

Market Central, Inc.

SecureSwitch[®] Fiber Optic Switch
Models: A, B, C, D, 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, 6:1, 7:1
and 8:1



Security Target

June 2020

Document prepared by



www.lightshipsec.com

Document History

Version	Date	Author	Description
0.1	6 Jan 2020	L Turner	Initial Draft
0.2	8 Jan 2020	M Kanasani	Draft for review
0.3	9 Jan 2020	M Kanasani	Release for evaluation
0.4	20 Jan 2020	M Kanasani	Address lab observations
0.5	12 Feb 2020	M Kanasani	Address scheme observations
0.6	12 Feb 2020	M Kanasani	Address lab observations
1.0	24 June 2020	R Morse	Update revision info and release

Table of Contents

- 1 Introduction 5**
 - 1.1 Overview 5
 - 1.2 Identification 5
 - 1.3 Conformance Claims..... 5
 - 1.4 Terminology..... 5
- 2 TOE Description 6**
 - 2.1 Type 6
 - 2.2 Usage 6
 - 2.3 Security Functions..... 8
 - 2.4 Physical Scope..... 8
 - 2.5 Logical Scope..... 13
- 3 Security Problem Definition..... 14**
 - 3.1 Threats 14
 - 3.2 Organizational Security Policies..... 14
 - 3.3 Assumptions..... 14
- 4 Security Objectives..... 15**
 - 4.1 Objectives for the Operational Environment 15
 - 4.2 Objectives for the TOE 15
- 5 Security Requirements..... 16**
 - 5.1 Conventions 16
 - 5.2 Extended Components Definition..... 16
 - 5.3 Functional Requirements 17
 - 5.4 Assurance Requirements..... 18
- 6 TOE Summary Specification..... 20**
 - 6.1 Switching 20
 - 6.2 Isolation 20
- 7 Rationale..... 21**
 - 7.1 Security Objectives Rationale 21
 - 7.2 Security Requirements Rationale..... 22
 - 7.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale..... 23

List of Tables

- Table 1: Evaluation identifiers 5
- Table 2: Terminology 5
- Table 3: TOE models and part numbers 8
- Table 4: Threats..... 14
- Table 5: Assumptions 14
- Table 6: Operational environment objectives 15
- Table 7: Security objectives..... 15
- Table 8: Extended Components 16
- Table 9: Summary of SFRs 17
- Table 10: Assurance Requirements 18
- Table 11: Security Objectives Mapping 21
- Table 12: Suitability of Security Objectives 21
- Table 13: Security Requirements Mapping 22

Table 14: Suitability of SFRs	22
Table 15: SFR dependencies	23
Table 16: Map of SFRs to TSS Security Functions.....	23

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

- 1 This Security Target (ST) defines the SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic Switch Models: A, B, C, D, 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, 6:1, 7:1 and 8:1 Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
- 2 The TOE is an optical switch that allows a single host to connect to multiple networks, one at a time, whilst maintaining separation between the networks. The TOE user manually switches between networks.
- 3 The TOE uses a proprietary mirrored switching mechanism with specially designed mirrors to provide isolation of a minimum 75 dB between all unselected ports. The mirrors are positioned electrically to control the switching action.

1.2 Identification

Table 1: Evaluation identifiers

Target of Evaluation	SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic Switch Models: A, B, C, D, 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, 6:1, 7:1 and 8:1
Security Target	SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic Switch Models: A, B, C, D, 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, 6:1, 7:1 and 8:1 Security Target, v1.0

1.3 Conformance Claims

- 4 This ST supports the following conformance claims:
 - a) CC version 3.1 Release 5
 - b) CC Part 2 extended
 - c) CC Part 3 conformant
 - d) Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1

1.4 Terminology

Table 2: Terminology

Term	Definition
CC	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP	Protection Profile
SFP	Security Function Policy
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

2 TOE Description

2.1 Type

5 The TOE is an optical switch.

2.2 Usage

6 The TOE is used when it is necessary to connect a single host to one or more (up to eight) networks, one at a time, whilst maintaining separation between the networks, such as those of different security classifications. As shown in Figure 1 below, to use the switch, the user selects the radio button on the front of the device (or on a connected remote control) that corresponds to the desired network. This connects the selected network to the host. LEDs and dry contact relay closures indicate which network is selected.




Figure 1: TOE usage scenario

7 Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the TOE (Model: Revision A) front and back panels. The radio buttons with integrated LEDs on the front indicate the selected network. The A/B/C ports on the back connect to the isolated networks and the Common port connects to the host.



Figure 2: Front Panel SecureSwitch® Revision A




Figure 3: Back Panel SecureSwitch® Revision A

- 8 The TOE is available in multiple models as follows. In all cases, the firmware and security enforcing mechanisms are the same:
- a) Revision A Multimode Fiber Optic A/B/C switch.
 - b) Revision B Multimode Fiber Optic A/B/C switch with remote control ports and switched AC power outlet.
 - c) Revision C Multimode Fiber Optic A/OFF/C switch with remote control ports and switched AC power outlet.
 - d) Revision D Single mode Fiber Optic A/B/C switch with remote control ports and switched AC power outlet.
 - e) SecureSwitch® 1:1 Fiber Optic Switch (1 port).
 - f) SecureSwitch® 2:1 Fiber Optic Switch (2 ports).
 - g) SecureSwitch® 3:1 Fiber Optic Switch (3 ports).
 - h) SecureSwitch® 4:1 Fiber Optic Switch (4 ports).
 - i) SecureSwitch® 5:1 Fiber Optic Switch (5 ports)
 - j) SecureSwitch® 6:1 Fiber Optic Switch (6 ports)
 - k) SecureSwitch® 7:1 Fiber Optic Switch (7 ports)
 - l) SecureSwitch® 8:1 Fiber Optic Switch (8 ports)
- 9 TOE models are available in a variety of enclosures including tabletop, 1U tabletop and rackmount as shown in the following figures.



Figure 4: Tabletop SecureSwitch® B



Figure 5: 1U Tabletop SecureSwitch® B



Figure 6: Rackmount SecureSwitch® B

2.3 Security Functions

10 The TOE provides the following security functions:

- a) **Switching.** An internal Mirror Switch allows optical communications to travel between the Common Port and one of the network ports at a time. When the user selects a different network, the Mirror Switch is repositioned to allow the host device that is connected to the Common Port to communicate with the selected network port. Each radio button has a corresponding LED that indicates which network port currently selected. Only one button/network can be selected at a time.
- b) **Isolation.** Due to the use of fiber-optic signals and the proprietary mirrored switching mechanism design, the TOE provides an isolation of a minimum of 75 dB between all unselected ports.

2.4 Physical Scope

11 The physical boundary of the TOE is the entire SecureSwitch® device. This includes the buttons, the LEDs, the Mirror Switch, the ports, as well as the internal electronics that operate the mirrored switching mechanism.

12 Each TOE model is available in multiple configurations as shown in Table 3. These configurations differ only in terms of type of fiber (multimode or single mode) and connectors, enclosure, remote status and control interfaces, switched AC power outlet and power delay for the AC power outlet (allows connected equipment to power down for the given time delay when switching between networks). In all configurations, the firmware and security enforcing mechanisms are the same.

13 The TOE is delivered to the user via commercial courier.

Table 3: TOE models and part numbers

Model	Part #	Fibre Mode & Connectors (network/common)	Enclosure	Remote Status & Control	Power Delay
Revision A	5101180	Multimode SC/SC	Tabletop	No	None
	5101180-1U		1U Tabletop	No	None
	5101183		Rackmount	No	None
	5101182	Multimode	Tabletop	No	None

Model	Part #	Fibre Mode & Connectors (network/ common)	Enclosure	Remote Status & Control	Power Delay
	5101182-1U	ST/ST	1U Tabletop	No	None
	5101184		Rackmount	No	None
Revision B	5101185	Multimode ST/SC	Tabletop	Yes	15s
	5101185-60		Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101185-1U		1U Tabletop	Yes	15s
	5101185-1U-60		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101186		Rackmount	Yes	15s
	5101186-60		Rackmount	Yes	60s
Revision C	5101191	Multimode ST/SC	Tabletop	Yes	15s
	5101191-60		Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101191-1U		1U Tabletop	Yes	15s
	5101191-1U-60		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101192		Rackmount	Yes	15s
	5101192-60		Rackmount	Yes	60s
Revision D	5101177	Single mode ST/SC	Tabletop	Yes	15s
	5101177-60		Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101177-1U		1U Tabletop	Yes	15s
	5101177-1U-60		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101178		Rackmount	Yes	15s
	5101178-60		Rackmount	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 1:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101720	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101721		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101722	Single mode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101723		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s

Model	Part #	Fibre Mode & Connectors (network/common)	Enclosure	Remote Status & Control	Power Delay
	5101753	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101754		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101755	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101756		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	SecureSwitch® 2:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101724	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes
5101725		1U Tabletop		Yes	60s
5101726		Single mode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
5101727			1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
5101757		Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
5101758			1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
5101759		Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
5101760			1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 3:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101728	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101729		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101730	Single mode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101731		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101761	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101762		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101763	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101764		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 4:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101700	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101701		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101702	Single mode	Rackmount	Yes	60s

Model	Part #	Fibre Mode & Connectors (network/common)	Enclosure	Remote Status & Control	Power Delay
	5101703	ST/SC	1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101733	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101734		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101735	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101736		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 5:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101704	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101705		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101706	Single mode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101707		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101737	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101738		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101739	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101740		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 6:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101708	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101709		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101710	Single mode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101711		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101741	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101742		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101743	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101744		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 7:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101712	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101713		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101714	Single mode	Rackmount	Yes	60s

Model	Part #	Fibre Mode & Connectors (network/common)	Enclosure	Remote Status & Control	Power Delay
	5101715	ST/SC	1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101745	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101746		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101747	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101748		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
SecureSwitch® 8:1 Fiber Optic Switch	5101716	Multimode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101717		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101718	Single mode ST/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101719		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101749	Multimode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101750		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s
	5101751	Single mode LC/SC	Rackmount	Yes	60s
	5101752		1U Tabletop	Yes	60s

2.4.1 Guidance Documents

14

The TOE includes the following guidance documents (PDF):

- a) Market Central, Inc. SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic A/B/C Switch Revision A Manual v1.3
- b) Market Central, Inc. SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic A/B/C Switch Revision B Manual v1.3
- c) Market Central, Inc. SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic A/OFF/C Switch Revision C Manual v1.3
- d) Market Central, Inc. SecureSwitch® Fiber Optic A/B/C Switch Revision D Manual v1.3
- e) Market Central, Inc. SecureSwitch® n:1 Fiber Optic Switch Products Manual v2.2

2.4.2 Non-TOE Components

15

The TOE is not reliant on any external components.

2.5 Logical Scope

- 16 The logical boundaries of the TOE include the switching and isolation capabilities described in section 2.3.
- 17 The switching capability enforces a flow control policy, by adjusting the position of a mirror in the TOE, so that it only allow optical communications to travel between the network connected to Common Port and only one of the networks connected to Network Ports at a time.
- 18 The isolation capability defines the TOE's ability to insulate the network ports from one another, preventing the illicit transfer of data between network ports.

3 Security Problem Definition

3.1 Threats

19 Table 4 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE.

Table 4: Threats

Identifier	Description
T.DIRECT	A remote attacker captures data of a separate network while the attacker's network is connected to that separate network by the TOE.
T.CROSSTALK	A remote attacker captures data of a separate network while the attacker's network is not connected to that separate network by the TOE.
T.ATTACK	A remote attacker performs malicious activity against the Host computer while the attacker's network is connected to the Host computer by the TOE.

3.2 Organizational Security Policies

20 None.

3.3 Assumptions

21 Table 5 identifies the assumptions related to the TOE's environment.

Table 5: Assumptions

Identifier	Description
A.INSTALL	The User has connected up to eight (depending on TOE model) distinct networks to the TOE Network Ports. The User has connected a computer on the Common Port that has a full-duplex network interface.
A.NOEVILUSER	The User is non-hostile.
A.COMPETENT	The User follows all user guidance when using the TOE.
A.ENVIRON	The TOE will be located in an environment that provides physical security, uninterruptible power, and temperature control required for reliable operation of the hardware. TOE connected optical cabling and equipment shall be protected from unauthorized physical access.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Objectives for the Operational Environment

22 Table 6 identifies the objectives for the operational environment.

Table 6: Operational environment objectives

Identifier	Description
OE.INSTALL	The User has connected up to eight (depending on TOE model) distinct networks to the TOE Network Ports. The User has connected a computer on the Common Port that has a full-duplex network interface.
OE.NOEVILUSER	The User is non-hostile.
OE.COMPETENT	The User follows all user guidance when using the TOE.
OE.ENVIRON	The TOE will be located in an environment that provides physical security, uninterruptible power, and temperature control required for reliable operation of the hardware.

4.2 Objectives for the TOE

23 Table 7 identifies the security objectives for the TOE.

Table 7: Security objectives

Identifier	Description
O.NOCONNECT	The TOE will not allow two Network Ports to directly connect (i.e., no information flow is permitted).
O.ISOLATION	The TOE will provide isolation between all unselected ports.
O.SWITCH	The TOE will provide the User with the ability to connect the Common Port to any one of up to eight (depending on TOE model) Network Ports, one at a time.

5 Security Requirements

5.1 Conventions

24 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

- a) **Assignment.** Indicated with italicized text.
- b) **Refinement.** Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
- c) **Selection.** Indicated with underlined text.
- d) **Assignment within a Selection:** Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
- e) **Iteration.** Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).

5.2 Extended Components Definition

25 Table 8 identifies the extended component that is incorporated into this ST.

Table 8: Extended Components


Component	Title	Rationale
FDP_ISO.1	Optical Isolation	No existing CC Part 2 SFRs address hardware port shielding and isolation. Since the purpose of optical isolation is to protect user data from unintended disclosure via crosstalk, a new family was created within the User Data Protection (FDP) class.

5.2.1 Secure Virtual Container (FDP_ISO)

5.2.1.1 Family Behavior

26 This family provides requirements that address the protection of user data unintended disclosure via crosstalk by means of optical isolation. Crosstalk occurs when a signal transmitted on one circuit or channel of a transmission system creates an undesired effect in another circuit or channel.

5.2.1.2 Component Leveling



27 FDP_ISO.1 Optical isolation addresses protection of user data from unintended disclosure via crosstalk.

5.2.1.3 Management: FDP_ISO.1

28 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) None

5.2.1.4 Audit: FDP_ISO.1

29 The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) None

FDP_ISO.1 Optical Isolation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: None

FDP_ISO.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that there is a minimum of 75 dB of isolation between all ports that are not currently connected by the position of the Mirror Switch.

5.3 Functional Requirements**Table 9: Summary of SFRs**

Requirement	Title
FDP_IFC.2	Complete Information Flow Control
FDP_IFF.1	Simple Security Attributes
FDP_ISO.1	Optical Isolation

5.3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)**FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control**

Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the *SecureSwitch Flow Control Policy* on *optical signals on the Common Port and each of the Network Ports* and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

FDP_IFC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

- FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the *SecureSwitch Flow Control Policy* based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: *the position of the Mirror Switch*.
- FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: *Information may only flow between the Common Port and a single Network Port if the position of the Mirror Switch is in the single position that corresponds to that Network Port*.
- FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the *no additional rules*.
- FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: *no explicit authorization rules*.
- FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: *no explicit denial rules*.

FDP_ISO.1 **Optical Isolation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: None

FDP_ISO.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that there is a minimum of 75 dB of isolation between all ports that are not currently connected by the position of the Mirror Switch.

5.4 Assurance Requirements

30 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 10 commensurate with EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.

Table 10: Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class	Components	Description
Development	ADV_ARC.1	Security Architecture Description
	ADV_FSP.4	Complete Functional Specification
	ADV_IMP.1	Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_TDS.3	Basic Modular Design
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative Procedures
Life Cycle Support	ALC_CMC.4	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS.4	Problem Tracking CM Coverage

Assurance Class	Components	Description
	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery Procedures
	ALC_DVS.1	Identification of Security Measures
	ALC_LCD.1	Developer Defined Life-Cycle Model
	ALC_TAT.1	Well-defined Development Tools
	ALC_FLR.1	Basic Flaw Remediation
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance Claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended Components Definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST Introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security Objectives
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived Security Requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE Summary Specification
Tests	ATE_COV.2	Analysis of Coverage
	ATE_DPT.1	Testing: Basic Design
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2	Independent Testing - sample
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.3	Focused Vulnerability Analysis

6 TOE Summary Specification

6.1 Switching

Related SFRs: FDP_IFC.2, FDP_IFF.1

- 31 The SecureSwitch® device has a front panel with radio buttons labeled A - H (number of buttons depends on TOE model). The TOE also has remote control inputs on the rear panel labeled A - H (number of inputs depends on TOE model) plus a Ground connection labeled GND. Only one front panel radio button or only one rear panel remote control input can be selected at a time.
- 32 Each front panel button and each rear panel remote control input corresponds to a Network Port on the rear of the device. Each Network Port has a corresponding front panel LED that indicates if that Network Port is currently selected. The TOE also has remote control outputs on the rear panel labeled A - H (number of outputs depends on TOE model) that correspond to each Network Port, and that indicate if that Network Port is currently selected.
- 33 Another port on the rear of the TOE labeled Common is for connection to a host computer. The information flows from each of these ports are the only information flows in the TOE.
- 34 Inside the SecureSwitch® device is a Mirror Switch. The Mirror Switch is a specially designed set of miniature mirror movements that allow optical communications to travel between the Common Port and one of the Network Ports at a time. When the Mirror Switch is repositioned, the Common Port can communicate with a different Network Port. There is a single position for each Network Port.
- 35 The radio buttons on the front of the device and the rear panel remote control inputs control the Position of the Mirror Switch. For example, when button 'A' is pressed, or when remote control input 'A' is connected to the 'GND' pin, an electro-mechanical mechanism rotates the mirror to the position designated for Network Port 'A'. The same applies to all buttons and remote control inputs.
- 36 The TOE is a self-contained unit that forwards information signals but is not affected by those signals.

6.2 Isolation

Related SFRs: FDP_ISO.1

- 37 Due to the use of fiber optic signals and the proprietary mirrored switching mechanism design, the TOE provides a minimum of 75 dB of isolation between all unselected ports. This high isolation was designed to comfortably meet the industry standard 65 dB isolation rating.

7 Rationale

7.1 Security Objectives Rationale

38 Table 11 provides a coverage mapping between security objectives, threats, OSPs and assumptions.

Table 11: Security Objectives Mapping

	T.DIRECT	T.CROSSTALK	T.ATTACK	A.INSTALL	A.NOEVILUSER	A.COMPETENT	A.ENVIRON
O.NOCONNECT	X						
O.ISOLATION		X					
O.SWITCH			X				
OE.INSTALL				X			
OE.NOEVILUSER					X		
OE.COMPETENT						X	
OE.ENVIRON							X

39 Table 12 provides the justification to show that the security objectives are suitable to address the security problem.

Table 12: Suitability of Security Objectives

Element	Justification
T.DIRECT	O.NOCONNECT. The TOE will not allow Network Ports to be connected to each other, directly addressing the threat of a direct connection.
T.CROSSTALK	O.ISOLATION. By providing isolation between ports, the only way for information to pass between ports is according to the TOE's information flow control policy.
T.ATTACK	O.SWITCH. The User has the ability to disconnect from a network from which malicious activity originates.
A.INSTALL	OE.INSTALL. The objective satisfies the assumption by providing the assumed installation configuration.
A.NOEVILUSER	OE.NOEVILUSER. The objective satisfies the assumption by

Element	Justification
	providing there will be no evil users.
A.COMPETENT	OE.COMPETENT. The objective satisfies the assumption by providing the User will follow guidance.
A.ENVIRON	OE.ENVIRON. The objective satisfies the assumption by providing the assumed operating conditions.

7.2 Security Requirements Rationale

7.2.1 SAR Rationale

40 EAL4 was chosen to provide a level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial practices.

7.2.2 SFR Rationale

Table 13: Security Requirements Mapping

	O.NOCONNECT	O.ISOLATION	O.SWITCH
FDP_IFC.2	X		X
FDP_IFF.1	X		X
FDP_ISO.1	X	X	

Table 14: Suitability of SFRs

Objectives	SFRs
O.NOCONNECT	FDP_IFC.2 & FDP_IFF.1 specify that only information may flow between the Common Port and a single Network Port at a time, never two Network Ports. FDP_ISO.1 supports this objective, because it requires all ports be isolated from each other by a minimum of 75dB. This includes one Network Port to the next, thereby supporting the objective of not allowing a connection between Network Ports.
O.ISOLATION	FDP_ISO.1 requires all ports be isolated from each other by a minimum of 75dB. This will prevent crosstalk and provide isolation between ports.
O.SWITCH	FDP_IFC.2 & FDP_IFF.1 define the SecureSwitch Flow Control Policy in accordance with O.SWITCH.

Table 15: SFR dependencies

SFR	Dependency	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2	FDP_IFF.1	Met
FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFC.1	Met by inclusion of FDP_IFC.2.
	FMT_MSA.3	Not met. Not included as there are no objects or attributes that can be created that affect the SecureSwitch Flow Control Policy. Rather, the policy is determined by one attribute alone, the position of the Mirror Switch.
FDP_ISO.1	None	Met

7.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

41 Table 16 provides a coverage mapping showing that all SFRs are mapped to the security functions described in the TSS.

Table 16: Map of SFRs to TSS Security Functions

	Switching	Isolation
FDP_IFC.2	X	
FDP_IFF.1	X	
FDP_ISO.1		X