

Common Criteria Certification Report

RICOH IM 2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J
/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H



CAN-688-LSS

6 May 2026

v1.0



Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Canadian Centre
for Cyber Security

Centre de la sécurité des
télécommunications Canada
Centre canadien
pour la cybersécurité

Canada

Foreword

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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Overview

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for evaluating the security of IT products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target (ST). A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the ST, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and ST are posted to the [Common Criteria portal](#) (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

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Executive Summary CAN-688-LSS

RICOH IM 2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J /4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **Ricoh Company, Ltd.**, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the following conformance claim: **Collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0e**

Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on **6 May 2026** and was conducted in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to consider the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the [Certified Products list](#) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the [Common Criteria portal](#) (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).

Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| TOE Name and Version | RICOH IM 2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J /4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H |
| Developer | Ricoh Company, Ltd. |

See the [Evaluated Configuration](#) section for more details on the evaluated configuration of the TOE.

Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the following methodology:

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5

The TOE claims the following conformance:

Collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, v1.0e

TOE Description

The TOE is a Digital Multi-Function Printer (MFP), which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and outputs electronic and hardcopy documents.

TOE Architecture

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1: TOE Architecture

Security Policy

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted path/channels

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the [Security Target](#).

Cryptographic Functionality

The TOE makes use of the following [CAVP validated cryptographic implementation\(s\)](#):

Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)

| Cryptographic Implementation | Certificate Number |
|--|--------------------|
| OpenSSL, v1.1.1 | A3561 |
| Ricoh Cryptographic Module for IPsec 2, v1.00 | A3560 |
| RICOH Cryptographic Library 3, v3.0 | A3557 |
| NesLib v6.5 for ST33 | A1288 |
| Platform Validation Library for JX3, v1.0 | A6516 |
| RICOH Cryptographic Library for ima, v1.1 | A7738 |
| Libimaevm, v1.1 | A7737 |
| RICOH Company AES256CBC Implementation | AES 3921 |
| GW Linux NVRAM Encryption Library, v1.0 | A3555 |
| wolfCrypt, v4.7.0i | A3028 |
| RICOH RSA Module for U-boot, v1.1.0 | A5472 |
| RICOH SHA256 Module for U-boot, v1.1.0 | A5473 |
| RICOH Cryptographic Library for Linux Kernel, v1.0.0 | A5471 |



Additionally, the TOE uses the following [CMVP validated entropy source\(s\)](#):

Table 3: Entropy Source(s)

| Entropy Source | Certificate Number |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| ST33HTPH2X32AHE4 FW v1.769 | E45 |



Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

Usage and Environmental Assumptions

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
- The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
- TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.
- Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.

Clarification of Scope

- USB Port. The MFP has a USB Port that is used to directly connect a client computer to the MFP for printing. This USB port is disabled during initial installation and configuration of the TOE.
- SD Card Slot. The MFP has two SD Card Slots, one for customer engineers and one for users. The SD Card Slot for customer engineers is used by customer engineers to install components of the MFP; the SD Card Slot for users is used by users to print documents. Both are disabled when the TOE is operational, a cover is placed on the SD Card slot for customer engineer so cards cannot be inserted or removed and the card slot for users is set to disabled during installation.



Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

Table 4: Evaluated Configuration

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| TOE Software/Firmware | JE-1.00-H |
| TOE Hardware | RICOH IM 2510, IM 2510A, IM 3010, IM 3510, IM 3510A, IM 4510, IM 5510, IM 6010, IM 2519J, IM 3019J, IM 3519J, IM 4519J, IM 6019J, RICOH IM 2510, RICOH IM 3510, RICOH IM 4510, RICOH IM 6010 |
| | nashuatec IM 2510, IM 2510A |
| | Rex Rotary IM 3010, IM 3010A, IM 3510, IM 3510A |
| | Gestetner IM 4510, IM 5510, IM 6010 |
| Environmental Support | Syslog Server, LDAP Server, NTP Server, FTP Server, SMTP Server, OCSP Responder |

Documentation

The following documents are available to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a) User Guide For RICOH IM
2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J/7010, D0GP7747, 2026/2
https://support.ricoh.com/services/device/ccmanual/IM_2510-3010-3510-4510-5510-6010-7010/en-GB/booklist/int/index_book.htm
- b) User Guide Security Reference For RICOH IM
2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J/7010, D0GP7732, 2025/11
https://support.ricoh.com/services/device/ccmanual/IM_2510-3010-3510-4510-5510-6010-7010/SecurityReference/en-GB/booklist/int/index_book.htm
- c) RICOH IM
2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H
Common Criteria Guide, version 1.0 (PDF)



Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation activities comprised a structured assessment of the TOE. Documentation and processes related to Development, Guidance Documentation, and Life-Cycle Support were reviewed and analyzed.

Development

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

Guidance Documents

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators exercised the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Life-Cycle Support

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

Testing Activities

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.

Assessment of Developer tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

Conduct of Testing

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate proprietary test results document.

Independent Testing

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP; and
- b. The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementations are present in the TOE.

Independent Testing Results

The testing produced the expected results, supporting the conclusion that the TOE correctly implements the functional requirements specified in the ST and the TOE functional specification.



Vulnerability Analysis

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases, and technical community sources. Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities. Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses, which they used in their vulnerability analysis.

Public domain searches were conducted on **30 April 2026** and included the following search terms:

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| TOE name and version | ARM Cortex-A57 Dual Core | wolfCrypt, v4.7.0i |
| wolfSSL, v4.7.0i | OpenSSL, v1.1.1 | Web Image Monitor |
| libimaevm | Intel Atom x5-E3930 | Intel Atom x5-E3940 |
| Intel Atom -x7-A3950 | Intel Celeron N3350 | NesLib |
| SecureCore SC300 | GW Linux NVRAM Encryption Library | Platform Validation Library for JX3 |
| MB8AL1062MH-GE1 | ST33TPHF2XSPI | |

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

| | |
|--|--|
| Ricoh: https://www.ricoh.com/products/security/vulnerabilities https://www.ricoh.com/info/ | NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search#/nvd/home?resultType=records |
| CISA – Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog | CVE: https://www.cve.org/ |
| WolfSSL: https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/ | WolfSSL: https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/blob/master/ChangeLog.md |
| WolfSSL: https://www.wolfssl.com/?s=vulnerability | OpenSSL: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities-1.1.1/ |



Vulnerability Analysis Results

The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



Results of the Evaluation

The Information Technology product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

Recommendations/Comments

It is recommended that all guidance be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



Supporting Content

List of Abbreviations

| Term | Definition |
|------|--|
| CAVP | Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program |
| CCTL | Common Criteria Testing Laboratory |
| CMVP | Cryptographic Module Validation Program |
| CSE | Communications Security Establishment |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level |
| ESV | Entropy Source Validation |
| ETR | Evaluation Technical Report |
| IT | Information Technology |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| ST | Security Target |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TSF | TOE Security Function |

References

| Reference |
|---|
| Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5. |
| Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5. |
| RICOH IM 2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H Security Target, v1.0, April 27, 2026. |
| RICOH IM 2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H Evaluation Technical Report, v1.1, May 6, 2026. |
| RICOH IM 2510/2519J/3010/3019J/3510/3519J/4510/4519J/5510/6010/6019J, version JE-1.00-H Assurance Activity Report, v1.1, May 6, 2026. |