

MAINTENANCE REPORT MR1
(supplementing Certification Report No. CRP294)

NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer
Version 10.5, Build 53.33.nc

running on MPX 9700-FIPS, MPX 10500-FIPS, MPX 12500-FIPS, MPX 15500-FIPS appliances

Issue 1.0
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NCSC Certification Body
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CERTIFICATION STATEMENT (ADDENDUM)

Sponsor	Citrix Systems Inc.	Developer	Citrix Systems Inc.		
Product Name, Version	NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer, Version 10.5, Build 53.33.nc				
Platform/Integrated Circuit	MPX 9700-FIPS, MPX 10500-FIPS, MPX 12500-FIPS, MPX 15500-FIPS appliances				
Description	NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer Version 10.5 is an application performance accelerator incorporating a SSL/TLS VPN.				
CC Version	Version 3.1 Release 4				
CC Part 2	Extended	CC Part 3	Conformant		
PP(s) or (c)PP Conformance	Protection Profile for Network Devices v1.1 [PP], with Errata #3 [PP_ERR3] applied				
EAL	Assurance Package as defined in [PP]				
CLEF	CGI UK				
CC Certificate	P294	Date Certified	13 November 2015	Date Maintained	19 October 2017

The evaluation was performed in accordance with the requirements of the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme as described in UK Scheme Publication 01 [UKSP01] and 02 [UKSP02]. The Scheme has established the NCSC (previously CESG) Certification Body, which is managed by the NCSC on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.

The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) in meeting its Security Target [ST], which prospective consumers are advised to read. To ensure that the ST gave an appropriate baseline for a CC evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against that baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with Protection Profile [PP] and supporting documents, CC Parts 1, 2 and 3 [CC], the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM] and relevant Interpretations.

The issuing of a Certification Report is a confirmation that the evaluation process has been performed properly and that no exploitable vulnerabilities have been found in the evaluated configuration of the TOE. It is not an endorsement of the product.

ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY (CCRA)

The NCSC Certification Body of the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme is a member of the above Arrangement [CCRA] and, as such, this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the Party's claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.

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¹ All judgements contained in this Certification Report are covered by the CCRA [CCRA] and the SOGIS MRA [MRA].



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I. INTRODUCTION

Overview

1. This Maintenance Report [MR1] states the outcome of the Common Criteria (CC) [CC] Assurance Continuity [AC] process for *NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer, Version 10.5, Build 53.33.nc* - i.e. the ‘latest derived version’ - as summarised on page 2 of this report, and is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of the product for their requirements.
2. The baseline for this report was the original CC evaluation of *NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer, Version 10.5, Build 53.22 (nCore)*, which was certified in November 2015 by the CESG Certification Body (now NCSC Certification Body) as conformant to the CC Protection Profile for Network Devices v1.1 [PP] with Errata #3 [PP_ERR3] applied - i.e. the ‘original certified version’ or ‘Certified TOE’.
3. The CC Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) [CCRA] requires the Security Target (ST) to be included with the Certification Report. Hence for the Target of Evaluation (TOE):
 - a) for the original certified version: its ST was [ST];
 - b) for the latest derived version: its ST is [ST1].
4. Prospective consumers should read the following documents for the TOE, which are available on the CC website (www.commoncriteriaportal.org):
 - for the original certified version: its [ST], its Certification Report [CR] and its related Certificate;
 - for the latest derived version: its [ST1], its Maintenance Report [MR1] (i.e. this document) and its maintenance addendum on the above website.
5. The Developer of the TOE (i.e. the original certified version and the latest derived version) is Citrix Systems Inc.

Maintained Version(s)

6. The ‘original certified version’ of the TOE was:
 - NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer, Version 10.5, Build 53.22 (nCore), running on MPX 9700 FIPS, MPX 10500 FIPS, MPX 12500 FIPS, MPX 15500 FIPS appliances.
7. The ‘latest derived version’ of the TOE for which assurance is maintained is:
 - NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer, Version 10.5, Build 53.33.nc, running on MPX 9700 FIPS, MPX 10500 FIPS, MPX 12500 FIPS, MPX 15500 FIPS appliances.
8. The maintenance of the latest derived version is described in this report [MR1], which provides a summary of the incremental changes from the original certified version [CR].



Assurance Continuity Process

9. The CCRA [CCRA] is a basis for the mutual international recognition of the results of CC evaluations and certifications. The CC Assurance Continuity process is defined in [AC], and UK specific aspects are defined in UK Scheme Publication 01 [UKSP01] and 03 [UKSP03P1, UKSP03P2]. That process is based on an Impact Analysis Report (IAR) by the Developer. The IAR is intended to describe all changes made to the product, including changes to previously-evaluated evidence, and to assess the security impact of each change.

10. For the latest derived version of the TOE, the Developer followed the above process and the following activities were performed:

- a) the Developer made bug-fixes to the TOE, to improve security;
- b) the Developer produced the IAR [IAR1] which details the bug-fixes and, for each bug-fix, explains how its impact on the TOE functionality is either 'none' or 'minor', and affirms that it does not affect the expression of the SFRs in the assurance evidence;
- c) the Developer made no other changes to the TOE, or its development environment, hence no additional security testing was required;
- d) the Developer requested assurance continuity for the Certified TOE, and that request was granted by the NCSC Certification Body, within the two years guideline stated in [AC].

11. The NCSC Certification Body examined [IAR1] and the supporting evidence, then produced this report [MR1] and produced the maintenance addendum on the CC website.

General Points

12. Assurance Continuity addresses the security functionality claimed, with reference to the assumed environment specified, in the ST. For the latest derived version, its scope, configuration and platform environment are summarised in Chapter II of this report [MR1], in conjunction with the original Certification Report [CR]. Prospective consumers are advised to check that this matches their requirements.



II. ASSURANCE MAINTENANCE

Analysis of Changes

13. [IAR1] is the IAR from the certified version of the TOE to the latest derived version of the TOE, and provides the Assurance Continuity rationale for the latest derived version on the stated platform. [IAR1] conforms to the requirements of [AC] and the UK specific aspects in [UKSP01], [UKSP03P1] and [UKSP03P2].

14. No *Major* changes that could cause a security impact on the TOE were made between the certified version and the latest derived version. As noted in [IAR1] Chapters 4 to 6, all changes were *Minor* and did not impact the TOE's security functionality.

15. The changes and their impact on the evaluation deliverables are detailed in [IAR1] Chapters 4 - 6, which show that for all changes:

- a) the impact of each change is determined to be *Minor*;
- b) the effect on the previously-evaluated evidence is determined to be *Minor*;
- c) the action required for resolution is determined to be *None*, as the previously-evaluated evidence has already been updated, and no further security tests are required.

16. The NCSC Certification Body's review of [ST1] and [IAR1] is documented in [REVIEW1], and concurs with the Sponsor's overall conclusion. The changes to the previously-evaluated evidence are summarised in Paragraph 17 of this report.

Changes to Developer Evidence

17. [IAR1] indicates that the following, previously-evaluated evidence has been updated for the latest derived version of the TOE:

- Security Target for NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer version 10.5 build 53.22 (nCore), Issue 1.0, 13 October 2015 [ST].

All updates in the above document were classified as *Minor*.

18. No changes were required to the TOE Security Guidance documentation detailed in [CR].

TOE Identification

19. The latest derived version is uniquely identified in Paragraph 7 of this report.

TOE Scope and TOE Configuration

20. The TOE scope is defined in [ST1] Sections 1.2 - 1.3.

21. The TOE configuration is defined in the Evaluated Configuration Guide [ECG].



TOE Documentation

22. Regarding the Installation, Configuration and Guidance documents listed in the Certification Report for the original certified version of the TOE [CR], there were no changes for the latest derived version of the TOE.

TOE Environment

23. The TOE environment is defined in [ST1] Section 1.2.6.



III. TOE TESTING

Vulnerability Analysis

24. In summary, there was no requirement to assess whether any vulnerability had been introduced into the TOE between its original certified version and its latest derived version, as there had been no changes to the TOE or its related development procedures. Therefore, there were no new vulnerabilities impacting the TOE and its subsystems.

25. During the evaluation of the original version of the TOE [ETR], the evaluators' vulnerability analysis was based on public domain sources and the visibility of the TOE provided by the evaluation deliverables. No vulnerabilities were found during that original evaluation.

26. A search of a sample of public websites on 26 September 2017 confirmed that there were no publicly-known vulnerabilities in the latest derived version of the TOE, as detailed in the IAR [IAR1].

Testing

27. The Developer performed appropriate testing (e.g. sanity testing, reboot testing) on the latest derived version of the TOE and its interim builds, as the changes do not impact the security functionality of the TOE

28. The Evaluators' testing for the original certified TOE was described in [CR]. The Evaluators were not required to perform any tests on the latest derived version of the TOE, as the changes do not impact the security functionality of the TOE.

29. The Developer holds a copy of the original evaluation's Evaluation Technical Report [ETR]. The Developer does not hold the Evaluators' test scripts and does not update them.



IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCLAIMERS

Summary

30. The analysis in [IAR1] shows that no change with a security impact of *Major* has been made to the TOE between the certified version of the TOE and the latest derived version of the TOE.

31. All changes have been categorised as having a security impact of *Minor* and hence conformance to the CC Protection Profile for Network Devices v1.1 [PP], with Errata #3 [PP_ERR3] applied, has been maintained.

Conclusions

32. The NCSC Certification Body accepts the analysis in [IAR1], which assessed each change as having a security impact of *Minor*, and concludes that the overall impact of all changes is *Minor*.

33. The NCSC Certification Body has therefore determined that conformance to the CC Protection Profile for Network Devices v1.1 [PP] with Errata #3 [PP_ERR3] applied, as outlined in the Certification Report [CR], has been maintained for the latest derived version of the TOE. These conclusions are summarised in ‘Certification Statement (Addendum)’ on Page 2 of this report.

34. Prospective consumers of the latest derived version of the TOE should understand the scope of the maintenance by reading this report in conjunction with [ST1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with the environmental assumptions specified in [ST1]. Prospective consumers should check that the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and the certified configuration (as maintained for the latest derived version of the TOE) match their requirements, and should give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.

35. The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance in the certified configuration, maintained for the latest derived version of the TOE. Recommendations on secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the TOE are in the Certification Report [CR].

Disclaimers

36. The Assurance Continuity process is *not* a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities. There remains a small probability that exploitable vulnerabilities may be discovered afterwards. This report reflects the NCSC Certification Body’s views on the date of this report.

37. Existing and prospective consumers should check regularly for themselves whether any security vulnerabilities have been discovered since this report was issued and, if appropriate, should check with the vendor to see if any patches exist for the product and whether those patches have further assurance.

38. The installation of patches for security vulnerabilities, whether or not those patches have further assurance, should improve the security of the TOE. However, note that unevaluated patching will invalidate the certification of the TOE, unless the TOE has undergone a formal re-certification or is covered under an approved Assurance Continuity process by a CCRA certificate-authorising Scheme.

39. All product or company names used in this report are for identification purposes only and may be trademarks of their respective owners.



V. REFERENCES

Common Criteria Documents:

- [AC] Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements,
Common Criteria Development Board,
2012-06-01, Version 2.1, June 2012.
- [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
(comprising Parts 1, 2, 3: [CC1], [CC2], [CC3]).
- [CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, Introduction and General Model,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
- [CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, Security Functional Components,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
- [CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, Security Assurance Components,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
- [CCRA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the Field of
Information Technology Security,
Participants in the Arrangement Group,
2 July 2014.
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
- [MRA] Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation
Certificates,
Management Committee,
Senior Officials Group – Information Systems Security (SOGIS),
Version 3.0, 8 January 2010 (effective April 2010).

UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Documents:

- [UKSP00] Abbreviations and References,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 00, Issue 1.8, August 2013.
- [UKSP01] Description of the Scheme,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 01, Issue 6.6, August 2014.



[UKSP03P1] Sponsor's Guide - General Introduction,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 03 Part I, Issue 3.1, August 2013.

[UKSP03P2] Sponsor's Guide - Assurance Continuity,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 03 Part II, Issue 1.3, August 2014.

Original Certified Version:

[CR] Common Criteria Certification Report No. CRP294,
CESG (now NCSC) Certification Body,
Issue 1.0, November 2015.

[ECG] Evaluated Configuration Guide for NetScaler 10 Platinum Edition,
Citrix Systems Inc.,
Document code: October 13, 2015 17:56:12 Version 3.6.

[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report,
CGI CLEF,
LFL/T279/ETR, Issue 1.1, 5 November 2015.

[PP] Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Information Assurance Directorate,
Version 1.1, 8 June 2012.

[PP_ERR3] Security Requirements for Network Devices,
Information Assurance Directorate,
Errata #3, 3 November 2014.

[ST] Security Target for NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer, Version 10.5,
Citrix Systems Inc.,
CN12-ST-0001, Issue 1.0, 13 October 2015.

Latest Derived Version:

[IAR1] NetScaler 10.5 Impact Analysis Report,
DNV-GL (for Citrix Systems Inc.),
Version 0-5, 18 October 2017.

[MR1] Common Criteria Maintenance Report MR1 (*i.e. this document*).

[REVIEW1] NCSC Certification Body Review Form,
LFL/T279 - CCAM03 - CIN15 - ST1 & IAR1,
CB/170912/LFL-T279/CCAM003, 19 October 2017.

[ST1] Common Criteria Maintenance Security Target for
NetScaler Platinum Edition Load Balancer Version 10.5 Build 53.33.nc,
Citrix Systems Inc.,
Version 1-2, 18 October 2017.



VI. ABBREVIATIONS

This list of abbreviations is specific to the TOE. It therefore excludes: general IT abbreviations (e.g. GUI, LAN); standard CC abbreviations (e.g. TOE, TSF) covered in CC Part 1 [CC1]; and UK Scheme abbreviations and acronyms (e.g. CESG, CLEF) covered in [UKSP00].

NCSC UK National Cyber Security Centre (which has absorbed and replaced CESG)