



Security Target Lite of W75F32W 32M-bit Secure Serial Flash Memory

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1 Security Target Introduction

This introductory chapter contains the following sections:

- Security Target Reference
- TOE Reference
- TOE Overview
- TOE Description
- TOE operating modes and life-cycle

This Security Target is based on the Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages [5]. However, the Security Target does not include the Random Generation and the IC Identification security objectives. The corresponding assumptions of the Protection Profile are not used and replaced by other assumptions.

On the other hand, the Security Target includes additional elements which are not required by the Protection Profile [5]. Those security elements (threats, security objectives, SFR) are clearly identified in each Chapter of this document.

1.1 Security Target Reference

Title: Lite Security Target of W75F32W 32M-bit Secure Serial Flash Memory

Version: 1.2

Authors: Trusted Labs SAS and Winbond Technology Ltd.

Evaluator: Applus

Certified by: CCN Organismo de Certificacion

1.2 TOE Reference

The Target of Evaluation is identified as below:

Commercial Name	Secure Serial Flash Memory
Product Name	W75F32W
Version	1.0
Reference Design	G1
Guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational User Guidance [15] • Preparative Procedure [16]

Table 1 TOE Identification

1.3 TOE Overview

1.3.1 TOE Type

The Target of Evaluation is a Memory Flash IC.

1.3.2 TOE Intended Usage

The TOE is dedicated to be embedded into highly critical hardware devices such as smart card, secure element, USB token, secure micro SD, etc. These devices will embed secure applications such as financial, telecommunication, identity (e-Government), etc and will be working in a hostile environment. In particular, the TOE is dedicated to the secure storage of the code and data of critical applications.

The security needs for the TOE consist in:

- Maintaining the integrity of the content of the memories and the confidentiality of the content of protected memory areas as required by the critical HW products (e.g. Security IC) the Memory Flash is built for;
- Providing a secure communication with the Host device that will embed the TOE in a secure HW product such as Security IC;

1.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware

For the present ST, the TOE is a pure storage hardware device.

The TOE does not comprise:

- a) The Host device that will embed the TOE and will be needed to run the TOE in order to stimulate the TSF
- b) SPI Bus for the communication between the Host device and the TOE

The ST assumes that all components (Hardware or Software) of the Host Device are appropriately protected in the TOE security environment.

1.4 TOE Description

1.4.1 Physical Scope

The TOE comprises:

- All security functionality necessary to ensure the secure execution of the Memory Flash,
- The guidance for the secure usage of the TOE: Operational User Guidance [15] and Preparative Procedure [16].

1.4.1.1 TOE Physical Characteristics

The TOE physical characteristics are described as follows.

- Capacity: 32M-bit / 4M-byte
- Performance
 - 50MHz Standard/Quad/Octal SPI clocks
 - 28MB/S continuous encrypted and authenticated data transfer rate
 - More than 100,000 erase/program cycles
 - More than 20-year data retention

- Efficiency
 - 16-byte burst read
 - Data Integrity Check
 - Allows secure execution in place (S-XIP) operation
- Operating conditions
 - Single 1.65 to 1.95V supply
 - 2mA active current, <1µA Power-down (typ.)
 - -40°C to +85°C operating range
- 4KB-block Architecture
 - Uniform Block Erase (4K-bytes)
 - Program 1 to 16 byte in a single command
 - Erase/Program Suspend & Resume

1.4.1.2 TOE Architecture

The architecture of the Memory Flash is described in **Figure 1**. The TOE is delimited by the Red box.




Figure 1 TOE Architecture

The TOE consists of the following Hardware components

- Auxiliary array contains the flash specific data: the binding key (and its digest value), the failure and session counters;
- Flash array stores the User data (i.e. the mass data including executable codes) and translates SPI commands into Flash operations;
- SFF (Secure Flash Front-end) which implements encrypted and authenticated interface for Flash operation and supports Flash memories up to 4GB;
- Detectors of abnormal operating conditions;

1.4.1.3 Interfaces of the TOE

- The physical interface of the TOE with the external environment is the entire surface of the Memory Flash module.

- The electrical interface of the TOE with the external environment is made of the chip's pads including the data pins for SPI bus:
 - Standard SPI: CLK, /CS, DI_IO0, DO_IO1
 - Quad SPI: CLK, /CS, DI_IO0, DO_IO1, IO2, IO3
 - Octal: CLK, /CS, DI_IO0, DO_IO1, IO2, IO3, IO4, IO5,
 - IO6, IO7

1.4.2 Logical Scope

The main security features of the TOE are described as follows:

- Secure separation between Test mode and Normal mode. More precisely,
 - The switch from Normal mode to Test mode can only be done after completely erasing the flash content.
 - The confidentiality and the integrity of the flash content are protected in both Test mode and Normal mode.
- The Read data confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data from/to the Host device are protected by a secure channel;
- Integrity protection of the flash content by error detection codes (CRC-32);
- Confidentiality protection of the flash content by memory scrambling with diversified key;
- Security sensors or detectors including power glitch detector and out-of-specified operating conditions (voltage, temperature, clock frequency);
- Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks (e.g. reverse-engineering, probing);
- State machine protection to counter fault injection;
- Dual Flip-Flops and Path-Differential signaling to counter fault injection and side-channel attacks;
- Failure counter to detect and react to tamper attempts;

The logical interface of the TOE is made of Flash commands.

1.5 TOE operating modes

TEST mode	NORMAL mode
In TEST mode, the TOE provides access to both the auxiliary and flash arrays. However, there are some restrictions in the Test mode: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Binding Key (Kb) cannot be read out; - The auxiliary array can only be erased if a complete erase has been done after the last reset; - The read and write commands do not read and write effective values of the flash; 	In NORMAL mode, the access to the flash arrays is authenticated and controlled via the flash commands. There is no interface to access to the auxiliary array. TOE cannot switch back from NORMAL mode to TEST mode without erasing all the memory.

Table 2 Operating modes

1.6 TOE Life cycle

The development, manufacturing and integration processes of the TOE into a composite product can be separated into two distinct phases.

Phase	Title	Description
1	TOE Development	Memory flash designer is responsible for: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- TOE (HW) development
2	TOE Manufacturing and Testing	Memory flash Manufacturer is responsible for: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Photomask manufacturing- wafer manufacturing and- testing

Table 3 TOE life-cycle

The TOE is delivered as already packaged products (Known Good Die) after the phase 2.

The TOE user is responsible for developing the Host-based dedicated driver and for generating a random and unique binding key (Kb) for binding the TOE to a unique Host.

2 Conformance Claim

This chapter 2 contains the following sections:

- CC Conformance Claim
- PP Claim
- Package Claim
- Conformance Claim Rationale

2.1 CC Conformance Claim

This Security target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1 Release 4.

Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.

2.2 PP Claim

This Security Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

2.3 Package Claim

The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 because the TOE is dedicated to store highly critical applications and data which are submitted to advanced logical and physical attacks.

3 Security Problem Definition

3.1 Assets

Assets include all data stored in the TOE (including executable code of the applications). They include:

- User data, that is typically stored in the "flash array" part of the memory chip;
- TSF data, that is relied upon for the enforcement of the TOE security functionality.
 - TSF data contains sensitive data stored in registers or in the auxiliary array of the memory chip.
 - The TOE does not include any software, however the logic of the TOE security mechanisms is still part of the TSF data. This logic is hardcoded in SFF.

3.1.1 TSF data

TSF logic

The TSF logic is the functionality of the TSF, and is hardcoded in the SFF component. The TSF logic is protected in terms of integrity and confidentiality.

Binding key (Kb)

A unique 256-bit key that is shared between the TOE and the Host. This key is protected in terms of integrity and confidentiality.

Runtime data

The internal runtime data necessary for the execution of the SFF: session key, memory scrambling keys, Integrity Checking Engine register, stream-ciphering buffer, Bit mixing key, Failure counter, session counter, etc. All runtime data shall be protected in terms of integrity. All runtime data (except for the session counter) shall be protected in terms of confidentiality.

3.1.2 User data

User data corresponds to all data stored inside the memory flash (including executable code of the applications).

User Data

Mass data (including executable codes) stored in the "flash array" part of the memory chip. User data is protected in terms of integrity and confidentiality.

3.2 Users / Subjects

U.Host-Device

The host device communicates with the TOE through a SPI Bus.

3.3 Threats

T.Phys-Manipulation

Physical Manipulation

An attacker may physically modify the Memory Flash in order to

- o modify *User Data* stored in the TOE;
- o modify *TSF Data* stored in the TOE;
- o modify or deactivate the security services of the TOE (provided by *TSF logic*);
- o modify the security mechanisms of the TOE (provided by *TSF logic*) to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating *User Data*, for example the integrity protection mechanism.

T.Phys-Probing

Physical Probing

An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order to disclose *User Data* and *TSF Data* while stored in Memory Flash.

T.Malfunction

Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

An attacker may cause a malfunction of *TSF logic* by applying environmental stress in order to deactivate or affect security mechanisms of the TOE. This enables attacks disclosing or manipulating *User Data*.

This may be achieved by operating the Memory Flash outside the normal operating conditions.

T.Abuse-Func

Abuse of Functionality

An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery in order to

- o disclose or manipulate *User Data* (user data or code stored in the TOE) or
- o enable an attack disclosing or manipulating *User Data*.

T.Leak-Inherent

Inherent Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the Memory Flash in order to disclose confidential *User Data*.

T.Leak-Forced

Forced Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the Memory Flash in order to disclose confidential *User Data* even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker.

T.Abuse-Communication

Communication Probing and Manipulation

An attacker may probe and modify the communication between the TOE and **U.Host-Device** in order to manipulate *User/TSF Data* or disclose *User/TSF Data* read from the TOE.

T.Host-Forging

Forge the functionality of an authorized Host device

An attacker may access to the User data currently stored in the TOE by:

- o illegally establishing a secure channel the with the TOE (e.g. by tampering the Binding key or by forging the secure channel without knowing the Binding key) in order to execute the Flash commands;
- o binding the TOE with another Host device in order to execute the Flash commands;

3.4 Organisational Security Policies

3.5 Assumptions

A.Secure-Channel

External protection during the secure channel

It is assumed that **U.Host-Device** supports the trusted communication channel with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data.

In particular, **U.Host-Device** is assumed to correctly protect the secure channel in order to prevent data modification, disclosure, insertion, deletion and replaying.

A.Binding-Process

Protection during Binding process

It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE (to prevent any possible copy, modification, or unauthorised use).

This means that the binding process (i.e. generating a unique and random key K_b for **U.Host-Device** and the TOE) is assumed to be done in a secure environment where the communication between **U.Host-Device** and the TOE is protected.

Furthermore, **U.Host-Device** is assumed to provide a secure random source for generating a fresh Binding key (K_b) for the TOE.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This chapter contains the following sections:

- Security Objectives for the TOE
- Security Objectives for the operational Environment
- Security Objectives Rationale

O.Phys-Probing

Protection against Physical Probing

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure/reconstruction of *User Data* and *TSF Data* while stored in the Flash.

This includes protection against

- o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis) with a prior reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

O.Malfunction

Protection against Malfunctions

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must indicate and prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent malfunctions. Examples of environmental conditions are voltage, and clock frequency, temperature, or external energy fields.

O.Phys-Manipulation

Protection against Physical Manipulation

The TOE must provide protection against manipulation of *User Data* (the user data stored in the TOE) and *TSF data*. This includes protection against

- o reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its properties and functions),
- o manipulation of the hardware and TSF data, as well as
- o undetected manipulation of User data (i.e. Flash array).

O.Abuse-Func

Protection against Abuse of Functionality

The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order to (i) disclose sensitive user data stored in the TOE, (ii) manipulate sensitive user data stored in the TOE.

O.Leak-Inherent

Protection against Inherent Information Leakage

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data stored and processed in the TOE

- o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals (for example on the power, clock, or I/O lines) and
- o by measurement and analysis of the time between events found by measuring signals (for instance on the power, clock, or I/O lines).

O.Leak-Forced

Protection against Forced Information Leakage

The TOE must be protected against disclosure of confidential data processed in the TOE (using methods as described under O.Leak-Inherent) even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker

- o by forcing a malfunction (refer to "Protection against Malfunction due to Environmental Stress O.Malfunction") and/or
- o by a physical manipulation (refer to "Protection against Physical Manipulation - O.Phys-Manipulation").

If this is not the case, signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets could become an information channel for a leakage attack.

O.Sec-Binding

Protection of residual information at Re-binding

This objective protects against the disclosure of the User data when the TOE is re-bound to another Host device.

This includes protection against:

- o integrity failure on Binding Key
- o illegal modification on Binding Key
- o illegal attempt to erase the Binding key

O.Trusted-Path

Trusted communication with authorized Host

The TSF provides a trusted path only with authorized **U.Host-Device** (based on the shared Binding key), and protects the integrity of the User data communicated with **U.Host-Device** and the confidentiality of the User data read by **U.Host-Device**.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.Secure-Channel

Secure communication with the TOE

The authorized **U.Host-Device** shall support the trusted communication channel with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data.

In particular, **U.Host-Device** shall correctly protect the secure channel in order to prevent data modification, disclosure, insertion, deletion and replaying.

OE.Binding-Process

Protection during Binding process

Security procedures shall be used after the TOE delivery to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

In addition, **U.Host-Device** shall provide a secure random source for generating a fresh Binding key (Kb) for the TOE.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

4.3.1 Threats

T.Phys-Manipulation This threat is countered by the security objectives O.Phys-Manipulation. This objective ensures that the protection against manipulation of the user data is provided by the TOE.

T.Phys-Probing This threat is countered by the security objectives O.Phys-Probing. This objective ensures that the protection against disclosure/reconstruction of User Data and TSF Data while stored in the Flash is provided by the TOE.

T.Malfunction This threat is countered by the security objectives O.Malfunction. This objective ensures the correct operation of the TOE outside the normal operating conditions.

T.Abuse-Func This threat is countered by the security objectives O.Abuse-Func. This objective prevents that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order to manipulate/disclose sensitive user data stored in the TOE.

T.Leak-Inherent This threat is countered by the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent. This objective ensures the protection against disclosure of confidential data stored and processed in the TOE.

T.Leak-Forced This threat is countered by the security objectives O.Leak-Forced. This objective ensures the protection against disclosure of confidential data stored and processed in the TOE even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker.

T.Abuse-Communication This threat is countered by the security objective O.Trusted-Path. This objective protects the integrity of the User/TSF data communicated with U.Host-Device and the confidentiality of the User/TSF data read by U.Host-Device.

T.Host-Forging This threat is countered by the security objectives:

- o O.Trusted-Path to protect the integrity of the User data communicated with U.Host-Device and the confidentiality of the User data read by U.Host-Device

- o O.Sec-Binding to protect against the disclosure of the User data when the TOE is re-bound to another Host device

4.3.2 Assumptions

A.Secure-Channel Since OE.Secure-Channel requires the Host device to implement the protection assumed in A.Secure-Channel, the assumption is covered by this objective.

A.Binding-Process Since OE.Binding-Process requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to implement those measures assumed in A.Binding-Process, the assumption is covered by this objective.

4.3.3 SPD and Security Objectives

Threats	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	Section 4.3.1
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing	Section 4.3.1
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	Section 4.3.1
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func	Section 4.3.1
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent	Section 4.3.1
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced	Section 4.3.1
T.Abuse-Communication	O.Trusted-Path	Section 4.3.1
T.Host-Forging	O.Trusted-Path , O.Sec-Binding	Section 4.3.1

Table 4 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage

Security Objectives	Threats
O.Phys-Probing	T.Phys-Probing
O.Malfunction	T.Malfunction
O.Phys-Manipulation	T.Phys-Manipulation
O.Abuse-Func	T.Abuse-Func
O.Leak-Inherent	T.Leak-Inherent
O.Leak-Forced	T.Leak-Forced
O.Sec-Binding	T.Host-Forging
O.Trusted-Path	T.Abuse-Communication , T.Host-Forging

Table 5 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage

Assumptions	Security Objectives for the Operational Environment	Rationale
A.Secure-Channel	OE.Secure-Channel	Section 4.3.2
A.Binding-Process	OE.Binding-Process	Section 4.3.2

Table 6 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage

Security Objectives for the Operational Environment	Assumptions
OE.Secure-Channel	A.Secure-Channel
OE.Binding-Process	A.Binding-Process

Table 7 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage

5 Extended Requirements

5.1 Extended Families

5.1.1 Extended Family *FMT_LIM* - Limited capabilities and availability

5.1.1.1 Description

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE (refer to Section 6.1) appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.

The family "Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)" is specified as follows.

FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability

Family behaviour

This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the component Limited Capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.

Component levelling:



FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE's life-cycle.

Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

5.1.1.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FMT_LIM.1

Description

Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Definition

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)

Extended Component FMT_LIM.2

Description

Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE's life-cycle.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Definition

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)

Application Note:

The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limitation of capabilities and limitation of availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the same policy or two mutual supportive policies related to the same functionality. This allows e.g. that

(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced or conversely

(ii) the TSF is designed with high functionality but is removed or disabled in the product in its user environment.

5.1.2 Extended Family FDP_SDC - Stored data confidentiality

5.1.2.1 Description

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FDP_SDC.1) of the Class FDP (User data protection) is defined here.

The family "Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC)" is specified as follows.

FDP_SDC Stored data confidentiality

Family behaviour

This family provides requirements that address protection of user data confidentiality while these data are stored within memory areas protected by the TSF. The TSF provides access to the data in the memory through the specified interfaces only and prevents compromise of their information bypassing these interfaces. It complements the family Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI) which protects the user data from integrity errors while being stored in the memory.

Component levelling:

FDP_SDC Stored data confidentiality — **1**

FDP_SDC.1 Requires the TOE to protect the confidentiality of information of the user data in specified memory areas.

Management: FDP_SDC.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FDP_SDC.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

5.1.2.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FDP_SDC.1

Description

Requires the TOE to protect the confidentiality of information of the user data in specified memory areas.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

*Definition***FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality**

FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the **[assignment: memory areas]**.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

6 Security Requirements

6.1 Security Functional Requirements

6.1.1 Malfunctions

FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance

FRU_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following failures occur: [assignment: list of type of failures].

The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following failures occur: ***exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1/Detectors).***

Application Note:

The term "failure" above means "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstance" defined above.

FPT_FLS.1/Detectors Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1/Detectors The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

- o ***Out-of-specified range voltage***
- o ***Out-of-specified range temperature***
- o ***Out-of specified range clock frequency***
- o ***Power glitch.***

Application Note:

The term "failure" above means "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstance" defined above.

The secure state is maintained by TSF's detectors. The TSF's detectors monitor the failures. If a failure happens, the TSF disturbs the cryptographic computations, interrupts data interchange and inform **U.Host-Device**.

6.1.2 Abuse of Functionality

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability policy].

The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced ***Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.***

Application Note:

In the Test mode, the following restrictions are enforced by the TSF:

- The Binding Key (Kb) cannot be read out by the Flash commands;
- The Binding key cannot be erased unless a complete erase has been done after the last reset;
- The read and write commands do not read and write effective values of the flash array;

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited availability policy].

The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced ***Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.***

Application Note:

The switch from Normal mode to Test mode is allowed after TOE delivery but after the flash array is completely erased.

6.1.3 Physical Manipulation and Probing

FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality

FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the [assignment: memory areas].

The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the ***Flash array.***

FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action

FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [assignment: integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment: user data attributes].

The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for **CRC-32 error detecting code** on all objects, based on the following attributes: **stored in the Flash array**.

FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [assignment: action to be taken].

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall **inform U.Host-Device about the error. In addition, the TSF also sends a pseudo-randomly chosen part of the CRC-32 error detecting bits to U.Host-Device in a secure manner so that data integrity can be independently verified by U.Host-Device.**

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the **TSF** by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Application Note:

The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, "automatic response" means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

6.1.4 Leakage**FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection**

FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to prevent the [selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use] of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** to prevent the **disclosure** of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

Application Note:

The Flash array and the SFF are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.

FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from [selection: disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

The TSF shall protect TSF data from **disclosure** when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Application Note:

The Flash array and the SFF are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP].

The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** on **User data that is processed or transferred by the TOE or by U.Host-Device**.

Application Note:

The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Data Processing Policy is defined for the requirement "Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)"

"User data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the U.Host-Device decides to communicate the User data via an external interface".

6.1.5 Secure Data Exchange**FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality**

FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** to **transmit** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] errors.

The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification, deletion, and insertion** errors.

FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] has occurred.

The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification**, **deletion**, and **insertion** has occurred.

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path

FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].

The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and **remote** users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **modification and disclosure**.

Application Note:

The protection against disclosure is only provided for data transmitted from the TSF (to **U.Host-Device**). The protection against modification is provided for all communicated data.

FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

The TSF shall permit **remote users** to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for **any access to User data stored in the Flash array**.

6.1.6 Protection of Binding Key

FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1/Binding_Key The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **integrity failure on Binding Key**.

Application Note:

The secure state is defined as follows:

- if the Binding key is illegally modified, then the TOE is locked;
- if the Binding key is erased, then the TOE User data (stored in the Flash array) is also erased;

FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

FDP_RIP.1.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of the **Flash array** is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: list of objects].

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of the **Flash array** is made unavailable upon the **allocation of the resource to and deallocation of the resource from** the following objects: **the Binding key (Kb)**.

Application Note:

- "Object Allocation" means that a new Binding key is set in order to replace the current Binding key.
- "Object Deallocation" means that the current Binding key is erased from the TSF (more precisely, from the auxiliary array).

6.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Evaluation Assurance Level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.

6.2.1 Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements

6.2.1.1 Refinement regarding Vulnerability Analysis (AVA_VAN)

Application Note:

Evaluator may assess the **Flash array** content protection in addition to the vulnerability analysis related to the SFR FDP_SDC.1 in order to assess effectiveness of the security architecture if relevant security features of the TOE are identified.

Application Note:

The Vulnerability Analysis will assess the resistance against Side Channel Attacks to meet the SFP "Data Processing Policy" defined for the SFR "Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)" and the security architecture aspect non-bypassability of the SFR "Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)".

6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

6.3.1 Objectives

6.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

O.Phys-Probing The SFR FDP_SDC.1 requires the TSF to protect the confidentiality of the user data stored in specified memory areas and prevent its compromise by physical attacks bypassing the specified interfaces for memory access. The scenario of physical probing as described for this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.

O.Malfunction The definition of this objective shows that it covers a situation, where malfunction of the TOE might be caused by the operating conditions of the TOE (while direct manipulation of the TOE is covered O.Phys-Manipulation). There are two possibilities in this situation: Either the operating conditions are inside the tolerated range or at least one of them is outside of this range. The second case is covered by FPT_FLS.1/Detectors, because it states that a secure state is preserved in this case. The first case is covered by FRU_FLT.2 because it states that the TOE operates correctly under normal (tolerated) conditions.

O.Phys-Manipulation The SFR FDP_SDI.2 requires the TSF to detect the integrity errors of the stored user data and react in case of detected errors. More precisely, FDP_SDI.2 prevents manipulation of memory contents by ensuring detection and response from the TSF (use of a failure counter and capability to lock the session or the TOE itself).

The scenario of physical manipulation as described for this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.

O.Abuse-Func This objective states that abuse of functions (especially provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software, for instance in order to read secret data) must not be possible when TOE is used by the final user. There are two possibilities to achieve this: (i) They cannot be used by an attacker (i. e. its availability is limited) or (ii) using them would not be of relevant use for an attacker (i. e. its capabilities are limited) since the functions are designed in a specific way. The first possibility is specified by FMT_LIM.2 and the second one by FMT_LIM.1. Since these requirements are combined to support the policy, which is suitable to fulfil O.Abuse-Func, both security functional requirements together are suitable to meet the objective. Other security functional requirements (FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1/Detectors and FDP_IFC.1) which prevent attackers from circumventing the functions implementing these two security functional requirements (for instance by manipulating the hardware) also support the objective. The relevant objectives are O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced.

O.Leak-Inherent The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1 together with the policy statement in FDP_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of disclosure of secret data (TSF data as well as user data) when while being processed. This includes that attackers cannot reveal such data by measurements of

emanations, power consumption or other behaviour of the TOE while data is processed by TOE parts.

O.Leak-Forced This objective is directed against attacks, where an attacker wants to force an information leakage, which would not occur under normal conditions. In order to achieve this the attacker has to combine a first attack step, which modifies the behaviour of the TOE (either by exposing it to extreme operating conditions or by directly manipulating it) with a second attack step measuring and analysing some output produced by the TOE. The first step is prevented by the same mechanisms which support O.Malfunction (FPT_FLS.1/Detectors, FRU_FLT.2) and O.Phys-Manipulation (FPT_PHP.3), respectively. The requirements covering O.Leak-Inherent (FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1) also support O.Leak-Forced because they prevent the attacker from being successful if he tries the second step directly.

O.Sec-Binding The security functional requirement FDP_RIP.1 ensures that the User data is erased before the Host device is changed.

O.Trusted-Path The security functional requirement FTP_TRP.1 contribute in this protection because it only establishes a trusted path between the TSF and authorized **U.Host-Device** for the communication purpose.

The security functional requirement FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key protects the Binding key against the tampering.

The security functional requirements FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 protect against the modification (integrity) of the User Data communicated with **U.Host-Device** and against the disclosure (confidentiality) of the User data read by **U.Host-Device**.

6.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements	Rationale
O.Phys-Probing	FPT_PHP.3 , FDP_SDC.1	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Malfunction	FRU_FLT.2 , FPT_FLS.1/Detectors	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Phys-Manipulation	FDP_SDI.2 , FPT_PHP.3	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Abuse-Func	FDP_ITT.1 , FPT_ITT.1 , FPT_PHP.3 , FRU_FLT.2 , FPT_FLS.1/Detectors , FMT_LIM.1 , FMT_LIM.2 , FDP_IFC.1	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Leak-Inherent	FDP_ITT.1 , FPT_ITT.1 , FDP_IFC.1	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Leak-Forced	FDP_ITT.1 , FPT_ITT.1 , FRU_FLT.2 , FPT_FLS.1/Detectors , FPT_PHP.3 , FDP_IFC.1	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Sec-Binding	FDP_RIP.1	Section 6.3.1.1
O.Trusted-Path	FDP_UCT.1 , FDP_UIT.1 , FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key , FTP_TRP.1	Section 6.3.1.1

Table 8 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage

Security Functional Requirements	Security Objectives
FRU_FLT.2	O.Malfunction , O.Abuse-Func , O.Leak-Forced
FPT_FLS.1/Detectors	O.Malfunction , O.Abuse-Func , O.Leak-Forced
FMT_LIM.1	O.Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2	O.Abuse-Func
FDP_SDC.1	O.Phys-Probing
FDP_SDI.2	O.Phys-Manipulation
FPT_PHP.3	O.Phys-Probing , O.Phys-Manipulation , O.Abuse-Func , O.Leak-Forced
FDP_ITT.1	O.Abuse-Func , O.Leak-Inherent , O.Leak-Forced
FPT_ITT.1	O.Abuse-Func , O.Leak-Inherent , O.Leak-Forced
FDP_IFC.1	O.Abuse-Func , O.Leak-Inherent , O.Leak-Forced
FDP_UCT.1	O.Trusted-Path
FDP_UIT.1	O.Trusted-Path
FTP_TRP.1	O.Trusted-Path
FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key	O.Trusted-Path
FDP_RIP.1	O.Sec-Binding

Table 9 SFRs and Security Objectives

6.3.3 Dependencies

6.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FRU_FLT.2	(FPT_FLS.1)	FPT_FLS.1/Detectors
FPT_FLS.1/Detectors	No Dependencies	
FMT_LIM.1	(FMT_LIM.2)	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	(FMT_LIM.1)	FMT_LIM.1
FDP_SDC.1	No Dependencies	
FDP_SDI.2	No Dependencies	
FPT_PHP.3	No Dependencies	
FDP_ITT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)	FDP_IFC.1
FPT_ITT.1	No Dependencies	
FDP_IFC.1	(FDP_IFF.1)	
FDP_UCT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_IFC.1 , FTP_TRP.1
FDP_UIT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_IFC.1 , FTP_TRP.1
FTP_TRP.1	No Dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key	No Dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1	No Dependencies	

Table 10 SFRs Dependencies

Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies

The dependency FDP_IFF.1 of FDP_IFC.1 is discarded. Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of FDP_IFC.1 (information flow control policy statement) on FDP_IFF.1 (Simple security attributes). The specification of FDP_IFF.1 would not capture the nature of the security functional requirement nor add any detail.

As stated in the Data Processing Policy referred to in FDP_IFC.1, there are no attributes necessary. The security functional requirement for the TOE is sufficiently described using FDP_ITT.1 and its Data Processing Policy (FDP_IFC.1).

6.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_IMP.1 , ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1	(ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_TDS.4 , ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_IMP.1 , ADV_TDS.4 , ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4	(ADV_FSP.5)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1	(ADV_FSP.1)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1	No Dependencies	
ALC_CMC.4	(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1)	ALC_CMS.5 , ALC_DVS.2 , ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5	No Dependencies	
ALC_DEL.1	No Dependencies	
ALC_DVS.2	No Dependencies	
ALC_LCD.1	No Dependencies	
ALC_TAT.2	(ADV_IMP.1)	ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ASE_ECD.1 , ASE_INT.1 , ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1	No Dependencies	
ASE_INT.1	No Dependencies	
ASE_OBJ.2	(ASE_SPD.1)	ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)	ASE_ECD.1 , ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1	No Dependencies	
ASE_TSS.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , ASE_INT.1 , ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_ARC.1 , ADV_TDS.4 , ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1	(ATE_COV.1)	ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , AGD_OPE.1 , AGD_PRE.1 , ATE_COV.2 , ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_DPT.1)	ADV_ARC.1 , ADV_FSP.5 , ADV_IMP.1 , ADV_TDS.4 , AGD_OPE.1 , AGD_PRE.1 , ATE_DPT.3

Table 11 SARs Dependencies

6.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements

The assurance level EAL5 and the augmentation with the requirements ALC_DVS.2, and AVA_VAN.5 were chosen in order to meet assurance expectations explained in the following paragraphs.

An assurance level of EAL5 with the augmentations AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 are required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against sophisticated attacks. This evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defence against such attacks, the evaluators should have access to the low level design and source code.

6.3.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE.

In the particular case of a memory flash the TOE is developed and produced within a complex and distributed industrial process which must especially be protected. Details about the implementation, (e.g. from design, test and development tools as well as Initialisation Data) may make such attacks easier. Therefore, in the case of a memory flash, maintaining the confidentiality of the design is very important.

This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (which only requires ALC_DVS.1). ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.

6.3.6 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Due to the intended use of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.

Independent vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing high attack potential.

AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies to ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.2 "Security enforcing functional specification", ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design", ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF", AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user guidance", and AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures". All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.

It has to be assumed that attackers with high attack potential try to attack memory flashes embedded in smart cards used for digital signature applications or payment systems. Therefore, specifically AVA_VAN.5 was chosen in order to assure that even these attackers cannot successfully attack the TOE.

7 TOE Summary Specification

This Chapter describes the TSF security functionality by a set of security features and justifies how the SFR defined in Chapter 6 are enforced by those features.

7.1 TOE Summary Specification

SF.SEC-COM

Secure communication

SF.SEC-COM protects the integrity of the communication between the TOE and **U.Host-Device** against probing, Man-in-the-Middle and hammering attacks. The confidentiality of the communication is also protected when data stored in the TOE is read by **U.Host-Device**. In particular,

- o a fresh session key is used for each session;
- o for reading operation: 8 transport integrity check bits are added to each 32 bit long word, providing a progressive authentication of the transmitted data; the payload is encrypted using the session key.
- o for update operations (write/erase): a MAC digest is added to ensure integrity;

SF.PHY-PRO

Physical protection

SF.PHY-PRO protects the TOE against physical manipulation (including the TOE probing). SF.PHY-PRO includes the following security mechanisms:

- o Failure counter: this counter is incremented after each tamper-detection and the TOE is locked if the counter reaches a pre-defined value.
- o Active Shielding: The Active Shield detection is filtered using a counter, when that number reaches a preset threshold, the Active Shield raises a tamper alarm.
- o Dual flip-flop and Path-differential signaling: A difference in the state of two joint flip-flops indicates a fault and raises the Fault Injection Alarm output signal. This mechanism is designed to detect perturbation attacks like Laser or Electro-Magnetic fault injections.
- o State machine monitoring: The TOE implements Tamper Detectors that detects abnormal conditions and reports a fault state.

SF.PHY-PRO also protects the TOE against the inherent or intentional leak of the TOE operations by the following security mechanisms:

- o advanced stream cipher using long linear feedback shift registers: the calculations are protected against timing and power consumption leak;
- o anti-DPA measures for the hash functions that are used for stream-ciphering and MAC digest: masking input data and undisclosed of intermediate output values;
- o session setup: the logic is protected against timing and power consumption leak;

SF.OPE-MODE

Control of Operating Modes

SF.OPE-MODE ensures that the User Data is not disclosed or manipulated via the features available in the TEST mode.

In particular, the Flash array is completely erased before switching to TEST mode. Furthermore, the access to User data is also restricted in the Test mode. More precisely:

- o The Binding Key (Kb) cannot be read out by the Flash commands;
- o The Binding key cannot be erased unless a complete erase has been done after the last reset;
- o The read and write commands do not read and write effective values of the Flash array;

SF.OPE-COND

Control of Operating Conditions

SF.OPE-COND detects the abnormal operation conditions (voltage, temperature, clock frequency, power glitch) using the corresponding sensors.

If an abnormal operation condition happens, then SF.OPE-COND disturbs the cryptographic computations, interrupts data interchange and inform **U.Host-Device**.

SF.SEC-MEM-INT

Storage Integrity

SF.SEC-MEM-INT protects the integrity of the User Data (including executable codes) stored in the flash array using CRC-32 error detecting code. All User data can be protected by CRC-32 error detecting code but the integrity verification is performed only if the access is done via an authenticated read (i.e. AUTH_READ command).

If an inconsistency is detected between a User data and its error detecting code, then SF.SEC-MEM-INT informs U.Host-Device about the error.

In addition, SF.SEC-MEM-INT also sends pseudo-randomly chosen of the CRC-32 error detecting code to **U.Host-Device** in a secure way so that data integrity can be independently verified by **U.Host-Device**.

SF.SEC-MEM-CONF

Storage Confidentiality

SF.SEC-MEM-CONF protects the confidentiality of the User Data stored in the flash array by a memory scrambling mechanism that is based on diversified keys. Both the addresses and the memory content are scrambled but by a key that is unique for each instance of the TOE.

SF.KEY-PRO

Protection of Binding Key

SF.KEY-PRO protects the User data against disclosure by manipulating the binding key. In particular, the Flash array is completely erased before

- o a new Binding key is set, or
- o the current Binding key is erased.

Furthermore, the current Binding key is stored in the Auxiliary array and cannot be read out by the Flash commands. The integrity of the Binding key is protected by a digest value: if an illegal modification is detected on the Binding key, then the TOE is locked and can only be unlocked in Test mode (and the Flash array has been erased).

SF.SEC-AUTH**Secure Authentication**

SF.SEC-AUTH ensures that only an authorized Host device (i.e. a Host device that knows the Binding key K_b) can open a secure channel to communicate with the TOE.

More precisely, SF.SEC-AUTH provides a mutual authentication between the Host device and the TOE by verifying that both of them share the same Binding key. A failed authentication increases the Failure counter: if this counter reaches a pre-defined value, then the TOE is locked.

7.2 SFRs and TSS

7.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale

7.2.1.1 TOE Summary Specification

SF.SEC-COM SF.SEC-COM enforces the FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 because the the User Data is protected while being transmitted to **U.Host-Device**. SF.SEC-COM enforces the FDP_IFC.1 in particular the user data is protected in terms of confidentiality when being transferred by the TOE to **U.Host-Device**. Moreover, the user data is protected in terms of integrity during the communication between the TOE and **U.Host-Device**.

SF.PHY-PRO SF.PHY-PRO enforces the TOE resistance against physical attacks (FPT_PHP.3). SF.PHY-PRO contributes to the integrity and confidentiality protection of the User data stored in the TOE (FDP_SDI.2 and FDP_SDC.1): the failure counter is increased when a data inconsistency is detected; the cryptographic services are also protected against the physical attacks. SF.PHY-PRO protects against some attacks on the cryptographic services used for the transmission of the User data (FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1).

SF.OPE-MODE SF.OPE-MODE enforces the restriction of the TSF capabilities and availability during the deployment of the test features after the TOE delivery (respectively FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2).

SF.OPE-COND SF.OPE-COND enforces the TOE fault-tolerance and fail-secure (respectively FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1/Detectors).

SF.SEC-MEM-INT By definition, SF.SEC-MEM-INT enforces FDP_SDI.2.

SF.SEC-MEM-CONF By definition, SF.SEC-MEM-CONF enforces FDP_SDC.1. SF.SEC-MEM-CONF also enforces the FDP_IFC.1 in particular the User data and TSF data are protected in terms of confidentiality when being stored, processed or transferred between two TOE components (SFF and Flash array).

SF.KEY-PRO SF.KEY-PRO enforces FDP_RIP.1 because it erases the Flash content before a new Binding key is set or the current Binding key is erased. SF.KEY-PRO also detects the failure and put the TOE in a secure state (i.e. locked state) due to an illegal modification of the current Binding key. In other words, SF.BIND-KEY-PRO enforces FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key.

SF.SEC-AUTH SF.SEC-AUTH enforces the FTP_TRP.1 because only an authorized **U.Host-Device** can open a trusted channel with the TOE.

7.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS

Security Functional Requirements	TOE Summary Specification
FRU_FLT.2	SF.OPE-COND

Security Functional Requirements	TOE Summary Specification
FPT_FLS.1/Detectors	SF.OPE-COND
FMT_LIM.1	SF.OPE-MODE
FMT_LIM.2	SF.OPE-MODE
FDP_SDC.1	SF.PHY-PRO , SF.SEC-MEM-CONF
FDP_SDI.2	SF.PHY-PRO , SF.SEC-MEM-INT
FPT_PHP.3	SF.PHY-PRO
FDP_ITT.1	SF.PHY-PRO
FPT_ITT.1	SF.PHY-PRO
FDP_IFC.1	SF.SEC-MEM-CONF , SF.SEC-COM , SF.PHY-PRO
FDP_UCT.1	SF.SEC-COM
FDP_UIT.1	SF.SEC-COM
FTP_TRP.1	SF.SEC-AUTH
FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key	SF.KEY-PRO
FDP_RIP.1	SF.KEY-PRO

Table 12 SFRs and TSS - Coverage

TOE Summary Specification	Security Functional Requirements
SF.SEC-COM	FDP_IFC.1 , FDP_UCT.1 , FDP_UIT.1
SF.PHY-PRO	FDP_SDC.1 , FDP_SDI.2 , FPT_PHP.3 , FDP_ITT.1 , FPT_ITT.1 , FDP_IFC.1
SF.OPE-MODE	FMT_LIM.1 , FMT_LIM.2
SF.OPE-COND	FRU_FLT.2 , FPT_FLS.1/Detectors
SF.SEC-MEM-INT	FDP_SDI.2
SF.SEC-MEM-CONF	FDP_SDC.1 , FDP_IFC.1
SF.KEY-PRO	FPT_FLS.1/Binding_Key , FDP_RIP.1
SF.SEC-AUTH	FTP_TRP.1

Table 13 TSS and SFRs - Coverage

8 Notice

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8.1 Revisions

Modification	Comment
1.0	First version
1.1	Update following ST v1.13
1.2	Update following ST v1.14

Table 14 History of Modifications

9 ANNEX

9.1 Glossary

SFI

Secure Flash Interface is the SPI interface on the Host device (i.e. SPI Master).

SFF

Secure Flash Front-end is the SPI interface on the memory chip (i.e. SPI Slave).

SPI

Serial Peripheral Interface is a synchronous serial data link, a *de facto* standard, that operates in full duplex mode.

9.2 Abbreviations

CC

Common Criteria

EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level

IT

Information Technology

PP

Protection Profile

ST

Security Target

TOE

Target of Evaluation

TSC

TSF Scope of Control

TSF

TOE Security Functionality

TSFI

TSF Interface

TSP

TOE Security Policy

9.3 References

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