

Security Target Lite

M7893 B11

Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented (EAL6+)

Resistance to attackers with HIGH attack potential

Version: 2.1

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REVISION HISTORY

1.0	Initial Version
2.0	Recertification to include updated user guidance documents.
2.1	Recertification to include asymmetric cryptographic library ACL v2.03.008 and updated user guidance

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1 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT)

1.1 Security Target and Target of Evaluation Reference

The title of this document is Security Target Lite, M7893 B11 Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented (EAL6+).

This document comprises the Infineon Technologies AG Security Controller (Integrated Circuit IC) M7893 B11 with specific IC dedicated software and optional software:

- RSA v2.03.008 or v1.03.006
- EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006
- SHA-2 v1.01
- Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006
- Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.02.010.

The target of evaluation (TOE) M7893 B11 is described in the following. This Security Target Lite has the revision 2.1 and is dated 2017-10-20.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an Infineon Security Controller M7893 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.010 libraries and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware).

The design step of this TOE is B11.

The Security Target is based on the Protection Profile "Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile" [11].

The Protection Profile and the Security Target are built in compliance with Common Criteria v3.1 Revision 5.

The Confidential Security Target takes all relevant current final interpretations into account.

Table 1: Identification

Item	Version	Date	Registration
Security Target Lite	2.1	2017-10-20	M7893 B11
Confidential Security Target	2.2	2017-10-20	M7893 B11
Target of Evaluation			<p>M7893 B11</p> <p>with FW-Identifier 78.019.03.4 (update) and optional SW:</p> <p>RSA2048 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 (optional)</p> <p>RSA4096 v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 (optional)</p> <p>EC v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 (optional)</p> <p>SHA-2 v1.01 (optional)</p> <p>Toolbox v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 (optional)</p> <p>SCL v2.02.010 (optional)</p> <p>and Guidance documentation</p>
Protection Profile	1.0	2007-06-15	Security IC Platform Protection Profile PP0035
Common Criteria	3.1 Revision 5	2012-09	<p>Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation</p> <p><i>Part 1: Introduction and general model</i> CCMB-2017-04-001</p> <p><i>Part 2: Security functional components</i> CCMB-2017-04-002</p> <p><i>Part 3: Security assurance components</i> CCMB-2017-04-003</p>
<p>Chapter 2.2.4 describes briefly the contents of the individual documents of the User Guidance Documentation, while the individual documents are versioned and entitled in chapter 9 literature and references. The listed set of user guidance documents belongs to the TOE.</p>			

The firmware identifier has been updated due to an update of the Flash Loader coming with certain improvements regarding the communication using the USB interface.

This TOE is represented by a number of various products. They all differentiate by different mask sets with slight - not security relevant - modifications, various configuration possibilities, done either by Infineon settings during production or, after delivery, by means of blocking at customer premises. Despite these variation possibilities, all products are derived from the equal hardware design results, the M7893 B11.

The user has the free choice for combinations of optional cryptographic libraries. The TOE can be delivered with either v2.03.008 or v1.03.006 (or none) of these libraries, but it is not possible to combine different versions within the TOE.

The TOE can be identified with the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). The M-number hardware is identified by the bytes 05 and 06, which are the first two bytes of the chip identification number, having for M7893 B11 always the hexadecimal value of 0x0004. Or, in other words, the value of 0x0004 represents the hardware platform M7893.

All products are identically from module design and layout, but differ in their possibilities to connect to the power supply, radio frequency antenna, contact based interface options and different packages. Therefore, the TOE is represented and made out of different mask sets and combinations hereof with following TOE internal and security irrelevant differences:

First, there is one metal mask differing only in the input capacity (analogue part) of the radio frequency interface (RFI) allowing adapting different types of antennas. This leads to three versions of this mask and enables to connect a wide range of antennas and to design for different form factors.

Second, one top metal mask alternatively supports different kinds of packages by an optional short cut of the ISO-pads- and the chip core supply. This difference is required for specific applications with restrictions given by standard CC-packages such as VQFN32. This adds two further power supply related options. These differences are comparable to the scenario where for example someone takes a piece of wire and reconnects the pads of the TOE using a soldering bolt.

And last, in order to enable the communication abilities for additional special modules respectively packages with enhanced requirements, different ISO pad usages have been introduced. More details are described in the Errata Sheet [8].

To each of the TOE relevant optional different mask set variants, an individual value is assigned, which is part of the data output of the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). By that the various hardware mask sets can be clearly identified and differentiated by the GCIM output. The interpretation of the output GCIM data is clearly explained in the user guidance, Hardware Reference Manual [1].

There are no other differences between the mask sets the TOE is produced with, and all these changes have no impact on the TOEs security policies and related functions. Details are explained in the user guidance hardware reference manual HRM [1] and in the Errata Sheet [8].

In addition to these hardware differences, the M7893 B11 allows for a maximum of configuration possibilities defined by the customer order following the market needs. For example, a M7893 B11 product can come in one project with

the fully available ROM and SOLID FLASH™ Non Volatile Memory (NVM) or in another project without any ROM and with any other SOLID FLASH™ NVM-size below the physical implementation size, or with a different RAM size. Even more, the user has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric coprocessor SCP, or the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user decides, whether the TOE comes with a free combination of software libraries or without any. And, to be even more flexible, various interface options can be chosen as well. To sum up the major selections, the user defines by his order:

- The available memory sizes of ROM, SOLID FLASH™ NVM and RAM.
- The availability of the cryptographic coprocessors.
- The availability of the cryptographic library version.
- The availability of the Flash Loader for available interfaces like ISO-7816, contactless ISO14443, USB or DCLB.
- The availability of various further interface options.
- The possibility to tailor the product by blocking with regard to memory sizes and availability of certain modules on his own premises.
- The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG and made available via the order tool.

Beside fix TOE configurations, which can be ordered as usual, this TOE implements optionally the so called Bill-Per-Use (BPU) ability to enable for the freedom of blocking at user premises. This solution enables our customer to tailor the product on his own to the required configuration – project by project. By that BPU allows for significant reduction of logistic cost at all participating parties and serves for acceleration of delivery of tailored product to the end-user.

The realization of this user configuration by blocking requires the presence of the Flash Loader software, enhanced with the BPU blocking software part. The presence of the BPU ability defines the customer with his order.

The user then receives this TOE in a predefined starting configuration, for example entirely unblocked. Again, the delivered starting configuration depends on the purchasing contract. After delivery, the user can put the TOE in volume on his stock and can block it down to the required sizes and features, whenever a certain configuration is required by a certain project.

Depending on the number of TOE products delivered, and their individual final blocked configuration, the customer receives a back payment. By that our customers are charged only for the true configurations required in their projects.

As written above, the software realizing the user allowed blocking, is implemented and delivered in the TOE – depending on the order - and is part of the evaluation and certificate. This software is an additional part of the Flash Loader software, but also the other firmware has seen a small enhancement to enable for BPU.

On the user production side, the blocking is done by the user; usually by taking an enhancement of the user own personalization flow and applying the according APDUs. These APDUs are predefined by Infineon Technologies AG and can also depend on the customer order. Only these APDUs can block the chip according to the user demands.

Infineon Technologies AG provides special software, running in parallel when doing the blocking. This software summarizes all devices and final configurations allowing for the later commercial balancing. The balancing depends on the number of chips and their individual final blockings the user has made over a defined time span. This special software can be used only for the commercial balancing, is not present on the TOE, not security relevant and therefore not part of this certificate.

All blockings are done by setting the according value in the chip configuration page, where certain parts are left available to the blocking software. Of course, strong means of authentication are in place. The blocking software is an additional part of the Flash Loader software and the only piece of software, able to manage the blocking APDUs. Therefore, the presence of the Flash Loader software is essential for the BPU ability.

The user can only apply a predefined and checksum protected set of allowed APDU configuration commands provided by Infineon Technologies AG. For this, the Flash Loader BPU software part, together with the firmware, execute one of those APDUs. After the final blocking is done and the user additionally may have downloaded his software, the entire Flash Loader including the BPU software part is permanently deactivated.

Of course, exclusively all security relevant settings are contained in the Infineon Technologies AG (IFX-only) part. The Flash Loader BPU software does not access and has no access to the IFX-only part.

Once the user blocking by applying the APDU has been finalized, and the Flash Loader was locked, the configuration page is no more accessible for changes. After the final deactivation – this is the locking - of the Flash Loader the product is permanently fixed regarding its configurations and software. A reactivation of the Flash Loader is not possible. At the next start-up, the STS apply the settings, and, if called, a RMS-function can output the finally made chip configuration for verification and information purposes.

The entire configuration storage area is protected against manipulation, perturbation and false access. Note that the IFX-only part of the configuration page is already access protected prior delivery to the user and the TOE leaves the Infineon Technologies AG premises only locked into User Mode.

The Flash Loader BPU software part is only present on the products which have been ordered with the BPU option. In all other cases this software is not present on the product. If a product has been ordered without Flash Loader, consequently the Flash Loader software is not present in SOLID FLASH™ NVM and the BPU configuration change options are blocked in the IFX-configuration. This renders the BPU functionality unusable. Various delivery combinations are given and for example, a product can come with a fix configuration and with Flash Loader, to enable the user to download software, but without BPU option. Following cases can occur:

- Order in fixed configuration, without Flash Loader:
downloading of user software is not supported and there is also no blocking possibility after delivery
- Order in fixed configuration with Flash Loader but without BPU option:
download of user software but no blocking possibility after delivery
- Order with Flash Loader and Bill-per-Use option in starting configuration:
final chip configuration by the user and download of user software after delivery

Beside the various TOE configurations further possibilities of how the user inputs his software on the TOE, i.e. the operating system and applications, are in place. This provides a maximum of flexibility and for this an overview is given in the following table:

Table 2: Options to implement user software at Infineon Technologies production premises

1.	The user or/and a subcontractor downloads the software into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM on his own. Infineon Technologies AG has not received user software and there are no user data in the ROM.	The Flash Loader can be activated by the user or subcontractor to download his software in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM – until the Flash Loader is finally deactivated by the user.
2	The user provides software for the download into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to Infineon Technologies AG. The software is downloaded to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during chip production. I.e. there are no user data in the ROM.	The Flash Loader is deactivated.
3	The user provides software for the download into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to Infineon Technologies AG. The software is downloaded to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during chip production. I.e. there are no user data in the ROM	The Flash Loader is blocked afterwards but can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to download his software in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. Precondition is that the user has provided an own reactivation procedure in software prior chip production to Infineon Technologies AG.
4	The user provides the software for implementation into the ROM mask.	There is no Flash Loader present.
5	The user provides the software for implementation into the ROM mask.	The FL is blocked afterwards but can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to download his software in the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ NVM memory. Precondition is that the user has provided an own reactivation procedure in software prior chip production to Infineon Technologies AG.

6	The user provides the software for implementation into the ROM mask and provides software for the download into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to Infineon Technologies AG.	There is no Flash Loader present.
7	The user provides the software for implementation into the ROM mask and provides software for the download into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to Infineon Technologies AG.	The FL is blocked afterwards but can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to download his software in the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ memory. Precondition is that the user has provided an own reactivation procedure in software prior chip production to Infineon Technologies AG.

For the cases with Flash Loader on board and whenever the user has finalized his SW-download, respectively the TOE is in the final state and about to be delivered to the end-user, the user is obligated to lock the Flash Loader. The final locking of the FL results in a permanent deactivation of the Flash Loader. This means that once being in the locked status, the Flash Loader cannot be reactivated anymore.

The confidential Security Target [10] contains an overview about the blocking options of the memory size ranges, certain modules, peripherals and interface options. The blocking option can be applied and configured by Infineon Technologies AG and partly within defined limits by the user. Within those limitations the TOE configurations can vary under only one identical IC-hardware and one M-number with the above described design steps and without impact on security. All of these possible variations are covered by this certificate.

Table 3: Configuration ranges and blocking respectively order options

Module / Feature (User View)	Max-Value (User View)	Min-Value (User View)	User Blocking	User Blocking Step
Memories				
SOLID FLASH™ NVM	Max. 500 kBytes	Min. 0 kBytes	Yes	1 kBytes
ROM	Max. 182 kBytes	Min: 0 kBytes	By order only (2)	By order only (2)
RAM	Max. 20 kBytes	Min. 4 kBytes	Yes	1 kBytes
Coprocessors				
Crypto@2304T	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
SCP	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off

Module / Feature (User View)	Max-Value (User View)	Min-Value (User View)	User Blocking	User Blocking Step
Peripheral Modules				
16 Bit CRC support	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Watchdog Timers (2)	Available 2	Available 1	Yes	On/off
Timers (3)	Available 4	Available 2	Yes	On/off
Hash - Module: SHA-256 or SHA-1 or MD5	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Interface Options				
Voltage Classes A or B	Supported	Not supported	Yes	On/off
ISO7816 (slave)	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
ISO7816 (master)	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
USB Interchip or Slave	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
SPI Slave or Master	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
IIC Slave	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
GPIO Signals available	Available 12	No signal available	Yes	Signal by signal
RFI available	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
ISO14443 Type A	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
ISO 14443 Type B	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
ISO 18092 or ISO 14443 Type C	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Mifare Card Mode	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Mifare reader mode	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Mifare 4 k cards	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Mifare 1 k cards	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Mifare 4 Bytes UID	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off

Module / Feature (User View)	Max-Value (User View)	Min-Value (User View)	User Blocking	User Blocking Step
Mifare 7 Bytes UID	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
Mifare 10 Bytes UID	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
DCLB	Available	Not available	Yes	On/off
ACLB	Available	Not available	No	By order only (1)

Notes legend:

1. The blocking respectively availability of this feature depends on the customer order but is made at Infineon production premises only
2. One Watchdog Timer remains always active (no subject of blocking)
3. Two timers remain always active (no subject of blocking)

All possible TOE configurations equal and/or within the specified ranges are covered by the certificate. The hardware reference manual HRM [1] provides an overview about the configuration options respectively ranges.

Note that it is also possible to have no user data in the ROM module. The user software and data are then located in a dedicated and protected part of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The long life storage endurance, the automatic management of frequently used memory pages, together with the means for error detection and correction serves for comparable respectively equal reliability and endurance, compared to a conventional ROM.

According to the blocking and order options, a not limited number of configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. Basically, the number of various configurations depends on the user and purchase contract only.

Note that the TOE answers to the Non-ISO-ATR with the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) answer. This GCIM outputs a coded clear identifier for the hardware, design step and further identification information. The confidential Security Target [10] and the hardware reference manual HRM [1], being part of the user guidance, enables then for the clear interpretation of the read out GCIM data.

In addition, a dedicated firmware allows reading out the present configuration in detail.

All these steps for gathering identification and detailed configuration information can be done by the user himself, without involving Infineon Technologies AG.

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware parts and the software parts.

The software parts are differentiated into:

the cryptographic libraries RSA¹, EC² and SHA-2³, symmetric cryptographic libraries and the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base.

¹ Rivest-Shamir-Adleman asymmetric cryptographic algorithm

RSA, EC, SHA-2, Toolbox and SCL provide certain functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Base Library is only used internally by the RSA, EC and Toolbox libraries and has no user interface. If none of the three libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox is delivered, also the Base Library is not on board. The SHA-2 library does not use the Base Library.

The firmware parts are the RMS library, the Service Algorithm (SA), the STS firmware for test purpose (see chapter 2.2.2), the Flash Loader for downloading user software to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM and the Mifare compatible software interface. The STS is implemented in a separated Test-ROM being part of the TOE. The RMS and the Flash Loader provide some functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software, i.e. the operating system and applications are not part of the TOE.

The TOE can be delivered including - in free combinations - or not including any of the functionality of the cryptographic libraries SCL, EC, RSA, SHA-2 and the supporting Toolbox library. If RSA or EC or Toolbox is delivered, automatically the Base Library is part of the shipment too.

If the user decides not to use one or all of the crypto library(s), the specific library(s) is (are) not delivered to the user and the accompanying “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” *Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)* and/ or *EC* and/ or *SHA-2* and/ or *SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)* and/ or *SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)* is/are not provided by the TOE.

The Toolbox library provides the user optionally basic arithmetic and modular arithmetic operations, in order to support user software development using long integer operations. These basic arithmetic operations do not provide any security functionality, implement no security mechanism, and do not provide additional specific security functionality - as defined for the cryptographic libraries.

The user developed software using the Toolbox basic operations is not part of the TOE.

The Base Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor and has no user available interface. The base library does not provide any security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional specific security functionality.

Deselecting one of the libraries does not include the code implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use. Not including the code of the deselected functionality has no impact of any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

The SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox libraries can be implemented together with the Smartcard Embedded Software in the User-ROM mask or respectively loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. This holds also for the Base Library, if the RSA, EC or Toolbox or combinations hereof is/are part of the shipment.

All other Smartcard Embedded Software does not belong to the TOE and is not subject of the evaluation.

² The Elliptic Curve Cryptography is abbreviated with EC only in the further, in order to avoid conflicts with the abbreviation for the Error Correction Code ECC.

³ SHA Secure Hash Algorithm

1.2 Target of Evaluation overview

The TOE comprises the Infineon Technologies AG Security Multiple Interface Controller M7893 B11 with specific IC dedicated software and optional SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox libraries.

The TOE is a member of the Infineon Technologies AG high security SLE78-controller-family meeting the highest requirements in terms of performance and security. A summary product description is given in this Confidential Security Target (ST).

The SLE70 family provides a common architecture upon which specific products can be tailored for markets ranging from low security applications (76 controller family) up to high security and contactless applications (78 controller family).

This TOE is intended to be used in any application and device requiring the highest level of security, for example as secure element in various devices.

This member of the high security controller family features a security philosophy focusing on data integrity instead of numerous sensors. By that two main principles combined in close synergy are utilized in the security concept called the "Integrity Guard". These main principles are the comprehensive error detection, including the dual CPU, and the full encrypted data path, leaving no plain data on the chip. These principles proved that they provide excellent protection against invasive and non-invasive attacks known today.

This TOE provides multiple interface options for various applications and markets. Due to the interface flexibility the product can be used in almost any application, within any device and almost any form factor, i.e. as a build-in device: Due to these multiple communication possibilities, the TOE can be seen as a stand-alone security device being capable to maintain a multitude of data communication interfaces simultaneously. For example, one application communicates via one interface, totally separated from another application, communicating via a second interface, at the same time.

Again these communication and application independency capabilities enable the usage to almost everywhere, where highly secure applications are in use and of course in any other application as well. This TOE is deemed for governmental, corporate, transport and payment markets, or wherever a secure root of trust is required. Various types of applications can use this TOE, for example in closed loop logical access controls, physical access controls, secure internet access control and internet authentication, or as multi-application token or simply as encrypted storage.

This multiple interface controller provides, depending on the used communication protocols, maximum flexibility in terms of simultaneously respectively parallel available communication ability. A brief description of the interface types is given below and a table with regard to the parallel availability is given in chapter 2.2.3:

Contactless Interfaces

- ISO 14443 Type A and Type B

These are ISO defined proximity contactless protocols using an external antenna and the TOE implemented analogue and digital radio frequency interface.

- ISO/IEC 18092 passive mode
This is an ISO defined proximity contactless protocol using an external antenna and the TOE implemented analogue and digital radio frequency interface.
- Mifare compatible software Interface
The software interface is a proprietary proximity contactless protocol using an external antenna and the TOE implemented analogue and digital radio frequency interface, as well as the memory part reserved for Mifare use.

Contact based Interfaces

- ISO/IEC 7816-3
The ISO defined standard contact based communication protocol, using the pads.
- DCLB Digital Contactless Bridge mode
The DCLB mode enables the use of an external analogue interface or near field communication (NFC) modem via the ISO-pads or alternatively via the GPIO pads. Those external analogue modems are typically deemed for applications running in mobile devices and are not part of this TOE. Whether the DCLB option is available or not is a configuration applied in TOE production which cannot be changed afterwards.
- ACLB Advanced Contactless Bridge mode
The ACLB mode provides the possibility to leave the analogue communication to the external device - as with DCLB - but the connection is done via the L_a and L_p pads to the external device or external contactless reader chip directly. Therefore, an external antenna cannot be connected, if the user decides to use this interface option.
- IIC Inter-Integrated Circuit-bus
The Inter-Integrated Circuit (IIC) module is able to be connected as slave to an external multi-master-serial-bus-system used to connect the TOE to an external master, using the IIC protocol. The master can also be a multi master IIC system. The IIC protocol software is not part of the TOE.
- GPIO General Purpose Input Output
The GPIO module supports a number of general purpose I/O signals in parallel and independent of each other. Each of the I/O signals can be configured as push-pull or open-drain output with a fast or slow slew rate. The GPIO interface can be directly accessed by the user software.
In addition, it can be configured which of the other interface module connects to the GPIO signals. But note that below listed interfaces do not require the connection to GPIO. The configurable connection to GPIO signals is just an option. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].
- Serial Peripheral Interface SPI master or slave, serial interface
This interface can be configured as SPI master or SPI slave and enables for serial communication. In both cases the data width, the shift direction, the clock polarity and the clock phase are configurable, allowing for easy and flexible adaptation to other SPI enabled peripherals.
- Universal Serial Bus USB
This TOE provides the universal serial bus USB interface ability to communicate with numerous USB-enabled

devices. The USB communication uses the ETSI TS 102 600 (IC-USB) standard and provides the full speed of USB 2.0.

Some of the interfaces can be combined and used simultaneously. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].

A further option is the Advanced Communication Mode allowing for very high bit rates in the context of using Mifare communication.

In order to increase the contactless interface performance even more, the RFI can be configured in terms of baud rates for reception and transmission and the setting of the sub-carrier frequency used for the load modulation. More details are given in the hardware reference manual HRM [1].

The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the 80251 microcontroller architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), acting as one, the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPU parts control each other in order to detect faults and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept consists of ROM, RAM and the nonvolatile memory (NVM), respectively SOLID FLASH™ NVM. For the SOLID FLASH™ NVM the Unified Channel Programming (UCP) memory technology is used.

The RMS library providing some functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software contains for example SOLID FLASH™ NVM service routines. The Service Algorithm provides functionality for the tearing save write into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The STS firmware is used for test purposes during start-up and the Flash Loader allows downloading user software to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during the manufacturing process. The firmware parts are implemented in the ROM and in access protected areas of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.

The BSI has changed names and abbreviations for Random Number Generators, which is clarified as follows: The Physical True Random Number Generator (PTRNG), also named True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is a physical random number generator and meets the requirements of the functionality class AIS31 PTG.2, see [15]. It is used for provision of random number generation as a security service to the user and for internal purposes. The produced genuine random numbers can be used directly or as seed for the Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG), former named as Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). The DRNG respectively PRNG is not in the scope of the evaluation. The TRNG respectively PTRNG is specially designed for smart cards, but can also be used in any other application where excellent physical random data are required.

The two cryptographic coprocessors serve the need of modern cryptography: The symmetric coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Coprocessor, called Crypto@2304T, provides optimized high performance calculations for the user software executing cryptographic operations and is also used by the optional cryptographic libraries for RSA and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography.

The software part of the TOE consists of the optional asymmetric cryptographic RSA- and EC libraries available in two different versions (v1.03.006 or v2.03.008) and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries, the optional SHA-2 library

(v1.01) and the optional symmetric crypto library (SCL; v2.02.010). If the RSA, EC, or Toolbox library or combinations hereof are part of the shipment, the Base Library is automatically included. Each of these libraries has the same version, i.e., v1.03.006 or v2.03.008.

Each of the available RSA libraries (v1.03.006 and v2.03.008) is used to provide a high level interface to the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The routines are used for RSA primary keys generation (only available in ACL v2.03.008), the RSA signature verification, the RSA signature generation and the RSA modulus recalculation. The hardware Crypto@2304T unit provides the basic long number calculations (add, subtract, multiply, square) with high performance. The ordered RSA library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The RSA library can perform RSA operations from 512 to 4096 bits. Following the BSI⁴ recommendations, key lengths below 1976 bit are not included in the certificate.

Each of the available EC libraries (v1.03.006 and v2.03.008) is used to provide a high level interface to the Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The routines are used for ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key generation and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. In addition, the EC library provides an additional function for calculating primitive elliptic curve operations like ECC Add and ECC Double. EC curves over prime field F_p , as well as over $GF(2^n)$ finite field are supported too. Note that the according user guidance the Elliptic Curve cryptographic functions are abbreviated using ECC.

The ordered EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The certification covers the standard NIST [17] and Brainpool [18] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification process.

The SHA-library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU. The SHA-library is delivered as object code and is in this way available for the user software. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance. The availability of the SHA library does not depend on the hardware configuration.

In addition to the SHA-library, this TOE provides the Hash module to compute extremely fast hash values within just some dozens of clock cycles. The availability of the Hash-module depends on the user. The Hash module provides following hashing algorithms:

- MD-5
- SHA-1
- SHA-256.

⁴ BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik – Federal Office for Information Security

This Hash module is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Following the BSI recommendations the algorithms MD-5 and SHA-1 are not covered by this evaluation. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance.

The use for keyed hash operations like HMAC or similar security critical operations involving keys, is not subject of this TOE and requires specific security improvements and DPA analysis including the operating system, which is not part of this TOE.

The TOE can come with the Secure Hash Algorithm by Hardware (optional HW Hash) being available or not. If the Hash module is blocked the hardware implemented Hash Algorithms are not available. The use of the Hash module is independent from the optional SHA-2 library software and also independent of the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors. No accessibility of the Hash module is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the Hash module.

Each of the available toolbox libraries (v1.03.006 and v2.03.008) does not provide cryptographic support or additional security functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor: Addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, comparison, reduction, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion and modular exponentiation. No security relevant policy, mechanism or function is supported. The toolbox libraries are deemed for software developers as support for simplified implementation of long integer and modular arithmetic operations.

Each of the available Base Libraries (v1.03.006 and v2.03.008) provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor. The Base Libraries do not provide any security functionality or implement no security mechanism on its own. Hence, they do not provide additional specific security functionality.

The SCL Library offers a high-level interface for performing symmetric cryptography algorithms using SCP coprocessor. The SCL has implemented block repetitions, dummy calculations, backward calculation rounds and known-answer test security functions using 128, 192 and 256 AES algorithm, and TDES or DES algorithms. The SCL also supports ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB and PCBC block cipher modes, however the PCBC mode is not a part of this evaluation. The SCL provides public API [125] containing cipher block management functions (Cipher*), block cipher mode encryption/decryption functions (BCM*), cipher block instantiation helper functions CipAlg*_Sec1 and CipAlg*_Sec2, however the CipAlg*_Sec1 functions are not a part of this evaluation.

Note that this TOE can come with both cryptographic coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both cryptographic coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the user's choice prior to the production of the hardware. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors. The TOE can be delivered without a specific library. In this case the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) or/and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) or/and SHA-2 or/and SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or/and SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES).

To fulfill the highest security standards for smartcards today and also in the future, this TOE implements a progressive digital security concept, which already has been certified in various forerunner processes and which has proven its resistance against attackers with high attack potential. This TOE utilizes digital security features to include customer friendly security, combined with a robust design overcoming the disadvantages on analogue protection technologies. The TOE provides full on-chip encryption of the data path, covering the core including the ALUs of the CPU parts, busses, memories and cryptographic coprocessors leaving no plaintext on the chip. Therefore the attractiveness for attackers is extremely reduced as encrypted signals are of no use for the attacker – neither for manipulation nor for eavesdropping.

In addition, the TOE is equipped with a comprehensive error detection capability. The dual CPU approach allows error detection even while processing, e.g. a comparator detects, whether a calculation was performed without errors. This approach is designed to cover all relevant parts of the circuitry. The concept allows that the relevant attack scenarios are detected, whereas other conditions that would not lead to an error would mainly be ignored. And more, the TOE is equipped with signal protection implemented by an Infineon-specific shielding combined with further topological means.

Subsequently, an intelligent shielding algorithm finishes the upper layers, finally providing the so called intelligent implicit active shielding "I²-shield". This provides physical protection against probing and forcing.

In the confidential Security Target [10] the TOE is described and a summary specification is given. The security environment of the TOE during its different phases of the lifecycle is defined. The assets are identified which have to be protected through the security policy. The threats against these assets are described. The security objectives and the security policy are defined, as well as the security requirements. These security requirements are built up of the security functional requirements as part of the security policy and the security assurance requirements. These are the steps during the evaluation and certification showing that the TOE meets the targeted requirements. In addition, the functionality of the TOE matching the requirements is described.

The assets, threats, security objectives and the security functional requirements are defined in this Security Target and in the Protection Profile [11] and are referenced here. These requirements build up a minimal standard common for all Smartcards.

The security functions are defined here in the security target as property of this specific TOE. Here it is shown how this specific TOE fulfills the requirements for the standard defined in the Protection Profile [11].

2 Target of Evaluation Description

The TOE description helps to understand the specific security environment and the security policy. In this context the assets, threats, security objectives and security functional requirements can be employed. The following is a more detailed description of the TOE than in the Protection Profile [11] as it belongs to the specific TOE.

2.1 TOE Definition


This TOE consists of Security Multiple Interface Controllers as integrated circuits, meeting the highest requirements in terms of performance and security. They are manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG in 90 nm CMOS-technology (L90). This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards and other form factors for particularly security-relevant applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating systems according to the lifecycle model from the Protection Profile [11].

The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE regardless whether it is a smartcard or another application of form factor. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.

The TOE consists of a core system, memories, computing peripherals, system peripherals, standard peripherals, an analogue module and the connecting busses.

Following diagram provides a simplified overview upon the hardware subsystems which are briefly described below:

Figure 1: Block diagram of the TOE



The major components of the core system are the dual CPU (Central Processing Units) including the internal encryption leaving no plain data anywhere, the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit) and the CACHE memory.

The CPU – here the two processor parts (CPU1 and CPU2) are seen from functional perspective as one - is compatible with the instruction set of the forerunner family 66-PE and is therefore also compatible to the SAB 80251 instruction set (8051 is a subset hereof) and to the MCS® 251 instruction set which is enhanced. Anyhow, the double-CPU is faster than the standard processor at the same clock frequency. It provides additional powerful instructions for smart card or other applications. It thus meets the requirements for the recent generation of operating systems, although the double-CPU implementation is entirely proprietary and not standard.

The CPU accesses the memory via the integrated Memory Encryption and Decryption unit (MED), which transfer the data from the memory encryption schema to the CPU encryption schema without decrypting into intermediate plain data. The error detection unit (EDU) automatically manages the error detection of the individual memories and detects incorrect transfer of data between the memories and the core by means of Error Detection Code (EDC) comparison. The access rights of the firmware, user operating system and application to the memories are controlled and enforced by the memory management unit (MMU). Errors in the memories are automatically detected (EDC) and in terms of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM 1-Bit-errors are also corrected (ECC). The two processors of the CPU control each

other in order to detect faults and maintain by this the data integrity. A comparator detects whether a calculation was performed without errors and allows error detection even while processing. Therefore the TOE is equipped with a comprehensive error detection capability, which is designed to leave no relevant parts of the circuitry unprotected.

The controllers of this TOE store both code and data in a linear 16-MByte memory space, allowing direct access without the need to swap memory segments in and out of memory using a memory management unit.

The error detection unit (EDU) automatically manages the error detection of the individual memories and detects incorrect transfer of data between the memories by means of error code comparison.

Just to sum up, the TOE stores, computes and internally transfers only masked respectively encrypted and integrity protected data, leaving no plain data anywhere on the TOE. The only plain data could be found when it is communicated to the outer world via the multiple interfaces.

The CACHE memory – or simply, the CACHE – is a high-speed memory-buffer located between the CPU and the (external) main memories holding a copy of some of the memory contents to enable access to the copy, which is considerably faster than retrieving the information from the main memory. In addition to its fast access speed, the CACHE also consumes less power than the main memories. All CACHE systems own their usefulness to the principle of locality, meaning that programs are inclined to utilize a particular section of the address space for their processing over a short period of time. By including most or all of such a specific area in the CACHE, system performance can be dramatically enhanced. The implemented post failure detection identifies and manages errors if appeared during storage.

The memory block contains the ROM, RAM and the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. All data of the memory block is encrypted and all memory types are equipped with an error detection code (EDC), the SOLID FLASH™ NVM in addition with an error correction code (ECC). This TOE stores user code and data in a linear 16-MByte memory space, the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, allowing direct access without the need to swap memory segments in and out of memory using a memory management unit.

The TOE uses also Special Function Registers SFR. These SFR registers are used for general purposes and chip configuration. These registers are located in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM as configuration area page.

The non-volatile ROM contains the firmware parts, accessible for Infineon only, and could optionally include user code and/or data, if transferred to Infineon Technologies AG prior production. The RAM is a volatile memory which means that the content is lost at power off and used by the core.

The computing peripherals block contains the processors for asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic algorithm and Hash processing, the random number generators and the cyclic redundancy check CRC module.

The PTRNG respectively TRNG is specially designed for smart card applications. The PTRNG respectively TRNG fulfills the requirements from the functionality class PTG.2 of the AIS31 and produces genuine random numbers which then can be used directly or as seed for the PRNG respectively DRNG. The PRNG respectively DRNG is not in the scope of the evaluation.

The TOE implements two cryptographic coprocessors: The symmetric cryptographic coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and DES with dual-key or triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Coprocessor, called Crypto@2304T, provides optimized high performance calculations for the user software executing cryptographic operations and is also used by the optional cryptographic libraries for RSA and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography. These coprocessors are especially designed for smart card applications with respect to the security and power consumption. The SCP module computes the complete DES algorithm within a few clock cycles and is especially designed to counter attacks like DPA, EMA and DFA.

Note that this TOE can come with both crypto coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both crypto coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the production of the hardware. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors.

In addition, this TOE provides the Hash module to compute extremely fast hash values within just some dozens of clock cycles. The Hash module is based on the hash sub-block of the CEU module⁵, developed by the COM group. Following hashing algorithms can be performed using this module:

- MD-5
- SHA-1
- SHA-256.

This Hash module is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Following the BSI recommendations the algorithms MD-5 and SHA-1 are not covered by this evaluation. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance.

The TOE can come with the Secure Hash Algorithm by Hardware (optional HW Hash) being available or not. If the Hash module is blocked the hardware implemented Hash Algorithms are not available. The use of the Hash module is independent from the optional SHA-2 library software and also independent of the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors. No accessibility of the Hash module is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the Hash module.

The cyclic redundancy check (CRC) module is a checksum generator. The checksum is a unique number associated with a message or another block of data consisting of several bytes. The idea of the CRC method is to treat the input data as a binary bit stream and divide that stream by a fixed binary number. The remainder of that division is the CRC checksum.

The system peripherals block contains mainly the components required for chip operation and the standard peripherals block the components mainly related to the interfaces. Due to their size the contactless interface RFI and the GPIO interface represent a block on their own. The analogue module contains the required analogue circuits such as filters, some robustness sensors and the analogue circuits required for the chip power regulation and generation.

⁵ See IPDB, Configurable Encryption Unit (CEU) Architecture Specification Rev. 1.4.2, November 22, 2007

The system peripheral block contains the User Mode Security Life Control and the small remaining set of sensors and filters. This small set of sensors is left in order to detect excessive deviations from the specified operational range, while not being over-sensitive. These digital features do not need adjustment or calibration and makes the chip even more robust. Conditions that would not be harmful for the operation would in most cases not influence the proper function. The small set of sensors is not necessary for the chip security but serve for robustness. Having the integrity guard concept in place, the sensors - except a single one - are no more required for the TOE security. The only sensor left, contributing to a security mechanism, is the frequency sensor. All other sensors are assigned to be security supporting only.

The filters are on board to make the TOE more robust against perturbations on the supply lines. The UmSLC enables for checking the proper functions of modules and subsystems essential for the correct operation of the TOE.

The digital controlled oscillator DCO implements a precise and configurable oscillator for proper synchronization of the communication regarding the interfaces, i.e. USB, and the various system frequencies.

Further module in this block is the interface management module (IMM), controlling the various interfaces as well as modules supplying clock and power. The test control module is used only during the TOE production and has no user interface.

The implemented clock management is optimized to reduce the overall power consumption. Contactless products provide a low-power halt mode for operation with reduced power consumption. The Clock Unit (CLKU) supplies the clocks for all components of the TOE. The Clock Unit can work in an internal and external clock mode. The system frequency can be configured and this enables a programmer to choose the best-fitting frequency for an application in consideration of a potential current limit and a demanded application performance.

The standard peripherals block contains finally the various interface modules enabling to communicate using the contact based or the contactless interfaces in various combinations and partly even simultaneously. The RFI and GPIO represent blocks on their own but interact also with the controls located in the standard peripherals block.

The timer enables for easy implementation of communication protocols such as T=1 and all other time-critical operations. The timer can be programmed for particular applications, such as measuring the timing behavior of an event. Timer events can generate interrupt requests to be used for peripheral event channel data transfers. The watchdog is implemented to provide the user some additional control of the program flow. More details are given in the hardware reference module HRM [1].

The Interrupt and Peripheral Channel Controller (ITP) arbitrates what CPU action is required to manage individual interrupt requests. The controller can be associated with different interrupt events, allowing it to select between either executing a standard interrupt service routine or a fast data transfer between two memory locations over a so-called peripheral event channel.

The Synchronous Serial Controller (SSC) peripheral provides the Serial Peripheral Interface SPI compatibility. The data format, data shifting, clock settings are programmable. The interface speed (that means, the maximum data transfer rate) depends on the module clock frequency and the selected mode.

The Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter UART-controlled I/O interface enables the security controller and the terminal interface to be operated independently, and implements a contact based asynchronous serial interface. The UART supports the T=0 and T=1 protocol according to ISO7816-3.

The analogue block finally contains all analogue design parts required for the clock -and voltage supply and for the various interfaces.

This immense flexibility enables for example also for bypassing the coding/decoding of the RFI and leaves its interpretation up to the software. By that further and also proprietary protocols can be implemented by the user software. Note that anything contacting from outside the chip and also any user software managing the communication are not part of this TOE.

The availability of the DCLB and ACLB modes is configured during TOE production and depends on the customer order. Regarding the DCLB enabled derivatives it depends on the operating system of how the pads are configured and used. The individual combinations of the interface options are depicted in the table below. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].

Supporting a Mifare compatible software interface application requires a dedicated small space of memory. Depending on user’s choice, various Mifare compatible Interface memory sections of 1 or 4 Kbytes each can be defined. The number and location of Mifare compatible interface memory sections is simply limited by the available SOLID FLASH™ NVM space. The Mifare compatible interface memory sections are read/write protected and are defined and generated by the user.

More information about the interfaces and their combinations can be found in the confidential Security Target [10].

An overview upon the various interface options is provided by following table:

Table 4: The new interface flexibility

CI-supply	Pad group	La/Lb						
	Interface	RF						
	Protocol	TI (CIM)	ISO14443 A	ISO14443 B	ISO18092 (Felica)	Mifare		
CB-supply	Pad group	La/Lb						
	Interface	RF / ACLB						
	Protocol	ISO14443 A	ISO14443 B	ISO18092 (Felica)	Mifare			
	Pad group	ISO - CB						
	Interface	ISO 7816		I2C	DCLB			
	Protocol	TI (CIM)	ISO7816	I2C	ISO14443 A	ISO14443 B	ISO18092 (Felica)	Mifare
	Pad group	USB						
	Interface	USB						
	Protocol	USB2.0	IC-USB	TS_102600				
	Pad group	GPIO						
Interface	GPIO		I2C	DCLB				
Protocol	SWIO	SPI	I2C	ISO14443 A	ISO14443 B	ISO18092 (Felica)	Mifare	

The SHA-library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU. The SHA-library is delivered as object code and is in this way available for the user software.

This secure hash-algorithm SHA-2 is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance.

The STS (self-test software), RMS (Resource Management System), the Service Algorithm (SA) and Flash Loader (FL) together compose the TOE firmware stored in the ROM and the patches hereof in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. All mandatory functions for internal testing, production usage and start-up behavior (STS), and also the RMS and SA functions are grouped together in a common privilege level. These privilege levels are protected by a hardwired Memory Management Unit (MMU) setting.

The user software can be implemented in various options depending on the user's choice and described in chapter 1.1. Thereby the user software can be implemented in the ROM and/or the SOLID FLASH™ NVM or coming without user software. In the latter case, the user downloads his entire software on his own using the Flash Loader software.

The TOE sets a new, improved standard of integrated security features, thereby meeting the requirements of all smart card applications such as information integrity, access control, mobile telephone and identification, as well as uses in electronic funds transfer and healthcare systems.

To sum up, the TOE is a powerful Multiple Interface high security controller with a large amount of memory and special peripheral devices with improved performance, optimized power consumption, free to choose contact based or contactless operation, at minimal chip size while implementing high security. It therefore constitutes the basis for current and future applications.

2.2 Scope of the TOE

The TOE comprises several types of hardware each differing by mask set changes and mask set combinations to allow for maximum flexibility in terms of connection to power supplies, external antennas and implementation into different kinds of package and module types. All these changes have no influence on the security or any security policy related to the TOE. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].

Therefore, this TOE includes:

- All configurations and resulting derivatives generated out of the mask sets and combinations as described in the confidential Security Target [10],
- The according equal firmware on all derivatives, and with or without,
- Optional equal software in various combinations for all TOE derivatives,
- User's guidance documentation including hardware, software, crypto library, Flash Loader, secure coding, and other reference manuals,

as defined in the following chapters.

Despite this module respectively package, communication and power supply related hardware differences and options, the TOE is delivered in various configurations, achieved by means of blocking and depending on the customer order.

All product derivatives of this TOE, including all configuration possibilities differentiated by the GCIM data and the configuration information output, are manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG. In the following descriptions, the term “manufacturer” stands short for Infineon Technologies AG, the manufacturer of the TOE.

New configurations can occur at any time depending on the user blocking or by different configurations applied by the manufacturer. In any case the user is able to clearly identify the TOE hardware, its configuration and proof the validity of the certificate independently, meaning without involving the manufacturer.

The various blocking options, as well as the means used for the blocking, are done during the manufacturing process or at user premises. Entirely all means of blocking and the, for the blocking involved firmware respectively software parts, used at Infineon and/or the user premises, are subject of the evaluation. All resulting configurations of a TOE derivative are subject of the certificate. All resulting configurations are either at the predefined limits or within the predefined configuration ranges.

The firmware used for the TOE internal testing and TOE operation, the firmware and software parts exclusively used for the blocking, the parts of the firmware and software required for cryptographic support are part of the TOE and therefore part of the certification. The documents as described in chapter 2.2.4 are supplied as user guidance.

Not part of the TOE and not part of the certification are:

- the Smartcard Embedded Software respectively user software, and
- some software parts running at user premises cover commercial aspects of user applied blocking.

2.2.1 Hardware of the TOE

The hardware part of the TOE as defined in the Protection Profile [11] is comprised of:

Core System

Proprietary dual CPU implementation being comparable to the 80251 microcontroller architecture from functional perspective and with enhanced MCS® 251 instruction set

Memory Management Unit (MMU)

CACHE with Post Failure Detection

Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED) and Error Detection Unit (EDU)

Memory Bus Master

Peripheral Bus Master

Memories

SOLID FLASH™ NVM implementing the Unified Channel Programming concept UCP

Read-Only Memory (ROM)

Random Access Memory (RAM)

Computing Peripherals

Optional Crypto@2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC

Optional Symmetric Crypto Coprocessor for DES and AES Standards

True Random Number Generator (TRNG)

Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Optional Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)

Optional Hash module

Peripheral Bus**Memory Bus****System Peripherals**

Interface Management Module (IMM)

User Mode Security Life Control (UMSLC)

Test Controller

Clock and Power Management Unit (CLKU)

Digital Controlled Oscillator (DCO)

Analogue Module

Modules for power supply of the chip core

Modules for power supply for the various interfaces

Filters

Remaining set of sensors for robustness

Analogue modules of the interface controls

Standard Peripherals

Timers and Watchdogs

Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller (ITP and PEC)

ISO communication modules with Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)

Inter-IC-circuit-bus IIC

Synchronous Serial Controller SSC

Universal Serial Bus (USB)

RF interface (radio frequency power and signal interface)

General Purpose Input Output GPIO

Extended Configuration

If a hardware module is claimed above as optional, it may be available or not to the user by blocking means only. This means that the chip hardware remains always equal, regardless whether such optional module is available or not.

2.2.2 Firmware and software of the TOE

The entire firmware of the TOE consists of different parts.

Firmware

One part comprises the RMS and SA routines used for providing the chip resource management interface for the user. The routines are used for tearing save handling of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, user testing of the security functions and error correction (Resource Management System, IC Dedicated Support Software in the Protection Profile [11]).

The RMS and SA routines are stored from Infineon Technologies AG in a reserved area of the user ROM and belonging patches (if any) are located in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.

A further part of the Firmware is the STS, consisting of test and initialization routines (Self-Test Software, IC Dedicated Test Software in the Protection Profile [11]). The STS routines are stored in the ROM and are not accessible for the user software.

The TOE also provides the Flash Loader, a piece of software located in the ROM and allowing downloading the user software or parts of it to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM in a secured way. After completion of the download the Flash Loader can be permanently deactivated by the user.

Furthermore, the firmware provides Mifare compatible software interface routines. Note that this interface is always present, but deactivated, in case of the non-Mifare compatible interface derivatives. Thus the user software interface is identical in both cases and consequently the related Mifare compatible interface routines can be called in each of the derivatives. In case this interface is blocked, but the routines are however called, a dedicated error code is returned.

Optional Cryptographic Libraries

The optional software part of the TOE consists of the SCL, RSA, the EC, Toolbox, Base and the SHA-2 libraries. In case of the RSA, EC, Toolbox, and Base libraries, two versions are available (all library files share the same version; it is not possible to mix the available versions of the asymmetric crypto libraries). The RSA and EC libraries v.2.03.008 provide additional encryption, decryption, signature generation and verification schemes compared to the RSA and EC libraries v1.03.006.

The SCL Library offers a high-level interface for performing symmetric cryptography algorithms using SCP coprocessor. The SCL has implemented block repetitions, dummy calculations, backward calculation rounds and known-answer test security functions using 128, 192 and 256 AES algorithm, and TDES or DES algorithms. The SCL also supports ECB, CBC,

CTR, CFB and PCBC block cipher modes, however the PCBC mode, the single DES operation, as well as the additional block cipher modes, which may be implemented by the generic BCM extension concept are not a part of this evaluation. The SCL provides public API containing cipher block management functions (Cipher*), block cipher mode encryption/decryption functions (BCM*), cipher block instantiation helper functions CipAlg_*_Sec1 and CipAlg_*_Sec2, however the CipAlg_*_Sec1 functions are not a part of this evaluation.

Either of the available RSA libraries is used to provide a high level interface to the RSA cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The routines are used for the RSA signature verification, the RSA signature generation and the RSA modulus recalculation. The module provides the basic long number calculations (add, subtract, multiply, square with 1100 bit numbers) with high performance.

The ordered RSA library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. Either of the available RSA libraries can perform RSA operations from 512 to 4096 bits. Depending on the customer's choice, the TOE can be delivered with the 4096 code portion or with the 2048 code portion only. The 2048 code portion is included in both.

Parts of the evaluation are only operations with key length from 1976 bits to 2048 bits, and 4096 bits with or without making use of the CRT⁶. Note that key lengths below 1976 bit are not included in the certificate.

Either of the available EC libraries is used to provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The routines are used for ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key generation and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. In addition, the EC library provides an interface to an addition function for primitive elliptic curve operations like ECC Add and ECC Double. ECC curves over prime field F_p , as well as over $GF(2^n)$ finite field are supported too. Note that the according user guidance abbreviates the Elliptic Curve cryptographic functions with ECC.

The ordered EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The certification covers the standard NIST [17] and Brainpool [18] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification process.

The SHA-2 library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU. The SHA-2 library is delivered as object code and is in this way available for the user software. This secure hash-algorithm SHA-2 is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance.

Either of the available toolbox libraries does not provide cryptographic support or additional security functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor: Addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, comparison, reduction, modular addition,

⁶ CRT: Chinese Remainder Theorem

modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion and modular exponentiation. No security relevant policy, mechanism or function is supported. The toolbox library is deemed for software developers as support for simplified implementation of long integer and modular arithmetic operations.

Either of the available Base Libraries provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor and has no user available interface. The base library does not provide any security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional specific security functionality.

Note:

The cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and the Toolbox library are delivery options. If one of the available libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox or combinations hereof are delivered, the respective Base Lib is automatically part of it. The TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2 and/or SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and/or SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES).

Both available Toolbox and Base Libraries are no cryptographic libraries and provide no additional specific security functionality.

2.2.3 Interfaces of the TOE

- The physical interface of the TOE to the external environment is the entire surface of the IC.
- The electrical interface of the TOE to the external environment is constituted by the pads of the chip:
 - The ISO 7816 pads consist particularly of the contacted RES, I/O, CLK lines and supply lines VCC and GND. The contact based communication is according to ISO 7816/ETSI/EMV.
 - The GPIO interface consists of 12 functional and 2 power pads which can be individually configured and combined in various ways.
 - The USB interface is built out of two differential USB-data pads and two power pads.
 - A further electrical interface are the La and Lb pads used for the antenna connection and alternatively for the ACLB communication mode connecting an external reader chip which is not part of the TOE.
 - The DCLB, the IIC and the SPI communication can be driven via the GPIO or ISO 7816 pads. This has certain dependencies if intended to be used simultaneously with other interfaces. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].
- The contactless or radio frequency interface enables contactless communication between a PICC (proximity integration chip card, PICC) and a PCD reader/writer (proximity coupling device, PCD). The required antenna is not part of the TOE.
- The data-oriented I/O interface to the TOE is formed by the I/O pads of ISO 7816, GPIO and USB interfaces and by the various contactless interface options.
- The interface to the firmware is constituted by special registers used for hardware configuration and control (Special Function Registers, SFR).

- The interface of the TOE to the operating system is constituted on one hand by the RMS routine calls and on the other by the instruction set of the TOE.
- The interface of the TOE to the test routines is formed by the STS test routine call, i.e. entry to test mode (STS-TM entry).
- The interface to the RSA calculations is defined from the RSA library interface.
- The interface to the EC calculations is defined from the EC library interface
- The interface to the SHA-2 calculation is defined from the SHA-2 library interface.
- The interface to the Toolbox is defined from the Toolbox library interface.
- The interface to the symmetric crypto-operations DES/TDES/AES is defined from the SCL library interface.

Note that the interfaces to the cryptographic libraries (SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2) are optionally depending on the customer order.

2.2.4 Guidance documentation

The guidance documentation consists of the listing given in the table in chapter 9. The exact versions of these documents are also given there, as well as the document number referenced here. The documents provide guidance as follows:

- The Hardware Reference Manual (HRM) [1] is the user data book of the TOE and contains the relevant module, function and feature description
- The Production and Personalization User's Manual (PPUM) [2] contains detailed information about the usage of the Flash Loader
- The Programmer's Reference Manual (PRM) [3] describes the usage and interface of the Resource Management System RMS.
- Depending on the ordered version of the asymmetric crypto library (which comprises the RSA, EC, Toolbox, and Base library), the Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2404T (CLUI) ([4] for v1.03.006, [29] for v2.03.008) contains all interfaces of the RSA, EC and Toolbox libraries and is only delivered to the user in case the RSA library and/or the EC library and/or the Toolbox library is/are part of the delivered TOE.
- The Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 [5] contains all interfaces of the SHA-2 library and is only delivered to the user in case the SHA-2 library is part of the delivered TOE. The security guidelines contain all hints and recommendations for a secure programming of the TOE.
- The Cypto@2304T User Manual (CUM) [6] describes the architecture of cryptographic coprocessor on register level. It also provides a functional description of the register architecture, instruction set and gives programming guidance.
- The Security Guidelines (SG) [7] represents the User Manual for the software programmers.
- The Errata Sheet (ES) [8] contains the description of all interfaces of the software to the hardware relevant for programming the TOE. The SLE70 Family Errata Sheet can be changed during the life cycle of the TOE. This is reported in a monthly updated list provided from Infineon Technologies AG to the user.

- The Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology (AMM) documentation [9] contains additional user guidance how to use the Advanced Mode for Mifare Technology (AMM). This documentation is provisioned to the user if the AMM option has been ordered. This user guidance describes the interface and how to implement and use this communication mode. This is an addendum to the HRM [1].
- The document SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES/AES [30] contains the description of the user interface, general concepts and important security guidelines for software designers.

Finally the certification report may contain an overview of the recommendations to the software developer regarding the secure use of the TOE. These recommendations are also included in the ordinary documentation.

2.2.5 Forms of delivery

The TOE can be delivered in form of complete modules, with or without inlay mounting, with or without inlay antenna mounting, in form of plain wafers or in an IC case (for example TSSOP28, VQFN32, VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.) or in bare dies. In any case, the form of delivery does not affect the TOE security and it can be delivered in any form, as long as the processes applied and sites involved have been subject of the appropriate audit.

The delivery can therefore be at the end of phase 3 or at the end of phase 4 which can also include pre-personalization steps according to the Protection Profile [11]. Nevertheless in both cases the TOE is finished and the extended test features are removed. In this document are always both cases mentioned to avoid incorrectness but from the security policy point of view the two cases are identical.

The delivery to the software developer (phase 2 → phase 1) contains the development package and is delivered in form of documentation as described above, data carriers containing the tools and emulators as development and debugging tool.

Part of the software delivery could also be the Flash Loader program, provided by Infineon Technologies AG, running on the TOE and receiving via the UART interface the transmitted information of the user software to be loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The download is only possible after successful authentication. The user software can also be downloaded in an encrypted way. In addition, the user is, after he finalized the download and prior deliver to third party, obligated to permanently lock further use of the Flash Loader. Note that it depends on the procurement order, whether the Flash Loader program is present or not.

2.2.6 Production sites

The TOE may be handled in different production sites but the silicon of this TOE is produced in Dresden, Germany. To distinguish the different production sites of various products in the field, the site is coded into the Generic Chip Ident Mode (GCIM) data. The exact coding of the generic chip identification data is described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1].

The delivery measures are described in the ALC_DVS aspect.

3 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)

3.1 CC Conformance Claim

This Security Target (ST) and the TOE claim conformance to Common Criteria version v3.1 part 1 [12], part 2 [13] and part 3 [14], following the evaluation methodology will be used for this evaluation “Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation” [36].

Furthermore conformance of this ST is claimed for:

Common Criteria part 2 extended and Common Criteria part 3 conformant.

The extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 6.

3.2 PP Claim

This Security Target is conformant to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [11].

The Security IC Platform Protection Profile is registered and certified by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik⁷ (BSI) under the reference:

BSI-PP-0035, Version 1.0, dated 2007-06-15.

The Protection Profile [11] requires the **strict conformance** for the ST claiming conformance to this PP. This is mentioned in chapter 2.2 of [11].

3.3 Package Claim

This Security Target does not claim conformance to a package of the PP [11].

The Security Target is EAL6 augmented with the component ALC_FLR.1.

Table 5: Augmentations of the assurance level of the TOE

Assurance Class	Assurance components	Description
Life-cycle support	ALC_FLR.1	Basic flaw remediation

Thus the targeted EAL6+ level includes already the augmentations of the PP [11] (AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2) and includes further augmentations compared to the predefined EAL6 assurance level (this package is defined in CC part 3).

⁷ Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) is the German Federal Office for Information Security

3.4 Conformance Rationale

This security target claims conformance to one PP, the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [11].

This Protection Profile requires strict conformance for the ST claiming conformance to this PP. This is mentioned in chapter 2.2 of [11].

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a typical security IC as defined in PP chapter 1.2.2 comprising:

- The circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories).
- Configuration data, initialization data related to the IC Dedicated Software and the behavior of the security functionality.
- The IC Dedicated Software with the parts.
- The IC Dedicated Test Software.
- The IC Dedicated Support Software.
- The associated user's guidance documentation.

The TOE is designed, produced and/or generated by the TOE Manufacturer.

3.4.1 Security Problem Definition

Compared to the PP [11], the security problem definition of this Security Target is enhanced by adding:

- Additional threats (for details refer to chapter 4.1.1).
- Additional organization security policies (for details refer to chapter 4.2.1).
- And additional assumptions (for details refer to chapter 4.3.1).

Aside these add-ons, the security problem definition of this Security Target is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PP [11], as the Protection Profile [11] demands strict conformance.

The threats and OSPs of the Security Target are a superset of the ones defined in the PP [11]. Although an additional assumption is defined in the Security Target compared to the PP [11], the Security Target is still strict conformant to the PP [11], as the added assumption does neither mitigate a threat, which is meant to be addressed by a security objective for the TOE nor does it fulfil an OSP, which is meant to be addressed by the security objectives for the TOE.

3.4.2 Security Objectives

Compared to the PP [11], the security objectives of this Security Target are enhanced by adding security objectives (for details refer to 5.1). These modifications are necessary due to the additional security functionalities, one coming from cryptographic libraries – O.Add-Functions and due to the memory access control – O.Mem-Access, additional security objectives have been introduced.

The Security Target is still strict conformant to the PP [11], as it is permissible for a Security Target to contain additional security objectives compared to the PP.

3.4.3 Summary

Due to the rationale provided above the Security Problem Definition (refer to chapter 4) and the Security Objectives (refer to chapter 5) are strict conformant to the PP [11].

The Security Target enhances the required assurance package EAL4+ augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 of the PP [11] to EAL6+ augmented with ALC_FLR.1. Thus the Security Target contains all assurance requirements, respectively hierarchically higher assurance requirements, of the PP [11].

Furthermore all security functional requirements defined in the PP [11] are included and completely defined in the Security Target and the augmented security functional requirements are listed in Table 15.

The following security functional requirements are defined in the Extended Component Definition of the Security Target (refer to chapter 6):

- FPT_TST.2 “Subset TOE security testing” (Requirements from [11])

All open assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are either done in the PP [11] or in this Security Target (please refer to chapter 7.1).

3.5 Application Notes

The functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is a refinement of the FCS_RNG.1 defined in the Protection Profile [11] according to AIS31, see reference [15].

4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)

The content of the PP [11] applies to this chapter completely.

4.1 Threats

The threats are directed against the assets and/or the security functions of the TOE. For example, certain attacks are only one step towards a disclosure of assets while others may directly lead to a compromise of the application security. The more detailed description of specific attacks is given later on in the process of evaluation and certification. An overview on attacks is given in PP [11] section 3.2.

The threats to security are defined and described in PP [11] section 3.2.

Table 6: Threats according PP [11]

T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation
T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing
T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage
T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality
T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers

4.1.1 Additional Threat due to TOE specific Functionality

The additional functionality of introducing sophisticated privilege levels and access control allows the secure separation between the operation system(s) and applications, the secure downloading of applications after personalization and enables multitasking by separating memory areas and performing access controls between different applications. Due to this additional functionality “area based memory access control” a new threat is introduced.

The Smartcard Embedded Software is responsible for its User Data according to the assumption “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)”. However, the Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise different parts, for instance an operating system and one or more applications. In this case, such parts may accidentally or deliberately access data (including code) of other parts, which may result in a security violation.

The TOE shall avert the threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” as specified below.

T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation

Parts of the Smartcard Embedded Software may cause security violations by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code) or privilege levels. Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific application context and must be implemented by the Smartcard Embedded Software.

Table 7: Additional threats due to TOE specific functions and augmentations

T.Mem-Access	Memory Access Violation
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For details see PP [11] section 3.2.

4.1.2 Assets regarding the Threats

The primary assets concern the User Data which includes the user data as well as program code (Security IC Embedded Software) stored and in operation and the provided security services. These assets have to be protected while being executed and or processed and on the other hand, when the TOE is not in operation.

This leads to four primary assets with its related security concerns:

- SC1 Integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories),
- SC2 Confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)
- SC3 Correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
- SC4 Continuous availability of random numbers

SC4 is an additional security service provided by this TOE which is the availability of random numbers. These random numbers are generated either by a physical true random number (PTRNG) or a deterministic random number generator (DRNG) or by both, when a true random number is used as seed for the deterministic random number generator. Note that the generation of random numbers is a requirement of the PP [11].

To be able to protect the listed assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality as well. Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:

- logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data
- Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data, specific development aids, test and characterization related data, material for software development support, and reticles.

The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE development and production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as follows:

- logical design data,
- physical design data,

- IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data,
- specific development aids,
- test and characterization related data,
- material for software development support, and
- reticles and products in any form

as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by the TOE Manufacturer.

For details see PP [11] section 3.1.

4.2 Organizational Security Policies

The TOE has to be protected during the first phases of their lifecycle (phases 2 up to TOE delivery which can be after phase 3 or phase 4). Later on each variant of the TOE has to protect itself. The organizational security policy covers this aspect.

P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production

An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.

The organizational security policies are defined and described in PP [11] section 3.3. Due to the augmentations of PP [11] an additional policy is introduced and described in the next chapter.

Table 8: Organizational Security Policies according PP [11]

P.Process-TOE	Protection during TOE Development and Production
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4.2.1 Augmented Organizational Security Policy

Due to the augmentations of the PP [11] an additional policy is introduced.

The TOE provides specific security functionality, which can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided in the context of the smartcard application, against which threats the Smartcard Embedded Software will use the specific security functionality.

The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Additional Specific Security Functionality (P.Add-Functions)” as specified below.

P.Add-Functions **Additional Specific Security Functionality**

The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- Secure hardware based cryptographic services by the optional software AES
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)
- Secure hardware based cryptographic services by the optional software TDES
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA),
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC)
- Secure hardware based cryptographic services by the optional software SHA
- Secure Hash Algorithm by Hardware (optional HW Hash)

Note:

The cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and the Toolbox library are delivery options. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2 and/or SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and/or SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES). The Toolbox library is no cryptographic library and provides no additional specific security functionality. If RSA, EC or Toolbox libraries are part of the shipment, the Base Library is automatically included. The Base Library does not provide additional specific functionality.

Note:

This TOE can come with both crypto coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both crypto coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by hardware is possible (neither solely hardware based nor SCL based). In case the Crypto@2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation supported by hardware is possible. The use of the SHA-2 library is also possible with both crypto coprocessors blocked. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors.

Note:

The TOE can come with the Secure Hash Algorithm by Hardware (optional HW Hash) being available or not. If the Hash module is blocked the hardware implemented Hash Algorithms are not available. The use of the Hash module is independent from the optional SHA-2 library software and also independent of the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors. No accessibility of the Hash module is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the Hash module.

4.3 Assumptions

The TOE assumptions on the operational environment are defined and described in PP [11] section 3.4.

The assumptions concern the phases where the TOE has left the chip manufacturer.

A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization

It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.Plat-Appl

Usage of Hardware Platform

The Security IC Embedded Software is designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE guidance documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as documented in the certification report.

A.Resp-Appl

Treatment of User Data

All User Data are owned by Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as defined for its specific application context.

The support of cipher schemas needs to make an additional assumption.

Table 9: Assumptions according PP [11]

A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
A.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform
A.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data

4.3.1 Augmented Assumptions

The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.

A.Key-Function

Usage of Key-dependent Functions

Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).

Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE.

For details see PP [11] section 3.4.

5 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)

This section shows the subjects and objects where are relevant to the TOE.

A short overview is given in the following.

The user has the following standard high-level security goals related to the assets:

- SG1 maintain the integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software
- SG2 maintain the confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software
- SG3 maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software
- SG4 provision of random numbers.

5.1 Security objectives for the TOE

The security objectives of the TOE are defined and described in PP [11] section 4.1.

Table 10: Objectives for the TOE according to PP [11]

O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunction
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification	TOE Identification
O.RND	Random Numbers

The TOE provides “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” as specified below.

O.Add-Functions	Additional Specific Security Functionality
------------------------	---

The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES),
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC),
- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-2).

Note:

The cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and the Toolbox library are delivery options. If one of the libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox or combination hereof are delivered, the Base Lib is automatically part of it. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2 and/or SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and/or SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES). The Toolbox library is no cryptographic library and provides no additional specific security functionality. If RSA, EC and Toolbox are part of the shipment, the Base Library is automatically included. The Base Library does not provide additional specific security functionality.

Note:

This TOE can come with both crypto coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both crypto coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by hardware is possible (neither solely hardware based nor SCL based). In case the Crypto@2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation supported by hardware is possible. The use of the SHA-2 library is also possible with both crypto coprocessors blocked. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors.

Note:

The TOE can come with the Secure Hash Algorithm by Hardware (optional HW Hash) being available or not. If the Hash module is blocked the hardware implemented Hash Algorithms are not available. The use of the Hash module is independent from the optional SHA-2 library software and also independent of the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors. No accessibility of the Hash module is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the Hash module.

The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified below.

O.Mem Access **Area based Memory Access Control**

The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with the capability to define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the partitioning of such memory areas so that access of software to memory areas and privilege levels is controlled as required, for example, in a multi-application environment.

Table 11: Additional objectives due to TOE specific functions and augmentations

O.Add-Functions	Additional specific security functionality
O.Mem-Access	Area based Memory Access Control

5.2 Security Objectives for the development and operational Environment

The security objectives for the security IC embedded software development environment and the operational environment is defined in PP [11] section 4.2 and 4.3. The table below lists the security objectives.

Table 12: Security objectives for the environment according to PP [11]

Phase 1	OE.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform
	OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data
Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4	OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing

5.2.1 Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”

Regarding the cryptographic services this objective of the environment has to be clarified. The TOE supports cipher schemes as additional specific security functionality. If required the Smartcard Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software are just being executed, the Smartcard Embedded Software must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data) stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the methods described under “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)”.

The objectives of the environment regarding the memory, software and firmware protection and the SFR and peripheral-access-rights-handling have to be clarified. For the separation of different applications the Smartcard Embedded Software (Operating System) may implement a memory management scheme based upon security functions of the TOE.

5.2.2 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-AppI)”

Regarding the cryptographic services this objective of the environment has to be clarified. By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Smartcard Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.

This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is beyond practicality to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realized in the environment.

Regarding the memory, software and firmware protection and the SFR and peripheral access rights handling these objectives of the environment has to be clarified. The treatment of User Data is also required when a multi-application operating system is implemented as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the multi-application operating system should not disclose security relevant user data of one application to another application when it is processed or stored on the TOE.

5.2.3 Clarification of “Protection during composite product manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”

The protection during packaging, finishing and personalization includes also the personalization process (Flash Loader software) and the personalization data (TOE software components) during Phase 4, Phase 5 and Phase 6.

5.3 Security Objectives Rationale

The security objectives rationale of the TOE are defined and described in PP [11] section 4.4. For organizational security policy P.Add-Functions, OE.Plat-AppI and OE.Resp-AppI the rationale is given in the following description.

Table 13: Security Objective Rationale

Assumption, Threat or Organizational Security Policy	Security Objective
P.Add-Functions	O.Add-Functions
A.Key-Function	OE.Plat-AppI OE.Resp-AppI
T.Mem-Access	O.Mem-Access

The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” is as follows: Since O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-Functions; the organizational security policy is covered by the objective.

Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions. (Note that these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way as expected from P.Add-Functions.) Especially O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) in general. User Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions.

Compared to PP [11] clarification has been made for the security objective “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”: If required the Smartcard Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. In addition, the Smartcard Embedded Software must implement functions which perform operations on keys (if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data. The non-disclosure due to leakage A.Key-Function attacks is included in this objective OE.Plat-Appl. This addition ensures that the assumption A.Plat-Appl is still covered by the objective OE.Plat-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to O.Add-Functions.

Compared to the PP [11] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Smartcard Embedded Software will protect such data if required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. The user has appropriate means to generate a key in a safe environment and import it to the TOE. Quality and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realized in the environment. That is expressed by the assumption A.Key—Function which is covered from OE.Resp—Appl. These measures make sure that the assumption A.Resp-Appl is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Functions.

Compared to the PP [11] an enhancement regarding memory area protection has been established. The clear definition of privilege levels for operated software establishes the clear separation of different restricted memory areas for running the firmware, downloading and/or running the operating system and to establish a clear separation between different applications. Nevertheless, it is also possible to define a shared memory section where separated applications may exchange defined data. The privilege levels clearly define by using a hierarchical model the access right from one level to the other. These measures ensure that the threat T.Mem-Access is clearly covered by the security objective O.Mem-Access.

The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumption show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

6 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)

There are four extended components defined and described for the TOE:

- the family **FCS_RNG** at the class FCS Cryptographic Support
- the family **FMT_LIM** at the class FMT Security Management
- the family **FAU_SAS** at the class FAU Security Audit
- the component **FPT_TST.2** at the class FPT Protection of the TSF

The extended components FCS_RNG, FMT_LIM and FAU_SAS are defined and described in PP [11] section 5. The component FPT_TST.2 is defined in the following.

6.1 Component “Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)”

The security is strongly dependent on the correct operation of the security functions. Therefore, the TOE shall support that particular security functions or mechanisms are tested in the operational phase (Phase 7). The tests can be initiated by the Smartcard Embedded Software and/or by the TOE or is done automatically and continuously.

Part 2 of the Common Criteria provides the security functional component “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)”. The component FPT_TST.1 provides the ability to test the TSF’s correct operation.

For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition, FPT_TST.1 requires verification of the integrity of TSF data and of the stored TSF executable code which might violate the security policy. Therefore, the functional component “**Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)**” of the family TSF self-test has been newly created. This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE are tested.

6.2 Definition of FPT_TST.2


The functional component “Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)” has been newly created (Common Criteria Part 2 extended). This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE can be tested after TOE Delivery or are tested automatically and continuously during normal operation transparent for the user.

This security functional component is used instead of the functional component FPT_TST.1 from Common Criteria Part 2. For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition, FPT_TST.1 requires verifying the integrity of TSF data and stored TSF executable code which might violate the security policy. The functional component “Subset TOE testing (FPT_TST.2)” is specified as given in the following chapter (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

6.2.1 TSF self test (FPT_TST)

Family Behavior The Family Behavior is defined in [13] section 15.14 (442, 443).

Component leveling



FPT_TST.1	The component FPT_TST.1 is defined in [3] section 15.14 (444, 445, 446).
FPT_TST.2	<p>Subset TOE security testing, provides the ability to test the correct operation of particular security functions or mechanisms. These tests may be performed at start-up, periodically, at the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It also provides the ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.</p> <p>Management: FPT_TST.2</p> <p>The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management of the conditions under which subset TSF self-testing occurs, such as during initial start-up, regular interval or under specified conditions • Management of the time of the interval appropriate. <p>Audit: FPT_TST.2</p> <p>There are no auditable events foreseen.</p>

FPT_TST.2	Subset TOE Testing
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies to other components.
FPT_TST.2.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [selection: <i>during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, and/or at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]</i>] to demonstrate the correct operation of [assignment: <i>functions and/or mechanisms</i>].

7 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)

For this section the PP [11] section 6 can be applied completely.

7.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The security functional requirements (SFR) for the TOE are defined and described in the PP [11] section 6.1 and in the following description.

The following table provides an overview of the functional security requirements of the TOE, defined in the in PP [11] section 6.1. In the last column it is marked if the requirement is refined. The refinements are also valid for this ST.

Table 14: Security functional requirements defined in PP [11]

Security Functional Requirement	Refined in PP [11]
FRU_FLT.2 "Limited fault tolerance"	Yes
FPT_FLS.1 "Failure with preservation of secure state"	Yes
FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities"	No
FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability"	No
FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage"	No
FPT_PHP.3 "Resistance to physical attack"	Yes
FDP_ITT.1 "Basic internal transfer protection"	Yes
FPT_ITT.1 "Basic internal TSF data transfer protection"	Yes
FDP_IFC.1 "Subset information flow control"	No
FCS_RNG.1 "Random Number Generation"	No

The Table 15 provides an overview about the augmented security functional requirements, which are added to the TOE and defined in this ST. All requirements are taken from Common Criteria Part 2 [13], with the exception of the requirement FPT_TST.2, which is defined in this ST completely.

Table 15: Augmented security functional requirements

Security Functional Requirement	
FPT_TST.2	"Subset TOE security testing"
FDP_ACC.1	"Subset access control"
FDP_ACF.1	"Security attribute based access control"
FMT_MSA.1	"Management of security attributes"

Security Functional Requirement	
FMT_MSA.3	“Static attribute initialization”
FMT_SMF.1	“Specification of Management functions”
FCS_COP.1/TDES	“Cryptographic support -TDES”
FCS_COP.1/AES	“Cryptographic support - AES”
FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL	“Cryptographic support TDES-SCL”
FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL	“Cryptographic support AES-SCL”
FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006	“Cryptographic support – RSA-v1.03.006”
FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008	“Cryptographic support – RSA-v2.03.008”
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008	“Cryptographic support – RSA-v2.03.008”
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006	“Cryptographic support – ECDSA-v1.03.006”
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008	“Cryptographic support – ECDSA-v2.03.008”
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006	“Cryptographic support – ECDH-v1.03.006”
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008	“Cryptographic support – ECDH-v2.03.008”
FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW	“Cryptographic support – SHA-SW”
FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW	“Cryptographic support – SHA-HW”
FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006	“Cryptographic key management-EC-v1.03.006”
FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008	“Cryptographic key management-EC-v2.03.008”
FCS_CKM.4/TDES	“Cryptographic key destruction -TDES”
FCS_CKM.4/AES	“Cryptographic key destruction - AES”
FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL	“Cryptographic key destruction –TDES-SCL”
FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL	“Cryptographic key destruction - AES-SCL”
FDP_SDI.1	“Stored data integrity monitoring”
FDP_SDI.2	“Stored data integrity monitoring and action”

All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements of the TOE are done in PP [11] and in the following description.

7.1.1 Extended Components FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1

7.1.1.1 FCS_RNG

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined as an extended component in the PP [11]. This family describes the functional

requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The PP [11] does already provide an instance of this SFR with a completed selection and a partially completed assignment. The instance of FCS_RNG.1 that will be used within this ST is completed according to AIS31 [15]. The element FCS_RNG.1.1 was subject of an editorial refinement in order to provide an easy integration of the PTG.2 class from AIS31 [5]. Furthermore the element FCS_RNG.1.2 was functionally refined, which is indicated by the underlined text. This refinement does specify the format of the provided random numbers and does not mitigate the security functional requirement, as defined in the PP [11]. The Security Target is still strict conformant to the PP [11], as the refined FCS_RNG.1 still meets the requirement as defined in the PP [11].

FCS_RNG.1	Random number generation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1	Random numbers generation Class PTG.2 according to [5]
FCS_RNG.1.1	<p>The TSF shall provide a <i>physical</i> random number generator that implements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>PTG.2.1 A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.</i> • <i>PTG.2.2 If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.</i> • <i>PTG.2.3 The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.</i> • <i>PTG.2.4 The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.</i> • <i>PTG.2.5 The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.</i>
FCS_RNG.1.2	<p>The TSF shall provide numbers <u>in the format 8- or 16-bit</u> that meet:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>PTG.2.6 Test procedure A, as defined in [5] does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.</i> • <i>PTG.2.7 The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.</i>

Note:

The physical random number generator implements total failure test of the random source and a continuous RNG test according to following standard:

National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 140-2 [37], 2002-12-03, chapter 4.9.2.

7.1.1.2 FAU_SAS

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FAU_SAS.1	Audit Storage
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1	The TSF shall provide the <i>test process before TOE Delivery</i> with the capability to store the <i>Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software</i> in the <i>not changeable configuration page area and non-volatile memory</i> .

7.1.2 Subset of TOE testing

The security is strongly dependent on the correct operation of the security functions. Therefore, the TOE shall support that particular security functions or mechanisms are tested in the operational phase (Phase 7). The tests can be initiated by the Smartcard Embedded Software and/or by the TOE.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset TOE testing (FPT_TST.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FPT_TST.2	Subset TOE testing
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_TST.2.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests <i>at the request of the authorized user</i> to demonstrate the correct operation of the <i>alarm lines and/or following environmental sensor mechanisms</i> : <i>The information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].</i>

7.1.3 Memory access control

Usage of multiple applications in one Smartcard often requires code and data separation in order to prevent that one application can access code and/or data of another application. For this reason the TOE provides Area based Memory

Access Control. The underlying memory management unit (MMU) is documented in section 4 of the hardware reference manual HRM [1].

The security service being provided is described in the Security Function Policy (SFP) **Memory Access Control Policy**. The security functional requirement “**Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)**” requires that this policy is in place and defines the scope where it applies. The security functional requirement “**Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)**” defines security attribute usage and characteristics of policies. It describes the rules for the function that implements the Security Function Policy (SFP) as identified in FDP_ACC.1. The decision whether an access is permitted or not is taken based upon attributes allocated to the software. The Smartcard Embedded Software defines the attributes and memory areas. The corresponding permission control information is evaluated “on-the-fly” by the hardware so that access is granted/effective or denied/inoperable.

The security functional requirement “**Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)**” ensures that the default values of security attributes are appropriately either permissive or restrictive in nature. Alternative values can be specified by any subject provided that the **Memory Access Control Policy** allows that. This is described by the security functional requirement “**Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)**”. The attributes are determined during TOE manufacturing (FMT_MSA.3) or set at run-time (FMT_MSA.1).

From TOE’s point of view the different roles in the Smartcard Embedded Software can be distinguished according to the memory based access control. However the definition of the roles belongs to the user software.

The following Security Function Policy (SFP) **Memory Access Control Policy** is defined for the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”:

Memory Access Control Policy

The TOE shall control read, write, delete and execute accesses of software running at the privilege levels as defined below. Any access is controlled, regardless whether the access is on code or data or a jump on any other privilege level outside the current one.

The memory model provides distinct, independent privilege levels separated from each other in the virtual address space. The access rights to these levels are controlled by the MMU. Further details are given in the confidential Security Target [10].

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below.

FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> on all subjects (software running at the defined and assigned privilege levels), all objects (data including code stored in memories) and all the operations defined in the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> , i.e. privilege levels.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below.

FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> to objects based on the following: <i>Subject:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Software running at the IFX, OS1 and OS2 privilege levels required to securely operate the chip. This includes also privilege levels running interrupt routines.</i> • <i>Software running at the privilege levels containing the application software</i> <i>Object:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Data including code stored in memories</i> <i>Attributes:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The memory area where the access is performed to and/or</i> • <i>The operation to be performed.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <i>evaluate the corresponding permission control information of the relevant memory range before, during or after the access so that accesses to be denied cannot be utilized by the subject attempting to perform the operation.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none.</i>

FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified below.

FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> to provide <i>well defined</i> ⁸ default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2	The TSF shall allow <i>any subject, provided that the Memory Access Control Policy is enforced and the necessary access is therefore allowed</i> ⁹ , to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” as specified below:

FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> to restrict the ability to <i>change default, modify or delete</i> the security attributes <i>permission control information to the software running on the privilege levels</i> .

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below:

FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to	No other components.

⁸ The static definition of the access rules is documented in [6]

⁹ The Smartcard Embedded Software is intended to set the memory access control policy

Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <i>access the configuration registers of the MMU.</i>

7.1.4 Support of Cipher Schemes

The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation requires a cryptographic operation to be performed in accordance with a specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of specified sizes. The specified algorithm and cryptographic key sizes can be based on an assigned standard; dependencies are discussed in Section 7.3.1.1 “Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements”.

The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:

- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ¹⁰
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) ¹⁰
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) ¹¹
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) ¹¹
- Secure Hash Algorithm by software (SHA-2)
- Secure Hash Algorithm by hardware (Hash).

Note that the additional function of the EC library, providing the primitive elliptic curve operations, does not add specific security functionality.

Note:

This TOE can come with both crypto coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both crypto coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by hardware is possible (neither solely hardware based nor SCL based). In case the Crypto@2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation supported by hardware is possible. In case of a blocked Crypto@2304T the optionally delivered cryptographic and the supporting Toolbox and Base Library cannot be used in that TOE product. The use of the SHA-2 library is also possible with both crypto coprocessors blocked. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors.

¹⁰ The TOE provides a solely hardware based AES and TDES implementation and the AES and TDES calculations provided by the SCL.

¹¹ For the case the TOE comes without RSA and/or EC library, the TOE provides basic HW-related routines for RSA and/or EC calculations. For a secure library implementation the user has to implement additional countermeasures himself.

7.1.4.1 Preface regarding Security Level related to Cryptography

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification (see [24] Section 9, Para.4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functions it shall be checked whether the related cryptographic operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the “Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102”, www.bsi.bund.de.

Any cryptographic functionality that is marked in the column “Security level above 100 Bits” of the following table with a “no” achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context).

Table 16: Cryptographic TOE functionality

Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
Key Agreement			
ECDH	[23]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192,224}, K-{163,233}, B-{233} [17], and brainpool P{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpool P{160, 192, 224}t1 [18]	No
ECDH	[39]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-{409}, B-{283, 409} [17], brainpool P{256, 320, 384, 512}r1, brainpool P{256, 320, 384, 512}t1 [18]	Yes
ECDSA key generation	[22], [26]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192,224}, K-{163,233}, B-{233} [17] and brainpool P{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpool P{160, 192, 224}t1 [18]	No
ECDSA key generation	[22], [26]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-{409}, B-{283, 409} [17], brainpool P{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpool P{256,320,384,512}t1 [18])	Yes
ECDSA signature generation / verification	[22], [26]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192,224}, K-{163,233}, B-{233} [17] and brainpool P{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpool P{160, 192, 224}t1 [18]	No
ECDSA signature generation / verification	[22], [26]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-{409}, B-{283, 409} [17], brainpool P{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpool P{256,320,384,512}t1	Yes

Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
		[18])	
TDES	[19]	k = 112 in all operating modes	No
	[19]	k = 168	Yes
	proprietary	k = 168 Blinding Feedback Mode	No
	proprietary	k = 168 Recrypt	Yes
	[19], [27], [28]	k = 168 in operating mode ECB, CBC-MAC. CBC-MAC-ELB	No
AES	[20]	k = 128, 192, 256	Yes
	[20], [27]	k = 128, 192, 256 in operating modes CBC, CFB, CTR	Yes
	proprietary	k = 128, 192, 256 Recrypt	Yes
	proprietary	k = 128, 192, 256 Operating mode: BLD	No
	[20], [27], [28]	k = 128, 192, 256 in operating mode ECB, CBC-MAC, CBC-MAC-ELB	No
RSA encryption / decryption / signature generation / verification (only modular exponentiation part)	[21]	Modulus length = 1976 - 4096	Yes
SHA-{256, 512}	[25]	None	N/A, keyless operation
Physical True RNG PTG.2	[15]	N/A	N/A

7.1.4.2 Triple-DES Operation

The DES Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” and “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/TDES	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES	<p>The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in the <i>Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)</i>, in the <i>Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)</i>, in the <i>Blinding Feedback Mode (BLD)</i>, in the <i>Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC-MAC)</i>, in the <i>CBC-MAC-encrypt-last-block (CBC-MAC-ELB)</i> and in the <i>Recrypt Mode</i> and cryptographic key sizes of <i>112 bit and 168 bit</i> that meet the following standards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>TDES:</i> <i>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-67 Rev. 1 [19]</i> • <i>ECB, CBC:</i> <i>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [27]</i> • <i>CBC-MAC, CBC-MAC-ELB:</i> <i>ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 [28]</i> • <i>Recrypt and BLD Mode</i> <i>Proprietary, description given in the hardware reference manual HRM [1]</i>

Note:

This SFR applies to the solely hardware based TDES calculations and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP.

FCS_CKM.4/TDES	Cryptographic key destruction – TDES
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4/TDES	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <i>overwriting or zeroing</i> that meets the following: None:
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Note:

This SFR applies to the solely hardware based TDES and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP. The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by software reset of the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.

FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL	Cryptographic operation - TDES_SCL
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES_SCL	The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) in the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB), in the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Counter (CTR) Modes</i> and cryptographic key sizes of <i>112 bit and 168 bit</i> that meet the following standards: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES):</i> <i>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-67 Rev. 1 [19].</i> • <i>Block Cipher Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR:</i> <i>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [27].</i>

Note:

This SFR refers to the TDES calculations provided by the optional symmetric cryptographic library (SCL) and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP or without SCL.

FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL	Cryptographic key destruction – TDES_SCL
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of

	user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <i>overwriting or zeroing</i> that meets the following: None.

Note:

This SFR refers to the TDES provided by the optional symmetric cryptographic library (SCL) and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP or without SCL. The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by software reset of the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers. The data object stored in the memory of the TOE can be destroyed using the “Cipher_Close” function of the SCL.

7.1.4.3 AES Operation

The AES Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” and “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/AES	Cryptographic operation - AES
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES	The TSF shall perform <i>encryption and decryption</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in ECB mode and CBC mode</i> and cryptographic key sizes of <i>128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit</i> that meet the following standards: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [27]</i> • <i>ISO/IEC 10118-3 [34]</i> • <i>ISO/IEC 18033-3 [35]</i> • <i>FIPS 197 [20]</i>

Note:

This SFR refers solely to the hardware based AES calculation and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP.

FCS_CKM.4/AES	Cryptographic key destruction – AES
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/AES	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <i>overwriting or zeroing</i> that meets the following: None.

Note:

This SFR refers to solely hardware based AES and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP. The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by software reset of the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.

FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL	Cryptographic operation – AES_SCL
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES_SCL	The TSF shall perform <i>encryption and decryption</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC), Counter Mode (CTR) and Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)</i> and cryptographic key sizes of <i>128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit</i> that meet the following standards: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES):</i> <i>U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS 197 [20], ISO/IEC 10118-3 [34], ISO/IEC 18033-3 [35].</i> • <i>Block Cipher Modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB</i> <i>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [27]</i>

Note:

This SFR applies to the AES calculations provided by the optional symmetric library (SCL) and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP or without SCL.

FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL	Cryptographic key destruction – AES-SCL
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/AES_SCL	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <i>overwriting or zeroing</i> that meets the following: None.

Note:

This SFR refers to the AES interface provided by the symmetric cryptographic library (SCL) and is not applicable if the TOE is delivered with a blocked SCP or without SCL. The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key registers interfaces or by software reset of the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers. The data object stored in the memory of the TOE can be destroyed using the “Cipher_Close()” function of the SCL.

7.1.4.4 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) operation

The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006	Cryptographic operation -RSA-v1.03.006
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA-v1.03.006	The TSF shall perform <i>encryption and decryption</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)</i> and cryptographic key sizes 1976 - 4096 bits that meet the following <i>standards</i>

Encryption:

According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS v2.1 RFC3447 [21], without 5.1.1.1.

Decryption (with or without CRT):

According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS v2.1 RFC3447 for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$, therefore without 5.1.2.2.b (ii)&(v), without 5.1.2.1. 5.1.2.2.a, only supported up to $n < 2^{2048}$

Signature Generation (with or without CRT):

According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS v2.1 RFC3447 for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$, therefore without 5.2.1.2.b (ii)&(v), without 5.2.1.1. 5.2.1.2.a, only supported up to $n < 2^{2048}$

Signature Verification:

According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS v2.1 RFC3447, without 5.2.2.1.

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the RSA library version v1.03.006 are both ordered by the customer.

FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008 Cryptographic operation – RSA-v2.03.008

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/RSA-v2.03.008 The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)* and cryptographic key sizes 1976 - 4096 bits that meet the following standards

Encryption:

1. According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS [21]:

- Supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$

- 5.1.1(1) not supported

2. According to section 8.2.2 IFEP-RSA in IEEE [33]:

- Supported for $n < 24096 + 128$

Decryption (with or without CRT):

1. According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS [21]:

for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$

- 5.1.2(1) not supported
- 5.1.2(2.a) not supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 5.1.2(2.b) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to $u = 2$

2. According to section 8.2.3 IEEE [33]:

- 8.2.1(I) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 8.2.1(II) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$

8.2.1(III) not supported

Signature Generation (with or without CRT):

1. According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS [21]:

for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$

- 5.2.1(1) not supported
- 5.2.1(2.a) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 5.2.1(2b) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 5.2.1(2b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to $u = 2$

2. According to section 8.2.4 IFSP-RSA1 in IEEE [33]:

- 8.2.1(I) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 8.2.1(II) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 8.2.1(III) not supported

Signature Verification:

1. According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS [21]:

supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$

- 5.2.2(1) not supported

2. According to section 8.2.5 IEEE [33]:

- Supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 8.2.5(1) not supported

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the RSA library version v2.03.008 are both ordered by the customer.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

7.1.4.5 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key generation

The key generation for the RSA shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”

ACL v1.03.006 does not provide functionality for RSA primary keys generation.

Valid for cryptographic library version v2.03.008:

FCS_CKM.1/RSA- v2.03.008 Cryptographic key generation

Dependencies: FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA-
v2.03.008** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *rsagen1* and specified cryptographic key sizes of 1024 – 4096 bits that meet the following standard:

1. According to section 3.1 and 3.2 in PKCS [22]:

for $u=2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$

- 3.1 supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 3.2(1) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 3.2(2) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$

2. According to section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE [28]:

- 8.1.3.1(1) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 8.1.3.1(2) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 8.1.3.1(3) supported for $p \times q < 2^{2048 + 64}$

Note 1:

For easy integration of RSA functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if required.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

End of note.

Note 2:

The TOE can be delivered with or without the RSA library. If the TOE comes with, automatically the Base Library is part of the shipment. In the case of coming without the RSA library the TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) realized with the security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008 and FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008. In case of a blocked Crypto2304T the optionally delivered cryptographic and the supporting Toolbox and Base Library cannot be used in that TOE product.

End of note.

7.1.4.6 General Preface regarding Elliptic Curve Cryptography

The EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The certification covers the standard NIST [17] and Brainpool [18] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI. Note that there are numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side channel attacks on this TOE, which the user can optionally add in the composition certification process.

All curves are based on finite field GF(p) with size $p \in [2^{41-1}; 2^{521}]$ as well as curves based on a finite field GF(2ⁿ) with size $n \in [41 - 1; 521]$ are supported.

7.1.4.7 Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) operation

The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006	Cryptographic operation – ECDSA-v1.03.006
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006	The TSF shall perform <i>signature generation and signature verification</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes <i>160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits</i> that meet the following <i>standard</i> :
	Signature Generation:
	1. According to section 7.3 in ANSI X9.62 – 2005 [22]
	<i>Not implemented are steps d) and e) thereof.</i>

The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.

Deviation of steps c) and f):

The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.

2. According to sections 6.2 (6.2.2. + 6.2.3) in ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002 [38]

Not implemented is section 6.2.1:

The output of 5.4.2 has to be provided by the caller as input to the function.

Signature Verification:

1. According to section 7.4.1 in ANSI X9.62–2005 [22]

Not implemented are steps b) and c) thereof.

The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.

Deviation of step d):

Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of BasepointerOrder n to the calculated values $u1$ and $u2$.

2. According to sections 6.4 (6.4.1. + 6.4.3 + 6.4.4) in ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002 [38]

Not implemented is section 6.4.2:

The output of 5.4.2 has to be provided by the caller as input to the function.

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the EC library version v1.03.006 are both ordered by the customer.

FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008 Cryptographic operation- ECDSA-v2.03.008

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4

Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA-
v2.03.008**

The TSF shall perform *signature generation and signature verification* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following *standard*:

ECDSA Signature Generation

According to section "7.3 Signing Process" in ANSI X9.62 – 2005 [22]:

Steps d) and e) not supported.

The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.

Deviation of step c) and f):

The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.

According to section "6.4.3 Signature process" in ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006 [31]:

6.4.3.3 not supported.

6.4.3.5 not supported:

the hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as input to our function.

6.4.3.7 not supported.

6.4.3.8 not supported.

According to section "7.2.7 ECSP-DSA" in IEEE Std 1363-2000 [33]:

Deviation of step (3) and (4):

The jumps to step 1, were substituted by a return of the function with an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.

ECDSA Signature Verification:

According to section "7.4.1 Verification with the Public Key" in ANSI X9.62 – 2005 [22]:

Steps b) and c) not supported.

The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.

Deviation of step d):

Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of BasepointOrder n to the calculated values u_1 and u_2 .

According to section "6.4.4 Signature Verification Process" in ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006 [31]:

6.4.4.2 not supported.

6.4.4.3 not supported:

the hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as input to our function.

According to section "7.2.8 ECVP-DSA" in IEEE Std 1363-2000 [33].

Note:

The former ISO/IEC standard 15946 has been withdrawn.

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the EC library version v2.03.008 are both ordered by the customer.

Note:

For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if required.

7.1.4.8 Elliptic Curve (EC) key generation

The key generation for the EC shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”

FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006	Cryptographic key generation – EC-v1.03.006
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/EC-v1.03.006	<p>The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <i>Elliptic Curve EC specified in ANSI X9.62-2005 [22] and ISO/IEC 15946-1:2002 [26]</i> and specified cryptographic key sizes <i>160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits</i> that meet the following <i>standard</i>:</p> <p>ECDSA Key Generation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. According to the appendix A4.3 in ANSI X9.62-2005 [22] <i>the cofactor h is not supported.</i> 2. According to section 6.1 (not 6.1.1) in ISO/IEC 15946-1:2002 [26]

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the EC library version v1.03.006 are both ordered by the customer.

FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008	Cryptographic key generation – EC-v2.03.008
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Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/EC-v2.03.008	<p>The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <i>Elliptic Curve EC</i> and specified cryptographic key sizes <i>160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits</i> that meet the following <i>standard</i>:</p> <p>ECDSA Key Generation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>According to the appendix A4.3 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation in ANSI X9.62 [22]: The optional cofactor h is not supported.</i> 2. <i>According to section 6.4.2 Generation of signature key and verification key in ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006[31].</i> 3. <i>According to appendix A.16.9 An algorithm for generating EC keys in IEEE Std. 1363-2000 [33].</i>

Note:

The former ISO/IEC standard 15946 has been withdrawn.

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the EC library version v2.03.008 are both ordered by the customer.

Note:

For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if required.

7.1.4.9 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement

The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006	Cryptographic operation – ECDH-v1.03.006
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

<p>FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-v1.03.006</p>	<p>FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction</p> <p>The TSF shall perform <i>elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>ECDH</i> and cryptographic key sizes <i>160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits</i> that meet the following <i>standard</i>:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>According to section 5.4.1 in ANSI X9.63-2001[23]</i> <i>Unlike section 5.4.1.3 our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and y-coordinate.</i> 2. <i>According to sections 8.4.2.1, 8.4.2.2, 8.4.2.3, and 8.4.2.4 in ISO/IEC 15946-3:2002[39]:</i> <i>The function enables the operations described in the four sections.</i>
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Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the EC library version v1.03.006 are both ordered by the customer.

<p>FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008</p>	<p>Cryptographic operation – ECDH-v2.03.008</p>
<p>Hierarchical to:</p>	<p>No other components.</p>
<p>Dependencies:</p>	<p>[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction</p>
<p>FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-v2.03.008</p>	<p>The TSF shall perform <i>elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>ECDH</i> and cryptographic key sizes <i>160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits</i> that meet the following <i>standard</i>:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>According to section 5.4.1 Standard Diffie-Hellman Primitive in ANSI X9.63 [23]</i> <i>Unlike section 5.4.1(3) our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.</i> 2. <i>According to section Appendix D.6 Key agreement of Diffie-Hellman type in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [32] the function enables the operations described in appendix D.6</i> 3. <i>According to section 7.2.1 ECSVHDP-DP in IEEE Std. 1363:2000 [33].</i> <i>Unlike section 7.2.1 our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the</i>

shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.

Note:

The Security Functional Requirement FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008 is only available if (1) the asymmetric coprocessor Crypto@2304T and (2) the EC library version v2.03.008 are both ordered by the customer.

Note:

The certification covers the standard NIST [18] and Brainpool [19] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification process.

Note:

For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if required.

The EC primitives allow the selection of various curves. The selection of the curves depends to the user.

7.1.4.10 SHA-2 Operation with Cryptographic Software Library

The SHA-2 Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW	<p>The TSF shall perform <i>Hash-value calculation of user chosen data</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>SHA-2</i> and with cryptographic key sizes <i>of none</i> that meet the following <i>standards</i>:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>U.S. Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4 [25], 2012-March, section 6.2 SHA-256 and section 6.4 SHA-512.</i></p>

Note:

These SFR are not applicable if the TOE is delivered without the SHA-2 library.

Note:

The SHA-2 cryptographic operation is a keyless operation.

Note:

The secure hash-algorithm SHA-2 is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. The SHA-library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance.

7.1.4.11 Hash Operation with Hardware Module

The Hash operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.

FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW	<p>The TSF shall perform <i>hash-value calculation of user chosen data</i> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <i>SHA-2</i> and with cryptographic key sizes of <i>none</i> that meet the following <i>standards</i>:</p> <p><i>U.S. Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4 [25], 2012-March, section 6.2 SHA-256.</i></p>

Note that the hash cryptographic operation is a keyless operation.

Note:

This Hash module is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Following the BSI recommendations the algorithms MD-5 and SHA-1 are not covered by this evaluation. Further essential information about the usage is given in the confidential user guidance.

7.1.5 Data Integrity

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring (FDP_SDI.1)” as specified below:

FDP_SDI.1	Stored data integrity monitoring
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies
FDP_SDI.1.1	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <i>inconsistencies between stored data and corresponding EDC</i> on all objects, based on the following attributes: <i>EDC values for certain memories</i> .

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)” as specified below:

FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to:	FDP_SDI.1 stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies:	No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2.1	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <i>data integrity and one- and/or more-bit-errors</i> on all objects, based on the following attributes: <i>corresponding EDC value for the memories and error correction for the SOLID FLASH™ NVM</i> .
FDP_SDI.2.2	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall correct 1 bit errors in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM automatically and inform the user about more bit errors.

7.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The evaluation assurance level is EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.

In the following table, the security assurance requirements are given. The augmentation of the assurance components compared to the Protection Profile [11] is expressed with bold letters.

Table 17: Assurance Components

Aspect	Acronym	Description	Refinement
Development	ADV_ARC.1	Security Architecture Description	In PP [11]
	ADV_FSP.5	Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information	in ST
	ADV_IMP.2	Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF	In ST
	ADV_INT.3	Minimally complex internals	
	ADV_TDS.5	Complete semi-formal modular design	
	ADV_SPM.1	Formal TOE security policy model	
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	in PP [11]
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	in PP [11]
Life-Cycle Support	ALC_CMC.5	Advanced support	in ST
	ALC_CMS.5	Development tools CM coverage	in ST
	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	in PP [11]
	ALC_DVS.2	Sufficiency of security measures	in PP [11]
	ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model	
	ALC_TAT.3	Compliance with implementation standards – all parts	
	ALC_FLR.1	Basic Flaw Remediation	
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims	
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition	
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction	
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives	
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements	
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition	
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification	
Tests	ATE_COV.3	Rigorous analysis of coverage	in ST
	ATE_DPT.3	Testing: modular design	
	ATE_FUN.2	Ordered functional testing	
	ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample	

Aspect	Acronym	Description	Refinement
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.5	Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	in PP [11]

7.2.1 Refinements

Some refinements are taken unchanged from the PP [11]. In some cases a clarification is necessary. In the table above an overview is given where the refinement is done.

The refinements from the PP [11] have to be discussed here in the Security Target, as the assurance level is increased. The refinements from the PP [11] are included in the chosen assurance level EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.

7.2.1.1 Development (ADV)

ADV_IMP Implementation Representation:

The refined assurance package ADV_IMP.1 implementation representation of the TSF requires the availability of the entire implementation representation, a mapping of the design description to the implementation representation with a level of detail that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions. In addition, the correspondence of design description and implementation representation shall be demonstrated.

The covered higher assurance package ADV_IMP.2 requires a complete and not curtailed mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF, and the mapping of the design description to the entire implementation representation. In addition, the correspondence of design description and the implementation representation shall be demonstrated. The ADV_IMP.1 aspect and refinement remains therefore valid. The enhancement underlines the refinement in the PP [11] and by that the entirely complete design i.e. not curtailed representation with according mapping was provided, demonstrated and reviewed.

ADV_FSP Functional Specification:

The ADV_FSP.4 package requires a functional description of the TSFIs and there assignment to SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, SFR-non-interfering, including related error messages, the assurance package. The enhancement of ADV_FSP.5 requires additionally a complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information. In addition the package includes a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs, as well as the TSFIs descriptions including error messages not resulting from an invocation of a TSFI.

These aspects from ADV_FSP.5 are independent from the ADV_FSP.4 refinements from the PP [11] but constitute an enhancement of it. By that the aspects of ADV_FSP.4 and its refinement in the PP [11] apply also here. The assurance and evidence was provided accordingly.

7.2.1.2 Life-cycle Support (ALC)

ALC_CMS Configuration Management Scope:

The Security IC embedded firmware and the optional software are part of TOE and delivered together with the TOE as the firmware and optional software are stored in the ROM and/or SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The presence of the optional

parts belongs to the user order. Both, the firmware and software delivered with the TOE are controlled entirely by Infineon Technologies. In addition, the TOE offers the possibility that the user can download his software at his own premises. These parts of the software are user controlled only and are not part of this TOE. The download of this solely user controlled software into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM is protected by strong authentication means. In addition, the download itself could also be encrypted. By the augmentation of ALC_CMS.4 to ALC_CMS.5 the configuration list includes additional the development tools. The package ALC_CMS.5 is therefore an enhancement to ACL_CMS.4 and the package with its refinement in the PP [11] remains valid. The assurance and evidence was provided accordingly.

ALC_CMC Configuration Management Capabilities:

The PP [11] refinement from the assurance package ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation points out that the configuration items comprise all items defined under ALC_CMS to be tracked under configuration management. In addition a production control system is required guaranteeing the traceability and completeness of different charges and lots. Also the number of wafers, dies and chips must be tracked by this system as well as procedures applied for managing wafers, dies or complete chips being removed from the production process in order to verify and to control predefined quality standards and production parameters. It has to be controlled that these wafers, dies or assembled devices are returned to the same production stage from which they are taken or they have to be securely stored or destroyed otherwise.

The additionally covered extended package of ALC_CMC.5 Advance Support requires advanced support considering the automatism configuration management systems, acceptance and documentation procedures of changes, role separation with regard to functional roles of personnel, automatism for tracking and version controlling in those systems, and includes also production control systems. The additional aspects of ADV_CMC.5 constitute an enhancement of ACL_CMC.4 and therefore the aspects and ACL_CMC.4 refinements in the PP [11] remain valid. The assurance and evidence was provided.

7.2.1.3 Tests (ATE)

ATE_COV Test Coverage:

The PP [11] refined assurance package ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage addresses the extent to which the TSF is tested, and whether or not the testing is sufficiently extensive to demonstrate that the TSF operates as specified. It includes the test documentation of the TSFIs in the functional specification. In particular the refinement requires that The TOE must be tested under different operating conditions within the specified ranges. In addition, the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms against physical attacks should be covered by evidence that the TOE has the particular physical characteristics. This is furthermore detailed in the PP [11].

This assurance package ATE_COV.2 has been enhanced to ATE_COV.3 to cover the rigorous analysis of coverage. This requires the presence of evidence that exhaustive testing on rigorous entirely all interfaces as documented in the functional specification was conducted. By that ATE_COV.2 and refinements as given in the PP [11] are enhanced by ATE_COV.3 and remain as well. The TSFIs were completely tested according to ATE_COV.3 and the assurance and evidence was provided.

7.2.2 ADV_SPM Formal Security Policy Model:

It is the objective of this family to provide additional assurance from the development of a formal security policy model of the TSF, and establishing a correspondence between the functional specification and this security policy model. Preserving internal consistency the security policy model is expected to formally establish the security principles from its characteristics by means of a mathematical proof. The assurance and evidence was provided.

ADV_SPM.1	Formal TOE security policy model
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	ADV_FSP.4 Complete function description
ADV_SPM.1.1D	<p>The developer shall provide a formal security policy model for the</p> <p><i>Memory Access Control Policy and the corresponding SFRs</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control</i> • <i>FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control</i> • <i>FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes</i> • <i>FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute initialisation.</i> <p><i>Moreover, the following SFRs shall be addressed by the formal security policy model:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring</i> • <i>FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action</i> • <i>FDP_ITT.1 Basic Internal Transfer Protection</i> • <i>FDP_IFC.1 Information Flow Control</i> • <i>FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection</i> • <i>FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack</i> • <i>FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state</i> • <i>FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance</i> • <i>FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities</i> • <i>FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability</i> • <i>FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage</i> • <i>FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions</i>
ADV_SPM.1.2D	For each policy covered by the formal security policy model, the model shall identify the relevant portions of the statement of SFRs that make up that policy.

ADV_SPM.1.3D	The developer shall provide a formal proof of correspondence between the model and any formal functional specification.
ADV_SPM.1.4D	The developer shall provide a demonstration of correspondence between the model and the functional specification.

7.3 Security Requirements Rationale

7.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

The security functional requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in PP [11] section 6.3.1, including a mapping of the SFRs to their objectives.

The additional introduced SFRs are discussed below:

Table 18: Rational for additional SFR in the ST

Objective	TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Add-Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FCS_COP.1/TDES „Cryptographic operation - TDES“ - FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL „Cryptographic operation – TDES_SCL“ - FCS_COP.1/AES „Cryptographic operation - AES“ - FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL „Cryptographic operation – AES_SCL“ - FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW „Cryptographic operation – SHA-SW“ - FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW “Cryptographic operation – SHA-HW” - FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006 „Cryptographic operation – RSA - v1.03.006 “ - FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008 „Cryptographic operation – RSA - v2.03.008 “ - FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006 „Cryptographic operation – ECDSA - v1.03.006 “ - FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008 „Cryptographic operation – ECDSA - v2.03.008 “ - FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006 „Cryptographic operation – ECDH - v1.03.006 “ - FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008 „Cryptographic operation – ECDH - v2.03.008 “ - FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006 „Cryptographic key generation – EC - v1.03.006 “ - FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008 „Cryptographic key generation – EC - v2.03.008 “ - FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008 „Cryptographic key generation – EC - v2.03.008“ - FCS_CKM.4/TDES „Cryptographic key destruction - TDES“ - FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL „Cryptographic key destruction - TDES_SCL“ - FCS_CKM.4/AES „Cryptographic key destruction – AES“ - FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL „Cryptographic key destruction – AES_SCL“
O.Phys-Manipulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FPT_TST.2 „ Subset TOE security testing “ - FDP_SDI.1 „Stored data integrity monitoring“ - FDP_SDI.2 „Stored data integrity monitoring and action“
O.Mem-Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control” - FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control” - FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialization” - FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes” - FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”

The table above gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the security objectives. The detailed justification is given in the following:

The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:

The security functional requirement(s) “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” exactly requires those functions to be implemented which are demanded by O.Add-Functions. FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006, FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008 and FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008 support the generation of EC keys needed for these cryptographic operations. Therefore, FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008 and FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008 are suitable to meet the security objective. The FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW and FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW are keyless algorithms and have no dependencies to FCS_CKM.1.

The symmetric services demanded by O.Add-Functions are provided via the SFRs FCS_COP.1/AES, FCS_COP.1/TDES, FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL and FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL. The TOE may not provide key generation for the symmetric cryptographic operations (for further details please refer to chapter 7.3.1.1), however the SFRs FCS_CKM.4/AES, FCS_CKM.4/TDES, FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL and FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL provide the user with the possibility to destroy the keys, which are stored on the TOE.

The use of supporting libraries Toolbox and Base has no impact on any security functional requirement nor does generate additional requirements.

Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the application context. These issues are addressed by the specific security functional requirements:

- [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
- FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,

As already mentioned above, some of these dependencies are already achieved by the TOE and can optionally be achieved by the operational environment as well. However the remaining dependencies have to be fulfilled by the TOE accordingly OE.Resp-Appl. For further details on dependences, which have to be achieved by the operational environment, please refer to chapter 7.3.1.1.

The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality. However, key-dependent functions could be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software.

The usage of cryptographic algorithms requires the use of appropriate keys. Otherwise these cryptographic functions do not provide security. The keys have to be unique with a very high probability, and must have a certain cryptographic strength etc. In case of a key import into the TOE (which is usually after TOE delivery) it has to be ensured that quality and confidentiality are maintained. Keys for TDES and AES are provided by the environment. Keys for RSA and EC algorithms can be provided either by the TOE or the environment.

In this ST the objectives for the environment OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl have been clarified. The Smartcard Embedded Software defines the use of the cryptographic functions FCS_COP.1 provided by the TOE. The requirements for the environment FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 support an appropriate key management (for details on the dependencies, which have to be fulfilled by the environment, please refer to chapter 7.3.1.1). These security requirements are suitable to meet OE.Resp-Appl.

The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements (both for the TOE and its environment) show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

The security functional component Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2) has been newly created (Common Criteria Part 2 extended). This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE can be tested after TOE Delivery. This security functional component is used instead of the functional component FPT_TST.1 from Common Criteria Part 2. For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition, FPT_TST.1 requires verification of the integrity of TSF data and stored TSF executable code which might violate the security policy.

The tested security enforcing functions are SF_DPM Device Phase Management, SF_CS Cryptographic Support and SF_PMA Protection against modifying attacks.

The security functional requirement FPT_TST.2 will detect attempts to conduce a physical manipulation on the monitoring functions of the TOE. The objective of FPT_TST.2 is O.Phys-Manipulation.

The security functional requirement "Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)" with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) "Memory Access Control Policy" exactly require the implementation of an area based memory access control as required by O.Mem-Access. The related TOE security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMF.1 cover this security objective. The implementation of these functional requirements is represented by the dedicated privilege level concept.

The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there. Moreover, these additional security functional requirements cover the requirements by [13] user data protection of chapter 11 which are not refined by the PP [11].

Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the application context. The TOE only provides the tool to implement the policy defined in the context of the application.

The security functional requirement "Stored data integrity monitoring (FDP_SDI.1)" requires the implementation of an Error Detection (EDC) algorithm which detects integrity errors of the data stored in all memories. By this the manipulation of the TOE using corrupt data is prevented. Therefore FDP_SDI.1 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Phys-Manipulation.

The security functional requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)” requires the implementation of an integrity observation and correction which is implemented by the Error Detection (EDC) and Error Correction (ECC) measures. The EDC is present throughout all memories of the TOE while the ECC is realized in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. These measures detect and inform about one and more bit errors. In case of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM 1 bit errors of the data are corrected automatically. By the ECC mechanisms it is prevented that the TOE uses corrupt data. The security reset performs an action to prevent the TOE to operate with manipulated data. Therefore FDP_SDI.2 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Phys-Manipulation.

7.3.1.1 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

The dependence of security functional requirements are defined and described in PP [11] section 6.3.2 for the following security functional requirements: FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.2, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1.

The dependence of security functional requirements for the security functional requirements FPT_TST.2, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FDP_SDI.1 and FDP_SDI.2 are defined in the following description.

Table 19: Dependency for cryptographic operation requirement

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements
FCS_COP.1/TDES	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, FCS_CKM.4/TDES
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_CKM.4/TDES	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/AES	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, FCS_CKM.4/AES
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_CKM.4/AES	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/RSA-	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements
v1.03.006	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2]	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_CKM.1/RSA- v2.03.008	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1	Yes
	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/RSA- v2.03.008	FCS_CKM.4	Yes
	[FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2]	Yes, FCS_CKM.1/RSA- v2.03.008. See comment 3.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA- v1.03.006	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, FCS_CKM.1/EC-- v1.03.006. For details see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA- v2.03.008	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, FCS_CKM.1/EC- v2.03.008. For details see comment 3
FCS_CKM.1/EC- v1.03.006	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]	Yes, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA- v1.03.006 and FCS_COP.1/ECDH- v1.03.006
	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_CKM.1/EC- v2.03.008	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]	Yes, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA- v2.03.008 and FCS_COP.1/ECDH- v2.03.008
	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/ECDH- v1.03.006	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, FCS_CKM.1/EC- v1.03.006. For details see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-	FCS_CKM.4	Yes, see comment 3

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements
v2.03.008	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008. For details see comment 3
FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW	No dependencies, see comment 4	N/A
FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW	No dependencies, see comment 4	N/A
FPT_TST.2	No dependencies, see comment 1	N/A
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	Yes Yes
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1	Yes
	FMT_SMR.1	Not required, see comment 2
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes
	FMT_SMR.1	Yes, see comment 2
	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
FMT_SMF.1	None	N/A
FDP_SDI.1	None	N/A
FDP_SDI.2	None	N/A

Comment 1:

The TOE is already a platform representing the lowest level in a Smartcard. There is no lower or »underlying abstract machine« used by the TOE which can be tested. Therefore, the former dependency to FPT_AMT.1 is fulfilled without further and by that dispensable. CC in the Revision 3 considered this and dropped this dependency.

Comment 2:

The dependency FMT_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 is considered to be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is not role-based but enforced for each subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security functional requirement FMT_SMR.1.

Comment 3:

These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified cryptographic function and are not part of the PP [11]. Most requirements concerning key management shall be

fulfilled by the environment since the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed for a specific application context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE.

For the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/TDES, FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL, FCS_COP.1/AES, FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL, FCS_CKM.4/TDES, FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL, FCS_CKM.4/AES and FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL the respective dependencies [FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2] has to be fulfilled by the environment. That means that the environment should have a choice either to generate the symmetric keys (FCS_CKM.1) as defined in [13], section 10.1 or to import the keys, as defined in [13], section 11.7.

For the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006 and FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008 the respective dependencies FCS_CKM.4 have to be fulfilled by the environment. This means, that the environment shall provide the respective key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) as defined in [13], section 10.1. The TOE does already provide the respective key generation (FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008 and FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008) as defined in 7.1.4.8. However, the environment has to either implement its own key generation (e.g. FCS_CKM.1) as defined in [13], section 10.1, or, instead, import the generated key into the TOE ([FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2]), as defined in [3], section 11.7.

The cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and the Toolbox library are delivery options. If one of the libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox or combination hereof are delivered, the Base Lib is automatically part of it. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2 and/or SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and/or SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES). The Toolbox and Base Library are no cryptographic libraries and provide no additional specific security functionality.

In case of a blocked Crypto@2304T the optionally delivered cryptographic libraries RSA and EC, as well as the supporting Toolbox and Base Library cannot be used in that TOE product. In case the SCP is blocked the optionally delivered cryptographic library SCL cannot be used and the TOE does not provide the solely hardware based AES and TDES calculation as well. The SHA-2 library is computed in the CPUs and thus independent from the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors.

If the TOE is delivered without a specific cryptographic service, depending on the chosen delivery options, the operational environment does not fulfill the corresponding dependencies.

Comment 4

The dependencies FCS_CKM.1 and FMT_CKM.4 are not required for the SHA-2 algorithm respectively library and for the algorithms of the hardware Hash module, because the algorithms are keyless operations. So the environment is not obligated to meet certain requirements for key management.

7.3.2 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements

The chosen assurance level EAL6 is augmentation with the requirements coming from ALC_FLR.1. In the chapter 7.2 different assurance levels are shown as well as the augmentations. The augmentations are in compliance with the Protection Profile.

An assurance level EAL6 with the augmentations ALC_FLR.1 is required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against **highly sophisticated attacks** without protective environment over a targeted long life time. Thereby, the TOE must withstand attackers with high attack potential, which is achieved by fulfilling the assurance class AVA_VAN.5.

In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance and that the TOE provides an adequate level of defense against such high potential attacks, the evaluators have access to all information regarding the TOE including the TSF internals, the low level design and source code including the testing of the modular design. Additionally the mandatory technical document "Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards" [16] shall be taken as a basis for the vulnerability analysis of the TOE.

Due to the targeted long life time of the Infineon Technologies AG products, a comprehensive flaw remediation process and database is in place to maintain the TOE also in future. Reported flaws of any kind, meaning, regardless whether the flaws reported have a more directed towards quality, functional or security, are tracked by a dedicated database and related processes.

And more, in order to continuously improve also future products reported flaws are analyzed whether they could affect also future products. Due to its overall importance for future development, the assurance class ALC_FLR.1 is included in this certification process.

This evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer gaining maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial practices as well as the assurance that the TOE is maintained during its targeted life time. The evaluation assurance package follows the EAL6 assurance classes as given in [14].

7.3.2.1 ALC_FLR.1 Basic Flaw Remediation

Flaws of any kind are entered into a dedicated database with related processes to solve those.

At the point in time where a flaw is entered, it is automatically logged who entered a flaw and who is responsible for solving it. In addition, it is also documented if, when and how an individual flaw has been solved.

Flaws are prioritized and assigned to a responsibility.

The assurance class ALC_FLR.1 has no dependencies.

8 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)

The product overview is given in section 2.1. In the following the Security Features are described and the relation to the security functional requirements is shown.

The TOE is equipped with following Security Features to meet the security functional requirements:

- SF_DPM Device Phase Management
- SF_PS Protection against Snooping
- SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
- SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
- SF_CS Cryptographic Support

The following description of the Security Features is a complete representation of the TSF.

8.1 SF_DPM: Device Phase Management

The life cycle of the TOE is split-up in several phases. Chip development and production (phase 2, 3, 4) and final use (phase 4-7) is a rough split-up from TOE point of view. These phases are implemented in the TOE as test mode (phase 3) and user mode (phase 4-7).

In addition a chip identification mode exists which is active in all phases. The chip identification data (O.Identification) is stored in the not changeable configuration page area and non-volatile memory. In the same area further TOE configuration data is stored. In addition, user initialization data can be stored in the non-volatile memory during the production phase as well. During this first data programming, the TOE is still in the secure environment and in Test Mode.

The covered security functional requirement is FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage".

During start-up of the TOE the decision for one of the various operation modes is taken dependent on phase identifiers. The decision of accessing a certain mode is defined as phase entry protection. The phases follow also a defined and protected sequence. The sequence of the phases is protected by means of authentication.

The covered security functional requirements are FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2.

During the production phase (phase 3 and 4) or after the delivery to the customer (phase 5 or phase 6), the TOE provides the possibility to download, user code and data into the empty (erased) SOLID FLASH™ NVM flash memory area. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10]. These procedures are defined as phase operation limitation. The covered security functional requirement is FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability".

During operation within a phase the accesses to memories are granted by the MMU controlled access rights and related privilege level.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1 and FMT_MSA.1.

In addition, during each start-up of the TOE the address ranges and access rights are initialized by the STS with predefined values. The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.3.

The TOE clearly defines and assigns access rights and privilege levels. By this clearly defined management functions are implemented, enforced by the MMU, and the covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMF.1.

During the testing phase in production within the secure environment the entire SOLID FLASH™ NVM is deleted. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3.

Each operation phase is protected by means of authentication and encryption. The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1.

The **SF_DPM** “Device Phase Management” covers the security functional requirements FAU_SAS.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1.

8.2 SF_PS: Protection against Snooping

All contents of all memories of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect against data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data. There is no plain data on the chip.

In addition the data transferred over the memory bus to and from the core, cryptographic coprocessors, certain SFRs and peripheral devices are automatically encrypted.

The memory content and bus encryption is done by the MED using a complex key management. All security relevant transfer of addresses or data via the peripheral bus is protected against readout and analysis.

No plain data are handled anywhere on the TOE and thus also the two CPUs compute entirely masked as well the symmetric cryptographic coprocessor.

The encryption means covers the data processing policy and FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1.

The user can define his own key for an SOLID FLASH™ NVM area to protect his data. This user individually chosen key is then delivered by the operating system and included in the dynamic SOLID FLASH™ NVM encryption. The user specified SOLID FLASH™ NVM area is then encrypted with his key and a dynamic component. The encryption of the memories is performed by the MED with a proprietary cryptographic algorithm. The few keys which have to be stored on the chip, for example the user chosen key and the chip specific ROM key, are protected against read out.

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, and FDP_ITT.1.

The proprietary implementation of the CPU has no standard command set and discloses therefore no possibility for deeper analysis. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3.

The entire design is kept in a nonstandard way to prevent attacks using standard analysis methods. A smartcard dedicated CPU operating in non-standard way renders analysis very complicated and time consuming. Important parts of the chip are especially designed to counter leakage or side channel attacks like DPA/SPA or EMA/DEMA. Therefore, even the physical data gaining is difficult to perform, since timing and current consumption is independent of the dynamically encrypted, masked and randomized processed data.

In the design a number of components are automatically synthesized and mixed up to disguise their physical outlines and to make an analysis more difficult.

A further topological design method is used during the definition of the layout. This result is called implicit shielding or short I²-shielding.

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1.

In addition the storage of code and data in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM is protected against side channel attacks too: Even if users operate with direct and static addressing for storing their secrets, the addresses are always translated to virtual addresses.

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1.

A low system frequency sensor FSE is implemented to prevent the TOE from single stepping.

Further protective means are described in the confidential Security Target [10]. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 and FPT_FLS.1.

An induced error which cannot be corrected will be recognized by the Integrity Guard and leads to an alarm. In case of security critical detections a security alarm and reset is generated. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1.

The **SF_PS** “Protection against Snooping” covers the security functional requirements FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_FLS.1.

8.3 SF_PMA: Protection against Modifying Attacks

First of all we can say that all security mechanisms effective against snooping **SF_PS** apply also here since a reasonable modification of data is almost impossible on dynamically encrypted, masked, scrambled, transparently relocated, randomized and topologically protected hardware. Due to this the covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_FLS.1.

The TOE is equipped with an error detection code (EDC) which covers the memory system of RAM, ROM and SOLID FLASH™ NVM and includes also the MED and MMU. Thus introduced failures could be detected and in terms of single bit errors in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM also automatically corrected (FDP_SDI.2).

In order to prevent accidental bit faults during production in the ROM, over the data stored in ROM an EDC value is calculated (FDP_SDI.1).

The covered security functional requirements are FRU_FLT.2, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SDI.1 and FDP_SDI.2.

If a user tears the card resulting in a power off situation during an SOLID FLASH™ NVM programming operation or if other perturbation is applied, no data or content loss occurs and the TOE restarts power on. The SOLID FLASH™ NVM tearing save write functionality covers FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state” since if the programming was not successful, the old data are still present and valid, which ensures a secure state although a programming failure occurred. This action includes also FDP_SDI.1 “Stored data integrity monitoring” as the new data to be programmed are checked for integrity and correct programming before the page with the old data becomes the new physical page for the next new data.

The covered security functional requirement is also FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, since these measures

make it difficult to manipulate the write process of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 and FDP_SDI.1.

The TOE is protected against fault and modifying attacks. The core provides the functionality of double-computing and e.g. result comparison of all tasks to detect incorrect calculations. The detection of an incorrect calculation is stored and the TOE enters a defined secure state which causes the chip internal reset process.

The implementation of two CPUs computing on the same data is by this one of the most important security features of this platform. As also the results of both CPU parts are compared at the end, a fault induction of modifying attacks would have to be done on both CPU parts at the correct place with the correct timing – despite all other countermeasures like dynamic masking, encryption and others. As the comparison and the register files are also protected by various measures successful manipulative attacks are seen as being not practical.

During start up, the STS performs various configurations and subsystem tests. After the STS has finished, the operating system or application can call the User Mode Security Life Control (UMSLC) test. The UMSLC checks the alarm lines and/or certain functions and sensors for correct operation. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].

In the case that a physical manipulation or a physical probing attack is detected, the processing of the TOE is immediately stopped and the TOE enters a secure state called security reset. By release of a security reset all logic and memory of the coprocessors (SCP and Crypto) immediately reset with their respectful reset values. The stored keys are overwritten with the default reset values and memory data structures are overwritten with random values. The covered security functional requirements are FCS_CKM.4, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 and FPT_TST.2.

As physical effects or manipulative attacks may also address the program flow of the user software, dedicated countermeasures are implemented. These features allow the user to check the correct processing of the user software. By this induced errors are discovered. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [10].

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_PHP.3.

The RMS provides the user also the testing of all security features enabled to generate an alarm. This security testing is called user mode security life control (UMSLC). As attempts to modify the security features will be detected from the test, the covered security functional requirement is FPT_TST.2.

All communication via the buses is in addition protected. If an error occurs an alarm is generated.

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3.

The virtual memory system and privilege level model are enforced by the MMU. This controls the access rights throughout the TOE. There is a clear differentiation within the privilege levels defined. The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_SMF1.

The **SF_PMA** “Protection against Modifying Attacks” covers the security functional requirements FCS_CKM.4 (all iterations), FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_TST.2, FDP_SDI.1, FDP_SDI.2 and FPT_FLS.1.

8.4 SF_PLA: Protection against Logical Attacks

The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit (MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by using virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege level model. The MMU controls the address permissions of the privileged levels. In case of an access violation the MMU will trigger a reset. The policy of setting up the MMU is defined from the user software (OS).

As the TOE provides support for separation of memory areas the covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1 "Subset access control", FDP_ACF.1 "Security attribute based access control", FMT_MSA.3 "Static attribute initialisation", FMT_MSA.1 "Management of security attributes" and FMT_SMF.1 "Specification of Management functions".

The TOE provides the possibility to protect the property rights of user code and data by the encryption of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM areas with a specific key defined by the user. Due to this key management FDP_ACF.1 is fulfilled. In addition, each memory present on the TOE is encrypted using either mask specific or chip individual or even session keys, assigned by a complex key management. All data are protected by means of encryption or masking also during transportation via the buses. Induced errors are to be recognized by the Integrity Guard concept and lead to an alarm. In case of security critical errors a security alarm is generated and the TOE ends up in a secure state. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FPT_FLS.1.

Beside the access protection and key management, also the use of illegal operation code is detected and will release a security reset.

The **SF_PLA** "Protection against Logical Attacks" covers the security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FMT_SMF.1.

8.5 SF_CS: Cryptographic Support

The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. This security function is introduced to include the cryptographic operation in the scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function respectively mathematic algorithm itself is not used from the TOE security policy. On the other hand these functions are of special interest for the use of the hardware as platform for the software. The components are a coprocessor supporting the DES and AES algorithms (alternatively a combination of a coprocessor and software, if the SCL is used) and a combination of a coprocessor and software modules to support RSA cryptography, RSA key generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification, ECDH key agreement and EC public key calculation and public key testing.

Note that the additional function of the EC library, ECC_ADD, providing the primitive elliptic curve operations, does not add specific security functionality and that the according user guidance abbreviates the Elliptic Curve cryptographic functions with ECC.

Note:

The cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and the Toolbox library are delivery options. If one of the libraries RSA,

EC and Toolbox or combination hereof are delivered, the Base Lib is automatically part of it. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2 and/or SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and/or SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES). The Toolbox and Base Library are no cryptographic libraries and provide no additional specific security functionality.

Note:

This TOE can come with both crypto coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both crypto coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by hardware is possible (neither solely hardware based nor SCL based). In case the Crypto@2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation supported by hardware is possible. The use of the SHA-2 library is also possible with both crypto coprocessors blocked. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors.

8.5.1 Triple DES

Hardware-Implemented TDES

The TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with cryptographic key sizes of 112 bit or 168 bit meeting the standard:

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Data Encryption Standard (DES), NIST Special Publication 800-67, Version 1.1 [19]

The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user: the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB), the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC), the Blinding Feedback Mode (BLD), the Cipher Block Chaining Mode Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC), the CBC-MAC- encrypt-last-block (CBC-MAC-ELB) and the Recrypt Mode.

The CBC-MAC and CBC-MAC-ELB complies with the standard:

ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1[28].

The Recrypt Mode and the BLD are described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1] while the implementations of ECB and CBC follow the standard:

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Data Encryption Standard (DES), NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 Edition [27].

Note that the BLD follows also the standard, but in a masked way.

The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces of the SCP or by software reset of the SCP, which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_CKM.4/TDES.

Software-Implemented TDES (SCL)

The SCL78-SCP-v3 symmetric crypto library supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) cryptographic key sizes of 112 bit or 168 bit meeting the standard:

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Data Encryption Standard (DES), NIST Special Publication 800-67, Version 1.1 [19]

The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user: ECB, CBC, Counter (CTR) and Cipher Feedback (CFB) block cipher modes, defined by "NIST FIPS PUB 800-38A [27]" and published in December 2001.

To implement FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL, SCL software performs reset triggering at the end of the kernel function by writing the "trigger reset" value 0xFFFF to the SCP_CTRL register (hardware). As a result, the key store register is overwritten with the reset value. The second step is a removal of the complete DES data object from RAM by overwriting it by random value.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

Please note that the PCBC mode, the single DES operation, the additional block cipher modes, which may be implemented by the generic BCM extension concept, as well as the "*_Sec1"-functions of the SCL are not part of the evaluation.

The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL and FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL.

8.5.2 AES

Hardware-Implemented AES

The TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit that meet the standard:

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS PUB 197 [20].

The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user: the ECB and CBC block cipher modes, defined by "NIST FIPS PUB 800-38" and published in December 2001.

The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces of the SCP or by software reset of the SCP, which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/AES and FCS_CKM.4/AES.

Software-Implemented AES (SCL)

The SCL AES complies with the standard:

AES Advanced Encryption Standard defined by "NIST FIPS PUB 197" [20] and published in November 2001.

The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user: the ECB, CBC, CTR and CFB defined by "NIST FIPS PUB 800-38" and published in December 2001.

To implement FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL, SCL software performs reset triggering at the end of the kernel function by writing the "trigger reset" value 0xFFFF to the SCP_CTRL register (hardware). As a result, the key store register is overwritten with the reset value. The second step is a removal of the complete AES data object from RAM by overwriting it by random value.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

Please note that the PCBC mode, the additional block cipher modes, which may be implemented by the generic BCM extension concept and the "*_Sec1"-functions of the SCL are not part of the evaluation.

The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL and FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL.

8.5.3 RSA

8.5.3.1 Encryption, Decryption, Signature Generation and Verification

The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and cryptographic key sizes 1024 - 4096 bits that meet the following standards:

Valid for cryptographic library version v1.03.006

Encryption:

According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS [22] without 5.1.1.1.

Decryption (with or without CRT):

According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS [22] for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$, therefore without 5.1.2.2.b (ii)&(v), without 5.1.2.1. 5.1.2.2.a, only supported up to $n < 2^{2048}$

Signature Generation (with or without CRT):

According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS [22] for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$, therefore without 5.2.1.2.b (ii)&(v), without 5.2.1.1. 5.2.1.2.a, only supported up to $n < 2^{2048}$

Signature Verification:

According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS [22], without 5.2.2.1.

Valid for cryptographic library version v2.03.008

Encryption:

1. According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS [22]:

- Supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 5.1.1(1) not supported

2. According to section 8.2.2 IFEP-RSA in IEEE [28]:

- Supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$

Decryption (with or without CRT):

1. According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS [22] for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$

- 5.1.2(1) not supported
- 5.1.2(2.a) not supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 5.1.2(2.b) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to $u = 2$

2. According to section 8.2.3 IEEE [28]:

- 8.2.1(I) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 8.2.1(II) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 8.2.1(III) not supported

Signature Generation (with or without CRT):

1. According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS [22] for $u = 2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$

- 5.2.1(1) not supported
- 5.2.1(2.a) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 5.2.1(2b) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 5.2.1(2b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to $u = 2$

2. According to section 8.2.4 IFSP-RSA1 in IEEE [28]:

- 8.2.1(I) supported for $n < 2^{2048 + 64}$
- 8.2.1(II) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096 + 128}$
- 8.2.1(III) not supported

Signature Verification:

1. According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS [22]:

supported for $n < 2^{4096 + 128}$

- 5.2.2(1) not supported

2. According to section 8.2.5 IEEE [28]:

- Supported for $n < 2^{4096+128}$
- 8.2.5(1) not supported

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

8.5.3.2 Asymmetric Key Generation

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *RSA specified in PKCS#1 [22]* and specified cryptographic key sizes of 1024 – 4096 bits that meet the following *standard*:

Valid for cryptographic library version v1.03.006

The ACL v1.03.006 does not support RSA keys generation.

Valid for cryptographic library version v2.03.008

1. According to section 3.1 and 3.2) in PKCS [22]:

for $u=2$, i.e., without any (r_i, d_i, t_i) , $i > 2$

- 3.1 supported for $n < 2^{4096+128}$
- 3.2(1) supported for $n < 2^{2048+64}$
- 3.2(2) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096+128}$

2. According to section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE [28]:

- 8.1.3.1(1) supported for $n < 2^{2048+64}$
- 8.1.3.1(2) supported for $p \times q < 2^{4096+128}$
- 8.1.3.1(3) supported for $p \times q < 2^{2048+64}$

Note 3:

For easy integration of RSA functions into the user's operating system and/or application, the library contains single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if required.

Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.

End of note.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008 and FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008.

8.5.4 Elliptic Curves EC

The certification covers the standard NIST [17] and Brainpool [18] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI. Note that there are

further uncounted side channel secure curve types, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification process.

8.5.4.1 Signature Generation and Verification

The TSF shall perform signature generation and signature verification in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 and 521 bits that meet the following standard:

FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006 is covered by:

Signature Generation:

1. According to section 7.3 in ANSI X9.62 – 2005[22]
Not implemented are steps d) and e) thereof.
The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
Deviation of steps c) and f):
The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.
2. According to sections 6.2 (6.2.2. + 6.2.3) in ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002[38]
Not implemented is section 6.2.1:
The output of 5.4.2 has to be provided by the caller as input to the function.

Signature Verification:

1. According to section 7.4.1 in ANSI X9.62–2005[22]
Not implemented are steps b) and c) thereof.
The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
Deviation of step d):
Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of BasepointerOrder n to the calculated values $u1$ and $u2$.
2. According to sections 6.4 (6.4.1. + 6.4.3 + 6.4.4) in ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002[38]
Not implemented is section 6.4.2:
The output of 5.4.2 has to be provided by the caller as input to the function.

FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008 is covered by:

ECDSA Signature Generation

1. According to section "7.3 Signing Process" in ANSI X9.62 – 2005[22]:
 - Step d) and e) not supported.
 - The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 - Deviation of step c) and f):
 - The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.
2. According to section "6.4.3 Signature process" in ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006[31]:
 - 6.4.3.3 not supported.
 - 6.4.3.5 not supported:
 - the hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as input to our function.
 - 6.4.3.7 not supported.
 - 6.4.3.8 not supported.
3. According to section "7.2.7 ECSP-DSA" in IEEE Std 1363-2000[33]:
 - Deviation of step (3) and (4):
 - The jumps to step 1, were substituted by a return of the function with an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.

ECDSA Signature Verification:

1. According to section "7.4.1 Verification with the Public Key" in ANSI X9.62 – 2005[22]:
 - Step b) and c) not supported.
 - The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 - Deviation of step d):
 - Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of BasepointOrder n to the calculated values u_1 and u_2 .

2. According to section "6.4.4 Signature Verification Process" in ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006[31]:
 - 6.4.4.2 not supported.
 - 6.4.4.3 not supported:
 - the hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as input to our function.
3. According to section "7.2.8 ECVP-DSA" in IEEE Std 1363-2000[33].

8.5.4.2 Asymmetric Key Generation

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Elliptic Curve EC specified in ANSI X9.62-2005 and ISO/IEC 15946-1:2002 and specified cryptographic key sizes 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following standard:

FCS_CKM.1.1/EC-v1.03.006 is covered by:

ECDSA Key Generation:

1. According to the appendix A4.3 in ANSI X9.62-2005[22]
the cofactor h is not supported.
2. According to section 6.1 (not 6.1.1) in ISO/IEC 15946-1:2002[26]

FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008 is covered by:

1. According to the appendix A4.3 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation in ANSI X9.62 [22]: The optional cofactor h is not supported.
2. According to section 6.4.2 Generation of signature key and verification key in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [31]
3. According to appendix A.16.9 An algorithm for generating EC keys in IEEE Std. 1363-2000 [33]

8.5.4.3 Asymmetric Key Agreement

The TSF shall perform elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH and cryptographic key sizes 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following standard:

FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-v1.03.006 is covered by:

1. According to section 5.4.1 in ANSI X9.63 -2001[23]
Unlike section 5.4.1.3 our implementation not only returns the x -coordinate of the shared secret, but rather the x -coordinate and y -coordinate.

2.. According to sections 8.4.2.1, 8.4.2.2, 8.4.2.3, and 8.4.2.4 in ISO/IEC 15946-3:2002[39]:

The function enables the operations described in the four sections.

FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-v2.03.008 is covered by:

1. According to section 5.4.1 Standard Diffie-Hellman Primitive in ANSI X9.63 [23]

Unlike section 5.4.1(3) our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.

2. According to section Appendix D.6 Key agreement of Diffie-Hellman type in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [32] the function enables the operations described in appendix D.6

3. According to section 7.2.1 ECSVHDP-DP in IEEE Std. 1363:2000 [33].

Unlike section 7.2.1 our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.

Note:

For easy integration of EC functions into the user's operating system and/or application, the library contains single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if required.

The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006 and FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-v2.03.008.

8.5.5 SHA-2 Operation with Cryptographic Software Library

The TOE comes optionally with the SHA-2 library for hash value calculation. Regarding the SHA-2 library it has to be noted that the secure hash-algorithm SHA-2 is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Further essential information is given in the confidential user guidance.

The TSF shall perform hash-value calculation of user chosen data in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-2 and with cryptographic key sizes of none that meet the following standards:

U.S. Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4[25], 2012-March, section 6.2 SHA-256 and section 6.4 SHA-512.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW.

8.5.6 Hash Operation with Hardware Module

The SHA module provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU and is intended to be used for signature generation, verification and generic data integrity checks. Further essential information is given in the confidential user guidance.

The TOE provides the Hash module to compute extremely fast hash values within just some dozens of clock cycles. Following hashing algorithms can be performed using this module:

- MD-5
- SHA-1
- SHA-256.

Following the BSI recommendations the algorithms MD-5 and SHA-1 are not covered by this evaluation.

The TSF shall perform *Hash-value calculation of user chosen data* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *SHA-2, SHA-1 and MD5* with cryptographic key sizes of *none* that meet the following standards:

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4[25], 2012-March, section 6.2 SHA-256.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW.

8.5.7 SCL

The SCL78-SCP-v3 symmetric crypto library is delivered as a binary code and is in this way available for the user software. The API of the SCL includes security functions:

“Cipher_*” for operations with cipher’s software object;
“BCM_*” for Block Cipher Mode operations
“CipAlg_AES*_SEC2” for AES calculations on Cipher Block
“CipAlg_DES*_SEC2” for DES/TDES calculations on Cipher Block

For details on the provided security functionality of the SCL please refer to the “software implementation” section of the chapters 8.5.1 and 8.5.2.

8.5.8 Toolbox Library

The toolbox provides the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor: Addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, comparison, reduction, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion and modular exponentiation. No security relevant policy, mechanism or function is supported. The toolbox library is deemed for software developers as support for simplified implementation of long integer and modular arithmetic operations.

The toolbox does not cover security functional requirements.

8.5.9 Base Library

The Base Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor. The Base Library does not provide any security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional specific security functionality on its own. The Base Library does not cover security functional requirements.

The Base Library contains private and public Auxiliary API. The public Auxiliary API has user available interface.

8.5.10 PTRNG respectively TRNG

Random data is essential for cryptography as well as for security mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a physical True Random Number Generator (PTRNG respectively TRNG, FCS_RNG.1). The random data can be used from the Smartcard Embedded Software and is also used from the security features of the TOE, like masking. The PTRNG respectively TRNG implements also self-testing features. The PTRNG respectively TRNG fulfills the requirements from the functionality class PTG.2 of the AIS31 [15].

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_RNG.1, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_TST.2 and FPT_FLS.1.

8.5.11 Summary of SF_CS: Cryptographic Support

The **SF_CS** "Cryptographic Support" covers the security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/TDES, FCS_CKM.4/TDES, FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL, FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL, FCS_COP.1/AES, FCS_CKM.4/AES, FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL, FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL, FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006, FCS_CKM.1/EC-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008, FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW, FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW, FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_TST.2, FPT_FLS.1 and FCS_RNG.1.

Note:

The cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and the Toolbox library are delivery options. If one of the libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox or combination hereof are delivered, the Base Lib is automatically part of it. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2, the TOE does not provide the additional specific security functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2 and/or SCL based Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) and/or SCL based Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The Toolbox and Base Library are no cryptographic libraries and provide no additional specific security functionality.

Note:

This TOE can come with both crypto coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked Crypto@2304T, or with both crypto coprocessors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by hardware is possible (neither solely hardware based nor SCL based). In case the Crypto@2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation supported by hardware is possible. The use of the SHA-2 library is also possible with both crypto coprocessors blocked. No

accessibility of the deselected cryptographic coprocessors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic coprocessors.

Note:

The TOE can come with the Secure Hash Algorithm by Hardware (optional HW Hash) being available or not. If the Hash module is blocked the hardware implemented hash algorithms are not available. The use of the Hash module is independent from the optional SHA-2 library software and also independent of the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors. No accessibility of the Hash module is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the Hash module.

8.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements to TOE’s Security Functionality

The justification and overview of the mapping between security functional requirements (SFR) and the TOE’s security functionality (SF) is given in the sections above. The results are shown in the table below. The security functional requirements are addressed by at least one relating security feature.

The various functional requirements are often covered manifold. As described above the requirements ensure that the TOE is checked for correct operating conditions and if a not correctable failure occurs that a stored secure state is achieved, accompanied by data integrity monitoring and actions to maintain the integrity although failures occurred. An overview is given in following table:

Table 20: Mapping of SFR and SF

Security Functional Requirement	SF_DPM	SF_PS	SF_PMA	SF_PLA	SF_CS
FAU_SAS.1	X				
FMT_LIM.1	X				
FMT_LIM.2	X				
FDP_ACC.1	X		X	X	
FDP_ACF.1	X		X	X	
FPT_PHP.3	X	X	X	X	X
FDP_ITT.1	X	X	X	X	X
FDP_SDI.1			X		
FDP_SDI.2			X		
FDP_IFC.1		X	X	X	X
FMT_MSA.1	X		X	X	
FMT_MSA.3	X		X	X	
FMT_SMF.1	X		X	X	

Security Functional Requirement	SF_DPM	SF_PS	SF_PMA	SF_PLA	SF_CS
FRU_FLT.2			X		
FPT_ITT.1	X	X	X	X	X
FPT_TST.2			X		X
FPT_FLS.1		X	X	X	X
FCS_RNG.1					X
FCS_COP.1/TDES					X
FCS_CKM.4/TDES			X		X
FCS_COP.1/AES					X
FCS_CKM.4/AES			X		X
FCS_COP.1/TDES_SCL					X
FCS_CKM.4/TDES_SCL			X		X
FCS_COP.1/AES_SCL					X
FCS_CKM.4/AES_SCL			X		X
FCS_COP.1/RSA-v1.03.006					X
FCS_COP.1/RSA-v2.03.008					X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v1.03.006					X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-v2.03.008					X
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v1.03.006					X
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-v2.03.008					X
FCS_COP.1/SHA-SW					X
FCS_COP.1/SHA-HW					X
FCS_CKM.1/EC-v1.03.006					X
FCS_CKM.1/EC -v2.03.008					X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-v2.03.008					X

8.7 Security Requirements are internally consistent

For this chapter the PP [11] section 6.3.4 can be applied completely.

In addition to the discussion in section 6.3 of PP [11] the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1 is introduced. The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,

O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the cryptographic algorithms implemented according to the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1. Therefore, these security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS_COP.1.

As disturbing, manipulating during or forcing the results of the test checking the security functions after TOE delivery, this security functional requirement FPT_TST.2 has to be protected. An attacker could aim to switch off or disturb certain sensors or filters and preserve the detection of his manipulation by blocking the correct operation of FPT_TST.2. The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the security functional requirement FPT_TST.2. Therefore, the related security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FPT_TST.2.

The requirement FPT_TST.2 allows testing of some security mechanisms by the Smartcard Embedded Software after delivery. In addition, the TOE provides an automated continuous user transparent testing of certain functions.

The implemented privilege level concept represents the area based memory access protection enforced by the MMU. As an attacker could attempt to manipulate the privilege level definition as defined and present in the TOE, the functional requirement FDP_ACC.1 and the related other requirements have to be protected themselves. The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the area based memory access control function implemented according to the security functional requirement described in the security functional requirement FDP_ACC.1 with reference to the Memory Access Control Policy and details given in FDP_ACF.1. Therefore, those security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FDP_ACF.1 with its dependent security functional requirements.

The requirement FDP_SDI.2.1 allows detection of integrity errors of data stored in memory. FDP_SDI.2.2 in addition allows correction of one bit errors or taking further action. Both meet the security objective O.Malfunction.

The requirements FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, and FDP_ACC.1 which also meet this objective are independent from FDP_SDI.2 since they deal with the observation of the correct operation of the TOE and not with the memory content directly.

9 Literature

Ref	Version	As off	Titel
[1]	v2.3	2013-06-06	M7893 Controller Family for Security Applications, Family Hardware Reference Manual, called HRM
[2]		2015-04-01	SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual
[3]	v9.6	2017-07-04	16-bit Controller Family, SLE 70, Programmer's Reference Manual
[4]	v1.03.006	2017-06-20	SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T, RSA / ECC / Toolbox, User Interface (optional and alternative)
[5]		2009-11-06	Chipcard and Security ICs, SLx70 Family, Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2, (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) (optional)
[6]		2010-03-23	SLE70 Crypto@2304T User Manual,
[7]		2017-07-19	M7893 Security Guidelines
[8]	3.1	2017-06-23	M7893 Errata Sheet
[9]	1.0	2013-02-19	AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology, Addendum to M7893 Hardware Reference Manual
[10]	2.2	2017-10-20	The confidential Security Target for this TOE
[11]	1.0	2007-06-15	Security IC Platform Protection Profile PP0035
[12]	V3.1 Rev 5	2017-04	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
[13]	V3.1 Rev 5	2017-04	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components; Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
[14]	V3.1 Rev 5	2017-04	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components; Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
[15]	3.0	2013-05-15	Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators AIS31, Version 3.0, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik and belonging "A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators", Version 2.0, 2011-09-18, Wolfgang Killmann, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Werner Schindler, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[16]	2.9	2013-01	Application of Attack Potential to Smartcard, mandatory technical document, CCDB-2013-05-002, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[17]	186-4	2013-09-05	NIST: FIPS publication 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2013-09-05
[18]	RFC 5639	2010-03	IETF: RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, March 2010, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt
[19]	SP 800-67 Rev. 1	2012-01	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher

[20]	PUB 197	2001-11-26	U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS PUB 197
[21]	PKCS, RFC 3447, v2.1	2002-06-14	PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories
[22]	X9.62	2005-11-16	American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), American National Standards Institute
[23]	X9.63	2001-11-20	American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2001, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, American National Standards Institute
[24]	I	2009-08-14	Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSiG), Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821.
[25]	180-4	2015-08	Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
[26]	ISO/IEC 15946-1	2002	ISO/IEC 15946-1:2002 Information Technology - Security Techniques - Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - part 1: General
[27]	SP 800-38A	2001-12	National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), Technology Administration, US Department of Commerce, NIST Special Publication SP 800-38A (for AES and DES)
[28]	ISO/IEC 9797-1	2011-03-01	International Standard ISO/IEC 9797-1, Information Technology - Security Techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
[29]	v2.03.008	2017-05-10	SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library Crypto@2304T, RSA / EC / Toolbox, User Interface (optional and alternative)
[30]	v2.02.010	2016-10-14	SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP v3, DES/AES, 16-Bit Security Controller, User Interface (optional)
[31]	ISO/IEC 14888-3	2006, published 2009-02-15	INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2, Published 2009-02-15, Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms
[32]	ISO/IEC 11770-3	2008, published 2009-09-15	INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 11770-3:2008, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1, Published 2009-09-15, Information technology – Security techniques – Key management – Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques
[33]	IEEE 1363	2000-01-30 (approved)	IEEE Standard Specification for Public key Cryptography, IEEE Standards Board. The Standard covers specification for public key cryptography including mathematical primitives for secret value deviation, public key encryption and digital signatures and cryptographic schemes based on those primitives.
[34]	ISO/IEC 10118-3	2004	ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004, Information technology – Security techniques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash functions (for AES)
[35]	ISO/IEC 18033-3	2005	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005, Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption algorithms– Part 3: Block ciphers [18033] (for AES)
[36]	V3.1, Rev. 5	2017-04	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,

			Evaluation methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004
[37]	PUB 140-2	2002-12-03	National Institute of Standards and Technology, " <i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules</i> ", Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 140-2 , 2002-12-03
[38]	ISO/IEC 15946-2	2002	ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002 Information Technology - Security Techniques - Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - part 2: Digital signatures
[39]	ISO/IEC 15946-3	2002	ISO/IEC 15946-3:2002 Information Technology - Security Techniques - Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - part 3: Key Establishment

Note that the versions of these documents will be defined at the end of the evaluation and listed in the certification report.

10 Appendix

In Table 21 the Hash signatures of the respective CL70 Crypto Library file are documented. For convenience purpose several Hash values are referenced.

Table 21: Reference Hash values of the optional Cryptographic Libraries

Optional Asymmetric Cryptographic Library v1.03.006 Hash Values

CI70-LIB-base-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=d41da6598a5fde96c090120a757c0f51

SHA1=b5ad2456aa5a13b21428986a2e34f71452152d48

SHA256=93a19624b2d76453abc5c37352e672e614c8e1eec7bf55d1db16385b5609aea0

CI70-LIB-ecc-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=66956fba12b2126fe7228f0f939aced5

SHA1=aa13bb47ef66ed7f2dbf2e540edc118bf4669733

SHA256=7f403d7797a6c6b53914fd43a6dad80c35c55f152ffeb267079bea257be116cb

CI70-LIB-2k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=64fdfa83b754d2c6461dc720d2fc5de7

SHA1=4e85a3760084c68cf989c006bb3f287894a58a29

SHA256=5d93de6e609ea4f2316f0bd83c4fa1de9d4024b609b88831c507829c0bd30b2d

CI70-LIB-4k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=511cd1f3bb1c5ae58db064904f9018e0

SHA1=f2458477c94bd0fba8e8dde1b10aaa61cf2cb89d

SHA256=10c04adaff39b38372469c6a80f74a60c88c023eca2d1a760ca29038bff82d66

CI70-LIB-toolbox-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=8fa281387c9cfc16942b8e704290598f

SHA1=1363e820486902d56b36ec365b49ef0767cdf411

SHA256=b4554607af89dd003f8ac34a771505ed0b097263fa8f61962395964f1a42ec79

CI70-ROM-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=4e4334c65e795cb940b2a09665ddaf35

SHA1=8f0f0a4f86326430fe4bf8d9f33fc35ac21a8fbf

SHA256=1c31f50a1d24be9ef6ba8e368d617da34c7764a4b25564cb0a04c29e9157168a

Optional Asymmetric Cryptographic Library v2.03.008

CI70-LIB-base-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=00503528859c293140fe231265c1cdba

SHA1=7723660ac9222527f429c94ce015dac1ab2a2ffb

SHA256=77d5f9f0d03e38d7c0d0a3b33a9ae6bf2192748573e01fcad29a418998dad724

CI70-LIB-ecc-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=b189b6ecb0435c91797e8b9bdce7edd8

SHA1=b94a7a3a4af019febeb3236fff54f1bc36af2c8b

SHA256=aaec91f8b273efd3a7510be5cf2e2d825e01be9e2d9caf7c5dc595bd79c4b870

CI70-LIB-2k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=4820f7af7ead4b76b53ec9498505c715

SHA1=d1c8df9a2b9b29ae7395a3ab0bf13a965a0957d2

SHA256=eba3ba1c33cf91880ee6c838674cda16f1eec7f536c55034217a6f958874c130

CI70-LIB-4k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=0d18984da350fae0b08099fa8ce60541

SHA1=3d2dc9c74f992f18883ae3b1f498b9dac460f309

SHA256=6ec924a46a729df061826f45abb1fd8a9f3aeb54e745be5e7ca69e665dc6f944

CI70-LIB-toolbox-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=eda224cea852510b37dea323719362d8

SHA1=1d861a3b26a8000b80e727b8c98fd6a1172ece91

SHA256=b03c32463922bb2d4312bf8c62e747cd48f0752dbea90129042fdefac36bf092

SHA-2 Library v1.01

MD5: 70d2df490185b419fb820d597d82d117

SHA-1: df15ff79b5f5ab70bbad0ee031953e1877cabd47

SHA-256: 765fc5d47cf8274833476406b24010a56ebcfd4b0972704ddd27e2d3e3e086f8

SCL Library Version v2.02.010

Scl78-SCP-v3-LIB-cipher-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=fda1638129910ae1b67e0eafe46856ff

SHA1=745411582d5f1af4b6f1771e921b1935d57b82a6

SHA256=b758150725a310d4269de566426a70e7114d6af13a25ff712e16144ba1a9b5e4

Scl78-SCP-v3-LIB-des-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=71400373a23db40fe94424ed2e7bbe04

SHA1=f4c1f11055166000238ef23b4e4841051d1f4983

SHA256=beacd54f096f9967b9223764c6e09189ab743b2009956df187c5dbe8e2ef4d1d

ScI78-SCP-v3-LIB-aes-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:

MD5=964432c8339a8e3432a5a52a6888e1f8

SHA1=5f104d9ea356d29622d46fb7c0fdecde595a0b7d

SHA256=592c1c0fe7d4dfa5b68b09c6092542cbe3a07bb6fb2c0029b44a8bc4b0bcca48

11 List of Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS31	“Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zu ITSEC und CC Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren”
API	Application Programming Interface
BSI	German: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik English: Federal Office for Information Security https://www.bsi.bund.de
CC	Common Criteria
CI	Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM	Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto@2304T	Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT	Chinese Remainder Theorem
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
DFA	Differential Failure Analysis
DRNG	Deterministic Random Number Generator
EC	Elliptic Curve
ECC	Error Correction Code
EDC	Error Detection Code
EDU	Error Detection Unit
EMA	Electromagnetic analysis
GPIO	General Purpose Input/Output
HW	Hardware
IC	Integrated Circuit
ICO	Internal Clock Oscillator
ID	Identification
IMM	Interface Management Module
ITP	Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
I/O	Input/Output
IRAM	Internal Random Access Memory

ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
M	Mechanism
MED	Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU	Memory Management Unit
NVM	Non Volatile Memory
O	Object
OS	Operating system
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator, see also DRNG
PROM	Programmable Read Only Memory
PTRNG	Physical True Random Number Generator
RAM	Random Access Memory
RMS	Resource Management System
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SA	Service Algorithm
SCL	Symmetric Cryptographic Library
SSC	Synchronous Serial Controller
SPI	Serial Peripheral Interface
SCP	Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF	Security Feature
SFR	Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement
	The specific meaning is given in the context
SPA	Simple power analysis
STS	Self-Test Software
SW	Software
SO	Security objective
T	Threat
TM	Test Mode
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TOE Security Functions Control
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TRNG	True Random Number Generator, see also PTRNG

UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM	User Mode
UMSLC	User mode Security Life Control
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WDT	Watch Dog Timer
XRAM	eXtended Random Access Memory
TDES	Triple DES Encryption Standard

12 Glossary


Application Program/Data	Software which implements the actual TOE functionality provided for the user or the data required for that purpose
Central Processing Unit	Logic circuitry for digital information processing
Chip	Integrated Circuit
Chip Identification Data	Data stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM containing the chip type, lot number (including the production site), die position on wafer and production week and data stored in the ROM containing the STS version number
Chip Identification Mode	Operational status phase of the TOE, in which actions for identifying the individual chip by transmitting the Chip Identification Data take place
Controller	IC with integrated memory, CPU and peripheral devices
Crypto@2304T	Cryptographic coprocessor for asymmetric cryptographic operations (RSA, Elliptic Curves)
Cyclic Redundancy Check	Process for calculating checksums for error detection
SOLID FLASH™ NVM	The Non Volatile Memory enables for reading and writing data and keeps information also in power-off state. The module implements the Unified Channel Programming UCP concept.
End User	Person in contact with a TOE who makes use of its operational capability
Firmware	Part of the software implemented as hardware
Hardware	Physically present part of a functional system (item)
Integrated Circuit	Component comprising several electronic circuits implemented in a highly miniaturized device using semiconductor technology
Internal Random Access Memory	RAM integrated in the CPU
Mechanism	Logic or algorithm which implements a specific security function in hardware or software
Memory Encryption and Decryption	Method of encoding/decoding data transfer between CPU and memory
Memory	Hardware part containing digital information (binary data)
Microprocessor	CPU with peripherals
Object	Physical or non-physical part of a system which contains information and is acted upon by subjects
Operating System	Software which implements the basic TOE actions necessary for operation
Programmable Read Only Memory	Non-volatile memory which can be written once and then only permits read operations

Random Access Memory	Volatile memory which permits write and read operations
Random Number Generator	Hardware part for generating random numbers
Read Only Memory	Non-volatile memory which permits read operations only
Resource Management System	Part of the firmware containing SOLID FLASH™ NVM programming routines, AIS31 testbench etc.
SCP	Symmetric cryptographic coprocessor for symmetric cryptographic operations (TDES, AES).
Self-Test Software	Part of the firmware with routines for controlling the operating state, performing the chip setup during its startup and testing the TOE hardware
Security Function	Part(s) of the TOE used to implement part(s) of the security objectives
Security Target	Description of the intended state for countering threats
Smart Card	Plastic card in credit card format with built-in chip
Software	Information (non-physical part of the system) which is required to implement functionality in conjunction with the hardware (program code)
Subject	Entity, generally in the form of a person, who performs actions
Target of Evaluation	Product or system which is being subjected to an evaluation
Test Mode	Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions to test the TOE hardware take place
Threat	Action or event that might prejudice security
User Mode	Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions intended for the user takes place

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