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## MAINTENANCE REPORT

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Expediente # **2025-16**

TOE **GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.2.7**

Solicitante **ESA-79197356 - GMV Aerospace and Defence, S.A.**

### Referencias

[AC]	Assurance Continuity: CCRA requirements. v2.1, June 2012
[CCRA]	Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security, July 2014
[EXT-9230]	Evaluation Technical Report of GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.1.7
[EXT-9470]	Maintenance request
[IAR]	GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Impact Analysis Report v2.0
[INF-4410]	Certification Report of GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.1.7
[STEOR]	GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Security Target v2.1.7
[STEMA]	GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Security Target v2.2.7

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## INTRODUCTION

According to the CCRA (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) requirements regarding the assurance continuity outlined in [AC] and considering the impact analysis report [IAR] provided by GMV Aerospace and Defence, S.A., the changed TOE version GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.2.7 maintains the assurance gained in the original TOE certification GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.1.7.

The baseline for this maintenance have been the certification report [INF-4410], the Security Target [STEOR], the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-9230] from the original certified TOE referenced by the file number 2023-23, and the impact analysis report [IAR] from the changed TOE referenced by the file number 2025-16.

As the changes in the maintained TOE has been considered as minor changes, the conclusion of this CB is that the maintained TOE is appropriate for assurance continuity therefore a re-evaluation is not required. It must be stated that no additional evaluation testing has been performed by the evaluation lab during the maintenance process.

This report is considered as an addendum to the Certification Report [INF-4410]. The following section describes the information regarding the identification of the Impact Analysis Report [IAR] of the maintained TOE and the declared changes as outlined in [AC].

## IDENTIFICATION OF THE IMPACT ANALYSIS REPORT

- **Title:** GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Impact Analysis Report.
- **Version:** 2.0.
- **Issue date:** 14/05/2025.
- **Author:** GMV Aerospace and Defence, S.A.
- **Status:** Issued.

## CERTIFIED TOE IDENTIFICATION

- GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.1.7.

## MAINTAINED TOE IDENTIFICATION

- GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module v2.2.7

## SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION OF THE CERTIFIED TOE

- **Title:** GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Security Target.
- **Version:** 2.1.7.
- **Issue date:** 28/08/2024.
- **Author:** GMV Aerospace and Defence, S.A.
- **Status:** Issued.

- **CC version:** Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation/Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation version 3.1 release 5

## SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAINTAINED TOE

- **Title:** GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Security Target.
- **Version:** 2.2.7.
- **Issue date:** 19/02/2025.
- **Author:** GMV Aerospace and Defence, S.A.
- **Status:** Issued
- **CC version:** Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation/Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation version 3.1 release 5

## CHANGES DESCRIPTION

### *CHANGES IN THE CERTIFIED TOE*

No changes to the TOE specification, design, tests or source code have been made, the TOE sources remain unchanged from the previous certified TOE.

The main change has been to support compilation for ARM architecture by selecting the desired architecture when calling the compiler in the building process. This generates a new binary that is incorporated into the TOE distribution file.

### *CHANGES IN THE EVALUATION ASSURANCE LEVEL*

None.

### *CHANGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT*

The TOE is built on the same original development environmental, same version of both the OS and the build tools, indicating a target ARM architecture.

### *CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE TOE*

None.

## CHANGES IN THE TOE DOCUMENTATION

The following developer evidence documents have been updated to reflect the changes introduced in this version of the TOE:

- The document *“GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Security Target”* has been updated to reflect the new supported architecture and the hashes of the added distribution files.
- The document *“GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – User guide”* has been modified to document how the user can operate the TOE depending on the architecture and how the user will receive it.
- The document *“GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Secure delivery processes and procedures”* has been updated to document the new TOE distribution content.
- The document *“GMV GNSS Cryptographic Module – Configuration Management Processes and Procedures”* has been updated to detail the modification in configuration derived from the ARM architecture files.