



Federal Office
for Information Security

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015

for

Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000

from

Sophos Technology GmbH

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111



Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 (*)

Packet Filter

Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000

from: Sophos Technology GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement



The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 21 April 2015

For the Federal Office for Information Security



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4

Thomas Gast
Head of Division

L.S.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111



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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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A. Certification

1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security²
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural Description (BSI 7138) [3]
- BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁵ [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045.
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

2. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

² Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08 September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. for all assurance components selected.

As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. for all assurance components selected.

3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 31 March 2015. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Sophos Technology GmbH.

The product was developed by: Sophos Technology GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited as outlined on the certificate. The certificate issued on 21 April 2015 is valid until 20 April 2020. The validity date can be extended by re-assessment or re-certification.

The owner of the certificate is obliged

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

- Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,
 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the product deliverables according to the Certification Report part B chapter 2 to third parties, permission of the Certification Body at BSI has to be obtained.
 4. to provide latest at of half of the certificate's validity period unsolicitedly and at his own expense current qualified evidence to the Certification Body at BSI that demonstrates that the requirements as outlined in the Security Target are up-to-date and remain valid in view of the respective status of technology. In general, this evidence is provided in the form of a re-assessment report according to the rules of the BSI Certification Scheme.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5. Publication

The product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁷ Sophos Technology GmbH
Amalienstraße 41 / Bau 52
76227 Karlsruhe

B. Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1. Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 provided by Sophos Technology GmbH which allows the integration of packet filtering capability into a firewall or VPN components which are parts of the Sophos UTM (Unified Threat Management) product family. The packet filter has to be delivered to an application developer.

The application developer integrates the Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 into an application in order to build a network component. The administrator of this application is defined as TOE end-user.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified Protection Profile.

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionalities:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
Information Flow Protection	The TSF implements the information flow control (as routers) on the network layer (IP/ICMP) and transport layer (TCP/UDP). In order to define packet filter rules, the TSF provides packet filter criteria and packet filter actions.
Security Audit	The TOE collects audit data and sends it to a memory buffer in order to identify attempts to violate a policy. This allows the authorized administrator to inspect the received audit data from the packet filter.
Management	<p>The TSF is capable of performing the following management functions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modification of network traffic filter rules • Modification of configuration data <p>The TOE verifies the identification information of an administrator provided by the environment (application) before any management function can be performed. The TOE is initialized with a strict packet filter rule set, that is, everything is dropped.</p>

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapters 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSI-G Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2. Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

	Delivery item	Description / Additional Information	Type	Delivery method
1	Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter	UTMPF_1.000	SW	See binary parts below
2	Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch.pdf	Manual for application developers [9]	DOC	b0916b540fe3f22e1b94da538f136af3dd17f5dcfcfb5f69841245038625de0e
3	ReleaseNotes.txt	Release Notes	DOC	61a323042ccc93fef45b103fa04408d5eebea2e330726f6e0f38ae5cc766ad9a
4	sophos-pf-sign.asc	Public verification key	SW	6ae98004448a17d2d53400b48380baf1b6106293357157ae835d09e61ff7b922
5	sha256sums.asc	Signed checksum file	SW	N/A
6	flr_utm_pf_v0.90.pdf	Flaw remediation [10]	DOC	335f14bbd2ed190098f30c091ae672ee68e31bab28f4ea09c7d22d9b5233a85b
Binary parts of the TOE				
7	ip_tables.ko	Module configuration IPv4	SW	115c8955d9cea3aadcc6c3b6b059a13697d3033100470a6c3d8f6cd4f90fa2f9
8	ip6_tables.ko	Module configuration IPv6	SW	4827ae17ba96d6a2a510b6fcfbc2decdd5d3a7e2304f5d9dc5358ad85e8079f4f

	Delivery item	Description / Additional Information	Type	Delivery method
9	xt_LOG.ko	Module log	SW	e246f75dadd0255421e5a50453c32012ceb0f5b00f9239bc6ff5e51e8b7f6434
10	iptables_filter.ko	Module filter IPv4	SW	3748898767d476066ab6be2c1903bb09ca83c33c7919a64ea60324f336c8e54a
11	ip6table_filter.ko	Module filter IPv6	SW	186c9ed842ae5ed338fa8858a0461afcddc9e2728e58d4da40a3b702a3b38b66
12	ipv6.ko	Module IPv6 Kernel Stack	SW	fc7a624be2c1a317e2d83b021e7e05feadac168c785a42a5cabe2857cb9ba6c1

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The software consists of eight binary files which can be uniquely identified by their hash checksums. Table 2 lists, where applicable, the SHA-256 checksums of all TOE components.

The TOE is personally delivered on a CD to the application developer. The project manager describes the integrity and authentication checks to the application developer. The application developer and the end-user can verify that the authenticity and integrity of the TOE has not been altered. First the signed checksum file must be verified. Therefore the user uses the public verification RSA key with the SHA-256 fingerprint described above. After a successful verification of the checksum file the hash values of the binary parts of the TOE stated in this file can be compared to the calculated ones. This calculation can be done with any available SHA-256 program.

3. Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

Information Flow Protection: The TOE enforces the Packet Filter information flow policy.

Security Audit: The TOE collects audit data into a memory buffer to facilitate identification of policy violations.

Management: The TSF is capable of performing the management functions modification of network traffic filter rules and modification of configuration data.

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.

5. Architectural Information

The TOE is a packet filter. The Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 consists of software on machines to implement packet filter functionality for the network components; i.e. the Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 is part of the network components. The packet filter relies on information available at OSI layer 3 and layer 4 for policy enforcement. The functionality for packet filtering is part of the operating system (Linux). The Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 supports IPv4 and IPv6 protocol. This chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE and the corresponding TSF which were objects of this evaluation.

The security functions of the TOE are:

- SF.1 Information Flow Control
- SF.2 Security Audit
- SF.3 Management

These security functions are enforced by the following subsystems:

- IPv4 Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
- IPv6 Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
- Netfilter (supports the TSFs SF.1, SF.2 and SF.3)
- /proc file system (supports the TSF SF.3)
- User-Space I/O (supports the TSF SF.3)

6. Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

7.1. Developer Testing

The developer tested all TOE Security Functions. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases were specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid input parameters. Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.

TOE Test Configuration

The TOE was tested on a stand-alone test computer with three virtual workstations. The TOE was running in a virtual machine which was configured according to chapter 1.2.2 of [6].

The test environment also needed to fulfil the security objectives for the environment. These security objectives are fulfilled by the services which were installed on the virtual machine that match the needed components described in the application developer

guidance [9]. The TOE environment and the related test equipment for the tests were consistent with the described ones in [6].

Testing Approach

Each TOE security functional interface was covered by at least one test case. Additionally, test cases exist for all subsystems and SFR-enforcing modules identified in the TOE design documentation.

The virtual workstations provided two standard workstations and one with the TOE installed. The entire developer test configuration and the test protocols were provided to the evaluator.

Each test was conducted by the evaluators to test the full coverage of the test procedure of the developer.

The test cases were dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all security functions, commands and filter functionalities. Test cases were specified for all commands and functionality in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby all possible parameters were tested. Furthermore, the vulnerability tests consisted of additional tests for specified combinations and attack scenarios.

Conclusion

All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result. If necessary the developer gave additional annotations, clarifying the test results.

7.2. Evaluator Independent Testing

TOE Test Configuration

The TOE can have only one configuration. The TOE separates two networks from another (see chapter 1.2.1 of [6]). For testing the TOE the evaluators used three virtual workstations. Two of these virtual machines simulate the different networks and on the third machine the TOE is installed. The virtual host is able to start tests and is used as a management workstation.

The following configuration

- Intel i686 compatible CPU
- Two or more Ethernet network interfaces
- 2048 MB RAM
- 20GB hard disk drive

is the configuration of the virtual machine and is consistent with the one described in [6].

Testing Approach

The independent test subset consists of six individual tests that cover the main functionality of the TOE (the correct handling of incoming packets) and additionally the logging functionality as well as the correct handling of access rights of the filter rules and configuration files that were tested during the repetition of the developer tests.

The evaluators have conducted all tests of the developer using the test suites and equipment provided by the developer. The evaluators have executed the developer tests and therefore tested all interfaces.

Conclusion

All tests were executed successfully., i.e. the test results fulfil the requirements of assurance family ATE_IND.2.

7.3. Evaluator Penetration Testing

TOE Test Configuration

All configurations of the TOE to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in section 1.2.2 of [6]. The hardware configuration used for testing:

- CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU, M 540, 2.53GHz
- Memory: 4 GB
- Harddisk: Disk /dev/sda: 250.1 GB
- Operating System (Host System): Ubuntu 10.04.1 LTS
- Additional Packages screen: qemu, kqemu, bridgemodules and bridge-utils

This hardware configuration has been used to virtualize the complete testing network including the TOE. Two virtual Debian GNU/Linux systems, 'Source' (src) and 'Destination' (dst) were installed and operated in the testing network, each with three virtual interfaces. The TOE was mounted on a third virtual machine as the one used in the independent evaluator functional tests. The TOE has been set up between the virtual systems src, dst and host. The systems are connected using the bridge mode for the network of virtual machines.

Testing Approach

For the penetration tests the differential Firewall analysis method was used. In this method someone needs to be able to compare the traffic on the “outside” to the traffic on the “inside” in real-time and alert when this contradicts. Therefore two monitoring points must be placed logically in front and behind the packet filter. At the two monitoring points a sniffer is placed at which the network traffic is analysed. These monitoring points are the bridges “net-in” and “net-out” of the test network.

The sensor is placed on the “inside” to alert if traffic is detected and violating the firewall rules. In the operational environment of the TOE it is also possible that malicious or unintended traffic is coming from the inside of the network passing the TOE. It was tested that the packet filter responds to both network interfaces in the same way. Therefore the extensive testing of one interface was sufficient to prove if the TOE is resistant to an attacker with attack potential enhanced-basic.

Attack Scenarios being tested

After the setup of the test environment the different attack scenarios were defined. These attack scenarios were mapped to test cases and executed in the test environment.

The following list gives a short overview about the attack scenarios which have been tested:

- Port scan with or without different source ports to detect open ports.
- Bypassing the packet filter with fuzzy generated TCP, UDP or ICMP packets.
- Using the publicly available change log to find vulnerabilities.
- Bypassing the packet filter with packets with an incorrect IPv4 or IPv6 header.

- Bypassing the packet filter with a flood attack with “syn” or fragmented packets.
- Bypassing the packet filter with packets with a spoofed source address.
- Manipulation of the log output by sending incorrect payload in packets.
- Manipulation of Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) for IPv6 to cause a denial of service
- Bypassing the access rule checks.

SFRs penetration tested

Only direct attacks against the implementation of SFRs needed to be considered. The tested SFRs are listed in the following:

- FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
- FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
- FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not tested through penetration due to non-exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the TOEs operational environment.

Conclusion

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential enhanced basic was actually successful. Therefore the test results fulfil the requirements of AVA_VAN.3.

8. Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE test configuration is defined by “Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000” with the hash values as given in table 3 in chapter 2.

The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:

- Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000

The following documents are part of the TOE:

- Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch [9],
- Flaw remediation [10]
- Release Notes

To identify the TOE the document "Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch" [9] is providing relevant information in chapter 3.

9. Results of the Evaluation

9.1. CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on changed in the design.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: None
- for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the assessment.

10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security.

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

- The user must not load any new modules into the kernel. In case a new module is loaded the TOE is no longer certified.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

12. Definitions

12.1. Acronyms

AIS	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
IP	Internet Protocol
IPv4	Internet Protocol Version 4
IPv6	Internet Protocol Version 6
IT	Information Technology
ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NDP	Neighbour Discovery Protocol
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OSI	Open Systems Interconnection
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH	Secure Shell
ST	Security Target
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionalities
UDP	User Datagram Protocol

VPN Virtual Private Network

12.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

13. Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
- [3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products, protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE⁸.
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015, Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, Version 1.00, 25.03.2015, Sophos Technology GmbH
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 30.03.2015, Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) - Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
- [8] Konfigurationsliste ALC_CMS.4, Sophos, Version 0.91, 22.12.2014 (confidential document)
- [9] Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, Version 0.92, 30.09.2014
- [10] Beheben von Schwachstellen ALC_FLR.2, Version 0.90, 26.09.2014

⁸specifically

- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
- AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results

C. Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
 - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
 - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
 - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
 - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
	ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Assurance class decomposition

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE’s assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one

component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)

“Objectives

EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)

“Objectives

EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)

“Objectives

EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 8.6)

“Objectives

EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)

“Objectives

EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 8.8)

“Objectives

EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9)

“Objectives

EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL 1	EAL 2	EAL 3	EAL 4	EAL 5	EAL 6	EAL 7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)

“Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

D. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

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