BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V3-2020

for

IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software

from

Infineon Technologies AG

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V3-2020 (*)

IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software

SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

from	Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance:	Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality:	PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:	Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1

Common Criteria

The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Bonn, 24 July 2020

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Matthias Intemann   L.S.
Head of Branch

DAkkS
Deutsche
Akkreditierungsstelle
D-ZE-19615-01-00

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A.   Certification

1.   Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG[1] Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

2.   Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security[1]

● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance[2]

● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs [3]

● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard

● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3]

● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]

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[1]   Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

[2]   Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

[3]   BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365

- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1[4] [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.

- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045

- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

3.   Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

3.1.   European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

3.2.   International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

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4   Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.

4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V2-2019. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V2-2019 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 10 July 2020. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)[5] recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.

The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

5. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that

● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,

● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 24 July 2020 is valid until 23 July 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.

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[5]   Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

The owner of the certificate is obliged:

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,

2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,

3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

6. Publication

The product IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer[6] of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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[6]   Infineon Technologies AG
      Am Campeon 1-15
      85579 Neubiberg

B.   Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1.   Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies AG security controller (integrated circuit IC), IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h Design Step G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware and the following optional software: RSA 2048/4096 v2.08.006, EC v2.08.006, Toolbox v2.08.006, Base v2.08.006, Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.04.002, Hardware Support Library (HSL) v2.01.6198, NRG Library (NRG) v04.03.3431 and CIPURSE Cryptographic Library (CCL) v02.00.0005. The firmware version of the TOE is referenced via the firmware identifier 80.201.04.1.

The TOE provides a proprietary 32-bit RISC CPU designed on the basis of the ARMv7_M architecture. The major components of the core system is the CPU (Central Processing Unit), the MPU (Memory Protection Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption / Decryption Unit).

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware part and the software part.

This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded software.

Depending on the blocking configuration a IFX_CCI_000011h G12 product can have e.g. different user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible cryptographic coprocessors. All products are identical in regard to module design, layout and footprint.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF_DPM	Device Phase Management:
	The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases following a defined sequence. Different operation modes with appropriate restrictions help to protect the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle. This also includes the permanent deactivation of the flash

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
	loader.
SF_PS	Protection against Snooping: The TOE is equipped with various countermeasures against snooping. Amongst other countermeasures, the TOE implements complete encryption of the memories in combination with a complex key management, topological measures and dynamic masking of the peripheral bus.
SF_PMA	Protection against Modifying Attacks: This TOE is equipped with various countermeasures against modifying attacks. Amongst other countermeasures, the TOE implements a set of sensors to monitor the operating conditions, error detection and correction in the memories, program flow protection and backwards calculation in the SCP.
SF_PLA	Protection against Logical Attacks: The memory model of the TOE provides two distinct, independent levels and the possibility to define up to eight memory regions with different access rights enforced by the Management Protection Unit (MPU).
SF_CS	Cryptographic Support: The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations like RSA, EC, TDES, and AES. Additionally the TOE is equipped with a Hybrid Random Number Generator providing four different modes of operation: Hybrid random number generation, true random number generation, deterministic random number generation and key stream generation. The TOE is further equipped with an optional CIPURSE library which can be used by the IC embedded software to set up a CIPURSE V2 conformant protocol.

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2.   Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW	IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h	G12	Transfer in cages as complete modules, bare dies, wafers, IC cases or packages
2	SW	BOS	80.201.04.1	Stored on the delivered hardware.
3	SW	NRG Base	80.201.04.1	Stored on the delivered hardware. Not part of the TSF.
4	SW	Flash Loader	80.201.04.1	Stored on the delivered hardware. Optional, depending on order.
5	SW	RSA2048 Library	v2.08.006	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Optional; depending on order.
6	SW	RSA4096 Library	v2.08.006	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Optional; depending on order.
7	SW	EC Library	v2.08.006	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Optional; depending on order.

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
8	SW	Toolbox Library	v2.08.006	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Not part of the TSF.
9	SW	Base Library	v2.08.006	Optional; depending on presence of RSA, EC and Toolbox
10	SW	Symmetric Crypto Libary (SCL)	v2.04.002	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Optional; depending on order. Consists of three library files
11	SW	CIPURSE™ Library (CCL)	v2.00.0005	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Optional; depending on order
12	SW	NRG Libary (NRG) (not part of the TSF)	v04.03.3431	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare. Optional; depending on order and not part of the TSF of this TOE
13	SW	Hardware Support Libary (HSL)	v2.01.6198	Optional; depending on order
14	DOC	ARMv7-M Architecture Reference Manual, ARM DDI 0403D ID021310, ARM Limited	12. February 2010	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
15	DOC	32-bit Security Controller - V07 Hardware Reference Manual, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 6.0, 2019-06-13	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
16	DOC	Production and personalization 32-bit ARM-based security controller User´s Manual, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 3.4, 2018-05-14	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
17	DOC	32-bit ARM-based Security Controller SLC 37 / 65–nm Technology Programmer's Reference Manual, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 4.3.2, 2019-08-10	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
18	DOC	32-bit Security Controller – V07 Security Guidelines, Infineon Technologies AG	Version 1.01-2480, 2020-03-09	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
19	DOC	32-bit Security Controller-V07 Errata Sheet, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 5.0, 2019-06-27	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
20	DOC	ALC37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library RSA / ECC / Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User Interface, Infineon Technologies AG	Version 2.08.006, 2018-05-23	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
21	DOC	SCL37-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 DES / AES 32-bit Security Controller User Interface	Version v2.04.002, 2018-01-15	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
22	DOC	SLxx7-C65 Hardware Support Library, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 1.3, 2019-07-05	Secured download (CHM) via ishare.
23	DOC	CIPURSE™ Crypto Library CCL37xCIP v02.00.0005 CIPURSE™ V2 User Interface, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 1.4, 2018-03-13	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.
24	DOC	32-bit Security Controller Crypto@2304T V3 User Manual, Infineon Technologies AG	Revision 1.4.1, 2014-11-10	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare.

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production process.

As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the composite product manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software (developed by the IC embedded software developer) which allows detection of modifications after the delivery.

In detail, regarding identification:

The hardware part of the TOE is identified by the Common Criteria identifiers IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh and IFX_CCI_000025h, each in design step G12. Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data which is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).

In the field, the IC embedded software developer can identify a product in question using the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) and the user guidance. Detailed information is provided in [13] section 7.10.7. Thereby, the exact and distinct identification of any product with its exact configuration of this TOE is given.

Several bytes of the GCIM include the Common Criteria Certification Identifier. This identifier reflects the name of the TOE and includes the hexadecimal values listed behind the "IFX_CCI_" part of the TOE name. Thus this TOE is identified by the Common Criteria Certification Identifiers 0x000011, 0x00001B, 0x00001E, and 0x000025. These identifiers are used by the developer only for this TOE and reflect different underlying basic hardware

configurations. However, these configurations are achieved only by the means of blocking; the actual hardware is always present and thus identical, but may not be accessible to the user. The design step of the TOE is also indicated by the GCIM. The GCIM is described in [12] section 5.5.

In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts and software parts:

The firmware part of the TOE is identified also via the GCIM. The versions for the individual firmware parts can be received by the mapping giving in [21], section 3.1.

The RSA, EC, Toolbox, Base, SCL, HSL, CCL and the NRG software as separate and optional software parts of the TOE are identified by their unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is provided in [6] and [9] section 11. The version numbers of firmware and software are listed in [6] and [9] Table 4.

In detail, regarding delivery:

"TOE Delivery" is uniquely used to indicate

- after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or
- after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.

Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:

- Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the TOE manufacturer to the IC embedded software developer.
- Delivery of the IC embedded software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC embedded software developer to the TOE manufacturer.
- Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE manufacturer to the composite product manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).

The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:

1. DHL Singapore,
2. G&D Neustadt,
3. IFX Morgan Hill,
4. KWE Shanghai and
5. K&N Großostheim.

3.   Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and

- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.

Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 7 and 8 of the Security Target (ST) [6] and [9].

4.   Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

The ST includes the following security objective for the IC embedded software developer: OE.Resp-Appl.

The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in the security guidelines [11].

The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage and OE.TOE_Auth.

The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its manufacturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [6], [9] the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after phase 3 or after phase 4 (as complete modules, plain wafers, bare dies, in any IC case, or in any type of package). However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means that the test mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore it is not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software it is not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the composite product manufacturer.

The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment has to support the authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient information with regard to the authentication mechanism in [18].

The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user has to support the trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. [18] provides sufficient information regarding this topic.

The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader is described in [18]. This objective for the environment originates from the "Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only". However, this TOE also implements "Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only" and thus

the flash loader can also be used in an unsecure environment and is able to protect itself against misuse if the authentication and download keys are handled appropriately.

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.

5. Architectural Information

Detailed information in the TOE architecture is to be found in [6] and [9] section 2.1.

6. Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

The developers' testing effort can be summarised in the following aspects:

TOE test configuration: The tests are performed with the TOE, an emulator and a simulator.

Developer's testing approach: All TSFs and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in order to assure complete coverage of all SFRs.

Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:

- Simulation tests (design verification)
- Qualification test
- Verification tests
- Security Evaluation tests
- Production tests

The evaluator's testing effort can be summarised in the way described in the following:

The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE, and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and to add independent tests.

In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were carried out:

- Module tests,
- Simulation tests,
- Emulation tests,
- Tests in user mode,
- Tests in test mode,
- Hardware tests,
- Optional library tests.

With these kinds of tests, the entire security functionality of the TOE was (functionally) tested by the ITSEF.

The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer's testing environment, partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.

All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested.

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually successful.

8.   Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

- Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h G12 (Tainan).

Hardware configuration:

Depending on the blocking configuration a product can have different user available configuration by order or by BPU (Bill-per-use; please refer to [6] and [9] section 1.1 for an identification of the components, which can be blocked via BPU).

The Crypto@2304T coprocessor provides functionalities for asymmetric cryptography. If it is not available the optional software libraries Toolbox, RSA and EC cannot be used, because they depend on the features of this coprocessor.

If the TOE is delivered with a deactivated SCP, it will not provide the hardware based AES and TDES calculations and the SCL cannot be used.

Deselecting a cryptographic coprocessor has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE. It is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

Firmware configuration:

There is only a single firmware packages available for the TOE, referenced via its firmware identifier 80.201.04.1.

The firmware package consists of different parts:

- Boot Software (BOS),
- Flash Loader, and
- NRG Base.

Software libraries:

The TOE can be delivered with optional software libraries, as described in [6] and [9] sections 1.1 / 2.2.2.

The optional software libraries (also listed in Table 2 above) can be freely combined according to the demands of the user. If one of the RSA, EC, and Toolbox libraries is selected, a Base library with the same version number is automatically included, as it is required in order to use the aforementioned libraries. If none of these libraries is selected, the Base library is not included. Furthermore the RSA library can be selected in two

variants supporting different key lengths, as indicated in the table above. However, the version of EC, RSA and Toolbox libraries cannot be chosen independently.

Based on the library selection the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA, EC, SCL, HSL, CCL, NRG, and Toolbox libraries. This is considered in the developer documentation and corresponding notes are added where required.

If the user decides not to use the RSA, EC, SCL, HSL, CCL, NRG, and Toolbox libraries it is not delivered to the user and the accompanying additional specific security functionality is not provided by the TOE. Deselecting the libraries library excludes the code implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use. Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

Overall:

In accordance with these configuration possibilities, developer and evaluator tested the TOE in these configurations.

9.   Results of the Evaluation

9.1.   CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-10-11,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,

- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-03,

- Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,

- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36, Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,

- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,

- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31 and

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents

- Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0, February 2009,

- Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.0, 2019-04,

- CC Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.4, 2015-12, CCDB-2015-12-001,

- CC Supporting Document Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation, Version 2.0, February 2010, CCDB-2010-03-001 and

- CC Supporting Document, Guidance, ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2015-12, CCDB-2015-12-002

are considered.

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).

To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)

● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V2-2019, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the update of the user guidance and the re-integration of the two-key TDES (112 bit) to the evaluation and certification scope.

The evaluation has confirmed:

● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
                      Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
                      [8]

● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
                          Common Criteria Part 2 extended

● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
                          EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).

The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column '*Security Level above 100 Bits*' of the following table with '*no*' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
1	Key Agreement	ECDH	[X963], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_11770-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4]; brainpool: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1 [RFC5639]	Key sizes 160, 163, 192: No Key sizes >= 224: Yes
2	Cryptographic Primitive	TDES in modes ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB, CBC-MAC, CBC-MAC-ELB PCBC	[N867] [N838] [ISO_9797-1] [Schneier]	$|k| = 168$ $|k| = 112$ (for legacy use only, see [N867]),	168 Yes 168 Yes No Encryption (168): Yes Authenticated Encryption (168): No 112 No
3	Cryptographic Primitive	AES in modes ECB, CTR, CBC, CFB, CBC-MAC, CBC-MAC-ELB, PCBC	[FIPS197] [N838] [ISO_9797-1] [Schneier]	$|k| = 128, 192, 256$	 ECB: No CTR, CBC, CFB: Yes No Encryption: Yes Authenticated Encryptio: No

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
4	Cryptographic Primitive	RSA encryption / decryption / signature generation / verification (only modular exponentiation part)	[PKCS1], [IEEE_P1363]	Modulus length = 1024 - 4096 (note: TOE supports larger and smaller key sizes, which are generally out of scope of evaluation in BSI scheme)	Yes
5	Cryptographic Primitive	ECDSA signature generation	[X962], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4]; brainpool: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1 [RFC5639]	Key size 160,163,192: No Key sizes >=224: Yes
6	Cryptographic Primitive	ECDSA signature verification	[X962], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4]; brainpool: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1 [RFC5639]	Key size 160,163,192: No Key sizes >=224: Yes
7	Cryptographic Primitive	Physical True RNG PTG.2	[AIS31]	N/A	N/A
8	Cryptographic Primitive	Hybrid Random Number Generator PTG.3	[AIS31]	N/A	N/A

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
9	Cryptographic Primitive	Deterministic Random Number Generation DRG.3	[AIS31]	N/A	N/A
10	Cryptographic Primitive	Key Stream Generation DRG.2	[AIS31], [Achterbahn]	N/A	N/A
11	Session key agreement	AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 5.3], section 5.3 "Session Key Derivation and Authentication Algorithm"	|KID| = 128	Yes
12	Authentication	AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 5.3] "Session Key Derivation and Authentication Algorithm" and [CIPURSE_Crypto, 6.3] "Integrity Protection"	|KID| = 128	Yes
13	Secure Messaging for Integrity	MAC based on AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 6.3] "Integrity Protection"	|KID| = 128	No
14	Secure Messaging for Confidentiality	AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 6.3] "Confidential Communication"	|KID| = 128	Yes
15	Key generation	RSA key Generation using CryptoGeneratePrime	Proprietary The generated Keys meet [PKCS1], Sections 3.1 and 3.2. [IEEE_P1363], Section 8.1.3.1.	|K| = 1976 - 4096	Yes (only for ACL v.2.08.006)
16	Key generation	RSA key Generation using CryptoGeneratePrimeMask	Proprietary The generated Keys meet [PKCS1], Sections 3.1 and 3.2. [IEEE_P1363], Section 8.1.3.1.	|K| = 1976 - 4096	No statement

Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality

For the Cryptographic Functionality

● CryptoGeneratePrimeMask() which might be used in conjunction with RSA Key Generation in ACL v2.08.006,

no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.

Furthermore, regarding the additional notes "Note to DRG.2.2" and "Note to DRG.2.3" in [6] and [9] (chapter 7.1.1.5) for FCS_RNG.1/KSG, no statement is given in this Certification Report.

The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was also not assessed by BSI. However, the evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any implementation weaknesses.

Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has been achieved for those functionalities as well.

Detailed results on conformance have been compiled into the report [22].

Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:

[N867]	NIST SP800-67 Revision 1, Recommendation for Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, 2012-01, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[N838]	NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[ISO_9797-1]	Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011-03, ISO/IEC
[Schneier]	Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, B. Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, 1996
[FIPS197]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001, U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[PKCS1]	PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, 2012-10, RSA Laboratories
[IEEE_P1363]	IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography. IEEE, 2000
[X962]	American National Standard for Financial Services, ANS X9.62–2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005-11, American National Standard Institute
[ISO_14888-3]	Information technology - Security techniques – Digital signatures with appendix - Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms, 2006-11, ISO/IEC
[AIS31]	Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15

[X963]	American National Standard for Financial Services, ANS X9.63–2011, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011-12, American National Standard Institute
[ISO_11770-3]	Information technology - Security techniques - Key management - Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2008-07, ISO/IEC
[FIPS186-4]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[RFC5639]	RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, 2010-03
[Achterbahn]	ACHTERBAHN-128/80, 2006-06-30, Infineon Technologies AG
[CIPURSE_Crypto]	The CIPURSE™V2 Specification Cryptographic Protocol, Revision 1.0, 2012-09-28, Infineon Technologies AG

10.   Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.

Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top, e.g. the [Auswahl im Einzelfall: IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software] using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].

At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.

Furthermore:

The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the composite product issuer together with the application which runs on the TOE.

The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.

- All security hints described in the delivered documents have to be considered.

The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.

- All security hints described in [17] have to be considered.

In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has to be considered:

- The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the composite product manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.

- The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)

None.

13. Definitions

13.1. Acronyms

AIS   Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme

BSI   Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany

BSIG   BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security

CCRA   Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement

CC   Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

CEM   Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation

cPP   Collaborative Protection Profile

EAL   Evaluation Assurance Level

ETR   Evaluation Technical Report

IT   Information Technology

ITSEF   Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

PP   Protection Profile

SAR   Security Assurance Requirement

SFP   Security Function Policy

SFR   Security Functional Requirement

ST   Security Target

TOE   Target of Evaluation

TSF   TOE Security Functionality

13.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

14. Bibliography

[1]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
         Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
         Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
         Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
         https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017, https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org

[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung

[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE[7] https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS

[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte

[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V3-2020, Version 1.3, 2020-03-17, Confidential Security Target IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)

[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2020-07-02, ETR Summary V2 – IFX_CCI_000011h G12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)

[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014

[9] Security Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V3-2020ersion 1.3, 2020-03-17, Public Security Target IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)

[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h G12, Version 2, 2020-07-02, ETR for Composite Evaluation V2: IFX_CCI_000011h G12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[11] 32-bit Security Controller – V07 Security Guidelines, v1.01-2480, 2020-03-09, Infineon Technologies AG

[12] 32-bit Security Controller – V07 Hardware Reference Manual, v6.0, 2019-06-13, Infineon Technologies AG

[13] 32-bit Arm-based Security Controller SLC 37 / 65-nm Technology Programmer´s Reference Manual, v4.3.2, 2019-08-10, Infineon Technologies AG

[14] 32-bit Security Controller Crypto@2304T V3 User Manual, v1.4.1, 2014-11-10, Infineon Technologies AG

[15] SCL37-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 DES / AES 32-bit Security Controller User Interface (v2.04.002), 2018-01-15, Infineon Technologies AG

[16] ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User Interface (v2.08.006), 2018-05-23, Infineon Technologies AG

[17] CIPURSE™ Crypto Library CCL37xCIP v02.00.0005 CIPURSE™ V2 User Interface (v02.00.005), v1.4, 2018-03-13, Infineon Technologies AG

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[7]specifically

- See section B 9.1

[18]   Production and Personalization Manual, v3.4, 2018-05-14, Infineon Technologies AG

[19]   ARMv7-M Architecture Reference Manual, 2010-02-12, ARM

[20]   SLxx7-C65 Hardware Support Library, v1.3, 2019-07-05, Infineon Technologies AG

[21]   Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.5, 2019-08-20, "Life Cycle Support IFX_CCI_11h including optional Software Libraries and Flash Loader according Package 1 and Package 2" (confidential document), Infineon Technologies AG

[22]   Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification, "SINGLE EVALUATION REPORT ADDENDUM to ETR-Part ASE, AVA, AGD, ADV, Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification", Version 1, 2020-05-20, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

C.   Excerpts from the Criteria

For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the Common Criteria can be followed:

- On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5

- On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3 chapter 7.1

- On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8

- On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapter 12

- On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17

- The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and components.

The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/

D.   Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
            and production environment

Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V3-2020

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

The IT product IFX_CCI_000011h, 00001Bh, 00001Eh, 000025h, design step G12 with optional libraries and with specific IC dedicated software, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 July 2020, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FÖR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.

The relevant delivery sites are as follows:

Site ID	Company name und address
DHL Singapore	DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center Tampines LogisPark 1 Greenwich Drive Singapore 533865
G&D Neustadt	Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data Management GmbH Austraße 101b 96465 Neustadt bei Coburg Germany
IFX Morgan Hill	Infineon Technologies North America Corp. 18275 Serene Drive Morgan Hill, CA 95037 USA
KWE Shanghai	KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd. Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone No. 530 Zheng Ding Road Shanghai, P.R. China

K&N Großostheim	Infineon Technology AG
	Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
	Kühne & Nagel
	Stockstädter Strasse 10
	63762 Großostheim
	Germany

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

Note: End of report