

**Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX**  
**Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X**  
**Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-X9700LX**  
**Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X**  
**Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX**  
**Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K**  
**Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX**  
**Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K**

## **Security Target**

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Security Target Identification

**Title:** Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX  
Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X  
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-X9700LX  
Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X  
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX  
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K  
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX  
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K

### Security Target

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## 1.2 TOE Identification

The TOE is the HP FutureSmart 5.6.0.2 firmware for the Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX, Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X, Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-X9700LX, Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX, and Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K multifunction printers (MFPs). The complete list of the TOE models along with the firmware versions for the models is provided in [Table 1](#).

## 1.3 TOE Type

The TOE type is the internal firmware providing the functionality of a network multifunction printer (MFP).

## 1.4 TOE Overview

The TOE models are enterprise network MFPs designed to be shared by many client computers and users. These products are designed to meet the requirements of the [PP2600.1] protection profile.

The TOE contains functions for copying, printing, faxing, scanning, storing, and retrieving of documents. These hardcopy devices (HCDs), as they are called in [PP2600.1], are self-contained units that include processors, memory, networking, one storage drive, and a print engine. The operating system, web servers, and Control Panel applications (i.e., applications that run internally on the HCD) reside within the firmware of the HCD.

The TOE is the contents of the firmware and the operating system. The operating system is Linux 4.9.230.

Each model provides the following security features:

- Auditing
- Cryptography
- Identification and authentication
- Data protection and access control
- Protection of the TSF (restricted forwarding, TSF self-testing, timestamps)
- TOE access protection (inactivity timeout)
- Trusted channel communication and certificate management
- User and access management

### 1.4.1 Required and Optional Hardware, Software, and Firmware

The following *required* components are part of the Operational Environment.

- The applicable MFP model from Table 1 for running the TOE firmware.
- Domain Name System (DNS) server
- One administrative client computer connected to the TOE in the role of an Administrative Computer. It must contain:
  - Web browser
- One or both of the following:
  - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server
  - Windows domain controller/Kerberos server
- Syslog server
- Windows Internet Name Service (WINS) server
- Network Time Protocol (NTP) server

The following *optional* components are part of the Operational Environment.

- Client computers connected to the TOE in a non-administrative computer role
- Universal Print Driver for client computers (for submitting print job requests from client computers).
- Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) gateway
- Microsoft SharePoint®
- Remote file systems:

- File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
- Server Message Block (SMB)

## 1.4.2 Intended Method of Use

[PP2600.1] is defined for a commercial information processing environment in which a high level of document security, network security, and security assurance are required.

The TOE is intended to be used in non-hostile, networked environments where TOE users have direct physical access to the HCDs for printing, copying, faxing, scanning, and the storing and retrieving of documents. The physical environment should be reasonably controlled and/or monitored where physical tampering of the HCDs would be evident and noticed.

The TOE can be connected to multiple computers via a wired local area network using the HCD's embedded Jetdirect Inside print server in the evaluated configuration. The evaluated configuration uses secure network mechanisms for communication between the network computers and the TOE. The TOE is managed by one designated administrative computer. The TOE is not intended to be connected to the Internet.

The evaluated configuration contains a built-in user identification and authentication database (a.k.a. sign in method) used for Local Device Sign In that is part of the TOE. It also supports a Windows domain controller (via Kerberos) for a feature called Windows Sign In and a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication server for a feature called LDAP Sign In to identify and authenticate users. The Windows domain controller and LDAP server are part of the Operational Environment.

The evaluated configuration supports the Embedded Web Server (EWS), Representational State Transfer (REST) Web Services, and Control Panel interfaces for managing the TOE.

The Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports are disabled in the evaluated configuration.

## 1.5 TOE Description

### 1.5.1 TOE Models and Firmware Versions

Table 1 shows the HCD models included in this evaluation.

The TOE includes the following Jetdirect Inside firmware versions.

- JOL25060606

The TOE includes the following System firmware versions.

- 2506649\_040420
- 2506649\_040417
- 2506649\_040426
- 2506649\_040423

Table 1 includes a mapping of System firmware versions to the TOE models.

**Table 1: TOE reference**

Product model name	Product number	Option codes	System firmware version
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6350ZX	34S03A	#AB1	2506649_040420
Samsung Color MFP SL-G306X	34S02A	#301	
Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X	34S01A	#301	
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6350LX	34S00A	#AB1	
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6300LX	34R99A	#AB1	
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX	34R98A	#AB1	
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9700LX	34S07A	#AB1	2506649_040426
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9600LX	34S06A	#AB1	
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9500LX	34S05A	#AB1	
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX	34S04A	#AB1	
Samsung Color MFP SL-G509X	34S09A	#301	
Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X	34S08A	#301	
Samsung Mono MFP SL- K9700LX	34R93A	#AB1	2506649_040423
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9600LX	34R92A	#AB1	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX	34R91A	#AB1	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G609K	34R95A	#301	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K	34R94A	#301	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6400ZX	34R90A	#AB1	2506649_040417
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G356K	34R89A	#301	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K	34R88A	#301	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6400LX	34R87A	#AB1	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6350LX	34R86A	#AB1	
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX	34R85A	#AB1	

The following table lists the English-guidance documentation for the TOE:

**Table 2: English-only guidance documentation**

MFP models	Title	Reference
All	Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Samsung Multifunction Printers  Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-X9700LX	[CCECG]

MFP models	Title	Reference
	Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K  Edition 1, 2/2024	

The firmware, [CCECG], and other supporting files are packaged in a single ZIP file (i.e., a file in ZIP archive file format). This ZIP file is available for download from the HP Inc. website. The firmware is packaged in this ZIP file as a single firmware bundle.

The consumer receives the hardware independent of the ZIP file. The evaluated hardware models, which are defined in Table 1, are either already on the consumer's premises or must be obtained from Samsung.

## 1.5.2 TOE Architecture

As mentioned previously, the TOE is the firmware of an MFP designed to be shared by many client computers and human users. It performs the functions of printing, copying, scanning, faxing, storing, and retrieving of documents. The TOE can be connected to a wired local network through the embedded Jetdirect Inside print server's built-in Ethernet, to an analog telephone line using its internal analog fax modem, or to a USB device using its USB port (but the use of which must be disabled in the evaluated configuration).



**Figure 1: HCD Physical Diagram**




Figure 1 shows a high-level physical diagram of an HCD with the unshaded areas representing the TOE and the shaded areas indicating components that are part of the Operational Environment.

At the top of this figure is the Administrative Computer which connects to the TOE using Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) with X.509v3 certificates for both mutual authentication and for protection of data from disclosure and alteration. This computer can administer the TOE using the following interfaces over the IPsec connection:

- Embedded Web Server (EWS)
- Representational State Transfer (REST) Web Services

The HTTP-based EWS administrative interface allows administrators to remotely manage the features of the TOE using a web browser. (Web browsers are part of the Operational Environment.)

The REST Web Services interface allows administrators to externally manage the TOE.

Printer Job Language (P.JL) is used in a non-administrative capacity by the Administrative Computer. The Administrative Computer uses P.JL to send print jobs to the TOE as well as to receive job status. In general, P.JL supports password-protected administrative commands, but in the evaluated configuration these commands are disabled. For the purposes of this Security Target, the P.JL Interface is defined as P.JL data sent to networking port 9100 on the TOE.

The TOE protects all non-broadcast/non-multicast network communications with IPsec, which is part of the embedded Jetdirect Inside firmware. Though IPsec supports multiple authentication methods, in the evaluated configuration, both ends of the IPsec connection are authenticated using X.509v3 certificates. An identity certificate for the TOE must be created outside the TOE, signed by a Certificate Authority (CA), and imported (added) into the TOE along with the Certificate Authority's CA certificate.

Because IPsec authenticates the computers (IPsec authenticates the computer itself; IPsec does not authenticate the individual users of the computer), access to the Administrative Computer should be restricted to TOE administrators only.

The TOE distinguishes between the Administrative Computer and Network Client Computers using IPsec (IPsec rules include a mapping of IP addresses and permitted services). In the evaluated configuration, the number of Administrative Computers used to manage the TOE is limited to one and the Device Administrator Password must be set.

Network Client Computers connect to the TOE using IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communication and to mutually authenticate. These client computers can send print jobs to the TOE using the PJI interface as well as receive job status.

The TOE supports an optional analog telephone line connection for sending and receiving faxes. The Control Panel uses identification and authentication to control access for sending analog faxes. Because the fax protocol doesn't support authentication of incoming analog fax phone line users, anyone can connect to the analog fax phone line (unless the number has been added to the Blocked Fax Numbers list), but the only function an incoming analog fax phone line user can perform is to transmit a fax to the TOE.

The TOE protects stored non-fax jobs with either a 4-digit Job PIN or by accepting (and storing) an encrypted print job from a client computer. Both protection mechanisms are optional by default and are mutually exclusive of each other if used. In the evaluated configuration, all stored non-fax jobs must either be assigned a 4-digit Job PIN or be an encrypted print job.

The TOE also supports Microsoft SharePoint and remote file systems for the storing of scanned documents. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to SharePoint and the remote file systems. For remote file system connectivity, the TOE supports the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. SharePoint is HTTP-based. The MFP can encrypt stored document files according to the Adobe PDF specification.

The TOE can be used to email scanned documents. In addition, the TOE can send email alert messages to administrator-specified email addresses, or send automated emails regarding product configuration and MFP supplies. The TOE supports protected communications between itself and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) gateways. It uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate with the SMTP gateway. The TOE can only protect unencrypted emails up to the SMTP gateway. It is the responsibility of the Operational Environment to protect emails from the SMTP gateway to the email's destination. Also, the TOE can only send emails; it does not accept inbound emails.

The TOE supports name resolution using the DNS and WINS. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to the name resolution servers.

The TOE automatically synchronizes its system clock with an NTP server. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to the NTP server.

Each HCD contains a user interface called the Control Panel which consists of a touchscreen LCD. The Control Panel is the physical interface that a user uses to communicate with the TOE when physically using the HCD. The LCD screen displays information such as menus and status to the user. It also provides virtual buttons to the user such as an alphanumeric keypad for entering usernames and passwords. When a user signs in at the Control Panel, a Permission Set is associated with their session which determines the functions the user is permitted to perform.

The TOE's Control Panel supports local and remote sign-in methods for I&A of users.

- Local sign-in method:
  - Local Device Sign In
- Remote sign-in methods:
  - LDAP Sign In
  - Windows Sign In

The Local Device Sign In method maintains the account information within the TOE. Only the Device Administrator account, which is an administrative account, is supported through this method in the evaluated configuration. The remote sign-in methods are called LDAP Sign In and Windows Sign In (i.e., Kerberos). The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect both the LDAP and Kerberos communications.

The Scanner in [Figure 1](#) converts hardcopy documents into electronic form. The Print Engine in [Figure 1](#) converts electronic documents into hardcopy form.

All MFP models have a field-replaceable nonvolatile storage drive (a.k.a. storage drive) that resides in the Operational Environment. The field-replaceable nonvolatile storage drive is a self-encrypting hard disk.

The primary storage drive contains a section called Job Storage which is a user-visible filesystem where stored print, stored copy, and stored received faxes are stored/held. All jobs in Job Storage are automatically persisted across power cycles except Personal Jobs, which are a type of stored print job. Personal Jobs can be persisted across power cycles or deleted depending on the how the administrator configures the TOE. (Job types are discussed in section [1.5.5.2.1](#))

The TOE supports the auditing of document-processing functions and security-relevant events by generating and forwarding audit records to a remote syslog server. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications between itself and the syslog server and for mutual authentication of both endpoints.


The Jetdirect Inside firmware and System firmware components comprise the firmware on the system. They are shown as two separate components but they both share the same operating system (OS). Both firmware components also contain an Embedded Web Server (EWS).

The Jetdirect Inside firmware includes IPsec and the management functions for managing network-related features. The Jetdirect Inside firmware also provides the network stack and drivers controlling the TOE's embedded Ethernet interface.

The System firmware controls the overall functions of the TOE from the Control Panel to the storage drive to the print jobs.

[Figure 2](#) shows the HCD boundary in grey and the firmware (TOE) boundary in blue. The Jetdirect Inside firmware provides the network connectivity and network device drivers used by the System firmware. The System firmware and Jetdirect Inside firmware share the same operating system. The System firmware also includes internal Control Panel applications that drive the functions of the TOE. Both firmware components work together to provide the security functionality defined in this document for the TOE.

**Figure 2: HCD Logical Scope Diagram**



## 1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality (TSF) Summary

### 1.5.3.1 Auditing

The TOE performs auditing of document-processing functions and security-relevant events. Both the Jetdirect Inside and System firmware generate audit records. The TOE connects and sends audit records to a syslog server for long-term storage and audit review. (The syslog server is part of the Operational Environment.)

### 1.5.3.2 Cryptography

The TOE uses IPsec to protect its communications channels. IPsec supports automatic key exchange via the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols. The QuickSec cryptographic library within the TOE is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms for the IKE protocols. The Linux Kernel Crypto API within the TOE is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec. See section 1.5.3.7 for more information.

The TOE supports key derivation and decryption for printing encrypted stored print jobs. Both the key derivation function and decryption algorithm used by the TOE for printing encrypted stored print jobs are included in the TOE. See section 1.5.3.4.3 for more information.

The TOE contains a Data Integrity Test that provides administrators the ability to verify the integrity of certain TSF Data on-demand through the EWS. The Data Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of TSF Data. The OpenSSL 1.1.1n library within the TOE supplies the SHA2-256 algorithm. See section 1.5.3.5.2 for more information.

The TOE contains a Code Integrity Test that provides administrators the ability to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive on-demand through the EWS. The Code Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files. The OpenSSL 1.1.1n library within the TOE supplies the SHA2-256 algorithm. See section 1.5.3.5.2 for more information.

The product includes functionality to encrypt certain types of scan jobs using the Adobe PDF specification. This encryption functionality is not part of the claimed security functions of the TOE. Instead, the TOE uses IPsec to protect its communication channels.

The product includes functionality to encrypt email using S/MIME and X.509v3 certificates. This encryption functionality is not part of the claimed security functions of the TOE. Instead, the TOE uses IPsec to protect its communication channels.

The self-encrypting hard disk provides hardware-based cryptography and persistent storage to securely manage sensitive document and system data. Data on a self-encrypting hard disk is encrypted, and the encryption key is locked to the HCD. The cryptographic functionality is transparent to the TOE and to the user. This encryption functionality is not part of the claimed security functions of the TOE.

### **1.5.3.3 Identification and Authentication**

#### **1.5.3.3.1 Control Panel I&A**

From the Control Panel, the user can perform the following actions prior to authentication.

- View the Welcome message
- Reset the session
- Select the Sign In button
- Select a sign-in method from Sign In screen
- View the device status information
- Change the display language for the session
- Place the device into sleep mode
- View or print network connectivity status information
- View or print Web Services status information
- View help information
- View the system time

The Control Panel user cannot perform any other TSF-mediated actions until after the user has been successfully identified and authenticated.

Users select the sign in method from a menu of sign in methods. The menu options vary depending on the number of remote sign-in methods configured for the TOE. The Control Panel supports the following local and remote sign-in methods in the evaluated configuration.

The mechanism for the local sign-in method, which is part of the TOE firmware, is called:

- Local Device Sign In

Remote sign-in methods used by the TOE are:

- LDAP Sign In
- Windows Sign In (via Kerberos)

Although the Local Device Sign In method supports multiple accounts, only the built-in Device Administrator account (U.ADMINISTRATOR) is to be used with this method in the evaluated configuration. The administrator must not create any Local Device Sign In accounts.

For successful authentication using a remote sign-in method, Control Panel users must enter their username and password as defined on the remote authentication server.

When users sign in through the Control Panel, the TOE displays dots for each character of access code or password typed to prevent onlookers from viewing another user's authentication data. The TOE also contains account lockout functionality for the built-in Device Administrator account to help prevent password discovery through a brute-force attack.

### 1.5.3.3.2 IPsec I&A

Client computers can connect to the TOE to submit print jobs and to manage the TOE. The TOE uses IPsec to identify and mutually authenticate client computers that attempt to connect to the TOE.

The client computers that connect to the TOE are considered IPsec users and are classified as either Network Client Computers or the Administrative Computer. The TOE uses IP addresses to identify these users and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) X.509v3 certificates to authenticate the users. The IP address of a connecting client computer must be defined in the TOE's IPsec Policy for the computer to be considered authorized to access the TOE. Any client computer not defined in the TOE's IPsec Policy is considered unauthorized and is blocked by the IPsec Policy from accessing the TOE.

The TOE uses IPsec address templates, service templates, and rules to map IP addresses to network service protocols. An address template contains two or more IP addresses. A service template contains one or more allowed network service protocols. A rule contains a mapping of an address template to a service template. Through the rules, an administrator determines the User Role of the client computers (i.e., the administrator determines which client computer is the Administrative Computer and which client computers are the Network Client Computers). [Table 3](#) shows the mapping of IPsec users to their allowed network protocols in the evaluated configuration.

**Table 3: IPsec user mappings to allowed network protocols**

IPsec user	Allowed network protocol access
Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR)	EWS (HTTP), REST (HTTP) and PJI (TCP port 9100)
Network Client Computer (U.NORMAL)	PJI (TCP port 9100)

Because IPsec mutual authentication is performed at the computer level, not the user level, the computer allowed by the IPsec Policy to access the TOE via the EWS (HTTP) and REST (HTTP) interfaces must itself be the Administrative Computer. This means that non-TOE administrative users should not be allowed to logon to the Administrative Computer because every user of the Administrative Computer is potentially a TOE administrator.

IPsec is configured to use X.509v3 certificates via the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols. Both IKEv1 and IKEv2 are supported in the evaluated configuration.

In addition, the TOE can contact many types of trusted IT products using IPsec and mutual authentication. The TOE contacts these trusted IT products either to send data to them (e.g., send email alert to the SMTP gateway) or to request information from them (e.g., authenticate a user using LDAP). The TOE mutually authenticates these trusted IT products via IPsec prior to sending data or requesting information from them.

### 1.5.3.4 Data Protection and Access Control

#### 1.5.3.4.1 Permission Sets

The TOE controls user access to functions available at the Control Panel using permissions. Each Control Panel application and protected feature has an associated permission. A permission is configured to either grant or deny access. Permissions are defined in Permission Sets (a.k.a. User Roles) which are assigned to users. To execute a Control Panel application or protected feature, the applicable permission must be configured to grant access in the Permission Set applied to a user. The Permission Set applied to a user is a combination of Permission Sets assigned to the user.

The TOE contains built-in Permission Sets. The built-in Permission Sets are:

- Device Guest
- Device Administrator
- Device User

Built-in Permission Sets cannot be deleted or renamed. Additionally, the permissions defined in the Device Administrator Permission Set cannot be configured (i.e., the permissions are always set to grant access). In addition to the built-in Permission Sets, the TOE provides the ability to add custom Permission Sets. Permission Sets are stored in the TOE and are managed via the EWS.

The following table lists the access control level each Permission Set provides, and the User Role each Permission Set is assigned to in the evaluated configuration.

**Table 4: Permission sets to user roles**

Permission set	Access control level	Assigned to user role
Device Guest	None  (The Device Guest Permission Set has all permissions configured to deny access.)	All
Device Administrator	Administrative	U.ADMINISTRATOR

Permission set	Access control level	Assigned to user role
	(The Device Administrator Permission Set has all permissions set to grant access. With all permissions set to grant access, the Device Administrator Permission Set provides access to all functions.)	
Device User	Non-administrative  (The Device User Permission Set has all permissions for administrative functions configured to deny access.)	U.NORMAL
Custom (if any are added by U.ADMINISTRATOR)	Non-administrative  (Custom Permission Sets have all permissions for administrative functions configured to deny access.)	U.NORMAL

#### 1.5.3.4.2 Job PINs

Users control access to print (non-encrypted) and copy jobs that they place in Job Storage by assigning Job PINs to these jobs (required in the evaluated configuration). Job PINs must be 4 digits in length. Job PINs limit access to these jobs while they reside on the TOE and allow users to control when the jobs are printed so that physical access to the hard copies can be controlled.

#### 1.5.3.4.3 Job Encryption Password

The TOE can store, and decrypt encrypted stored print jobs received from a client computer that has the Universal Print Driver installed. A stored print job is first encrypted by the client computer using a user-specified Job Encryption Password. The job is then sent encrypted to the TOE and stored encrypted by the TOE.

To print or delete an encrypted stored print job at the Control Panel, a non-administrative user must provide the correct Job Encryption Password for the encrypted stored print job. An administrative user can delete an encrypted stored print job at the Control Panel without providing a Job Encryption Password but must provide the correct Job Encryption Password to print the job.

#### 1.5.3.4.4 Common Access Control

The TOE protects each non-fax job in Job Storage from non-administrative users using a user identifier and a Job PIN or using just a Job Encryption Password. The user identifier for a print job received from a client computer is either automatically assigned by that client computer or assigned by the user sending the print job from the client computer. Every non-fax job in Job Storage is assigned either a Job PIN or a Job Encryption Password by the user at job creation time.

The default rules for a non-administrative (U.NORMAL) user for accessing a non-fax job in Job Storage are:



- if the job is Job PIN protected:
  - the job owner (i.e., the authenticated user who matches the job's user identifier) can access the job without supplying the Job PIN
  - any non-owner authenticated user who supplies the correct Job PIN can access the job
- if the job is Job Encryption Password protected, any authenticated user who supplies the correct Job Encryption Password can access the job

A Control Panel administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) user has a permission in their Permission Set that allows the administrator to delete a non-fax job in Job Storage.

The TOE protects each fax job in Job Storage through the Permission Set mechanism. A user must have a specific fax permission in their Permission Set to access received fax jobs in Job Storage.

#### **1.5.3.4.5 TOE Function Access Control**

For Control Panel users, the TOE controls access to Control Panel applications (e.g., Print from Job Storage) using Permission Sets and, optionally, sign-in methods (authentication databases). Permission Sets act as User Roles to determine if the user can perform a function controlled by permissions.

Each Control Panel application requires the user to have one or more specific permissions in their session Permission Set to access that application. In addition, the TOE's administrator can map a sign-in method to each Control Panel application and require the user to be authenticated to that sign-in method to access that application. The individual applications only check and enforce permissions. They do not check the sign-in methods. Instead, the TOE enforces the sign-in method requirement at the time that the user signs into the TOE by removing permissions from the user's session Permission Set for each application in which the user's sign-in method does not match the sign-in method required by the TOE. By removing the permissions required by each non-matching application, the TOE limits the set of applications that the user can access.

Administrators can change/modify the sign-in method mapped to each application. In addition, the TOE contains a function that allows administrators to select if the sign-in method application mappings are enforced or ignored by the TOE. This function is called "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product control panel." When this function is disabled, the TOE enforces the "sign in method to application" mappings and prunes (reduces) the user's session Permission Set accordingly. When this function is enabled, the sign in method mappings are ignored by the TOE and the user's session Permission Set remains unchanged.

For IPsec users, the TOE uses the IPsec Policy to control access to the supported network service protocols. The IPsec Policy contains the IP addresses of authorized client computers grouped into address templates and the network service protocols grouped into service templates. The administrator maps an address template to a service template using an IPsec rule. Service templates, therefore, act as the User Roles. IP addresses of computers not contained in a rule are denied access to the TOE.

#### **1.5.3.4.6 Managing Temporary Job Files**

Temporary job files that have been written to the hard disk during Copy, Scan to Job Storage, Retrieve from Job Storage, Scan to E-mail, Scan to Network Folder, Scan to SharePoint®, or Fax operations are overwritten in real time when the HCD is finished processing the jobs.

#### **1.5.3.4.7 Erase Job Data**

The Erase Job Data feature enables administrators to delete (overwrite) job data from the hard disk on demand. Job data files include stored jobs, temporary job files created as a result of processing jobs, and installed solutions stored as job data.

### **1.5.3.5 Protection of the TSF**

#### **1.5.3.5.1 Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces**

The TOE allows an administrator to restrict the forwarding of data received from an External Interface to the Shared-medium Interface. The TOE does not provide a pathway or support for commands necessary to achieve network access through the analog fax phone line connection.

#### **1.5.3.5.2 TSF Self-Testing**

The TOE contains a suite of self-tests to test specific security functionality of the TOE. It contains an on-demand Data Integrity Test to verify the integrity of specific TSF Data of the TOE, and an on-demand Code Integrity Test to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive.

#### **1.5.3.5.3 Reliable Timestamps**

The TOE contains a system clock that is used to generate reliable timestamps. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be configured to synchronize its system clock with a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server.

### **1.5.3.6 TOE Access Protection**

#### **1.5.3.6.1 Inactivity Timeout**

The Control Panel supports an Inactivity Timeout in case users forget to sign out of the Control Panel after signing in.

### **1.5.3.7 Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management**

The TOE supports IPsec to protect data being transferred over the Shared-medium Interface. IPsec along with IKE uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) to establish the key used for the secure channel, IP addresses and RSA X.509v3 certificates to identify and authenticate the endpoint, and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with cipher block chaining (CBC) to protect the data transfers between the TOE and the endpoint using the key derived from the key establishment. DH uses the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for key generation. In addition, the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based on SHA are used as part of the IPsec and IKE protocols. A deterministic random bit generator (DRBG)—specifically the counter DRBG CTR\_DRBG(AES) that uses AES—is used to generate cryptographically random numbers for creating encryption keys, key material, and secret keys.

The IKE cryptographic algorithms are all supplied by the QuickSec 7.3 cryptographic library. The IPsec cryptographic algorithms are all supplied by the Linux Kernel Crypto API cryptographic library.

In the evaluated configuration, the following cryptographic algorithms are supported for IKE:

- DH (dhEphem) (P=2048, SHA2-256)
- DSA (L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256)
- SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hashing
- HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256

- CTR\_DRBG(AES)
- RSA 2048-bit, and 3072-bit signature generation and verification
- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CBC mode for data transfers
- AES-256 (with ECB mode) for the CTR\_DRBG(AES)

In the evaluated configuration, the following cryptographic algorithms are supported for IPsec:

- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CBC mode for data transfers
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hashing
- HMAC-SHA1-96, HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256
- HMAC\_DRBG(HMAC-SHA2-256)

In addition, the TOE provides certificate management functions used to manage X.509v3 certificates used for IPsec authentication.

### 1.5.3.8 User and Access Management

The TOE provides management capabilities for managing its security functionality. The TOE supports the following roles:

- Administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
- Normal User (U.NORMAL)

Administrators have the authority to manage the security functionality of the TOE and to manage normal users. Normal users can only manage user data that they have access to on the TOE.

## 1.5.4 TOE Boundaries

### 1.5.4.1 Physical

The physical boundary of the TOE is the programs and data stored in the firmware of the HCD and the English-language guidance documentation.

It is typical for an HCD, and thus the TOE, to be shared by many users and for those users to have direct physical access to the HCD. By design, users have easy access to some of the hardware features, such as the Control Panel, the paper input trays, the paper output trays, the scanner, and the power button. But other features such as the processor, volatile memory, and the storage drive are located inside the HCD in the formatter cage. The formatter cage can be secured to the HCD chassis using a lock, thus, restricting normal user access to the components inside the cage.

Because of the restricted access to the storage drive, the drive is considered a non-removable nonvolatile storage device from the perspective of [PP2600.1].

Due to the physical accessibility of the HCDs, they must be used in non-hostile environments. Physical access should be controlled and/or monitored.

### 1.5.4.2 Logical

The security functionality provided by the TOE has been described above and includes:

- Auditing

- Cryptography
- Identification and authentication
- Data protection and access control
- Protection of the TSF (restricted forwarding, TSF self-testing, and timestamps)
- TOE access protection (inactivity timeout)
- Trusted channel communication and certificate management
- User and access management

### 1.5.4.3 Evaluated Configuration

The following items need to be adhered to in the evaluated configuration:

- Only one Administrative Computer is used to manage the TOE.
- Third-party solutions must not be installed on the TOE.
- PC Fax Send must be disabled.
- Fax polling receive must be disabled.
- Device USB and Host USB plug and play must be disabled.
- Firmware upgrades sent as print jobs through P9100 interface must be disabled.
- All non-fax stored jobs must be assigned a Job PIN or Job Encryption Password.
- Networking XML Services must be disabled.
- External file system access through PJJ and PS must be disabled.
- IPsec authentication using X.509v3 certificates must be enabled (IPsec authentication using Kerberos or Pre-Shared Key is not supported).
- IPsec Authentication Headers (AH) must be disabled.
- Control Panel Mandatory Sign-in must be enabled (this disables the Guest role).
- SNMP must be disabled.
- The Service PIN, used by a customer support engineer to access functions available to support personnel, must be disabled.
- Wireless functionality must be disabled:
  - Near Field Communication (NFC) must be disabled.
  - Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) must be disabled.
  - Wireless Direct Print must be disabled.
  - Wireless station must be disabled.
- PJJ device access commands must be disabled.
- When using Windows Sign In, the Windows domain must reject Microsoft NT LAN Manager (NTLM) connections.
- User names for the LDAP and Windows Sign In users must only contain the characters defined in **P.USERNAME.CHARACTER\_SET**.
- Remote Control-Panel use is disallowed per **P.REMOTE\_PANEL.DISALLOWED**.
- Local Device Sign In accounts must not be created (i.e., only the built-in Device Administrator account is allowed as a Local Device Sign In account).
- Access must be blocked to the following Web Services (WS) using the Jetdirect Inside's IPsec Policy:

- Open Extensibility Platform device (XPd) Web Services
- WS\* Web Services
- Device Administrator Password must be set as per P.ADMIN.PASSWORD.
- Remote Configuration Password must not be set.
- OAUTH2 use is disallowed.
- SNMP over HTTP use is disallowed.
- HP Workpath Platform must be disabled.
- Licenses must not be installed to enable features beyond what is supported in the evaluated configuration.
- All received faxes must be converted into stored faxes.
- Fax Archive must be disabled.
- Fax Forwarding must be disabled.
- Internet Fax and LAN Fax must be disabled.
- Firmware updates through REST Web Services is disallowed.
- Scan+ must be disabled.
- Remote User Auto Capture must be disabled.
- PS privileged operators must be disabled.
- Cancel print jobs after unattended error must be enabled.
- Smart Cloud Print must be disabled.

## 1.5.5 Security Policy Model

This section describes the security policy model for the TOE. Much of the terminology in this section comes from [PP2600.1] and is duplicated here so that readers won't have to read [PP2600.1] to understand the terminology used in the rest of this Security Target document.

### 1.5.5.1 Subjects/Users

Users are entities that are external to the TOE, and which interact with the TOE. TOE users are defined in Table 5.

**Table 5: TOE users**

Designation	Definition	
U.USER	Any authorized User. Authorized Users are U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL.	
	Designation	Definition
	U.NORMAL	A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE.
	U.ADMINISTRATOR	A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). A password must be set for all U.ADMINISTRATOR accounts in the evaluated configuration.

For the purpose of clarity in this Security Target, the following distinctions are made:

- **Control Panel users** - U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR users who physically access the TOE's Control Panel.
  - **Security attributes:** User Role (defined by Permission Set) and User Identifier.
- **Incoming analog fax phone line users** - Unauthenticated entities that initiate and transmit faxes to the TOE over the TOE's analog fax phone line connection. These users are considered U.ADMINISTRATOR because User Document Data (i.e., incoming faxes) created by these users is considered to be owned by U.ADMINISTRATOR. There are no management/administrative functions available to these users.
  - **Security attributes:** None
- **IPsec users:**
  - **Network Client Computers** - Computers (U.NORMAL entities) that can successfully authenticate to the TOE's PJI Interface (TCP port 9100) using IPsec and mutual authentication. The TOE will accept print jobs from any user of a client computer where the client computer has successfully authenticated with the TOE.
    - **Security attributes:** User Role (defined by IPsec service template) and User Identifier (defined by IP address).
  - **Administrative Computer** - Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR entity) that can successfully authenticate to the TOE's administrative interfaces (e.g., EWS (HTTP)) using IPsec and mutual authentication. An Administrative Computer may also connect to the TOE as a Network Client Computer (i.e., the Administrative Computer can send print jobs as a U.NORMAL user through the PJI Interface on port 9100).
    - **Security attributes:** User Role (defined by IPsec service template) and User Identifier (defined by IP address).

## 1.5.5.2 Objects

Objects are passive entities in the TOE that contain or receive information, and upon which Subjects perform Operations. Objects are equivalent to TOE Assets. There are three types of Objects:

- User Data
- TSF Data
- Functions

### 1.5.5.2.1 User Data

User Data are data created by and for Users and do not affect the operation of the TOE Security Functionality (TSF). This type of data is comprised of two objects:

- User Document Data
- User Function Data

**Table 6: User data**

<b>Designation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
D.DOC	User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user's document. This includes the original document itself in hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the HCD while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output.
D.FUNC	User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE.

User Data objects include:

- **Fax jobs:**
  - **Fax Receive jobs** - Fax jobs received by the TOE over the analog fax phone line where the connection is initiated by another fax device.
  - **Fax Send jobs** - Fax jobs being sent by the TOE over the analog fax phone line. (The Fax Send functionality is available in the evaluated configuration, but the PC Fax Send and Fax Polling Receive features is disabled in the evaluated configuration.)
- **Print job types that use Job Storage:**
  - **Personal jobs** - Print jobs from a client computer that are stored in Job Storage. In the evaluated configuration, such jobs must be PIN protected with a Job PIN. These jobs are held until the user logs in to the Control Panel and releases the job. For PIN protected stored jobs, the user must be the job owner or know the Job PIN (or have administrator privileges) in order to delete the job. These jobs are automatically deleted after printing or if the HCD is turned off depending on how the administrator configures the TOE. In the evaluated configuration, these jobs are automatically deleted after an administrator-specified time interval.
  - **Stored jobs** - Print jobs such as a personnel form, time sheet, or calendar from a client computer that are stored on the TOE and reprinted. In the evaluated configuration, such jobs must be PIN protected with a Job PIN. The administrator can configure the TOE to automatically delete these jobs after a specified time interval. For PIN protected stored jobs, the user must be the job owner or know the Job PIN (or have administrator privileges) in order to delete the job.
  - **Encrypted stored print jobs** - Print jobs like those described above but that require higher than normal protection (for example, documents containing company or employee confidential information). These jobs will be assigned a password by the submitter when submitted to the TOE. The user must know the password of the job in order to print or delete it. The administrator may delete it without knowing the password.
- **Scan job types:**
  - **Email jobs** - Scan jobs that are scanned directly into an email and sent from the TOE to an SMTP gateway.
  - **Scan to Network Folder jobs** - Scan jobs that are saved to a remote file system.
  - **Scan to SharePoint jobs** - Scan jobs that are saved to a SharePoint server.
- **Stored copy jobs** - A copy job that a Control Panel user has stored on the TOE. Stored copy jobs are scanned using the HCD scanner. In the evaluated configuration, users are required to protect stored copy

jobs with a 4-digit Job PIN. The user must be the job owner, know the Job PIN of the job, or be an administrator to delete the job.

A user signed in at the Control Panel will be the owner of any created stored copy job. Ownership of a print job sent from a client computer is defined as the username associated with the job when it is submitted to the TOE. The username is specified outside of the TOE, in the Operational Environment, so it can neither be confirmed nor denied by the TOE.

### 1.5.5.2.2 TSF Data

TSF Data are data created by and for the TOE and that might affect the operation of the TOE. This type of data is comprised of two components: TSF Protected Data and TSF Confidential Data.

**Table 7: TSF data**

Designation	Definition
D.CONF	TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a user who is neither an administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE.
D.PROT	TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a user who is neither an administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.

The following table lists the TSF Data and the data designations.

**Table 8: TSF data listing**

TSF data	D.CONF	D.PROT
Audit records	X	
Cryptographic keys and certificates	X	
Device and network configuration settings (including IPsec rules and templates)		X
Job PINs associated with PIN-protected stored print and PIN-protected stored copy jobs	X	
Content encryption keys associated with encrypted stored print jobs	X	
PJL protocol excluding the job data and Job PINs		X
Permission sets		X
System time		X
User and administrator identification data		X
User and administrator authentication data	X	

### 1.5.5.3 SFR Package Functions

Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data. The following [PP2600.1]-defined functions apply to this Security Target.



**Table 9: SFR package functions**

Designation	Definition
F.CPY	Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output.
F.DSR	Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs.
F.FAX	Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output.
F.PRT	Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output.
F.SCN	Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output.
F.SMI	Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency wireless media.

#### 1.5.5.4 SFR Package Attributes

When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is associated with that particular data as a security attribute. The following [PP2600.1]-defined attributes apply to this Security Target.

**Table 10: SFR package attributes**

Designation	Definition
+CPY	Indicates data that is associated with a copy job.
+DSR	Indicates data that is associated with a document storage and retrieval job.
+FAXIN	Indicated data that is associated with an inbound (received) fax job.
+FAXOUT	Indicates data that is associated with an outbound (sent) fax job.
+PRT	Indicates data that is associated with a print job.
+SCN	Indicates data that is associated with a scan job.
+SMI	Indicates data that is transmitted or received over a shared-medium interface.

## 2 CC Conformance Claim

This Security Target is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant, with a claimed Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL3, augmented by ALC\_FLR.2.

This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles and PP packages, if any:

- [PP2600.1]: IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A". Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
- [PP2600.1-CPY]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
- [PP2600.1-DSR]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
- [PP2600.1-FAX]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
- [PP2600.1-PRT]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
- [PP2600.1-SCN]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
- [PP2600.1-SMI]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.

Common Criteria [CC] version 3.1 revision 5 is the basis for this conformance claim.

### 2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions

#### 2.1.1 IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A" ([PP2600.1])

Although the HCDs in this Security Target contain a nonvolatile mass storage device (i.e., a storage drive), this device is considered an internal, built-in component of the HCDs and, therefore, constitutes a non-removable nonvolatile storage device from the perspective of [PP2600.1]. Because no removable nonvolatile storage devices exist in the HCDs, this Security Target does not claim conformance to "2600.1-NVS SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment A" contained in [PP2600.1].

The following tables provide the mappings of and rationale for how the SFRs in this Security Target map to the SFRs in the protection profile [PP2600.1]. The term "n/a" means "not applicable". The term "common" is used to refer to that portion of [PP2600.1] to which all TOEs must conform (i.e., the portions not labeled as packages).

**Table 11: SFR mappings between 2600.1 and the ST**

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1			The ST's FAU_GEN.1 combines the contents of FAU_GEN.1 from the common [PP2600.1] and FAU_GEN.1 from the [PP2600.1] SMI SFR package.
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.2			n/a
FDP_ACC.1(a)	FDP_ACC.1-cac			The ST's FDP_ACC.1-cac combines the contents of the FDP_ACC.1(a) from the common [PP2600.1] and the FDP_ACC.1's from the [PP2600.1] packages claimed by the ST. The iteration name was changed from "(a)" to "-cac" (Common Access Control) for better understandability when reading the ST.
FDP_ACC.1(b)	FDP_ACC.1-tfac			The iteration name was changed from "(b)" to "-tfac" (TOE Function Access Control) for better understandability when reading the ST.
FDP_ACF.1(a)	FDP_ACF.1-cac			The ST's FDP_ACF.1-cac combines the contents of the FDP_ACF.1(a) from the common [PP2600.1] and the FDP_ACF.1's from the [PP2600.1] packages claimed by the ST. The iteration name was changed from "(a)" to "-cac" (Common Access Control) for better understandability when reading the ST.
FDP_ACF.1(b)	FDP_ACF.1-tfac			The iteration name was changed from "(b)" to "-tfac" (TOE Function Access Control) for better understandability when reading the ST.

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1	FDP_RIP.1			n/a
FIA_ATD.1	FIA_ATD.1			n/a
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1			The TOE's Control Panel supports authentication (FIA_UAU.1).
	FIA_UAU.2		X	The TOE supports IPsec authentication (FIA_UAU.2) which complies with the more restrictive FIA_UAU.2.
FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1			The TOE's Control Panel supports identification (FIA_UID.1).
	FIA_UID.2		X	The TOE supports IPsec identification (FIA_UID.2) which complies with the more restrictive FIA_UID.2.
FIA_USB.1	FIA_USB.1			n/a
FMT_MSA.1(a)	FMT_MSA.1			FMT_MSA.1(a) was omitted because management of all security attributes can be covered by FMT_MSA.1.
FMT_MSA.1(b)	FMT_MSA.1			FMT_MSA.1(b) was omitted because management of all security attributes can be covered by FMT_MSA.1.
FMT_MSA.3(a)	None			FMT_MSA.3(a) was omitted because the security attributes do not have default values in the evaluated configuration.
FMT_MSA.3(b)	None			FMT_MSA.3(b) was omitted because the security attributes do not have default values in the evaluated configuration.

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FMT_MTD.1.1(a)	FMT_MTD.1			Iteration was omitted because only TSF Data that is not associated with a Normal User can be managed.
FMT_MTD.1.1(b)	None			Iteration was omitted because only TSF Data that is not associated with a Normal User can be managed.
FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1			n/a
FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1			n/a
FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM.1			Because the TOE can be configured to use NTP along with its internal time source, both A.SERVICES.RELIABLE and OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE apply.
FPT_TST.1	FPT_TST.1			n/a
FTA_SSL.3	FTA_SSL.3			n/a

These SFRs in the Security Target are not required by and do not map to the protection profile [PP2600.1].

**Table 12: SFR mappings of non-PP2600.1 SFRs and the ST  
(in the ST, but not required by or hierarchical to SFRs in PP2600.1)**

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
None	FCS_CKM.1-ipsec	X		FCS_CKM.1-ipsec specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
None	FCS_CKM.1-job	X		FCS_CKM.1-job specifies key derivation function used by the TOE to unlock an encrypted stored print job.

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
None	FCS_CKM.2			FCS_CKM.2 specifies cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec.
None	FCS_COP.1-ipsec	X		FCS_COP.1-ipsec specifies RSA signature generation and verification along with AES and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE in IPsec.
None	FCS_COP.1-job	X		FCS_COP.1-job specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted stored print jobs and the AES decryption cryptographic algorithm used by the TOE for decrypting encrypted stored print jobs.
None	FCS_COP.1-tst	X		FCS_COP.1-tst specifies SHA cryptographic algorithms used by TSF self-testing.
None	FIA_AFL.1			The TOE locks the Device Administrator account (a.k.a. Local Administrator account) after an administrator configurable positive integer of unsuccessful Control Panel authentication attempts via the Local Device Sign In method. Recommended by [PP2600.1] APPLICATION NOTE 38.
None	FIA_SOS.1			FIA_SOS.1 specifies the Job PIN strength of certain authorization mechanisms used by the TOE.
None	FIA_UAU.7			The TOE masks Job PINs, Access Codes, and passwords. Recommended by [PP2600.1] APPLICATION NOTE 38.
None	FMT_MOF.1			The TOE allows administrators to manage the security functions

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
				Control Panel authorization, Windows Sign In, LDAP Sign In, account lockout for Local Administrator account, Inactivity Timeout for Control Panel user sign-in sessions, enhanced security event logging, and IPsec.
None	<u>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</u>			<u>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</u> specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.

## 2.1.2 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions ([PP2600.1-CPY])

The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.

Table 13: SFR mappings between 2600.1-CPY and the ST

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1	<u>FDP_ACC.1-cac</u>	X		See rationale for <u>FDP_ACC.1(a)</u> .
FDP_ACF.1	<u>FDP_ACF.1-cac</u>	X		See rationale for <u>FDP_ACF.1(a)</u> .

## 2.1.3 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions ([PP2600.1-DSR])

The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.

Table 14: SFR mappings between 2600.1-DSR and the ST

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1	<u>FDP_ACC.1-cac</u>	X		See rationale for <u>FDP_ACC.1(a)</u> .
FDP_ACF.1	<u>FDP_ACF.1-cac</u>	X		See rationale for <u>FDP_ACF.1(a)</u> .

## 2.1.4 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions ([PP2600.1-FAX])

The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.

**Table 15: SFR mappings between 2600.1-DSR and the ST**

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1-cac	X		See rationale for FDP_ACC.1(a).
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1-cac	X		See rationale for FDP_ACF.1(a).

## 2.1.5 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions ([PP2600.1-PRT])

The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.

**Table 16: SFR mappings between 2600.1-PRT and the ST**

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1-cac	X		See rationale for FDP_ACC.1(a).
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1-cac	X		See rationale for FDP_ACF.1(a).

## 2.1.6 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions ([PP2600.1-SCN])

The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.

**Table 17: SFR mappings between 2600.1-PRT and the ST**

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1-cac	X		See rationale for FDP_ACC.1(a).
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1-cac	X		See rationale for FDP_ACF.1(a).



## 2.1.7 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions ([PP2600.1-SMI])

The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.

**Table 18: SFR mappings between 2600.1-SMI and the ST**

[PP2600.1] SFR	Maps to ST SFR(s)	Iteration	Hierarchical substitution	Rationale
FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1			The ST's FAU_GEN.1 combines the contents of FAU_GEN.1 from the common [PP2600.1] and FAU_GEN.1 from the [PP2600.1] SMI SFR package.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1	FPT_FDI_EXP.1			n/a
FTP_ITC.1	FTP_ITC.1			n/a

## 3 Security Problem Definition

### 3.1 Introduction

The statement of TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be deployed.

To this end, the statement of TOE security environment identifies the list of assumptions made on the Operational Environment (including physical and procedural measures) and the intended method of use of the product, defines the threats that the product is designed to counter, and the organizational security policies with which the product is designed to comply.

### 3.2 Threat Environment

This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents:

- a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE.
- b) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they are not authorized.
- c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they not authorized.
- d) Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated threats.

The threats and policies defined in this Security Target address the threats posed by these threat agents.

The threat agents are assumed to originate from a well-managed user community in a non-hostile working environment. Therefore, the product protects against threats of security vulnerabilities that might be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE with low level of expertise and effort. The TOE protects against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a Basic attack potential.

#### 3.2.1 Threats Countered by the TOE

**Table 19: Threats countered by the TOE**

Threat	Description
T.DOC.DIS	User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.DOC.ALT	User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.FUNC.ALT	User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.PROT.ALT	TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.DIS	TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.ALT	TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.

## 3.3 Assumptions

### 3.3.1 Environment of Use of the TOE

#### 3.3.1.1 Physical

**Table 20: Physical assumptions**

Assumption	Description
A.ACCESS.MANAGED	The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE	The administrative computer is in a physically secured and managed environment and only the authorized administrator has access to it.
A.USER.PC.POLICY	User computers are configured and used in conformance with the organization's security policies.

#### 3.3.1.2 Personnel

**Table 21: Personnel assumptions**

Assumption	Description
A.USER.TRAINING	TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING	Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. The organization security policies and procedures include security awareness training covering topics such as how to identify and avoid clicking on malicious links.
A.ADMIN.TRUST	Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

#### 3.3.1.3 Connectivity

**Table 22: Connectivity assumptions**

Assumption	Description
A.SERVICES.RELIABLE	When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS, FTP, Kerberos, LDAP, NTP, SMTP, syslog, SMB, SharePoint, and/or WINS, these services provide reliable information and responses to the TOE.
A.EMAILS.PROTECTED	For emails received by the SMTP gateway from the TOE, the transmission of emails between the SMTP gateway and the email's destination is protected.

## 3.4 Organizational Security Policies

### 3.4.1 Included in the PP2600.1 Protection Profile

**Table 23: Organizational security policies in the PP2600.1 protection profile**

Organizational security policy	Description
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION	To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION	To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING	To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT	To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.

### 3.4.2 In addition to the PP2600.1 Protection Profile

**Table 24: Organizational security policies in addition to the PP2600.1 protection profile**

Organizational security policy	Description
P.ADMIN.PASSWORD	To restrict access to administrative tasks, the Device Administrator Password will be set in the evaluated configuration so that it is required to perform security-relevant actions through the EWS (HTTP), REST (HTTP), and Control Panel interfaces.
P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET	To prevent ambiguous user names in the TOE's audit trail, the user names of the LDAP and Windows Sign In users must only contain ASCII printable characters except for the double quote (22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).
P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED	To preserve operational accountability and security, administrators must not use the Remote Control-Panel feature.

## 4 Security Objectives

### 4.1 Objectives for the TOE

**Table 25: Security objectives for the TOE**

Security objective	Description
O.AUDIT.LOGGED	The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
O.CONF.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.CONF.NO_DIS	The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized disclosure.
O.DOC.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.DOC.NO_DIS	The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies.
O.PROT.NO_ALT	The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED	The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE.

### 4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment

**Table 26: Security objectives for the operational environment**

Security objective	Description
OE.ADMIN.PC.SECURE	The TOE Owner shall locate the Administrative Computer in a physically secured and managed environment and allow only authorized personnel access to it.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED	The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization; have the training, competence, and time to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation; and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. The organization security policies and procedures include security awareness training covering topics such as how to identify and avoid clicking on malicious links.

Security objective	Description
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED	The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED	The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorized persons.
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED	The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces.
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED	The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.
OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE	When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS, FTP, Kerberos, LDAP, NTP, SMTP, syslog, SMB, SharePoint, and/or WINS, these services shall provide reliable information and responses to the TOE.
OE.EMAILS.PROTECTED	The IT environment shall protect the transmission of emails from the SMTP gateway to the email's destination.
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED	The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their organization.
OE.USER.PC.POLICY	The TOE Owner shall create a set of security policies to which user computers will conform.
OE.USER.TRAINED	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and have the training and competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET	The user names of all LDAP and Windows Sign In method users shall only contain ASCII printable characters except for the double quote (22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

### 4.3.1 Coverage

The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that each objective counters or enforces at least one threat or policy, respectively.

**Table 27: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies**

Objective	Threats/OSPs
O.AUDIT.LOGGED	P.AUDIT.LOGGING
O.CONF.NO_ALT	T.CONF.ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS	T.CONF.DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT	T.DOC.ALT
O.DOC.NO_DIS	T.DOC.DIS
O.FUNC.NO_ALT	T.FUNC.ALT
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED	P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
O.PROT.NO_ALT	T.PROT.ALT
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED	P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
O.USER.AUTHORIZED	T.DOC.DIS T.DOC.ALT T.FUNC.ALT T.PROT.ALT T.CONF.DIS T.CONF.ALT P.USER.AUTHORIZATION

The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective holds, counters or enforces at least one assumption, threat or policy, respectively.

**Table 28: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats and policies**

Objective	Assumptions/Threats/OSPs
OE.ADMIN.PC.SECURE	A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED	A.ADMIN.TRAINING P.ADMIN.PASSWORD P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED	A.ADMIN.TRUST

Objective	Assumptions/Threats/OSPs
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED	P.AUDIT.LOGGING
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED	P.AUDIT.LOGGING
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED	P.AUDIT.LOGGING
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED	P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED	A.ACCESS.MANAGED
OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE	A.SERVICES.RELIABLE
OE.EMAILS.PROTECTED	A.EMAILS.PROTECTED
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED	T.DOC.DIS T.DOC.ALT T.FUNC.ALT T.PROT.ALT T.CONF.DIS T.CONF.ALT P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
OE.USER.PC.POLICY	A.USER.PC.POLICY
OE.USER.TRAINED	A.USER.TRAINING
OE.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET	P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET

### 4.3.2 Sufficiency

The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter each individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved, actually contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat:

**Table 29: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats**

Threat	Rationale for security objectives
T.DOC.DIS	<p>The threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.</li> </ul> <p>is countered by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.DOC.NO_DIS which protects D.DOC from unauthorized disclosure.</li> <li>O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.</li> <li>OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>
T.DOC.ALT	<p>The threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.</li> </ul>



Threat	Rationale for security objectives
	<p>is countered by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• O.DOC.NO_ALT which protects D.DOC from unauthorized alteration.</li> <li>• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.</li> <li>• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>
T.FUNC.ALT	<p>The threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.</li> </ul> <p>is countered by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• O.FUNC.NO_ALT which protects D.FUNC from unauthorized alteration.</li> <li>• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.</li> <li>• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>
T.PROT.ALT	<p>The threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.</li> </ul> <p>is countered by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• O.PROT.NO_ALT which protects D.PROT from unauthorized alteration.</li> <li>• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.</li> <li>• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>
T.CONF.DIS	<p>The threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.</li> </ul> <p>is countered by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• O.CONF.NO_DIS which protects D.CONF from unauthorized disclosure.</li> <li>• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.</li> <li>• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>
T.CONF.ALT	<p>The threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.</li> </ul> <p>is countered by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• O.CONF.NO_ALT which protects D.CONF from unauthorized alteration.</li> <li>• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization.</li> <li>• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>

The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are suitable to cover each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment that traces back to an assumption about

the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually contributes to the environment achieving consistency with the assumption, and that if all security objectives for the environment that trace back to an assumption are achieved, the intended usage is supported:

**Table 30: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions**

Assumption	Rationale for security objectives
A.ACCESS.MANAGED	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED which establishes a protected physical environment for the TOE.</li> </ul>
A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The administrative computer is in a physically secured and managed environment and only the authorized administrator has access to it.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.ADMIN.PC.SECURE which establishes the responsibility of the TOE owner to locate the administrative computer in a physically secured and managed environment and allow only authorized personnel access.</li> </ul>
A.USER.PC.POLICY	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>User computers are configured and used in conformance with the organization's security policies.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.USER.PC.POLICY which establishes the responsibility of the TOE owner to create a set of security policies to which user computers will conform.</li> </ul>
A.USER.TRAINING	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.USER.TRAINED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User training.</li> </ul>

Assumption	Rationale for security objectives
A.ADMIN.TRAINING	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. The organization security policies and procedures include security awareness training covering topics such as how to identify and avoid clicking on malicious links.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.ADMIN.TRAINED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate Administrator training.</li> </ul>
A.ADMIN.TRUST	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship with Administrators.</li> </ul>
A.SERVICES.RELIABLE	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS, FTP, Kerberos, LDAP, NTP SMTP, syslog, SMB, SharePoint, and/or WINS, these services provide reliable information and responses to the TOE.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE which, when the TOE uses the network services DNS, FTP, Kerberos, LDAP, NTP, SMTP, syslog, SMB, SharePoint, and/or WINS, establishes that these services provide reliable information and responses to the TOE.</li> </ul>
A.EMAILS.PROTECTED	<p>The assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For emails received by the SMTP gateway from the TOE, the transmission of emails between the SMTP gateway and the email's destination is protected.</li> </ul> <p>is upheld by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>OE.EMAILS.PROTECTED which protects the transmission of emails from the SMTP gateway to the email's destination</li> </ul>

The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to cover each individual organizational security policy, that each security objective that traces back to an OSP, when achieved, actually

contributes to the implementation of the OSP, and that if all security objectives that trace back to an OSP are achieved, the OSP is implemented:

**Table 31: Sufficiency of objectives enforcing Organizational Security Policies**

OSP	Rationale for security objectives
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION	<p>The OSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization to use the TOE.</li> <li>OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization.</li> </ul>
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION	<p>The OSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED which provides procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.</li> </ul>
P.AUDIT.LOGGING	<p>The OSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.AUDIT.LOGGED which creates and maintains a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration.</li> <li>OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED which protects exported audit records from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.</li> <li>OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate access to exported audit records.</li> <li>OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that audit logs are appropriately reviewed.</li> </ul>
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT	<p>The OSP:</p>

OSP	Rationale for security objectives
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>O.INTERFACE.MANAGED</b> which manages the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies.</li> <li><b>OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED</b> which establishes a protected environment for TOE external interfaces.</li> </ul>
<b>P.ADMIN.PASSWORD</b>	<p>The OSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To restrict access to administrative tasks, the Device Administrator Password will be set in the evaluated configuration so that it is required to perform security-relevant actions through EWS (HTTP), REST (HTTP), and Control Panel interfaces.</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>OE.ADMIN.TRAINED</b> which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate Administrator training.</li> </ul>
<b>P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET</b>	<p>The OSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To prevent ambiguous user names in the TOE's audit trail, the user names of the LDAP and Windows Sign In method users must only contain ASCII printable characters except for the double quote (22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>OE.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET</b> which establishes that the user names of all LDAP and Windows Sign In methods users shall only contain ASCII printable characters except for the double quote (22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).</li> </ul>
<b>P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED</b>	<p>The OSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To preserve operational accountability and security, administrators must not use the Remote Control-Panel feature.</li> </ul> <p>is enforced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>OE.ADMIN_TRAINED</b> which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate Administrator training.</li> </ul>

## 5 Extended Components Definition

This section contains the extended component definition(s) used by this ST.

### 5.1 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

#### 5.1.1 Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces (FDI)

##### Family behaviour

This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external interface to another external interface.

Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT\_FDI\_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.

##### Component levelling

FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role.

##### Management: FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

##### Audit: FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1

There are no audit events foreseen.

##### 5.1.1.1 FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1 - Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

**FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1.1** The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: **list of external interfaces**] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: **list of external interfaces**].

## 5.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

### 5.2.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS\_RBG)

#### Family behaviour

This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

#### Component levelling

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

#### Management: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

#### Audit: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1

There are no audit events foreseen.

#### 5.2.1.1 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST SP 800-90A using [selection: **Hash\_DRBG(any)**, **HMAC\_DRBG(any)**, **CTR\_DRBG(AES)** ].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from software-based noise sources with a minimum of [selection: **128 bits**, **256 bits**] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to NIST SP 800-57, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

Rationale Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation. This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

## 6 Security Requirements

### 6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table shows the security functional requirements for the TOE, and the operations performed on the components according to CC part 2: iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment (Ass.) and selection (Sel.).

**Table 32: Security functional requirements for the TOE**

Security functional group	Security functional requirement	Base security functional component	Source	Operations			
				Iter.	Ref.	Ass.	Sel.
FAU - Security audit	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation		PP2600.1	No	No	Yes	Yes
	FAU_GEN.2 User identity association		PP2600.1	No	No	No	No
FCS - Cryptographic support	FCS_CKM.1-ipsec Cryptographic key generation	FCS_CKM.1	CC Part 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	FCS_CKM.1-job Cryptographic key generation	FCS_CKM.1	CC Part 2	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key establishment		CC part 2	No	Yes	Yes	No
	FCS_COP.1-ipsec Cryptographic operation for IPsec	FCS_COP.1	CC part 2	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FCS_COP.1-job Cryptographic operation for encrypted stored print jobs	FCS_COP.1	CC part 2	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FCS_COP.1-tst Cryptographic operation for TSF self-testing	FCS_COP.1	CC part 2	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation		ECD	No	No	No	Yes
FDP - User data protection	FDP_ACC.1-cac Common access control SFP	FDP_ACC.1	PP2600.1	Yes	No	Yes	No



Security functional group	Security functional requirement	Base security functional component	Source	Operations			
				Iter.	Ref.	Ass.	Sel.
	FDP_ACC.1-tfac TOE function access control SFP	FDP_ACC.1	PP2600.1	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FDP_ACF.1-cac Common access control functions	FDP_ACF.1	PP2600.1	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FDP_ACF.1-tfac TOE function access control functions	FDP_ACF.1	PP2600.1	Yes	No	Yes	No
	FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection		PP2600.1	No	No	Yes	Yes
FIA - Identification and authentication	FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling		CC Part 2	No	No	Yes	Yes
	FIA_ATD.1 Local user attribute definition		PP2600.1	No	No	Yes	No
	FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets		CC Part 2	No	No	Yes	No
	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Control Panel authentication		PP2600.1	No	Yes	Yes	No
	FIA_UAU.2 IPsec authentication before any action		CC Part 2	No	Yes	No	No
	FIA_UAU.7 Control Panel protected authentication feedback		CC Part 2	No	Yes	Yes	No
	FIA_UID.1 Timing of Control Panel identification		PP2600.1	No	Yes	Yes	No
	FIA_UID.2 IPsec identification before any action		CC Part 2	No	Yes	No	No

Security functional group	Security functional requirement	Base security functional component	Source	Operations			
				Iter.	Ref.	Ass.	Sel.
	<b>FIA_USB.1</b> User-subject binding		PP2600.1	No	Yes	Yes	No
FMT - Security management	<b>FMT_MOF.1</b> Management of authentication security functions behavior	FMT_MOF.1	CC Part 2	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	<b>FMT_MSA.1</b> Management of security attributes	FMT_MSA.1	PP2600.1	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	<b>FMT_MTD.1</b> Management of TSF data	FMT_MTD.1	PP2600.1	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	<b>FMT_SMF.1</b> Specification of management functions		PP2600.1	No	No	Yes	No
	<b>FMT_SMR.1</b> Security roles		PP2600.1	No	No	Yes	No
FPT - Protection of the TSF	<b>FPT_FDI_EXP.1</b> Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces		PP2600.1-SMI	No	No	Yes	No
	<b>FPT_STM.1</b> Reliable time stamps		PP2600.1	No	No	No	No
	<b>FPT_TST.1</b> TSF testing		PP2600.1	No	No	Yes	Yes
FTA - TOE access	<b>FTA_SSL.3</b> Control Panel TSF-initiated termination		PP2600.1	No	Yes	Yes	No
FTP - Trusted path/channels	<b>FTP_ITC.1</b> Inter-TSF trusted channel		PP2600.1-SMI	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

## 6.1.1 Security audit (FAU)

### 6.1.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU\_GEN.1)

**FAU\_GEN.1.1** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; and
- b) All auditable events for the **not specified** level of audit; and

- c) **All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 33; none.**

**FAU\_GEN.1.2**

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, **for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 33 (1) information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required); none.**

**Table 33: Auditable events**

<b>Auditable event</b>	<b>Relevant SFR(s)</b>	<b>Audit Level</b>	<b>Additional information</b>	<b>[PP2600.1]</b>
Job completion	FDP_ACF.1-tfac	Not specified	Type of job	Yes: Common
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism	FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.2	Basic	None required	Yes: Common
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the identification mechanism	FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2	Basic	Attempted user identity, if available	Yes: Common
Use of the management functions	FMT_SMF.1	Minimum	None required	Yes: Common
Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role	FMT_SMR.1	Minimum	None required	Yes: Common
Changes to the time	FPT_STM.1	Minimum	None required	Yes: Common
Failure of the trusted channel functions	FTP_ITC.1	Minimum	None required	Yes: SMI
Termination of an interactive session by the session termination mechanism	FTA_SSL.3	Minimum	None required	No

**6.1.1.2 User identity association (FAU\_GEN.2)**

**FAU\_GEN.2.1**

For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

## 6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)

### 6.1.2.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1-ipsec)

**FCS\_CKM.1.1** The TSF shall generate *asymmetric* cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **defined in Table 34** and specified cryptographic key sizes **defined in Table 34** that meet the following: **the standards defined in Table 34**.

**Table 34: Asymmetric cryptographic key generation**

Usage	Implementation	Purpose	Algorithm	Key sizes	Standards
IKE	HP FutureSmart Firmware QuickSec 7.3 Cryptographic Module	KAS FFC	DH (dhEphem)	P=2048, SHA2-256	[SP800-56A-Rev3] "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for finite field-based key establishment schemes  [FIPS186-4] Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)"
			DSA	L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256	

**Application Note:** Random bit generation for *FCS\_CKM.1-ipsec* is implemented by *FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1*.

**Application Note:** The asymmetric keys generated by the DSA algorithm are used by the key establishment algorithms specified in *FCS\_CKM.2*.

### 6.1.2.2 Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1-job)

**FCS\_CKM.1.1** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specific cryptographic key generation algorithm **Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) with HMAC-SHA-256** and specified cryptographic key sizes **256 bit** that meet the following: **[PKCS5v2.1]**

**Application Note:** PBKDF2 is used to derive a key from a Job Encryption Password to unlock an encrypted stored print job.

### 6.1.2.3 Cryptographic key establishment (FCS\_CKM.2)

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The TSF shall *perform cryptographic key establishment* ~~distribute cryptographic keys~~ in accordance with a specified cryptographic key *establishment* ~~distribution~~ method **defined in Table 35** that meets the following: **the standards defined in Table 35**.

**Table 35: Cryptographic key establishment**

Protocol	Key establishment method	Standards
IKE	IKEv1 (DH)	[RFC4109] Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1) [RFC3526] More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
	IKEv2 (DH)	[RFC4306] Diffie-Hellman key agreement method defined for the IKEv2 protocol; [RFC4718] IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines [RFC3526] More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

#### 6.1.2.4 Cryptographic operation for IPsec (FCS\_COP.1-ipsec)

##### FCS\_COP.1.1

The TSF shall perform the operations defined in Table 36 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm defined in Table 36 and cryptographic key sizes defined in Table 36 that meet the following: the standards defined in Table 36.

**Table 36: Cryptographic operations for IPsec**

Protocol	Operations	Algorithm	Key sizes (in bits)	Standards
IKE	Symmetric encryption and decryption	AES	CBC: 128, 192, 256; ECB: 256	[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard; [SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques
	Signature generation and verification	RSA	2048, 3072	[PKCS1v1.5] Public-Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1 v1.5: RSA Encryption Standard
	Secure hash	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512		[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS);
	Data authentication	HMAC-SHA-256-128 HMAC-SHA-384-192 HMAC-SHA-512-256	256 384 512	[RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication; [RFC4868] Using HMAC-SHA-256-, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec

Protocol	Operations	Algorithm	Key sizes (in bits)	Standards
IPsec	Symmetric encryption and decryption	AES	CBC: 128, 192, 256	[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard; [SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques
	Secure hash	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512		[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS);
	Data authentication	HMAC-SHA1-96	160	[RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication; [RFC2404] The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH
		HMAC-SHA-256-128	256	[RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication; [RFC4868] Using HMAC-SHA-256-, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec
		HMAC-SHA-384-192	384	
HMAC-SHA-512-256		512		

### 6.1.2.5 Cryptographic operation for encrypted stored print jobs (FCS\_COP.1-job)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1

The TSF shall perform the operations defined in Table 37 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm defined in Table 37 and cryptographic key sizes defined in Table 37 that meet the following: the standards defined in Table 37.

Table 37: Cryptographic operations for encrypted stored print jobs

Protocol	Operations	Algorithm	Key sizes (in bits)	Standards
Print job	Symmetric decryption	AES	CBC: 256	[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard; [SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation
	Secure hash	SHA-256		[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
	HMAC calculation	HMAC-SHA	256	[RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication [FIPS198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

### 6.1.2.6 Cryptographic operation for TSF self-testing (FCS\_COP.1-tst)

**FCS\_COP.1.1** The TSF shall perform the operations defined in Table 38 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm defined in Table 38 and cryptographic key sizes defined in Table 38 that meet the following: the standards defined in Table 38.

**Table 38: Cryptographic operations for TSF self-testing**

Protocol	Operations	Algorithm	Key sizes (in bits)	Standards
TSF self-testing	Secure hash	SHA-256		[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS)

### 6.1.2.7 Random Bit Generation (FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST SP 800-90A using the algorithms defined in Table 39.

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from software-based noise sources with a minimum of **256 bits** of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to NIST SP 800-57, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

**Table 39: DRBG algorithms**

Usage	Algorithm	Hardware noise sources	Minimum entropy bits
IKE	CTR_DRBG(AES)	1	256 bits
IPsec	HMAC_DRBG(HMAC-SHA2-256)	1	256 bits

## 6.1.3 User data protection (FDP)

### 6.1.3.1 Common access control SFP (FDP\_ACC.1-cac)

**FDP\_ACC.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 40 on the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table 40.

**Table 40: Common Access Control SFP**

Object	Operations(s)	Subject	Access control rules	[PP2600.1] section
D.FUNC	Modify, Delete	U.NORMAL	For stored print and stored copy jobs in Job Storage with the Job PIN attribute set: From the Control Panel, subjects must be the job owner or know the Job	Common

Object	Operations(s)	Subject	Access control rules	[PP2600.1] section
			<p>PIN or have the appropriate Job Storage permission in their Permission Set to delete the job; otherwise, delete access is denied. D.FUNC for Stored Jobs cannot be modified by any user, including U.ADMINISTRATOR.</p> <p>For encrypted stored print jobs in Job Storage: From the Control Panel, subjects must know the job's Job Encryption Password or have the appropriate Job Storage permission in their Permission Set to delete D.FUNC; otherwise, delete access is denied.</p> <p>For Fax Receive jobs in Job Storage: Subjects must have the appropriate permission in their Permission Set to delete D.FUNC; otherwise, delete access is denied. Modify access is denied to all subjects.</p>	
D.DOC	Delete	U.NORMAL	<p>For stored print and stored copy jobs in Job Storage with the Job PIN attribute set: From the Control Panel, subjects must be the job owner, know the Job PIN, or have the appropriate Job Storage permission in their Permission Set to delete the job; otherwise, delete access is denied.</p> <p>For encrypted stored print jobs in Job Storage: From the Control Panel, subjects must know the job's Job Encryption Password or have the appropriate Job Storage permission in their Permission Set to delete D.DOC; otherwise, delete access is denied.</p> <p>For Fax Receive jobs in Job Storage: From the Control Panel, subjects must have the appropriate permission in their Permission Set to delete the objects;</p>	Common



Object	Operations(s)	Subject	Access control rules	[PP2600.1] section
			otherwise, delete access is denied. By default, U.NORMAL users do not have the appropriate permission. (Network access is not possible.)	
D.DOC+DSR D.DOC+SCN	Read	U.NORMAL	<p>Scan jobs are not stored in Job Storage while the scan is in progress, but in temporary storage not accessible to any other user. The user scanning the document specifies its disposition (e.g. network folder, email, job storage) at the time of the scan and the scan job becomes the job type appropriate for the requested disposition upon completion of the scan.</p> <p>For stored copy jobs in Job Storage with the Job PIN attribute set: Subjects must be the job owner or know the Job PIN to read the object; otherwise, read access is denied.</p>	DSR, SCN
D.DOC+DSR D.DOC+PRT	Read	U.NORMAL	<p>For stored print jobs in Job Storage with the Job PIN attribute set: Subjects must be the job owner or know the Job PIN to read the object; otherwise, read access is denied.</p> <p>For encrypted stored print jobs in Job Storage: Subjects must know the job's Job Encryption Password to read the object, otherwise, read access is denied.</p>	DSR, PRT
D.DOC+DSR D.DOC+FAXIN D.DOC+FAXOUT	Read	U.NORMAL	<p>(D.DOC+FAXIN+DSR) For Fax Receive jobs in Job Storage: Subjects must have the appropriate permission in their Permission Set to read the objects; otherwise, read access is denied.</p> <p>(D.DOC+FAXOUT) Fax Send jobs cannot be read by any subject.</p>	DSR, FAX
D.DOC+CPY	Read, Modify	U.NORMAL	There are no access control restrictions for read and modify access.	CPY

### 6.1.3.2 TOE function access control SFP (FDP\_ACC.1-tfac)

**FDP\_ACC.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the **TOE Function Access Control SFP** on users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as operations.

### 6.1.3.3 Common access control functions (FDP\_ACF.1-cac)

**FDP\_ACF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the **Common Access Control SFP in Table 40** to objects based on the following: **the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 40, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 40.**

**FDP\_ACF.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **rules specified in the Common Access Control SFP in Table 40 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.**

**FDP\_ACF.1.3** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- **U.ADMINISTRATOR can delete any D.DOC without providing a Job PIN or Job Encryption Password.**

**FDP\_ACF.1.4** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none.**

### 6.1.3.4 TOE function access control functions (FDP\_ACF.1-tfac)

**FDP\_ACF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the **TOE Function Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following: **users and the following TOE functions and security attributes:**

- **Users: Control Panel users;**  
**Functions: F.CPY, F.DSR, F.FAX, F.PRT, F.SCN, F.SMI;**  
**Security attributes:**
  - **User Role as defined by the user's Permission Set**
  - **Association of a sign in method to a Control Panel application**
- **Users: Network Client Computers, Administrative Computer;**  
**Functions: F.DSR, F.PRT, F.SMI;**  
**Security attributes:**
  - **User Role as defined by the user's IPsec service templates.**

**Application Note:** *The "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product control panel" function affects the sign in processing behavior of Control Panel users, but is considered a function instead of a security attribute and, thus, not listed under "security attributes" above.*

**FDP\_ACF.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- **The user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTRATOR to use a function**
- **A Network Client Computer that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions F.DSR, F.PRT, F.SMI.**

**FDP\_ACF.1.3** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR, none.**

**FDP\_ACF.1.4** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none.**

### 6.1.3.5 Subset residual information protection (FDP\_RIP.1)

**FDP\_RIP.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **deallocation of the resource from** the following objects: **D.DOC, none.**

## 6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)

### 6.1.4.1 Local Device sign in authentication failure handling (FIA\_AFL.1)

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when **an administrator configurable positive integer within 3 to 10** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **the last successful authentication for the indicated user identity for the following interfaces**

- **Control Panel**
  - **Local Device Sign In**

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **met**, the TSF shall **lock the account**.

**Application Note:** *Multiple unsuccessful authentication attempts using the same authentication data are counted as just one unsuccessful authentication attempt by the sign in method.*

### 6.1.4.2 Local user attribute definition (FIA\_ATD.1)

**FIA\_ATD.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:

- **Control Panel users:**
  - **Local Device Sign In (Local Administrator account only)**
    - **User Identifier: Display name**
    - **User Role: Permission set**
  - **Windows Sign In**
    - **User Role: Permission set**
  - **LDAP Sign In**
    - **User Role: Permission set**
- **IPsec users:**

- **User Identifier: IP address**
- **User Role: IPsec service template**

**Application Note:** *The LDAP and Windows Sign In method security attributes belonging to individual users are not in **FIA\_ATD.1** because these attributes are "maintained" independently by the LDAP server and Windows domain controller, respectively, which are part of the Operational Environment.*

#### 6.1.4.3 Verification of secrets (FIA\_SOS.1)

**FIA\_SOS.1.1** The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet **the requirement: Job PINs shall be 4 digits.**

#### 6.1.4.4 Timing of Control Panel authentication (FIA\_UAU.1)

**FIA\_UAU.1.1** The TSF shall allow

- **View the Welcome message**
- **Reset the session**
- **Select the Sign In button**
- **Select a sign-in method from Sign In screen**
- **View the device status information**
- **Change the display language for the session**
- **Place the device into sleep mode**
- **View or print network connectivity status information**
- **View the system time**

on behalf of the *Control Panel* user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2** The TSF shall require each *Control Panel* user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### 6.1.4.5 IPsec authentication before any action (FIA\_UAU.2)

**FIA\_UAU.2.1** The TSF shall require each *Network Client Computer, Administrative Computer, and trusted IT product connection user* to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that *connection user*.

#### 6.1.4.6 Control Panel protected authentication feedback (FIA\_UAU.7)

**FIA\_UAU.7.1** The TSF shall provide only *dots ("●")* to users while the *Control Panel* authentication is in progress.

**Application Note:** *Job PINs and Job Encryption Passwords are not used for authentication, but the digits are masked within dots ("●") when entered.*

### 6.1.4.7 Timing of Control Panel identification (FIA\_UID.1)

#### FIA\_UID.1.1

The TSF shall allow

- **View the Welcome message**
- **Reset the session**
- **Select the Sign In button**
- **Select a sign-in method from Sign In screen**
- **View the device status information**
- **Change the display language for the session**
- **Place the device into sleep mode**
- **View or print network connectivity status information**
- **View the system time**

on behalf of the *Control Panel* user to be performed before the user is identified.

#### FIA\_UID.1.2

The TSF shall require each *Control Panel* user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### 6.1.4.8 IPsec identification before any action (FIA\_UID.2)

#### FIA\_UID.2.1

The TSF shall require each *Network Client Computer, Administrative Computer, and trusted IT product connection user* to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that *connection user*.

### 6.1.4.9 User-subject binding (FIA\_USB.1)

#### FIA\_USB.1.1

The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user:

##### 1. User Identifier

- **Control Panel users:**
  - **Local Device Sign In: Display name**
  - **Windows Sign In: Windows username**
  - **LDAP Sign In: LDAP username**
- **IPsec users:**
  - **IP address**

##### 2. User Role

- **Control Panel users:**
  - **Local Device Sign In: Permission set**
  - **Windows Sign In: Permission set**
  - **LDAP Sign In: Permission set**

- **IPsec users:**
  - **IPsec service template**

**Application Note:** *Incoming analog fax phone line users have no security attributes, but Fax Receive jobs are owned by U.ADMINISTRATOR.*

**FIA\_USB.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on behalf of users:

- **If "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product control panel" is disabled, the Control Panel user's session Permission Set will be reduced to exclude the permissions of applications whose sign-in method does not match the sign-in method used by the user to sign in.**

**FIA\_USB.1.3** The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with the subjects acting on the behalf of users:

- **None**

## 6.1.5 Security management (FMT)

### 6.1.5.1 Management of security functions (FMT\_MOF.1)

**FMT\_MOF.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to **perform the actions defined in Table 41** on the functions **defined in Table 41** to U.ADMINISTRATOR.

**Table 41: Management of functions**

Function(s)	Action(s)	Application note
Control Panel user authorization	determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	The “Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product control panel” function affects how the TOE authorizes control panel users. When this function is disabled, the sign-in method to application mappings are enforced during control panel user authorization.
Windows Sign In	disable, enable, determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, at least one external authentication mechanism must be enabled.
LDAP Sign In	disable, enable, determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, at least one external authentication mechanism must be enabled.
Account lockout for Local Administrator account	disable, enable, determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, account lockout for the Local Administrator account must be enabled.

Function(s)	Action(s)	Application note
Inactivity Timeout for Control Panel user sign-in sessions	determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, the Control Panel Inactivity Timeout must be set to value in the range of 10-60 seconds.
Enhanced security event logging	disable, enable, determine the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, enhanced security event logging must be enabled.
IPsec	disable, enable, determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, IPsec must be enabled.
File Erase Mode for Managing Temporary Job Files	determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	In the evaluated configuration, the File Erase Mode for Managing Temporary Job Files must be set to either Secure Fast Erase (Overwrite 1 time) or Secure Sanitize Erase (Overwrite 3 times).
Data Erase Mode when performing the Erase Job Data operation	determine the behavior of, modify the behavior of	When initiating an Erase Job Data operation, the administrator selects the Data Erase Mode for the Erase Job Data operation. In the evaluated configuration, the Data Erase Mode must be set to Secure Fast Erase (Overwrite 1 time).

### 6.1.5.2 Management of security attributes (FMT\_MSA.1)

#### FMT\_MSA.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the **Common Access Control SFP** in **Table 42** and **TOE Function Access Control SFP** to restrict the ability to **perform the operations defined in Table 42** on the security attributes **defined in Table 42** to **U.ADMINISTRATOR**.

**Table 42: Management of security attributes**

Security attributes(s)	Operation(s)	Application note
User Identifier		
Custom IPsec address template	query, create, modify, delete	The TOE provides the capability to create custom IPsec address templates. A custom IPsec address template defines two or more IP addresses for which the address template is to apply.
Role		
Built-in Device Administrator permission set	query	The TOE contains a built-in Device Administrator permission set that cannot be renamed or deleted.

Security attributes(s)	Operation(s)	Application note
		In the evaluated configuration, U.ADMINISTRATOR users must be granted the Device Administrator permission set.
Built-in Device User permission set	query	<p>The TOE contains a built-in Device User permission set that cannot be renamed or deleted.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration, U.NORMAL users must be granted either the built-in Device User permission set or a custom permission set (if any exist).</p>
Custom permission set	query, create, modify, delete	<p>The TOE provides the capability to create custom permission sets. A custom permission set can be renamed or deleted.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration, U.NORMAL users must be granted either the built-in Device User permission set or a custom permission set (if any exist).</p>
Permissions associated with built-in Device Administrator permission set	query	The built-in Device Administrator permission set has all permissions enabled. The permissions associated with the Device Administrator permission set cannot be disabled.
Permissions associated with built-in Device User permission set	query, enable, disable	<p>The permissions associated with the built-in Device User permission set can be enabled or disabled.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration, the built-in Device User permission set must have all administrative permissions disabled.</p>
Permissions associated with a custom permission set	query, enable, disable	<p>The permissions associated with a custom permission set can be enabled or disabled.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration, any custom permission sets created must have all administrative permissions disabled.</p>



Security attributes(s)	Operation(s)	Application note
Built-in All Services IPsec template	query	<p>The TOE contains a built-in All Services IPsec template. The built-in All Services IPsec template cannot be renamed or deleted.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration, built-in All Services IPsec template must be granted to the Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR).</p>
Custom IPsec service template	query, create, delete, modify	<p>The TOE provides the capability to create custom IPsec service templates.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration, two custom IPsec service templates must be created: One custom IPsec service template for Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL). One custom IPsec service template for trusted IT products.</p>
Network services associated with built-in IPsec All Services template	query	<p>The built-in IPsec All Services template has all network services enabled. Network services associated with the built-in IPsec All Services template cannot be disabled.</p>
Network services associated with a custom IPsec services template	query, enable, disable	<p>Network services associated with a custom IPsec services template can be enabled or disabled.</p> <p>In the evaluated configuration; The custom IPsec service template for Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL) must only have the P9100 services enabled. The custom IPsec service template for trusted IT products must only have those network services (e.g. SMTP) required for the TOE to establish an IPsec connection with the trusted IT products to either send data to them or request data from them. The custom IPsec service template must not contain any network services that allow trusted IT products to initiate a connection to the TOE.</p>

### 6.1.5.3 Management of TSF data (FMT\_MTD.1)

**FMT\_MTD.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to **perform the operations defined in Table 43** on the **TSF Data defined in Table 43** to U.ADMINISTRATOR.

**Table 43: Management of TSF data**

TSF Data	Operation(s)	Application note
Device Administrator Password	query, set, modify, clear	In the evaluated configuration, the Device Administrator Password must be set.  The query operation reads the status (set or not set) of the Device Administrator Password and not the value of the Device Administrator Password.
CA certificates	query, install, delete, export	<none>
Identity certificates	query, install, delete, export	In the evaluated configuration, an identity certificate with private key that is generated outside the TOE must be imported into the TOE's certificate store.  The query operation does not allow reading of the private key associated with an identity certificate.  If the private key associated with an identity certificate is marked as non-exportable, the export operation will export an identity certificate without its associated private key.
IPsec certificate	query, modify	The query operation does not allow reading of the private key associated with the IPsec certificate.

#### 6.1.5.4 Specification of management functions (FMT\_SMF.1)

##### FMT\_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Management of Control Panel user authorization (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of Windows Sign In (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of LDAP Sign In (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of account lockout policy for Local Administrator account (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of Inactivity Timeout for Control Panel sign-in sessions (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of enhanced security event logging (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of IPsec (FMT\_MOF.1)
- Management of IPsec address templates (FMT\_MSA.1)
- Management of IPsec service templates (FMT\_MSA.1)
- Management of permission sets (FMT\_MSA.1)
- Management of permissions associated with permission sets (FMT\_MSA.1)

- **Management of Device Administrator Password (FMT\_MTD.1)**
- **Management of CA certificates (FMT\_MTD.1)**
- **Management of identity certificates (FMT\_MTD.1)**
- **Management of IPsec certificate (FMT\_MTD.1)**
- **Management of the File Erase Mode for Managing Temporary Job Files (FMT\_MOF.1)**
- **Management of the Data Erase Mode for Erase Job Data operation (FMT\_MOF.1)**

### 6.1.5.5 Security roles (FMT\_SMR.1)

**FMT\_SMR.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles **U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL.**

**FMT\_SMR.1.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### 6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### 6.1.6.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1)

**FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1.1** The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on **any external Interface** from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any **Shared-medium Interface.**

#### 6.1.6.2 Reliable time stamps (FPT\_STM.1)

**FPT\_STM.1.1** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

#### 6.1.6.3 TSF testing (FPT\_TST.1)

**FPT\_TST.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **at the request of the authorised user** to demonstrate the correct operation of

- **System Clock - Timestamp verification**
- **LDAP Sign In - LDAP Settings verification**
- **Windows Sign In (via Kerberos) - Windows Settings verification**

**FPT\_TST.1.2** The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of

- **Device Administrator Password**
- **Windows Sign In settings**
- **LDAP Sign In settings**
- **Permission sets**
- **Permissions associated with permission sets**
- **Network user to permission set relationships**
- **Network group to permission set relationships**

- “Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product control panel” function enable/disable setting

**FPT\_TST.1.3** The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

## 6.1.7 TOE access (FTA)

### 6.1.7.1 TSF-initiated termination of Control Panel sign-in session (FTA\_SSL.3)

**FTA\_SSL.3.1** The TSF shall terminate an interactive *Control Panel sign-in* session after a an administrator-configurable amount of user inactivity.

## 6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

### 6.1.8.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP\_ITC.1)

**FTP\_ITC.1.1** The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the ~~channel~~ *communicated* data from modification or disclosure.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2** The TSF shall permit **the TSF, another trusted IT product** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**FTP\_ITC.1.3** The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for **communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface.**

## 6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

### 6.2.1 Coverage

The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each security functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.

**Table 44: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives**

Security functional requirements	Objectives
FAU_GEN.1	O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FAU_GEN.2	O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FCS_CKM.1-ipsec	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT

Security functional requirements	Objectives
FCS_CKM.1-job	O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FCS_CKM.2	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT
FCS_COP.1-ipsec	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT
FCS_COP.1-job	O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FCS_COP.1-tst	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT
FDP_ACC.1-cac	O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FDP_ACC.1-tfac	O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FDP_ACF.1-cac	O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FDP_ACF.1-tfac	O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FDP_RIP.1	O.DOC.NO_DIS
FIA_AFL.1	O.USER.AUTHORIZED

Security functional requirements	Objectives
FIA_ATD.1	O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_SOS.1	O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UAU.1	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UAU.2	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UAU.7	O.CONF.NO_DIS
FIA_UID.1	O.AUDIT.LOGGED, O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, O.PROT.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UID.2	O.AUDIT.LOGGED, O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, O.PROT.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_USB.1	O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FMT_MOF.1	O.PROT.NO_ALT
FMT_MSA.1	O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FMT_MTD.1	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.PROT.NO_ALT
FMT_SMF.1	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT,

Security functional requirements	Objectives
	O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT
FMT_SMR.1	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FPT_FDI_EXP.1	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
FPT_STM.1	O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FPT_TST.1	O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
FTA_SSL.3	O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FTP_ITC.1	O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.PROT.NO_ALT

## 6.2.2 Sufficiency

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

**Table 45: Security objectives for the TOE rationale**

Security objectives	Rationale
O.AUDIT.LOGGED	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FAU_GEN.1 which enforces audit policies by requiring logging of relevant events.</li> <li>FAU_GEN.2 which enforces audit policies by requiring logging of information associated with audited events.</li> <li>FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support audit policies by associating user identity with events</li> </ul>

Security objectives	Rationale
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FPT_STM.1</b> which supports audit policies by requiring time stamps associated with events.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.CONF.NO_ALT</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alteration.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.2</b> which specifies the cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</b> which specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which support access control and security roles by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MTD.1</b> which enforce protection by restricting access.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring functions to control attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring security roles.</li> <li>• <b>FTP_ITC.1</b> which enforces protection by requiring the use of trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.CONF.NO_DIS</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized disclosure.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.2</b> which specifies the cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to create a channel protected from unauthorized disclosure.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the RSA signature generation and verification along with the AES and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to help prevent unauthorized disclosure.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</b> which specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UAU.7</b> which masks the display of certain passwords and PINs during authentication.</li> </ul>



Security objectives	Rationale
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which support access control and security roles by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MTD.1</b> which enforce protection by restricting access.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring functions to control attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring security roles.</li> <li>• <b>FTP_ITC.1</b> which enforces protection by requiring the use of trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.DOC.NO_ALT</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.1-job</b> which specifies the PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256 used by the TOE to process encrypted stored print jobs.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.2</b> which specifies the cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-job</b> which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted stored print jobs and the AES decryption cryptographic algorithm used by the TOE to decrypt encrypted stored print jobs.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</b> which specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.</li> <li>• <b>FDP_ACC.1-cac</b> which enforces protection by establishing an access control policy.</li> <li>• <b>FDP_ACF.1-cac</b> which supports access control policy by providing access control function.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which support access control and security roles by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MSA.1</b> which supports access control function by enforcing control of security attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring functions to control attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring security roles.</li> <li>• <b>FTP_ITC.1</b> which enforces protection by requiring the use of trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> </ul>

Security objectives	Rationale
<p>O.DOC.NO_DIS</p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.</li> <li>FCS_CKM.1-job which specifies the PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256 used by the TOE to process encrypted stored print jobs.</li> <li>FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to create a channel protected from unauthorized disclosure.</li> <li>FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the RSA signature generation and verification along with the AES and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to help prevent unauthorized disclosure.</li> <li>FCS_COP.1-job which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted stored print jobs and the AES decryption cryptographic algorithm used by the TOE to decrypt encrypted stored print jobs.</li> <li>FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.</li> <li>FDP_ACC.1-cac which enforces protection by establishing an access control policy.</li> <li>FDP_ACF.1-cac which supports access control policy by providing access control function.</li> <li>FDP_RIP.1 which enforces protection by making residual data unavailable.</li> <li>FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and security roles by requiring user identification.</li> <li>FMT_MSA.1 which supports access control function by enforcing control of security attributes.</li> <li>FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by requiring functions to control attributes.</li> <li>FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by requiring security roles.</li> <li>FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> </ul>
<p>O.FUNC.NO_ALT</p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.</li> </ul>

Security objectives	Rationale
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.1-job</b> which specifies the PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256 used by the TOE to process encrypted stored print jobs.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.2</b> which specifies the cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-job</b> which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted stored print jobs and the AES decryption cryptographic algorithm used by the TOE to decrypt encrypted stored print jobs.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</b> which specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.</li> <li>• <b>FDP_ACC.1-cac</b> which enforces protection by establishing an access control policy.</li> <li>• <b>FDP_ACF.1-cac</b> which supports access control policy by providing access control function.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which support access control and security roles by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MSA.1</b> which supports access control function by enforcing control of security attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring functions to control attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring security roles.</li> <li>• <b>FTP_ITC.1</b> which enforces protection by requiring the use of trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.INTERFACE.MANAGED</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FIA_UAU.1</b> and <b>FIA_UAU.2</b> which enforce management of external interfaces by requiring user authentication.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which enforce management of external interfaces by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FPT_FDI_EXP.1</b> which enforces management of external interfaces by requiring (as needed) administrator control of data transmission from external Interfaces to Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> <li>• <b>FTA_SSL.3</b> which enforces management of external interfaces by terminating inactive sessions.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.PROT.NO_ALT</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p>

Security objectives	Rationale
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the type of cryptographic keys generated for IPsec key establishment.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_CKM.2</b> which specifies the cryptographic key establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-ipsec</b> which specifies the SHA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized modification.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_RBG_EXT.1</b> which specifies the random bit generation used by IPsec.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which support access control and security roles by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MOF.1</b> which specifies the roles that can manage the security functions.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MTD.1</b> which enforce protection by restricting access.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring functions to control attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> which supports control of security attributes by requiring security roles.</li> <li>• <b>FTP_ITC.1</b> which enforces protection by requiring the use of trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-medium Interfaces.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FPT_TST.1</b> which enforces verification of software by requiring the TOE include self-tests.</li> <li>• <b>FCS_COP.1-tst</b> which specifies the SHA cryptographic algorithm used for TSF self-testing.</li> </ul>
<p><b>O.USER.AUTHORIZED</b></p>	<p>The objective:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE.</li> </ul> <p>is met by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FDP_ACC.1-tfac</b> which enforces authorization by establishing an access control policy.</li> <li>• <b>FDP_ACF.1-tfac</b> which supports access control policy by providing access control function.</li> </ul>

Security objectives	Rationale
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FIA_AFL.1</b> which locks Device Administrator account (a.k.a. Local Administrator account) after an administrator configurable positive integer of unsuccessful Control Panel authentication attempts via Local Device Sign In method.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_ATD.1</b> which supports authorization by associating security attributes with users.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_SOS.1</b> which specifies the password/PIN strength of certain authentication mechanisms.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UAU.1</b> and <b>FIA_UAU.2</b> which enforce authorization by requiring user authentication.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_UID.1</b> and <b>FIA_UID.2</b> which enforce authorization by requiring user identification.</li> <li>• <b>FIA_USB.1</b> which enforces authorization by distinguishing subject security attributes associated with User Roles.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_MSA.1</b> which support access control function by enforcing control of security attributes.</li> <li>• <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> which supports authorization by requiring security roles.</li> <li>• <b>FTA_SSL.3</b> which enforces authorization by terminating inactive sessions.</li> </ul>

### 6.2.3 Security requirements dependency analysis

The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs for the TOE resolve those dependencies:

**Table 46: TOE SFR dependency analysis**

Security functional requirement	Dependencies	Resolution
<b>FAU_GEN.1</b>	FPT_STM.1	<b>FPT_STM.1</b>
<b>FAU_GEN.2</b>	FAU_GEN.1	<b>FAU_GEN.1</b>
	FIA_UID.1	<b>FIA_UID.1</b>
<b>FCS_CKM.1-ipsec</b>	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]	<b>FCS_CKM.2</b> <b>FCS_COP.1-ipsec</b>
	FCS_CKM.4	This dependency is unresolved. The generated keys are not formally destroyed. The object reuse mechanisms of the operating system prevent their use except in the intended context.
<b>FCS_CKM.1-job</b>	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]	<b>FCS_COP.1-job</b>

Security functional requirement	Dependencies	Resolution
	FCS_CKM.4	This dependency is unresolved. The derived keys are not formally destroyed. The object reuse mechanisms of the operating system prevent their use except in the intended context.
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	FCS_CKM.1-ipsec
	FCS_CKM.4	This dependency is unresolved. The derived keys are not formally destroyed. The object reuse mechanisms of the operating system prevent their use except in the intended context.
FCS_COP.1-ipsec	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	This dependency is unresolved. The RSA keys used by the TOE for IPsec authentication are generated outside the TOE in the operational environment and imported into the TOE. The IPsec session keys are generated by FCS_CKM.2.
	FCS_CKM.4	This dependency is unresolved. The keys used for encryption, decryption, and data authentication are not formally destroyed. The object reuse mechanisms in the operating system prevent their use except in the intended context.
FCS_COP.1-job	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	FCS_CKM.1-job
	FCS_CKM.4	This dependency is unresolved. The derived keys are not formally destroyed. The object reuse mechanisms of the operating system prevent their use except in the intended context.
FCS_COP.1-tst	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	This dependency is unresolved. There are no keys generated for or used by this hash algorithm.
	FCS_CKM.4	This dependency is unresolved. There are no keys used by this hash algorithm, thus, there are no keys to destroy.

Security functional requirement	Dependencies	Resolution
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	No dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1-cac	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1-cac
FDP_ACC.1-tfac	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1-tfac
FDP_ACF.1-cac	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1-cac
	FMT_MSA.3	This dependency is unresolved. The Job PIN, Job Encryption Password, and Permission Sets do not have default values and do not allow for the specification of alternative initial values.
FDP_ACF.1-tfac	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1-tfac
	FMT_MSA.3	This dependency is unresolved. The IP service templates, associations of sign in method to a Control Panel application, and Permission Sets do not have default values and do not allow for the specification of alternative initial values.
FDP_RIP.1	No dependencies.	
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1	No dependencies.	
FIA_SOS.1	No dependencies.	
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.2	No dependencies.	
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]	FDP_ACC.1-cac FDP_ACC.1-tfac
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1

Security functional requirement	Dependencies	Resolution
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1
FPT_FDI_EXP.1	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1
FPT_STM.1	No dependencies.	
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies.	
FTA_SSL.3	No dependencies.	
FTP_ITC.1	No dependencies.	

### 6.3 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 3 components as specified in [CC] part 3, augmented by ALC\_FLR.2.

The following table shows the Security assurance requirements, and the operations performed on the components according to CC part 3: iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment (Ass.) and selection (Sel.).

**Table 47: Security assurance requirements**

Security assurance class	Security assurance requirement	Source	Operations			
			Iter.	Ref.	Ass.	Sel.
ADV Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
AGD Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
ALC Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No



Security assurance class	Security assurance requirement	Source	Operations			
			Iter.	Ref.	Ass.	Sel.
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
ASE Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
ATE Tests	ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No
AVA Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis	CC Part 3	No	No	No	No

## 6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The evaluation assurance level has been chosen to match a Basic attack potential commensurate with the threat environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE and commensurate with [PP2600.1]. In addition, the evaluation assurance level has been augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 commensurate with the augmented flaw remediation capabilities offered by the developer beyond those required by the evaluation assurance level and commensurate with [PP2600.1].

## 7 TOE Summary Specification

### 7.1 TOE Security Functionality

The following section explains how the security functions are implemented by the TOE. The different TOE security functions cover the various SFR classes.

The primary security features of the TOE are:

- Auditing
- Cryptography
- Identification and authentication
- Data protection and access control
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access protection
- Trusted channel communication and certificate management
- User and access management

#### 7.1.1 Auditing

The TOE performs auditing of security-relevant functions. The TOE connects and sends audit records to a syslog server (part of the Operational Environment) for long-term storage and audit review. The records sent to the syslog server by the TOE are only those generated by the TOE while the syslog server has an established connection with the TOE. If the connection between the TOE and syslog server breaks and is later reestablished, only records generated by the TOE after the connection is reestablished are sent to the syslog server.

To generate the proper set of audit events, the TOE's enhanced security event logging must be enabled.

The complete audit record format and audit record details are provided in the [CCECG] in chapter 7 *Enhanced security event logging messages* in section *Syslog messages*. The [CCECG] groups the events into event categories in the section *Syslog messages*.

The following table provides a mapping of the [CCECG] event categories to the events defined in FAU\_GEN.1. (The ST author's intent is to not consume 30 pages of the ST by repeating the audit events listed in the [CCECG], but to refer the ST reader to the appropriate category of events in the [CCECG] that map to the events defined in FAU\_GEN.1.).

**Table 48: TOE audit records**

Auditable event	CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions	<u>Enhanced security event logging:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Auditing was started during boot up</li> <li>• Auditing was stopped via the EWS</li> <li>• Auditing was restarted via the EWS</li> </ul>
Job completion	<u>Job completion:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Copy job completion</li> </ul>

Auditable event	CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Email job completion</li> <li>• Save (scan) to SharePoint job completion</li> <li>• Save (scan) to Network Folder job completion</li> <li>• Fax Send job completion</li> <li>• Fax Receive job completion</li> <li>• Save to Device Memory job completion</li> <li>• Retrieve from Device Memory job completion (Print from job storage)</li> <li>• Job Notification completion</li> <li>• Print job completion</li> </ul>
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism	<p><u>Control panel sign in (Local Device):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sign in using the Local Device sign-in method successful for the specified user</li> <li>• Sign in using the Local Device sign-in method failed</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Control panel sign in (Windows):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sign in using the Windows sign-in method successful for the specified user</li> <li>• Sign in using the Windows sign-in method failed for the specified user</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Control panel sign in (LDAP):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sign in using the LDAP sign-in method successful for the specified user</li> <li>• Sign in using the LDAP sign-in method failed for the specified user</li> </ul>
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the identification mechanism	Same categories and records as the "Both successful and unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism" auditable events
Use of the management functions	<p><u>Device administrator password:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Device Administrator Password modified</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Windows Sign In:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Windows Sign In enabled</li> <li>• Windows Sign In disabled</li> <li>• Windows Sign In configuration modified</li> </ul>
	<p><u>LDAP Sign In:</u></p>

Auditable event	CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LDAP Sign In enabled</li> <li>• LDAP Sign In disabled</li> <li>• LDAP Sign In configuration modified</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product control panel:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sign In and Permission Policy settings modified</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Account lockout policy for device administrator account:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Account Lockout Policy enabled</li> <li>• Account Lockout Policy disabled</li> <li>• Account Lockout Policy setting modified</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Control panel inactivity timeout:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Control Panel Inactivity Timeout Changed</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Custom permission sets:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Permission Set added</li> <li>• Permission Set copied</li> <li>• Permission Set deleted</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Permissions associated with permission sets:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Permission Set modified</li> </ul>
	<p><u>CA certificates:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Device CA certificate installed</li> <li>• Device CA certificate deleted</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Identity certificates:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Device Identity certificate and private key installed</li> <li>• Device Identity certificate for IPsec selected</li> <li>• Device Identity certificate deleted</li> </ul>
	<p><u>IPsec address templates:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPsec address policy added</li> <li>• IPsec address policy modified</li> <li>• IPsec address policy deleted</li> </ul>
	<p><u>IPsec service templates:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPsec service policy added</li> <li>• IPsec service policy modified</li> </ul>

Auditable event	CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPsec service policy deleted</li> </ul> <p><u>Modifying the File Erase Mode for Managing Temporary Job Files:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Managing Temporary Job Files configuration modified</li> </ul> <p><u>Modifying the Data Erase Mode when performing Erase Job Data operation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Erase Job Data requested</li> </ul>
Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role	<p><u>Network user to permission set relationships:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• User to Permission Set Relationship added</li> <li>• User to Permission Set Relationship deleted</li> </ul> <p><u>Network group to permission set relationships:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group to Permission Set Relationship added</li> <li>• Group to Permission Set Relationship deleted</li> </ul> <p><u>IPsec rules:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPsec rule added</li> <li>• IPsec rule deleted</li> <li>• IPsec rule enabled</li> <li>• IPsec rule disabled</li> <li>• IPsec rule position changed</li> </ul>
Changes to the time	<p><u>System time:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• System time changed</li> </ul>
Failure of the trusted channel functions	<p><u>IKEv1 phase 1 negotiations:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IKEv1 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the client computer</li> <li>• IKEv1 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the local device (TOE)</li> </ul> <p><u>IKEv1 phase 2 negotiations:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IKEv1 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the client computer</li> <li>• IKEv1 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the local device (TOE)</li> </ul> <p><u>IKEv2 phase 1 negotiations:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IKEv2 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the client computer</li> <li>• IKEv2 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the local device (TOE)</li> </ul>

Auditable event	CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
	<p><u>IKEv2 phase 2 negotiations:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IKEv2 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the client computer</li> <li>• IKEv2 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the local device (TOE)</li> </ul>
	<p><u>IPsec ESP:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPsec using ESP failed</li> </ul>
<p>Termination of an interactive session by the session termination mechanism</p>	<p><u>Control panel user sign out:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Control Panel session terminated</li> </ul>

Each audit record includes the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.

The subject identity used in the audit record is formed in the following manner. For Local Device Sign In, the subject's identity contains the user's Display Name prefixed with "LOCAL\". For LDAP Sign In, the subject's identity contains the user's LDAP user name prefixed with either the LDAP server's host name or IP address then a "\". For Windows Sign In, the subject's identity contains the user's Windows domain name and Windows user name separated by a "\". For IPsec, the subject's identity is the user's IP address.

The time source used for the audit record timestamps is discussed in section 7.1.5.3.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FAU\_GEN.1
- FAU\_GEN.2

## 7.1.2 Cryptography

The TOE uses IPsec to protect its communications channels. The QuickSec cryptographic library is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms for IKE, and the Linux Kernel Crypto API is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms for IPsec. See section 7.1.7 for more information.

The TOE supports the decrypting of an encrypted stored print job. To decrypt an encrypted stored print job, the TOE derives a key from a Job Encryption Password and unlocks the decryption key using the derived key. The TOE then decrypts the encrypted stored print job using the decryption key. The key derivation code and the decryption code used by the TOE is included in the TOE. See section 7.1.4.3 for more information.

The TOE's on-demand Data Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of specific TSF Data. The OpenSSL 1.1.1n library within the TOE supplies the SHA2-256 algorithm. See section 7.1.5.2 for more information.

The TOE's on-demand Code Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive. The OpenSSL 1.1.1n library within the TOE supplies the SHA2-256 algorithm. See section 7.1.5.2 for more information.

### 7.1.3 Identification and Authentication (I&A)

The TOE supports multiple Control Panel sign in methods, both local and remote methods. It also supports IPsec identification and mutual authentication.

The following interfaces support I&A:

- Control Panel
- IPsec

The following interface allows a user limited TOE access without I&A:

- Analog Fax Phone Line (for incoming analog fax phone line users)

#### 7.1.3.1 Control Panel I&A

The Control Panel interface supports both local and remote sign in methods. The following sign in methods are allowed with the evaluated configuration:

- Local sign in method:
  - Local Device Sign In (Local Administrator account only)
- Remote sign in methods:
  - LDAP Sign In
  - Windows Sign In (via Kerberos)

(The servers for the remote sign in methods are part of the Operational Environment.)

The Control Panel also allows both non-administrative users (U.NORMAL) and administrative users (U.ADMINISTRATOR) to sign in. Prior to sign in, the Control Panel allows users to perform the following functions:

- View the Welcome message
- Reset the session
- Select the Sign In button
- Select a sign-in method from Sign In screen
- View the device status information
- Change the display language for the session
- Place the device into sleep mode
- View or print network connectivity status information
- View the system time

The TOE contains a local user database that defines a single administrative (U.ADMINISTRATOR) device user account called the Local Administrator account to support the Local Device Sign In mechanism. The Local Administrator account contains the following attributes:

- Display Name
- Administrator Access Code
- Permission Set

The Display Name and Permission Set attributes for the Local Administrator account are hardcoded. Their values are:

- Display Name = admin
- Permission Set = Device Administrator

Only the Administrator Access Code (a.k.a. Device Administrator Password) is manageable. It can be managed via the EWS. The Device Administrator Password can be set to a value between 1 and 16 characters in length. Additionally, the Device Administrator Password can contain upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, and the following special characters:

- "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", ")", ":", ";", "<", "=", ">", "?", "[", "]", "\_", "|", "~", "{", "}"

In the evaluated configuration, the Device Administrator Password must be at a minimum 8 characters in length and must contain three of the following: uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters.

The Device Administrator Password can be used to sign into the EWS and authenticate to REST Web Services from a remote computer in addition to signing in at the Control Panel.

The Permission Set defines/determines a user's access to many of the TOE's functions. Permission Sets are discussed in more detail in section [7.1.4.1](#).

Like Local Device Sign In, the remote sign-in methods are used by the Control Panel. The TOE receives authentication credentials from the Control Panel users and passes the credentials to the remote sign-in method. The remote sign-in method returns an authentication decision to the TOE. This decision is then enforced by the TOE by granting or denying access to the Control Panel user.

In the case of LDAP, the user name and password entered at the Control Panel are used to bind to the LDAP server. The user must have a valid and active LDAP account in order to successfully authenticate using this method.

In the case of Kerberos, the user name and password entered at the Control Panel are used to authenticate with the Windows domain controller. The user must have a valid and active Windows domain account in order to successfully authenticate using this method.

When a user successfully signs in to the Control Panel, the Permission Set associated with that user is bound to that user's sign-in session and defines the user's User Role.

When users authenticate through the Control Panel, the TOE displays a dot character of a PIN, Access Code, or password typed to prevent onlookers from viewing another user's authentication data. (Job PINs are not authentication data, but the Job PIN is masked.)

The TOE contains account lockout functionality to help protect against brute-force attacks. The account lockout functionality applies to the Device Administrator account (a.k.a. Local Administrator account) only.

The lockout mechanism uses the following control values.

- Account lockout maximum attempts
- Account lockout interval
- Account reset lockout counter interval



The account lockout maximum attempts value allows an administrator to control the number of failed authentication attempts on the account before it is locked. The administrator can choose a value between 3 and 10 inclusively. Consecutive failed authentication attempts using the same authentication credential count as a single failed authentication attempt. The counted failed attempts must happen within the value set for the account reset lockout counter interval value; otherwise, the maximum attempts counter is reset when the account reset lockout counter interval value elapses.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FIA\_AFL.1
- FIA\_ATD.1
- FIA\_UAU.1
- FIA\_UAU.7
- FIA\_UID.1
- FIA\_USB.1
- FMT\_SMR.1

### 7.1.3.2 IPsec I&A

The TOE uses IPsec to identify and mutually authenticate the following user types:

- Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
- Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL)

IPsec uses IP addresses and RSA X.509v3 certificates via the IKE protocols (IKEv1 and IKEv2) to identify and authenticate, respectively, a client computer. The TOE contains one X.509v3 identity certificate designated as the IPsec certificate and one or more X.509v3 CA certificates to use for the IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE does not maintain individual X.509v3 certificates of its client computers.

The User Identity of a client computer is its IP address. The TOE's IPsec implementation maintains lists (IPsec address templates) of IP addresses of client computers that can connect to the TOE as a Network Client Computer and as the Administrative Computer. If a client computer has an unrecognized IP address that is not defined in the IPsec Policy as either the Administrative Computer or a Network Client Computer, then the client computer is not allowed to connect to the TOE. Similarly, if the client computer presents an invalid or unknown (unrecognized CA) X.509v3 certificate, the IPsec mutual authentication mechanism will fail. The TOE uses RSA signature generation and signature verification methods as part of this validity checking process.

The TOE also uses IP addresses and X.509v3 certificates via the IKE protocols to connect to and identify other trusted IT products. See section 7.1.7 for more details.

The TOE supports the following versions of the IKE protocol:

- IKEv1 ([RFC4109])
- IKEv2 ([RFC4306], [RFC5996])

Mutual identification and authentication must be completed before any tasks can be performed by a Network Client Computer or an Administrative Computer.

The service templates define the User Role of a client computer. The following service templates are used to define the TOE's User Roles for IPsec users:

- Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
- Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL)

The Administrative Computer and Network Client Computers service templates are created by the administrator as part of the TOE's configuration guidance.

Both the Administrative Computer and the Network Client Computers can access the PJJ Interface on port 9100, but only the Administrative Computer can access the EWS (HTTP) and REST (HTTP) interfaces.

IP address management is discussed in section 7.1.4.5. Certificate management is discussed in section 7.1.7.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FIA\_ATD.1
- FIA\_UAU.2
- FIA\_UID.2
- FIA\_USB.1
- FMT\_SMR.1

## 7.1.4 Data Protection and Access Control

### 7.1.4.1 Permission Sets

For Control Panel users, the TOE uses a user's User Role (as determined by each user's Permission Set) to determine a user's access to many TOE functions. Only U.ADMINISTRATOR can query, create, modify, and delete Permission Sets. In addition, only U.ADMINISTRATOR can query, create, modify, and delete the Permission Set associations to users. The TOE contains the following built-in Permission Sets:

- Device Guest
- Device Administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
- Device User (U.NORMAL)

Built-in Permission Sets cannot be renamed or deleted. The permissions associated with the Device Administrator Permission Set can be queried, but cannot be configured to deny access (i.e., the permissions are always set to grant access). The permissions associated with the Device Guest and Device User Permission Sets can be queried and can be configured to grant or deny access.

The Device Administrator Permission Set has all permissions set to grant access. In the evaluated configuration, the Device Guest Permission Set has permissions configured to deny access, and the Device User permission set has all administrative permissions configured to deny access.

The Device Administrator Permission Set is automatically granted to the Local Administrator account (U.ADMINISTRATOR) and can be granted to other administrator accounts (U.ADMINISTRATOR) defined in a remote authentication server (e.g., LDAP server) used by a remote sign-in method (e.g., LDAP Sign In).

The Device Guest Permission Set is associated with a Control Panel session when no user is signed in. In the evaluated configuration, the Device Guest Permission Set has all permissions configured to deny access. With all permissions in the Device Guest Permission Set configured to deny access, the TOE requires all users to sign in at the Control Panel in order to perform any document-processing or administrative functions at the Control Panel.

Permissions in a Permission Set include permissions as high-level as executing the Print from Job Storage application. They also include more granular permissions that control administrative functions like the ability to delete protected jobs in Job Storage without entering a Job Encryption Password or Job PIN. Each permission in a Permission Set has two possible values: deny access and grant access.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- [FMT\\_MSA.1](#)
- [FMT\\_SMF.1](#)

### 7.1.4.2 Job PINs

Users can control access to each stored print and stored copy job that they place under the TOE's control by assigning a Job PIN to each job. A Job PIN limits access to a stored print or stored copy job while the job resides under the TOE's control and allows a user to control when the job is printed so that physical access to the hard copies can be controlled by the user. A Job PIN must be 4 digits (0000-9999) in length. Only one Job PIN is permitted per job.

A Job PIN can only be assigned to a job at the time of creation. They cannot be assigned after the job already resides under the TOE's control. A user assigns a Job PIN to a stored copy job via the Control Panel. A user assigns a Job PIN to a print job at the client computer. The Job PIN is embedded in the print job by the client computer prior to sending the print job to the TOE. Once the TOE receives a print job containing a Job PIN, the TOE enforces the Job PIN embedded in that job.

Once a Job PIN is set on a job and the job resides under the TOE's control, the Job PIN cannot be modified or deleted (i.e., the TOE does not provide the ability to manage Job PINs).

A job with a Job Encryption Password cannot be assigned a Job PIN.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- [FIA\\_SOS.1](#)

### 7.1.4.3 Job Encryption Passwords

The TOE can store, and decrypt encrypted stored print jobs received from a client computer. A stored job is first encrypted with AES-256 in CBC mode using an encryption/decryption key and protected with a key derived from the user-specified Job Encryption Password. The stored print job is then sent encrypted to the TOE and stored encrypted by the TOE. To decrypt the encrypted stored print job at the Control Panel, a user must enter the correct Job Encryption Password that was used to derive the key to protect the job. The key derivation function and decryption algorithm are included in the TOE. Only one Job Encryption Password is permitted per job.

A Job Encryption Password can only be assigned to a job at job creation time. A user assigns a Job Encryption Password to a print job via the client computer. Once a Job Encryption Password is set on a job, it cannot be changed or removed. In addition, a job with a Job Encryption Password cannot be assigned a Job PIN.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- [FCS\\_CKM.1-job](#)
- [FCS\\_COP.1-job](#)

#### 7.1.4.4 Common Access Control

The TOE protects each non-fax job in Job Storage from non-administrative users through the use of a user identifier and a Job PIN or through the use of a Job Encryption Password. The user identifier for a stored print job received from a client computer is either assigned by that client computer or assigned by the user sending the print job from the client computer. For all other types of jobs, the user identifier is assigned by the TOE. Every non-fax job in Job Storage is assigned either a Job PIN or a Job Encryption Password by the user at job creation time. If the TOE receives a print job from a client computer without either a Job PIN or a Job Encryption Password, the TOE cancels the job.

The User Role, as defined by the user's Permission Set, defines each user's access. The default rules for a U.NORMAL User Role for accessing a non-fax job in Job Storage are:

- if the job is Job PIN protected:
  - the job owner (i.e., the authenticated user who matches the job's user identifier) can access (read/delete D.DOC) the job without supplying the Job PIN
  - any non-owner authenticated user who supplies the correct Job PIN can access (read/delete D.DOC) the job
- if the job is Job Encryption Password protected, any authenticated user who supplies the correct Job Encryption Password can access (read/delete D.DOC) the job

By default, a Control Panel administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) has a permission in their Permission Set that allows them to delete non-fax jobs (D.DOC) in Job Storage.

The TOE protects each fax job in Job Storage through the Permission Set mechanism. A user must have a specific fax permission in their Permission Set to access (read/delete D.DOC) received fax jobs stored in Job Storage. By default, only U.ADMINISTRATOR has this permission enabled. Faxes are automatically deleted by the TOE once they are printed.

Scan jobs are ephemeral and not stored in Job Storage. Only the user performing the scan can access the job on the TOE.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FDP\_ACC.1-cac
- FDP\_ACF.1-cac

#### 7.1.4.5 TOE Function Access Control

The TOE controls to TOE functions available at the Control Panel using permissions defined in Permission Sets. During the Control Panel sign-in process, the TOE authorizes the user after they are successfully identified and authenticated. As part of the user authorization process, the TOE associates Permission Sets to the user and then applies a Permission Set (which is the combination of the Permission Sets associated to the user). The applied Permission Set (a.k.a. session Permission Set) becomes the user's User Role. Access to each TOE function is configurable via a permission in Permission Sets by an administrator. A user can perform any function permitted in the session Permission Set. Control Panel applications (e.g., Copy, Fax, Print from Job Storage) use the user's session Permission Set to determine which of the application's functions should be allowed or disallowed for the user. A Control Panel user can perform the [PP2600.1] functions of F.CPY, F.DSR, F.FAX, F.PRT, F.SCN, and F.SMI as determined by the user's session Permission Set.

Each Control Panel application requires the user to have one or more specific permissions in their session Permission Set in order to access that application. In addition, the TOE's administrator can map sign-in methods to each Control Panel application and require the user to be authenticated to that sign-in method in order to access that application. The individual applications only check and enforce permissions. They do not check the sign-in methods. Instead, the TOE enforces the sign-in method requirement at the time that the user signs in to the TOE by removing permissions from the user's session Permission Set for each application in which the user's sign in method does not match the sign in method required by the TOE. By removing the permissions required by each non-matching application, the TOE limits the set of applications that the user can access.

Administrators can change/modify the sign-in method mapped to each application. In addition, the TOE provides a feature called "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product's control panel" which allows administrators to select if the sign-in method application mappings are enforced or ignored by the TOE. This feature can be enabled or disabled through the EWS (HTTP). When this feature is disabled, the TOE enforces the "sign-in method to application" mappings and prunes (reduces) the user's session Permission Set accordingly. When this feature is enabled, the sign-in method mappings are ignored by the TOE and the user's session Permission Set remains unchanged.

For IPsec users, the TOE uses the IPsec Policy to control access to the supported network service protocols. The IPsec Policy contains the IP addresses of authorized client computers grouped into address templates and the network service protocols grouped into service templates. The administrator maps an address template to a service template using an IPsec rule. Service templates, therefore, act as the User Roles for IPsec users. IP addresses of computers not contained in a rule are denied access to the TOE. The [PP2600.1] functions available to an authorized client computer are F.DSR, F.PRT, and F.SMI.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FDP\_ACC.1-tfac
- FDP\_ACF.1-tfac

#### 7.1.4.6 Managing Temporary Job Files

With the File Erase Mode for the Managing Temporary Job Files feature set to a secure mode, temporary job files that have been written to the hard disk during Copy, Scan to Job Storage, Retrieve from Job Storage, Scan to E-mail, Scan to Network Folder, Scan to SharePoint®, or Fax operations are overwritten in real time when the HCD is finished processing the jobs.

The evaluation configuration requires the administrator to change the factory default File Erase Mode to either of the following options:

- Secure Fast Erase
- Secure Sanitize Erase

Secure Fast Erase is the File Erase Mode by which all addressable file locations are overwritten once with a character.

Secure Sanitize Erase is the File Erase Mode by which file locations are overwritten with three passes using a secure, repetitive method to remove all residual or remanent data as a file is deleted. The first pass is a character written to each byte of each deleted sector. The second pass is the complement of the first character written to each byte of each deleted sector. The third pass is a random character written to each byte of each deleted sector.

This section maps to the following SFR:

Version: 1.0

Last Update: 2024-01-25

Classification: Public

- FDP\_RIP.1

### 7.1.4.7 Erase Job Data

In the evaluated configuration (Data Erase Mode set to Secure Fast Erase), the Erase Job Data feature enables administrators to delete (overwrite) job data from the hard disk on demand.

The HCD stores various types of job data files on its hard disk. These files include stored jobs, temporary job files created as a result of processing jobs, and installed solutions stored as job data.

When the administrator initiates an Erase Job Data operation, the Erase Job Data feature reboots the HCD. During this reboot, the TOE skips mounting the hard disk scheduled for the overwrite operation. This allows the Erase Job Data feature full access to the hard disk. This also causes other HCD services to become unavailable during the operation. As the process continues, all partition sectors on the hard disk containing job data are overwritten. When overwriting is finished, the HCD reboots to remount the hard disk normally and enable regular HCD operations.

If the HCD is turned off after beginning a scheduled Erase Job Data operation, the HCD will continue to attempt the operation until it is successful. If the power to the HCD is lost during an Erase Job Data operation, the HCD will restart the operation on reboot, starting at the first block and continuing sequentially until completed.

The evaluated configuration requires the administrator to use the following Data Erase Mode:

- Secure Fast Erase

Secure Fast Erase is the Data Erase Mode by which all addressable partition sectors are overwritten once with a character.

This section maps to the following SFR:

- FDP\_RIP.1

## 7.1.5 Protection of the TSF

### 7.1.5.1 Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces (including fax separation)

The TOE does not allow forwarding of data to an External Interface. The TOE contains only one External Interface in the evaluated configuration and that interface is the Shared-medium Interface. The terms External Interface and Shared-medium Interface are defined in [PP2600.1] and duplicated in section 8.2 of this Security Target. This implies that an administrator can configure the TOE to have a distinct functional separation between the analog fax phone line and the Shared-medium Interface (i.e., network interface) of the TOE. In the evaluated configuration, the forwarding of data functionality is disabled.

The analog fax hardware and the firmware that controls the fax hardware do not have the ability to access the Shared-medium fax functions. No pathway is provided to the Shared-medium interface from the fax. The TOE's analog fax functions only support the sending and receiving of fax data. Fax commands with potential for accessing the Shared-medium interface are not supported by the TOE.

This section maps to the following SFR:

- FPT\_FDI\_EXP.1

### 7.1.5.2 TSF Self-Testing

#### *TSF Functional tests*

The EWS interface allows an administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) to execute a set of correct operations tests. These correct operation tests are listed in [FPT\\_TST.1](#). In some cases, the tests have pre-requisites that must be met prior to execution in order to receive valid results. For example, the LDAP Settings verification test requires LDAP Sign In to be configured and enabled prior to executing the test. The tests that may be available during self-test include:

- System Clock - Timestamp verification
- LDAP Settings verification
- Windows Setting verification

#### *TSF Data Integrity Test*

The Data Integrity Test provides the administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) the ability to verify the integrity of certain TSF data on-demand. The administrator first sets a reference point and then the administrator can periodically perform the test to verify the integrity of the current TSF data against the reference point. The EWS interface allows the administrator to set the reference point and execute the Data Integrity Test.

The Data Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm for both setting the reference point and verifying the integrity of current TSF Data against the reference point.

#### *TSF Code Integrity Test*

The Code Integrity Test provides the administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) the ability to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive on-demand. The administrator first sets a reference point and then the administrator can periodically perform the test to verify the integrity of the current TOE executable code files against the reference point. The EWS interface allows the administrator to set the reference point and execute the Code Integrity Test.

The Code Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm for both setting the reference point and verifying the integrity of current TOE executable code files against the reference point.

This section maps to the following SFR:

- [FCS\\_COP.1-tst](#)
- [FPT\\_TST.1](#)

### 7.1.5.3 Reliable Timestamps

The TOE contains a system clock that is used to generate reliable timestamps. In the evaluated configuration, the administrator must configure the TOE to synchronize its system clock with a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server.

This section maps to the following SFR:

- [FPT\\_STM.1](#)

## 7.1.6 TOE Access Protection

The following session termination mechanisms are supported by the TOE:

- Inactivity timeout

### 7.1.6.1 Inactivity Timeout

The TOE supports an inactivity timeout for Control Panel sign-in sessions. If a signed in user is inactive for longer than the specified period of inactivity, the user is automatically signed out of the Control Panel by the TOE. The inactivity period is managed by the administrator through EWS (HTTP) or the Control Panel. Only one inactivity period setting exists per TOE.

This section maps to the following SFR:

- **FTA\_SSL.3**

### 7.1.7 Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management

Shared-medium communications (i.e., Ethernet) between the TOE and other trusted IT products use a trusted channel mechanism to protect the communications from disclosure and modification. The TOE also ensures the cryptographic operations are validated during policy processing such as validating digital signatures or encrypting and decrypting data. The following table provides a list of the mechanism(s) used to protect these channels and the channels protected by the mechanism(s).

**Table 49: Trusted channel connections**

Secure protocol	Network channel	Initiated by
IPsec	Email connections (SMTP gateway)	TOE
	EWS (HTTP) connections (including web browser & certificate upload)	Administrative Computer
	REST (HTTP) connections	Administrative Computer
	Windows domain controller (Kerberos) connections	TOE
	LDAP server connections	TOE
	NTP connections	TOE
	PJL connections	Administrative Computer & Network Client Computer
	Scan to Network Folder connections (SMB, FTP)	TOE
	Scan to SharePoint connections	TOE
	Syslog server connections	TOE
	DNS server connections	TOE
	WINS server connections	TOE



The TOE uses IPsec as means to provide trusted channel communications. IPsec uses X.509v3 certificates, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), IKEv1, and IKEv2 protocols, and the cryptographic algorithms listed below to protect communications.

The cryptographic functions used by IKE are implemented in the QuickSec cryptographic library version 7.3. The cryptographic functions used by IPsec are implemented in the Linux Kernel Crypto API cryptographic library.

In the evaluated configuration, the following cryptographic algorithms are supported for IKE:

- DH (dhEphem) (P=2048, SHA2-256)
- DSA (L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256)
- SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hashing
- HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256
- CTR\_DRBG(AES)
- RSA 2048-bit, and 3072-bit signature generation and verification
- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CBC mode for data transfers
- AES-256 (with ECB mode) for the CTR\_DRBG(AES)

In the evaluated configuration, the following cryptographic algorithms are supported for IPsec:

- AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CBC mode for data transfers
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hashing
- HMAC-SHA1-96, HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256
- HMAC\_DRBG(HMAC-SHA2-256)

IPsec is conformant to the MUST/MUST NOT requirements of the following Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFCs):

- [RFC4301], [RFC3602], and [RFC4868] for IPsec
- [RFC4303] and [RFC2404] for ESP
- [RFC2407] and [RFC2408] for ISAKMP
- [RFC4109], [RFC2409], and [RFC3526] for IKEv1
- [RFC4306], [RFC4718], [RFC5996], and [RFC3526] for IKEv2

The TOE maintains the following X.509v3 certificates for IPsec in the certificate store:

- One IPsec identity certificate
- One or more Certificate Authority (CA) certificates

The EWS (HTTP) interface allows administrators to manage these X.509v3 certificates used by IPsec.

When the TOE is first powered on, it generates a self-signed identity certificate to use for IPsec. In the evaluated configuration, the use of a self-signed identity certificate generated by the TOE for IPsec is not permitted. The administrator must import a CA-signed identity certificate with private key and designate it for IPsec usage. The TOE requires an IPsec identity certificate to always exist; therefore, it allows the administrator to replace the identity certificate used by IPsec.

The TOE uses a copy of the self-signed identity certificate it generates when first powered on as a CA certificate (self-signed) and comes with other CA certificates pre-installed. The administrator must obtain a CA certificate from

the Operational Environment and install this certificate when setting up the evaluated configuration. The TOE allows the administrator to install and delete CA certificates used by IPsec.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FCS\_CKM.1-ipsec
- FCS\_CKM.2
- FCS\_COP.1-ipsec
- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1
- FMT\_MTD.1
- FMT\_SMF.1
- FTP\_ITC.1

## 7.1.8 User and Access Management

The TOE supports the following roles:

- Administrators (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
- Users (U.NORMAL)

Administrators maintain and configure the TOE and Operational Environment. Users perform the standard print, copy, fax, etc. functions on the system.

In addition, the TOE performs many security management functions.

Only administrators can configure the list of Network Client Computers and the Administrative Computer that are allowed to connect to the TOE and the list of other trusted IT products to which the TOE will connect.

Administrators do this by creating, modifying, and deleting IPsec address templates, service templates, and rules via the TOE. Similarly, only administrators can create, modify, and delete address templates, service templates, and rules via the TOE for trusted IT products.

For each Control Panel application, an administrator can modify the association of a sign-in method to an application. (For example, the administrator can associate LDAP Sign In method to the Print from Job Storage application). In addition, administrators control whether or not a Control Panel user must use the administrator-selected sign-in method associated with the applications in order to access that application. This latter feature is controlled through the "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product's control panel" feature.

It's worth noting that although the following security attributes are enforced by the TOE, the TOE does not provide functionality to manage these attributes (i.e., the TOE cannot add, change, delete, or query these attributes on an existing job) and the TOE does not provide default values for these attributes; therefore, there are no management SFRs specified in this ST for these security attributes:

- Job Encryption Password - The job is protected using a key derived from the Job Encryption Password by the Operational Environment. The TOE does not provide a mechanism to change or delete the password on the job.
- Job PIN - A print job's Job PIN is set by the Operational Environment (i.e., Network Client Computer). The TOE does not provide a mechanism to change or delete a Job PIN from a print job.

This section maps to the following SFRs:

- FMT\_MOF.1
- FMT\_MSA.1
- FMT\_MTD.1
- FMT\_SMF.1
- FMT\_SMR.1

## 8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References

### 8.1 Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AH	Authentication Header (IPsec)
ASCII	American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BIOS	Basic Input/Output System
BLE	Bluetooth Low Energy
CA	Certificate Authority
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
DNS	Domain Name System
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec)
EWS	Embedded Web Server
HCD	Hardcopy Device
HMAC	Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTML	Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IKE	Internet Key Exchange (IPsec)
IP	Internet Protocol
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
ISAKMP	Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (IPsec)
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD5	Message Digest 5
MMC	MultiMediaCard
NFC	Near Field Communication
NTLM	Microsoft NT LAN Manager
NTP	Network Time Protocol
OMP	Open Extensibility Platform
OMPd	OMP device layer
PIN	Personal Identification Number

PJL	Printer Job Language
PS	PostScript
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
REST	Representational State Transfer
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB	Server Message Block
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SOAP	Simple Object Access Protocol
SSH	Secure Shell
TOE	Target of Evaluation
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WINS	Windows Internet Name Service
XML	Extensible Markup Language

## 8.2 Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.

Administrative User	This term refers to a user with administrative control of the TOE.
Authentication Data	This includes the Access Code and/or password for each user of the product.
Control Panel Application	An application that resides in the firmware and is selectable by the user via the Control Panel.
Device Administrator Password	The password used to restrict access to administrative tasks via the EWS, REST, and Control Panel interfaces. This password is also required to associate a user with the Administrator role. In product documentation, it may also be referred to as the Local Device Administrator Password, Local Device Administrator Access Code, the Device Password, or the Administrator Password.
External Interface	A non-hardcopy interface where either the input is being received from outside the TOE or the output is delivered to a destination outside the TOE.
Hardcopy Device (HCD)	This term generically refers to the product models in this Security Target.
Near Field Communication (NFC)	Proximity (within a few inches) radio communication between two or more devices.
Shared-medium Interface	Mechanism for transmitting or receiving data that uses wired or wireless network or non-network electronic methods over a communications medium

which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users.

User Security Attributes	Defined by functional requirement FIA_ATD.1, every user is associated with one or more security attributes which allow the TOE to enforce its security functions on this user.
Wireless Direct Print	Feature that enables Wi-Fi capable devices (for example: smart phones, tablets, or computers) to establish a direct peer-to-peer wireless connection with the printer to submit print jobs.

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