



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-04

SE5000-8.1 Version I

from

Stoneridge Electronics AB



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-01 dated 16 April 2025 and BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-02 dated 22 July 2025.



The change to the certified product is at the level of the hardware layout of the TOE. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 dated 7 April 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 and subsequent Maintenance Reports BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-01 and BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-02.



Bonn, 4 February 2026

The Federal Office for Information Security

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the SE5000-8.1 Version I, Stoneridge Electronics AB, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The SE5000-8.1 Version I was changed due to a change in the output supply control of the external GNSS antenna, replacing an obsolete connector by a newer version of it, and in order to fix mechanical interference issues. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from H to I.

The Security Target [4] as well as the public Security Target lite [5] were editorially updated to reflect the changed product identifier.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of the hardware layout. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 dated 7 April 2025 and subsequent Maintenance Reports BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-01, dated 16 April 2025, and BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-02, dated 22 July 2025, are of relevance and have to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report subsequent Maintenance Reports [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG), 2. December 2025 (BGBl. 2025 I Nr. 301, S. 2)

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 3.1, 29 February 2024
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.2, March 2024
- [2] Impact Analysis Report, Revision 21, Impact Analysis SE5000-8.1, Stoneridge Electronics AB, 5 December 25 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025 for SE5000-8.1 Version F from Stoneridge Electronics AB, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 7 April 2025
Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-01 for SE5000-8.1 Version G from Stoneridge Electronics AB, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 16 April 2025
Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1071-V8-2025-MA-02 for SE5000-8.1 Version H from Stoneridge Electronics AB, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 22 July 2025
- [4] Security Target, Version 17, SE5000-8.1 Security Target Vehicle Unit, Stoneridge Electronics AB, 18 November 2025 (confidential document)
- [5] Security Target Lite, Version 09, SE5000-8.1 Security Target Lite, Stoneridge Electronics AB, 18 November 2025