Maintenance Report

Curtiss-Wright VPX3-685/CCA-685 Secure Routers v2.0.0 & 2.1.0

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1   Introduction

Curtiss-Wright Controls Defense Solutions has submitted (via CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility) the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) for Curtiss-Wright VPX3-685/CCA-685 Secure Routers v2.0.0 & 2.1.0 (hereafter referred to as VPX3-685/CCA-685), satisfying the requirements outlined in Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, v2.1, June 2012. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes implemented VPX3-685/CCA-685, (the maintained Target of Evaluation), the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

2   Description of changes in the Maintained Target of Evaluation

The following characterizes the changes implemented in VPX3-685/CCA-685. For each change, it was verified that there were no required changes to the security functional requirements in the ST, and thorough functional and regression testing was conducted by the developer to ensure that the assurance in the Target of Evaluation (TOE) was maintained. The changes in VPX3-685/CCA-685 comprise;

- A new hardware platform is being added. The new hardware platform is called the CCA-685-2820. This hardware platform runs version 2.1.0 of the firmware image which differs from version 2.0.0 of the firmware running on the original certified TOE hardware platforms.
- The difference between v2.1.0 and v2.0.0 is that the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module in the CCA-685 chassis was subjected to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.10 which required significant re-engineering to account for when and where the FIPS self-tests ran.

3   Description of Changes to the IT Environment

There were no changes to the underlying IT environment.

4   Affected developer evidence

Modifications to the product necessitated changes to a subset of the developer evidence that was previously submitted for the TOE. The set of affected developer evidence was identified in the IAR.

Modifications to the security target were made to reflect the new product versions.

5   Conclusions

Through functional and regression testing of VPX3-685/CCA-685 , assurance gained in the original TOE certification was maintained. As all of the changes to the maintained TOE have been classified as minor, it is the conclusion of the CB that the maintained TOE is appropriate for assurance continuity and re-evaluation is not required.

6   References

- Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, v2.1, June 2012;
- CCS Guide #6, Technical Oversight for Assurance Continuity of a Certified TOE, v1.6, May 2011;
- Certification Report: Curtiss-Wright VPX3-685 Secure Routers v2.0.0, 05 November 2013, v1.0;
- Curtiss-Wright Controls Defense Solutions VPX3-685/CCA-685 Secure Routers Security Target, October 6, 2014, v1.16