



## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023-MA-01**

**CASA 1.0** (SW: 31000000\_\_X026e  
HW: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304)

**CASA 1.1** (SW: 31000000\_\_X026e  
HW: 11 301 / 11 302)

from

**EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG**



SOGIS  
Recognition Agreement  
for components up to  
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023.



The change to the certified product is at the level of the implementation representation. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.



Common Criteria  
Recognition Arrangement  
recognition for components  
up to EAL 2 and ALC\_FLR  
only

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023 dated 02 October 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023.

Bonn, 10 October 2023

The Federal Office for Information Security



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the CASA 1.0 (SW: 31000000\_\_X026e, HW: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304) and CASA 1.1 (SW: 31000000\_\_X026e, HW: 11 301 / 11 302), EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1 were changed due to enhance the performance during system start and selftest as well as to enhance the connectivity to external meters. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore, the SW version number for CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1 changed from 31000000\_\_X026d to 31000000\_\_X026e.

The Security Target [5] and the guidance documentation [6] and [7] were editorially updated to reflect the new TOE version.

## Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of the implementation representation. The change has no effect on product assurance, but the editorially updated guidance documentation has to be followed.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023 dated 02 October is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

### Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG<sup>1</sup> Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.2, 30 September 2021  
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.0, November 2019
- [2] CASA 1.0 und CASA 1.1 – Maintenance-Verfahren 012 – Impact Analysis Report (IAR), Version 0.02, 2023-08-14, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023 for CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1, 2023-10-02, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023, Version 3.00, 2023-07-05, CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1 Security Target, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
- [5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V3-2023, Version 3.03, 2023-08-14, CASA 1.0 and CASA 1.1 Security Target, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
- [6] CASA 1.0 und CASA 1.1 Benutzerhandbuch für Letztverbraucher, Version 1.55, 2023-08-14, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG  
SHA-256 hash:  
231aa65322b089c667fa8d657274017b400723c920d0a7f48e01f3343aa04af4
- [7] CASA 1.0 und CASA 1.1 Installations- und Konfigurationshandbuch für Service-Techniker und Gateway-Administratoren, Version 1.55, 2023-08-14, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG  
SHA-256 hash:  
8d01a81dd62ed161907209be98afc1bcbf55da039d2213f8e3c84951c7c2ff1d