Federal Office
for Information Security

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017

for

KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor 1.0.7

from

KoCo Connector AG

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Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 (*)

KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor
1.0.7

from	KoCo Connector AG
PP Conformance:	Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015
Functionality:	PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:	Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2

SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4

Common Criteria

The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 2

Bonn, 22 March 2017

For the Federal Office for Information Security

DAkkS
Deutsche
Akkreditierungsstelle
D-ZE-19615-01-00

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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG[1] Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

[1] Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

Contents

A. Certification

1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security[2]
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance[3]
- BSI Schedule of Costs[4]
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3]
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1[5] [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045.
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

2. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

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2 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

3 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 component of this assurance family is relevant.

2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i.e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 components. The evaluation contained the components AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ATE_COV.2 and ATE_DPT.1 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2014, for mutual recognition the EAL 2 components of these assurance families are relevant.

3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 11.11.2016. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)[6] recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the applicant is: KoCo Connector AG.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 22 March 2017 is valid until 21 March 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.

The owner of the certificate is obliged:

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,

[6] Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5. Publication

The product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer[7] of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

[7] KoCo Connector AG
Marienstraße 12
10117 Berlin

B. Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1. Executive Summary

The target of evaluation (TOE) is KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, Version 1.0.7. The TOE is the network connector (German: “Netzkonnektor”) and a small part of the application connector (German “Anwendungskonnektor”) of the so-called “KoCoBox MED+” connector (German: “Konnektor”). The TOE is part of a secure platform called KoCoBox MED+ which is used as an “e-Health Konnektor” in the context of the German health care telematics infrastructure.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015 [8].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF.VPN	VPN Client
SF.DynamicPacketFilter	Firewall with stateful packet inspection
SF.NetworkServices	DHCP, DNS and NTP networking services
SF.SelfProtection	Self-tests, attack counter mechanisms, deletion of confidential data and non-emanation of data
SF.Audit	Secure audit
SF.Administration	Secure administration channels and update mechanism
SF.CryptographicServices	Cryptographic services required by other functionality

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapters 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2. Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	FW	Firmware Image	1.0.7	Either: Initially included in the e-Health Konnektor product KoCoBox MED+ or as a software update package via KSR process.
2	DOC	KoCoBox MED+ Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung Purpose: Guide for the end user	1.0.7, September 2016	Delivered with the delivery package of the product KoCoBox MED+.
3	DOC	Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+ für die Komponente Netzkonnektor Purpose: Guide for the Administrator	1.0.7	Delivered to the authorized service technician, who installs the TOE at the end user site. The service technician performs administration tasks.
4	DOC	Guidance addendum documentation („Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+ für die Komponente Netzkonnektor“)	1.0.1	See 3.

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE is delivered to the end user as part of the product KoCoBox MED+. An authorized service technician will deliver the product to the end user. The service technician installs the product KoCoBox MED+ within the premises of the end user. Prior to installation, the service technician must be identified via a photo ID by the end user. The service technician is trained, instructs the end user and provides security advice.

The TOE can be identified within the KoCoBox MED+ as following:

- Display:
  - OK to enter the Menu
  - Select 4 for Version

  Identification: Firmwareversion 1.0.7, Hardwareversion 1.0.0

- Web Administration Interface:
  - Check the entry Firmware on the status page of the Web Administration Interface

  Identification: Produktversion: 1.0.7:1.0.0

3. Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

- Security Audit,
- Cryptographic Support,
- User Data Protection,
- Identification and Authentication,
- Security Management,
- Protection of the TSF,
- Trusted Path/Channels.

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

- OE.NK.phys_Schutz: The TOE must be physically protected against unauthorized access,
- OE.NK.Admin_EVG: The TOE must be configured by a trustworthy and well trained administrator, who operates the TOE according to the guidance.

Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.

5. Architectural Information

A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.7.

6. Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

Developer testing effort

TOE test configurations:

The Security Target [6] has identified solely one configuration of the TOE under evaluation. Nevertheless, the developer uses two “preparative” and four test configurations for his simulative testing approach. Furthermore, two firmware versions for blackbox and for whitebox testing are provided. Simulation is used for flexibility reasons: Properties of the TOE can be changed, the “inner” behaviour can be analysed by whitebox approach.

TOE test environment configurations:

The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses five test environment configurations which simulate a large amount of the real environment. Again, simulation is used for flexibility reasons: All simulated components can be configured according to test needs.

Testing approach:

- Coverage and depth tests are done together.
- The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and module(s).
- Different testing approaches are used:
  - Code analysis
  - Blackbox tests
    - Manual
    - Automatic
  - Whitebox tests
    - Manual
    - Automatic
  - The test descriptions comprise (inter alia)
    - Pre conditions: preparative steps
    - Test steps: Core test steps
    - Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test
- Testing results: The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.

All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all passed according to their expected result.

Evaluator testing effort

TOE test configurations:

The evaluation body used the same test configurations and test environment as the developer during functional testing.

Test subset chosen:

The evaluation body chose to repeat and inspect a broad set of developer tests. Effectively more that 50% of the tests were covered.

Interface selection criteria:

The evaluation body chose to broadly cover the existing interfaces without specific restrictions.

Interfaces tested:

Services at the LAN and the WAN ports were considered during testing.

Developer tests performed:

The evaluation body chose to perform a random sampling with the intent to broadly cover the existing interfaces and the implemented security functionality.

Verdict for the sub-activity:

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results.

Penetration Testing effort

The configuration defined in the ST was tested. Furthermore, different TOE variants were used during penetration testing to verify different mechanisms.

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful.

- Penetration testing approach:

  The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritized with regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing coverage, detectability of flaws during developer testing.

  Medium and high areas were guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger emphasis on high priorities. Low priorities were also considered during penetration, but could be less emphasized, if developer tests were found to be sufficient.

  The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks. Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas Update, Random Number Generation and Hardening Mechanisms. Combined approaches were also applied.

- TOE test configurations:

  The TOE was delivered by the developer in two different configurations: A final operational and a special ATE variant. The ATE configuration is an enhanced variant of the software running on the same hardware and using the same smart cards (gSMC-K). The ATE configuration is used to enable tests that are not possible due to security mechanisms applied in the final operational configuration. The differences between final operational configuration and the ATE variant are clearly defined. Therefore, two goals can be achieved:

  (1) Perform detailed testing using the target hardware and smart card,

  (2) ensure that the tests results of the ATE variant are also valid for the final variant.

  During the evaluation process, the TOE was updated several times. Penetration tests were performed with versions 1.0.6 and 1.0.7. The developer provided a change

analysis which documents, the differences between the versions. The evaluation body did not identify changes that would render the 1.0.6 test results invalid for 1.0.7. The most important tests were conducted with the final version 1.0.7.

- Attack scenarios having been tested:

  The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the following areas:

  - VPN Connections
  - Administration Connections
  - Random Number Generation
  - Update
  - Hardening Mechanisms
  - Filtering and Routing
  - Self-Protection
  - Network Services
  - Audit

- Tested security functionality:

  The evaluator ensured that all areas listed above are tested. Actually, the evaluation body used a more detailed list during the analysis and testing. The penetration testing was then conducted based on priorities as described above. Therefore, a complete coverage of security functional testing based on technical areas of concern is performed.

- Verdict for the sub-activity:

  The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful in the TOE's operational environment provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.

Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis

The TOE testing did not reveal vulnerabilities exploitable by an attacker with high attack potential.

8. Evaluated Configuration

The evaluation results are only valid for the single configuration defined in the Security Target [6].

9. Results of the Evaluation

9.1. CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5.

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015 [8]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
  Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
  EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comment
1	Authenticity	RSA signature verification with encoding RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5 using SHA-256	[PKCS#1] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048	FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert, FCS_COP.1/TLS, FCS_COP.1/Sign
2	Authentication	RSA signature creation with support of gSMC-K and verification with encoding RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5 using SHA-256 (sha256withRSAEncryption)	[PKCS#1] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048	FCS_COP.1/NK.Auth, FCS_COP.1/TLS
3	Key Agreement	Diffie-Hellman (IKEv2) with key derivation function PRF-HMAC-{SHA-1, SHA-256}	[HaC] (DH) [RFC3526] (dh-group), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC),	2048 (dh-group 14) with DH exponent length ≥ 384	FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comment
			[RFC5996] (IKEv2)	bits	
4		Diffie-Hellman with TLS key derivation function	[HaC] (DH) [RFC3526] (dh-group), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC1321] (MD5), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC4346] (TLSv1.1) [RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)	2048 (dh-group 14) with DH exponent length ≥ 384 bits	FCS_COP.1/TLS
5	Confidentiality	AES in CBC	[FIPS197] (AES), [RFC3602] (AES-CBC)	256	FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP, FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec, FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
6		AES in CBC	[FIPS197] (AES), [RFC3602] (AES-CBC)	128, 256	FCS_COP.1/TLS
7	Integrity	HMAC with SHA-{1, 256} (IKE, IPsec)	[FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC2404], [RFC4868], [RFC5996] (IKEv2)	160, 256	FCS_COP.1/NK.HMAC
8		HMAC with SHA-1 (TLS)	[FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC2404], [RFC4868], [RFC5996] (IKEv2)	160	FCS_COP.1/TLS
9	Trusted Channel	IKEv2, IPsec	[RFC5996] (IKEv2) [RFC4301] (IPsec), [RFC4303] (ESP)		FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_TI
10		IKEv2, IPsec	[RFC5996] (IKEv2) [RFC4301] (IPsec), [RFC4303] (ESP)		FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_SIS
11		TLS v1.1 and v1.2	[RFC4346] (TLSv1.1), [RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)		FTP_TRP.1/NK.Admin

Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

According to [gemSpec_Kon], [gemSpec_Krypt] and [TR03116-1] the algorithms are suitable for the corresponding purpose.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with

a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).

Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context).

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits	Comment
1	Authenticity	RSA signature verification with encoding RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5 using SHA-1	[PKCS#1] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048, 4096	no	FCS_COP.1/ Sign for x.509 certificate verification
2		RSA signature verification with encoding RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512	[PKCS#1] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048	yes	FCS_COP.1/ Sign for firmware update signatures verification

Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality (Update)

10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

The administrator shall only configure the TOE by using the functionality of the web administration interface as presented in the recommended web browser.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

12. Definitions

12.1. Acronyms

AIS	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AK	Application connector
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
DH	Diffie-Hellman
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK	Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
gSMC-K	Secure module for the connector
HBA	Heilberufsausweis
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE	Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KSR	Konfigurations- und Software-Repository
LAN	Local Area Network
MD5	Message-Digest Algorithm 5
NK	Network connector
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm

SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SIS	Secure Internet Service
SMC-B	Secure Module Card – Type B: Praxisausweis / Institutionsausweis
ST	Security Target
TI	Telematikinfrastruktur
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WAN	Wide Area Network

12.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE[8] https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS

[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte

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[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 11.11.2016, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)

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- AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
- AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren

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C. Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
  - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
  - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
  - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
  - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition“

Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
	ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Assurance class decomposition

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one

component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)

“Objectives

EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)

“Objectives

EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)

“Objectives

EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering."

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 8.6)

"Objectives

EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs."

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)

"Objectives

EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques."

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 8.8)

"Objectives

EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs."

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9)

"Objectives

EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis."

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL 1	EAL 2	EAL 3	EAL 4	EAL 5	EAL 6	EAL 7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)

“Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

D. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

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