



Federal Office  
for Information Security

# Certification Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0895-2014**

for

**MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and  
S3CT9KC (BAC)**

from

**MaskTech International GmbH**

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Bundesamt  
für Sicherheit in der  
Informationstechnik

# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## BSI-DSZ-CC-0895-2014

Security IC with MRTD BAC Application

### MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC)

from MaskTech International GmbH

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009

Functionality: PP conformant  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by ALC\_DVS.2



SOGIS  
Recognition Agreement



The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.



Common Criteria  
Recognition Arrangement  
for components up to  
EAL 4

Bonn, 24 October 2014

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski  
Head of Department

L.S.



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## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

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<sup>1</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural Description (BSI 7138) [3]
- BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1<sup>5</sup> [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045.
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

### 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

#### 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.

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<sup>2</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

## 2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC\_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC\_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08 September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component ALC\_DVS.2 that is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

## 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.



The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0894-2014. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0894-2014 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC) was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 09 September 2014. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the applicant is:

MaskTech International GmbH

The product was developed by:

MaskTech International GmbH

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

## 4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

## 5 Publication

The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC), has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

# 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC) provided by MaskTech International GmbH and based on the S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC dual interface Smartcard IC by Samsung Electronics. It is an electronic travel document (Machine Readable Travel Document – MRTD) representing a smart card programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” [19] and additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to the ICAO documents [20] and [21] and the Technical Guideline TR-03110, Version 2.10 [22], respectively. The communication between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according to the Protection Profile [8]. Additionally, Active Authentication according to the ICAO Technical Report [26] is provided.

For CC evaluation the following applications of corresponding product are considered:

- Passport Application (ePassport) containing the related user data (incl. biometric data) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); with this application the TOE is intended to be used as a machine readable travel document (MRTD).

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified Protection Profile:

- Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7].

Please note that in consistency to the claimed Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 the security mechanism *Basic Access Control* is in the focus of this evaluation process. The further security mechanisms *Password Authenticated Connection Establishment* and *Extended Access Control* are subjects of the separate evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0894-2014 [30].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC\_DVS.2.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed Issue
F.IC_CL	Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
F.Access_Control	Regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only executed after this TSF allowed access
F.Identification_Authentication	Provides identification/authentication of the user roles

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed Issue
F.Management	Provides management and administrative functionalities
F.Crypto	Provides a high level interface to the used algorithms and implements the used hash algorithms
F.Verification	TOE internal functions to ensure correct operation

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE (for details refer to chapter 8 of this report):

- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software including the cryptographic library of the platform,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the ePassport Application, and
- the associated guidance documentation.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

**MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC)**

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW/SW	<p>MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC)</p> <p>An initialised module, but <u>without</u> hardware for the contactless interface, consisting of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Hardware Platform</b> Samsung Electronics S3CT9KW (144 K-byte) and S3CT9KC (80 K-byte) Smartcard IC</li> <li>2. <b>TOE Embedded Software</b> IC Embedded Software (the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2), Samsung Secure RSA / ECC Library, Samsung TRNG (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC)</li> <li>3. <b>TOE Embedded Applications</b> IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the MRTD Application implemented in the EEPROM of the IC)</li> </ol>	<p>MTCOS Pro Version 2.2</p> <p>ROM checksum: 0xAF5D (S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC)</p> <p>EEPROM checksum: 0xB91E (S3CT9KW) and 0xB87E (S3CT9KC)</p> <p>Secure RSA / ECC Library: Version 2.2</p> <p>TRNG: Version 2.0</p>	<p>SW implemented in ROM and EEPROM memory, chip initialised and tested.</p> <p>Delivery type: module</p>
2	DOC	MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC, User Guidance, MaskTech International GmbH	Version 0.3, 24.03.2014 [11]	Document in electronic form
3	DOC	MTCOS Standard & Pro: Part 1 – File System and Related Commands, MaskTech GmbH	Version 3.0, 27.07.2012 [12]	Document in electronic form
4	DOC	MTCOS Standard & Pro: Part 2 – Access Control Mechanisms and Symmetric Cryptography, MaskTech GmbH	Version 2.1, 03.06.2013 [13]	Document in electronic form
5	DOC	MTCOS Std & Pro: Product Specification – MTCOS Pro V2.2 on Samsung SS3CT9KW and S3CT9KC, MaskTech GmbH	Version 1.0, 26.02.2014 [16]	Document in electronic form

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD BAC PP [7]. The Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalisation facility respectively the inlay manufacturer as a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site or inlay manufacturing site. The TOE itself will be delivered as an initialized module but without hardware for contactless interface to the inlay manufacturer, who securely delivers the inlay containing the pre-personalized MRTD to the personalisation facility. The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not

part of the TOE and takes part after the delivery from the initialization facility. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalisation process as described in the User's Guide [11] have to be followed.

### 3 Security Policy

The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [7] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact less chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the advanced security methods for authentication and secure communication, which are described in detail in the Security Target [6] and [9].

### 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

- OE.MRTD Manufact: Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
- OE.MRTD Delivery: Protection of theMRTD delivery
- OE.Personalization: Personalization of logical MRTD
- OE.Pass Auth Sign: Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
- OE.BAC-Keys: Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
- OE.Exam MRTD: Examination of the MRTD passport book
- OE.Passive Auth Verif: Verification by Passive Authentication
- OE.Prot Logical MRTD: Protection of data of the logical MRTD

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.

### 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Dedicated Software, and IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the MRTD Application implemented in the EEPROM of the IC). While the IC Embedded software contains the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2, the Part Application Software contains the MRTD application. As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the Samsung S3CT9Kx. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the Samsung Semiconductor and its cryptographic library see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ANSSI-CC-2012/70 together with surveillance report ANSSI-CC-2012/70-S01 [17]. This chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE's Embedded Software and the corresponding TSF which were objects of this evaluation.

The security functions of the TOE are:

- F.IC\_CL
- F.Access\_Control
- F.Identification\_Authentication
- F.Management
- F.Crypto
- F.Verification

According to the TOE design these security functions are enforced by the following subsystems:

- Application data (supports the TSF F.Access\_Control, F.Identification\_Authentication)
- Operation System Kernel (supports the TSF F.Access\_Control, F.Identification\_Authentication, F.Management, F.Crypto, F.Verification)
- HAL (supports the TSF F.IC\_CL, F.Crypto, F.Identification\_Authentication, F.Verification)
- Hardware (supports the TSF F.IC\_CL)

## 6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

## 7 IT Product Testing

The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.

Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered

- testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
- testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
- testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,
- penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
- source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
- testing the commands which are used to execute the BAC protocol,



- side channel analysis for SHA,
- fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
- testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
- testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.

The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced basic attack potential during their penetration testing.

The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:

MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC) consisting of

- the Samsung Electronics dual interface Smartcard IC's S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC,<sup>8</sup>
- the cryptographic library of the platform,
- the IC embedded software,
- a file system in the context of the ICAO application, and
- the associated guidance documentation.

The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2 and an application layer, consisting of the ICAO application.

Since an MRTD may have different file structures here the certified configuration of the TOE is addressed. The TOE has 28 different variations due to a total of five layouts, concretely the four layouts (LayoutA-80, LayoutB-80, LayoutC-128, and LayoutE-36) each with six curves (BP-256-3DES, BP-256-AES, BP-512-AES, NIST-256-3DES, NIST-256-AES and NIST-384-AES), and two Layouts (Layout0-80 and Layout0-128) with two curves (BP-256-AES and NIST256-AES), whereby the identifier 3DES or AES determines the cryptographic algorithm used for secure messaging with default Chip Authentication configuration. The following table summarizes the possible curve settings for the layouts:

Curve setting	EC Curve	Default Chip Authentication SM configuration
BP-256-3DES	brainpoolP256r1	3DES
BP-256-AES	brainpoolP256r1	AES-128
BP-512-AES	brainpoolP512r1	AES-256
NIST-256-3DES	nistP256	3DES
NIST-256-AES	nistP256	AES-128
NIST-384-AES	nistP384	AES-192

Table 3: Possible curve settings for the layouts

<sup>8</sup>The TOE itself will be delivered as an initialised module with contactbased interface disabled

Thus the TOE consists of the hardware applied with the following different initialisation / pre-personalisation files:

- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-128-BP-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-128-NIST-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-BP-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-NIST-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-preperso-Layout0-128-BP-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-preperso-Layout0-128-NIST-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-BP-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-NIST-0-0.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-512-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-384-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-512-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-384-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-BP-512-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NIST-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NIST-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-128-NIST-384-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP-512-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NIST-256-3DES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NIST-256-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NIST-384-AES.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-BP-0-0-KC.txt*

- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-NIST-0-0-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-256-3DES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-256-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-512-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-256-3DES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-256-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-384-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-256-3DES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-256-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-512-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-256-3DES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-256-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-384-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP-256-3DES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP-256-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-BP-512-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NIST-256-3DES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NIST-256-AES-KC.txt*
- *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-36-NIST-384-AES-KC.txt*

Note: The initialisation as well as pre-personalisation is done using one of the above listed scripts except for Layout0 where the process is done using two scripts, e.g. the initialisation script *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-initscript-Layout0-128-BP-0-0.txt* and *Dummy-patch0v2-FSP-preperso-Layout0-128-BP-0-0.txt*.

All files are maintained using the configuration management system Subversion. The version numbers of the above mentioned scripts are:

- *Layout0 Version: 12732 (init) and Version: 12762 (prepers),  
Layout0-80-KC Version: 12745*
- *LayoutA Version: 12732,  
LayoutA-KC Version: 12745*
- *LayoutB Version: 12732,  
LayoutB-KC Version: 12745*
- *LayoutC Version: 12732*
- *LayoutE and LayoutE-KC Version: 12767*

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

### 9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [10] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
- Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
- Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).  
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [17], [18]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.

(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36).

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC\_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0894-2014 [30], re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the PP conformance claim from BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [15] to BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]. The TOE itself did not change.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"  
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,  
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by ALC\_DVS.2

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

## 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

For details of the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy please refer to Annex A of the Security Target [9].

## 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

## 11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

## 12 Definitions

### 12.1 Acronyms

<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard
<b>AIS</b>	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
<b>APDU</b>	Application Protocol Data Unit
<b>BAC</b>	Basic Access Control
<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>BSIG</b>	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
<b>CCRA</b>	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>CEM</b>	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
<b>DES</b>	Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
<b>EAC</b>	Extended Access Control
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>ECC</b>	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report
<b>ICAO</b>	International Civil Aviation Organisation
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology

<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
<b>MAC</b>	Message Authentication Code
<b>MRTD</b>	Machine Readable Travel Document
<b>PACE</b>	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>RNG</b>	Random Number Generator
<b>SAR</b>	Security Assurance Requirement
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionality

## 12.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

**Collaborative Protection Profile** - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Package** - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

**Protection Profile** - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

**Security Target** - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Subject** - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

**Target of Evaluation** - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

**TOE Security Functionality** - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

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<sup>9</sup>specifically

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## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

### Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
  - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
  - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
  - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
  - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

**Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation** (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

**Class ASE: Security Target evaluation** (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

## Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
	ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Assurance class decomposition

**Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)**

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

**Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)**

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE’s assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one

component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

### **Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)**

#### “Objectives

EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

### **Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)**

#### “Objectives

EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

### **Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)**

#### “Objectives

EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

**Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed** (chapter 8.6)

“Objectives

EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested** (chapter 8.7)

“Objectives

EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

**Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested** (chapter 8.8)

“Objectives

EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested** (chapter 8.9)

“Objectives

EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”



Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL 1	EAL 2	EAL 3	EAL 4	EAL 5	EAL 6	EAL 7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

**Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment** (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VAN)** (chapter 16.1)

## “Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

## **D Annexes**

### **List of annexes of this certification report**

- Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
- Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

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## Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0895-2014

### Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC (BAC) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 October 2014, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC\_CMC.4, ALC\_CMS.4, ALC\_DEL.1, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1, ALC\_TAT.1)

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

- a) MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany (Development)
- b) HID Global Ireland Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0034-2014 [27] (External initialisation)
- c) SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd., 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laen, Amphor Bang-Pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya, Thailand, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0023-2013 [28] (External initialisation)
- d) Trueb AG, Switzerland, Hintere Bahnhofsstrasse 12, CH-5001 Aarau, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0033-2014 [29] (External initialisation)

For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to the certification report ANNSI-CC-2012/70 [17].

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

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