the security technology provider

Security Target Lite

SOMA801NXP Electronic Passport

Basic Access Control

**Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3 – ISO/IEC 15408
Assurance Level EAL 4+**

Version   1.0

Date   2012-05-16

Reference   TCLE120006

Classification PUBLIC

Version control

Version	Date	Author	Revision Description
1.0	2012-05-16	Marco EVANGELISTA	First version

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Abbreviations and Notations

Numerical values
Numbers are printed in decimal, hexadecimal or binary notation.
Hexadecimal values are indicated with a 'h' suffix as in XXh, where X is a hexadecimal digit from 0 to F.
Decimal values have no suffix.

Example: the decimal value 179 may be noted as the hexadecimal value B3h.

Denoted text
The text added to provide details on how the TOE implementation fulfils some security requirements is written in *italics* and is preceded by the numbered tag "Application Note".

Refinements to the security requirements are denoted by the tag "Refinement" and are written in **bold** text.

Selections and *assignments* made by the Protection Profile authors are written in underlined text.

Selections and *assignments* made by the authors of this ST are written in **underlined bold** text.

Iterations are denoted by showing a slash "/", and the iteration indicator after the component indicator.

The original text of the selection and assignment components, as defined by the Common Criteria, is given by a footnote.

Key words
The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [R16].

1. Introduction

1.1 ST Overview

This Security Target (ST) document defines the security requirements and the scope of the Common Criteria evaluation of the SOMA801NXP electronic passport. The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip NXP Semiconductors P5CD081, programmed with the operating system and with the ICAO passport application. The TOE adds security features to a passport booklet, providing machine-assisted identity confirmation and machine-assisted verification of document security.

This ST covers the Basic Access Control (BAC) mechanism only, as defined by the ICAO Doc 9303 [R14][R15]. The Extended Access Control (EAC) is covered by an other ST [R13].

The SOMA801NXP passport was developed in full accordance with specifications for a Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO Doc 9303 [R14] [R15] details technical properties and security features of such a travel document, as well as recommendations for the security environment in which it operates.

The TOE is meant for "global interoperability". According to ICAO the term is understood as "*the capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective States*".

The TOE is supplied with a file system, that contains all the data that is used in the context of the ICAO application as described in the Protection Profiles [R5][R6].

1.2 ST reference

Table 1-1   ST Identification

Title	Security Target Lite SOMA801NXP Electronic Passport Basic Access Control
Version	1.0
Author	Marco EVANGELISTA
Reference	TCLE120006
Keywords	Security target, protection profile, common criteria

1.3 TOE reference

Table 1-2   TOE Identification

Product Name	SOMA801NXP
Product Version	1.0
TOE Identification Data	53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h 38h 30h 31h 4Eh 58h 50h 5Fh 31h 5Fh 30h
Evaluation Criteria	Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3
Protection Profile	BSI-CC-PP-0055
Evaluation Assurance Level	EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2
Developer	Gep S.p.A.
Evaluation Sponsor	Gep S.p.A.
Evaluation Facility	SERMA Technologies' ITSEF
Certification Body	ANSSI – Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
Certification ID	SOMA-NXP
Keywords	electronic passport, e-Passport, ICAO, machine readable travel document, basic access control, BAC

The TOE identification data is located in the non-volatile memory of the chip. Instructions for reading identification data are provided by the pre-personalization guidance, the personalization guidance and the user guidance.
The TOE is identified by the following string, representing the <u>Global Reference</u>:

<p style="text-align:center">SOMA801NXP_1_0</p>

<p style="text-align:center">(ASCII codes 53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h 38h 30h 31h 4Eh 58h 50h 5Fh 31h 5Fh 30h)</p>

The first four bytes of the identification data identify the operating system. Bytes from 5 to 10 contain the IC identifier. Last three bytes encode ROM code and patch version (also known as OS version). Bytes 11 and 13 are field separators.

The parts of the Global Reference data have the following meaning:
- OS identifier: SOMA (ASCII codes 53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h)
- IC identifier: 801NXP (ASCII codes 38h 30h 31h 4Eh 58h 50h)
- ROM code version: 1 (ASCII code 31h)
- Patch version: 0 (ASCII code 30h)

Application Note 1:   *The OS version is composed of a major version number, indicating the ROM code version, and of a minor version number, indicating the patch version. The major version number and the minor version number are separated by the character "_" (underscore, ASCII code 5Fh). A minor version number 0 (ASCII code 30h) indicates that no patch is loaded.*

1.4 TOE overview

1.4.1   TOE Definition

The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit of MRTD programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [R14] and providing Basic Access Control, according to Doc 9303 [R14], and Extended Access Control as defined in the technical guideline BSI TR-03110 [R7].

On account of its composite nature, the TOE evaluation builds on the evaluation of the integrated circuit.

The chip is equipped with an operating system and with a software application providing the passport features. The TOE adds security features to an ordinary passport booklet. Cryptographic techniques are applied to confirm the identity of the holder and to verify the authenticity of the passport.

The TOE is connected to an antenna for wireless communication. Both the TOE and the antenna are embedded in a paper or plastic substrate, that provides mechanical support and protection. The resulting device (TOE, antenna and substrate), is called "inlay" as it is intended to be inserted in a passport booklet (see section 1.4.3.2).

Once personalized with the data of the legitimate holder and with security data, the e-Passport can be inspected by authorized agents.

The product provides a number of security features to prevent forgery, tampering and data leakage. Such features include:

- User authentication based on 112 bit symmetric key cryptography to protect the overall content of the passport
- Additional user authentication based on up to 2048 bit asymmetric key cryptography to protect sensitive biometric data such as fingerprints and iris image.
- Sophisticated on-chip sensors to detect physical attacks
- Memory management unit to prevent improper usage of memory and unauthorized code execution.
- Encrypted communications between the passport and the Inspection System

In the operational use, the integrated circuit, along with its OS and application, provides the following authentication mechanisms:

- Basic Access Control, according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [R14]
- Extended Access Control, implemented combining the Chip Authentication protocol with the Terminal Authentication protocol, as defined in the BSI TR-03110 technical guideline [R7]

The TOE is comprised of:

- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip NXP P5CD081,
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (SOMA801NXP Operating System),
- the MRTD application and
- the associated guidance documentation.

1.4.2   TOE Usage and security features for operational use

A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity.

The MRTD in context of this protection profile contains
  i.   visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
  ii. a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
  iii. data elements on the MRTD's chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading.

The authentication of the traveler is based on:
- the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for the traveler with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and
- biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD chip.

The Issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving state trusts a genuine MRTD of an Issuing State or Organization.

For this security target the MRTD is viewed as the unit of:
- the **physical MRTD** as travel document in the form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder:
    i.   the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport booklet,
    ii. the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ),
    iii. the printed portrait
- the **logical MRTD** as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [R12] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder:
    i.   the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
    ii. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
    iii. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both[1];
    iv. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG14, EF.DG16)
    v.   the Document security object (SO_D),
    vi. security data objects required for product management.

The Issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD's chip are uniquely identified by the Document Number.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD's chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [R14]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD's chip to the passport book.

The logical MRTD delivered by the IC Manufacturer is protected by a mutual authentication mechanism based on symmetric cryptography until   completion of the

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[1] These biometric reference data are optional according to [R8]. This ST assumes that the issuing State or Organization uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.

initialization and pre-personalization processes. After completion the authentication keys are disabled.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

The ICAO defines the baseline required security methods Passive Authentication and the following optional advanced security methods:
- Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD,
- Active Authentication of the MRTD's chip,
- Extended Access Control to and
- the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as an optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [R14].

The Passive Authentication and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.

This security target does not address the Active Authentication and the Extended Access Control as optional security mechanisms.

This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD:
  i.   in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means and
  ii. in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism.

The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE. The inspection system:
  i.   reads optically the MRTD,
  ii. authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document Basic Access Keys.

After successful authentication of the inspection system, the MRTD chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [R14], normative appendix 5.

1.4.3   TOE Life-cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of four life cycle phases:
  1. <u>Development</u>, composed of (i) the development of the operating system software by the Embedded Software Developer and (ii) the development of the integrated circuit by the IC Manufacturer
  2. <u>Manufacturing</u>, composed of (i) the fabrication of the integrated circuit by the IC Manufacturer, (ii) the embedding of the chip in an inlay with an antenna, (iii) the completion of the operating system, (iv) the initialization and pre-personalization of the MRTD
  3. <u>Personalization</u>
  4. <u>Operational Use</u>

Application Note 2:   *The entire Development phase, as well as step (i) "fabrication of the integrated circuit" of the Manufacturing phase are the only phases covered by the*

assurance class ALC, as during these phases the TOE is under construction in a protected environment. All other phases are covered by assurance class AGD and in these phases the TOE is self-protected.

In Figure 1-1 activities (represented as rounded rectangles) and deliveries (represented as arrows) printed orange are secured by the environment and are covered by assurance class ALC. The activities and deliveries printed white refer to phases covered by assurance class AGD, in which the TOE is self-protected.

Figure 1-1   TOE life-cycle

Phase 1 – Development

Embedded software development

IC design and dedicated software development

Integration

Mask fabrication

Gep

NXP

Phase 2 - Manufacturing

IC manufacturing

TOE Delivery

Inlay Manufacturing

Assembling of the book

Pre-personalization

MRTD Manufacturer

Phase 3 - Personalization

Personalization

Personalization Agent

Phase 4 – Operational Use

Operational use

End of life

MRTD Holder

Table 1-3 identifies the roles in each phase of the TOE life cycle.

Table 1-3   Roles Identification

Phase	Role	Identification
1	IC Developer	NXP Semiconductors
1	Embedded Software Developer	Gep S.p.A.
2	IC Manufacturer	NXP Semiconductors
2	MRTD Manufacturer	the agent who is acting on the behalf of the Issuing State or Organization to assemble the passport book embedding the TOE, and to pre-personalize the MRTD
3	Personalization Agent	the agent who is acting on the behalf of the Issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder
4	MRTD Holder	The rightful owner of the MRTD

1.4.3.1   Phase 1   "Development"
Step1 "IC Development"
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

Step2 "Embedded Software Development"
The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

The manufacturing documentation of the IC, including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD Manufacturer.

1.4.3.2   Phase 2   "Manufacturing"
Step3 "IC Manufacturing"
In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD's chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC Manufacturer:
- (i)   writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD Manufacturer.
- (ii)   Creates the MRTD application

Application Note 3: *Creation of the application implies the creation of MF and ICAO.DF*

The IC is securely delivered from the IC Manufacturer to the MRTD Manufacturer.

If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). Patches, if any, are loaded in this step.

Step4 "MRTD Manufacturing – Assembling of the book"
The MRTD Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface, and embeds the inlay in the passport book.

Step5 "MRTD Manufacturing – Pre-Personalization"
The MRTD Manufacturer equips MRTD's chips with pre-personalization Data.

The pre-personalized MRTD, together with the IC Identifier, is securely delivered from the MRTD Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.

1.4.3.3   Phase 3   "Personalization of the MRTD"
Step6 "Personalization"
The personalization of the MRTD includes:
- (i)   the survey of the MRTD holder's biographical data,
- (ii)   the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
- (iii)   the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
- (iv)   the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and
- (v)   configuration of the TSF, if necessary.

The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of
- (i)   the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
- (ii)   the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and
- (iii)   the Document security object.

The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer[R14] finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.

Application Note 4: *The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE; cf. [R8], section 92) comprise (but are not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key(s) and the Basic Access Control Key.*

Application Note 5: *This ST distinguishes between the Personalization Agent as an entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as an entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document security object as described in [R14]. This approach allows, but*

does not enforce, the separation of these roles. The selection of the authentication keys should consider the organization, the productivity and the security of the personalization process. Asymmetric authentication keys provide comfortable security for distributed personalization, but their use may be more time consuming than authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives. Authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives allows for fast authentication protocols appropriate for centralized personalization schemes but relies on stronger security protection in the personalization environment.

1.4.3.4   Phase 4   "Operational Use"

The TOE is used as MRTD's chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the "Operational Use" phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State, but they can never be modified.

Application Note 6:   *The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add (not to modify) data in the other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 "Operational Use". This will imply an update of the Document Security Object including the re-signing by the Document Signer.*

Application Note 7:   *This ST considers the phases 1 and parts of phase 2 (i.e. Step1 to Step3) as part of the evaluation and therefore defines the TOE delivery according to CC after this phase. Since specific production steps of phase 2 are of minor security relevance (e. g. booklet manufacturing and antenna integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation under ALC. The national body of the issuing State or Organization is responsible for these specific production steps. Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing State or Organization. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the "Operational Use" (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class.*

1.4.4   Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE

There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.

1.5 TOE Description

1.5.1   Physical scope of the TOE

The physical TOE is comprised of the following:
- the integrated circuit chip NXP P5CD081 (microcontroller) programmed with the operating system and with the ICAO passport application.

The chip received a Common Criteria certification at the assurance level EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2 [R1][R2] [R25], with certification ID:

<div align="center">BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009</div>

The certified version of the IC is the revision V1A.
The platform's certificate is valid and up-to-date.

1.5.2   Other non-TOE physical components

Figure 1-2 shows a picture of the inlay components, distinguishing between TOE components and non-TOE components.
The antenna and the substrate of the inlay <u>are not part</u> of the TOE.

<div align="center">**Figure 1-2   Inlay components**</div>

1.5.3   Logical scope of the TOE

The logical part of the TOE comprises the following software components stored in the non-volatile memory units of the microcontroller:
- operating system
- file system
- MRTD application
- security data objects

The SOMA801NXP operating system manages all the resources of the integrated circuit that equips the passport, providing secure access to data and functions. Major tasks performed by the operating system are:
- Communication between internal objects
- Communication with external devices
- Data storage in the file system
- Execution of commands

- Cryptographic operations
- Management of the security policies

The operating system has a flexible modular structure and a layered architecture providing:
- full support of the ICAO MRTD application
- Basic Access Control
- Extended Access Control
- secure support of various types of applications
- secure management of functions and data

The file system contains security data objects and the MRTD application.

Before the initialization, access to IC's resources is protected by a symmetric cryptographic mechanism requiring a mutual authentication between the Initialization System and the e-Passport.

The IC Manufacturer stores identification data and the MRTD Manufacturer keys.

In the pre-personalization phase, the MRTD Manufacturer stores the Personalization Agent keys, as well as keys and data required by the authentication mechanisms used in the subsequent phases.

In the personalization phase, the Personalization Agent stores the ICAO application data, the BAC keys and other data required by the authentication mechanisms used in the operational use phase.

Once the passport is in the Operational state, no data can be deleted or modified, except for the current date, the trustpoint and the EF.CVCA file, which can also be modified.

2. Conformance claims

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance

This Security Target claims conformance to:

- Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3, International English Version [R8][R9][R10], as follows:
  - Part 2 (security functional requirements) extended
  - Part 3 (security assurance requirements) conformant

The software part of the TOE runs on the chip NXP Semiconductors P5CD081.
This integrated circuit is certified against Common Criteria at the assurance level EAL5+ [R1][R2][R25].

2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

This ST claims strict conformance to:

- BSI-CC-PP-0055 Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control version 1.10 25th March, 2009 [R6].

2.3 Package Conformance

This Security Target claims conformance to:

- EAL4 assurance package augmented with ALC_DVS.2 defined in CC part 3 [R10]

2.4 Conformance Rationale

The parts of the TOE listed in the Protection Profile [R6] correspond to the ones listed in section 1.4 of this ST.

In this ST, the TOE will be delivered from the IC Manufacturer to the MRTD Manufacturer after Step3 "IC Manufacturing" of Phase 2, as a chip, in accordance with Application Note 5 of the PP [R5]. At TOE delivery, there is no user data or machine readable data available. The EF.DG14 file, containing part of the user data, is written by the MRTD Manufacturer in Step5 "MRTD Manufacturing – Pre-Personalization" of Phase 2. The remaining user data as well as applicative files are written by the Personalization Agent, during Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD".

The security problem definition of this ST is taken from the one in the PP with the following modifications:

- New subjects "Initialization and Pre-personalization Terminal" and "Personalization Terminal" have been added as a specialization of the "Terminal" subject from the PP. The introduction of these subjects does not lower security as a 112 bit Triple-DES mutual authentication mechanism is required.
- Some security objectives for the TOE have been modified in a more restrictive way with respect to the PP, as showed in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1   Modified security objectives

Security Objective	Definition	Operation
OT.AC_Pers	Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD.	Modified in a more restrictive way as data addition is not allowed at all after personalization
OT.Identification	Identification and Authentication of the TOE	Modified in a more restrictive way as access to TOE identification data in Phase 4 is restricted to a BAC authenticated Inspection System only (the Personalization Agent cannot access identification data after personalization).

The functional requirements described in section 6 of this ST correspond to the ones in section 5 of the PP [R6].
Table 2-2 shows assignment changes or refinements/iterations/additions with respect to the PP security functional requirements for the TOE. These changes do not lower the TOE security and, in some cases, changed requirements are more restrictive than the ones from the PP.

Table 2-2   SFRs assignment changes, refinements, iterations and additions

Security Functional Requirement	Operation
Addition: FCS_CKM.1/CPS Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Personalization Keys by the TOE	Iteration that specifies the generation of the session keys for the MRTD Manufacturer and for the Personalization Agent.
Change: FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE	Due to the addition of FCS_CKM.1/CPS, an iteration label "BAC" has been added to this SFR to distinguish the generation of the Document BAC keys.
Addition: FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE Management of TSF data – additional TSF data write	Iteration that specifies additional TSF data written in personalization
Change: FIA_UAU.4 single use authentication mechanisms – single use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE	This SFR now also relates to the MRTD Manufacturer Authentication (cf. Application Note 34:).
Change: FIA_UAU.5 multiple authentication mechanisms	the MRTD Manufacturer has been added as a user allowed to authenticate to the passport.
Change: FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	This SFR has been modified in a more restrictive way with respect to the PP since access conditions to initialization and pre-personalization data cannot be modified after Phase 2 "Manufacturing".
Change: FMT_SMR.1.1	This SFR has been modified to distinguish the roles IC Manufactuer and MRTD Manufacturer.

3. Security Problem Definition

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Assets

The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD's chip.

Logical MRTD sensitive User Data

The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R14]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.

Due to interoperability reasons, as the ICAO Doc 9303 [R14] requires that Basic Inspection Systems must have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16, the TOE described in this security target specifies only the BAC mechanism with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to
- Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
- Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
- Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
- Common Data in EF:COM.

Application Note 8:   *EF.DG15 is not present in the list of the assets because the SOMA801NXP operating system does not support Active Authentication which, therefore, is not addressed by this security target. As an alternative to Active Authentication the SOMA801NXP operating system provides the Chip Authentication mechanism (cf. [R13]).*

The TOE prevents read access to sensitive USER Data
- Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).

A sensitive asset is the following more general one.

Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD's holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.

3.1.2 Subjects

This security target considers the following subjects:

- **Manufacturer**: The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD's chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing.

- **Personalization Agent**: The agent who is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all the following activities:
  - i. establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD,
  - ii. enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s),
  - iii. writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability,
  - iv. writing the initial TSF data and
  - v. signing the Document Security Object (SO_D) as defined in the ICAO Doc 9303 [R14].

- **Terminal**: A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.

- **Inspection system (IS)**: A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) in examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.

  The **Basic Inspection System** (BIS):
  - i. contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD's chip,
  - ii. implements the terminals part of the BAC Mechanism and
  - iii. gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the BAC by optically reading the printed data in the MRZ or other parts of the passport book providing this information.

  The **General Inspection System** (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.

  The **Extended Inspection System** (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System
  - i. implements the Terminal Authentication protocol and
  - ii. is authorized by the Issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.

  The security attributes of the EIS are defined by the Inspection System Certificates.

Application Note 9: *This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Chip Authentication and the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.*

- **MRTD Holder**: The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

- **Traveler**: A person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

- **Attacker**: A threat agent trying:

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    i.   To identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD's chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data),

    ii.   To read or manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or

    iii.   To forge a genuine MRTD

Application Note 10: *An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore, the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.*

- **Pre-personalization Terminal (PPT)**: A system used by the MRTD Manufacturer to perform TOE pre-personalization in phase 2; it allows to write user and TSF data in the logical MRTD, by implementing the terminals part of a pre-personalization process (described in the guidance documentation), using a secure messaging mechanism with diversified keys.

- **Personalization Terminal (PT)**: A terminal used by the Personalization Agent to perform TOE personalization and configuration in phase 3; it allows to write user and TSF data in the logical MRTD, by implementing the terminals part of a personalization process (described in the guidance documentation), using a secure messaging mechanism with diversified keys.

Application Note 11: *The new subjects "Initialization and Pre-personalization Terminal" and "Personalization Terminal" are a specialization of the "Terminal" subject from the PP. The introduction of these subjects does not impact on the security of the TOE, since they are required to establish a mutual authentication based on 112 bit Triple-DES cryptography and the respective authentication keys are destroyed at the completion of phase 2 (Initialization and Pre-personalization Terminal) and phase 3 (Personalization Terminal).*

3.2 Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

- **A.MRTD_Manufact   MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6**

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft of unauthorized use).

- **A.MRTD_Delivery   MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6**

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:

☐ Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.

☐ Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.

☐ Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

- **A.Pers_Agent   Personalization of the MRTD's chip**

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of:
  i. the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
  ii. the Document BAC Keys,
  iii. the Chip Authentication Public Key Info (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip and
  iv. the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (is dtored on the MRTD's chip).

The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

- **A.Insp_Sys   Inspection Systems for global interoperability**

The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State
  i. examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
  ii. verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.

The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
  i. includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
  ii. implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R14].

The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.

Application Note 12: *According to [R14] the support of Passive Authentication mechanism is mandatory whereas the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST does not address Primary Inspection Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory within this ST.*

- **A.BAC-Keys   Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys**

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R14], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

Application Note 13: *When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.*

3.3 Threats

This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.

The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.

- **T.Chip_ID   Identification of MRTD's chip**

Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD's chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: Anonimity of user

- **T.Skimming   Skimming the logical MRTD**

Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data

- **T.Eavesdropping   Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system**

Adverse action: An attacker is listening communication between the MRTD's chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data

- **T.Forgery   Forgery of data on MRTD's chip**

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder's

identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into an other MTRD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data

The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.

- **T.Abuse-Func   Abuse of Functionality**

Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order:
  - i. to manipulate User Data,
  - ii. to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or
  - iii. to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.

This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF

- **T.Information_Leakage   Information Leakage from MRTD's chip**

Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency,

or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality logical MRTD and TSF data

- **T.Phys_Tamper   Physical Tampering**

Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order:
     i.   to disclose TSF Data, or
    ii.   to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to:
     i.   modify security features or functions of the MRTD's chip,
    ii.   modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software,
   iii.   modify User Data or
   iv.   modify TSF data.

The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF

- **T.Malfunction   Malfunction due to Environmental Stress**

Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to:
  i. deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
  ii. circumvent or deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF

3.4 Organizational Security Policies

The TOE shall comply to the following organization security policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2 [R8]).

- **P.Manufact   Manufacturing of the MRTD's chip**

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely, to set the initial configuration and to create the MRTD application.
The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-Personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent key.

- **P.Personalization   Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only**

The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the Issuing State or Organization only.

- **P.Personal_Data   Personal data protection policy**

The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD's chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)₃ and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD's chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD's chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R14].

Application Note 14: *The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R14]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.*

4. Security Objectives

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

- **OT.AC_Pers**   **Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD**

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [R12] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and can not be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.

Application Note 15:   *The OT.AC_Pers implies that*

(1) *The data of the LDS groups written during personalization for the MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) cannot be changed by write access after personalization,*

(2) *The Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the "Operational Use" phase is not provided.*

- **OT.Data_Int**   **Integrity of personal data**

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.

- **OT.Data_Conf**   **Confidentiality of personal data**

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key.

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.

Application Note 16:   *The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD's chip shall provide read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ data's entropy. Any attack based on decision of the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R14] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful Enhanced Access Control not covered by this protection profile. Thus the read access must be prevented even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.*

- **OT.Identification   Identification and Authentication of the TOE**

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing the Personalization Agent Key(s). In phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identifiy itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System.

Application Note 17:   *The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 "Manufacturing" into the Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE is identified by the Document Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.*

The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD's chip independent on the TOE environment.

- **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func   Protection against Abuse of Functionality**

After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to:
  i.   disclose critical User Data,
  ii.   manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software,
  iii.   manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or

iv.   bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

- **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak   Protection against Information Leakage**

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip
  - by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
  - by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
  - by a physical manipulation of the TOE.

Application Note 18:   *This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.*

- **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper   Protection against Physical Tampering**

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential by means of
  - measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
  - measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis),
  - manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as,
  - controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF, Data)

  with a prior

  - reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

- **OT.Prot_Malfunction   Protection against Malfunctions**

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

Application Note 19:   *A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation*

(refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

Issuing State or Organization

The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

- **OE.MRTD_Manufact**   **Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing**

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.

- **OE.MRTD_Delivery**   **Protection of the MRTD delivery**

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:
- non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- identification of the element under delivery,
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
- physical protection to prevent external damage,
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE's),
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
  - o origin and shipment details,
  - o reception, reception acknowledgement,
  - o location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.

Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

- **OE.Personalization**   **Personalization of logical MRTD**

The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization
- i.   establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,

   ii.   enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and

   iii.   personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

- **OE.Pass_Auth_Sign**   **Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature**

The issuing State or Organization must:
   i.   generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair,

   ii.   ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment and

   iii.   distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.

The issuing State or Organization must:
   i.   generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys,

   ii.   sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only, and

   iii.   distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations.

The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R14].

- **OE.BAC-Keys**   **Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys**

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [6] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

Receiving State or Organization

The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

- **OE.Exam_MRTD**   **Examination of the MRTD passport book**

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
   i.   includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and

ii.   implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R14].

- **OE.Passive_Auth_Verif**   **Verification by Passive Authentication**

The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of the Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The Receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

- **OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD**   **Protection of data from the logical MRTD**

The inspection system of the Receiving State ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basci Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).

4.3 Security Objective Rationale

Table 4-1 provides an overview for security objectives coverage.

Table 4-1 Security Objective Rationale

	OT.AC_Pers	OT.Data_Int	OT.Data_Conf	OT.Identification	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction	OE.MRTD_Manufact	OE.MRTD_Delivery	OE.Personalization	OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	OE.BAC-Keys	OE.Exam_MRTD	OE.Passive_Auth_Verif	OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip-ID				x									x			
T.Skimming			x										x			
T.Eavesdropping			x													
T.Forgery	x	x					x					x		x	x	
T.Abuse-Func					x						x					
T.Information_Leakage						x										
T.Phys-Tamper							x									
T.Malfunction								x								
P.Manufact				x												
P.Personalization	x			x							x					
P.Personal_Data		x	x													
A.MRTD_Manufact									x							
A.MRTD_Delivery										x						
A.Pers_Agent											x					
A.Insp_Sys														x		x
A.BAC_Keys													x			

The OSP **P.Manufact** "Manufacturing of the MRTD's chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by **OT.Identification**.

The OSP **P.Personalization** "Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only" addresses the
  i.   the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalization** "Personalization of logical MRTD", and
  ii. the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective **OT.AC_Pers** "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD".

Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to **OT.Identification** "Identification and Authentication of the TOE". The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.

The OSP **P.Personal_Data** "Personal data protection policy" requires the TOE

(i)   to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control and

(ii)   enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization.

This policy is implemented by the security objectives **OT.Data_Int** "Integrity of personal data" describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective **OT.Data_Conf** "Confidentiality of personal data" describes the protection of the confidentiality.

The threat **T.Chip_ID** "Identification of MRTD's chip" addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD's chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective **OT.Identification** by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment **OE.BAC-Keys**.

The threat **T.Skimming** "Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait" and **T.Eavesdropping** "Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system" address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRTD's chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective **OT.Data_Conf** "Confidentiality of personal data" through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment **OE.BAC-Keys**.

The threat **T.Forgery** "Forgery of data on MRTD's chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective **OT.Data_Int** "Integrity of personal data" and **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to **OE.Exam_MRTD** "Examination of the MRTD passport book" shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to **OE.Pass_Auth_Sign** "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to **OE.Passive_Auth_Verif** "Verification by Passive Authentication".

The threat **T.Abuse-Func** "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks using the MRTD's chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func** "Protection against Abuse of Functionality". Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: **OE.Personalization** "Personalization of logical MRTD" ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.

The threats **T.Information_Leakage** "Information Leakage from MRTD's chip", **T.Phys-Tamper** "Physical Tampering" and **T.Malfunction** "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high

attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak** "Protection against Information Leakage", **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering" and **OT.Prot_Malfunction** "Protection against Malfunctions".

The assumption **A.MRTD_Manufact** "MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.MRTD_Manufact** "Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing" that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.

The assumption **A.MRTD_Delivery** "MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.MRTD_ Delivery** "Protection of the MRTD delivery" that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.

The assumption **A.Pers_Agent** "Personalization of the MRTD's chip" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalization** "Personalization of logical MRTD" including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.

The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption **A.Insp_Sys** "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Exam_MRTD** "Examination of the MRTD passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD** "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.

The assumption **A.BAC-Keys** "Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys" is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.BAC-Keys** "Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys" ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.

5. Extended Components Definition

This ST uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2 [R9]. Some of these components are defined in [R4], other components are defined in the protection profile [R5].

5.1 Definition of the family FAU_SAS

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined in the PP [R5]. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

The family "Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)" is specified in the following table.

Table 5-1   Family FAU_SAS

FAU_SAS Audit data storage	
Family behavior:	This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling:	FAU_SAS Audit data storage —— 1
FAU_SAS.1	Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit	There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1	**Audit storage**
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No Dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1	The TSF shall provide [assignment: *authorized users*] with the capability to store [assignment: *list of audit information*] in the audit records.

5.2 Definition of the family FCS_RND

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined in the PP [R6]. This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.

The family "Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)" is specified in the following table.

Table 5-2   Family FCS_RND

FCS_RND Generation of random numbers	
Family behavior:	This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:	FCS_RND Generation of random numbers — 1
FCS_RND.1	Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
Management:	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1	**Quality metric for random numbers**
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No Dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1	The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

5.3 Definition of the family FMT_LIM

The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.

The family "Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)" is specified as follows.

Table 5-3   Family FMT_LIM

FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability	
Family behavior:	This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:	FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability 1 2
FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
Management:	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE's life-cycle.
Management:	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	There are no actions defined to be auditable.

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.

The TOE Functional Requirement "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" is specified as follows.

FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

The TOE Functional Requirement "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" is specified as follows.

FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

Application Note 20:   *the functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that*

- *the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced*

or conversely

- *the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.*

The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.

5.4 Definition of the family FPT_EMSEC

The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined in the PP [R6] to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [R9].

The family "TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)" is specified as follows.

Table 5-4   Family FPT_EMSEC

FPT_EMSEC	
Family behavior.	This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:	┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌─────┐ │ FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation │───│ 1 │ └─────────────────────────┘ └─────┘
FPT_EMSEC.1	TOE emanation has two constituents: • FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data. • FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management:	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1	**TOE Emanation**
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1	The TOE shall not emit [assignment: *types of emissions*] in excess of [assignment: *specified limits*] enabling access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2	The TSF shall ensure [assignment: *type of users*] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: *type of connection*] to gain access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: *list of types of user data*].

6. Security Requirements

The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; *refinement*, *selection*, *assignment*, and *iteration* are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [R8] of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this PP.

The **refinement** operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word "refinement" in bold text and the added/changed words are in **bold text**. In cases where words from a CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.

The **selection** operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a selection is to be made, [selection:], and are *italicized*.

The **assignment** operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are *italicized*. In some cases the assignment made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST author. Thus this text is underlined and italicized like *this*.

The **iteration** operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is denoted by showing a slash "/", and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.

The definition of the subjects "Manufacturer", "Personalization Agent", "Basic Inspection System" and "Terminal" used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in section 7 or in the following table. The operations "write", "modify", "read" and "disable read access" are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations "transmit", "receive" and "authenticate" are originally taken from [R9].

6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main security functionality.

6.1.1   Class FAU Security Audit

6.1.1.1   FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
The TOE shall meet the requirement "Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

Hierarchical to:	No other components.

Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FAU_SAS.1.1	The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer[2] with the capability to store the IC Identification Data[3] in the audit records.

Application Note 21:   *The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer in the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD's chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).*

6.1.2   Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)

6.1.2.1   FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
The TOE shall meet the requirement "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" as specified below (CC part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.

6.1.2.2   FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Key by the TOE

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm[4] and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit[5], that meet the following: [R14], normative appendix 5[6].

Application Note 22:   *The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control*

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[2] [assignment: *authorised user*]
[3] [assignment: *list of audit information*]
[4] [assignment: *cryptographic key generation algorithm*]
[5] [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]
[6] [assignment: *list of standards*]

Authentication Protocol described in [R14], normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [R14], Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.

6.1.2.3   FCS_CKM.1/CPS Cryptographic key generation – Generation of CPS session Keys for Pre-personalization and Personalization by the TOE

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1/ CPS	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **CPS Keys Generation Algorithm**[7] and specified cryptographic key sizes **112 bit**[8] that meet following:, **[R12], section 5.2**[9]

6.1.2.4   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TOE shall meet the requirement "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method: **physical deletion by overwriting the memory data with zeros**[10] that meets the following: **none**[11].

Application Note 23:   *The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging.*

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[7] [assignment: *cryptographic key generation algorithm*]
[8] [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*
[9] [assignment: *list of standards*]
[10] [assignment: *cryptographic key destruction method*]
[11] [assignment: *list of standards*]

6.1.2.5   FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)" as specified below (CC part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.

FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
                            FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
                            FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
                            FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA	The TSF shall perform hashing[12] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **SHA-1, SHA-256**[13] and cryptographic key sizes none[14] that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [R24][15].

Application Note 24:   *This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4) according to [R14]*

FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption/Decryption Triple DES

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
                            FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
                            FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
                            FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/ ENC	The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption[16] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode[17] and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit[18] that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [R23] and [R14]; normative appendix 5, A5.3[19].

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[12] [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]
[13] [selection: *SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256 or other approved algorithms*]
[14] [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]
[15] [selection: *FISP 180-2 or other approved standards*]
[16] [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]
[17] [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]
[18] [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]
[19] [assignment: *list of standards*]

Application Note 25: *This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive Triple-DES for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.*

FCS_COP.1/AUTH   Cryptographic operation – Authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH	The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption[20] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **Triple-DES**[21] and cryptographic key sizes: 112 bit [22] that meet the following: FIPS 46-3[23]

Application Note 26: *This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).*

FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/ MAC	The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code[24] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC[25] and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit[26] that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) [R18][27].

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[20] [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]
[21] [selection: *Triple-DES, AES*]
[22] [selection: 112, 128, 168, 19, 256]
[23] [selection: FIPS 46-3, FIPS 197]
[24] [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*]
[25] [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*]
[26] [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*]
[27] [assignment: listo f standards]03

Application Note 27: *This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.*

6.1.2.6 FCS_RND.1 Quality metrics for random numbers

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)" as specified below (CC part 2 extended).

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS_RND.1.1	The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet **BSI AIS-31 functionality class P2 [R3] (see Application Note 29:)** [28].

Application Note 28: *This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.*

Application Note 29: *The TOE makes use of the true random number generator of the IC P5CD081, which has already been evaluated as conformant to AIS31.*

6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication

Application Note 30: *Table 6-1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.*

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[28] [assignment: *a defined quality metric*]

Table 6-1 – Overview on authentication SFR

Mechanism	SFR for the TOE	Algorithms and key sizes according to [R14], normative appendix 5, and [R7]
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism	FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.6	Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents and for MRTD Manufacturers	FIA_UAU.4	Triple-DES with 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH)

6.1.3.1   FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UID.1.1	The TSF shall allow 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing" 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD" 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"[29] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application Note 31:   *The IC manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the Phase 2 "Manufacturing". The audit records can be written only in the Phase 2 Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD Manufacturer may create the user role Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The users in role Personalization Agent identify by themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after power*

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[29] [assignment: *list of TSF-mediated actions*]

up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.

Application Note 32:   *In the "Operational Use" phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD's chip use a randomly chosen identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more then one RFID.*

6.1.3.2   FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria part 2).

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

   Hierarchical to: No other components.

   Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FIA_UAU.1.1	The TSF shall allow 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing", 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD" 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"[30]. on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application Note 33:   *The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves.*

6.1.3.3   FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

The TOE shall meet the requirements of "Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE

   Hierarchical to: No other components.

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[30] [assignment: *list of TSF-mediated actions*]

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UAU.4.1	The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
	1. <u>Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,</u>
	2. <u>Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES</u>[31].

Application Note 34: *The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalization Agent and of MRTD Manufacturer may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.*

Application Note 35: *The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism defined in [6]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD's chip and the MRTD's chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD's chip provides the terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD's chip with some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.*

6.1.3.4   FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UAU.5.1	The TSF shall provide
	1. <u>Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,</u>
	2. <u>Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES</u>[32]
	<u>to support user authentication.</u>
FIA_UAU.5.2	The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the <u>following rules:</u>
	1. **the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as MRTD Manufacturer by one of the following mechanisms: the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with MRTD**

---

[31] [selecion: *Triple-DES, AES or aother approved algorithms*]
[32] [selection: *Triple-DES, AES*]

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>

<u>**Manufacturer Keys,**</u>

2.   <u>the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanisms: the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,</u>

3.   <u>The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys[33]</u>
</td></tr>
</table>

Application Note 36:   *The MRTD Manufacturer authentication uses a key diversification algorithm based on data randomly chosen by the card.*

Application Note 37:   *The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.*

6.1.3.5   FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UAU.6.1	The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions <u>each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism[34]</u>.

Application Note 38:   *The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [R14] includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-*

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[33] [assignment: *rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication*]
[34] [assignment: *list of conditions under which re-authentication is required*]

authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.

Application Note 39: *Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [R6] the BAC communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication but are protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more advanced authentication process.*

6.1.3.6   FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when **a defined number of consecutive**[35] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **the authentication events specified in column 1 of Table 6-2**[36]. [37]
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **met**[38], the TSF shall **perform the actions specified in column 2 of Table 6-2**[39].

Refinement: refer to Table 6-2.

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[35] [assignment: positive integer number]
[36] [assignment: list of authentication events]
[37] [selection: *[assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]*]
[38] [selection: *met, surpassed*]
[39] [assignment: *list of actions*]

Table 6-2   FIA_AFL.1 Refinement

| Column 1
Assignment:
Authentication Events | Column 2
Assignment:
Actions |
|---|---|
| Unsuccessful BAC authentication | The outcome of the authentication is issued with a delay, in order to prevent brute-force attacks. |
| Unsuccessful MAC verification after BAC authentication | Session closed |
| Unsuccessful mutual authentication with MRTD Manufacturer keys | MRTD Manufacturer keys blocked |
| Unsuccessful mutual authentication with Personalization Agent keys | Personalization Agent keys blocked |

6.1.4   Class FDP User Data Protection

6.1.4.1   FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria part 2).

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Basic Access Control SFP</u>[40] on <u>terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to **EF.DG14, EF.DG16** of the logical MRTD</u>[41].

Application Note 40:   *Access to EF.DG15 is not listed in FDP_ACC.1.1 because this ST does not address Active Authentication.*

6.1.4.2   FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control

        Hierarchical to: No other components.

---

[40] [assignment: *access control SFP*]
[41] [assignment: *list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP*]

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP[42] to objects based on the following:
	1. Subjects:
	  a. Personalization Agent,
	  b. Basic Inspection System,
	  c. Terminal.
	
	2. Objects:
	  a. data EF.DG1 to **EF.DG14, EF.DG16** of the logical MRTD,
	  b. data in EF.COM,
	  c. data in EF.SOD.
	
	3. Security attributes:
	  a. authentication status of terminals[43].
	  -

FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to **EF.DG14, EF.DG16** of the logical MRTD, 2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to **EF.DG14, EF.DG16** of the logical MRTD**[44]**.
FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none[45].
FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: 1. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify any of the

---

[42] [assignment: *access control SFP*]

[43] [assignment: *list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes*]

[44] [assignment: *rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations or controlled objects*]

[45] [assignment: *rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects*]

	EF.DG1 to **EF.DG14, EF.DG16** of the logical MRTD 2. Any Terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to **EF.DG14, EF.DG16** of the logical MRTD 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4[46]

Application Note 41: *The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization for read access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this security target (cf. [R13] for details).*

Application Note 42: *Access to EF.DG.15 is not listed in FDP_ACF.1 because this ST does not address Active Authentication.*

Inter-TSF-Transfer

Application Note 43: *FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes after successful authentication of the terminal. The authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include the key agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure messaging.*

6.1.4.3   FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FDP_UCT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP[47] to be able to transmit and receive[48] user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.

---

[46] [assignment: *rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects*]
[47] [assignment: *access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)*]
[48] [selection: *transmit, receive*]

6.1.4.4   FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Basic data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]

FDP_UIT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Basic Access Control SFP</u>[49] to be able to <u>transmit and receive</u>[50] user data in a manner protected from <u>modification, deletion, insertion and replay</u>[51] errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether <u>modification, deletion, insertion and replay</u>[52] has occurred.

6.1.5   Class FMT Security Management

Application Note 44: *The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management of the TSF data.*

6.1.5.1   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria part 2).

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No Dependencies

---

[49] [assignment: *access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)*]
[50] [selection: *transmit, receive*]
[51] [selection: *modification, deletion, insertion, replay*]
[52] [selection: *modification, deletion, insertion, replay*]

FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: 1. <u>Initialization,</u> 2. <u>Pre-Personalization,</u> 3. <u>Personalization</u>[53].

Application Note 45: *The ability to initialize, personalize and configure the TOE is restricted to a successfully authenticated MRTD Manufacturer or Personalization Agent by means of symmetric keys. MRTD Manufacturer Keys are only active in uninitialized products. Personalization Agent Keys are only active in initialized but not personalized products. The MRTD locks out after a programmable number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts. The MRTD Manufacturer Keys are disabled once initialization is complete.*

6.1.5.2   FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles: 1. <u>IC Manufacturer</u> 2. <u>MRTD Manufacturer</u> 3. <u>Personalization Agent</u> 4. <u>Basic Inspection System</u> [54].
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

Application Note 46: *The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.*

6.1.5.3   FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" as specified below (CC part 2 extended).

---

[53] [assignment: *list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF*]
[54] [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.

FMT_LIM.1.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: <u>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:</u> 1. <u>User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,</u> 2. <u>TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,</u> 3. <u>software to be reconstructed and</u> 4. <u>substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks</u>[55].

6.1.5.4   FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" as specified below (CC part 2 extended).

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

FMT_LIM.2.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: <u>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:</u> 1. <u>User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,</u> 2. <u>TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,</u> 3. <u>software to be reconstructed and</u> 4. <u>substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks</u>[56].

Application Note 47:   *The formulation of "Deploying Test Features …" in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.*
Note that the term "software" in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.

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[55] [assignment: *limited capability and availability policy*]
[56] [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*]

6.1.5.5   FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

Application Note 48:   *the following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.*

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)" as specified below (CC part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data

>   Hierarchical to: No other components.

>   Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
>   FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA	The TSF shall restrict the ability to write[57] the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data[58] to the Manufacturer[59].

Application Note 49:   *the pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent, which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Authentication Key.*

Application Note 50:   *Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer and Pre-personalization Data are written by the MRTD Manufacturer, according to the description given in section 1.5.3.*

FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data

>   Hierarchical to: No other components.

>   Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
>   FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS	The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to[60] the Initialization Data[61] to **the IC Manufacturer and to the IC Manufacturer**[62].

---

[57] [selection: *change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]*]
[58] [assignment: *list of TSF data*]
[59] [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]
[60] [selection: *change_default, query, modify, dolete, clear, [assignment: other operations]*]
[61] [assignment: *list of TSF data*]

Application Note 51: *After Phase 2 "Manufacturing" the read access conditions to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data cannot be modified by anyone. This is a more restrictive requirement than the one defined in the PP.*

Application Note 52: *According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 "Manufacturing". The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by:*
i. allowing to write these data only once and
ii. blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2.

The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides an unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 "personalization" but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 "Operational Use". Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE   Management of TSF data – Key Write

    Hierarchical to: No other components.

    Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
                        FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE	The TSF shall restrict the ability to write[63] the Document Basic Access Keys[64] to the Personalization Agent[65].

FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE Management of TSF data – Additional TSF data Write

    Hierarchical to: No other components.

    Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
                        FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MTD.1.1/ ADDTSF_WRITE	The TSF shall restrict the ability to write[66] **the Security Environment object and the Document Number** to the Personalization Agent[67].

---

[62] [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]
[63] [selection: *change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]*]
[64] [assignment: *list of TSF data*]
[65] [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]
[66] [selection: *change_default, query, modify, dolete, clear, [assignment: other operations]*]
[67] [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]

Application Note 53:   *The Security environment object stores links to internal data*

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read

    Hierarchical to: No other components.

    Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
                            FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ	The TSF shall restrict the ability to read[68] the Document Basic Access Keys and the Personalization Agent Keys [69] to none[70].

Application Note 54:   *The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.*

6.1.6   Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions

The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements "Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)" and "TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)" on the one hand and "Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)" on the other. The SFRs "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)", "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" and "Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)" together with the SAR "Security architecture description" (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.

6.1.6.1   FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation

The TOE shall meet the requirement "TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)" as specified below (CC part 2 extended):

FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation

    Hierarchical to: No other components.

    Dependencies: No dependencies.

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[68] [selection: *change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]*]
[69] [assignment: *list of TSF data*]
[70] [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]

FPT_EMSEC.1.1	The TOE shall not emit **electromagnetic and current emissions**[71] in excess of **intelligible threshold**[72] enabling access to Personalization Agent Key[73] and **EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG16**, **EF.SOD**, **EF.COM**[74]
FPT_EMSEC.1.2	The TSF shall ensure any users[75] are unable to use the following interface smart card circuits contacts[76] to gain access to Personalization Agent Keys[77] and **EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG16**, **EF.SOD**, **EF.COM**[78]

Application Note 55:   *The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The MRTD's chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) additional contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. This TOE does not support any contact based communication protocol like ISO/IEC 7816-3. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.*

6.1.6.2   FPT_FLS Failure with preservation of secure state

The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria part 2).

FPT_FLS.1   Failure with preservation of secure state

   Hierarchical to: No other components.

   Dependencies: No dependencies

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[71] [assignment: *type of emissions*]
[72] [assignment: *specified limits*]
[73] [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*]
[74] [assignment: *list of types of user data*]
[75] [assignment: *type of users*]
[76] [assignment: *type of connection*]
[77] [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*]
[78] [assignment: *list of types of user data*]

FPT_FLS.1.1	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: 1. exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur, 2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1[79]

6.1.6.3   FPT_TST.1   TSF testing

The TOE shall meet the requirement "TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria part 2).

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

     Hierarchical to: No other components.

     Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **during initial start-up, and before any use of TSF data**[80] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

6.1.6.4   FPT_PHP.3   Resistance to physical attack

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)" as specified below (CC part 2).

FPT_PHP.3   **Resistance to physical attack**

     Hierarchical to: No other components.

     Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_PHP.3.1	The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing[81] to the TSF[82] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Application Note 56: *The TOE will use appropriate countermeasures implemented by the IC manufacturer to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means*

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[79] [assignment: *list of types of failures in the TSF*]
[80] [selection: *during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which sel test should occur]*]
[81] [assignment: *physical tampering scenarios*]
[82] [assignment: *list of TSF devices/elements*]

detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, "automatic response" means here:

- *assuming that there might be an attack at any time and*
- *countermeasures are provided at any time.*

6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

The components for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the component ALC_DVS.2.

Table 6-3   summarizes the assurance components that define the security assurance requirements for the TOE.

Table 6-3   Assurance requirements at EAL4+

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3
AGD	AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
ALC	ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1
ASE	ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1
ATE	ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
AVA	AVA_VAN.3

6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

6.3.1   Security functional requirements rationale

Table 6-4 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage of security objectives.

Table 6-4   Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR

	OT.AC_Pers	OT.Data_Int	OT.Data_Conf	OT.Identification	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FAU_SAS.1				x				
FCS_CKM.1/BAC	x	x	x					
FCS_CKM.1/CPS	x	x						
FCS_CKM.4	x		x					

FCS_COP.1/SHA	x	x	x				
FCS_COP.1/ENC	x	x	x				
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	x	x					
FCS_COP.1/MAC	x	x	x				
FCS_RND.1	x	x	x				
FIA_UID.1			x	x			
FIA_AFL.1			x	x			
FIA_UAU.1			x	x			
FIA_UAU.4	x	x	x				
FIA_UAU.5	x	x	x				
FIA_UAU.6	x	x	x				
FDP_ACC.1	x	x	x				
FDP_ACF.1	x	x	x				
FDP_UCT.1	x	x	x				
FDP_UIT.1	x	x	x				
FMT_SMF.1	x	x	x				
FMT_SMR.1	x	x	x				
FMT_LIM.1							x
FMT_LIM.2							x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA				x			
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS				x			
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	x	x	x				
FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE	x		x				
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	x	x	x				
FPT_EMSEC.1	x				x		
FPT_TST.1					x		x
FPT_FLS.1	x				x		x
FPT_PHP.3	x				x	x	

The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.

The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [R6] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).

In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.

The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR

FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys. The Personalization Agent handles the security environment object and the document number according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/CPS allows to protect the transmitted data by means secure messaging during the initialization and personalization processes.

The security objective **OT.Data_Int** "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective **OT.Data_Int** "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), FCS_CKM.1/CPS (for the generation of the initialization and personalization keys) and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.

The security objective **OT.Data_Conf** "Confidentiality of personal data" requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and

FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_DATA addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.

Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure messaging.

The security objective **OT.Identification** "Identification and Authentication of the TOE" address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.

Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in Phase 4 "Operational Use". The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt (cf. Application Note 35:). In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.

The security objective **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func** "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.

The security objective **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak** "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip against disclosure:

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.

The security objective **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.

The security objective **OT.Prot_Malfunction** "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by:

  i.   the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code,
  ii.   the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.

6.3.2 Dependency Rationale

The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.

Table 6-5 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.

Table 6-5 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE

SFR	Dependencies	Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/BAC	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_CKM.1/CPS	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Justification 1 for non-satisfied dependencies Fulfilled by FCS_CMK.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Justification 2 for non-satisfied dependencies Justification 2 for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FCS_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.5	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.6	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_AFL.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1 Justification 3 for non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1	[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	Justification 4 for non-satisfied dependencies FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1	[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],	Justification 4 for non-satisfied dependencies

SFR	Dependencies	Support of the Dependencies
	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1	Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	n.a.
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	n.a.

Justifications for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:

Justification 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.

Justification 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.

Justification 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.

Justification 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.

6.3.3   Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.

The TOE assurance level is augmented with respect to the EAL4 package for what refers to development security (ALC_DVS.2 instead of ALC_DVS.1).

The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's development and manufacturing, especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.

The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security requirements.

6.3.4   Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency

The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.

The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal consistency demonstrates:

- The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.

- The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.

Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are functional assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to arise in section 6.3.2 "Dependency Rationale" and 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.

7. TOE Summary Specification

The following sections provide a general understanding of how the TOE is implemented. To facilitate reading, the description of the security features of the TOE is organized in security services. Table 7-2. provides a mapping between SFRs and security services.

7.1 Coverage of SFRs

7.1.1 SS.AG_ID_AUTH   Agents Identification & Authentication

This security service meets the following SFRs:
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_AFL.1.

Access to functions and data of the TOE is only allowed to authenticated users. The authentication mechanism applied depends on the system used for operations. Table 7-1 summarizes the authentication mechanisms for the various systems, later detailed in this section.

Table 7-1   Summary of authentication mechanisms

System type	MRTD Life-Cycle status	Authentication Mechanism
Initialization and Pre-personalization system	Non-Initialized	Symmetric authentication with MRTD Manufacturer Keys
Personalization System	Initialized	Symmetric authentication with Personalization Agent Keys
Basic Inspection System	Operational	BAC with Triple-DES algorithm and 112 byte Document Basic Access Keys

The MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves to the e-Passport by means of a mutual authentication mechanism (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5). The algorithm used for encryption/decryption is a Triple-DES in CBC mode with key sizes 112 bits (FIPS 46-3 and ICAO Doc 9303, normative appendix 5) (FCS_COP.1/ENC) and the message authentication code computation accords to Retail MAC algorithm and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit (ISO 9797 - MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) (FCS_COP.1/MAC).
This function detects each unsuccessful authentication attempt. The MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent have only a limited number of authentication attempts after which the related keys are blocked.
In case of regular termination of the protocol, both parties possess authentic keying materials only known to them. The user may establish a secure messaging session (FCS_CKM.1/CPS) and at the end of the session, the session keys are securely erased (FCS_CKM.4).

The Basic Access System and the MRTD mutually authenticate by means of a Basic Access Control mechanism based on a three pass challenge-response protocol

(FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5). The challenge is the random number sent from one party to the other. This random number will be enciphered with the secret symmetric key by the receiver and then will be verified by the sender. This security service manages the session keys exchanged between the terminal and the TOE and provides the means to identify and authenticate the users in a secure way. The algorithm used for encryption/decryption is a Triple-DES in CBC mode with key sizes 112 bits (FIPS 46-3 and normative appendix 5 of the ICAO Doc 9303 [R14]) (FCS_COP.1/ENC), while the message authentication code is computed according to Retail MAC algorithm and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit (ISO 9797 - MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) (FCS_COP.1/MAC). These authentication keys are derived by the SHA-1 algorithm (FIPS 180-2) like described in the ICAO Doc 9303, normative appendix 5 [R14] [R15(FCS_COP.1/SHA).

After a successful BAC authentication, the Basic Access System is able to read less sensitive data, such as the MRZ, the facial image and other data easily available from other sources.

In the operational use phase, the TOE identification data can be obtained by an authenticated BIS only. A BAC-like mechanism is used for this authentication (FIA_UAU.5).

7.1.2   SS.SEC_MSG   Data exchange with Secure Messaging

This security service meets the following SFRs:
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/CPS, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_CKM.1/ENC, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FIA_UAU.6, FIA_AFL.1.

This security service concerns the creation and the management of a secure communication channel for the sensitive data exchange between the TOE and the Inspection System. On this channel the data will be encrypted and authenticated with session keys (data Triple-DES-encryption and MAC computation) such that the TOE is able to verify the integrity and authenticity of received data. The algorithm used for encryption/decryption is a Triple-DES in CBC mode with key sizes 112 bits (FIPS 46-3 and ICAO Doc 9303, normative appendix 5), while the message authentication code is according to Retail MAC algorithm and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit (ISO 9797 - MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2). The session keys are calculated during the authentication phase. The secure messaging channel will be closed in case of a received message with:

- inconsistent or missing MAC,
- wrong sequence counter,
- plain access.

Session keys are overwritten after usage (FCS_CKM.4).

7.1.3   SS.ACC_CNTRL   Access Control of stored Data Objects

This security service meets the following SFRs:
FAU_SAS.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE, FM, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ

As required in FDP_ACF.1, read and write access to stored data must be controlled in different phases of the production and during operational use.

This security service ensures that the assets (user data and TSF data) can only be accessed as defined by the access right written during the personalization process and allows the access to the TOE identification data in the Personalization phase. Furthermore, the access conditions allow to differentiate the roles based on the knowledge of secret keys. Any access not explicitly allowed is denied.

The Document Basic Access Keys, the Document Number and the Security Environment object will be written during the personalization phase by the Personalization Agent.

After keys have been written any type of direct access to any key is not allowed (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ).

7.1.4   SS.LFC_MNG   Life cycle management
This security service meets the following SFRs:
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1

It ensures that the TOE life cycle status is set in an irreversible way to mark the following phases in the given order: manufacturing, personalization and operational use. The only role allowed to set the life cycle status is the Manufacturer.
The transition between the manufacturing phase and personalization phase is performed disabling the MRTD Manufacturer Keys.

7.1.5   SS.SW_INT_CHECK   Software integrity check of TOE's assets
This security service meets the following SFRs:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_TST.1

The TOE doesn't allow to analyze, debug or modify TOE's software during the operational use. In phase 3 and 4 no commands are allowed to load executable code. Self tests will be executed at initial start-up on ROM area (this functionality is implemented by the underlying hardware).
This security service also checks the integrity of the following assets:
- application files,
- security data objects.

Integrity checks will be executed before any use of TSF data.
This SF warns the entity connected upon detection of an integrity error of the sensitive data stored within the TOE Scope of Control and preserves a secure state when failure is detected by TSF.

7.1.6   SS.SF_HW   Security features provided by the hardware
This security service meets the following SFRs: FCS_RND.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3.

The TOE benefits of a set of features provided by the integrated circuit to enforce security. These security functions have already been evaluated and certified being the chips

already certified; a more detailed formulation of the security functions provided by the chip can be found in the related security target [R25].

Table 7-2 shows a mapping between SFRs and the above security services.

Table 7-2   Mapping between SFRs and TOE security services

	SS.AG_ID_AUTH Agents Identification & Authentication	SS.SEC_MSG Data exchange with Secure Messaging	SS.ACC_CNTRL Access Control of Stored Data Object	SS.LFC_MNG Life Cycle Management	SS.SW_INT_CHECK SW Integrity check of TOE's Assets	SS.SF_HW Security features provided by the hardware
FAU_SAS.1			X			
FCS_CKM.1/BAC		X				
FCS_CKM.1/CPS		X				
FCS_CKM.4	X	X				
FCS_COP.1/SHA		X				
FCS_CKM.1/ENC		X				
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	X	X				
FCS_COP.1/MAC		X				
FCS_RND.1						X
FIA_UID.1	X					
FIA_UAU.1	X					
FIA_UAU.4	X					
FIA_UAU.5	X					
FIA_UAU.6		X				
FIA_AFL.1	X	X				
FDP_ACC.1			X			
FDP_ACF.1			X			
FDP_UCT.1			X			
FDP_UIT.1			X			
FMT_SMF.1			X	X		
FMT_SMR.1			X	X		
FMT_LIM.1			X		X	X
FMT_LIM.2			X		X	X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA			X			
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS			X			
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE			X			
FMT_MTD.1/ADDTSF_WRITE			X			
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ			X			
FPT_EMSEC.1						X
FPT_TST.1					X	X
FPT_FLS.1						X
FPT_PHP.3						X

7.2 Assurance Measures

Assurance measures applied to the TOE are fully compliant to those described in part 3 of the Common Criteria v3.1 [R10].
The implementation is based on a description of the security architecture of the TOE and on an informal high-level and low-level design of the components of the TOE. The

description is sufficient to generate the TOE without other design requirements. These documents, together with the source code of the software, address the ADV_ARC, ADV_FSP, ADV_TDS and ADV_IMP assurance families.

The configuration management plan addresses the ALC_CMC and ALC_CMS assurance families, and enforces good practices to securely manage configuration items including, but not limiting to, design documentation, user documentation, source code, test documentation and test data.
The configuration management process guarantees the separation of the development configuration libraries from the configuration library containing the releases and also supports the generation of the TOE.
All the configuration items are managed with the help of automated tools. In particular configuration items regarding security flaws are managed with the support of an issue tracking system, while all the other configuration items are managed with the help of a version control system.

The software test process, addressing the class ATE, is machine-assisted to guarantee a repeatable error-free execution of the same test chains in both the system test pahase and in the validation phase.

A secure delivery of the TOE is guaranteed by the application of dedicated procedures. The prevention measures, the checks and all the actions to be performed at the developer's site are described in the secure delivery procedure addressing the ALC_DEL assurance family, while the security measures related to delivery to be applied at the user's site are defined in the pre-personalization guidance. The latter document also addresses the assurance family AGD_PRE.

The necessary information for the passport personalization is provided by a dedicated guidance and the information for its usage after delivery to the legitimate holder is provided by the guidance for the operational user. These documents address the AGD_OPE assurance family.

To protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation, the development and production environment and tools conform to the security policies defined in the documentation dedicated to the development security, which addresses the assurance family ALC_DVS.

The life-cycle model adopted in the manufacturing phases and the tools supporting the development and production of the TOE are described in dedicated documents addressing the assurance families ALC_LCD and ALC_TAT.

An independent vulnerability analysis, meeting requirements of the assurance family AVA_VAN, is conducted by a third party.

Due to the composite nature of the evaluation, which is based on the CC evaluation of the hardware, the assurance measures related to the platform (IC) will be covered in documents from the IC Manufacturer. Security procedures described in such documents have been taken into consideration.

Table 7-3 shows the documentation that provides the necessary information related to the assurance requirements defined in this security target.

Table 7-3   Assurance Requirements documentation

Security Assurance Requirements	Documents
ADV_ARC.1	Description of the Security Architecture of the SOMA801NXP embedded software
ADV_FSP.4	Functional Specification for the SOMA801NXP embedded software
ADV_IMP.1	Source code of the SOMA801NXP embedded software
ADV_TDS.3	Description of the Design of the SOMA801NXP embedded software
ADV_COMP.1	Rationale for Embedded Software Design Compliance concerning the composite evaluation of the SOMA801NXP electronic passport.
AGD_OPE.1	Personalization Guidance for the SOMA801NXP electronic passport User Guidance for the SOMA801NXP electronic passport
AGD_PRE.1	Pre-personalization guidance for the SOMA801NXP electronic passport.
ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4	Configuration Management Plan, configuration list evidences of configuration management
ALC_DEL.1	Secure Delivery procedure Delivery documentation
ALC_DVS.2	Development security description Development security documentation
ALC_LCD.1	Life-cycle definition
ALC_TAT.1	Description of tools and techniques
ATE_COV.2	Test coverage analysis for the SOMA801NXP Electronic Passport
ATE_DPT.1	Test depth analysis for the SOMA801NXP Electronic Passport
ATE_FUN.1	Functional Test Specification for the SOMA801NXP Electronic Passport Evidences of tests
ATE_IND.2	Documentation related to an independent test.
AVA_VAN.3	Documentation related to an independent vulnerability analysis.

Assurance measures described in this section cover the assurance requirements in section 6.3.3.

8. References

8.1 Acronyms

BAC	Basic Access Control
BIS	Basic Inspection System
C$_{DS}$	DS Public Key Certificate
CBC	Cipher-block Chaining (block cipher mode of operation)
CC	Common Criteria
COM	Common data group of the LDS (ICAO Doc 9303)
CPS	Common Personalization Standard
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CSCA	Country Signing Certification Authority
CVCA	Country Verifying Certification Authority
DF	Dedicated File (ISO 7816)
DG	Data Group (ICAO Doc 9303)
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
DS	Document Signer
DV	Document Verifier
EAC	Extended Access Control
ECB	Electronic Codebook (block cipher mode of operation)
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory
EF	Elementary File (ISO 7816)
EIS	Extended Inspection System
ESW	Embedded Software
GIS	General Inspection System
IC	Integrated Circuit
IS	Inspection System
LDS	Logical Data Security
LCS	Life Cycle Status
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MF	Master File (ISO 7816)
MMU	Memory Management Unit
MRTD	Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ	Machine Readable Zone
N/A	Not Applicable
n.a.	Not Applicable
OCR	Optical Character Recognition
OS	Operating System
OSP	Organization Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
RAM	Random Access Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SO$_{D}$	Document Security Object
SOF	Strength of Function
SPA	Simple Power Analysis
ST	Security Target

Triple-DES	Triple DES
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TOE Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TR	Technical Report
VIZ	Visual Inspection Zone

8.2 Glossary

Active Authentication	Security mechanism defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [R14] option by which means the MTRD's chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MTRD's chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known state or organization.
application note	Additional information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
audit records	Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
authenticity	Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip were created by the Issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access Control	Security mechanism defined by ICAO [R14] by which means the MTRD's chip proves and the inspection system protect their communication by means of secure messaging with the Document BAC Keys.
Basic Inspection System	An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the BAC Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip using the Document BAC Keys derived from the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
biographical data	The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the Visual Inspection Zone (VIZ) and Machine Readble Zone (MRZ) on the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa *[R14]*.
biometric reference data	Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD's chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain	Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Document Verifier Certificate and Country

	Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level . The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
Chip Authentication	Authentication protocol used to verify the genuinity of the MRTD chip.
counterfeit	An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means *[R14]*.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)	Certification Authority of the Issuing State or Organization which attests the validity of certificates and digital signatures issued by the Document Signer.
Country Signing Certification Authority Certificate (C$_{CSCA}$)	Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (PK$_{CSCA}$) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the inspection system.
Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)	The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
Current Date	The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link Certificate	Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new keys is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Keys	Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication of data transmitted between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system [R14]. It is derived from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security Object	A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer. It carries the hash values of the LDS

	DG's and is stored in the MRTD's chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (C_{DS}) [R14].
Document Signer	Entity delegated by the Issuing State or Organization to digitally sign the DG's present in the LDS.
eavesdropper	A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD's chip.
enrolment	The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity [R14].
Extended Access Control	Security mechanism identified in BSI TR-03110 [R7] by which means the MTRD's chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Keys and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System	A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to the BIS authorized by the Issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery	Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the portrait *[R14]*.
General Inspection System	A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Global interoperability	The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs.

impostor	A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person's document *[R14]*.
Initialization Data	Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are, for instance, used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD's material (IC identification data).
inspection	The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity.
Inspection System	A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated Circuit	Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD's chip is an integrated circuit.
integrity	Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip have not been altered from that created by the Issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization	Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the passport) [R14].
Issuing State	The Country issuing the MRTD [R14]
Logical Data Structure	The collection of groupings of DG's stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [R14]. The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD's chip.

Logical MRTD	Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the LDS [R14] as specified by ICAO on the contactless IC. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to):
	   i. personal data of the MRTD holder
	   ii. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
	   iii. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
	   iv. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
	   v. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).

Machine Readable Travel Document	Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read [R14].
Machine Readable Zone	Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods [R14].
machine-verifiable biometrics feature	A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and verified by machine.

MRTD application	Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the MRTD's chip. It includes:
	   i. the file structure implementing the LDS [R14],
	   ii. the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14 and EF.DG 16) and
	   iii. the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authentication data itself.

MRTD Basic Access Control	Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the inspection system and the MRTD's chip based on MRZ information as a key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD's chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder	The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing

	State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD's chip	A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and programmed according to the LDS [R14].
MRTD's chip Embedded Software	Software embedded in a MRTD's chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD's chip Embedded Software is designed in phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD's chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference data	Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD's chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive Authentication	Passive Authentication is a mechanism that ensures the authenticity of the DG's present in the LDS by: i. the verification of the digital signature of the SO_D and ii. comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the SO_D.
Personalization	The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the document *[R14]*.
Personalization Agent	The agent delegated by the Issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by i. establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, ii. enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or the encoded iris image(s) and iii. writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent Authentication Information	TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Physical travel document	Travel document in the form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but not limited to): i. biographical data, ii. data of the MRZ, iii. photographic image and iv. other data.

Pre-personalization Data	Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD's and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD's chip	MRTD's chip equipped with a unique identifier, the Personalization Agent Keys, and a unique asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Primary Inspection System	An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD's chip and does not implement the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
Receiving State	The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry [R14].
reference data	Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
secure messaging	Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [R17].
skimming	Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
travel document	A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
traveler	A person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data	Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE [R8].
Unpersonalized MRTD	MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing an initialized and pre-personalized MRTD's chip.
User data	Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF [R8].

Verification	The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee's template [R14].
Verification data	Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.

8.3 Technical References

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[R2] **BSI:** *Assurance Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-MA-01 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software*

[R3] **BSI:** *Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators, AIS31, Version 1, 25.9.2001*

[R4] **BSI:** *Security IC Platform Protection Profile version 1.0 15 June, 2007; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0035*

[R5] **BSI:** *Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application ", Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055.*

[R6] **BSI:** *Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application ", Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056.*

[R7] **BSI:** *Technical Guideline TR-03110 - Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11*

[R8] **CCRA:** *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model, July 2009, version 3.1 rev.3, CCMB-2009-07-001*

[R9] **CCRA:** *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, July 2009, version 3.1 rev.3, CCMB-2009-07-002*

[R10] CCRA: *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, July 2009, version 3.1 rev 3, CCMB-2009-07-003*

[R11] CCRA: *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Composite evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, September 2007, version 1.0 rev. 1, CCDB-2007-09-001*

[R12] EMV CPS: *EMV Card Personalization Specification – version 1.0, June 2003*

[R13] Gep: *Security Target Lite SOMA801NXP Electronic Passport, Extended Access Control" v1.0 2012-05-16, ref TCLE120007.*

[R14] ICAO: *MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS – Part 3 Machine Readable Official Travel Documents, Volume 2 Specifications for Electronically Enabled Official Travel Documents with Biometric Identification Capability Approved by the Secretary General and published under his authority – Doc 9303, Third Edition – 2008*

[R15] ICAO: *SUPPLEMENT TO DOC 9303 – Release 8 – March 19, 2010*

[R16] IETF Network Working Group: *Request For Comments 2119, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, March 1997.*

[R17] ISO/IEC: *International Standard 7816-4 2005 Information Technology – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts – Part 4: Interindustry commands for interchange – January 15, 2005*

[R18] ISO/IEC: *International Standard 9797-1 1999 nformation Technology – Security Techniques – Message Authentication Codes – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 1999*

[R19] ISO/IEC: *International Standard 14443-1 - Identification cards – Contactless Integrated circuit cards – Proximity cards. Part 1: Physical characteristics.*

[R20] ISO/IEC: *International Standard 14443-2 - Identification cards – Contactless Integrated circuit cards – Proximity cards. Part 2: Radio frequency interface power and signal interface.*

[R21] ISO/IEC: *International Standard 14443-3 - Identification cards – Contactless Integrated circuit cards – Proximity cards. Part 3: Initialization and anticollision.*

[R22] ISO/IEC: *International Standard 14443-4 - Identification cards – Contactless Integrated circuit cards – Proximity cards. Part 4: Transmission protocol.*

[R23] NIST: *FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology*

[R24] NIST: *FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 180-2, SECURE HASH STANDARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology – 2002 August 1*

[R25] NXP Semiconductors: *NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041/051V1A and P5Cx081V1A Security Target Lite rev. 1.4, 25 October 2010, BSI-DSZ-CC-0555*

[R26] RSA Laboratories: *PKCS #3 - Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, version 1.4 November 1993.*

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