



**Australian Government**  
**Department of Defence**

# **Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program**

## **Maintenance Report**

**Supplementing Certification Report 2005/35**

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**Version 1.0**

Commonwealth of Australia 2007.

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## Amendment Record

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# Chapter 1 - Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose

- 1 This document is an addendum to the Certification Report (Ref [1]) that describes the relevant baseline evaluation of the SQ Phoenix Digital Encryptor.
- 2 The purpose of this Maintenance Report is to describe the status of assurance continuity activities undertaken by CES Communications for the Digital Encryptor, hence known as the Multifunction Encryptor, against the requirements contained in Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements (Ref [2]).
- 3 CES Communications provided information about their assurance continuity activities in the form of an Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The IAR (Ref [3]) lists the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.
- 4 This report should be read in conjunction with:
  - a) The certified TOE's Certification Report (Ref [1]) and
  - b) The certified TOE's Security Target (Ref [4]) which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the baseline evaluation.

## 1.2 Identification

- 5 Table 1 provides identification details for the maintained TOE and the certified TOE.

**Table 1: Identification Information**

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
Maintained TOE	SQ Phoenix Multifunction Encryptor
Developer	CES Communications
Certified TOE	SQ Phoenix Digital Encryptor
Security Target	SQ Phoenix Digital Encryptor Version: 2.7
Evaluation Level	EAL 2
Certificate Number	2005/35

## Chapter 2 - IAR Summary

### 2.1 Description of Changes

6 The Impact Analysis Report (IAR) indicated that the following changes have been made:

- a) The case of the certified TOE has been changed to provide better aesthetics and a more reliable keyboard operation.

The Certification Report (Ref [1]), states that the evaluation of the TOE took into account the assumption about its original environment that, the product incorporates measures to ensure that electro magnetic radiation does not allow cryptographic variables or sensitive information to be transmitted without protection into an insecure environment. This assumption remains with regard to the new case.

- b) An external access to the battery is provided.

In the absence of an external power supply, the emergency erase and anti- tamper systems are powered by the TOE's internal battery. The case cover for the battery aperture has been fitted with a tamper-proof switch. This has the effect of ensuring that tamper response measures are invoked before battery removal/disconnection.

### 2.2 Documentation Updated

7 The affected developer evidence was:

- a) The appearance of the TOE has been altered; the developer states that the changed TOE is operated and functions exactly as the certified TOE.
- b) The developer evidence remains the same for the changed TOE as for the Certified TOE.

8 The DSD Consumer Guide (Ref [5]) has been updated to reflect the changes.

## Chapter 3 - Assurance Continuity

### 3.1 Assurance Continuity Result

- 9 After consideration of the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) provided by CES Communications, the Australasian Certification Authority (ACA) has determined that the design changes of the product did not alter the certified security functionality of the TOE and hence the impact is of a minor nature.
- 10 The ACA agrees that the resultant change in the TOE can be classified as minor and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance. The ACA agrees that the original assurance result is maintained for CES Communications product SQ Phoenix Multifunction Encryptor Version 2.7.

## References and Abbreviations

### A.1 References

- [1] Certification Report 2005/35, Australasian Certification Authority
- [2] Assurance Continuity: CCRA requirements, Common Criteria Interpretation Management Board, CCIMB-2004-02-009, Version 1.0, February 2004.
- [3] Impact Analysis Report (IAR), Assurance Continuity for the Certification Report April 2005, IAR/0907/CES Communications.
- [4] Security Target for SQ Phoenix Digital Encryptor Version 2.7
- [5] DSD Consumer Guide SQ-Phoenix Multifunction Encryptor Version 2.7

### A.2 Abbreviations

ACA	Australasian Certification Authority
AISEP	Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IAR	Impact Analysis Report
TOE	Target of Evaluation