



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023-MA-01

Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) in the variants SGH-S-AL1-B-100 & SGH-S-AM1-B-100, V1.01

from

EFR GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023.



The change to the certified product is at the level of guidance. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product. The changes are related to an update of the user guidance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 dated 11 September 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023.



Bonn, 16 January 2024

The Federal Office for Information Security

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) in the variants SGH-S-AL1-B-100 & SGH-S-AM1-B-100, V1.01, EFR GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) in the variants SGH-S-AL1-B-100 & SGH-S-AM1-B-100, V1.01 was changed due to updated guidance documents regarding PTB requirements. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from V1.00 to V1.01. The Security Target was editorially updated.

The changes are related to an update of the user guidance [6-9] only.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of guidance documentation. The change has no effect on product assurance, but the updated guidance documentation has to be followed.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 dated 11. September 2023 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The foundation for usage of the certificate updated by this maintenance procedure is:

- Use of the latest version of the TOE guidance documentation, see [6-9].

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.2, 30 September 2021
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.0, November 2019
- [2] Impact Analysis Report “IAR_DSZ-CC-1000-2023”, Version 1.01_d, 2024-01-16, EFR GmbH (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 for Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) V1.00, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 11. September 2023
- [4] Security Target SMART GRID HUB – SECURE, V1.23, 22.12.2023, EFR GmbH
- [5] Konfigurations-Management-Scope Konfigurationsliste, Version 1.15_e, 2023-12-22, EFR GmbH (Confidential document)
- [6] Produkthandbuch SGH-S für den GWA, V1.23, 12.12.2023, EFR GmbH
- [7] Servicetechniker Handbuch für Installation und Inbetriebnahme, V1.20, 12.12.2023, EFR GmbH
- [8] Handbuch SGH-S für Endnutzer, V1.08, 12.12.2023, EFR GmbH
- [9] Betriebshinweise für eine mess- und eichrechtskonforme Verwendung anwendbar auf Softwareversion 6.1.1, V1.2, 14.12.2023, EFR GmbH