

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020

for

KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor 2.3.24

from

KoCo Connector GmbH

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Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 (*)

KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor
2.3.24

from KoCo Connector GmbH

PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile)
Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an den Konnektor,
Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V2-2020 vom
17.03.2020

Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.3



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 30 December 2020

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Sandro Amendola
Head of Division

L.S.



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

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A. Certification

1. Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security¹
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance²
- BSI Schedule of Costs³
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3]
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁴ [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

² Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

³ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519

- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

3. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at <https://www.sogis.eu>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.

⁴ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 July 2020. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁵ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: KoCo Connector GmbH.

The product was developed by: KoCo Connector GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

5. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30 December 2020 is valid until 29 December 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.

The owner of the certificate is obliged:

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,

⁵ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

6. Publication

The product KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁶ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁶ KoCo Connector GmbH
Dessauer Str. 28/29
10963 Berlin

B. Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1. Executive Summary

The target of evaluation (TOE) is KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, Version 2.3.24. The TOE is the base software part of the product KoCoBox MED+. This product is a decentral component, called “e-Health Konnektor” in the context of the German health care telematics infrastructure. The TOE consists of three parts, the network connector (NK) (German: “Netzkonnektor”), the application connector (AK) (German: “Anwendungskonnektor”) and a healthcare specific module (VSDM) (German: “Fachmodul VSDM”).

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an den Konnektor, Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V2-2020 vom 17.03.2020 [8].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.3.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionalities:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
NK services	
SF.VPN	VPN Client
SF.DynamicPacketFilter	Firewall with stateful packet inspection
SF.NetworkServices	DHCP, DNS and NTP networking services
SF.SelfProtection/NK	Mechanisms of self-protection of the TOE: Key destruction and residual information protection for NK, Self-tests of TSF and TSF data for NK and Mitigation of attacks
SF.Audit/NK	Secure audit service for NK
SF.Administration/NK	Secure administration channels and update mechanism
SF.CryptographicServices/NK	Cryptographic services required by other security functionality of the TOE
AK services	
SF.CryptographicServices/AK	Cryptographic services for AK
SF.TLS	TLS service for secure communication channel
SF.Authentication	Identification and authentication service
SF.AccessControl	Access control service for connect requests
SF.CardTerminalMgmt	eHealth card terminal management
SF.SmartCardMgmt	Smart card management
SF.SignatureService	Signature Creation and Validation Application (SCaVA)

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF.EncryptionService	Document encryption service
SF.SecureStorage	Secure data storage service
SF.VSDM	Versichertenstammdaten (VSD) management service
SF.Administration/AK	Administration management service for AK
SF.SelfProtection/AK	Mechanisms of self-protection of the TOE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verification management of TSL, CRL etc. • Secure state upon failure, • Self-tests of TSF and TSF data for AK, and • Key destruction and residual information protection for AK.
SF.Audit/AK	Secure audit service for AK

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] chapters 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2. Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	FW	Firmware Image	2.3.24	Initially included within the TOE. Download via an internet URL ⁷ from developer. Via KSR process as a software update package.

⁷ https://www.kococonnector.com/kococonnector_downloads/downloads.de.jsp

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
2	DOC	Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+	2.3 (14.7.2020)	Download via an internet URL ⁷ from developer. SHA-256: 69e5afcefc58eceddd45a0885de66b27f6 14bf1fbbec24e116f7466faaf86b47
3	DOC	Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+	1.1.1	Download via an internet URL ⁷ from developer. SHA-256: 0d874468dc327bff98bcbc77d0b8b898b9 799be2d3b0b82ecd15a78d6e409cea
4	DOC	Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung KoCoBox MED+	1.3.8	Delivered with the delivery package of the TOE. SHA-256: 2912d4d5eaa5113edd856e2a53e25f0f1 4dc820a0d4fce81ebb903ab67d20a7a
5	DOC	JSON-Managementschnittstelle der KoCo-Box MED+	2.22	Delivered on demand. SHA-256: 8a375936f18256232f6dbb4c1edcd7447d 87e8b0bbef3889fb2af47c24113bf7
6	DOC	Konnektor Security Guidance Fachmodule NFDM und AMTS	1.15	Delivered on demand. SHA-256: e49dad7fb5498ac78653fec235c5266b05 28a05dc27896c28aa49d21735ac1b8
7	DOC	Konnektor API für Fachmodule Javadoc	2.3.24	Delivered on demand. SHA-256: b0fba4e9baff2c87fcd20ace6c5ac19826 cd6a9ef6b5428cb459004387308bf

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

TOE Delivery Process

The TOE is delivered by an authorized service technician to the end user. The service technician installs the TOE within the premises of the end user. Prior to installation, the service technician must be identified via a photo ID by the end user. The service technician is trained, instructs the end user and provides security advice.

TOE Identification

The TOE can be identified as follows:

- Display:

- OK to enter the Menu

- Select 4 for Version

Identification:

- Firmwareversion 2.3.24,
- Hardwareversion 2.0.0,
- Produktversion: 2.3.24:2.0.0

- Web Administration Interface:

→ Check the entry Firmware on the status page of the Web Administration Interface
Identification: Produktversion: 2.3.24:2.0.0

The hardware is not part of the TOE and therefore not relevant for the TOE identification.

3. Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

- Security Audit,
- Cryptographic Support,
- User Data Protection,
- Identification and Authentication,
- Security Management,
- Protection of the TSF,
- Trusted Path/Channels,
- TOE Access.

Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter 6 of the Security Target [6].

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.

Although there are various objectives for the operational TOE environment that must be fulfilled in order to preserve security, only a small subset can be controlled by the administrator or end user using the guidance documentation. The following topics are of relevance:

Network connector (NK)

- OE.NK.phys_Schutz: The TOE shall be physically protected against unauthorized access.
- OE.NK.Admin_EVG: The TOE shall be configured by a trustworthy and well trained administrator who operates the TOE according to the guidance.
- OE.NK.PKI: If the administrator manually uploads TSLs and CRLs in the admin web GUI. Such files shall only be taken from a trustworthy source.

When the TOE is stolen or no longer under the control of the owner, the owner shall initiate the blocking of the TOE and its gSMC-Ks.

- OE.NK.Betrieb_CS: The client systems shall be secured by the CS administrators. The owner of the CS shall only operate CS software that follows the developer specific CS implementation guide "Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+".

Application Connector (AK)

- OE.AK.Admin_EVG: The administrators shall keep passwords and secrets confidential.
- OE.AK.Admin_Konsole: The admin shall use a secure web browser and not store password.
- OE.AK.Kartenterminal: For the security of the TOE only certified eHealth card terminals shall be used for communication with the TOE.
- OE.AK.SecAuthData, OE.AK.Clientsystem, OE.AK.ClientsystemKorrekt: The owner of the CS shall only operate CS software that follows the developer specific CS implementation guide “Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+” [10].
- OE.AK.phys_Schutz: The TOE must be physically protected against unauthorized access.
- OE.AK.Personal: Only qualified and trustworthy personnel are allowed to use and maintain the TOE.

Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapters 4.3 and 4.4.

5. Architectural Information

A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.7.

6. Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

Developer's Test

TOE test configurations:

The Security Target [6] has not identified different TOE variants or configurations. Only the released TOE is referenced. Nevertheless, the developer uses two firmware variants for blackbox and for whitebox testing. For test configuration, the developer used two preparative and four test configurations. Environment simulation is also used.

TOE test environment configurations:

The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses seven test environment configurations which cover a large amount of the real environment.

Testing approach:

- Coverage and depth tests are done together.
- The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and module(s).
- Different testing approaches are used:

- Code analysis,
- Blackbox tests:
 - Manual,
 - Automatic.
- Whitebox tests:
 - Manual,
 - Automatic.
- The test descriptions comprise (inter alia):
 - Pre conditions: preparative steps,
 - Test steps: core test steps with expected results,
 - Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
- Testing results: The developer's testing efforts have been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.

All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all PASSED according to their expected result.

Evaluator Tests

TOE test configurations:

The Security Target [6] has not identified different TOE variants or configurations. Only the released TOE is referenced. Nevertheless, the developer uses two firmware variants for blackbox and for whitebox testing. For test configuration, the developer used two preparative and four test configurations. Environment simulation is also used.

TOE test environment configurations:

The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses seven test environment configurations which cover a large amount of the real environment.

Testing approach:

- Coverage and depth tests are done together.
- The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and module(s).
- Different testing approaches are used:
 - Code analysis,
 - Blackbox tests:
 - Manual,
 - Automatic.
 - Whitebox tests:
 - Manual,
 - Automatic.
- The test descriptions comprise (inter alia):

- Pre conditions: preparative steps,
- Test steps: core test steps with expected results,
- Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
- Testing results: The developer's testing efforts have been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.

All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all PASSED according to their expected result.

Penetration Testing

Overview:

The configuration defined in the ST was tested. Furthermore, different TOE variants were used during penetration testing to verify different mechanisms.

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful.

Penetration testing approach:

The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritized with regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing coverage, and detectability of flaws during developer testing.

Medium and high areas were guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger emphasis on high priorities. Low priorities were also considered during penetration, but could be less emphasized, if developer tests were found to be sufficient.

The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks. Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas Update, Random Number Generation and Hardening Mechanisms. Combined approaches were also applied.

TOE test configurations:

The TOE was delivered by the developer in two different variants: A release TOE and a special ATE variant. The ATE variant is an enhanced variant of the software running on the same hardware and using the same smart cards (gSMC-K). The ATE variant is used to enable tests that are not possible due to security mechanisms applied in the release TOE. The differences between release TOE and the ATE variant are clearly defined. Therefore, two goals can be achieved:

- Perform detailed testing using the target hardware and smart card,
- ensure that the tests results of the ATE variant are also valid for the TOE.

During the evaluation process, the TOE was updated. Penetration tests were performed with versions 2.3.20 and 2.3.24. The developer provided a change analysis which documents the differences between these versions. The evaluation body did not identify changes that would render the 2.3.20 test results invalid for 2.3.24. The most important tests were conducted with the final version 2.3.24.

Attack scenarios having been tested:

The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the following areas:

- VPN Connections,
- Administration Connections,
- Random Number Generation,
- Update,
- Hardening Mechanisms,
- Filtering and Routing,
- Self-Protection,
- TOE Services and Network Services, and
- Audit.

Tested security functionality:

The evaluator ensured that all areas listed above are tested. Actually, the evaluation body used a more detailed list during analysis and testing. The penetration testing was then conducted based on priorities as described above. Therefore, a complete coverage of security functional testing based on technical areas of concern is performed.

Verdict for the sub-activity:

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential defined by the protection profile was actually successful in the TOE's operational environment provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.

Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis

The TOE testing did not reveal vulnerabilities exploitable by an attacker with the attack potential as defined by the protection profile.

8. Evaluated Configuration

The evaluation results are only valid for the single configuration defined in the Security Target [6].

9. Results of the Evaluation

9.1. CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an den Konnektor, Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V2-2020 vom 17.03.2020 [8]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.3

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comments
1	Authenticity	RSA signature verification using signature scheme RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5 with SHA-256	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048	FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert, FCS_COP.1/Sign, FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
2		RSA signature verification of TSL and CRL using signature scheme RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [XMLSig]	2048	FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert, FCS_COP.1/Sign, FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
3	Authentication	RSA signature creation with support of gSMC-K and verification using signature scheme RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5 with SHA-256 (sha256withRSAEncryption)	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048	FCS_COP.1/NK.Auth, FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.Auth
4	Key Agreement	Diffie-Hellman (IKEv2) with key derivation function PRF-HMAC-	[HoAC] (DH) [RFC3526] (dh-group), [FIPS180-4] (SHA),	2048 (dh-group 14) with DH exponent length \geq 384 bits	FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comments
		{SHA-1, SHA-256}	[RFC2104] (HMAC) [RFC7296] (IKEv2)		
5		Diffie-Hellman with TLS key derivation function	[HoAC] (DH) [RFC3526] (dh-group), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC3268] (DHE_RSA) [RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)	2048 (dh-group 14) with DH exponent length \geq 384 bits	FCS_CKM.1/NK.TLS
6		EC Diffie-Hellman with TLS key derivation function	[SEC_1] (ECDH), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC4492] (ECDHE_RSA) [RFC5246] (TLSv1.2), [FIPS186-4] (P-256,P-384), [RFC7027] (Brainpool)	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256,384} and brainpoolP{256,384}r1	FCS_CKM.1/NK.TLS
7	Key Generation	Key generation for RSA key in X.509 and PKCS#12 format using FCS_RNG.1/Hash_DRBG	[RFC5280] (X.509), [RFC7292] (PKCS#12), [RFC4055] (supporting. [RFC5280]), [FIPS186-4] Method B.3.3 (Key-Gen)	2048	FCS_CKM.1/NK.Zert
8	Confidentiality	Symmetric encryption and decryption for VPN: AES in CBC	[FIPS197] (AES), [RFC3602] (AES-CBC) [RFC4303] (ESP) [RFC4301] (IPsec)	256	FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP, FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec,
9		Symmetric encryption and decryption for TLS: AES in CBC	[FIPS197] (AES), [RFC3602] (AES-CBC) [RFC3268] (AES-TLS with DH) [RFC4492] (AES-TLS with ECDH)	128, 256	FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.AES
10	Integrity	HMAC value generation and verification with SHA-{1, 256} (IKE, IPsec)	[FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC2404] (HMAC-SHA1), [RFC4868] (HMAC-SHA256/384/512), [RFC7296] (IKEv2)	160, 256	FCS_COP.1/NK.HMAC

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comments
11		HMAC value generation and verification with SHA-{1, 256, 384} (TLS)	[FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC2104] (HMAC), [RFC5246] (TLS v1.2)	160, 256, 384	FCS_COP.1/ NK.TLS.HMAC
12	Authenticated Encryption	AES-128 and AES-256 in GCM mode for TLS 1.2	[FIPS197] (AES) [RFC-3268] (AES-TLS) [SP800-38D] (GCM) [RFC-5289] (AES-GCM-TLS) [RFC-5116] (AEAD)	128, 256	FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.AES
13	Trusted Channel	IKEv2, IPsec	[RFC7296] (IKEv2) [RFC4301] (IPsec), [RFC4303] (ESP) [KoCo-VPNConfig]		FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_TI, FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_SIS
14		TLS v1.2	[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2), [KoCo-TLSConfig]		FTP_TRP.1/NK.Admin FDP_ITC.2/NK.TLS

Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionalities (NK)

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comments
1	Authenticity	PadES based signature generation with SHA-256 and support of HBA, SMC-B, and RSA signature verification using signature schemes RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS with SHA-{256, 512/256, 384, 512}, and ECDSA signature verification with SHA-256 for QES and nonQES	[RFC8017] (RSA), [RFC5639] (ECC Brainpool), [FIPS186-4] (P-256), [TR-03111] (ECDSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [ISO_32000-1] (PDF), [PAdES], [PAdES-BL]	RSA: 1976 to 4096; ECDSA: Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-256 and brainpoolP256r1	FDP_DAU.2/ AK.QES FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig FCS_COP.1/AK.PDF .Sign FCS_COP.1/AK.PDF .SigPr FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig Ver.SSA FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig Ver.PSS FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig Ver.ECDSA
2		RSA signature verification of binary data using signature schemes RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 for nonQES	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	RSA: 1976 to 4096;	FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig FCS_COP.1/AK.PK CS.SigPr FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig Ver.SSA FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig Ver.PSS
3		XadES based signature	[RFC8017] (RSA),	RSA: 1976 to	FDP_DAU.2/

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Comments
		generation with SHA-256 and support of HBA, SMC-B, and RSA signature verification using signature schemes RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS with SHA-{256, 384, 512}, and ECDSA signature verification with SHA-256 for QES	[RFC5639] (ECC Brainpool), [FIPS186-4] (P-256), [TR-03111] (ECDSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [XMLSig], [XAdES], [XAdES-BL]	4096 ECDSA: Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-256 and brainpoolP256r1	AK.QES FCS_COP.1/AK.XML.Sig FCS_COP.1/AK.XML.SigPr FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA FCS_COP.1/AK.SigVer.SSA FCS_COP.1/AK.SigVer.PSS FCS_COP.1/AK.SigVer.ECDSA
4		CadES based signature generation with SHA-256 and support of HBA, SMC-B, and RSA signature verification with signature schemes RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS with SHA-{256, 512/256, 384, 512}, and ECDSA signature verification with SHA-256 for QES and nonQES	[RFC8017] (RSA), [RFC5639] (ECC Brainpool), [FIPS186-4] (P-256), [TR-03111] (ECDSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA), [RFC5652] (CMS), [CAAdES], [CAAdES-BL]	RSA: 1976 to 4096; ECDSA: Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-256 and brainpoolP256r1	FDP_DAU.2/ AK.QES FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig FCS_COP.1/AK.CMS.Sig FCS_COP.1/AK.CMS.SigPr FCS_COP.1/AK.SHA FCS_COP.1/AK.SigVer.SSA FCS_COP.1/AK.SigVer.PSS FCS_COP.1/AK.SigVer.ECDSA
5	Key Generation	Key generation for hybrid encryption	[SP800-133, Kp. 6.1] (Direct Key-Gen)	256	FCS_CKM.1/ AK.AES
6	Authenticated Encryption	Document (XML, MIME, CMS) hybrid encryption and decryption ⁴ using encryption scheme RSAES-OAEP with AES-GCM	[XMLEnc] (XML), [RFC5751] (S/MIME) with [RFC5083] (CMS Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type), [RFC5652] (CMS), [RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS197] (AES), [SP-800-38D] (GCM), [RFC5084] (AES-GCM in CMS)	RSA-ENC: 2048 RSA-DEC: depending on card ⁸ AES-GCM-ENC: 256 AES-GCM-DEC: 128, 192, 256 Authentication tag: 128	FCS_COP.1/ AK.XML.Ver FCS_COP.1/AK.MIME.Ver FCS_COP.1/AK.CMS.Ver FCS_COP.1/AK.XML.Ent FCS_COP.1/AK.MIME.Ent FCS_COP.1/AK.CMS.Ent FCS_CKM.4/AK FCS_COP.1/AK.AES

Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionalities (AK)

⁸ The asymmetric decryption is performed within the smart cards, e.g. HBA.

According to [gemSpec_Kon], [gemSpec_Krypt] and [TR03116-1] the algorithms are suitable for the corresponding purpose.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (<https://www.bsi.bund.de>).

Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context).

The following cryptographic algorithms are additionally used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits	Comments
1	Authenticity	Firmware update file signature verification using RSASSA-PSS with SHA-512	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	2048	yes	FDP_ACC.1/AK.Update FDP_ACF.1/AK.Update FDP_UIT.1/AK.Update FCS_COP.1/Sign
2		FW update X.509 certificate verification using RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA)	4096	yes	FDP_ACC.1/AK.Update FDP_ACF.1/AK.Update FDP_UIT.1/AK.Update FCS_COP.1/Sign

Table 5: Additional TOE cryptographic functionalities (NK)

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits	Comments
1	Key Generation	Config Data Backup Encryption: Key generation for PBKDF2	[KoCo-ConfigFileKeyGen]	~115	yes	FMT_MTD.1/ AK.eHKT_Abf
2	Authenticated Encryption	Config Data Backup Encryption: AES-GCM encryption and decryption using PBKDF2	[FIPS197] (AES) [SP800-38D] (GCM) [RFC5084] (AES-GCM in CMS) [SP800-132] (PBKDF2)	~115 AES-GCM-ENC: 256 AES-GCM-DEC: 256 Authentication tag: 128	yes	FMT_MTD.1/ AK.eHKT_Abf FMT_MTD.1/A K.eHKT_Mod
3	Authenticity	Config Data Backup Signature:	[RFC8017] (RSA), [FIPS180-4] (SHA),	RSA: 1976 to 4096	yes	FMT_MTD.1/ AK.eHKT_Abf

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits	Comments
		Signature generation with SHA-256 and support of SMC-B, and RSA signature verification with signature scheme RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256	[RFC5652] (CMS)			FMT_MTD.1/A K.eHKT_Mod

Table 6: Additional TOE cryptographic functionalities (AK)

10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.

If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security.

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

- The administrator shall only configure the TOE by using the functionality of the web administration interface as presented in the recommended web browser.
- The TOE is only able to provide its security services under the following conditions:
 - The TOE is configured with mandatory TLS and mandatory client system authentication.
 - The connected client systems verify the authenticity of the Konnektor when using services and receiving events.
 - The user is able to identify whether a client system connection is secure.

The TOE user shall only operate the TOE under the conditions above. A violation of these conditions is considered a vulnerability of the TOE in the operational environment. In this case, the TOE user is responsible to counter the vulnerability.

- The TOE supports different setups. The main setups are “Parallel” Mode, “InReihe” Mode and Offline Mode. The “InReihe” Mode is recommended since it provides a higher protection of the connected LAN.
- Implementers of client systems shall oblige to the requirements for client systems as stated in [10].
- For the active VPN connections using IPsec no countermeasures against statistic traffic analysis are implemented.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

12. Definitions

12.1. Acronyms

AEAD	Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AIS	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AK	Application connector
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DOC	Documentation
DRNG	Deterministic RNG
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK	Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
FW	Firmware
gSMC-K	Secure module for the connector
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HBA	Heilberufsausweis
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code

HW	Hardware
ICCSN	Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
IKE	Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
KSR	Konfigurations- und Software-Repository
LAN	Local Area Network
LE	Leistungserbringer
NK	Network connector
PED	Professionelle endnutzernahe Dienstleister
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SIS	Secure Internet Service
SM-K	Secure Module Connector
SMC-B	Secure Module Card – Type B: Praxisausweis / Institutionsausweis
ST	Security Target
TI	Telematikinfrastuktur
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSL	Trust-Service Status List
UID	Unique Identification number
VPN	Virtual Private Network
VSDM	Versichertenstammdatenmanagement
WAN	Wide Area Network

12.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

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- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE⁹
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS>

⁹specifically

- AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria

For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the Common Criteria can be followed:

- On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
- On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3 chapter 7.1
- On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
- On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapter 12
- On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
- The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and components.

The CC are published at <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>

D. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Note: End of report