Federal Office
for Information Security

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020

for

Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software

from

Infineon Technologies AG

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020 (*)

Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software

from	Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance:	Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality:	PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:	Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1

SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

Common Criteria

The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Bonn, 30 June 2020

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Sandro Amendola   L.S.
Head of Division

DAkkS
Deutsche
Akkreditierungsstelle
D-ZE-19615-01-00

This page is intentionally left blank.

Contents

A.   Certification

1.   Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG[1] Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

2.   Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security[1]
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance[2]
- BSI Schedule of Costs[3]
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3]
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]

---

[1]   Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

[2]   Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

[3]   Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519

- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1[4] [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.

- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045

- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

3. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

---

[4]   Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.

4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software, has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2018. Only the design step P11 deviates. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2018 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 June 2020. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)[5] recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.

The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

5. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the

---

[5] Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30 June 2020 is valid until 29 June 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.

The owner of the certificate is obliged:

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,

2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,

3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

6. Publication

The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software, has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer[6] of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

---

[6]   Infineon Technologies AG
       Am Campeon 1-12
       85579 Neubiberg

B.   Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1.   Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies AG Security Controller (Integrated Circuit IC), M7892 Design Step P11, with specific IC dedicated firmware and the following optional software: RSA 2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, Base v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, and Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.02.010. The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251 architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface.

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware part and the software part. The software part can be separated into the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC, SHA-2, and SCL as well as the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. The Base library does not provide the smartcard embedded software with specific functionalities; however it is required in order to use the RSA, EC, and Toolbox libraries.

This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF_DPM	Device Phase Management: The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases. Different operation modes help to protect the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS	Protection against Snooping: The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of memories and busses and prevents single stepping.
SF_PMA	Protection against Modifying Attacks: This TOE implements protection against

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
	modifying attacks of memories, alarm lines and sensors.
SF_PLA	Protection against Logical Attacks:
	The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit (MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by using virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege level model. The MMU controls the address permissions of up to seven privileged levels and gives the software the possibility to define different access rights.
SF_CS	Cryptographic Support:
	The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. The components are a coprocessor, as well as the optional SCL, supporting the DES and AES algorithms and a combination of a coprocessor and software modules to support RSA cryptography, RSA key generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification, ECDH key agreement and EC public key calculation and public key testing. Furthermore, the TOE is equipped with an optional SHA-2 library as well as an AIS31 conformant TRNG that meets the functionality class PTG.2.
SF_MAE	Mutual Authentication Extension (optional):
	In TOE provides a mutual authentication between production equipment and the TOE according to ISO 9798-2. Only if the production equipment was successfully authenticated by an external authenticate command, the Flash Loader is activated to download software to the TOE's Non Volatile Memory.
	Furthermore, it contains an internal authenticate command by which the authenticity of a copy of the TOE can be verified.

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.1.3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2.   Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software.

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW	M7892 Security Controller	P11	Complete modules, with or without inlay mounting, in form of plain wafers or in any IC case (for example TSSOP28, VQFN32, VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.) or in bare dies or whatever type of package or even in no package.
2	HW	Flash Loader	78.015.18.2	Stored in reserved area of the ROM on the IC (patch in NVM).
3	FW	STS Self-Test Software (the IC Dedicated Test Software)	78.015.18.2	Stored in the ROM on the IC (patch in NVM).
4	FW	RMS Resource Management System (the IC Dedicated Support Software)	78.015.18.2	Stored in reserved area of the ROM on the IC (patch in NVM).
5	FW	Service Algorithm Minimal SAM	78.015.18.2	Stored in reserved area of the ROM on the IC (patch in NVM).
6	FW	Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE)	V8.00.006	On-chip software. Optional; depending on order.
7	SW	NVM image (including Embedded Software)	-	Stored in Flash memory on the IC.
8	SW	RSA library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Library files via secure iShare. Optional; depending on order.
9	SW	EC library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Library files via secure iShare. Optional; depending on order.
10	SW	SHA-2 library	v1.01	Library files via secure iShare. Optional; depending on order.
11	SW	Toolbox library (not in scope of the TSF)	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Library files via secure iShare. Optional; depending on order.
12	SW	Base Library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Library files via secure iShare. Optional; depending on presence of RSA, EC, and Toolbox library.

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
13	SW	Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL)	v2.02.010	Library files via secure iShare. Optional; depending on order.
14	DOC	*M7892 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security Applications Hardware Reference Manual*	Revision 3.0 2019-06-24	Electronic document via secure iShare.
15	DOC	*M7892 16-bit Security Controller Family Errata Sheet*	Revision 7.1 2019-12-18	Electronic document via secure iShare.
16	DOC	*AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference Manual*	Revision 2.0 2019-10-28	Electronic document via secure iShare.
17	DOC	*M7892 Security Guidelines*	2020-04-15	Electronic document via secure iShare.
18	DOC	*16-bit Security Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer's Reference Manual*	Revision 9.14 2019-12-03	Electronic document via secure iShare.
19	DOC	*SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual*	2015-04-01	Electronic document via secure iShare.
20	DOC	*Crypto@2304T User Manual*	2010-03-23	Electronic document via secure iShare.
21	DOC	*SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface (2.03.008)*	2019-07-15	Electronic document via secure iShare. Optional; delivered if the RSA, EC, or Toolbox library v2.03.008 is ordered.
22	DOC	*CL70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface (2.07.003)*	2019-05-27	Electronic document via secure iShare. Optional; delivered if the RSA, EC, or Toolbox library v2.07.003 is ordered.
23	DOC	*SLx70 Family, Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384), Library Version V1.01*	2009-11-06	Electronic document via secure iShare. Optional; delivered if the SHA-2 library is ordered.
24	DOC	*SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES / AES 16-bit Security Controller User Interface*	2016-12-09	Electronic document via secure iShare. Optional; delivered if the SCL is ordered.
25	DOC	*Production and personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for the SLx 70 family in 90nm*	Revision 1.3 2019-11-14	Electronic document via secure iShare. Optional; delivered if the MAE is ordered.

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

In general, the TOE - or parts thereof - are delivered between the following three parties (as defined in [PP]):

- IC Embedded Software Developer,

- TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
- Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except the end consumer).

Accordingly, three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:

1. Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.

2. Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.

3. Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).

The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user's site including the necessary intermediate delivery procedures.

Furthermore, the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it sent by the TOE Manufacturer and the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.

In general, the TOE - or parts thereof - are delivered between the following three parties (as defined in [8]):

- IC Embedded Software Developer,
- TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
- Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except the end consumer).

Accordingly, three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:

- Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.

- Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.

- Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).

Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).

The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production process.

The hardware part of the TOE is identified as M7892 P11. Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).

This GCIM outputs a variety of unique information in order to uniquely determine the underlying hardware configuration. Additionally, a dedicated RMS function (see [14] section 9.16) allows a customer to extract the present hardware configuration and the original Chip Identifier Byte, which was valid before blocking.

The firmware part of the TOE is also identified also via the GCIM for all of the firmware parts.

The SCL (optional), RSA (optional), EC (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional), and Base library (optional), as separate software parts of the TOE, are also identified by their unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is provided in the Security Target [6] and [9] section 10.

For further, detailed information regarding TOE identification see [9], section 1.2.

Please also note, that as the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software (developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of modifications after the delivery.

3. Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements which are implemented by the TOE. In principle, the Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security.

These functionalities cover the following issues:

- implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols, be it via direct hardware access or via the symmetric crypto lib (SCL) and its high level interfaces,
- provide a True Random Number Generator (TRNG),
- via the RSA lib, provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and include countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks,
- via the EC lib, provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks,
- the SHA-library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU.

In more general and CC formal terms, besides providing certain secrutiy functionalities, the TOE shall

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.

4.   Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

The ST only includes one security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the objective OE.Resp-Appl:

- The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate.

The ST includes four security objectives for the operational environment (for the Composite Product Manufacturer), the objectives OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth:

- OE.Process-Sec-IC states that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that the phases after TOE delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately.

  The Composite Procut Manufacturer therefore has to be informed only about the general requirement resulting from OE.Process-Sec-IC. The Composite Product Manufacturer is informed about these requirements resulting from OE.Process-Sec-IC in [22].

- OE.Lim_Block_Loader states that the Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the Loader functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.

  This objective is relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer. He is responsible for permanently deactivating the flash loader (if the flash loader is available) before delivery to the end user.

- OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ states that the authorized user must fulfil the access conditions required by the Loader, whereby the OE.TOE_Auth states that the operational environment shall support the authentication verification mechanism and know authentication reference data of the TOE.

- The Composite Product Manufacturer is informed about these requirements resulting from OE.Process-Sec-IC and OE.Lim_Block_Loader in [22] and [14] section 15.1.

The requirements resulting from OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth are given in [23].

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.

5.   Architectural Information

The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251 architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory

Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface.

The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM), respectively Infineon® SOLID FLASH™. For the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ memory the Unified Channel Programming (UCP) memory technology is used. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module anymore. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™.

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware part and the software part. The software part is differentiated into: the cryptographic libraries SCL, RSA, EC and SHA-2 and the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. SCL, RSA, EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox provide certain functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software.

Two cryptographic hardware co-processors serve the need of modern cryptography: The symmetric co-processor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor is called Crypto2304T and provides computation accelerations for RSA-2048 bit (and 4096-bit) and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography.

This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the IFX-ROM (Read-Only Memory) and enables the download of the user software or parts of it to the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ memory. After completion of the download, the Flash Loader shall be locked by the by the user.

6.   Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7.   IT Product Testing

The following groups of tests were performed by the developer:

- Simulation tests (design verification),
- Qualification tests,
- Verification Tests,
- Security Evaluation Tests and
- Production Tests.

The developer tests covered all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as identified in the functional specification.

The evaluators were able to repeat the developer-conducted tests either using the library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator. Or at the

developer's site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators, other test parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE, realised by specific design and layout measures, were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.

In detail, the following groups of tests were conducted by the evaluators:

- Module tests,

- Simulation tests,

- Emulation tests,

- Tests in user mode,

- Tests in test mode,

- Hardware tests and

- Cryptographic library and MAE tests.

The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirmed the correct implementation of the TOE security functionalities.

For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.

8.   Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

- Smartcard IC M7892 P11 (East Fishkill)

Depending on the blocking configuration a M7892 product can have a different user available configuration as described in Security Target [6] and [9], section 1.1.

The available options are summed up in the Security Target [6] and [9], section 1.1:

- The available memory sizes of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM and RAM. Note that there is no user available ROM on the TOE,

- The availability of the cryptographic coprocessors,

- The availability and free combinations of the cryptographic libraries,

- The availability of the Flash Loader for available interfaces like ISO-7816, contactless ISO-14443,

- The availability of various interface options,

- The possibility to tailor the product by blocking on his own premises,

- The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG and made available via the order tool.

All possible TOE configurations are covered by the certificate. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module any more. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of the SOLID FLASH™. According to the BPU option, a non limited number of configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations depends on the order and purchase contract only.

9.   Results of the Evaluation

9.1.   CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

(i)   The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits

(ii)   The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards

(iii)   Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators (see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).

To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)

● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2018, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this evaluation was on the different design step P11and penetration test updates. As a result, guidance has been updated.

The evaluation has confirmed:

● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
                                       Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
                                       [8]

● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
                                       Common Criteria Part 2 extended

● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
                                       EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2.   Results of cryptographic assessment

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).

The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column '*Security Level above 100 Bits*' of the following table with '*no*' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.

●   For the Cryptographic Functionality invoked through the API CryptoGeneratePrimeMask() (which is the same for both library versions v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003) no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.

Furthermore, the API CryptoGeneratePrime() invokes different cryptographic functionality in library versions v2.03.008 versus ACL v2.07.003.

●   Please note that the API CryptoGeneratePrime() of the RSA library v2.03.008 should <u>not</u> be used for the generation of prime numbers, as mentioned in [19].

●   The API CryptoGeneratePrime() of the RSA library v2.07.003 invokes an improved cryptographic functionality rated at security level above 100 Bits (see table 4 in Annex C of this report).

10.   Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.

Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top, e.g. the using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.

In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].

At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] to [23] have to be considered.

The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.

● All security hints described in [22] and [23] have to be considered.

● In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has to be considered:

● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.

● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.

11.   Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

12.   Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)

None

13.   Definitions

13.1. Acronyms

AES   Advanced Encryption Standard

APB™   Advanced Peripheral Bus

APDU   Application Protocol Data Unit

API   Application Programming Interface

AXI™   Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol

BPU   Bill Per Use

BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI	Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM	Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto2304T	Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT	Chinese Reminder Theorem
DCLB	Digital Contactless Bridge
DES	Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA	Differential Failure Analysis
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC	Error Correction Code
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDC	Error Detection Code
EDU	Error Detection Unit
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA	Electro Magnetic Analysis
Flash EEPROM	Flash Memory
FL	Flash Loader software
FW	Firmware
GCIM	Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW	Hardware
IC	Integrated Circuit
ICO	Internal Clock Oscillator
ID	Identification
IMM	Interface Management Module
IRAM	Internal Random Access Memory
IT	Information Technology

ITP	Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
I/O	Input/Output
MED	Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU	Memory Management Unit
NVM	Non-Volatile Memory
OS	Operating system
ST	Security Target
PEC	Peripheral Event Channel
PP	Protection Profile
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM	Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM	Random Access Memory
RMS	Resource Management System
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAM	Service Algorithm Minimal
SCP	Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF	Security Feature
SFR	Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement, the specific meaning is given in the context
SO	Security Objective
SOLID FLASH™	An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA	Simple Power Analysis
STS	Self Test Software
SW	Software
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TM	Test Mode (STS)
TRNG	True Random Number Generator
TSC	TOE Security Functions Control
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM	User Mode (STS)
UmSLC	User Mode Security Life Control
WDT	Watch Dog Timer

XRAM	eXtended Random Access Memory
3DES	Triple DES Encryption Standards

13.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

14. Bibliography

[1]   Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
        Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
        Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
        Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
        https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org

[2]   Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
        Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
        https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org

[3]   BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung

[4]   Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE [7]
        https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS

[5]   German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
        on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte

[6]   Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020, Version 2.4, 2020-04-23, "Security
        Target Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ M7892 Design Step P11",
        Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)

[7]   Evaluation Technical Report for certification BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020, Version 4,
        2020-06-02, "Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary)", TÜV
        Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[8]   Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
        January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014

[9]   Security Target Lite for BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020, Version 2.2, 2020-04-23, "Security
        Target Lite Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ M7892 Design Step P11,
        Developer Name (sanitised public document)"

[10]   ETR for composite evaluation (according to AIS 36) for BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020,
        Version 4, 2020-06-02, "Evaluation Technical Report for Conmposite Evaluation
        (ETR Comp)", TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[7]specifically

- AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers

- AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)

- AIS 19, Version 9, Verbindlich Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)

- AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren

- AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler

- AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document

- AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document

- AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren

- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema

- AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)

- AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies

- AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document

- AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen

- AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results

- AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren

[11]   Configuration list for the TOE, "Configuration Management Scope for Common Criteria with Evaluation Assurance Level EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) M7892 P11", Version 1.0, 2020-01-24, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)

[12]   M7892 Security Guidelines, 2020-04-15, Infineon Technologies AG

[13]   M7892 SOLID FLASH Controller for Security Hardware Reference Manual, Version 3.0, 2019-06-24, Infineon Technologies AG

[14]   16-bit Security Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer's Reference Manual, v9.14, 2019-12-03, Infineon Technologies AG

[15]   SLx70 Family – Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/221, SHA 512/384) Library Version V1.0.1, 2009-11-06, Infineon Technologies AG

[16]   Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG

[17]   M7892 Errata Sheet, v7.1, 2019-12-18

[18]   SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES / AES User Interface, v2.02.010, 2016-12-09, Infineon Technologies AG

[19]   SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface (v2.03.008), v2.03.008, 2019-07-15, Infineon Technologies AG

[20]   CL70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface (v2.07.003), v2.07.003, 2019-05-27, Infineon Technologies AG

[21]   AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference Manual, v.2.0, 2019-10-28, Infineon Technologies AG

[22]   SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon Technologies AG

[23]   Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for SLx 70 family in 90 nm, Rev. 1.3, 2019-11-14, Infineon Technologies AG

C.   Excerpts from the Criteria

For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the Common Criteria can be followed:

- On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5

- On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3 chapter 7.1

- On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8

- On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapter 12

- On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17

- The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and components.

The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/

D. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment

Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE

Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Step P11 with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional software, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 30 June 2020, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC-FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.

The relevant TOE distribution centers are as follows:

Distribution Center Name	Address
DHL Singapore	DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center Tampines LogisPark 1 Greenwich Drive Singapore 533865
G&D Neustadt	Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data Management GmbH Austraße 101b 96465 Neustadt bei Coburg Germany
IFX Morgan Hill	Infineon Technologies North America Corp. 18275 Serene Drive Morgan Hill, CA 95037 USA

Distribution Center Name	Address
KWE Shanghai	KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd. Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone No. 530 Zheng Ding Road Shanghai, P.R. China
K&N Großostheim	Kühne & Nagel Stockstädter Strasse 10 63762 Großostheim Germany

Table 3: TOE Distribution Centers

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1105-2020

Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
1	Key Agreement	ECDH	[ANS X9.63], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_11770-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192, 224}, K-{163, 233}, B-233 [FIPS186-4] and brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}t1 [RFC5639]	no
2		ECDH	[ANS X9.63], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_11770-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409, B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4], brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}t1 [RFC5639]	yes
3	Cryptographic Primitive	TDES in ECB mode, CBC mode (modes implemented in SCP)	[NIST SP800-67], [NIST SP800-38A]	|k| = 168	no (ECB) yes (CBC)
4		TDES in Recrypt mode, BLD mode (modes implemented in SCP)	–	|k| = 168	no
5		TDES in ECB mode, CBC mode, CFB mode, CTR mode	[NIST SP800-67], [NIST SP800-38A]	|k| = 168	no (ECB) yes (CBC, CFB, CTR)

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
		(modes implemented in SCL)			
6		AES in ECB mode, CBC mode (modes implemented in SCP)	[FIPS197], [NIST SP800-38A]	|k| = 128, 192, 256	no (ECB) yes (CBC)
7		AES in ECB mode, CBC mode, CFB mode, CTR mode (modes implemented in SCL)	[FIPS197] , [NIST SP800-38A]	|k| = 128, 192, 256	no (ECB) yes (CBC CFB, CTR)
8		RSA encryption / decryption / signature generation / verification (only modular exponentiation part)	[PKCS #1], [IEEE_P1363]	Modulus length = 1976 - 4096	yes
9		ECDSA signature generation / verification / key generation	[ANS X9.62], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192, 224}, K-{233, 163}, B-233 [FIPS186-4] and brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}t1 [RFC5639]	no

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
10		ECDSA signature generation / verification / key generation	[ANS X9.62], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409, B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4], brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}t1 [RFC5639]	yes
11		Physical True RNG PTG.2	[AIS31]	N/A	n/a
12		SHA-256, SHA-512	[FIPS180-4]	None	n/a (keyless operation)
13	Key generation	RSA key Generation using CryptoGeneratePrime (*only valid for ACL v2.07.003*)	Proprietary The generated keys meet [PKCS #1], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and [IEEE_P1363], Section 8.1.3.1.	1976-4096	yes (*only valid for ACL v2.07.003*)
14		RSA key Generation using CryptoGeneratePrimeMask (*valid for both ACL v2.07.003 and ACL v2.03.008*)	Proprietary The generated keys meet [PKCS #1], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and [IEEE_P1363], Section 8.1.3.1.	1976-4096	no (Security Level not rated by BSI)

Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality

This table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column '*Security Level above 100 Bits*' of the following table with '*no*' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.

● For the Cryptographic Functionality invoked through the API CryptoGeneratePrimeMask() (which is the same for both library versions v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003) no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.

Furthermore, the API CryptoGeneratePrime() invokes different cryptographic functionality in library versions v2.03.008 versus ACL v2.07.003.

● Please note that the API CryptoGeneratePrime() of the RSA library v2.03.008 should not be used for the generation of prime numbers, as mentioned in [19].

●   The API CryptoGeneratePrime() of the RSA library v2.07.003 invokes an improved cryptographic functionality rated at security level above 100 Bits (see table 4 in Annex C of this report).

Note: End of report