

COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY TARGET

Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic Access Control – CC IDEal Citiz

Reference: **SSE-0000087591**

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Common Criteria security target**Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic Access Control – CC IDEal
Citiz**

Table of contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	3
LIST OF TABLES	6
LIST OF FIGURES	6
1 INTRODUCTION	7
1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE	7
1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE)	7
1.2.1 Product presentation.....	7
1.2.2 TOE type.....	8
1.2.3 Usage and major security features of the TOE	8
1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION.....	9
1.3.1 TOE Boundary	9
1.3.2 TOE architecture.....	9
1.3.3 TOE life cycle.....	11
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS	13
2.1 CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA.....	13
2.2 CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE.....	13
2.3 CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE	13
2.3.1 Protection Profile reference	13
2.3.2 Protection Profile Refinements	13
2.3.3 Protection Profile Additions.....	13
2.3.4 Application notes	14
2.3.5 Protection Profile Claims rationale	14
2.4 CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	14
2.4.1 Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards.....	14
2.4.2 Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices	14
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION	16
3.1 ASSETS.....	16
3.2 SUBJECTS	16
3.3 THREATS	18
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP).....	20
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS	21
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES	24

4.1	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.....	24
4.2	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT.....	27
4.3	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	27
4.4	RATIONALE	29
4.4.1	Coverage matrix	29
4.4.2	Coverage of threats in the operational environment	30
4.4.3	Coverage of organisational security policies	31
4.4.4	Coverage of assumptions.....	32
5	EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.....	34
5.1	DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS	34
	FAMILY BEHAVIOUR.....	34
5.2	DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND.....	35
	FAMILY BEHAVIOUR.....	35
5.3	DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM	35
	FAMILY BEHAVIOUR.....	36
5.4	DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC	37
	FAMILY BEHAVIOUR.....	38
6	IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS	39
6.1	INTRODUCTION	39
6.2	TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.....	39
6.2.1	Class FAU Security Audit	39
6.2.2	Class Cryptographic Support (FCS).....	39
6.2.3	Class FIA Identification and Authentication	43
6.2.4	Class FDP User Data Protection	47
6.2.5	Class FMT Security Management	50
6.2.6	Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions.....	54
6.3	SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE	57
6.4	RATIONALE	58
6.4.1	Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements	58
6.4.2	Rationale for the Assurance Requirements.....	63
6.4.3	Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency.....	64
7	TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION	65
7.1	STATEMENT OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY	65
7.1.1	Chip security functionalities	65

7.1.2	Low level security functionalities	66
7.1.3	Operating system security functionalities	66
7.1.4	Application manager security functionalities.....	69
7.1.5	Application security functionalities.....	69
7.2	SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY RATIONALE	72
7.2.1	SFRs coverage	72
7.2.2	Security functionality consistency rationale	76
8	DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS.....	77
8.1	ACRONYMS.....	77
8.2	CONVENTIONS USED	78
8.3	DEFINITIONS.....	78
9	REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS	88
9.1	REFERENCE DOCUMENTS	88
9.2	APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS	89

List of tables

Table 1: Security problem definition / Security objectives.....	30
Table 2: Overview on authentication SFR.....	43
Table 3: security functional requirements / security objectives for the TOE	58
Table 4: Functional component dependencies.....	63
Table 5: Coverage of SFR for the TOE by the TOE security functionalities	73

List of figures

Figure 1: Architecture of the CC IDEal Citiz	10
Figure 2: TOE life cycle	11

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE

ST reference:

Title : MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENT – BASIC ACCESS
CONTROL – CC IDEAL CITIZ

Version : -

Security target identifier : SSE-0000087591

TOE reference:

Chip identifier : SB23YR48 Version B and SB23YR80 Version B

Masked chip reference : SB23YR48 SAI and SB23YR80 SAI

Crypto library : NesLib version 3.0

Component Assurance Level : EAL6+, augmented with ALC_FLR.1

TOE Identifier : IDEAL/ST23YR48/YR80/1.6.0

Administration guidance : 0000074722 - IDEal - AGD - Pre-Personalization Manual
0000074723 - IDEal - AGD - Personalization Manual

User guidance : 0000074862 - IDEal - AGD - ICAO User Manual

CC compliance:

Version : 3.1

Assurance level : EAL 4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3

Chip certificate reference : ANSSI-2010/02

Protection Profile : BSI-CC-PP-0055, VERSION 1.00 [R5]

1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE)

1.2.1 Product presentation

The CC IDEal Citiz product is the DUAL integrated circuit chip embedding

- An Operating system providing:
 - Java Card v2.2.2 interfaces, as specified in [R24]
 - Extended interfaces for targeted applications needs
- A Set of applications
 - An IAS ECC application compliant with [R26],
 - An ICAO application compliant with [R10] and

- An AIP Application, compliant with [R25], which performs the pre-personalization and the personalization operations of IAS and ICAO applications (this application is not accessible once in Operational Use phase).
- A card manager application compliant with the [25] standard. This application enables the card issuer to add functionality to the product by loading and executing new applets, even in the evaluated configuration. This functionality is out of the scope of the evaluation.

The evaluated IAS and ICAO applications are protected against post issuance Java Card applet loading and execution thanks to a firewall mechanism.

1.2.2 TOE type

The *Target of Evaluation* (TOE) is a contactless chip programmed according to the *Logical Data Structure* (LDS) [R10] (i.e. the MRTD's chip) and providing the advanced security methods Basic Access Control (BAC) as defined in the Technical reports of "ICAO Doc 9303" [R10]. The MRTD's chip allows the authenticity of the *travel document* and the identity of its holder to be checked during a border control, with the support of an inspection system.

The MRTD's chips are intended to be inserted into the cover page of traditional passport booklets and also into Smart card.

The Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [R10] informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps:

- the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control,
- the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD's Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object,
- the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and
- the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the MRTD's chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys).

The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.

1.2.3 Usage and major security features of the TOE

The MRTD's chip enables:

- protection of *integrity* of the holder's stored data: issuing state or organization, travel document number, expiration date, holder's name, nationality, birth date, sex, holder's face portrait, other optional data, additional biometric data and several other pieces of data for managing the security of the document,
- authentication between the travel document holder and the inspection system prior to any border control by the Basic Access Control mechanism²,
- protection of integrity and confidentiality of data read by secure messaging,

In addition to the protection provided by the chip, the *logical MRTD* is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD's chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)[R10]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD's chip to the passport book.

The details of these features are specified in [R10].

1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact and/or contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [R10] and providing Basic Access Control according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [R10].

Only the BAC feature is covered by this ST. The EAC feature is covered by another ST.

The TOE boundary encompasses:

- The ICAO application
- The Operating System
- The ST embedded crypto library: NesLib Version 3.0
- The ST chips: SB23YR48 Version B and SB23YR80 Version B

1.3.2 TOE architecture

The TOE is embedding two applications:

- AIP Application, compliant with [R25], which performs the pre-personalization and the personalization operations of the CC IDeal Citiz. This application is not accessible once in Operational Use phase.

- The ICAO application, which is compliant with [R10]. The ICAO application may be instantiated several times.

The TOE allows additional applets loading during its operational use.

The architecture of the CC IDEal Citiz is given in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Architecture of the CC IDEal Citiz

1.3.3 TOE life cycle

The product's life cycle is organised as follows:




Figure 2: TOE life cycle

This figure represents two views of the life-cycle:

- (1) an "end-user" view made of 4 phases, focusing on the main logical phases as defined in a protection profile like [R5]:
 - a. Development phase: IC design, and embedded software development;

- b. Manufacturing phase: from IC manufacturing to booklet manufacturing, including patch loading, application creation and pre-personalization (loading the authentication key for the personalization agent);
 - c. Personalization phase: loading of all data related to the MRTD holder;
 - d. Operational use phase: MRTD used by the traveler at the border control. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
- (2) a business view made of 7 steps, focusing more on the different trades and actors involved in smartcard business, and commonly used in protection profile related to smartcard such as [R7]. For example, the company in charge of IC manufacturing may be different from the one in charge of IC packaging, as well as from the one in charge of packaging, initialisation, pre-personalization, not considering all other actors involved in this phase: antenna supplier, booklet supplier. The definition of the content of each step and the associated supply chain vary from one provider to another and the picture is just indicative.

Referring to the life-cycle, the **evaluated product** is the product that comes out of the IC manufacturing, test and possible pre-personalization operations (**step 3**).

At this step, the product is already self-protected before delivery to step 4 and all steps after.

If a patch is necessary, it will be developed under the same conditions as the whole embedded software and will be included in the chip during manufacturing (step 3 of the product life cycle) or during pre-personalization (step 5 of the product life cycle).

2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1 CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA

This Security Target claims conformance to:

- Part 1 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 3, dated July 2009 (see [R1])
- Part 2 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 3, dated July 2009 (see [R2]),
- Part 3 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 3, dated July 2009 (see [R3]),

as follows

- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant.

2.2 CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE

The level of assurance targeted by this Security Target is EAL4+, augmented by the following component defined in CC part 3 [R3]:

- ADV_FSP.5,
- ADV_INT.2,
- ADV_TDS.4,
- ALC_CMS.5,
- ALC_DVS.2,
- ALC_TAT.2,
- ATE_DPT.3

2.3 CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE

2.3.1 Protection Profile reference

This Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile MRTD BAC [R5].

2.3.2 Protection Profile Refinements

No specific refinement was performed to the Protection Profile MRTD BAC [R5].

2.3.3 Protection Profile Additions

There is no addition to the protection profile in this security target.

2.3.4 Application notes

Application notes from the PP MRTD BAC [R5] have been copied in this ST when relevant.

2.3.5 Protection Profile Claims rationale

The TOE type defined in this security target is exactly the same than the one defined in the PP MRTD BAC [R5]: an contactless chip with embedded software, and the MRTD application conformant to ICAO [R10].

In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives, and the security requirements are identical to those of the PP MRTD BAC [R5].

There is neither addition nor refinement or augmentation performed in this security target compare to the PP [R5]. All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements whose completeness, consistency and soundness has been argued in the rationale sections of the present document.

2.4 CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

This security target address a smartcard TOE and therefore, the associated evaluation shall be performed in compliance with all CC mandatory supporting documents related to smartcard evaluations:

2.4.1 Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards

This document [R12] shall be used instead of the CEM [R4] when calculating the attack potential of the successful attack performed during AVA_VAN analysis. This document impacts only the vulnerability analysis performed by the ITSEF, and is not detailed here.

2.4.2 Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices

This document [R13] shall be used in addition to the CC part 3 [R3] and to the CEM [R4]. This document specifies the additional information to be provided by a developer, and the additional checks to be performed by the ITSEF when performing a “composite evaluation”. This is the case for the current TOE as the underlying IC SB23YR48 Version B (or IC SB23YR80 Version B) is already evaluated and certified under the reference: ANSSI-2010/02. Therefore, the following additional assurance requirements apply for this TOE:

- ASE_COMP.1 for the security target ;
- ALC_COMP.1 for the life cycle support ;
- ADV_COMP.1 for the development activity ;
- ATE_COMP.1 for the tests activity ;
- AVA_COMP.1 for the vulnerability assessment.



Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz

Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 15/90

The statement of compatibility required by ASE_COMP additional requirements can be found in this security target, chapter 8.

3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

3.1 ASSETS

The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R10]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.

Due to interoperability reasons as the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R10] the TOE described in this security target specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to

- Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
- Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
- Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
- Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
- Common data in EF.COM.

The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data

- Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)¹.

A sensitive asset is the following more general one.

Authenticity of the MRTD's chip

The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.

3.2 SUBJECTS

The following individuals and IT systems have access to the TOE:

Manufacturer

"Manufacturer" is the generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit as well as for the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD's chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing (step 3 to step 5). In this Security Target, the TOE does not

¹ Cf. **Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.** for details how to access these User data under EAC protection.

distinguish between the users “IC Manufacturer” and the “MRTD Manufacturer” using this role Manufacturer.

Personalization Agent

The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by:

- establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD,
- enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s),
- writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability,
- writing the initial TSF data and
- signing the Document Security Object defined in [R10].

Terminal

A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through its contactless interface.

Inspection system (IS)

A technical system used by the border control officer of the *receiving State*:

- examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity,
- verifying the traveler as the MRTD holder.

The **Basic Inspection System** (BIS):

- contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip,
- implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism,
- gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optically reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information.

The **General Inspection System** (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.

The **Extended Inspection System** (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System:

- implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
- is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined by the Inspection System Certificates.

Application note 1: This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Chip Authentication Mechanism and the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.

MRTD Holder

The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

Traveler

Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

Attacker

A threat agent trying:

- to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD's chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data),
- to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or
- to forge a genuine MRTD.

Application note 2: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.

3.3 THREATS**T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD's chip**

An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD's chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. The attacker cannot read and does not know the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD

An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker cannot read and does not know the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

T. Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system

An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD's chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.

Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the MRTD's chip not knowing the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page and without a help of the inspection system which knows these data. In case of T.Eavesdropping the attacker uses the communication of the inspection system.

T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD's chip

An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data.

This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.

The TOE shall also avert the threats as specified below:

T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality

An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in "TOE operational Use" phase in order

- to manipulate User Data,
- to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or
- to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.

This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.

T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD's chip

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.

Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering

An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order

- to disclose TSF Data, or
- to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to

- modify security features or functions of the MRTD's chip,
- modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software,
- modify User Data or,
- to modify TSF data.

The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

T.Malfunction

Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to

- deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
- circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP)

The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations.

P.Manufact

Manufacturing of the MRTD's chip

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.

P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only

The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.

P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy

The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD's chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)² and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD's chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD's chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R10].

Application note 3: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R10]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent

3.5 ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:

- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.

² Note, that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication not being covered by this Protection Profile.

- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD's chip

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of

- the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
- the Document Basic Access Keys,
- the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and
- the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD's chip).

The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability

The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State

- Examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
- verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.

The Basic Inspection System for *global interoperability*

- includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
- implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control **[R10]**.

The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.

Application note 4: According to **[R10]** the support of the Passive Authentication mechanism is mandatory whereas the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST does not address Primary Inspection Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory within this ST.

A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" **[R10]**, the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

Application note 5: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.

4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.

4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS **[R10]** and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.

Application note 6: The OT.AC_Pers implies that

- the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
- the Personalization Agents may:
 - add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and
 - update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.

OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.

OT. Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.

Application note 7: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD's chip shall provide read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ data's entropy. Any attack based on decision of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R10] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful Enhanced Access Control not covered by this security target. Thus the read access must be prevented even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.

OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the *Personalization Agent Authentication key(s)*. In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.

Application note 8: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 "Manufacturing" into the Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE is identified by the Document Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.

The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD's chip independent of the TOE environment.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality

After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to

- disclose critical User Data,
- manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software,
- manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or
- bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE.

Application note 9: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced basic attack potential by means of

- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)

with a prior

- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

Application note 10: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE's internals.

4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT

OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.

During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.

OE.MRTD_Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:

- non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- identification of the element under delivery,
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
- physical protection to prevent external damage,
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE's),
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 - origin and shipment details,
 - reception, reception acknowledgement,
 - location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.

Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Issuing State or Organization

The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD

The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization

- establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,

- enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and
- personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature

The issuing State or Organization must

- generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair,
- ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and
- distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.

The issuing State or Organization must

- generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys,
- sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and
- distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations.

The digital signature in the Document Security Object EF.SOD relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R10].

OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R10] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

Receiving State or Organization

The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability

- includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and

- implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R10].

OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication

The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).

4.4 RATIONALE

4.4.1 Coverage matrix

The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage:

	OT.AC_Pers	OT.Data_Int	OT.Data_Conf	OT.Identification	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction	OE.MRTD_Manufact	OE.MRTD_Delivery	OE.Personalization	OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	OE.BAC-Keys	OE.Exam_MRTD	OE.Passive_Auth_Verif	OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip-ID				X									X			
T.Skimming			X										X			
T.Eavesdropping			X													
T.Forgery	X	X				X						X		X	X	
T.Abuse-Func					X						X					
T.Information_Leakage						X										
T.Phys-tamper							X									
T.Malfunction								X								
P.Manufact				X												
P.Personalization	X		X								X					

	OT.AC_Pers	OT.Data_Int	OT.Data_Conf	OT.Identification	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction	OE.MRTD_Manufact	OE.MRTD_Delivery	OE.Personalization	OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	OE.BAC-Keys	OE.Exam_MRTD	OE.Passive_Auth_Verif	OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
P.Personal_Data		X	X													
A.MRTD_Manufact									X							
A.MRTD_Delivery										X						
A.Pers_Agent											X					
A.Insp_Sys														X		X
A.BAC_Keys													X			

Table 1: Security problem definition / Security objectives

4.4.2 Coverage of threats in the operational environment

T.Chip_ID

The threat **T.Chip_ID** “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective **OT.Identification** by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment **OE.BAC-Keys**.

T.Skimming

The threat **T.Skimming** “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and **T.Eavesdropping** “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system” address the reading of the logical MRTD through the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective **OT.Data_Conf** “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment **OE.BAC-Keys**.

T.Forgery

The threat **T.Forgery** “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the

stored logical MRTD according the security objective **OT.Data_Int** “Integrity of personal data” and **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to **OE.Exam_MRTD** “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to **OE.Pass_Auth_Sign** “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to **OE.Passive_Auth_Verif** “Verification by Passive Authentication”.

T.Abuse-Func

The threat **T.Abuse-Func** “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func** “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: **OE.Personalization** “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.

T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper, T.Malfunction

The threats **T.Information_Leakage** “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, **T.Phys-Tamper** “Physical Tampering” and **T.Malfunction** “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak** “Protection against Information Leakage”, **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** “Protection against Physical Tampering” and **OT.Prot_Malfunction** “Protection against Malfunctions”.

4.4.3 Coverage of organisational security policies

P.Manufact

The OSP **P.Manufact** “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by **OT.Identification**.

P.Personalization

The OSP **P.Personalization** “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only” addresses the:

- the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalization** “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and

- the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective **OT.AC_Pers** “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”.

Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according to **OT.Identification** “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.

P.Personal_Data

The OSP **P.Personal_Data** “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE:

- to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control and
- enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization.

This policy is implemented by the security objectives **OT.Data_Int** “Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective **OT.Data_Conf** “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.

4.4.4 Coverage of assumptions

A.MRTD_Manufact

The assumption **A.MRTD_Manufact** “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.MRTD_Manufact** “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.

A.MRTD_Delivery

The assumption **A.MRTD_Delivery** “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.MRTD_Delivery** “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.

A.Pers_Agent

The assumption **A.Pers_Agent** “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalization** “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.

A.Insp_Sys

The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption **A.Insp_Sys** “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Exam_MRTD** “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE

environment **OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD** “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.

A.BAC-Keys

The assumption **A.BAC-Keys** “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.BAC-Keys** “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.

5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are defined in [R7], other components are defined in protection profile MRTD BAC [R5].

5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the *audit records*.


The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.

FAU_SAS Audit data storage

Family behaviour

This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.

Component levelling



FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.

Management: FAU_SAS.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FAU_SAS.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: *authorized users*] with the capability to store [assignment: *list of audit information*] in the audit records.

5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.


The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.

FCS_RND Generation of random numbers

Family behaviour

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be use for cryptographic purposes.

Component leveling:



FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.

Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers ration

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM

The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management

of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.


The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.

FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability

Family behaviour

This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.

Component levelling



FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.

Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability

The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

Application note 11: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that

- the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced

or conversely

- the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.

The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.

5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC

The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirement of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [R2].


The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.

FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation

Family behaviour

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

Component leveling



FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:

FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.

FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.

Management: FPT_EMSEC.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: *types of emissions*] in excess of [assignment: *specified limits*] enabling access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: *list of types of user data*].

FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: *type of users*] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: *type of connection*] to gain access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: *list of types of user data*].

6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This section identifies the security functional requirements for the TOE.

Some refinement/selection/assignment operations in the SFRs are determined in the PP MRTD BAC [R5], some are let with unspecified values. Assignments made by the PP MRTD BAC [R5] authors are marked as bold text, while assignments made by the ST author are marked as bold text and in italics.

The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.

6.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

6.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit

The TOE shall meet the requirement « Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) » as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1	The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Assignment	Authorized users: the Manufacturer List of Audit Information: the IC Identification Data

Application note 12: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).

6.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)

6.2.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT (FCS_CKM)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE

FCS_CKM.1.1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards] .
Assignment	Cryptographic key generation algorithm: Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bit. List of standards: [R10], normative appendix 5.

Application note 13: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol described in **[R10]**, normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in **[R10]**, Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD

FCS_CKM.4.1	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards] .
Assignment	Cryptographic key destruction method: Overwriting of data List of standards: none

Application note 14: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging.

6.2.2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FCS_COP)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.

FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation

FCS_COP.1.1 / SHA	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards] .
Assignment	List of cryptographic operations: hashing Cryptographic algorithm: SHA-1, SHA224, SHA-256 Cryptographic key sizes: none List of standards: FIPS 180-2

Application note 15: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4) according to **[R10]**.

FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES

FCS_COP.1.1 / SYM	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards] .
Assignment	List of cryptographic operations: secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption Cryptographic algorithm: Triple-DES Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits List of standards: FIPS 46-3 [R17] and [R10], normative appendix 5, A5.3

Application note 16: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.

FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication

FCS_COP.1.1 / SYM	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
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	cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards] .
Assignment	List of cryptographic operations: symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption Cryptographic algorithm: Triple-DES in CBC mode Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits List of standards: FIPS 46-3 [R17]

Application note 17: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).

FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC

FCS_COP.1.1 / MAC	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards] .
Assignment	List of cryptographic operations: secure messaging – message authentication code Cryptographic algorithm: Retail MAC Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits List of standards: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).

Application note 18: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.

6.2.2.3 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION (FCS_RND)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1	The TSF shall a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: <i>a defined quality metric</i>].
Assignment	A defined quality metric: <i>AIS31 Class P2 quality metric</i>

Application note 19: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.

6.2.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication

The following table provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used:

Name	SFR for the TOE	Algorithms and key sizes according to [R10], normative appendix 5.
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism	FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.6	Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents	FIA_UAU.4	Triple-DES with 112 bit keys

Table 2: Overview on authentication SFR

6.2.3.1 USER IDENTIFICATION (FIA_UID)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1	The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
Assignment	List of TSF-mediated actions: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”, (2) to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, (3) to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
FIA_UID.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application note 20: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The audit records can be written only in the Phase 2 Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.

Application note 21: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a (randomly chosen) identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more than one RFID. If this identifier is randomly selected it will not violate the OT.Identification.

6.2.3.2 USER AUTHENTICATION (FIA_UAU)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1	The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
Assignment	List of TSF-mediated actions: (1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”, (2) to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, (3) identify themselves by selection of the authentication key.
FIA_UAU.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application note 22: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves.

The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism – Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE

FIA_UAU.4.1	The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)] .
Assignment	Identified authentication mechanism(s): (2) Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism, (3) Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES

Application note 23: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.

Application note 24: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism defined in **[R10]**. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1	The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms] to support user authentication.
Assignment	List of multiple authentication mechanisms: (1) Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism, (2) Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
FIA_UAU.5.2	The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication] .
Assignment	Rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication: (1) The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the

	<p>Personalization Agent Key during personalization phase of the product's life cycle (phase 3),</p> <p>(2) the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.</p>
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Application note 25: In case the 'Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control' [R6] should also be fulfilled the Personalization Agent should not be authenticated by using the BAC or the symmetric authentication mechanism as they base on the two-key Triple-DES. The authentication of the personalization agent is only possible during phase 3 of the life-cycle, using symmetric authentication mechanism.

This can be considered as a refinement of the SFR FIA_UAU.5 of the PP.

However, this refinement is more restrictive than the PP, increase the level of security and therefore, do not impact the conformity to the PP.

Application note 26: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE

FIA_UAU.6.1	The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required] .
Assignment	List of conditions under which re-authentication is required: (1) each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.

Application note 27: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [R10] includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE

re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.

Application note 28: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [R6] the BAC communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication but are protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more advanced authentication process.

The TOE shall meet the requirement « Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1) » as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events] .
Selection	32 successive
Assignment	List of authentication events: ➤ Failure of a TDES based Authentication attempt
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [assignment met or surpassed] , the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions] .
Assignment	met List of actions: Blocking the cryptographic key related to the authentication

6.2.4 Class FDP User Data Protection

6.2.4.1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY (FDP_ACC)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control

FDP_ACC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] .
Assignment	Access control SFP: Basic Access Control SFP List of subject, objects and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP: terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD

6.2.4.2 ACCESS CONTROL FUNCTIONS (FDP_ACF)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control

FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes] .
Assignment	Access control SFP: Basic Access Control SFP List of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes: (3) Subjects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Personalization Agent, b) Basic Inspection System c) Terminal, (4) Objects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> d) data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, e) Data in EF.COM, f) Data in EF.SOD. (5) Security attributes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> g) Authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules

	governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
Assignment	Rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, (2) the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].
Assignment	Rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects: none
FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
Assignment	Rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, (2) Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, (3) The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.

Application note 29: The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization for read access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this security target (cf. [R6] for details).

6.2.4.3 INTER-TSF USER DATA CONFIDENTIALITY TRANSFER PROTECTION (FDP_UCT)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD

FDP_UCT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or
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	information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Assignment	Access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s): Basic Access Control SFP
Selection	Transmit and receive

6.2.4.4 INTER-TSF USER DATA INTEGRITY TRANSFER PROTECTION (FDP_UIT)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FDP_UIT.1 Basic data exchange integrity - MRTD

FDP_UIT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] errors.
Assignment	Access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s): Basic Access Control SFP
Selection	transmit and receive modification, deletion, insertion and replay
FDP_UIT.1.2	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] has occurred.
Selection	modification, deletion, insertion and replay

6.2.5 Class FMT Security Management

Application note 30: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management of the TSF data.

6.2.5.1 SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (FMT_SMF)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions [assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF] .
Assignment	List of security management functions to be provided by the TSF: (1) Initialization, (2) Personalization, (3) Configuration.

Application note 31: The configuration capabilities of the TOE are available during the pre-personalization (initialization) and personalization phases.

6.2.5.2 SECURITY MANAGEMENT ROLES (FMT_SMR)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles] .
Assignment	The authorized identified roles: (1) Manufacturer, (2) Personalization Agent, (3) Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.2.5.3 LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY (FMT_LIM)

Application note 32: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
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	enforced: [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy] .
Assignment	<p>Limited capability and availability policy:</p> <p>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, (2) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, (3) Software to be reconstructed and (4) Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capability (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy] .
Assignment	<p>Limited capability and availability policy:</p> <p>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, (2) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated (3) software to be reconstructed and (4) substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

Application note 33: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features ...” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.

Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.

6.2.5.4 MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (FMT_MTD)

Application note 34: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization data

FMT_MTD.1.1 / INI_ENA	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles] .
Selection	Assignment: write
Assignment	List of TSF data: Initialization Data and Pre-Personalization Data The authorized identified roles: the Manufacturer

Application note 35: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Authentication Key.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data

FMT_MTD.1.1 / INI_DIS	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles] .
Selection	Assignment: disable read access for users to
Assignment	List of TSF data: Initialization Data The authorized identified roles: the Personalization Agent

Application note 36: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by

- allowing to write these data only once and

- blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2.

The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write

FMT_MTD.1.1 / KEY_WRITE	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles] .
Selection	Assignment: write
Assignment	List of TSF data: Document Basic Access Keys The authorized identified roles: the Personalization Agent

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read

FMT_MTD.1.1 / KEY_READ	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles] .
Selection	Assignment: read
Assignment	List of TSF data: (1) Document Basic Access Keys, (2) Personalization Agent Keys. The authorized identified roles: none.

Application note 37: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.

6.2.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions

The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one

hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.

6.2.6.1 TOE EMANATION (FPT_EMSEC)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMSEC.1.1	The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data] .
Assignment	Types of emissions: side channel Specified limits: limits of the state of the art List of types of TSF data: Personalization Agent Authentication Keys List of types of user data: none
FPT_EMSEC.1.2	The TSF shall ensure [assignment: types of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: types of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data] .
Assignment	Types of users: any unauthorized users Types of connection: smart card circuit contacts List of types of TSF data: Personalization Agent Authentication Keys List of types of user data: none

Application note 38: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The MRTD’s chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.

6.2.6.2 FAIL SECURE (FPT_FLS)

The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF] .
Assignment	List of types of failures in the TSF: (1) Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur, (2) Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1

6.2.6.3 TSF PHYSICAL PROTECTION (FPT_PHP)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1	The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Assignment	Physical tampering scenarios: physical manipulation and physical probing List of TSF devices/elements: TSF

Application note 39: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here

- assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
- countermeasures are provided at any time.

6.2.6.4 TSF SELF TEST (FPT_TST)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

FPT_TST.1

TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Selection	<i>During initial start-up</i>
FPT_TST.2.1	The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data .
FPT_TST.3.1	The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

Application note 40: the FPT_TST.1 requirement describes requirement for the Personalization and Operational Use phases. Self-tests during the Manufacturing phase are described in the chip security target and have been evaluated during the chip evaluation.

6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE

The TOE shall be evaluated according to Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4+)

And augmented by the following components:

- ADV_FSP.5,
- ADV_INT.2,
- ADV_TDS.4,
- ALC_CMS.5,
- ALC_DVS.2,
- ALC_TAT.2,
- ATE_DPT.3

6.4 RATIONALE

6.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

6.4.1.1 COVERAGE OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE

	OT.AC_Pers	OT.Data_Int	OT.Data_Conf	OT.Identification	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction
FAU_SAS.1				X				
FCS_CKM.1	X	X	X					
FCS_CKM.4	X		X					
FCS_COP.1/SHA	X	X	X					
FCS_COP.1/ENC	X	X	X					
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	X	X						
FCS_COP.1/MAC	X	X	X					
FCS_RND.1	X	X	X					
FIA_UID.1			X	X				
FIA_AFL			X	X				
FIA_UAU.1			X	X				
FIA_UAU.4	X	X	X					
FIA_UAU.5	X	X	X					
FIA_UAU.6	X	X	X					
FDP_ACC.1	X	X	X					
FDP_ACF.1	X	X	X					
FDP_UCT.1	X	X	X					
FDP_UIT.1	X	X	X					
FMT_SMF.1	X	X	X					
FMT_SMR.1	X	X	X					
FMT_LIM.1					X			
FMT_LIM.2					X			
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA				X				
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS				X				
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	X	X	X					
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	X	X	X					
FPT_EMSEC.1	X					X		
FPT_FLS.1	X					X		X
FPT_PHP.3	X					X	X	
FPT_TST.1						X		X

Table 3: security functional requirements / security objectives for the TOE

OT.AC_Pers

The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.

The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [R6] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).

In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.

The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentiality of these keys.

OT.Data_Int

The security objective **OT.Data_Int** “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.

The security objective **OT.Data_Int** “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the

Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.

OT.Data_Conf

The security objective **OT.Data_Conf** “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). FIA_AFL.1 will block the authentication key after 32 failed authentications to prevent from a brute force attack. The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).

The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.

Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure messaging.

OT.Identification

The security objective **OT.Identification** “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.

Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. FIA_AFL.1 will block the authentication key after 32 failed authentications to prevent from a brute force attack. The SFR

FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

The security objective **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func** "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE Delivery.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The security objective **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak** "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip against disclosure:

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The security objective **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The security objective **OT.Prot_Malfunction** "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by

- the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and
- the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.

6.4.1.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE

The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.

The Table 4 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.

SFR	Dependencies	Support of the dependencies
FAU_SAS.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or	Fulfilled by

SFR	Dependencies	Support of the dependencies
	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_COP.1/ENC, and FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_CKM.4 Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.	justification 1 for non-satisfied dependencies, justification 1 for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.	Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.5	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.6	No dependencies	n.a.
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization.	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1, Justification 2 for non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1	[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	Justification 3 for non-satisfied dependencies Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1 Justification 3 for non-satisfied dependencies
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability	Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities	Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1

SFR	Dependencies	Support of the dependencies
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	n.a.
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	n.a.

Table 4: Functional component dependencies

Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:

1. The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
2. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.2) is necessary here.
3. The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for sensitive SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.

6.4.2 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements

The assurance evaluation level is directly drawn from the Protection Profile for MRTD [R5] and the rationale is directly available in the associated document ([R5]). There is no refinement performed on security assurance requirements. The rationale is the following:

The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.

The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.

The components augmented to EAL4 are due to the EAL 5 level of the EAC security target.

6.4.3 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency

The rationale for mutual support and internal consistency is drawn from the Protection Profile for MRTD ([R5]) and is the following:

The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.

The analysis of the TOE's security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal consistency demonstrates:

The dependency analysis in section 6.4.1.2 (Dependency rationale) for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.

The assurance class EAL4+ is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in section 6.4.2 (Rationale for the Assurance Requirements) shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.

Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to arise in sections 6.4.1.2 (Dependency rationale) and 6.4.2 (Rationale for the Assurance Requirements). Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.4.2, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.

7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

7.1 STATEMENT OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY

7.1.1 Chip security functionalities

The following functionalities of the product are directly addressed by the chip. The complete list the chip security functionality can be check in the chip Security Target [R8].

TSF_INTEGRITY

This security functionality is responsible for:

- correcting single bit fails upon a read operation on each NVM byte,
- verifying valid CPU usage,
- checking integrity loss when accessing NVM, ROM or RAM,
- providing a sign engine to check code and/or data integrity loss,
- monitoring various manifestations of fault injection attempts,
- providing a security timeout feature (watchdog timer),
- providing the embedded software developer with the traceability information of the TOE.

TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING

This security functionality ensures that:

- The TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
- The TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity, and glitch attacks,
- The TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating conditions.

TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN

This security functionality ensures the management of the following security violation attempts:

- Incorrect CPU usage,
- Integrity loss in NVM, ROM or RAM
- Code signature alarm,
- Fault injection attempt,
- access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
- MPU errors,
- Clock and voltage supply operating changes,
- TOE physical integrity abuse.

TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY

This security functionality prevents the disclosure of user data and of TSF data when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE (the different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE such as a cryptographic co-processor are seen as separated parts of the TOE):

This functionality provides additional support mechanisms to the embedded software developer contributing to avoid information leakage.

TSF_SYM_CRYPTO

This security functionality provides DES and TDES data encryption / decryption capability, in order to compute Message Authentication code (MAC) or the encrypted data.

TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO

This security functionality provides:

- SHA-1 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 160 bits result,
- SHA-224 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 224-bit result,
- SHA-256 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 256-bit result.

TSF_ALEAS

This security functionality provides a hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) to support security operations performed by cryptographic applications. The RNG complies with the AIS31 Class P2 quality metric.

7.1.2 Low level security functionalities

TSF_PHYS

This security functionality provides protection mechanism of the TOE towards observation and physical tampering, such as random delay and desynchronization capability. This security functionality may call TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY.

7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities

TSF_ACCESS

This security functionality manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in E²PROM.

Write and read access to RAM and ROM are forbidden from outside of the TOE.

Access to an object is granted if:

- Object type is managed by the TOE ;

- Object Integrity is verified ;
- Access conditions are fulfilled ;

Operations on objects are:

- File or directory creation with related security attributes. A file or directory is created under the ADF of the application with whom it is associated.
- File or directory deletion.
- Write operation.
- Read operation.
- Object life cycle management.
- Key generation.

Access conditions are:

- The object must be under the ADF of the application, if an application is selected.
- There must be a consistency between the security state of the card and the access rights to the object. Access rights can be:
 - ALWAYS: Operation always authorized
 - NEVER: Operation never authorized
 - USERx: Operation authorized if USERx is authenticated
 - SMI: Operation authorized if the command is protected in integrity by a secure messaging.
 - SMI + SMC: Operation authorized if the command is protected in integrity and confidentiality by a secure messaging.

TSF_INIT

This security functionality is called after each reset of the card and performs the following operations:

- test of the TOE (call of the TSF_TEST security function) ;
- “Answer to Attrib” + “ATQB” emission ;
- Module initialization and application initialization.

TSF_MEMORY

This security functionality manages E²PROM and RAM erasure:

- RAM erasure is achieved by a software mechanism that writes random data in RAM;
- E²PROM erasure is achieved by a software mechanism that writes random data in E²PROM.

TSF_OTP

This security functionality manages the OTP area in E²PROM. It manages in particular the « life cycle parameter », enforcing non-reversibility of the life cycle. To achieve this, the life cycle is redundant in the OTP area and there is a checksum to verify the integrity of the OTP area.

TSF_CPLC

This security functionality manages the CPLC area. The CPLC area contains Manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and Personalization data. Manufacturing data are written by the Manufacturer during the Manufacturing phase and contain identification data such as founder ID, chip ID and operating system ID. Pre-Personalization data are written by the Manufacturer and also contains identification data such as the module ID. The CPLC area is a write-only-once area and write access is subject to Manufacturer or Personalization Agent authentication. Read access to the CPLC area is allowed during Personalization phase. During Operational Use phase, the CPLC area read access is only possible after BAC authentication.

TSF_CHECK

This security functionality tests the integrity of the following items:

- File header: Checksum / E²PROM ;
- File body: Checksum / E²PROM ;
- OTP area: Checksum / E²PROM ;
- Secrets ;
- I/O buffers ;

When an error is detected, the TSF_AUDIT mechanism is called and TSF_AUDIT takes the appropriate actions.

TSF_TEST

This security functionality tests the following elements at start-up:

- E²PROM stored executable code ;
- ROM ;
- RAM ;
- Random number generator ;
- DES hardware ;
- Crypto processor,
- Hardware CRC mechanism,
- Hardware interruption mechanism.

Integrity of the executable code in EEPROM is also checked before its execution.

When an error is detected, the TSF_AUDIT security functionality is called and TSF_AUDIT takes the appropriate actions.

TSF_AUDIT

This security functionality is reacting when a fault or an anomaly is detected. In any case, the RAM is erased and a reset occurs. In some cases, the E²PROM may also be erased and the card will be terminated.

Exception	Type	E ² PROM erasure and card termination
IT test	Anomaly	N.A.
Voltage sensor	Anomaly	N.A.
Frequency sensor	Anomaly	N.A.
Temperature sensor	Anomaly	N.A. (not available on ST23)
Erroneous OPCODE	Anomaly	No (reset only)
Error during RANDOM testing	Anomaly	No (reset only)
Error during Crypto-processor testing	Fault	Yes
DES Testing	Fault	Yes
CRC Testing	Fault	Yes
RAM writing/reading error test	Fault	Yes
Data integrity test	Fault	Yes
ROM code integrity test	Fault	Yes
OTP area integrity test	Fault	Yes
Code sequence testing during execution	Fault	Yes

7.1.4 Application manager security functionalities

TSF_GESTION

At start-up of the card, this security functionality calls TSF_INIT and then waits for a command sent by the terminal. This command is then executed or transmitted to another module or application.

This security functionality manages:

- Management of the secure state of the TOE.
- Application selection.
- Application separation.

Management of the secure state of the TOE:

The security functionality TSF_GESTION updates the security state of the TOE according to:

- Current authenticated user.
- Access conditions and validity of those access conditions.

Application selection and application separation:

The security functionality TSF_GESTION ensures that each received command is forwarded to the right application.

7.1.5 Application security functionalities

TSF_SECRET

This security functionality ensures secure management of secret such as cryptographic keys. All secrets are handled only by the Secret Management module (GS) and are identified through an identification number.

Secret management consists of the following functionalities:

- Session key generation (key derivation)
- Secret destruction
- Secret loading
- Secret transfer

Session key generation

Session keys are protected in integrity and confidentiality during generation. The Secret Management module (GS) enforces secure storage of the session keys during generation.

Secret destruction

The Secret Management module (GS) calls the security functionality TSF_MEMORY to erase keys.

Secret loading

Loading of a secret is always done by an authorized user through a secure command. This command is accepted only after authentication of the authorized user.

Secret transfer

The Secret Management module (GS) manages the secure transfer of every secret to the crypto-processor when used for cryptographic operation.

TSF_CRYPTO

This security functionality performs high level cryptographic operations:

- Encryption/decryption ;
- Integrity verification ;
- Secret decryption ;
- Authentication cryptogram creation/verification ;
- Key derivation ;
- Hash value calculation ;

TSF_CRYPTO may also call TSF_SYM_CRYPTO and TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO to perform some cryptographic operations.

Encryption/decryption

TSF_CRYPTO performs TDES in CBC mode in conformance with FIPS 46-3 [R17] and [R10] normative appendix 5, A5.3 in order to achieve encryption and decryption in secure messaging.

Integrity verification

TSF_CRYPTO performs Retail MAC in conformance with ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2), in order to achieve message authentication code in secure messaging.

Secret decryption

TSF_CRYPTO performs decryption of ciphered secret imported in the card in conformance with **[R25]**. This functionality is available in personalization phase only.

Authentication cryptogram creation/verification

TSF_CRYPTO performs the following authentication cryptogram calculation/verification:

- Mutual Authentication compliant with **[R25]** for authentication based on TDES, this mechanism is available in personalization phase only.
- Basic Access Control authentication (see key derivation)
- CBC DES with Retail MAC for secure messaging (see Integrity verification).

Authentication cryptogram calculations are performed using a random number (call to TSF_ALEAS) in order to avoid replay of the authentication.

Key derivation

TSF_CRYPTO performs the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm to derive Triple-DES and Retail-MAC Session Keys of size 112 bits for secure messaging, from agreed parameters produced during the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol, as described in **[R10]** normative appendix 5.

Hash value calculation

TSF_CRYPTO performs SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 in conformance with **[R19]**, in order to calculate a hash value.

TSF_BAC_AUTH

This security functionality manages the authentication of the Inspection system to the TOE, based on the Document Basic Access Keys.

TSF_BAC_AUTH performs the Basic Access Control mechanism, as described in **[R10]**, in order to authenticate the Inspection System. TSF_BAC_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO in order to perform the related cryptographic operations.

TSF_TDES_AUTH

This security functionality manages the authentication of a user to the TOE, based on the TDES keys related to this user, during the personalization phase.

TSF_TDES_AUTH performs an authentication mechanism based on TDES. TSF_TDES_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO in order to perform the related cryptographic operations.

TSF_RATIF

A counter may be associated to an authentication secret, which is used to count the number of successive unsuccessful authentication attempts. The counter is reinitialized when the authentication is successful. If the counter reaches 32, then the key is blocked and cannot be used anymore.

7.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY RATIONALE

7.2.1 SFRs coverage

Table 5 provides an overview on how the security functionalities of the TOE cover the SFRs for the TOE.

	TSF_INTEGRITY	TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING	TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN	TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY	TSF_SYM_CRYPTO	TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO	TSF_ALEAS	TSF_PHYS	TSF_ACCESS	TSF_INIT	TSF_MEMORY	TSF_OTP	TSF_CPLC	TSF_CHECK	TSF_TEST	TSF_AUDIT	TSF_GESTION	TSF_SECRET	TSF_CRYPTO	TSF_BAC_AUTH	TSF_TDES_AUTH	TSF_RATIF	
FAU_SAS.1												X	X										
FCS_CKM.1																		X	X				
FCS_CKM.4											X							X					
FCS_COP.1/SHA						X													X				
FCS_COP.1/ENC					X														X				
FCS_COP.1/AUTH					X														X		X		
FCS_COP.1/MAC																			X				
FCS_RND.1							X																
FIA_UID.1										X		X	X				X						
FIA_UAU.1										X		X	X				X			X	X		
FIA_UAU.4							X												X	X	X		
FIA_UAU.5																	X		X	X	X		
FIA_UAU.6																	X		X				
FIA_AFL																							X
FDP_ACC.1									X								X						
FDP_ACF.1									X								X						
FDP_UCT.1																	X		X	X			
FDP_UIT.1																	X		X				
FMT_SMF.1												X					X						
FMT_SMR.1																		X		X	X		
FMT_LIM.1	X														X	X							
FMT_LIM.2	X													X	X								
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA													X										

	TSF_INTEGRITY	TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING	TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN	TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY	TSF_SYM_CRYPTO	TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO	TSF_ALEAS	TSF_PHYS	TSF_ACCESS	TSF_INIT	TSF_MEMORY	TSF_OTP	TSF_CPLC	TSF_CHECK	TSF_TEST	TSF_AUDIT	TSF_GESTION	TSF_SECRET	TSF_CRYPTO	TSF_BAC_AUTH	TSF_TDES_AUTH	TSF_RATIF	
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS												X	X									X	
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE									X													X	
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ									X									X					
FPT_EMSEC.1				X				X										X	X				
FPT_FLS.1		X	X													X							
FPT_PHP.3		X	X	X				X								X							
FPT_TST.1														X	X								

Table 5: Coverage of SFR for the TOE by the TOE security functionalities

FAU_SAS.1 is met by TSF_OTP, which manages the write-only-once OTP area where TOE parameters, such as the life phase, are written, and by TSF_CPLC, which manages the write-only-once CPLC area where TOE identification data are written.

FCS_CKM.1 is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs, as described in [R10], normative appendix 5 Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm to generate session keys of 112 bits.

FCS_CKM.1 is also met by TSF_SECRET, which ensures the protection of the keys during generation.

FCS_CKM.4 is met by TSF_SECRET and by TSF_MEMORY, as TSF_SECRET manages the secure destruction of secret by calling TSF_MEMORY, and TSF_MEMORY manages E²PROM erasure.

FCS_COP.1/SHA is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs the SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 algorithms in conformance with [R19] to calculate a hash value, as required by FCS_COP.1/SHA. FCS_COP.1/SHA is also met by TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO, which provides SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 calculation.

FCS_COP.1/ENC is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs TDES encryption and decryption, in conformance with FIPS 46-3 [R17] and [R10] normative appendix 5, A5.3, in order to achieve secure messaging - confidentiality, as required by FCS_COP.1/ENC. FCS_COP.1/ENC is also met by TSF_SYM_CRYPTO, which provides TDES calculation.

FCS_COP.1/AUTH is met by TSF_CRYPTO and TSF_TDES_AUTH, which performs symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption, in order to achieve the authentication of the user during personalization phase, as required by FCS_COP.1/AUTH. FCS_COP.1/AUTH is also met by TSF_SYM_CRYPTO, which provides TDES calculation.

FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which performs Retail MAC in conformance with ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) in order to achieve secure messaging - integrity, as required by FCS_COP.1/MAC.

FCS_RND.1 is met by TSF_ALEAS, which generates random numbers using a random number generator that complies with the AIS31 Class P2 quality metric.

FIA_UID.1 is met by TSF_INIT and TSF_GESTION, which manage the initialization of the communication with the card and by TSF_OTP, which manages the card life cycle, and TSF_CPLC, which manages the CPLC area where the initialization and pre-personalization data are stored.

FIA_UAU.1 is met by TSF_INIT and TSF_GESTION, which manage the initialization of the communication with the card, by TSF_OTP, which manage the OTP area where the current phase of the TOE is stored, by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where the initialization and pre-personalization data are stored and by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_TDES_AUTH which manage user authentication (and thus key selection).

FIA_UAU.4 is met TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_TDES_AUTH, TSF_CRYPTO and TSF_ALEAS which ensure that each authentication of a user is performed using a random challenge, which prevents reuse of the authentication data.

FIA_UAU.5 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH, TSF_TDES_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO, which support all the authentication mechanisms required by FIA_UAU.5, and by TSF_GESTION which ensures that only commands consistent with the security state of the card are accepted.

FIA_UAU.6 is met by TSF_CRYPTO, which provide the re-authentication mechanism by means of the secure messaging, and by TSF_GESTION which ensures that only commands consistent with the security state of the card are accepted.

FIA_AFL is met by TSF_RATIF, which ensures, when a counter is related to an authentication key, that the counter is incremented in case of authentication failure, that the counter is reinitialized in case of authentication success and that the authentication key is blocked in case of 32 successive authentication attempts.

FDP_ACC.1 and **FDP_ACF.1** are met by TSF_ACCESS, which ensures that all the access conditions, such as user authentication or secure messaging, are fulfilled before authorizing access to an object, and by TSF_GESTION, which verify that each received command security status is consistent with the security status of the TOE.

FDP_UCT.1 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO, which ensures that a secure messaging in integrity and confidentiality is established after BAC Authentication, therefore enabling to protect transmitted and received data from disclosure and by TSF_GESTION, which verifies the security status of the received command, and will therefore detect if secure messaging is interrupted.

FDP_UIT.1 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_CRYPTO, which ensures that a secure messaging in integrity and confidentiality is established after BAC Authentication, therefore enabling to protect

transmitted and received data from modification and by TSF_GESTION, which verifies the security status of the received command, and will therefore detect if secure messaging is interrupted.

FMT_SMF.1 is met by TSF_OTP, which manages a life cycle that includes a pre-personalization (initialization) and a personalization phase, and by TSF_GESTION, which ensures that only the AIP application is selectable in pre-personalization (initialization) and personalization phases.

FMT_SMR.1 is met by TSF_BAC_AUTH and TSF_TDES_AUTH, which provide user authentication mechanism and by TSF_SECRET, which manages the identification number of the secret, therefore allowing the TOE to maintain different user roles.

FMT_LIM.1 and **FMT_LIM.2** are met by TSF_INTEGRITY, TSF_CHECK and TSF_TEST as those security functions provide test features of the TOE after TOE delivery, which do not allow disclosure or unauthorized manipulation of TSF data, user data, software or any other substantial information.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where the initialization and pre-personalization data are written.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by TSF_CPLC, which manages the area where initialization and pre-personalization data are written and also ensures that no access to those data is allowed during Operational Use phase before BAC authentication, by TSF_OTP, which manages the area where the life cycle phase is written, and by TSF_TDES_AUTH, which ensures that the Personalization Agent is authenticated during the personalization phase: when the Personalization Agent switches the card from Personalization phase to Operational Use phase, he will disable free external access to the CPLC area.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by TSF_ACCESS which ensures that all the access conditions, such as user authentication, are fulfilled before authorizing access to an object, and by TSF_TDES_AUTH, which ensures that the personalization Agent is authenticated.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by TSF_ACCESS which ensures that all the access conditions to an object, such as never for instance, are respected. **FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ** is also supported by TSF_SECRET which ensures that operations on secret keys do not allow any read access to those keys.

FPT_EMSEC.1 is met by TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY, which prevent TOE operations, such as key manipulation for instance, to be monitored and by TSF_PHYS which provides interruption in order to avoid information leakage through observation of emanation. **FPT_EMSEC.1** is also met by TSF_CRYPTO and TSF_SECRET which ensure secure execution of cryptographic operations on keys such as the Personalization Agent Authentication Key.

FPT_FLS.1 is met by TSF_AUDIT which ensure that a secure state of the TOE (whether by reset or card termination) is maintained whenever a default or an anomaly is detected. **FPT_FLS.1** is also met by TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING and TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN, which ensure the detection of a tampering attempt, of a default or of an anomaly.

FPT_PHP.3 is met by TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING, TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN and TSF_AUDIT, which monitor the TOE and react when a security event is detected, therefore protecting the TOE from probing or physical manipulation. FPT_PHP.3 is also met by TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY and TSF_PHYS, which provide physical protection of the TOE.

FPT_TST.1 is met by TSF_TEST, which automatically performs testing of critical elements of the TOE at power-up. FPT_TST.1 is also met by TSF_CHECK, which tests the integrity of accessed objects.

7.2.2 Security functionality consistency rationale

The coverage analysis shows that the security functions are complete and clearly defined. The security functions are internally and mutually consistent

The coverage analysis also shows how the TOE protects itself against interference and logical tampering (in particular with TSF_INTEGRITY, TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY, TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING, TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN) and how the TOE protects itself against bypass (in particular with TSF_GESTION, TSF_ACCESS).

8 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

8.1 ACRONYMS

BIS	Basic Inspection System
CC	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EF	Elementary File
EIS	Extended Inspection System
GIS	General Inspection System
IAS	Identité Authentication Signature
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCSN	Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
IT	Information Technology
JCRE	Java Card Runtime Environment
JVM	Java Virtual Machine
MF	Master File
MRTD	Machine Readable Travel Document
n.a.	Not applicable
OSP	Organizational security policy
PP	Protection Profile
RAD	Reference Authentication Data
RNG	Random Number Generator
SAR	Security assurance requirements
SDO	Signed Data Object
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security functional requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation

TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy
VAD	Verification Authentication Data
VGP	Visa Global Platform

8.2 CONVENTIONS USED

The following list shows the roots used for the various elements.

<u>Root</u>	<u>Elements described by this root</u>
T.	Threats relative to the TOE and the TOE operational environment
OSP.	Organisational security policy
A.	Assumption
OT.	Security objectives for the TOE
OE.	Security objectives for the operational environment

8.3 DEFINITIONS

Active Authentication

Security mechanism defined in [5] option by which means the MRTD's chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MRTD's chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of Organization.

Application note

Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.

Audit records

Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.

Authenticity

Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip were created by the issuing State or Organization.

Basic Access Control (BAC)

Security mechanism defined in [R10] by which means the MRTD's chip proves and the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there).

Basic Inspection System (BIS)

An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the MRTD's chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.

Biographical data (biodata)

The personalized details of the MRTD holder appearing as text in the visual and *machine readable zones* on the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. **[R10]**.

Biometric reference data

Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD's chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.

Certificate chain

Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key it contains (selfsigned certificate).

Chip

An integrated circuit and its embedded software as it come out of the IC manufacturing step.

Counterfeit

An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means. **[R10]**

Country Signing CA Certificate (CC_{SCA})

Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key ($K_{P_{UCSCA}}$) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the inspection system.

Country Verifying Certification Authority

The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization in respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.

Current date

The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.

CVCA link Certificate

Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.

Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm

The [R10], normative appendix 5, A5.1 describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.

Document Basic Access Keys

Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key K_{ENC}) and message authentication (key K_{MAC}) of data transmitted between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system [R10]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.

Document Security Object (SOD)

A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD's chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [R10]

Document Verifier

Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations.

Eavesdropper

A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD's chip.

Enrolment

The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity. [R10]

Extended Access Control

Security mechanism identified in [R10] by which means the MRTD's chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with

Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.

Extended Inspection System

A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.

Extended Inspection System (EIS)

A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.

Forgery

Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the portrait. **[R10]**

General Inspection System

A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip Authentication Mechanism.

Global Interoperability

The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. **[R10]**

IC Dedicated Support Software

That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.

IC Dedicated Test Software

That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.

Initialisation Data

Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD's material (IC identification data).

Inspection

The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [R10]

Inspection system (IS)

A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.

Integrated circuit (IC)

Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD's chip is built on an integrated circuit.

Integrity

Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization.

Issuing Organization

Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [R10]

Issuing State

The Country issuing the MRTD. [R10]

Logical Data Structure (LDS)

The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [R10]. The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD's chip.

Logical MRTD

Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [R10] as specified by ICAO on the MRTD's chip. It presents readable data including (but not limited to)

- (1) personal data of the MRTD holder
- (2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
- (3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
- (4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
- (5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
- (6) EF.COM and EF.SOD

Logical travel document

Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the integrated circuit including (but not limited to)

- (1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
- (2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
- (3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).

Machine readable travel document (MRTD)

Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read. [R10]

Machine readable zone (MRZ)

Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [R10]

MRTD application

Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the MRTD's chip. It includes

- the file structure implementing the LDS [R10]
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
- the authentication data itself.

MRTD Basic Access Control

Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the inspection system and the MRTD's chip based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD's chip according to LDS.

MRTD holder

The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

MRTD's Chip

A chip programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by [R10] and ready for personalisation.

MRTD's chip Embedded Software

Software embedded in a MRTD's chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD's chip Embedded Software is designed in Step 1 and embedded into the MRTD's chip in Step 3 of the TOE life-cycle.

Optional biometric reference data

Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD's chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.

Patch

Additional executable code loaded in EEPROM of a chip after IC manufacturing step, in order to fix a bug or a problem encountered with the embedded software execution. A patch can fix

- a functional problem, eg. missing arguments in an APDU, bad timing in the protocol management...
- a security problem: typically, a patch that corrects a weakness discovered on a security function.

Note that a patch that fixes a functional problem can have an impact on the security of the chip if it affects the behaviour of a security function.

Passive authentication

(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and

(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security Object.

Personalization

The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the document. This may also include the optional biometric data collected during the "Enrolment". [R10]

Personalization Agent

The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.

Personalization Agent Authentication Information

TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization Agent.

Personalization Agent Authentication Key

Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD's chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent.

Physical travel document

Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but not limited to)

- (1) biographical data,
- (2) data of the machine-readable zone,
- (3) photographic image and
- (4) other data.

Pre-personalization Data

Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD's and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.

Pre-personalized MRTD's chip

MRTD's chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.

Receiving State

The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [R10]

Reference data

Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.

Secure messaging in encrypted mode

Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Skimming

Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.

Security Target (ST)

Reference document for the TOE evaluation: the certificate awarded by the DCSSI will attest conformity of the product and its documentation with the (functional and assurance) requirements formulated in the security target.

Target of Evaluation (TOE)

The product to be evaluated and its associated documentation.

Terminal Authorization

Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.

TOE Security Functionality (TSF)

A set consisting of all hardware, software and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

TOE Security Policy (TSP)

Set of rules stipulating how to manage, protect and distribute assets within a TOE.

Travel document

A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or Organization which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [R10]

Traveler

Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

TSF data

Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [R1]).

Unpersonalized MRTD

The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.

User data

Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [R1]).

Verification

The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee's template. [R10]



Machine Readable Travel Document – Basic
Access Control – CC IDeal Citiz

Ref.: 0000087591
Page: 87/90

Verification data

Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.

9 REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

9.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Designation	Reference	Title	Revision	Date
Common Criteria				
[R1]	CCMB-2009-07-001	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model	Version 3.1, Revision 3	July 2009
[R2]	CCMB-2009-07-002	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components	Version 3.1, Revision 3	July 2009
[R3]	CCMB-2009-07-003	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components	Version 3.1, Revision 3	July 2009
[R4]	CCMB-2007-09-004	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology	Version 3.1, Revision 2	September 2007
Protection Profiles and Security Target				
[R5]	BSI-CC-PP-0055	Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control	1.10	March 2009
[R6]	BSI-CC-PP-0056	Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control	1.10	March 2009
[R7]	BSI-PP-0002-2001	Protection Profile, Security IC Platform Protection Profile. Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik).	Version 1.0	July 2001
[R8]	SMD_Sx23YRxx_ST_09_002	Sx23YRxxB Security Target - Public Version	Rev 02.01	February 2010
[R9]	ANSSI-2010/02	SB23YR80 Version B with NesLib Version 3 – Chip Certificate	Version 1.0	January 2010
E-passport specifications				
[R10]	ICAO Doc 9303	part 1 volume 1, Sixth edition, 2006, Passports with Machine Readable Data Stored in Optical Character Recognition Format;	Sixth edition	2006

Designation	Reference	Title	Revision	Date
		part 1 volume 2, Sixth edition, 2006, Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability.		
[R11]	TR-03110	Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC)	Version 1.11	
CC supporting document				
[R12]	CCDB-2008-04-001	Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards	V2.5, R1	April 2008
[R13]	CCDB-2007-09-001	Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices	V1.0, R1	September 2007

9.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

Designation	Reference	Title	Revision	Date
Cryptography				
[R14]	PKCS#3	PKCS#3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note	Version 1.4	Revised November 1, 1993
[R15]	ISO/IEC 15946	ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment.		2002
[R16]		Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI		2006
[R17]	FIPS PUB 46-3	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Standards (DES), U.S. Department Of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology.		Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[R18]	ANSI X9.31	American Bankers Association, Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998 - Appendix A.2.4		1998
[R19]		Federal Information Processing Standards		2002 August

		Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology		1
OTHER				
[R20]		VISA global platform requirements configuration 3 – compact	v2.1.1	May 2003
[R21]		Java Card 2.2.2 - Application Programming Interfaces, Sun Microsystems	V2.2.2	March 2006
[R22]		Java Card 2.2.2 - JCRE, Sun Microsystems	V2.2.2	March 2006
[R23]		Java Card 2.2.2 - Virtual Machine Specifications, Sun Microsystems	V2.2.2	March 2006
[R24]		Plate-forme commune pour l'eAdministration – Spécification technique	Version 1.01	
[R25]		EMV CPS	1.0 Final	16 June 2003
[R26]		Plate-forme commune pour l'eAdministration – Spécification technique	Version 1.01	