



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025-MA-02

**Bundesdruckerei Document Application with
tamper-evident casing, Version 2.6.1; Firmware
Version 2.0.8-616, TOE Casing Version 0**

from

Bundesdruckerei GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025-MA-01.



The changes are mainly related to including a production site. Additionally a production test functionality has been changed, the seals have been updated to a new Bundesdruckerei GmbH Logo including an respective update of AGD [6] and a minor change in the ST [4]. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 dated 30 January 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025.



Bonn, 23 February 2026

The Federal Office for Information Security

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, Version 2.6.1; Firmware Version 2.0.8-616, TOE Casing Version 0, Bundesdruckerei GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, Version 2.6.1; Firmware Version 2.0.8-616, TOE Casing Version 0 was changed.

The changes are mainly related to an update of life cycle security aspects by including a production site. The ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] and an editorial update of the Security Target. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [4].

Additionally a production test functionality has been changed, the seals have been updated to a new Bundesdruckerei GmbH Logo including a respective update of AGD [6].

Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1, Firmware Version 2.0.4-612, TOE Casing Version 0 to Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1; Firmware Version 2.0.8-616, TOE Casing Version 0.

Conclusion

The maintained change is mainly at the level of an update of life cycle security aspects, for details see above. The change has no effect on product assurance, but the updated guidance documentation has to be followed.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 dated 30 January 2025 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The foundation for usage of the certificate updated by this maintenance procedure is:

- Use of the latest version of the TOE guidance documentaion, see ([6] .

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025 , no. 301, p. 2

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 3.1, 29 February 2024
Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: SOG-IS Requirements”, version 1.2, March 2024
- [2] 2025_07 IAR Anlage zum Antrag auf ALC Re-Evaluierung, V1.1., 2026-01-30
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1247-2025 for Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing Version 2.6.1; Firmware Version 1.6.24-604, TOE Casing Version 0), Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 30 January 2025
- [4] Security Target Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing, V1.67, 2025-05-21, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
- [5] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.53, 2026-01-30, ALC_CMS_DMT_V1.53.xlsx, Bundesdruckerei GmbH and Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.48-1, 2026-01-26, ALC_CMS_DMT_V1.48-1.xlsx, Bundesdruckerei GmbH (Confidential document)
- [6] VISOTEC® V-ÄNDERUNGSTERMINAL Handbuch Installation und Bedienung, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
V1.234, 2025-12-03 for FW-Version 2.0.8.with SHA256-Hash:
81a2450e42c8e7b80d1b301b91caed5810c2dee632b1c8242b589ed3972b19cf
and
V 1.233-1, 2026-01-26 for FW-Version 2.0.4 with SHA256-Hash:
359d9f6276a454474e2738264df208691f7054cc07cfb6701c76f0c7d7442ee1.
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2026-02-17, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)