



**Swedish Certification Body for IT Security**

## Certification Report - Blue Coat ProxySG

**Issue: 2.0, 2019-feb-01**

*Products covered in this Certification Report:*

- Blue Coat ProxySG,
- Blue Coat Reverse Proxy
- Blue Coat Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance
- Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance
- Symantec Advanced Secure Gateway

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# 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation, TOE, is a network device. The purpose of the TOE is to provide a layer of security between an Internal and External Network (typically an office network and the Internet). The TOE allows administrators to create and manage configurable policies on controlled protocol traffic to and from the Internal Network users. A policy may include authentication, authorization, content filtering, and auditing.

The TOE is the Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat RP, Blue Coat RP VA, Blue Coat SWG VA, and Symantec ASG. The ProxySG, RP, and ASG run on the S400 and S500 hardware platforms. The SWG VA and RP VA are virtual appliances and are not tied to any specific hardware.

The TOE software is the following:

- Version 6.7.3.103
- Build 216856 (ProxySG, Reverse Proxy, Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance)
- Build 216878 (Advanced Secure Gateway)

According to [CCADM] section 1.4 Configuration Constraints, SAML Authentication should not be used in the evaluated configuration.

The ST claims conformance to Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.0, 27 February 2015. The NIT technical decisions that have been applied to the Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile can be found in the ST.

There are six assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the nine threats and comply with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST. The assumptions, the threat and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.

The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB and EWA-Canada. The evaluation was completed in 2018-09-28. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 5. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL 1, augmented by ASE\_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition.

Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada operates as a Foreign location for Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluators by reviewing all successive versions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level:

EAL 1 + ASE\_SPD.1 and in accordance with the NDcPP v1.0 Evaluation Activities.

The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Combitech AB.

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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification

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Certification Identification	
Certification ID	CSEC2017010
Name and version of the certified IT product	Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, and the Symantec Advanced Secure Gateway, Version 6.7.3.103, Build 216856 (ProxySG, Reverse Proxy, Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance), Build 216878 (Advanced Secure Gateway) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• S400-20</li><li>• S400-30</li><li>• S400-40</li><li>• S500-10</li><li>• S500-20</li><li>• S500-30</li></ul>
Security Target Identification	Symantec Corporation Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, and Symantec Advanced Secure Gateway Software Version: 6.7 Security Target, version 1.6, 2019-01-15
EAL	EAL1 + SPD.1 and NDcPP v1.0
Sponsor	Symantec Corporation
Developer	Symantec Corporation
ITSEF	Combitech AB
Common Criteria version	3.1 release 5
CEM version	3.1 release 5
QMS version	1.21.4
Recognition Scope	CCRA, SOGIS och EA/MLA
Certification date	2018-11-06

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## 3 Security Policy

The TOE provides the following security services:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted Path/Channels

### 3.1 Security Audit

The Network Appliances provide extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event.

### 3.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptographic support for the following features,

- TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 and HTTPS connectivity with the following entities:
  - Management Web Browser,
  - Audit Server.
- SSH connectivity with the following entities:
  - Management SSH Client.
- Secure software update

### 3.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs administrator interfaces (local CLI, remote CLI, and remote GUI). The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. In the Common Criteria evaluated configuration, the TOE is configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on any TOE administrative.

### 3.4 Security Management

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. Management can take place over a variety of interfaces including:

- Local console command line administration;
- Remote CLI administration via SSH;
- Remote GUI administration via HTTPS/TLS.

All administration functions can be accessed via, remote CLI, remote GUI or via a direct connection to the TOE. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage the below listed functions;

- All TOE administrative users;

- All identification and authentication;
- All audit functionality of the TOE;
- All TOE cryptographic functionality;
- The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
- Update to the TOE.

### **3.5 Protection of the TSF**

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, the TOE software (6.7.3) is custom-built for the appliance.

The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE's clock manually. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the security appliances themselves. The TOE verifies all software updates via digital signature (2048-bit RSA/SHA-256) and requires administrative intervention prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.

### **3.6 TOE Access**

The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. The TOE displays an Authorized Administrator specified banner on both the CLI and GUI management interfaces prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

### **3.7 Trusted Path/Channels**

The TOE supports several types of secure communications, including,

- Trusted paths with remote administrators over SSH,
- Trusted paths with remote administrators over TLS/HTTPS,
- Trusted channels with remote IT environment audit servers over TLS.

## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 4.1 Usage Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes five assumptions on the usage of the TOE.

#### A.LIMITED\_FUNCTIONALITY

The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example the device should not provide computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

#### A.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION

A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices (e.g, firewall).

#### A.TRUSTED\_ADMINISTRATOR

The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

#### A.REGULAR\_UPDATES

The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

#### A.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE

The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

### 4.2 Environmental Assumptions

One assumption on the environment is made in the Security Target.

#### A.PHYSICAL\_PROTECTION

The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.

### 4.3 Organisational Security Policies (OSPs),

The Security Target [ST] places one Organizational Security Policy on the TOE.

#### P.ACCESS\_BANNER



The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

## 4.4 Clarification of Scope

The Security Target [ST] contains nine threats, which have been considered during the evaluation.

### T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATOR\_ACCESS

Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to the network device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.

### T.WEAK\_CRYPTOGRAPHY

Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.

### T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS

Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.

### T.WEAK\_AUTHENTICATION\_ENDPOINTS

Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compromised.

### T.UPDATE\_COMPROMISE

Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.

### T.UNDETECTED\_ACTIVITY

Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the network device without administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.

### T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_COMPROMISE

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Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials include replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.

**T.PASSWORD\_CRACKING**

Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other network devices.

**T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_FAILURE**

A component of the network device may fail during start-up or during operations causing a compromise or failure in the security functionality of the network device, leaving the device susceptible to attackers.

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a hardware and software solution that is comprised of the network device and its configurations described above. The diagram below depicts the evaluated configuration. The red rectangle represents the physical boundary of the TOE.




Figure 1, Physical boundary for the ProxySG, RP, and ASG S400 and S500 appliances




Figure 2 Physical Boundary for the SWG and RP VA

The IPv4 network on which the TOE resides is considered part of the environment. The software for the physical appliances is pre-installed and is comprised of only the software versions identified in [ST] section 1.2.

The TOE physical boundary includes the following appliances:

- S400-20
- S400-30
- S400-40
- S500-10
- S500-20

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- S500-30

For the virtual appliances, the TOE physical boundary also includes the following:

- VMware ESXi 6.5 Hypervisor
- A single Guest Virtual Machine (SWG VA or RP VA)
- Hardware platform (Dell Precision T3610 for this evaluation) providing:
  - Intel Xeon processor E5-1600 with up to 6 cores
  - Minimum 4GB memory
  - Integrated Gigabit Ethernet controller
  - Minimum 1 hard drive with at least 100GB free space

No other virtual machines may be installed on the same hardware platform as the SWG VA or RP VA.

Dependencies on Other Hardware, Firmware and Software

In addition, as part of the evaluation, the TOE IT environment includes the use of

- Remote Management Workstation (GUI);
- Remote Management Workstation (CLI);
- Local Management Workstation (CLI); and
- Audit Server

Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration

According to [CCADM] section 1.4 Configuration Constraints, SAML Authentication should not be used in the evaluated configuration.

## 6 Documentation

For proper configuration of the TOE into the evaluated configuration, the following guidance documents are available:

- Symantec Corporation Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy, Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, and Symantec Advanced Secure Gateway Firmware Version: 6.7.3 Common Criteria Administrative Guidance Document version 0.3
- SGOS Administration Guide Version 6.7.x Document Revision: SGOS 6.7.2.1—11/2017-N
- Command Line Interface Reference Version 6.7.x Document Revision: SGOS 6.7.x—07/2017-B

## 7 IT Product Testing

The evaluator testing was executed on Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, Advanced Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, and the Advanced Secure Gateway. The TOE software was version 6.7.3.103, Build 216856 (ProxySG, Reverse Proxy, Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance) and Build 216878 (Advanced Secure Gateway).

The tested appliances are according to equivalency rationale:

- ASG S400-40
- SG S500-20
- Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, SWG-VA
- Blue Coat Advanced Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, ARP-VA

Testing was also performed on the previous versions 6.7.3.101 and 6.7.3.102.

The tests were executed in Combitech's test lab, Sundbyberg, Sweden..

### 7.1 Evaluator Testing

The test configuration and the test cases follows the test requirements for each SFR placed in NDcPP. The test cases provide coverage for the TOE interfaces and SFRs. The results of all test cases were consistent with the expected test results and all tests were judged to pass.

### 7.2 Penetration Testing

The following types of penetration tests were performed:

- Port scan
- Vulnerability scanning
- Protocol fuzzing

Port scans were run after installation and configuration had been done according the guidance documentation. The purpose was to check that no unexpected ports were opened unfiltered and no unexpected services available. The Nmap ([www.nmap.org](http://www.nmap.org)) port scan tool was used. Four different modes were used: TCP Connect, TCP SYN, UDP, and IP protocol scans. All possible 65535 ports were scanned for TCP/UDP.

Nessus ([www.tenable.com](http://www.tenable.com)) vulnerability scans were run. No issues concerning the evaluated configuration were found.

The ICMP and TCP protocols were fuzzed with 256 strings using scapy (<http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy>).

All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE evaluated configuration for the physical appliances is comprised of at least one of the following: S400-20, S400-30, S400-40, S500-10, S500-20, or S500-30. For the SWG VA and the RP VA, the TOE evaluated configuration is comprised of one instance of the VA executing on a Dell Precision T3610 hardware platform with ESXi 6.5. The evaluated configuration also supports the following required external IT entities;

Remote Management Workstation (GUI).	This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a web browser installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through HTTPS and TLS protected channels.
Remote Management Workstation (CLI).	This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with an SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through SSH protected channels.
Local Management Workstation (CLI).	This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a local CLI support that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through a direct connection.
Audit Server	The audit server is used for remote storage of audit records that have been generated by and pulled from the TOE.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.

The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].

The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.

The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:

Development	ADV	PASS
Functional Specification	ADV_FSP.1	PASS
Guidance Documents	AGD	PASS
Operational User Guidance	AGD_OPE.1	PASS
Preparative Procedures	AGD_PRE.1	PASS
Life-cycle Support	ALC	PASS
CM Capabilities	ALC_CMC.1	PASS
CM Scope	ALC_CMS.1	PASS
Security Target Evaluation	ASE	PASS
ST Introduction	ASE_INT.1	PASS
Conformance Claims	ASE_CCL.1	PASS
Security Problem Definition	ASE_SPD.1	PASS
Security Objectives	ASE_OBJ.1	PASS
Extended Components Definition	ASE_ECD.1	PASS
Security Requirements	ASE_REQ.1	PASS
TOE Summary Specification	ASE_TSS.1	PASS
Tests	ATE	PASS
Independent Testing	ATE_IND.1	PASS
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA	PASS
Vulnerability Analysis	AVA_VAN.1	PASS



## **10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations**

None.

## 11

## Glossary

ARP	Advanced Reverse Proxy
ASG	Advanced Security Gateway
CA	Certificate Authority
CC	Common Criteria
CLI	Command Line Interface
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	HTTP Secure
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
IP	Internet Protocol
IPv4	Internet Protocol version 4
NDcPP	Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile
OS	Operating System
PP	Protection Profile
RP	Reverse Proxy
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH	Secure Shell
ST	Security Target
SWG	Secure Web Gateway
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSFI	TSF Interface
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
VA	Virtual Appliance

## 12 Bibliography

ST	Symantec Corporation Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, and Symantec Advanced Secure Gateway Software Version: 6.7 Security Target, version 1.6, 2019-01-15
NDcPP	Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) version 1.0
NDSD	NDSD Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, February 2015, version 1.0
CCADM	Symantec Corporation Blue Coat ProxySG, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy, Blue Coat Reverse Proxy Virtual Appliance, Blue Coat Secure Web Gateway Virtual Appliance, and Symantec Advanced Secure Gateway, Common Criteria Administrative Guidance Document, September 26 2018, version 0.7
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1-3, CCMB-2017-04-001 through 003, version 3.1, revision 5
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CCMB-2017-04-004, version 3.1, revision 5
SP-002	Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2018-04-24, version 29.0
SP-188	Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2017-04-04, version 7.0

### A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System

During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management system (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received:

QMS 1.20.5 valid from 2017-06-28

QMS 1.21 valid from 2017-11-15

QMS 1.21.1 valid from 2018-03-09

QMS 1.21.2 valid from 2018-03-09

QMS 1.21.3 valid from 2018-05-24

QMS 1.21.4 valid from 2018-09-13

In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has examined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.

The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS 1.21.4”. The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.20.5 to the current QMS 1.21.4, there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification.

### A.2 Scheme Notes

The following Scheme interpretations have been considered during the certification.

- Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test coverage
- Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
- Scheme Note 21 - NIAP PP Certifications
- Scheme Note 23 - Evaluation Reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs