



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019-MA-01

**Bundesdruckerei Document Application with
tamper-evident casing, Document Application
Version 2.2.1; (Firmware Vers. 1.1.12, HW Vers. 0)**

from

Bundesdruckerei GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019 dated 31 October 2019 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Bonn, 6 December 2019

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, Document Application Version 2.2.1; (Firmware Vers. 1.1.12, HW Vers. 0), Bundesdruckerei GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change.

The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects. The ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6]. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [4]. This covers in brief:

- Repair of the TOE, solely done by a subcontractor of Bundesdruckerei GmbH
- Incident and defect analysis, supported by the Bundesdruckerei GmbH
- Extension of the secure storage area of a subcontractor of Bundesdruckerei GmbH

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of life cycle security aspects (storage, repair and related processes). The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019 dated 31 October 2019 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] IAR - Anlage zum Antrag auf ALC-Re-Evaluierung, V0.9, 20.09.2019 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019 for Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, Document Application Version 2.2.1; (Firmware Vers. 1.1.12, HW Vers. 0), Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 31.10.2019
- [4] Security Target Bundesdruckerei Document Application BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-2019, V 1.52, 12.09.2019, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
- [5] Configuration list for the TOE, V1.28, 10.10.2019, File: ALC_CMS_DMT-V1.xx.xlsx, Bundesdruckerei GmbH (confidential document)
- [6] Evaluation Technical Report, V 3, 25.11.2019, BSI-DSZ-CC-1125-MA-1, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)