3.1.1 FDP_IFC.2/FW: Complete information flow control for firewall**

1736 1737 1738 1739	FDP_IFC.2.1/FW	The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP ¹¹⁶ on the TOE, external entities on the WAN side, external entities on the LAN side and all information flowing between them ¹¹⁷ and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.
1740 1741 1742	FDP_IFC.2.2/FW	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

- ¹¹⁴ [assignment: *rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects*]
- 115 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
- 116 [assignment: *information flow control SFP*]
- 117 [assignment: *list of subjects and information*]

¹¹² [assignment: additional rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects or none]

¹¹³ [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]





- 1743 Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
- 1744 Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
- 1745 6.5.3.2 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF)

1746 **6.5.3.2.1 FDP_IFF.1/FW: Simple security attributes for Firewall**

1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753	FDP_IFF.1.1/FW	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Firewall SFP</i> ¹¹⁸ based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: subjects: The TOE and external entities on the WAN, HAN or LMN side information: any information that is sent to, from or via the TOE attributes: destination_interface (TOE, LMN, HAN or WAN), source_interface (TOE, LMN, HAN or WAN), destination_authenticated, source_authenticated ¹¹⁹ .
1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760	FDP_IFF.1.2/FW	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: (if source_interface=HAN or source_interface=TOE) and destination_interface=WAN and destination_authenticated = true Connection establishment is allowed
1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765		if source_interface=LMN and destination_interface= TOE and source_authenticated = true Connection establishment is allowed
1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770		if source_interface=TOE and destination_interface= LMN and destination_authenticated = true Connection establishment is allowed
1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775		if source_interface=HAN and destination_interface= TOE and source_authenticated = true Connection establishment is allowed
1776 1777 1778 1779		if source_interface=TOE and destination_interface= HAN and destination_authenticated = true Connection establishment is allowed

118 [assignment: *information flow control SFP*]

119 [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes]





1780 1781		else Connection establishment is denied ¹²⁰ .
1782 1783 1784	FDP_IFF.1.3/FW	The TSF shall enforce the establishment of a connection to a configured external entity in the WAN after having received a wake-up message on the WAN interface ¹²¹ .
1785 1786	FDP_IFF.1.4/FW	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: <i>none</i> ¹²² .
1787 1788	FDP_IFF.1.5/FW	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: <i>none</i> ¹²³ .
1789	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1790 1791	Dependencies:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
1792 1793 1794	Application Note 27:	It should be noted that the FDP_IFF.1.1/FW facilitates different interfaces of the origin and the destination of an information flow implicitly requires the TOE to implement physically separate ports for WAN, LMN and HAN.

¹²⁰ [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes]

^{121 [}assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules]

^{122 [}assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows]

^{123 [}assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows]





1795 **6.5.4 Meter SFP**

1796 **6.5.4.1 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC)**

1797 **6.5.4.1.1 FDP_IFC.2/MTR: Complete information flow control for Meter information**

1798 *flow*

1799 1800 1801 1802	FDP_IFC.2.1/MTR	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Meter SFP</i> ¹²⁴ on <i>the TOE, attached Meters, authorized External Entities in the WAN and all information flowing between them</i> ¹²⁵ and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.
1803 1804 1805	FDP_IFC.2.2/MTR	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
1806	Hierarchical to:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
1807	Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

1808 6.5.4.2 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF)

1809 **6.5.4.2.1 FDP_IFF.1/MTR: Simple security attributes for Meter information**

1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815	FDP_IFF.1.1/MTR	 The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP ¹²⁶ based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: subjects: TOE, external entities in WAN, Meters located in LMN information: any information that is sent via the TOE attributes: destination interface, source interface (LMN or WAN), Processing Profile ¹²⁷.
1816 1817 1818 1819	FDP_IFF.1.2/MTR	 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: an information flow shall only be initiated if allowed by a corresponding Processing Profile ¹²⁸.

^{124 [}assignment: *information flow control SFP*]

^{125 [}assignment: *list of subjects and information*]

^{126 [}assignment: *information flow control SFP*]

¹²⁷ [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes]

^{128 [}assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes]





1820	FDP_IFF.1.3/MTR	The TSF shall enforce the <i>following rules:</i>
1821		• Data received from Meters shall be processed as defined in the
1822		corresponding Processing Profiles,
1823		• Results of processing of Meter Data shall be submitted to external
1824		entities as defined in the Processing Profiles,
1825		 The internal system time shall be synchronised as follows:
1826		• The TOE shall compare the system time to a reliable external
1827		time source every 24 hours ¹²⁹ .
1828		• If the deviation between the local time and the remote time is
1829		acceptable ¹³⁰ , the local system time shall be updated
1830		according to the remote time.
1831		 If the deviation is not acceptable the TOE
1832		shall ensure that any following Meter Data is not used,
1833		stop operation ¹³¹ and
1834		inform a Gateway Administrator ¹³² .
1835 1836	FDP_IFF.1.4/MTR	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: <i>none</i> ¹³³ .
1837 1838 1839 1840	FDP_IFF.1.5/MTR	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: <i>The TOE shall deny any acceptance of information by external entities in the LMN unless the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the Meter Data could be verified</i> ¹³⁴ .
1841	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1842 1843	Dependencies:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
1844 1845 1846	Application Note 28:	FDP_IFF.1.3 defines that the TOE shall update the local system time regularly with reliable external time sources if the deviation is acceptable. In the context of this functionality two aspects should be mentioned:
1847		Reliability of external source
1848		There are several ways to achieve the reliability of the external source. On
1849		the one hand, there may be a source in the WAN that has an acceptable
1850		reliability on its own (e.g. because it is operated by a very trustworthy
1851		organisation (an official legal time issued by the calibration authority would

129 [assignment: synchronization interval between 1 minute and 24 hours]

130 Please refer to the following application note for a detailed definition of "acceptable".

131 Please note that this refers to the complete functional operation of the TOE and not only to the update of local time. However, an administrative access shall still be possible.

132 [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules]

133 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows]

134 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows]





1852 1853 1854 1855 1855		be a good example for such a source ¹³⁵)). On the other hand a developer may choose to maintain multiple external sources that all have a certain level of reliability but no absolute reliability. When using such sources the TOE shall contact more than one source and harmonize the results in order to ensure that no attack happened.
1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865		Acceptable deviation For the question whether a deviation between the time source(s) in the WAN and the local system time is still acceptable, normative or legislative regulations shall be considered. If no regulation exists, a maximum deviation of 3% of the measuring period is allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW]. It should be noted that depending on the kind of application a more accurate system time is needed. For doing so, the intervall for the comparison of the system time to a reliable external time source is configurable. But this aspect is not within the scope of this Security Target.
1866 1867		Please further note that – depending on the exactness of the local clock – it may be required to synchronize the time more often than every 24 hours.
1868 1869 1870	Application Note 29:	In FDP_IFF.1.5/MTR the TOE is required to verify the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the Meter Data received from the Meter. The TOE has two options to do so:
1871 1872 1873 1874 1875		 To implement a channel between the Meter and the TOE using the functionality as described in FCS_COP.1/TLS. To accept, decrypt and verify data that has been encrypted by the Meter as required in FCS_COP.1/MTR if a wireless connection to the meters is established.
1876 1877		The latter possibility can be used only if a wireless connection between the Meter and the TOE is established.

1878 **6.5.5 General Requirements on user data protection**

1879 6.5.5.1 Residual information protection (FDP_RIP)

1880 **6.5.5.1.1 FDP_RIP.2: Full residual information protection**

- 1881FDP_RIP.2.1The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is1882made unavailable upon the <u>deallocation of the resource from</u> ¹³⁶ all objects.
- 1883 Hierarchical to: FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

¹³⁵ By the time that this ST is developed however, this time source is not yet available.

^{136 [}selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]





Dependencies: No dependencies. 1884

1885 1886	Application Note 30:	Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this requirement applies to.
1887		Please further note that this SFR has been used in order to ensure that
1888		information that is no longer used is made unavailable from a logical
1889		perspective. Specifically, it has to be ensured that this information is not
1890		longer available via an external interface (even if an access control or
1891		information flow policy would fail). However, this does not necessarily mean
1892		that the information is overwritten in a way that makes it impossible for an
1893		attacker to get access to is assuming a physical access to the memory of the
1894		TOE.

1895 6.5.5.2 Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI)

6.5.5.2.1 FDP_SDI.2: Stored data integrity monitoring and action 1896

1897 1898 1899	FDP_SDI.2.1	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <i>integrity errors</i> ¹³⁷ on all objects, based on the following attributes: <i>cryptographical check sum</i> ¹³⁸ .
1900 1901	FDP_SDI.2.2	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall create a system log entry ¹³⁹ .
1902	Hierarchical to:	FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
1903	Dependencies:	No dependencies.

6.6 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication 1904

- 6.6.1 User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD) 1905
- 1906 6.6.1.1 FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition
- The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to 1907 FIA_ATD.1.1 1908 individual users: 1909
 - User Identity •
 - Status of Identity (Authenticated or not) •

1910

¹³⁷ [assignment: integrity errors]

¹³⁸ [assignment: user data attributes]

¹³⁹ [assignment: action to be taken]





1911 1912 1913		 Connecting network (WAN, HAN or LMN) Role membership none ¹⁴⁰.
1914	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1915	Dependencies:	No dependencies.

1916 **6.6.2 Authentication Failures (FIA_AFL)**

1917 6.6.2.1 FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure handling

1918 1919	FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when 5^{141} unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to <i>authentication attempts at IF_GW_CON</i> ¹⁴² .
1920 1921	FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been \underline{met}^{143} , the TSF shall <i>block IF_GW_CON for 5 minutes</i> ¹⁴⁴ .
1922	Hierarchical to:	No other components
1923	Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

1924 6.6.3 User Authentication (FIA_UAU)

1925 6.6.3.1 FIA_UAU.2: User authentication before any action

1926 1927	FIA_UAU.2.1	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
1928	Hierarchical to:	FIA_UAU.1
1929	Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
1930 1931	Application Note 31:	Please refer to [TR-03109-1] for a more detailed overview on the authentication of TOE users.

144 [assignment: *list of actions*]

^{140 [}assignment: *list of security attributes*]

¹⁴¹ [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]

^{142 [}assignment: *list of authentication events*]

^{143 [}selection: met, surpassed]





1932	6.6.3.2 FI	A_UAU.5: Multiple authentication mechanisms
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941	FIA_UAU.5.1	 The TSF shall provide authentication via certificates at the IF_GW_MTR interface TLS-authentication via certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface TLS-authentication via HAN-certificates at the IF_GW_CON interface authentication via password at the IF_GW_CON interface TLS-authentication via HAN-certificates at the IF_GW_SRV interface authentication at the IF_GW_CLS interface verification via a commands' signature ¹⁴⁵ to support user authentication.
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955	FIA_UAU.5.2	 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the meters shall be authenticated via certificates at the IF_GW_MTR interface only Gateway Administrators shall be authenticated via TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface only Consumers shall be authenticated via TLS-certificates or via password at the IF_GW_CON interface only Service Technicians shall be authenticated via TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_SRV interface only CLS shall be authenticated at the IF_GW_CLS only each command of an Gateway Administrator shall be authenticated by verification of the commands' signature, other external entities shall be authenticated via TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface only ¹⁴⁶.
1956	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1957	Dependencies:	No dependencies.
1958 1959	Application Note 3	32 : Please refer to [TR-03109-1] for a more detailed overview on the authentication of TOE users.

1960

6.6.3.3 FIA_UAU.6: Re-authenticating

1961FIA_UAU.6.1The TSF shall re-authenticate an external entity 147 under the conditions1962• TLS channel to the WAN shall be disconnected after 48 hours,

147 [refinement: the user]

^{145 [}assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]

^{146 [}assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]





1963 1964 1965 1966		 TLS channel to the LMN shall be disconnected after 5 MB of transmitted information, other local users shall be re-authenticated after at least 10 minutes¹⁴⁸ of inactivity ¹⁴⁹.
1967	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
1968	Dependencies:	No dependencies.
1969 1970 1971 1972	Application Note 33:	This requirement on re-authentication for external entities in the WAN and LMN is addressed by disconnecting the TLS channel even though a re-authentication is - strictly speaking - only achieved if the TLS channel is build up again.

1973 6.6.4 User identification (FIA_UID)

1974 6.6.4.1 FIA_UID.2: User identification before any action

1975FIA_UID.2.1The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing1976any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

- 1977Hierarchical to:FIA_UID.1
- 1978 Dependencies: No dependencies.
- 1979 6.6.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB)

1980 6.6.5.1 FIA_USB.1: User-subject binding

1981 1982	FIA_USB.1.1	The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: <i>attributes as defined in FIA_ATD.1</i> ¹⁵⁰ .
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990	FIA_USB.1.2	 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: The initial value of the security attribute 'connecting network' is set to the corresponding physical interface of the TOE (HAN, WAN, or LMN). The initial value of the security attribute 'role membership' is set to the user role claimed on basis of the credentials used for authentication at the connecting network as defined in FIA_UAU.5.2. For role membership 'Gateway Administrators', additionally the

¹⁴⁸ [refinement: *after at least 10 minutes*]. This value is configurable by the authorised Gateway Administrator.

^{149 [}assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]

^{150 [}assignment: *list of user security attributes*]





1991 1992		remote network endpoint ¹⁵¹ used and configured in the TSF data must be identical.
1993		• The initial value of the security attribute 'user identity' is set to the
1994		identification attribute of the credentials used by the subject. The
1995		security attribute 'user identity' is set to the subject key ID of the
1996		certificate in case of a certificate-based authentication, the meter-ID
1997		for wired Meters and the user name owner in case of a password-
1998		based authentication at interface IF_GW_CON.
1999		• The initial value of the security attribute 'status of identity' is set to
2000		the authentication status of the claimed identity. If the authentication
2001		is successful on basis of the used credentials, the status of identity is
2002		'authenticated', otherwise it is 'not authenticated' ¹⁵² .
2003	FIA USB.1.3	The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
2004	_	security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
2005		 security attribute 'connecting network' is not changeable.
2006		 security attribute 'role membership' is not changeable.
2007		 security attribute 'user identity' is not changeable.
2008		• security attribute 'status of identity' is not changeable ¹⁵³ .
2009	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2010	Dependencies:	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

¹⁵¹ The remote network endpoint can be either the remote IP address or the remote host name.

^{152 [}assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]

^{153 [}assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]





2011 6.7 Class FMT: Security Management

2012 6.7.1 Management of the TSF

2013 6.7.1.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF)

2014 **6.7.1.1.1 FMT_MOF.1: Management of security functions behaviour**

2015 2016 2017	FMT_MOF.1.1	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>modify the behaviour of</u> ¹⁵⁴ the functions <i>for management as defined in FMT_SMF.1</i> ¹⁵⁵ to <i>roles and criteria as defined in Table 13</i> ¹⁵⁶ .
2018	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2019 2020	Dependencies:	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Limitation
The management functions must only be accessible for an
authorised Consumer and only via the interface IF_GW_CON. An
authorized Service Technician is also able to access the version
numer of the TOE and the current time of the TOE via interface
IF_GW_SRV ¹⁵⁷ .
The management functions must only be accessible for an
authorised Gateway Administrator and only via the interface
IF_GW_WAN ¹⁵⁸ .
The firmware update must only be possible after the authenticity
of the firmware update has been verified (using the services of the
Security Module and the trust anchor of the Gateway developer)
and if the version number of the new firmware is higher to the
version of the installed firmware.
A deletion or modification of events from the calibration log must
not be possible.

2021

Table 13: Restrictions on Management Functions

^{154 [}selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]

^{155 [}assignment: *list of functions*]

^{156 [}assignment: the authorised identified roles]

¹⁵⁷ The TOE displays the version number of the TOE and the current time of the TOE also to the authorized service technician via the interface IF_GW_SRV because the service technician must be able to determine if the current time of the TOE is correct or if the version number of the TOE is correct.

¹⁵⁸ This criterion applies to all management functions. The following entries in this table only augment this restriction further.





2022 6.7.1.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF)

2023 **6.7.1.2.1 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions**

- 2024FMT_SMF.1.1The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:2025list of management functions as defined in Table 14 and Table 15 and2026additional functionalities: none 159.
- 2027 Hierarchical to: No other components.
- 2028 Dependencies: No dependencies.

SFR	Management functionality
FAU_ARP.1/SYS	The management (addition, removal, or modification) of actions 160
FAU_GEN.1/SYS	-
FAU_GEN.1/CON	
FAU_GEN.1/CAL	
FAU_SAA.1/SYS	 Maintenance of the rules by (adding, modifying, deletion) of rules from
	the set of rules 160
FAU_SAR.1/SYS	_ 161
FAU_SAR.1/CON	
FAU_SAR.1/CAL	
FAU_STG.4/SYS	 Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken
FAU_STG.4/CON	in case of audit storage failure 160
	• Size configuration of the audit trail that is available before the oldest
	events get overwritten 160
FAU_STG.4/CAL	_ 162
FAU_GEN.2	-
FAU_STG.2	• Maintenance of the parameters that control the audit storage capability
	for the consumer log and the system log ¹⁶⁰
FCO_NRO.2	 The management of changes to information types, fields, ¹⁶⁰ originator attributes and recipients of evidence
FCS_CKM.1/TLS	-
FCS_COP.1/TLS	 Management of key material including key material stored in the Security Module
FCS_CKM.1/CMS	-

¹⁵⁹ [assignment: *list of management functions to be provided by the TSF*]

As the rules for audit review are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.

¹⁶⁰ The TOE does not have the indicated management ability since there exist no standard method calls for the Gateway Administrator to enforce such management ability.

¹⁶² As the actions that shall be performed if the audit trail is full are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.





FCS_COP.1/CMS	A Management of key material including key material stared in the
	 Management of key material including key material stored in the Security Module
FCS_CKM.1/MTR	-
FCS_COP.1/MTR	 Management of key material stored in the Security Module and key material brought into the gateway during the pairing process
FCS_CKM.4	-
FCS_COP.1/HASH	-
FCS_COP.1/MEM	Management of key material
FDP_ACC.2	-
FDP_ACF.1	-
FDP_IFC.2/FW	-
FDP_IFF.1/FW	 Managing the attributes used to make explicit access based decisions Add authorised units for communication (pairing) Management of endpoint to be contacted after successful wake-up call Management of CLS systems
FDP IFC.2/MTR	-
FDP_IFF.1/MTR	 Managing the attributes (including Processing Profiles) used to make explicit access based decisions
FDP_RIP.2	-
FDP_SDI.2	The actions to be taken upon the detection of an integrity error shall be configurable. ¹⁶⁰
FIA_ATD.1	• If so indicated in the assignment, the authorised Gateway Administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users ¹⁶³ .
FIA_AFL.1	 Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication attempts ¹⁶⁰ Management of actions to be taken in the event of an authentication
	failure 160
FIA_UAU.2	Management of the authentication data by an Gateway Administrator
FIA_UAU.5	_ 164
FIA_UAU.6	Management of re-authentication time
FIA_UID.2	The management of the user identities
	· · ·

¹⁶³ In the assignment it is not indicated that the authorized Gateway Administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users.

As the rules for re-authentication are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.





FIA_USB.1	 An authorised Gateway Administrator can define default subject security attributes, if so indicated in the assignment of FIA_ATD.1.¹⁶⁰ An authorised Gateway Administrator can change subject security attributes, if so indicated in the assignment of FIA_ATD.1.¹⁶⁰
FMT_MOF.1	 Managing the group of roles that can interact with the functions in the TSF
FMT_SMF.1	-
FMT_SMR.1	 Managing the group of users that are part of a role
FMT_MSA.1/AC	 Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values ¹⁶⁵-¹⁶⁰
FMT_MSA.3/AC	_ 166
FMT_MSA.1/FW	Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values ¹⁶⁷ - ¹⁶⁰
FMT_MSA.3/FW	_ 168
FMT_MSA.1/MTR	 Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values ¹⁶⁹-¹⁶⁰
FMT_MSA.3/MTR	_ 170
FPR_CON.1	 Definition of the interval in FPR_CON.1.2 if definable within the operational phase of the TOE ¹⁶⁰
FPR_PSE.1	-
FPT_FLS.1	-
FPT_RPL.1	-
FPT_STM.1	Management a time source

¹⁶⁵ As the role that can interact with the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply.

As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.

¹⁶⁷ As the role that can read, modify, delete or add the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply.

¹⁶⁸ As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.

¹⁶⁹ As the role that can read, modify, delete or add the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply.

¹⁷⁰ As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.





FPT_TST.1	_ 171
FPT_PHP.1	 Management of the user or role that determines whether physical
	tampering has occurred 160
FTP_ITC.1/WAN	_ 172
FTP_ITC.1/MTR	_ 173
FTP_ITC.1/USR	_ 174

2029

Table 14: SFR related Management Functionalities

Gateway specific Management functionality
Pairing of a Meter
Performing a firmware update
Displaying the current version number of the TOE
Displaying the current time
Management of certificates of external entities in the WAN for communication
Resetting of the TOE ¹⁷⁵

2030

Table 15: Gateway specific Management Functionalities

2031 6.7.2 Security management roles (FMT_SMR)

2032 6.7.2.1 FMT_SMR.1: Security roles

2033 2034 2035	FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles <i>authorised Consumer, authorised Gateway</i> Administrator, authorised Service Technician, the authorised identified roles: <i>authorised external entity, CLS, and Meter</i> ¹⁷⁶ .
2036	FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
2037	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2038	Dependencies:	No dependencies.

As the rules for TSF testing are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply.

As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply.

As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply.

As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply.

¹⁷⁵ Resetting the TOE will be necessary when the TOE stopped operation due to a critical deviation between local and remote time (see FDP_IFF.1.3/MTR)or when the calibration log is full.

^{176 [}assignment: the authorised identified roles]





2039	6.7.3	Management of security	y attributes for Gateway	y access SFP
2039	0.7.5	wanagement of security	allinules for Galewa	у ассезо ог

- 2040 6.7.3.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA)
- 2041 **6.7.3.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/AC: Management of security attributes for Gateway access**
- 2042 **SFP**

2043 2044 2045	FMT_MSA.1.1/AC	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Gateway access SFP</i> ¹⁷⁷ to restrict the ability to <u>query, modify, delete, other operations: none</u> ¹⁷⁸ the security attributes <i>all</i> relevant security attributes ¹⁷⁹ to authorised Gateway Administrators ¹⁸⁰ .
2046	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2047 2048 2049 2050	Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by FDP_ACC.2 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

2051 6.7.3.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/AC: Static attribute initialisation for Gateway access SFP

2052 2053	FMT_MSA.3.1/AC	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Gateway access SFP</i> ¹⁸¹ to provide restrictive ¹⁸² default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
2054 2055	FMT_MSA.3.2/AC	The TSF shall allow the <i>no role</i> ¹⁸³ to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
2056	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2057 2058	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

- 178 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
- 179 [assignment: *list of security attributes*]
- 180 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
- 181 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- 182 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- 183 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]

^{177 [}assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]





2059 6.7.4 Management of security attributes for Firewall SFP

2060 6.7.4.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA)

2061 6.7.4.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/FW: Management of security attributes for firewall policy

2062 2063 2064	FMT_MSA.1.1/FW	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Firewall SFP</i> ¹⁸⁴ to restrict the ability to <u>query</u> , <u>modify</u> , <u>delete</u> , <u>other operations: none</u> ¹⁸⁵ the security attributes all relevant security attributes ¹⁸⁶ to authorised Gateway Administrators ¹⁸⁷ .
2065	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2066 2067 2068 2069	Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by FDP_IFC.2/FW FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

2070 6.7.4.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/FW: Static attribute initialisation for Firewall policy

2071 2072	FMT_MSA.3.1/FW	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Firewall SFP</i> ¹⁸⁸ to provide <u>restrictive</u> ¹⁸⁹ default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
2073 2074	FMT_MSA.3.2/FW	The TSF shall allow the <i>no role</i> ¹⁹⁰ to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
2075	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2076 2077	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
2078 2079 2080 2081	Application Note 34:	The definition of restrictive default rules for the firewall information flow policy refers to the rules as defined in FDP_IFF.1.2/FW and FDP_IFF.1.5/FW. Those rules apply to all information flows and must not be overwritable by anybody.

- 185 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
- 186 [assignment: *list of security attributes*]
- 187 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
- 188 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- 189 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- 190 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]

^{184 [}assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]





2082 6.7.5 Management of security attributes for Meter SFP

2083 6.7.5.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA)

2084 **6.7.5.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/MTR: Management of security attributes for Meter policy**

The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP¹⁹¹ to restrict the ability to 2085 FMT_MSA.1.1/MTR 2086 change_default, query, modify, delete, other operations: none ¹⁹² the security attributes all relevant security attributes ¹⁹³ to authorised Gateway 2087 Administrators ¹⁹⁴. 2088 Hierarchical to: 2089 No other components. 2090 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by FDP IFC.2/FW 2091 2092 FMT SMR.1 Security roles FMT SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2093

2094 **6.7.5.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/MTR: Static attribute initialisation for Meter policy**

2095 2096	FMT_MSA.3.1/MTR	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Meter SFP</i> ¹⁹⁵ to provide <u>restrictive</u> ¹⁹⁶ default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
2097 2098	FMT_MSA.3.2/MTR	The TSF shall allow the <i>no role</i> ¹⁹⁷ to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
2099	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2100 2101	Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

^{191 [}assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]

^{192 [}selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]

^{193 [}assignment: list of security attributes]

^{194 [}assignment: the authorised identified roles]

^{195 [}assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]

^{196 [}selection, choose one of: *restrictive*, *permissive*, [assignment: other property]]

^{197 [}assignment: the authorised identified roles]





2102 **6.8 Class FPR: Privacy**

2103 6.8.1 Communication Concealing (FPR_CON)

2104 6.8.1.1 FPR_CON.1: Communication Concealing

- 2105FPR_CON.1.1The TSF shall enforce the *Firewall SFP* ¹⁹⁸ in order to ensure that no2106personally identifiable information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis of2107*frequency, load, size or the absence of external communication* ¹⁹⁹.
- 2108FPR_CON.1.2The TSF shall connect to the Gateway Administrator, authorized External2109Entity in the WAN 200 in intervals as follows daily, other interval: none 201 to2110conceal the data flow202.
- 2111 Hierarchical to: No other components.
- 2112 Dependencies: No dependencies.

2113 6.8.2 Pseudonymity (FPR_PSE)

2114 6.8.2.1 FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity

2115 2116 2117	FPR_PSE.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that <i>external entities in the WAN</i> ²⁰³ are unable to determine the real user name bound to <i>information neither relevant for billing nor for a secure operation of the Grid sent to parties in the WAN</i> ²⁰⁴ .
2118 2119 2120	FPR_PSE.1.2	The TSF shall be able to provide <i>aliases as defined by the Processing Profiles</i> ²⁰⁵ of the real user name for the Meter and Gateway identity ²⁰⁶ to <i>external entities in the WAN</i> ²⁰⁷ .
2121 2122	FPR_PSE.1.3	The TSF shall <u>determine an alias for a user ²⁰⁸ and verify that it conforms to</u> the <i>alias given by the Gateway Administrator in the Processing Profile</i> ²⁰⁹ .

^{198 [}assignment: *information flow policy*]

- 201 [selection: weekly, daily, hourly, [assignment: other interval]]
- The TOE uses a randomized value of about ±50 percent per delivery.
- 203 [assignment: set of users and/or subjects]
- 204 [assignment: *list of subjects and/or operations and/or objects*]
- 205 [assignment: number of aliases]
- 206 [refinement: of the real user name]
- 207 [assignment: list of subjects]

208 [selection, choose one of: *determine an alias for a user, accept the alias from the user*]

^{199 [}assignment: characteristics of the information flow that need to be concealed]

^{200 [}assignment: list of external entities]





2123	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2123		No other components.

- 2124 Dependencies: No dependencies.
- 2125Application Note 35:When the TOE submits information about the consumption or production of
a certain commodity that is not relevant for the billing process nor for a
secure operation of the Grid, there is no need that this information is sent
with a direct link to the identity of the consumer. In those cases, the TOE
shall replace the identity of the Consumer by a pseudonymous identifier.
Please note that the identity of the Consumer may not be their name but
could also be a number (e.g. consumer ID) used for billing purposes.
- 2132 A Gateway may use more than one pseudonymous identifier.
- 2133A complete anonymisation would be beneficial in terms of the privacy of the2134consumer. However, a complete anonymous set of information would not2135allow the external entity to ensure that the data comes from a trustworthy2136source.
- 2137Please note that an information flow shall only be initiated if allowed by a2138corresponding Processing Profile.
- 2139 6.9 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

2140 6.9.1 Fail secure (FPT_FLS)

2141 6.9.1.1 FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state

2142 FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures 2143 occur: 2144 the deviation between local system time of the TOE and the reliable • 2145 external time source is too large, 2146 TOE hardware / firmware integrity violation or TOE software application integrity violation ²¹⁰. 2147 Hierarchical to: 2148 No other components. Dependencies: 2149 No dependencies. Application Note 36: The local clock shall be as exact as required by normative or legislative 2150 2151 regulations. If no regulation exists, a maximum deviation of 3% of the 2152 measuring period is allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW].

^{209 [}assignment: alias metric]

^{210 [}assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]





2153	6.9.2	Replay	Detection	(FPT	RPL)	
2100	0.5.2	epia,	Detettion	····-	/	

- 21546.9.2.1FPT_RPL.1: Replay detection2155FPT_RPL.1.1The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: all external entities ²¹¹.2156FPT_RPL.1.2The TSF shall perform ignore replayed data ²¹² when replay is detected.2157Hierarchical to:No other components.
- 2158 Dependencies: No dependencies.

2159	6.9.3	Time stamps	(FPT	STM)	
2139	0.9.3	rine stamps	(_31101	1

6.9.3.1 FPT_S	TM.1: Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
6.9.4 TSF self test	(FPT_TST)
6.9.4.1 FPT_T	ST.1: TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests <u>during initial startup</u> , at the request of a <u>user and periodically during normal operation</u> 213 to demonstrate the correct operation of <u>the TSF</u> 214 .
FPT_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>TSF data</u> 215 .
FPT_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of $\underline{\rm TSF}^{216}.$
Hierarchical to:	No other components .
	FPT_STM.1.1 Hierarchical to: Dependencies: 6.9.4 TSF self test 6.9.4.1 FPT_T FPT_TST.1.1 FPT_TST.1.2 FPT_TST.1.3

- 211 [assignment: *list of identified entities*]
- 212 [assignment: list of specific actions]
- ²¹³ [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
- 214 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
- 215 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
- 216 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]





2176 Dependencies: No dependencies.

2177 6.9.5 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP)

2178 **6.9.5.1 FPT_PHP.1: Passive detection of physical attack**

- 2179FPT_PHP.1.1The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that2180might compromise the TSF.
- 2181FPT_PHP.1.2The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering2182with the TSF's devices or TSF elements has occurred.
- 2183 Hierarchical to: No other components.
- 2184 Dependencies: No dependencies.

2185 **6.10 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels**

2186 **6.10.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC)**

2187 6.10.1.1 FTP_ITC.1/WAN: Inter-TSF trusted channel for WAN

2188 F ⁻ 2189 2190 2191		The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
2192 F 2193		The TSF shall permit the TSF 217 to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
2194 F ⁻ 2195	—	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for <i>all</i> communications to external entities in the WAN ²¹⁸ .
2196 H	lierarchical to:	No other components

2197 Dependencies: No dependencies.

2198 **6.10.1.2 FTP_ITC.1/MTR: Inter-TSF trusted channel for Meter**

2199FTP_ITC.1.1/MTRThe TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another2200trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication

^{217 [}selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]

^{218 [}assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]





2201 2202		channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
2203 2204	FTP_ITC.1.2/MTR	The TSF shall permit the Meter and the TOE ²¹⁹ to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
2205 2206	FTP_ITC.1.3/MTR	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for <i>any</i> communication between a Meter and the TOE ²²⁰ .
2207	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2208	Dependencies:	No dependencies.
2209	Application Note 37:	The corresponding cryptographic primitives are defined by FCS_COP.1/MTR.

2210 6.10.1.3 FTP_ITC.1/USR: Inter-TSF trusted channel for User

2211 2212 2213 2214	FTP_ITC.1.1/USR	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
2215 2216	FTP_ITC.1.2/USR	The TSF shall permit the Consumer, the Service Technician ²²¹ to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
2217 2218 2219	FTP_ITC.1.3/USR	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for <i>any communication between a Consumer and the TOE and the Service Technician and the TOE</i> ²²² .
2220	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
2221	Dependencies:	No dependencies.

6.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

- 2223 The minimum Evaluation Assurance Level for this Security Target is EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
- and ALC_FLR.2. The following table lists the assurance components which are therefore applicable to
- 2225 this ST.

^{219 [}selection: *the TSF, another trusted IT product*]

^{220 [}assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]

^{221 [}selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]

[[]assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]





Assurance Class	Assurance Component
Development	ADV_ARC.1
	ADV_FSP.4
	ADV_IMP.1
	ADV_TDS.3
Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1
	AGD_PRE.1
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4
	ALC_CMS.4
	ALC_DEL.1
	ALC_DVS.1
	ALC_LCD.1
	ALC_TAT.1
	ALC_FLR.2
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1
	ASE_ECD.1
	ASE_INT.1
	ASE_OBJ.2
	ASE_REQ.2
	ASE_SPD.1
	ASE_TSS.1
Tests	ATE_COV.2
	ATE_DPT.1
	ATE_FUN.1
	ATE_IND.2
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA VAN.5

2226 Table 16: Assurance Requirements

2227 6.12 Security Requirements rationale

2228 **6.12.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale**

2229 6.12.1.1 Fulfilment of the Security Objectives

- 2230 This chapter proves that the set of security requirements (TOE) is suited to fulfil the security
- 2231 objectives described in chapter 4 and that each SFR can be traced back to the security objectives. At
- least one security objective exists for each security requirement.





	O.Firewall	O.SeparatelF	0.Conceal	O.Meter	O.Crypt	O.Time	O.Protect	O.Management	0.Log	O.Access
FAU_ARP.1/SYS									Х	
FAU_GEN.1/SYS									Х	
FAU_SAA.1/SYS									Х	
FAU_SAR.1/SYS									х	
FAU_STG.4/SYS									Х	
FAU_GEN.1/CON									Х	
FAU_SAR.1/CON									Х	
FAU_STG.4/CON									Х	
FAU_GEN.1/CAL									Х	
FAU_SAR.1/CAL									х	
FAU_STG.4/CAL									Х	
FAU_GEN.2									Х	
FAU_STG.2									Х	
FCO_NRO.2				Х						
FCS_CKM.1/TLS					Х					
FCS_COP.1/TLS					Х					
FCS_CKM.1/CMS					Х					
FCS_COP.1/CMS					Х					
FCS_CKM.1/MTR					Х					
FCS_COP.1/MTR					Х					
FCS_CKM.4					Х					
FCS_COP.1/HASH					Х					
FCS_COP.1/MEM					Х		Х			
FDP_ACC.2										х
FDP_ACF.1										х
FDP_IFC.2/FW	х	х								





	O.Firewall	O.SeparatelF	O.Conceal	0.Meter	O.Crypt	O.Time	O.Protect	O.Management	O.Log	O.Access
FDP_IFF.1/FW	Х	Х								
FDP_IFC.2/MTR				Х		Х				
FDP_IFF.1/MTR				Х		Х				
FDP_RIP.2							Х			
FDP_SDI.2							Х			
FIA_ATD.1								Х		
FIA_AFL.1								Х		
FIA_UAU.2								Х		
FIA_UAU.5										х
FIA_UAU.6										х
FIA_UID.2								Х		
FIA_USB.1								Х		
FMT_MOF.1								Х		
FMT_SMF.1								Х		
FMT_SMR.1								Х		
FMT_MSA.1/AC								Х		
FMT_MSA.3/AC								Х		
FMT_MSA.1/FW								Х		
FMT_MSA.3/FW								Х		
FMT_MSA.1/MTR								Х		
FMT_MSA.3/MTR								Х		
FPR_CON.1			Х							
FPR_PSE.1				Х						
FPT_FLS.1							Х			
FPT_RPL.1					Х					
FPT_STM.1						Х			Х	





	O.Firewall	O.SeparatelF	O.Conceal	O.Meter	O.Crypt	O.Time	O.Protect	O.Management	O.Log	O.Access
FPT_TST.1		Х					Х			
FPT_PHP.1							Х			
FTP_ITC.1/WAN	Х									
FTP_ITC.1/MTR				Х						
FTP_ITC.1/USR									Х	

- 2233 Table 17: Fulfilment of Security Objectives
- 2234 The following paragraphs contain more details on this mapping.

2235 **6.12.1.1.1 O.Firewall**

- 2236 O.Firewall is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
- **FDP_IFC.2/FW** defines that the TOE shall implement an information flow policy for its firewall functionality.
- **FDP_IFF.1/FW** defines the concrete rules for the firewall information flow policy.
- **FTP_ITC.1/WAN** defines the policy around the trusted channel to parties in the WAN.

2241 **6.12.1.1.2 O.SeparatelF**

- 2242 O.SeparatelF is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
- **FDP_IFC.2/FW** and **FDP_IFF.1/FW** implicitly require the TOE to implement physically separate ports for WAN and LMN.
- FPT_TST.1 implements a self test that also detects whether the ports for WAN and LAN have
 been interchanged.





2247 **6.12.1.1.3 O.Conceal**

2248 O.Conceal is completely met by FPR_CON.1 as directly follows.

2249 **6.12.1.1.4 O.Meter**

- 2250 O.Meter is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
- **FDP_IFC.2/MTR** and **FDP_IFF.1/MTR** define an information flow policy to introduce how the Gateway shall handle Meter Data.
- FCO_NRO.2 ensure that all Meter Data will be signed by the Gateway (invoking the services
 of its Security Module) before being submitted to external entities.
- FPR_PSE.1 defines requirements around the pseudonymization of Meter identities for Status
 data.
- FTP_ITC.1/MTR defines the requirements around the Trusted Channel that shall be implemented by the Gateway in order to protect information submitted via the Gateway and external entities in the WAN or the Gateway and a distributed Meter.

2260 **6.12.1.1.5 O.Crypt**

- 2261 O.Crypt is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
- FCS_CKM.4 defines the requirements around the secure deletion of ephemeral
 cryptographic keys.
- FCS_CKM.1/TLS defines the requirements on key negotiation for the TLS protocol.
- **FCS_CKM.1/CMS** defines the requirements on key generation for symmetric encryption within CMS.
- FCS_COP.1/TLS defines the requirements around the encryption and decryption capabilities
 of the Gateway for communications with external parties and to Meters.
- FCS_COP.1/CMS defines the requirements around the encryption and decryption of content
 and administration data.





2271	•	FCS_CKM.1/MTR defines the requirements on key negotiation for meter communication
2272		encryption.
2273	٠	FCS_COP.1/MTR defines the cryptographic primitives for meter communication encryption.
2274	٠	FCS_COP.1/HASH defines the requirements on hashing that are needed in the context of
2275		digital signatures (which are created and verified by the Security Module).
2276	٠	FCS_COP.1/MEM defines the requirements around the encryption of TSF data.
2277	•	FPT_RPL.1 ensures that a replay attack for communications with external entities is detected.

- 2278 **6.12.1.1.6 O.Time**
- 2279 O.Time is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
- **FDP_IFC.2/MTR** and **FDP_IFF.1/MTR** define the required update functionality for the local time as part of the information flow control policy for handling Meter Data.
- **FPT_STM.1** defines that the TOE shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

2283 **6.12.1.1.7 O.Protect**

- 2284 O.Protect is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
- FCS_COP.1/MEM defines that the TOE shall encrypt its TSF and user data as long as it is not in use.
- FDP_RIP.2 defines that the TOE shall make information unavailable as soon as it is no longer
 needed.
- **FDP_SDI.2** defines requirements around the integrity protection for stored data.
- **FPT_FLS.1** defines requirements that the TOE falls back to a safe state for specific error cases.
- FPT_TST.1 defines the self testing functionality to detect whether the interfaces for WAN and
 LAN are separate.
- **FPT_PHP.1** defines the exact requirements around the physical protection that the TOE has to provide.





2295	6.12.1.1	.8 O.Management
2296	O.Manage	ment is met by a combination of the following SFRs:
2297	• Fl	A_ATD.1 defines the attributes for users.
2298	• Fl	A_AFL.1 defines the requirements if the authentication of users fails multiple times.
2299	• Fl	A_UAU.2 defines requirements around the authentication of users.
2300	• Fl	A_UID.2 defines requirements around the identification of users.
2301	• Fl	A_USB.1 defines that the TOE must be able to associate users with subjects acting on
2302	be	ehalf of them.
2303	• Fľ	MT_MOF.1 defines requirements around the limitations for management of security
2304	fu	nctions.
2305	• Fl	MT_MSA.1/AC defines requirements around the limitations for management of attributes
2306	us	sed for the Gateway access SFP.
2307	• FI	MT_MSA.1/FW defines requirements around the limitations for management of attributes
2308	us	ed for the Firewall SFP.
2309	• FI	MT_MSA.1/MTR defines requirements around the limitations for management of
2310	at	tributes used for the Meter SFP.
2311	• Fl	MT_MSA.3/AC defines the default values for the Gateway access SFP.
2312	• Fľ	MT_MSA.3/FW defines the default values for the Firewall SFP.
2313	• Fľ	MT_MSA.3/MTR defines the default values for the Meter SFP.
2314	• FI	MT_SMF.1 defines the management functionalities that the TOE must offer.
2315	• FN	MT_SMR.1 defines the role concept for the TOE.

2316 **6.12.1.1.9 O.Log**

O.Log defines that the TOE shall implement three different audit processes that are covered by theSecurity Functional Requirements as follows:





2319 System Log

The implementation of the system log itself is covered by the use of FAU_GEN.1/SYS. FAU_ARP.1/SYS and FAU_SAA.1/SYS allow to define a set of criteria for automated analysis of the audit and a corresponding response. FAU_SAR.1/SYS defines the requirements around the audit review functions and that access to them shall be limited to authorised Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface and to authorised Service Technicians via the IF_GW_SRV interface. Finally, FAU_STG.4/SYS defines the requirements on what should happen if the audit log is full.

2326 Consumer Log

The implementation of the consumer log itself is covered by the use of FAU_GEN.1/CON. FAU_STG.4/CON defines the requirements on what should happen if the audit log is full. FAU_SAR.1/CON defines the requirements around the audit review functions for the consumer log and that access to them shall be limited to authorised Consumer via the IF_GW_CON interface. FTP_ITC.1/USR defines the requirements on the protection of the communication of the Consumer with the TOE.

2333 Calibration Log

The implementation of the calibration log itself is covered by the use of FAU_GEN.1/CAL. FAU_STG.4/CAL defines the requirements on what should happen if the audit log is full. FAU_SAR.1/CAL defines the requirements around the audit review functions for the calibration log and that access to them shall be limited to authorised Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface.

2339 FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.2 and FPT_STM.1 apply to all three audit processes.





2340 **6.12.1.1.10 O.Access**

FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 define the access control policy as required to address O.Access. FIA_UAU.5 ensures that entities that would like to communicate with the TOE are authenticated before any action whereby FIA_UAU.6 ensures that external entities in the WAN are reauthenticated after the session key has been used for a certain amount of time.

2345 6.12.1.2 Fulfilment of the dependencies

2346 The following table summarises all TOE functional requirements dependencies of this ST and

2347 demonstrates that they are fulfilled.

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FAU_ARP.1/SYS	FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis	FAU_SAA.1/SYS
FAU_GEN.1/SYS	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps	FPT_STM.1
FAU_SAA.1/SYS	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1/SYS
FAU_SAR.1/SYS	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1/SYS
FAU_STG.4/SYS	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	FAU_STG.2
FAU_GEN.1/CON	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps	FPT_STM.1
FAU_SAR.1/CON	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1/CON
FAU_STG.4/CON	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	FAU_STG.2
FAU_GEN.1/CAL	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps	FPT_STM.1
FAU_SAR.1/CAL	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1/CAL
FAU_STG.4/CAL	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	FAU_STG.2
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1/SYS
	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FAU_GEN.1/CON
		FIA_UID.2
FAU_STG.2	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1/SYS
		FAU_GEN.1/CON
		FAU_GEN.1/CAL
FCO_NRO.2	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.2
FCS_CKM.1/TLS	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or	FCS_COP.1/TLS
	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/TLS	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or	FCS_CKM.1/TLS
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or	
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4





FCS_CKM.1/CMS	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or	FCS_COP.1/CMS
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CMS	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or	FCS_CKM.1/CMS
_ /	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or	_ /
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/MTR	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or	FCS_COP.1/MTR
	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MTR	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or	FCS_CKM.1/TLS
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or	
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or	FCS_CKM.1/TLS
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or	FCS_CKM.1/CMS
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	FCS_CKM.1/MTR
FCS_COP.1/HASH	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or	Please refer to
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or	chapter 6.12.1.3 for
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	missing dependency
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MEM	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or	not fulfilled ²²³
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or	
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.2	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	FDP_ACC.2
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FMT_MSA.3/AC
FDP_IFC.2/FW	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1/FW
FDP_IFF.1/FW	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	FDP_IFC.2/FW
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FMT_MSA.3/FW
FDP_IFC.2/MTR	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1/MTR
FDP_IFF.1/MTR	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	FDP_IFC.2/MTR
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FMT_MSA.3/MTR
FDP_RIP.2	-	-
FDP_SDI.2	-	-
FIA_ATD.1	-	-
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.2
FIA UAU.5		

²²³ The key will be generated by secure production environment and not the TOE itself.





FIA_UAU.6 - FIA_UID.2 -		-
FIA UID.2 -		
		-
FIA_USB.1 FIA_	ATD.1 User attribute definition	FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MOF.1 FMT	T_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FM1	T_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 -		-
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_	UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.2
FMT_MSA.1/AC [FDF	P_ACC.1 Subset access control, or	FDP_ACC.2
FDP	P_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	
FMT		FMT_SMR.1
FMT	SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FMT_SMF.1
		FMT_MSA.1/AC
FMT	SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/FW [FDF	P_ACC.1 Subset access control, or	FDP_IFC.2/WAN
FDP	P_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	
FMT		FMT_SMR.1
FMT	[_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3/FW FMT	[_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	FMT_MSA.1/FW
FMT	F_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/MTR [FDF	P_ACC.1 Subset access control, or	FDP_IFC.2/MTR
FDP	P_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	
FMT	SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT	[_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3/MTR FMT	[_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	FMT_MSA.1/MTR
FMT	F_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FPR_CON.1 -		-
FPR_PSE.1 -		-
FPT_FLS.1 -		-
FPT_RPL.1 -		-
FPT_STM.1 -		-
FPT_TST.1 -		-
FPT_PHP.1 -		-
		-
FTP_ITC.1/MTR -		-
FTP ITC.1/USR -		-

2348

Table 18: SFR Dependencies





2349 **6.12.1.3 Justification for missing dependencies**

2350 Dependency FCS_CKM.1 for FCS_COP.1/MEM ist not fulfilled. For the key generation process an 2351 external security module ("D-HSM") is used so that the key is imported from an HSM during TOE 2352 production.

The hash algorithm as defined in FCS_COP.1/HASH does not need any key material. As such the dependency to an import or generation of key material is omitted for this SFR.

2355 **6.12.2 Security Assurance Requirements rationale**

The decision on the assurance level has been mainly driven by the assumed attack potential. As outlined in the previous chapters of this Security Target it is assumed that – at least from the WAN side – a high attack potential is posed against the security functions of the TOE. This leads to the use of AVA_VAN.5 (Resistance against high attack potential).

- In order to keep evaluations according to this Security Target commercially feasible EAL 4 has been
 chosen as assurance level as this is the lowest level that provides the prerequisites for the use of
 AVA_VAN.5.
- Eventually, the augmentation by ALC_FLR.2 has been chosen to emphasize the importance of a structured process for flaw remediation at the developer's side, specifically for such a new technology.

2366 6.12.2.1 Dependencies of assurance components

The dependencies of the assurance requirements taken from EAL 4 are fulfilled automatically. The augmentation by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 does not introduce additional assurance components that are not contained in EAL 4.





2370 **7 TOE Summary Specification**

The following paragraph provides a TOE summary specification describing how the TOE meets eachSFR.

2373 7.1 SF.1: Authentication of Communication and Role Assignment for 2374 external entities

2375 The TOE contains a software module that authenticates all communication channels with WAN, HAN 2376 and LMN networks. The authentication is based on the TLS 1.2 protocol compliant to [RFC 5246]. 2377 According to [TR-03109], this TLS authentication mechanism is used for all TLS secured 2378 communications channels with external entities. The TOE does always implement the bidirectional 2379 authentication as required by [TR-03109-1] with one exception: if the Consumer requests a 2380 password-based authentication from the GWA according to [TR-03109-1], and the GWA activates this 2381 authentication method for this Consumer, the TOE uses a unidirectional TLS authentication. Thus, although the client has not sent a valid certificate, the TOE continues the TLS authentication process 2382 2383 with the password authentication process for this client (see [RFC 5246, chap. 7.4.6.]). The password 2384 policy to be fulfilled hereby is that the password must be at least 10 characters long containing at 2385 least one character of each of the following character groups: capital letters, small letters, digits, and special characters (!"§\$%&/()=?+*~#',;.:-_). Further characters could also be used. 2386

[TR-03109-1] requires the TOE to use elliptical curves conforming to [RFC 5289] whereas thefollowing cipher suites are supported:

- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- 2390 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
- 2393 The following elliptical curves are supported by the TOE
- BrainpoolP256r1 (according to [RFC 5639]),
- BrainpoolP384r1 (according to [RFC 5639]),





- BrainpoolP512r1 (according to [RFC 5639]),
- 2397
 - NIST P-256 (according to [RFC 5114]), and
- NIST P-384 (according to [RFC 5114]).

2399 Alongside, the TOE supports the case of unidirectional communication with wireless meter (via the 2400 wM-Bus protocol), where the external entity is authenticated via AES with CMAC authentication. In 2401 this case, the AES algorithm is operating in CBC mode with 128-bit symmetric keys. The authentication is successful in case that the CMAC has been successfully verified by the use of a 2402 2403 cryptographic key K_{mac} . The cryptographic key for CMAC authentication (K_{mac}) is derived from the 2404 meter individual key MK conformant to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.2]. The meter individual key MK 2405 (brought into the TOE by the GWA) is selected by the TOE through the MAC-protected but 2406 unencrypted meter-id submitted by the meter.

The generation of the cryptographic key material for TLS secured communication channels utilizes a Security Module. This Security Module is compliant to [TR-03109-2] and evaluated according to [SecModPP].

The destruction of cryptographic key material used by the TOE is performed through "zeroisation". The TOE stores all ephemeral keys used for TLS secured communication or other cryptographic operations in the RAM only. For instance, whenever a TLS secured communication is terminated, the TOE wipes the RAM area used for the cryptographic key material with 0-bytes directly after finishing the usage of that material.

2415 The TOE receives the authentication certificate of the external entity during the handshake phase of 2416 the TLS protocol. For the establishment of the TLS secured communication channel, the TOE verifies 2417 the correctness of the signed data transmitted during the TLS protocol handshake phase. While 2418 importing an authentication certificate the TOE verifies the certificate chain of the certificate for all certificates of the SM-PKI according to [TR-03109-4]. Note, that the certificate used for the TLS-based 2419 2420 authentication of wired meters is self-signed and not part of the SM-PKI. Additionally, the TOE checks 2421 whether the certificate is configured by the Gateway Administrator for the used interface, and 2422 whether the remote IP address used and configured in the TSF data are identical (FIA_USB.1). The





- 2423 TOE does not check the certificate's revocation status. In order to authenticate the external entity,
- the key material of the TOE's communication partner must be known and trusted.
- 2425 The following communication types are known to the TOE ²²⁴:
- a) WAN communication via IF_GW_WAN
- 2427 b) LMN communication via IF_GW_MTR (wireless or wired Meter)
- 2428 c) HAN communication via IF_GW_CON, IF_GW_CLS or IF_GW_SRV

Except the communication with wireless meters at IF_GW_MTR, all communication types are TLSbased. In order to accept a TLS communication connection as being authenticated, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

- a) The TLS channel must have been established successfully with the required cryptographicmechanisms.
- b) The certificate of the external entity must be known and trusted through configuration by
 the Gateway Administrator, and associated with the according communication type²²⁵.

For the successfully authenticated external entity, the TOE performs an internal assignment of the communication type based on the certificate received at the external interface if applicable. The user identity is associated with the name of the certificate owner in case of a certificate-based authentication or with the user name in case of a password-based authentication at interface IF_GW_CON.

For the LMN communication of the TOE with wireless (a.k.a. wM-Bus-based) meters, the external entity is authenticated by the use of the AES-CMAC algorithm and the meter-ID for wired Meters is used for association to the user identity (**FIA_USB.1**). This communication is only allowed for meters not supporting TLS-based communication scenarios.

FCS_CKM.1/TLS is fulfilled by the TOE through the implementation of the pseudorandom function of the TLS protocol compliant to [RFC 5246] while the Security Module is used by the TOE for the generation of the cryptographic key material. The use of TLS according to [RFC 5246] and the use of

²²⁴ Please note that the TOE additionally offers the interface IF_GW_SM to the certified Security Module built into the TOE.

²²⁵ Of course, this does not apply if password-based authentication is configured at IF_GW_CON.





the postulated cipher suites according to [RFC 5639] fulfill the requirement FCS_COP.1/TLS. The requirements FCS_CKM.1/MTR and FCS_COP.1/MTR are fulfilled by the use of AES-CMAC-secured communication for wireless meters. The requirement FCS_CKM.4 is fulfilled by the described method of "zeroisation" when destroying cryptographic key material. The implementation of the described mechanisms (especially the use of TLS and AES-CBC with CMAC) fulfills the requirements FTP_ITC.1/WAN, FTP_ITC.1/MTR, and FTP_ITC.1/USR. FPT_RPL.1 is fulfilled by the use of the TLS protocol respectively the integration of transmission counters according to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.3].

2455 A successfully established connection will be automatically disconnected by the TOE if a TLS channel 2456 to the WAN is established more than 48 hours, if a TLS channel to the LMN has transmitted more 2457 than 5 MB of information or if a channel to a local user is inactive for a time configurable by the 2458 authorised Gateway Administrator of up to 10 minutes, and a new connection establishment will require a new full authentication procedure (FIA_UAU.6). In any case – whether the connection has 2459 2460 been successfully established or not - all associated resources related with the connection or 2461 connection attempt are freed. The implementation of this requirement is done by means of the 2462 TOE's operation system monitoring and limiting the resources of each process. This means that with each connection (or connection attempt) an internal session is created that is associated with 2463 2464 resources monitored and limited by the TOE. All resources are freed even before finishing a session if 2465 the respective resource is no longer needed so that no previous information content of a resource is 2466 made available. Especially, the associated cryptographic key material is wiped as soon it is no longer 2467 needed. As such, the TOE ensures that during the phase of connection termination the internal 2468 session is also terminated and by this, all internal data (associated cryptographic key material and 2469 volatile data) is wiped by the zeroisation procedure described. Allocated physical resources are also 2470 freed. In case non-volatile data is no longer needed, the associated resources data are freed, too. The 2471 TOE doesn't reuse any objects after deallocation of the resource (FDP_RIP.2).

If the external entity can be successfully authenticated on basis of the received certificate (or the password in case of a consumer using password authentication) and the acclaimed identity could be approved for the used external interface, the TOE associates the user identity, the authentication status and the connecting network to the role according to the internal role model (**FIA_ATD.1**). In order to implement this, the TOE utilizes an internal data model which supplies the allowed





communication network and other restricting properties linked with the submitted security attribute on the basis of the submitted authentication data providing the multiple mechanisms for authentication of any user's claimed identity according to the necessary rules according to [TR-03109-1] (**FIA_UAU.5**).

In case of wireless meter communication (via the wM-Bus protocol), the security attribute of the Meter is the meter-id authenticated by the CMAC, where the meter-id is the identity providing criterion that is used by the TOE. The identity of the Meter is associated to the successfully authenticated external entity by the TOE and linked to the respective role according to Table 5 and its active session. In this case, the identity providing criterion is also the meter-id.

2486 The TOE enforces an explicit and complete security policy protecting the data flow for all external 2487 entities (FDP_IFC.2/FW, FDP_IFF.1/FW, FDP_IFC.2/MTR, FDP_IFF.1/MTR). The security policy 2488 defines the accessibility of data for each external entity and additionally the permitted actions for 2489 these data. Moreover, the external entities do also underlie restrictions for the operations which can 2490 be executed with the TOE (FDP_ACF.1). In case that it is not possible to authenticate an external 2491 entity successfully (e.g. caused by unknown authentication credentials), no other action is allowed on 2492 behalf of this user and the concerning connection is terminated (FIA_UAU.2). Any communication is 2493 only possible after successful authentication and identification of the external entity (FIA_UID.2, 2494 FIA_USB.1).

2495 The reception of the wake-up service data package is a special case that requests the TOE to 2496 establish a TLS authenticated and protected connection to the Gateway Administrator. The TOE 2497 validates the data package due to its compliance to the structure described in [TR-03109-1] and 2498 verifies the ECDSA signature with the public key of the Gateway Administrator's certificate which 2499 must be known and trusted to the TOE. The TOE does not perform a revocation check or any validity 2500 check compliant to the shell model. The TOE verifies the electronic signature successfully when the 2501 certificate is known, trusted and associated to the Gateway Administrator. The TOE establishes the 2502 connection to the Gateway Administrator when the package has been validated due to its structural 2503 conformity, the signature has been verified and the integrated timestamp fulfills the requirements of





2504	[TR-03109-1]. Receiving the data package and the successful validation of the wake-up package does
2505	not mean that the Gateway Administrator has successfully been authenticated.

- If the Gateway Administrator could be successfully authenticated based on the certificate submitted during the TLS handshake phase, the role will be assigned by the TOE according to now approved identity based on the internal role model and the TLS channel will be established.
- 2509 WAN roles
- 2510 The TOE assigns the following roles in the WAN communication (FMT_SMR.1):
- authorised Gateway Administrator,
- authorised External Entity.
- The role assignment is based on the X.509 certificate used by the external entity during TLS connection establishment. The TOE has explicit knowledge of the Gateway Administrator's certificate and the assignment of the role "Gateway Administrator" requires the successful authentication of the WAN connection.
- The assignment of the role "Authorized External Entity" requires the X.509 certificate that is used during the TLS handshake to be part of an internal trust list that is under control of the TOE.
- 2519 The role "Authorized External Entity" can be assigned to more than one external entity.
- 2520 HAN roles
- 2521 The TOE differentiates and assigns the following roles in the HAN communication (FMT_SMR.1):
- authorised Consumer
- authorised Service Technician
- The role assignment is based on the X.509 certificate used by the external entity for TLS-secured communication channels or on password-based authentication at interface IF_GW_CON if configured (FIA_USB.1).
- The assignment of roles in the HAN communication requires the successful identification of the external entity as a result of a successful authentication based on the certificate used for the HAN





connection. The certificates used to authenticate the "Consumer" or the "Service Technician" areexplicitly known to the TOE through configuration by the Gateway Administrator.

2531 Multi-client capability in the HAN

The HAN communication might use more than one, parallel and independent authenticated communication channels. The TOE ensures that the certificates that are used for the authentication are different from each other.

The role "Consumer" can be assigned to multiple, parallel sessions. The TOE ensures that these parallel sessions are logically distinct from each other by the use of different authentication information. This ensures that only the Meter Data associated with the authorized user are provided and Meter Data of other users are not accessible.

2539 LMN roles

- 2540 One of the following authentication mechanisms is used for Meters:
- a) authentication by the use of TLS according to [RFC 5246] for wired Meters
- a) authentication by the use of AES with CMAC authentication according to [RFC 3394] forwireless Meters.

The TOE explicitly knows the identification credentials needed for authentication (X.509 certificate when using TLS; meter-id in conjunction with CMAC and known K_{mac} when using AES) through configuration by the Gateway Administrator. If the Meter could be successfully authenticated and the claimed identity could thus be proved, the according role "Authorised External Entity" is assigned by the TOE for this Meter at IF_GW_MTR based on the internal role model.

2549 LMN multi-client capabilities

The LMN communication can be run via parallel, logically distinct and separately authenticated communication channels. The TOE ensures that the authentication credentials of each separate channel are different.

The TOE's internal policy for access to data and objects under control of the TOE is closely linked with the identity of the external entity at IF_GW_MTR according to the TOE-internal role model. Based on





the successfully verified authentication data, a permission catalogue with security attributes is internally assigned, which defines the allowed actions and access permissions within a communication channel.

2558 The encapsulation of the TOE processes run by this user is realized through the mechanisms offered 2559 by the TOE's operating system and very restrictive user rights for each process. Each role is assigned 2560 to a separate, limited user account in the TOE's operating system. For all of these accounts, it is only 2561 allowed to read, write or execute the files absolutely necessary for implementing the program logic. 2562 For each identity interacting with the TOE, a separate operating system process is started. Especially, 2563 the databases used by the TOE and the logging service are adequately separated for enforcement of 2564 the necessary security domain separation (FDP_ACF.1). The allowed actions and access permissions 2565 and associated objects are assigned to the successfully approved identity of the user based on the used authentication credentials and the resulting associated role. The current session is 2566 2567 unambiguously associated with this user. No interaction (e.g. access to Meter Data) is possible without an appropriate permission catalogue (FDP_ACC.2). The freeing of the role assignment and 2568 2569 associated resources are ensured through the monitoring of the current session.

2570 7.2 SF.2: Acceptance and Deposition of Meter Data, Encryption of Meter

2571

Data for WAN transmission

The TOE receives Meter Data from an LMN communication channel and deposits these Meter Data with the associated data for tariffing in a database especially assigned to this individual Meter residing in an encrypted file system (**FCS_COP.1/MEM**). The time interval for receiving or retrieving Meter Data can be configured individually per meter through a successfully authenticated Gateway Administrator and are initialized by the TOE during the setup procedure with pre-defined values.

The Meter Data are cryptographically protected and their integrity is verified by the TOE before the tariffing and deposition is performed. In case of a TLS secured communication, the integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted data is protected by the TLS protocol according to [RFC 5246]. In case of a unidirectional communication at IF_GW_MTR/wireless, the integrity is verified by the





2581 verification of the CMAC check sum whereas the protection of the confidentiality is given by the use 2582 of AES in CBC mode with 128 bit key length in combination with the CMAC authentication 2583 (FCS_CKM.1/MTR, FCS_COP.1/MTR). The AES encryption key has been brought into the TOE via a 2584 management function during the pairing process for the Meter. In the TOE's internal data model, the 2585 used cryptographic keys K_{mac} and K_{enc} are associated with the meter-id due to the fact of the 2586 unidirectional communication. The TOE contains a packet monitor for Meter Data to avoid replay 2587 attacks based on the re-sending of Meter Data packages. In case of recognized data packets which 2588 have already been received and processed by the TOE, these data packets are blocked by the packet 2589 monitor (FPT_RPL.1).

2590 Concerning the service layers, the TOE detects replay attacks that can occur during authentication 2591 processes against the TOE or for example receiving data from one of the involved communication 2592 networks. This is for instance achieved through the correct interpretation of the strictly increasing 2593 ordering numbers for messages from the meters (in case that a TLS-secured communication channel 2594 is not used), through the enforcement of an appropriate time slot of execution for successfully 2595 authenticated wake-up calls, and of course through the use of the internal means of the TLS protocol 2596 according to [RFC 5246] (**FPT_RPL.1**).

2597 The deposition of Meter Data is performed in a way that these Meter Data are associated with a 2598 permission profile. This means that all of the operations and actions that can be taken with these 2599 data as described afterwards (e.g. sending via WAN to an Authenticated External Entity) depend on 2600 the permissions which are associated with the Meter Data. For metrological purposes, the 2601 Meter Data's security attribute - if applicable - will be persisted associated with its corresponding 2602 Meter Data by the TOE. All user associated data stored by the TOE are protected by an AES-128-2603 CMAC value. Before accessing these data, the TOE verifies the CMAC value that has been applied to 2604 the user data and detects integrity errors on any data and especially on user associated Meter Data 2605 in a reliable manner (FDP_SDI.2).

Closely linked with the deposition of the Meter Data is the assignment of an unambiguous and reliable timestamp on these data. The reliability grounds on the regular use of an external time source offering a sufficient exactness (**FPT_STM.1**) which is used to synchronize the operating system





of the TOE. A maximum deviation of 3% of the measuring period is allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW]. The data set (Meter Data and tariff data) is associated with the timestamp in an inseparably manner because each Meter Data entry in the database includes the corresponding time stamp and the database is cryptographically protected through the encrypted file system. For details about database encryption please see page 137).

2614 For transmission of consumption data (tariffed Meter Data) or status data into the WAN, the TOE 2615 ensures that the data are encrypted and digitally signed (FCO_NRO.2, FCS_CKM.1/CMS, 2616 FCS_COP.1/CMS, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/MEM). In case of a successful transmission of 2617 consumption data into the WAN, beside the transmitted data the data's signature applied by the TOE 2618 is logged in the Consumer-Log for the respective Consumer at IF_GW_CON thus providing the 2619 possibility not only for the recipient to verify the evidence of origin for the transmitted data but to the Consumer at IF_GW_CON, too (FCO_NRO.2). The encryption is performed with the hybrid 2620 2621 encryption as specified in [TR-03109-1-I] in combination with [TR-03116-3]. The public key of the 2622 external entity, the data have to be encrypted for, is known by the TOE through the authentication 2623 data configured by the Gateway Administrator and its assigned identity. This public key is assumed by the TOE to be valid because the TOE does not verify the revocation status of certificates. The 2624 2625 public key used for the encryption of the derived symmetric key used for transmission of 2626 consumption data is different from the public key in the TLS certificate of the external entity used for 2627 the TLS secured communication channel. The derivation of the hybrid key used for transmission of 2628 consumption data is done according to [TR-03116-3, chapter 8].

2629 The TOE does also foresee the case that the data is encrypted for an external entity that is not 2630 directly assigned to the external entity holding the active communication channel. The electronic 2631 signature is created through the utilization of the Security Module whereas the TOE is responsible for 2632 the computation of the hash value for the data to be signed. Therefore, the TOE utilizes the SHA-256 2633 or SHA-384 hash algorithm. The SHA-512 hash algorithm is available in the TOE but not yet used 2634 (FCS_COP.1/HASH). The data to be sent to the external entity are prepared on basis of the tariffed 2635 meter data. The data to be transmitted are removed through deallocation of the resources after the 2636 (successful or unsuccessful) transmission attempt so that afterwards no previous information will be available (FDP_RIP.2). The created temporary session keys which have been used for encryption of 2637





the data are also deleted by the already described zeroisation mechanism as soon they are not longer needed (**FCS_CKM.4**).

2640 The time interval for transmission of the data is set for a daily transmission, and can be additionally 2641 configured by the Gateway Administrator. The TOE sends randomly generated messages into the 2642 WAN, so that through this the analysis of frequency, load, size or the absence of external 2643 communication is concealed (FPR_CON.1). Data that are not relevant for accounting are aliased for 2644 transmission so that no personally identifiable information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis of not 2645 billing-relevant information sent to parties in the WAN. Therefore, the TOE utilizes the alias as 2646 defined by the Gateway Administrator in the Processing Profile for the Meter identity to external 2647 parties in the WAN. Thereby, the TOE determines the alias for a user and verifies that it conforms to 2648 the alias given in the Processing Profile (FPR PSE.1).

2649 7.3 SF.3: Administration, Configuration and SW Update

The TOE includes functionality that allows its administration and configuration as well as updating the TOE's complete firmware ("firmware updates") or only the software application including the service layer ("software updates"). This functionality is only provided for the authenticated Gateway Administrator (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/AC, FMT_MSA.1/FW, FMT_MSA.1/MTR).

2654 The following operations can be performed by the successfully authenticated Gateway 2655 Administrator:

- a) Definition and deployment of Processing Profiles including user administration, rightsmanagement and setting configuration parameters of the TOE
- 2658 b) Deployment of tariff information
- 2659 c) Deployment and installation of software/firmware updates

A complete overview of the possible management functions is given in Table 14 and Table 15 (FMT_SMF.1). Beside the possibility for a successfully authenticated Service Technician to view the system log via interface IF_GW_SRV, administrative or configuration measures on the TOE can only be taken by the successfully authenticated Gateway Administrator.





- In order to perform these measures, the TOE has to establish a TLS secured channel to the GatewayAdministrator and must authenticate the Gateway Administrator successfully. There are two
- 2666 possibilities:
- a) The TOE independently contacts the Gateway Administrator at a certain time specified inadvance by the Gateway Administrator.
- b) Through a message sent to the wake-up service, the TOE is requested to contact theGateway Administrator.

In the second case, the wake-up data packet is received by the TOE from the WAN and checked by the TOE for structural correctness according to [TR-03109-1]. Afterwards, the TOE verifies the correctness of the electronic signature applied to the wake-up message data packet using the certificate of the Gateway Administrator stored in the TSF data. Afterwards, a TLS connection to the Gateway Administrator is established by the TOE and the above mentioned operations can be performed.

- 2677 Software/firmware updates always have to be signed by the TOE manufacturer.
- 2678 Software/firmware updates can be of different content:
- a) The whole boot image of the TOE is changed.
- b) Only individual components of the TOE are changed. These components can be the bootloader plus the static kernel or the SMGW application.

2682 The update packet is realized in form of an archive file enveloped into a CMS signature container 2683 according to [RFC 5652]. The electronic signature of the update packet is created using signature keys from the TOE manufacturer. The verification of this signature is performed by the TOE using the 2684 TOE's Security Module using the trust anchor of the TOE manufacturer. If the signature of the 2685 transferred data could not be successfully verified by the TOE or if the version number of the new 2686 2687 firmware is not higher than the version number of the installed firmware, the received data is rejected by the TOE and not used for further processing. Any administrator action is entered in the 2688 2689 System Log of the TOE. Additionally, an authorised Consumer can interact with the TOE via the 2690 interface IF_GW_CON to get the version number and the current time displayed (FMT_MOF.1).





- The signature of the update packet is immediately verified after receipt. After successful verification of the update packet the update process is immediately performed. In each case, the Gateway Administrator gets notified by the TOE and an entry in the TOE's system log will be written.
- 2694 All parameters that can be changed by the Gateway Administrator are preset with restrictive values
- 2695 by the TOE. No role can specify alternative initial values to override these restrictive default values
- 2696 (FMT_MSA.3/AC, FMT_MSA.3/FW, FMT_MSA.3/MTR).
- This mechanism is supported by the TOE-internal resource monitor that internally monitors existing connections, assigned roles and operations allowed at a specific time.

2699 7.4 SF.4: Displaying Consumption Data

2700 The TOE offers the possibility of displaying consumption data to authenticated Consumers at 2701 interface IF_GW_CON. Therefore, the TOE contains a web server that implements TLS-based communication with mutual authentication (FTP_ITC.1/USR). If the Consumer requests a password-2702 2703 based authentication from the GWA according to [TR-03109-1] and the GWA activates this 2704 authentication method for this Consumer, the TOE uses TLS authentication with server-side 2705 authentication and HTTP digest access authentication according to [RFC 7616]. In both cases, the 2706 requirement FCO NRO.2 is fulfilled through the use of TLS-based communication and through 2707 encryption and digital signature of the (tariffed) Meter Data to be displayed using FCS_COP.1/HASH.

2708 To additionally display consumption data, a connection at interface IF GW CON must be established and the role "(authorised) Consumer" is assigned to the user with his used display unit by the TOE. 2709 2710 Different Consumer can use different display units. The amount of allowed connection attempts at IF_GW_CON is set to 5. In case the amount of allowed connection attempts is reached, the TOE 2711 blocks IF_GW_CON (FIA_AFL.1). The display unit has to technically support the applied 2712 2713 authentication mechanism and the HTTP protocol version 1.1 according to [RFC 2616] as 2714 communication protocol. Data is provided as HTML data stream and transferred to the display unit. 2715 In this case, further processing of the transmitted data stream is carried out by the display unit.





According to [TR-03109-1], the TOE exclusively transfers Consumer specific consumption data to the display unit. The Consumer can be identified in a clear and unambiguous manner due to the applied authentication mechanism. Moreover, the TOE ensures that exclusively the data actually assigned to the Consumer is provided at the display unit via IF_GW_CON (**FIA_USB.1**).

2720 7.5 SF.5: Audit and Logging

The TOE generates audit data for all actions assigned in the System-Log (FAU_GEN.1/SYS), the Consumer-Log (FAU_GEN.1/CON), and the Calibration-Log (FAU_GEN.1/CAL) as well. On the one hand, this applies to the values measured by the Meter (Consumer-Log) and on the other hand to system data (System-Log) used by the Gateway Administrator of the TOE in order to check the TOE's current functional status. In addition, metrological entries are created in the Calibration-Log. The TOE thus distinguishes between the following log classes:

- a) System-Log
- b) Consumer-Log
- 2729 c) Calibration-Log

The TOE audits and logs all security functions that are used. Thereby, the TOE component accomplishing this security audit functionality includes the necessary rules monitoring these audited events and through this indicating a potential violation of the enforcement of the TOE security functionality (e. g. in case of an integrity violation, replay attack or an authentication failure). If such a security breach is detected, it is shown as such in the log entry (FAU_SAA.1/SYS).

The System-Log can only be read by the authorized Gateway Administrator via interface IF_GW_WAN or by an authorized Service Technician via interface IF_GW_SRV (FAU_SAR.1/SYS). Potential security breaches are separately indicated and identified as such in the System-Log and the GWA gets informed about this potential security breach (FAU_ARP.1/SYS, FDP_SDI.2). Data of the Consumer-Log can exclusively be viewed by authenticated Consumers via interface IF_GW_CON designed to display consumption data (FAU_SAR.1/CON). The data included in the Calibration-Log





2741 can only be read by the authenticated Gateway Administrator via interface IF_GW_WAN
2742 (FAU_SAR.1/CAL).

2743 If possible, each log entry is assigned to an identity that is known to the TOE. For audit events 2744 resulting from actions of identified users resp. roles, the TOE associates the generated log 2745 information to the identified users while generating the audit information (**FAU_GEN.2**).

Generated audit and log data are stored in a cryptographically secured storage. For this purpose, a file-based SQL database system is used securing its' data using an AES-XTS-128 encrypted file system (AES in XTS mode with 128-bit keys) according to [FIPS Pub. 197] and [NIST 800-38E]. This is achieved by using device-specific AES keys so that the secure environment can only be accessed with the associated symmetric key available. Using an appropriately limited access of this symmetric, the TOE implements the necessary rules so that it can be ensured that unauthorised modification or deletion is prohibited (FAU_STG.2).

Audit and log data are stored in separate locations: One location is used to store Consumer-specific log data (Consumer-Log) whereas device status data and metrological data are stored in a separate location: status data are stored in the System-Log and metrological data are stored in the Calibration-Log. Each of these logs is located in physically separate databases secured by different cryptographic keys. In case of several external meters, a separate database is created for each Meter to store the respective consumption and log data (FAU_GEN.2).

2759 If the audit trail of the System-Log or the Consumer-Log is full (so that no further data can be added), 2760 the oldest entries in the audit trail are overwritten (FAU_STG.2, FAU_STG.4/SYS, FAU_STG.4/CON). 2761 If the Consumer-Log's oldest audit record must be kept because the period of billing verification (of usually 15 months) has not beeen reached, the TOE's metrological activity is paused until the oldest 2762 audit record gets deletable. Thereafter, the TOE's metrological activity is started again through an 2763 2764 internal timer. Moreover, the mechanism for storing log entries is designed in a way that these entries are cryptographically protected against unauthorized deletion. This is especially achieved by 2765 2766 assigning cryptographic keys to each of the individual databases for the System-Log, Consumer-Log 2767 and Calibration-Log.





If the Calibration-Log cannot store any further data, the operation of the TOE is stopped through the
termination of its metering services and the TOE informs the Gateway Administrator by creating an
entry in the System-Log, so that additional measures can be taken by the Gateway Administrator.
Calibration-Log entries are never overwritten by the TOE (FAU_STG.2, FAU_STG.4/CAL,
FMT_MOF.1).

The TOE anonymizes the data in a way that no conclusions about a specific person or user can be drawn from the log or recorded not billing relevant data. Stored consumption data are exclusively intended for accounting with the energy supplier. The data stored in the System-Log are used for analysis purposes concerning necessary technical analyses and possible security-related information.

2777 7.6 SF.6: TOE Integrity Protection

The TOE makes physical tampering detectable through the TOE's sealed packaging of the device. So if an attacker opens the case, this can be physically noticed, e. g. by the Service Technician (FPT_PHP.1).

2781 The TOE provides a secure boot mechanism. Beginning from the AES-128-encrypted bootloader 2782 protected by a digital signature applied by the TOE manufacturer, each subsequent step during the boot process is based on the previous step establishing a continuous forward-concatenation of 2783 2784 cryptographical verification procedures. Thus, it is ensured that each part of the firmware, that 2785 means the operating system, the service layers and the software application in general, is tested by 2786 the TOE during initial startup. Thereby, a test of the TSF data being part of the software application is included. During this complete self-test, it is checked that the electronic system of the physical 2787 2788 device, and all firmware components of the TOE are in authentic condition. This complete self-test can also be run at the request of the successfully authenticated Gateway Administrator via interface 2789 IF_GW_WAN or at the request of the successfully authenticated Service Technician via interface 2790 2791 IF_GW_SRV. At the request of the successfully authenticated Consumer via interface IF_GW_CON, 2792 the TOE will only test the integrity of the Smart Metering software application including the service 2793 layers (without the operating system) and the completeness of the TSF data stored in the TOE's





database. Additionally, the TOE itself runs a complete self-test periodically at least once a month during normal operation. The integrity of TSF data stored in the TOE's database is always tested during read access of that part of TSF data (**FPT_TST.1**). **FPT_RPL.1** is fulfilled by the use of the TLS protocol respectively the integration of transmission counters according to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.3], and through the enforcement of an appropriate time slot of execution for successfully authenticated wake-up calls.

If an integrity violation of the TOE's hardware or firmware is detected or if the deviation between local system time of the TOE and the reliable external time source is too large, further use of the TOE for the purpose of gathering Meter Data is not possible. Also in this case, the TOE signals the incorrect status via a suitable signal output on the case of the device, and the further use of the TOE for the purpose of gathering Meter Data is not allowed (**FPT_FLS.1**).

Basically, if an integrity violation is detected, the TOE will create an entry in the System Log to document this status for the authorised Gateway Administrator on interface IF_GW_WAN resp. for the authorised Service Technician on interface IF_GW_SRV, and will inform the Gateway Administrator on this incident (FAU_ARP.1/SYS, FAU_GEN.1/SYS, FAU_SAR.1/SYS, FPT_TST.1).

2809 **7.7 TSS Rationale**

2810 The following table shows the correspondence analysis for the described TOE security functionalities

and the security functional requirements.

	SF.1	SF.2	SF.3	SF.4	SF.5	SF.6
FAU_ARP.1/SYS					Х	(X)
FAU_GEN.1/SYS					Х	(X)
FAU_SAA.1/SYS					Х	
FAU_SAR.1/SYS					Х	(X)
FAU_STG.4/SYS					Х	
FAU_GEN.1/CON					Х	
FAU_SAR.1/CON					Х	
FAU_STG.4/CON					Х	
FAU_GEN.1/CAL					Х	





	SF.1	SF.2	SF.3	SF.4	SF.5	SF.6
FAU_SAR.1/CAL					Х	
FAU_STG.4/CAL					Х	
FAU_GEN.2					Х	
FAU_STG.2					Х	
FCO_NRO.2		Х		Х		
FCS_CKM.1/TLS	Х					
FCS_COP.1/TLS	Х					
FCS_CKM.1/CMS		Х				
FCS_COP.1/CMS		Х				
FCS_CKM.1/MTR	Х	Х				
FCS_COP.1/MTR	Х	Х				
FCS_CKM.4	Х	Х				
FCS_COP.1/HASH		Х				
FCS_COP.1/MEM		Х				
FDP_ACC.2	Х					
FDP_ACF.1	Х					
FDP_IFC.2/FW	Х					
FDP_IFF.1/FW	Х					
FDP_IFC.2/MTR	Х					
FDP_IFF.1/MTR	Х					
FDP_RIP.2	Х	Х				
FDP_SDI.2		Х			Х	
FIA_ATD.1	Х					
FIA_AFL.1				Х		
FIA_UAU.2	Х					
FIA_UAU.5	Х					
FIA_UAU.6	Х					
FIA_UID.2	Х					
FIA_USB.1	Х			Х		
FMT_MOF.1			Х		Х	
FMT_SMF.1			Х			
FMT_SMR.1	Х					
FMT_MSA.1/AC			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/AC			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/FW			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/FW			Х			
FMT_MSA.1/MTR			Х			
FMT_MSA.3/MTR			Х			
FPR_CON.1		Х				





	SF.1	SF.2	SF.3	SF.4	SF.5	SF.6
FPR_PSE.1		Х				
FPT_FLS.1						Х
FPT_RPL.1	Х	Х				х
FPT_STM.1		Х				
FPT_TST.1						Х
FPT_PHP.1						Х
FTP_ITC.1/WAN	Х					
FTP_ITC.1/MTR	Х					
FTP_ITC.1/USR	Х			Х		

2812Table 19: Rationale for the SFR and the TOE Security Functionalities 226

 $^{^{226}}$ Please note that SFRs marked with "(X)" only have supporting effect on the fulfilment of the TSF.





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2841 **10 Appendix**

10.1 Mapping from English to German terms

English term	German term
billing-relevant	abrechnungsrelevant
CLS, Controllable Local System	dezentral steuerbare Verbraucher- oder Erzeugersysteme
Consumer	Anschlussnutzer; Letztverbraucher (im verbrauchenden Sinne); u.U. auch Einspeiser
Consumption Data	Verbrauchsdaten
Gateway	Kommunikationseinheit
Grid	Netz (für Strom/Gas/Wasser)
Grid Status Data	Zustandsdaten des Versorgungsnetzes
LAN, Local Area Network	Lokales Kommunikationsnetz
LMN, Local Metrological Network	Lokales Messeinrichtungsnetz
Meter	Messeinrichtung (Teil eines Messsystems)
Processing Profiles	Konfigurationsprofile
Security Module	Sicherheitsmodul (z.B. eine Smart Card)
Service Provider	Diensteanbieter
Smart Meter, Smart Metering System ²²⁷	Intelligente, in ein Kommunikationsnetz eingebundene, elektronische Messeinrichtung (Messsystem)
TOE	EVG (Ev aluierungsgegenstand)
WAN, Wide Area Network	Weitverkehrsnetz (für Kommunikation)

2843

²²⁷ Please note that the terms "Smart Meter" and "Smart Metering System" are used synonymously within this document.





2844 **10.2 Glossary**

Term	Description
Authenticity	property that an entity is what it claims to be (according to [SD_6])
Block Tariff	Tariff in which the charge is based on a series of different energy/volume rates applied to successive usage blocks of given size and supplied during a specified period. (according to [CEN])
BPL	Broadband Over Power Lines, a method of power line communication
СА	Certification Authority, an entity that issues digital certificates. CLS config
CDMA	Code Division Multiple Access
CLS config (secondary asset)	See chapter 3.2
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax
Confidentiality	the property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes (according to [SD_6])
Consumer	End user of electricity, gas, water or heat (according to [CEN]). See chapter 3.1
DCP	Data Co-Processor; security hardware of the CPU
DLMS	Device Language Message Specification
DTBS	Data To Be Signed
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
Energy Service Provider	Organisation offering energy related services to the Consumer (according to [CEN])
ETH	Ethernet
external entity	See chapter 3.1
firmware update	See chapter 3.2
Gateway Administrator (GWA)	See chapter 3.1
Gateway config (secondary asset)	See chapter 3.2
Gateway time	See chapter 3.2
GPRS	General Packet Radio Service, a packet oriented mobile data service
Home Area Network (HAN)	In-house data communication network which interconnects domestic equipment and can be used for energy management purposes (adopted according to [CEN]).
Integrity	property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorised and undetected manner (according to [SD_6])
IT-System	Computersystem





Term	Description
Local Area Network (LAN)	Data communication network, connecting a limited number of communication devices (Meters and other devices) and covering a moderately sized geographical area within the premises of the consumer. In the context of this ST, the term LAN is used as a hypernym for HAN and LMN (according to [CEN], adopted).
Local attacker	See chapter 3.4
LTE	Long Term Evolution mobile broadband communication standard
Meter config (secondary asset)	See chapter 3.2
Local Metrological Network (LMN)	In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment.
Meter Data	See chapter 3.2
Meter Data Aggregator (MDA)	Entity which offers services to aggregate metering data by grid supply point on a contractual basis. NOTE: The contract is with a supplier. The aggregate is of all that supplier's consumers connected to that particular grid supply point. The aggregate may include both metered data and data estimated by reference to standard load profiles (adopted from [CEN])
Meter Data Collector (MDC)	Entity which offers services on a contractual basis to collect metering data related to a supply and provide it in an agreed format to a data aggregator (that can also be the DNO). NOTE: The contract is with a supplier or a pool. The collection may be carried out by manual or automatic means. ([CEN])
Meter Data Management System (MDMS)	System for validating, storing, processing and analysing large quantities of Meter Data. ([CEN])
Metrological Area Network	In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment (i.e. Meters)
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OMS	Open Metering System
OCOTP	On-Chip One-time-programmable
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	Personally Identifiable Information refers to information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual.
RJ45	registered jack #45; a standardized physical network interface
RMII	Reduced Media Independent Interface
RTC	Real Time Clock
Service Technician	Human entity being responsible for diagnostic purposes.





Term	Description
Smart Metering System	The Smart Metering System consists of a Smart Meter Gateway and connected to one or more meters. In addition, CLS (i.e. generation plants) may be connected with the gateway for dedicated communication purposes.
SML	Smart Message Language
Tariff	Price structure (normally comprising a set of one or more rates of charge) applied to the consumption or production of a product or service provided to a Consumer (according to [CEN]).
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security protocol according to [RFC 5246]
TOE	Target of Evaluation - set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance
TSF	TOE security functionality
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
WAN attacker	See chapter 3.4
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network

2845





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