

# **Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report**

#### BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-04

SMGW, Version 1.2, Version 1.2.1 and Version 1.2.2

from

#### **Power Plus Communications AG**



SOGIS Recognition Agreement for components up to EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-01, BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-02, BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-03 and a re-assessment dated 04 September 2023.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to including an additional already certified production site into the scope of the certificate.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a <u>minor change</u> and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 dated 05 September 2021 updated by a re-assessment on 04 September 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021.

Bonn, 27 June 2024 The Federal Office for Information Security





Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 and ALC\_FLR only



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the SMGW, Version 1.2, Version 1.2.1 and Version 1.2.2, Power Plus Communications AG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change.

The changes are related to including an additional production site that is already certified into the scope of this certificate. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [4].

## Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of production sites. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 dated 05 September 2021 updated by a re-assessment on 04 September 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

#### Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG<sup>1</sup> Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

### References

[1] Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", Version 3.1, 29 February 2024

Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements", Version 1.2, March 2024

- Impact Analysis Report, Maintenance, Neuer Produktionsstandort Weptech, Version 1.0, 12 June 2024, Power Plus Communications AG (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 for SMGW Version 1.2, 5 September 2021, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021, Version 4.9, 28 May 2021, Security Target SMGW Version 1.2, Power Plus Communications AG