

SECURITY TARGET

SOPRANO GAMMA 4.1

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1 DOCUMENT INFORMATION

1.1 Amendment history

Version	Date	Revisions
0.1	7 December 2017	Initial draft
1.0	7 December 2017	Initial release
1.1	1 March 2018	Updated per assurance maintenance feedback

1.2 Copyright statement

Copyright © 2018 Soprano Design Pty Ltd (ABN: 50 066 450 397)

2 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION (ASE_INT)

2.1 ST Identification

ST Title	Security Target - Soprano GAMMA 4.1
ST Version	1.1
ST Release Date	1 March 2018

2.2 TOE Identification

TOE Name	Soprano GAMMA
TOE Version	Soprano GAMMA for iOS (Version 4.1) Soprano GAMMA for Android (Version 4.1) Soprano GAMMA Server (Version b473) Soprano GAMMA Registration Server (Version b1) Soprano Mobile Enterprise Messaging Suite (MEMS) (Version b649)
Protection Profile(s)	N/A
CC Identification	Common Criteria for Information Technology (IT) Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 (Revision 4), September 2012 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 (Revision 4), September 2012

2.3 Document organisation

This document is divided into the following sections:

- Section 2 (Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT)) provides the introductory material for the ST;
- Section 3 (Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)) provides the conformance claims for the evaluation;
- Section 4 (Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)) provides the security problem to be addressed by the TOE and the operational environment of the TOE;
- Section 5 (Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)) defines the security objectives for the TOE and the environment;
- Section 6 (Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)) provides a definition and justification for any extended components from CC Parts 2 or 3 that have been developed for the evaluation;
- Section 7 (Security Functional Requirements (ASE_REQ)) contains the functional and assurance requirements derived from the Common Criteria, Part 2 and 3, respectively that must be satisfied by the TOE; and
- Section 8 (TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)) provides a summary of the TOE specification, identifying the IT security functions provided by the TOE.
- Section 9 (Rationale) provides the rationales for the various sections of the Security Target.

2.4 References

- [1] Common Criteria Part 1 (Introduction and general model), Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
- [2] Common Criteria Part 2 (Security functional components), Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
- [3] Common Criteria Part 3 (Security assurance components), Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
- [4] Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012

2.5 TOE overview

2.5.1 TOE type and usage

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Soprano GAMMA. GAMMA is a secure messaging platform for use in enterprise environments. The TOE is comprised of three primary components:

- The GAMMA application (for Android or iOS) – a mobile messaging app running on Android and iOS platforms that allows users to exchange rich media messages using IP based communications with fall-back SMS support for last-mile coverage;
- The GAMMA server – a central server that processes and relays all messages exchanged between mobile devices;
- The GAMMA registration server – which provides a centralised platform for all application installation activities;
- The Mobile Enterprise Messaging Suite (MEMS) – a central server that provides the administration functionality to the GAMMA product, as well as APIs that allow integration with customers' business IT systems.

2.6 TOE description

This section addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE included in the evaluation.

2.6.1 Physical scope of the TOE

Users' mobile devices run the GAMMA app to securely send and receive messages on both the Google Android and Apple iOS platforms. Users download the GAMMA app from the corresponding Google Play Store or Apple App Store.

The GAMMA application communicates with the GAMMA server during registration and for every message that is sent or received. The communication channel between the application and server is protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.

The Mobile Enterprise Messaging Suite (MEMS) provides the following main functions:

- Customer administration. The MEMS server provides a web interface that, among other functions, allows customer administrators to manage users, contacts, as well as configure enterprise-wide settings, such as enabling end-to-end encryption;
- GAMMA secure messaging. In addition, the MEMS server provides users with a web interface for sending messages and includes extended features not available in the GAMMA app, such as the option to define expiry times for sent messages and the ability to wipe (recall) already sent messages;
- Business integration APIs. The MEMS server exposes a set of APIs that can be used by enterprise business applications to integrate with the messaging system. MEMS supports HTTP, WSDL, SMPP and SMTP interfaces.

Both the GAMMA server and MEMS server can be deployed either in an open cloud or a private cloud setting.

The Soprano Registration Server is used during the initial setup of the GAMMA client and provides the functionality required to register a unique device with an enterprise instance or deployment of GAMMA.

2.6.2 Logical scope of the TOE

The TOE is a software-only TOE, comprised of the components listed in Section 2.2 (TOE Identification). The connections between each of the distributed components is illustrated in the following figure:




Figure 1 – Soprano GAMMA architecture

The TOE provides the following logical security functions.

Table 1 – Logical scope of the TOE.

TSF	Description
Security audit	The TOE generates and stores audit files for a variety of auditable events. These events record the identity of the user that caused the event to occur, the date and time, the success/failure of the event and any other pertinent information. The TOE also provides protected storage for audit logs to prevent unauthorised modification and will alert administrative users if storage space is no longer available.
Communication	The TOE provides proof-of-receipt for GAMMA messages sent between users.
Cryptographic support	The TOE implements a variety of key generation and cryptographic functions to protect user data both at rest and in transit between components of the TOE.
User data protection	The TOE implements access control mechanisms to ensure that authorised users only have access to the functionality they have been granted by a customer/platform administrator.
Identification and authentication	The TOE implements mechanisms to ensure that users are both identified and authenticated before any access to TOE functionality or TSF data is granted.
Security management	The TOE provides a suite of management functions for both GAMMA and MEMS, allowing enterprise to customise the solution to meet its needs.
Protection of the TSF	The TOE generates reliable timestamps for use in other security functions (particularly during the generation of audit logs).
TOE access	The TOE provides session control mechanisms for both automated closing of sessions by the TOE and manual termination of sessions by users.
Trusted path/channels	The TOE provides a secure channel between its components using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to prevent TOE data modification or disclosure while in transit.

2.6.2.1 Non-TOE software/hardware requirements

The following table outlines any non-TOE software or hardware requirements for the successful installation and operation of the TOE:

Table 2 – Non-TOE hardware/software requirements

TSF	Description
Soprano GAMMA (Android)	Software <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Android 5.0+ (Lollipop) Evaluated devices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Samsung Galaxy S6, HTC One
Soprano GAMMA (iOS)	Software <ul style="list-style-type: none"> iOS 8 Evaluated devices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus
Soprano GAMMA Server	Software <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linux RHEL6 (x64) Hardware <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient to meet requirements for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6
Soprano MEMS	Software <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linux RHEL6 (x64) TLSv1.2-enabled browsers (Firefox v24 and later, Internet Explorer 8 and later, Chrome v30 and later) Hardware <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient to meet requirements for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6
GAMMA Registration Server	Software <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CentOS 6.4 Hardware <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient to meet requirements for CentOS 6.4.

2.6.3 Summary of out-of-scope items

The following features have not been examined as part of this evaluation:

- Soprano administration functionality of the GAMMA Server, GAMMA Registration Server and MEMS platforms;
- Any enterprise applications that use the Enterprise Integration APIs; and
- The underlying mobile operating system (iOS or Android).

3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS (ASE_CCL)

3.1 CC conformance claim

The ST and TOE are conformant to version 3.1 (Revision 4) of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

- **Part 2 conformant.** Conformant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional requirements, version 3.1, Revision 4.
- **Part 3 conformant.** Conformant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance requirements, version 3.1, Revision 4. The claimed assurance package is EAL2.

3.2 Protection Profile conformance claim

Neither the ST nor TOE claim conformance to any Protection Profiles.

4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION (ASE_SPD)

This section describes the nature of the security problem that the TOE is designed to address. The security problem is described through:

- a set of **threats** that the TOE must mitigate,
- specific **assumptions** about the security aspects of the environment (both IT related and non-IT related elements) in which the TOE will operate, and
- relevant **organisational security policies** that specify rules or guidelines that must be followed by the TOE and/or the operational environment.

4.1 Threats

Table 3 – Identified threats

Threat	Description
T.EAVESDROPPING	A malicious third party may attempt to intercept communications sent between users of the TOE.
T.REQUEST	An authenticated user may attempt to perform unauthorized actions on stored resources that may comprise the confidentiality and/or integrity of the stored identity information.
T.WEAK_CRYPTO	Inappropriate cryptographic functions are implemented by the TOE that may be exploited by a (potential) attacker, using cryptographic analysis techniques, in order to gain access to TOE data.
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS	An unauthorised user or third party may gain unauthorised physical access to a device containing the TOE, allowing direct access to TOE data for export, modification or other purposes.

4.2 Assumptions

Table 4 – Assumptions

Assumption	Description
A.ACCEPTABLE_USE	It is assumed that there is an enterprise acceptable use policy in place governing the use of the GAMMA application.
A.INSTALL	It is assumed that the Soprano GAMMA application is delivered, installed, configured and set up in accordance with documented delivery and installation/setup procedures. It is assumed that the Soprano MEMS environment will be provisioned and configured in accordance with documented procedures.
A.LOGICAL_PROTECT	Any internet connection to a server role is assumed to be appropriately secured by a firewall or similar network security mechanism.
A.NO_EVIL	It is assumed that there will be one or more competent administrators assigned to manage the MEMS/GAMMA Server, its platform and the security of the information both of them contain. It is also assumed that the administrator(s) are not careless, wilfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the administration documentation.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECT	It is assumed that the MEMS server, GAMMA Server, registration server and their associated platforms will be located within facilities providing controlled access to the TOE.
A.UNTRUSTED	It is assumed that no untrusted software is installed on the servers/devices the TOE is installed/provisioned on.

4.3 Organisational security policies

There are no organisational security policies for this Security Target.

5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES (ASE_OBJ)

5.1 Security objectives for the TOE

Table 5 – Security objectives for the TOE

Objective	Objective statement
O.AUDIT_REVIEW	The TOE shall generate audit data and provide the facility for administrators to review these logs.
O.AUTH	The TOE shall prevent unauthorised users from gaining access to TOE functionality or data.
O.AUTH_CONTROL	The TOE shall implement methods to prevent the brute forcing of authentication mechanisms.
O.CRYPTO	The TOE will implement cryptographic capabilities to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS	The TOE will provide protected communication channels for administrators, other parts of a distributed TOE, and authorized IT entities.
O.SESSION_LOCK	The TOE shall provide mechanisms that mitigate the risk of an unattended session being hijacked.
O.WIPE	The TOE shall allow users to wipe messages that they no longer wish to be available to recipients.

5.2 Security objectives for the environment

Table 6 – Security objectives for the environment

Objective	Objective statement
OE.APPS	Soprano GAMMA users will not install any applications on their device that directly impact the security functionality provided by the TOE.
OE.INSTALL	The operational environment shall ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, configured and set up in accordance with documented delivery and installation/setup procedures. The operational environment shall enable the administrator to ensure that the machines the TOE is installed on support the secure operation of the TOE.
OE.LOGICAL_SECURITY	The operational environment shall provide sufficient logical security (such as firewalls) to protect the TOE from external (and internal) malicious users.
OE.NO_EVIL	The operational environment shall provide one or more competent administrators assigned to manage the TOE, its platform and the security of the information both of them contain. The operational environment will ensure that the administrator(s) are not careless, wilfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the administration documentation.
OE.PHYSICAL_SECURITY	Physical security mechanisms, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, are provided by the environment to prevent unauthorised access to the TOE and TSF data.
OE.TRUSTED_USERS	TOE users are trusted to use the application in line with the guidance documentation and any applicable enterprise policies.

6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION (ASE_ECD)

6.1 Extended Components

Neither the TOE nor ST are claiming conformance to any extended requirements from CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.

7 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS (ASE_REQ)

7.1 Overview

This section defines the security requirements satisfied by the TOE. Each requirement has been extracted from version 3.1 (Rev 4) of the CC, Part 2 providing functional requirements and Part 3 providing assurance requirements.

Part 2 of the CC defines an approved set of operations that may be applied to security functional requirements. Following are the approved operations and the document conventions that are used within this ST to depict their application:

- **Assignment:** The assignment operation provides the ability to specify an identified parameter within a requirement. Assignments are depicted using bolded text and are surrounded by square brackets as follows [**assignment**].
- **Selection:** The selection operation allows the specification of one or more items from a list. Selections are depicted using bold italics text and are surrounded by square brackets as follows [***selection***].
- **Refinement:** The refinement operation allows the addition of extra detail to a requirement. Refinements are indicated using bolded text, for **additions**, and strike-through, for ~~deletions~~.
- **Iteration:** The iteration operation allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. Iterations are depicted by placing a number at the end of the component identifier (e.g. FCS_COP.1(1) and FCS_COP.1(2)).

The security functional requirements are expressed using the notation stated above and are identified in the table below.

Table 7 – Security functional requirements

Identifier	Title
Audit (FAU)	
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2	User identity association
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit storage
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss
Communication (FCO)	
FCO_NRR.2	Enforced proof of receipt.
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	
FCS_CKM.1(1)	Cryptographic key generation (RSA)
FCS_CKM.1(2)	Cryptographic key generation (AES)
FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic key distribution (AES)
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1)	Cryptographic operation (AES)
FCS_COP.1(2)	Cryptographic operation (RSA)

Identifier	Title
FCS_COP.1(3)	Cryptographic operation (Signatures)
User Data Protection (FDP)	
FDP_ACC.1(1)	Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1(2)	Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection
Identification and authentication (FIA)	
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication failure handling
FIA_SOS.1	Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2	User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action
Security Management (FMT)	
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialisation
FMT_REV.1	Revocation
FMT_SMF.1(1)	Specification of Management Functions (MEMS)
FMT_SMF.1(2)	Specification of Management Functions (GAMMA)
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps
TOE Access (FTA)	
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated termination
Trusted path/channels (FTP)	
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1	Trusted path

7.2 Audit (FAU)

7.2.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1	The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and c) [the list of auditable events in Table 8 – List of auditable events] .
FAU_GEN.1.2	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [none] .
Notes	None

Table 8 – List of auditable events

Platform	Auditable events
MEMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Login • Contacts: create, read, update and delete • Group: create, read, update and delete • Lists: create, read, update and delete • Message sent/received • Licences: grant/revoke/modify • Change preferences/settings
GAMMA Application	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Login • Message sent/received

7.2.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1	For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
Notes	None

7.2.3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1	The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2	The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
Notes	None

7.2.4 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to	FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1	The TSF shall [<i>ignore audited events</i>] and [provide the administrator with warnings] if the audit trail is full.
Notes	None

7.3 Communication (FCO)

7.3.1 FCO_NRR.2 Enforced proof of receipt

Hierarchical to	FCO_NRR.1 Selective proof of receipt
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FCO_NRR.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of receipt for received [messages sent using the GAMMA application] at all times.
FCO_NRR.2.2	The TSF shall be able to relate the [online status field] of the recipient of the information, and the [read status field] of the information to which the evidence applies.
FCO_NRR.2.3	The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of receipt of information to [originator] given [the recipient is not in "offline" or "do not disturb" mode] .
Notes	None

7.4 Cryptographic support (FCS)

7.4.1 FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (RSA)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1(1).1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [RSA GenKey 9.31] and specified cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4].
Notes	FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

7.4.2 FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (AES)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1(2).1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PBKDF2] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-132].
Notes	FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

7.4.3 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution (AES)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1	The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [one-time key encrypted with recipient's public key and sent alongside encrypted message] that meets the following: [NIST SP 800-56B].
Notes	NIST SP 800-56B: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes. Using Integer Factorization Cryptography.

7.4.4 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroization] that meets the following: [none].
Notes	None

7.4.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (AES)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1).1	The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 197].
Notes	FIPS PUB 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

7.4.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (RSA)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(2).1	The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA] and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [PKCS #1 v2 (OAEP)].
Notes	N/A

7.4.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (Signatures)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(3).1	The TSF shall perform [digital signatures and signature verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA] and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 186-3].
Notes	FIPS PUB 186-3: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

7.5 User data protection (FDP)

7.5.1 FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (MEMS)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1(1).1	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] on [</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subjects • Administrators • Customer Administrators • Objects • Users • Groups • Lists • Licenses • Operations • Create • Read • Update • Delete]
Notes	The TOE uses Uniform Resource Identifiers in tandem with user licensing to determine access to functions.

7.5.2 FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (GAMMA)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1(2).1	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] on [</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subjects • GAMMA users • Objects • Contacts • Groups • Messages • Operations • Create • View • Modify • Delete]
Notes	The TOE uses Uniform Resource Identifiers in tandem with user licensing to determine access to functions.

7.5.3 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to objects based on the following: [granted license and requested URIs].
FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [a user or administrator is able to access a function if they have a) requested a valid URI and b) their license permits access to that URI].
FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
Notes	The TOE uses Uniform Resource Identifiers in tandem with user licensing to determine access to functions.

7.5.4 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [user message lists].
Notes	N/A

7.6 Identification and authentication (FIA)

7.6.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when [3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [authenticating with the GAMMA application].
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [surpassed], the TSF shall [increase the period of time required between authentication attempts].
Notes	N/A

7.6.2 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

Hierarchical to	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Notes	N/A

7.6.3 FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1	The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
Notes	N/A

7.6.4 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies	None
FIA_UID.2.1	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Notes	N/A

7.6.5 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	None
FIA_SOS.1.1	The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet: [<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GAMMA application: PIN between four (4) and eight (8) alphanumeric characters; and • MEMS/GAMMA portal: Passwords must be at least ten (10) characters long, maximum of sixteen (16). Must include numbers, uppercase and lowercase characters. Cannot have more than three (3) of the same character]
Notes	N/A

7.7 Security management (FMT)

7.7.1 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [enable message encryption setting] to [customer administrators].
Notes	N/A

7.7.2 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2	The TSF shall allow the [customer administrator] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Notes	N/A

7.7.3 FMT_REV.1 Revocation

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_REV.1.1	The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [licenses] associated with the [users] under the control of the TSF to [customer administrators].
FMT_REV.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the rules [none].
Notes	N/A

7.7.4 FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions (MEMS)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1(1).1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage users; • Manage lists; • Manage groups; • Wipe/revoke messages; • Generate message metadata reports; • Change personal information; • Grant/revoke licenses for the GAMMA application; • Modify preferences/general settings; and • Enable/disable secure messaging].
Notes	N/A

7.7.5 FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions (GAMMA)

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1(2).1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send/receive messages; • Manage groups; and • Configure application settings].
Notes	N/A

7.7.6 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles [customer administrator, administrator, user].
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Notes	N/A

7.8 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

7.8.1 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
Notes	N/A

7.9 TOE access (FTA)

7.9.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FTA_SSL.3.1	The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [30 minute period of inactivity].
Notes	N/A

7.9.2 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FTA_SSL.4.1	The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session.
Notes	N/A

7.10 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

7.10.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall permit [<i>the TSF</i>] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [all communication between the GAMMA application, GAMMA server, MEMS platform and GAMMA registration server].
Notes	N/A

7.10.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path

Hierarchical to	No other components
Dependencies	No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2	The TSF shall permit [the TSF, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3	The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial user authentication, [transmission of messages, all administrative actions]].
Notes	N/A

7.11 Security assurance requirements

Table 9 – Security assurance requirements

Assurance class	Assurance component
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
	ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis

8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION (ASE_TSS)

8.1 Overview

This section provides the TOE summary specification, a high-level definition of the security functions claimed to meet the functional and assurance requirements.

8.2 Audit

The TOE provides an audit capability that will generate an audit log entry when the following events occur:

- MEMS – Login
- MEMS – Contact CRUD
- MEMS – Group CRUD
- MEMS – List CRUD
- MEMS – Message sent/received
- MEMS – License granting/revoking/modification
- MEMS – Configuration and preference changes
- GAMMA – Login
- GAMMA – Message sent/received

When generating an audit log, the TOE will record the ID of the user/process that caused the log to be generated, the date/time, success/failure of the event and any other pertinent information (FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2)

Audit data is provided to administrators in a read-only format via the web browser – administrators may not modify or change any audit logs once they have been generated and stored by the TOE (FAU_STG.1). The TOE will store audit data and, if the storage capacity for stored audit logs is met, will ignore new auditable events to prevent the deletion of existing log data and provide the administrator with warnings until additional storage capacity is made available (FAU_STG.4).

The TOE generates its own timestamps which are used during the generation of audit logs. These timestamps are generated using the time source of the underlying operating system (FPT_STM.1).

8.3 Communication

The TOE provides proof-of-receipt for messages sent using the GAMMA application. Each sent message is assigned a status – sending, sent, delivered and read. The TOE will track the status of each message and, unless the recipient is set to “Do Not Disturb” or is appearing offline, will update the status to reflect when the message has been read. This is also done on a per-user basis when in group conversations (FCO_NRR.2).

8.4 Cryptographic Support

The TOE generates cryptographic keys for its own use. The following key generation functionalities are implemented and utilised (FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.1(2)):

- Generation of 2048-bit RSA keys using the PKCS#1 v1.5 method, in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-4 (Digital Signature Standard); and
- Generation of 256-bit AES keys using PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2), in accordance with NIST SP 800-132: Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation

The keys generated by the TOE are used in the following cryptographic functions (FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2)):

- AES-CBC-256 (in accordance with FIPS PUB 197) is used for the encryption and decryption of messages sent between GAMMA users. The encrypted message, along with a generated shared secret, is delivered to the recipient to allow for the secure delivery and decryption of messages; and
- 2048-bit RSA (in accordance with PKCS #1 v2.0 with Optional Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)) is used for the encryption of the aforementioned shared secret. If a single message has more than a single recipient, the shared secret used is encrypted using a different RSA key for each recipient.

The TOE distributes keys via the following method (FCS_CKM.2):

- For each message to be encrypted and sent, the TOE generates a one-time cryptographic key (per recipient);
- The message is encrypted using the one-time key;
- The one-time key is then encrypted using the public key of the recipient; and
- Both the encrypted message and encrypted key are then bundled together and delivered to the recipient.

The TOE also generates and verifies digital signatures using RSA in accordance with FIPS 186-3 (FCS_COP.1(3)).

Both the encrypted message payload and encrypted shared secret are bundled together and sent, via a secure TLS channel, to the GAMMA server. Once received by the GAMMA server, the encrypted messages and keys are then passed on to their intended recipients (which may be between one and fifty (50) users, depending on size of the enterprise, group settings, etc.).

If a message is sent to be sent to more than one recipient, a unique shared secret is generated and used for each user.

The TOE will, when no longer requiring them, destroy cryptographic keys and other sensitive cryptographic material so they can no longer be used. As keys and CSPs are used persistently while the TOE is installed, zeroization is performed when the application is uninstalled or the user's phone is factory reset/wiped (FCS_CKM.4).

8.5 Data Protection

The MEMS platform implements a licensing system to prevent administrators/customer administrators from gaining access to functions or TSF data that they are not permitted to access.

Each license specifies a set of Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs) that the administrative user is permitted to access. Upon requesting a URI from the MEMS server, the TOE will compare the requested URI to the list of permitted functions in the administrator's license. If there is a match, access to the function/data is permitted. If the administrator does not have permission to access the functions/data, the TOE will return an error and deny access (FDP_ACC.1(1), FDP_ACF.1).

The GAMMA application uses the same mechanism for controlling access to functions – each user is allocated a license with a specific set of URIs. The user requests these URIs by navigating through the application and, if access is permitted, the TOE will provide the user with access to the TOE functionality and TSF data (FDP_ACC.1(2)).

Users may revoke (remote wipe) messages if they no longer wish them to be available to recipients once they have been delivered. Users must log in to the GAMMA portal and navigate to the GAMMA -> Remote Wipe menu. Users may then choose to revoke a single message, a set of messages based on search criteria or all messages that they have sent to a destination device (FDP_RIP.1).

8.6 Identification and Authentication

Both GAMMA and MEMS users must successfully identify themselves and authenticate with the TOE prior to being given access to any TOE functionality or TSF data. On the GAMMA application, this is done via a four-digit PIN set during initial application configuration. The MEMS platform requires a username and password combination prior to any access being granted (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2).

The TOE provides only obscured feedback (i.e. asterisks or other blocking characters) to TOE users while authentication is in progress (FIA_UAU.7).

After 3 failed authentication attempts, the TOE will increase the period of time required before the user may re-attempt authentication. This period of time increases exponentially with each failed authentication attempt and this prevents brute-forcing of the TOE's authentication mechanisms (FIA_AFL.1).

The GAMMA application requires the users to set a 4-8 alphanumeric PIN for authentication. Passwords for the GAMMA server/MEMS must be 8-16 characters, comprised of upper/lowercase characters and numbers and cannot have more than three of the same character (FIA_SOS.1).

8.7 Security management

The TOE provides three (3) different roles for users of the TOE (FMT_SMR.1):

- **Users:** Standard users of the GAMMA application;
- **Administrators:** Have access to a subset of MEMS functionality to allow them to administer the instance of MEMS and GAMMA used by their enterprise; and
- **Customer Administrators:** Have full access to manage their provisioning of MEMS and GAMMA. Customer administrators are the only role with the ability to revoke user licenses and to enable/disable the message encryption function provided by the TOE.

Customer administrators and Administrators have access to the following management functionality via the MEMS platform (FMT_SMF.1(1)):

- Management (creation, modification and deletion) of individual users, groups and messaging lists;

- Send/receive messages to users/groups/lists;
- Change personal information;
- Remote wipe of delivered messages;
- Report on historical message metadata;
- Granting and revoking of user licenses for GAMMA (FMT_REV.1);
- Enabling/disabling of the message encryption function (FMT_MSA.1); and
- Modify preferences/general settings.

Objects may contain default values upon their creation (such as licenses). The TOE allows customer administrators to specify alternate values to meet their requirements (FMT_MSA.3).

Users have access to the following functionality on the GAMMA app and GAMMA portal (FMT_SMF.1(2)):

- Send/receive messages to users/groups/lists;
- Manage groups; and
- Configure application settings.

8.8 TOE Access

The TOE will automatically close MEMS sessions after a thirty (30) minute period of inactivity. (FTA_SSL.3). GAMMA sessions continue to run until the user closes the application.

TOE users may close their sessions manually by logging out of the platform (MEMS) or closing the application (GAMMA) (FTA_SSL.4).

8.9 Trusted path/channels

The TOE implements Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide a secure channel between its distributed components. As indicated in Figure 1 – Soprano GAMMA architecture, TLS is used to provide a trusted channel between the MEMS platform and any connected enterprise applications or administrators, GAMMA server, registration server and instances of the GAMMA application on individual mobile devices (FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1).

9 RATIONALE

9.1 Security objectives rationale

The security objectives rationale is provided to demonstrate that the identified threats are countered and the assumptions are met.

9.1.1 Threat/OSP rationale

The following table provides a mapping of threats to objectives and adequate justification for the mapping.

Table 10 – Threats to objectives mapping

Threat	Objective	Justification
T.EAVESDROPPING	O.PROTECTED_COMMS O.CRYPTO	The threat of a malicious internal or external user intercepting traffic sent between components of the TOE is mitigated by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> O.CRYPTO: This objective ensures that the TOE uses cryptographic methods (i.e. encryption) of sufficient strength to prevent decryption in a feasible time period by a third party. O.PROTECTED_COMMS: The TOE utilises its cryptographic library to secure data sent between components of the TOE both in transit and at rest.
T.REQUEST	O.AUTH_CONTROL O.WIPE O.SESSION_LOCK	The threat of a malicious user gaining unauthorized access to TOE data/resources is mitigated by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> O.AUTH_CONTROL: The TOE implements mechanisms to prevent the brute-forcing of identification and authentication methods. O.WIPE: The TOE provides the capability for users to wipe sent/received messages, deleting them from the GAMMA application and preventing users from accessing the data. O.SESSION_LOCK: The TOE will automatically lock sessions after a pre-determined period of time to prevent accidental or malicious use of an unattended session.
T.WEAK_CRYPTO	O.CRYPTO	The threat of weak cryptographic methods that provide insufficient security is mitigated by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> O.CRYPTO: The TOE implements a suite of FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic methods, ensuring that sufficient strength is provided for the protection of data both in transit and at rest.
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS	O.AUDIT_REVIEW O.AUTH_CONTROL O.AUTH O.SESSION_LOCK	The risk of a malicious (or other) user gaining access to the TOE is mitigated by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> O.AUDIT_REVIEW: The TOE provides access to audit records for tracking of both user and administrator actions. O.AUTH_CONTROL: The TOE implements mechanisms to prevent the brute-forcing of identification and authentication methods. O.AUTH: The TOE implements mechanisms requiring users to successfully authenticate with the TOE before they are permitted access to TSF data and functionality. O.SESSION_LOCK: The TOE implements session timeouts to prevent accidental or malicious use of another users session that has been left unattended.

9.1.2 Assumption/objectives rationale

The following table provides a mapping of the security objectives for the environment and their relevant assumptions, as well as a justification for the mapping.

Table 11 – Assumptions to objectives mapping

Assumption	Objective	Justification
A.ACCEPTABLE_USE	OE.TRUSTED_USERS	The objective is a direct instantiation of the assumption and is therefore met.
A.LOGICAL_PROTECT	OE.LOGICAL_SECURITY	The objective is a direct instantiation of the assumption and is therefore met.
A.INSTALL	OE.INSTALL	The objective is a direct instantiation of the assumption and is therefore met.
A.NO_EVIL	OE.NO_EVIL	The objective is a direct instantiation of the assumption and is therefore met.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECT	OE.PHYSICAL_SECURITY	The objective is a direct instantiation of the assumption and is therefore met.
A.UNTRUSTED	OE.APPS	The objective is a direct instantiation of the assumption and is therefore met.

9.2 Security requirements rationale

9.2.1 Tracing of SFRs to security objectives

Table 12 – SFR to objectives mapping

Objective	SFR	Demonstration
O.AUDIT_REVIEW	FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.4 FPT_STM.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FAU_GEN.1 generates audit records for a set of auditable events. FAU_GEN.2 associates each audit log with a specific user. FAU_STG.1 ensures that audit storage is protected against modification and/or deletion. FAU_STG.4 ensures that the administrator is given warnings when storage space for audit logs has been filled. FPT_STM.1 ensures that accurate timestamps are used when the TOE generates audit logs.
O.AUTH	FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UID.2 FIA_UAU.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FIA_UAU.7: The TOE provides obscured feedback to users while authentication is underway. FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2: The TOE requires users to be successfully identified and authenticated prior to giving access to TSF data and TOE functions. FMT_SMF.1(1) and FMT_SMF.1(2) defines the functionality available to authenticated users of the TOE. FMT_SMR.1 defines the roles that can be assumed by TOE users. FDP_ACC.1(1), FDP_ACC.1(2), FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 define the access control mechanisms used to determine the functions available to TOE users depending on their role
O.AUTH_CONTROL	FIA_AFL.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FIA_AFL.1: The TOE will restrict user access to authentication methods after a defined number of failed authentication attempts.
O.CRYPTO	FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(2) FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCS_CKM.1(1): The TOE generates cryptographic keys in accordance with an approved standard. FCS_CKM.1(2): The TOE generates cryptographic keys in accordance with an approved standard. FCS_CKM.2: The TOE distributes cryptographic keys in accordance with an approved key distribution method. FCS_CKM.4: The TOE destroys cryptographic keys when they are no longer needed. FCS_COP.1(1): The TOE performs cryptographic operations in accordance with an approved standard. FCS_COP.1(2): The TOE performs cryptographic operations in accordance with an approved standard. FCS_COP.1(3): The TOE performs cryptographic operations in accordance with an approved standard.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS	FTP_ITC.1 FTP_TRP.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1 : The TOE establishes a secure channel between its distributed components and any connected users/applications to protect data against disclosure or modification.
O.SESSION_LOCK	FTA_SSL.3 FTA_SSL.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTA_SSL.3: The TOE will automatically close a user session after a defined period of non-activity. FTA_SSL.4: The TOE allows the user to manually close their active session.
O.WIPE	FMT_REV.1 FDP_RIP.1 FCO_NRR.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMT_REV.1: TOE users can remotely wipe/revoke messages sent to other TOE users. FDP_RIP.1: The TOE ensures that wiped messages are removed from user message lists. FCO_NRR.2: The TOE provides users with information regarding the delivery status of their message (sent, delivered, read).

9.2.2 Dependency analysis

The following table provides a dependency analysis for the SFRs chosen within this security target. For SFRs that have not been included a rationale is provided after the table.

Table 13 – SFR dependency rationale

SFR	Dependencies	Dependency met?
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps	Yes
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	Yes
	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Yes
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit storage	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	Yes
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	Yes
FCO_NRR.2 Enforced proof of receipt.	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Yes
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (RSA)	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation	Yes, met by FCS_COP.1(2)
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Yes
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (AES)	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation	Yes, met by FCS_CKM.2 and FCS_CKM.1(1)
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Yes
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution (AES)	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	Yes, met by FCS_CKM.1(2)
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	Met by FCS_CKM.1(1) and (2)
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (AES)	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	Met by FCS_CKM.1(2)
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Yes
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (RSA)	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	Met by FCS_CKM.1(1)

SFR	Dependencies	Dependency met?
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Yes
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Signatures)	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	Met by FCS_CKM.1(1)
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	Yes
FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	Yes
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	Yes
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	Met by FDP_ACC.1(1) and (2)
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	Yes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection	None	N/A
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	Met by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets	None	N/A
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Met by FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	Met by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action	None	N/A
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	Met by FDP_ACC.1(1) and (2)
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Yes
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	Met by FMT_SMF.1(1)
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	Yes
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Yes
FMT_REV.1 Revocation	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	Yes
FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions (MEMS)	None	N/A
FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions (GAMMA)	None	N/A
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	Met by FIA_UID.2
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps	None	N/A

SFR	Dependencies	Dependency met?
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination	None	N/A
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination	None	N/A
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel	None	N/A
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path	None	N/A

9.3 Security assurance requirements justification

The assurance package for the evaluation is Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2).

EAL2 assurance requirements provide confidence in the security functionality of the TOE by analysis using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and the high-level design of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.

The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE security functions, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, strength of function analysis, and evidence of a developer search for obvious vulnerabilities.

EAL2 also provides assurance through a configuration list for the TOE, and evidence of secure delivery procedures.

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