

**PUBLIC**

**Common Criteria  
Information Technology  
Security Evaluation**

---

**Security Target Lite  
of  
S3FS91J/S3FS91H/  
S3FS91V/S3FS93I  
32-bits RISC Microcontroller  
For Smart Card with SWP**

Version 1.0  
30<sup>th</sup> April 2009



## REVISION HISTORY

### UPDATES:

Version	Date	Modification
1.0	14 <sup>th</sup> April 2009	Creation

### WRITERS:

Written by	Title
Bryant K.S. YI	Senior Engineer
SJ Park	Engineer

# CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>4</b>
1.1	SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION .....	4
1.2	SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW .....	4
1.3	CC CONFORMANCE & EVALUATION ASSURANCE LEVEL .....	5
1.4	OPERATIONS .....	5
<b>2</b>	<b>TOE DESCRIPTION</b> .....	<b>6</b>
2.1	PRODUCT DESCRIPTION .....	6
2.2	TOE LIFE-CYCLE .....	8
2.3	TOE DEFINITION .....	11
2.4	TOE INTENDED USAGE .....	16
<b>3</b>	<b>TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</b> .....	<b>17</b>
3.1	DEFINITION OF ASSETS .....	17
3.2	ASSUMPTIONS .....	18
3.3	THREATS .....	19
3.4	ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .....	24
<b>4</b>	<b>SECURITY OBJECTIVES</b> .....	<b>26</b>
4.1	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .....	26
4.2	SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT .....	29
<b>5</b>	<b>IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS</b> .....	<b>32</b>
5.1	TOE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .....	32
5.2	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT .....	43
<b>6</b>	<b>TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION</b> .....	<b>48</b>
6.1	LIST OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS .....	48
6.2	RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY FUNCTIONS AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .....	51
6.3	ASSURANCE MEASURES .....	52
<b>7</b>	<b>PP CLAIMS</b> .....	<b>53</b>
7.1	PP REFERENCE .....	53
7.2	PP TAILORING .....	53
7.3	PP ADDITIONS .....	53
<b>8</b>	<b>RATIONALE</b> .....	<b>54</b>
8.1	SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE .....	54
8.2	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .....	57
8.3	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE AND INTERNALLY CONSISTENT .....	65
<b>9</b>	<b>ANNEX</b> .....	<b>68</b>

## 1 INTRODUCTION

- 2 This document presents the Security Target (ST) of S3FS91J/S3FS91H/S3FS91V/S3FS93I 32-bits RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with SWP, designed on the Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
- 3 The S3FS91J/S3FS91H/S3FS91V/S3FS93I 32-bits RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with SWP is designed for Smart Card applications. And the S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP mean the Target of Evaluation (TOE) from now on. The TOE maintains the integrity and the confidentiality of contents of the smartcard memory as required by the applications the smartcard is built for and maintains the correct execution of the software residing on the card.
- 4 This introductory chapter contains the following sections:
- 1.1 Security Target Identification
  - 1.2 Security Target Overview
  - 1.3 Common Criteria conformance & Evaluation Assurance Level

### 1.1 Security Target Identification

- 5 The Security Target version is 1.0 and dated 30<sup>th</sup> April 2009
- 6 The Security Target is based on the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001.
- 7 The Protection Profile and the Security Target are built on *Common Criteria version 2.3*.
- Title: Security Target of S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I 32-bits RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with SWP
  - Target of Evaluation: S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP revision3
  - Provided by: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
  - Common Criteria version : *ISO/IEC 15408-2005(E) (CC V2.3) part 1 to 3*

### 1.2 Security Target Overview

- 8 The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP featuring the Secure cryptographic coprocessor, is a smartcard integrated circuit which is composed of a processing unit with MPU, RNG, TDES, CRC, I/O ports, AMBA bus, Clock Controller, Timers, IVR, Power on Reset, Interrupt Controller, security components such as detector and filter, hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process (TEST ROM) and volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software (also known as IC firmware) as long as it physically exists in the smartcard integrated circuit after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services, including a TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S, Secure Boot loader and an AIS31 statistical compliant random number generation library. All other software is called Smartcard Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE. The main security functions of the TOE are:
- Environmental Security violation recording and reaction
    - The detectors and filters are use for preventing security violation.
  - Memory/FLASH Access Control
    - The TOE detects invalid address access occurrence on memory/flash.

- The TOE support secure boot loader which loads the firmware with security functions.
- Non-reversibility of TEST and USER modes
  - There is no way to return the TEST mode after selects the USER mode.
- Hardware countermeasures for unobservability
  - This security function enforces hardware counter measures to enhance unobservability and it protects memory and address/data bus from probing attacks.
- Cryptography
  - This security function is used for encryption/decryption data using Triple DES (3DES).
  - The TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S provides a set of functions to implement the cryptosystem based on asymmetric cryptographic technique.
  - The Random Number Generator is use to generating random numbers and provides a mechanism to generate random numbers.

### 1.3 CC Conformance & Evaluation Assurance Level

- 9 This security target conforms to Common Criteria version 2.3 (ISO15408) part 2 extended, part 3 conformant and conforms to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001. The assurance level is EAL4 augmented with components ADV\_IMP.2, ALC\_DVS.2, AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4. The minimum strength of the TOE security functions is Strength of Functions High (“SOF high”).

### 1.4 Operations

- 10 The notations, form, rule of operations are based on *Common Criteria version 2.3*.
- Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. An example of iteration is FCS\_COP.1 being iterated twice in order to require the implementation of two different cryptographic algorithms. In this security target, the round brackets represented as iteration operation rules; ‘( )’.
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more items from a list. An example of an element with a selection is: FPT\_TST.1.1 “The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions *under which self test should occur*] to demonstrate the correct operation of ...” In this security target, the square brackets represented as selection operation rules; ‘[ ]’.
  - Assignment: allows the specification of parameters. An example of an element with an assignment is: FIA\_AFL.1.2 “When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall *list of actions*.” In this security target, the italic characters represented as assignment operation rules; *Italic characters*.
  - Refinement: allows the addition of details. An example of a valid refinement is FIA\_UAU.2.1 “The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.” being refined to “The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated **by username/password** before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.” In this security target, the bold characters represented as assignment operation rules; **bold characters**.

## 2 TOE DESCRIPTION

11 This chapter 2 contains the following sections:

- 2.1 Product Description
- 2.2 TOE Life-cycle
- 2.3 TOE Definition
- 2.4 TOE intended usage

### 2.1 Product Description

12 The TOE designed and packaged specifically for Smart Card applications. The products maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of content of the smartcard memory as required by the application and maintain the correct execution of the software are residing on the card.

13 The TOE featuring the Secure TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor is a smartcard integrated circuit which is composed of a processing unit (SC100) with MPU, security components (RNG, Triple DES (3DES), Detectors & Security Controller, Crypto Accelerator) and contact based I/O ports (SWP, UART), hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process (TEST ROM), volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware) and etc (AMBA bus, Clock Controller, Timers, IVR, Power-on Reset, Interrupt Controller). The volatile and non-volatile memories are consist of 8K bytes TEST ROM, 32K bytes ROM, 768K bytes (S3FS91J) flash memory / 512K bytes (S3FS91H) flash memory / 420K bytes (S3FS91V) flash memory / 650K bytes (S3FS93I) flash memory, 20K bytes RAM (including 2K bytes Crypto. RAM). The TOE support Triple DES (3DES) Symmetric Cryptography and Secure TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor for RSA Asymmetric Cryptographic

14 The security features of the integrated circuit are:

- Detector & Security controller
  - Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High and Low Frequency detectors, High and Low Supply Voltage detectors, Supply Voltage Glitch detectors, Light detector
  - Active Shield against physical intrusive attacks
  - Dynamic data bus encryption
- Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Internal Variable Clock, Random Waits Generator, Random Current Generator, RAM and FLASH scrambling mechanisms
- Hardware parity/CRC calculators
- The IC Firmware includes:
  - A modular arithmetic library v3.9S for RSA Asymmetric Cryptography support
  - A True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31 statistical compliant Random Number Generation
  - TEST ROM and Code for testing purpose
  - Secure Boot loader can download the encrypted user code with TDES.

15 The products are support UART and SWP I/O port. The UART is implemented for T=0 and T1 protocols base on ISO 7816.

16 The TOE also includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software (IC firmware) as long as it physically exists in the smartcard integrated circuit after being delivered by the

IC Manufacturer. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services, including a TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S, an AIS31 statistical compliant random number generation library and Secure Boot loader. All other software is called Smartcard Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.

17 The main hardware blocks of the Integrated Circuit are described in Figure 2- 1 below:




Figure 2-1. HW Block Diagram

- 18 Note that only the Triple DES (3DES) algorithm belongs to the TOE, not the Single DES.
- 19 In figure2-1, 20K bytes RAM including 2K bytes Crypto. RAM
- 20 RNG is meaning a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31 statistical compliant Random Number Generation
- 21 Crypto Accelerator is meaning Secure TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor
- 22 Hardware parity/CRC calculators are two kinds of CRC calculator in the device: CRC-16 and CRC-32.

## 2.2 TOE Life-cycle

### 2.2.1 Smart Card Product Life-cycle

- 23 The Smart Card product life-cycle is decomposed into 7 phases, according to the " Smart Card Integrated Circuit Protection Profile ". (*Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001.*)

Phase 1	Smartcard embedded software development	<b>The smart card embedded software developer</b> is in charge of the smart card embedded software development and the specification of IC pre-personalisation requirements,
Phase 2	IC development	<b>The IC designer</b> designs the IC, develops IC dedicated software, provides information, software or tools to the smart card embedded software developer, and receives the smart card embedded software from the developer, through trusted delivery and verification procedures. From the IC design, IC dedicated software and smart card embedded software, he constructs the smart card IC database, necessary for the IC photomask fabrication,
Phase 3	IC manufacturing and wafer testing	<b>The IC manufacturer</b> is responsible for producing the IC through three main steps: IC manufacturing, IC wafer testing, and IC pre-personalisation,
Phase 4	IC packaging and testing	<b>The IC packaging manufacturer</b> is responsible for the IC packaging and testing,
Phase 5	Smartcard product finishing process	<b>The smart card product manufacturer</b> is responsible for the smart card product finishing process and testing,
Phase 6	Smartcard personalisation	<b>The personaliser</b> is responsible for the smart card personalisation and final tests. Other smart card embedded software may be loaded onto the chip at the personalisation process,
Phase 7	Smartcard end usage	<b>The smart card issuer</b> is responsible for the smart card product delivery to <b>the smart card end-user</b> , and the end of life process.

Table 2-1. Smart card product life-cycle phases

- 24 The limit of this Security Target corresponds to phase2, 3 and phase4; phase 1, 5, 6 and 7 are outside the scope of this ST. In phase1 the smart card embedded software developer is in charge of the smartcard embedded software development but in this Security Target except phase1 because the TOE does not include such like embedded software. The TOE is developed in phase2 and produced in phase3. Then the TOE is delivered in form of wafers to IC packing manufacturer and it is include in delivery step (phase4).



### 2.2.2 TOE Life-cycle definition

25 The figure 2-2.describes the Smartcard product life-cycle.




Figure 2-2. Smart card product life-cycle

26 Following table identifies the sites, which are within evaluation perimeter.

Phase	Description	Address for S3FS9CI
Phase 2	IC Development	C&M Development team Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. San #24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggi-Do, KOREA 449-711
	IC Photomask Fabrication	PKL 493-3 Sungsung-dong, Cheonan-City, Choongcheongnam-Do, Korea 330-300
Phase 3	IC Manufacturing	Line 5, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. San #24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggi-Do, KOREA 449-711
	IC wafer Testing	Line 2, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. San #24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggi-Do, KOREA 449-711

**Table 2-2. Site identification within the evaluation perimeter**

27 Procedures on the delivery process of the TOE must exist and be applied for every delivery within this phase or between phases. This includes any kind of delivery performed from phase 2 to 3, including:

- Intermediate delivery of the TOE or the TOE under construction within a phase
- Delivery of the TOE or the TOE under construction from one phase to the next.

28 These procedures shall be compliant with the assumptions [A.DLV].

29 The TOE controls following configurations:

30 The module and card embedding of the TOE provide external security mechanisms because they make it harder for an attacker to access parts of the TOE for physical manipulation.

31 Regarding the Application Note 4 of the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. Samsung will deliver the TOE at the end of phase 3 in form of wafers.

32 Regarding the Application Note 5 of the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. Samsung will deliver the TOE with IC Firmware. The IC Firmware is described in section 2.1.

33 The TOE is able to control two different logical modes. After production the chip is in the TEST mode that means under the control of the test software. At the end of the production test the chip will be switched into the USER Mode so that the chip is under the control of the application software. At the end of the production test the chip the TEST Mode is disabled.

TOE Mode	Product Life Cycle	Authorized User (Role)
TEST Mode	Phase 3	Test Administrator
USER Mode	Phase 4 to 7	User

**Table 2-3. TOE Mode**

### 2.2.3 TOE Secure Environment

34 Considering the TOE, the Development environment is defined as follow:

- Design environment corresponding to phase 2
- Production environment corresponding to phase 3 including the test operations
- User environment, from phase 4 to phase 7

#### 2.2.3.1 TOE Development Environment

35 To assure security, the environment in which the development takes place shall be made secured with controllable accesses having traceability. Furthermore, it is important that all authorised personnel involved fully understand the importance and the rigid implementation of defined security procedures.

36 The development begins with the TOE's specification. All parties in contact with sensitive information are required to abide by Non-Disclosure Agreement's.

37 Design and development of the IC then follows. The engineer uses a secure computer system (preventing unauthorised access) to make his design simulations, circuit performance verifications and generation of the TOE's IC photomask databases. Sensitive documents, databases on tapes, diskettes, and printed circuit layout information are stored in appropriate locked cupboards/safe. Of paramount importance also is the disposal of unwanted data (complete electronic erasures) and documents (e.g. shredding).

38 Reticles and photomasks are generated from the verified IC databases; the formers are used in the silicon Wafer-fab processing. Reticles and photomasks are generated only on-site for security

#### 2.2.3.2 TOE Production environment

39 As high volumes of product commonly go through such environments, adequate control procedures are necessary to account for all products at all stages of production.

40 Production starts within the Wafer-fab; here the silicon wafers undergo the diffusion processing typically in 25-wafer lots. Computer tracking at wafer level throughout the process is commonplace. The wafers are then taken into the test area. Testing and security programming of each TOE occurs. After fabrication, the TOE is tested to assure conformance with the device specification. The wafers will then be delivered for assembly onto the smart card.

#### 2.2.3.3 TOE user environment

41 The TOE user environment is the environment of phases 4 to 7.

42 At phases 5 and 6, the TOE user environment is a controlled environment.

##### End-user environment (phase 7)

43 Smart cards are used in a wide range of applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are Pay-TV, Banking Cards, Portable communication SIM cards, Health cards, and Transportation cards.

44 The end-user environment therefore covers a wide spectrum of very different functions, thus making it difficult to avoid and monitor any abuse of the TOE.

## 2.3 TOE Definition

45 The TOE consists of the following Firmware:

### 2.3.1 TOE Hardware

#### CPU

- 32-bits SC100 RISC processor

- Memory Protection Unit(MPU) - 8 separate regions using individual region base and region limit address registers

**Memory**

- 32K bytes ROM
- 8K bytes TEST ROM (hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process)
- 768K bytes (S3FS91J) flash memory / 512K bytes (S3FS91H) flash memory / 420K bytes (S3FS91V) flash memory / 650K bytes (S3FS93I) flash memory
- 20K bytes RAM (2K bytes use for Crypto )

**Triple DES (3DES)**

- Built-in hardware Triple DES (3DES) accelerator
- cryptographic coprocessor with 112 or 168 bits key size
- Circuit for resistance against SPA and DPA attacks

**Crypto Accelerator**

- Secure TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor's modular multiplier supporting from 1024 bits up to 2048 bits RSA cryptography

**Detector & Security Controller**

- Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High and Low Frequency detectors, High and Low Supply Voltage detectors, Supply Voltage Glitch detectors, Light detector
- Active Shield against physical intrusive attacks
- Dynamic data bus encryption
- Random Current Generator is designed to against SPA and DPA attacks

**Internal Voltage Regulator**

- Internal Voltage Regulator (IVR)

**Interrupts Controller**

- Normal interrupt (IRQ) or Fast interrupt (FIQ)
- ISO7816 reset interrupt

**Serial I/O Interface**

- UART is implemented by Hardware for T=0 and T=1 protocols
- Support asynchronous mode communication (conforms to ISO 7816 -3)
- SWP (Single Wire Protocol) embedded

**Power-on Reset**

- Power-on reset circuit
- External reset/interrupt circuit (interrupt is default-enabled)

**Random Number Generator**

- A True Random Number Generator(TRNG) for AIS31 statistical compliant

**CRC**

- Hardware parity/CRC calculator support data integrity checks function for embedded software.

**Timers**

- 16-bits Timer
- 20-bits Watchdog Timer

**Clock Controller**

- Internal & External Clock

**AMBA Bus**

- Address & data bus

**2.3.2 TOE Firmware**

46 The TOE firmware comprises the following components:

- Test ROM code that is used for testing the chip during production
  - At the time of TEST mode, it provides protocol of Data Transmission.
  - At the time of TEST mode, it performs chip test by receiving input of chip test command.
  - After USER mode is set with Test ROM code the program in Test ROM code can't be executed.

- The TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S

Secure TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor is Hardware coprocessor for high speed modular multiplications.

The TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S is a software library built on the Secure TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor that provides high level interface for RSA cryptographic algorithms.

The functions of the library included in the TOE are:

- TND\_RSA\_SigSTD\_Secure (RSA signature generation with straightforward method)
- TND\_RSA\_SigCRT\_Secure (RSA signature generation with CRT method (verification is done with public exponent))
- TND\_RSA\_SigCRT\_Secure3 (RSA signature generation with CRT method (verification is done without public exponent))
- TND\_RSA\_Verify (RSA signature verification)
- RSA\_Key\_Generation (RSA key generation)

The library supports key sizes from 32 bits to 2048 bits by step of 2 bits. However, only key sizes from 1024 bits up to 2048 bits are within the scope of this evaluation.

The functions TND\_RSA\_SigSTD\_Secure, TND\_RSA\_SigCRT\_Secure and TND\_RSA\_SigCRT\_Secure3 features some countermeasures against classical dedicated attacks such as SPA, DPA, high-order DPA and fault attacks.

- A True Random Number Generator that fulfills the requirements of AIS31 statistical.
- Secure Boot Loader can download the encrypted user code with TDES

47 The TOE configuration is summarized in table 2-4 below:

Item Type	Item	Version	Form of delivery
-----------	------	---------	------------------

Hardware	S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/ S3FS93I 32-bits RISC Microcontroller with SWP	3	Wafer
Firmware	Test ROM Code	1.0	Included in Test ROM
Firmware	TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library	3.9S	Software Library
Firmware	True Random Number Generator Library	3.0	Software Library
Firmware	Secure Boot Loader	1.0	Software Library
Document	User's manual	4.00	Softcopy
Document	Security Application Note	1.0	Softcopy

Table 2-4. TOE Component

- 48 Note: The TOE can be delivered without the TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S. In this case the TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography.

### 2.3.3 TOE Operating Features

#### 49 Clock Sources

- External clock: 1 MHz-7.5 MHz

#### 50 Operating Voltage Range

- 1.62 V - 5.5 V

#### 51 Operating Temperature

- 25°C to 85°C

### 2.3.4 Interfaces of the TOE

- The physical interface of the TOE with the external environment is the entire surface of the IC
- The electrical interface of the TOE with the external environment is made of the chip's pads including the Vdd, RESET, CLK, GND, and I/O.
- The data interface of the TOE is made of the Contact I/O pads
- The physical/electrical/data interface in accordance with the ISO7816 communication protocols.
- The software interface of the TOE with the hardware consists of Special Function Registers (SFR) and CPU instructions.
- The RSA interface of the TOE is defined by the RSA library interface.

### 2.3.5 TOE Security Features

52 The TOE supports the following security functions and those are the logical scope of the TOE.

- 1) Environmental Security violation recording and reaction
- 2) Memory Access Control
- 3) Non-reversibility of TEST and USER modes
- 4) Hardware countermeasures for unobservability
- 5) Cryptography

53 The TOE IT functionality consists of:

- ISO7816 data communication
- Timing information for embedded software
- Arithmetical functions (e.g. incrementing counters in electronic purse, calculating currency conversion in electronic purse...),
- Data storage and processing

## 2.4 TOE Intended Usage

- 54 The device is developed for most high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for embedding into chip cards according to ISO 7816. Usually the smart card is assigned to a single individual only although the smartcard may be expected to be used for multiple applications in a multi-provider environment. Therefore the TOE may store and process secrets of several systems that must be protected from each other. So the TOE must meet security requirements to be applied to security modules. The secret data shall be used as input for the calculation of authentication data, the calculation of signatures and the encryption of data and keys. The software developer and the system integrators such as the terminal software developer may use samples of the TOE during the development phases for their testing purposes. It is not intended that they are able to change the behaviour of the smartcard in another way than an enduser. The Smartcard Embedded software is designed that the requirements from TOE user manual and security application note. All user data are owned by Smartcard Embedded Software, it defines and manages its security relevant User Data, in the manner required by the application context. The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure key-dependent functions that shall be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks.
- 55 The TOE is dedicated to applications such as:
- Banking and finance applications for credit or debit cards, electronic purse (stored value cards) and electronic commerce.
  - Network based transaction processing such a mobile phones (GSM SIM cards), pay TV (subscriber and pay-per-view cards), communication highways (Internet access and transaction processing).
  - Transport and ticketing applications (access control cards).
  - Governmental cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses).
  - Multimedia applications and Digital Right Management protection.
- 56 During the phases 2 and 3, the TOE is being developed. The administrators are as the following:
- Design Team (phase 2): **Design Manager**
  - The Photomask Team (phase 2): **Photomask Manager**
  - IC Production Team(phase 3): **Production Engineering Manager**
  - IC Testing Team(phase 3): **Test Manager**



### 3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

57 This chapter 3 contains the following sections:

- 3.1 Definition of Assets
- 3.2 Assumptions
- 3.3 Threats
- 3.4 Organizational Security Policies

#### 3.1 Definition of Assets

58 The primary assets to be protected are

- User's Data stored in the TOE memories (confidentiality and integrity)
- Smartcard Embedded Software for (confidentiality and integrity)
- Correct operation of the TOE (integrity)

59 Random numbers are likely to be used by Embedded Software for generating cryptographic keys, other primary assets.

60 Other primary assets are

- Random numbers generated by the TOE

The confidentiality of random number is generally protected by embedded software (which is responsible for requesting random number). However, it is important that random number should not be subject to leakage (cf. T.Leak-Inherent), because of their potential role in cryptographic key generation.

- The special functions for the communication with an external interface device, the TORNADO™ cryptographic coprocessor is a high speed modular multiplication coprocessor for RSA public key asymmetric cryptographic support, and
- Memory access control for usage of multiple application in on smartcard and to support this function the TOE provide areas based memory access control
- Secure Boot loader can download the encrypted user code with TDES.

61 **Assets regarding the Organisational Security Policy P.Process-TOE**

62 The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE development and production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as follows:

- logical design data,
- physical design data,
- IC Dedicated Software, Initialization Data, Pre-personalization Data, TSF data
- specific development aids,
- test and characterization related data,
- material for software development support,
- photomasks.

as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by the TOE Manufacturer and Samsung will deliver the TOE at the end of phase 3 in form of wafers

Explanations can be found in *Section 8.1.2, Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*.

### 63 Assets regarding the Assumption A.Process-Card

64 The information and material produced and/or processed by the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Card Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:

- the Smart Card Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related documentation,
- pre-personalisation and personalisation data including specifications of formats and memory areas, test related data,
- the User Data and related documentation,
- material for software development support,

as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer.

## 3.2 Assumptions

65 The following assumptions apply in this Security Target.

A.Process-Card                      Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

The exact requirement of this assumption will depend on the Smartcard Embedded Software. This means that the phase after TOE Delivery (refer to section 2.2.2) are assumed to be protected appropriately. For a preliminary list of assets to be protected, see *section 3.1 of Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*.

A.Plat-Appl                              Usage of Hardware Platform

The Smartcard Embedded Software is designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met:

- (i) S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP User's manual
- (ii) S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP Security application Note
- (iii) TOE application notes, and
- (iv) Results from TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

Note that particular requirements for the Smartcard Embedded Software are often not clear before considering a specific attack scenario during vulnerability analysis of the smartcard integrated circuit (AVA\_VLA).

Therefore, such results from the TOE evaluation (as contained in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)) must be given to the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software in an appropriate and authorised form and be taken into account during the evaluation of the software. This may also hold for additional tests being required for the combination of hardware and software. The TOE evaluation must be completed before evaluation of the Smartcard Embedded Software can be completed. The TOE evaluation can be conducted before and independent from the evaluation of the Smartcard Embedded Software.

## A.Resp-Appl

## Treatment of User Data

All User Data are owned by Smartcard Embedded Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Smartcard Embedded Software as defined for the specific application context.

This assumption requires that the Smartcard Embedded Software defines and positively manages its security relevant User Data, in the manner required by the application context. Without this, the protection provided by the TOE itself may be of no use if the Smartcard Embedded Software itself allows data to be compromised.

Examples of embedded software security concerns are given in *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001, section 8.2.1*.

- 66 The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.

## A.Key-Function

## Usage of Key-dependent Functions

Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).

Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including cryptographic keys.

### 3.3 Threats

- 67 The cloning of the functional behaviour of the Smartcard on its ISO command interface is the highest level security concern in the application context.
- 68 The cloning of that functional behaviour requires to (i) develop a functional equivalent of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (ii) disclose, interpret and employ the secret User Data stored in the TOE, and (iii) develop and build a functional equivalent of the smartcard using the input from the previous steps.
- 69 The smartcard integrated circuit is a platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software which ensures that especially the critical User Data are stored and processed in a secure way (refer to below). The Smartcard Embedded Software must also ensure that critical User Data are treated as required in the application context (refer to Section 3.2). In addition, the personalisation process supported by the Smartcard Embedded Software (and perhaps by the smartcard integrated circuit in addition) must be secure (refer to Section 3.2). This last step is beyond the scope of the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. As a result the threat “cloning of the functional behaviour of

the smartcard on its ISO command interface” is averted by the combination of measures which split into those being evaluated according to the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. and those being subject to the evaluation of the Smartcard Embedded Software or Smartcard and the corresponding personalisation process. Therefore, functional cloning is indirectly covered by the security concerns and threats described below.

70 Note that the threats also pertain to the disclosure of cryptographic keys while being used to perform cryptographic algorithms such as RSA. If the TOE provides further functions or services to the Smartcard Embedded Software this would result in having additional high-level security concerns.

71 According to the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. section 3.3 there are the following high-level security concerns:

SC1 Manipulation of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories)

SC2 Disclosure of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories).

Though the Smartcard Embedded Software (normally stored in the ROM) will in many cases not contain secret data or algorithms, it must be protected from being disclosed, since for instance knowledge of specific implementation details may assist an attacker. In many cases critical User Data will be stored in the E2PROM.

72 These high-level security concerns are refined below by defining threats as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 3-1). Note that manipulation of the TOE is only a means to threaten User Data or the Smartcard Embedded Software and is not a success for the attacker in itself.




Figure 3-1. Standard Threats

73 According to the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. section 3.3 there are the following high-level security concerns:

SC3 Deficiency of random numbers.

74 These high-level security concerns being related to specific functionality are refined below by defining threats as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 3-2)



Figure 3-2. Threats related Specific Functionality

- 75 The above security concerns are derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7) since
- Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by assumptions and
  - The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy.
- 76 Refer to Figure 2-2. The TOE's countermeasures are designed to avert the threats described below. Nevertheless, they may be effective in earlier phases (Phases 4 to 6).
- 77 The TOE is exposed to different types of influences for interaction with its outer world. Some of them may result from using the TOE only but others may also indicate an attack. The different types of influences or interaction are visualized in Figure 3-3.




Figure 3-3. Attack model for the TOE

- 78 An interaction with the TOE can be done through the ISO interfaces (Number 7 – 9 in Figure 3-3) which are realised using contacts and/or a contactless interface. Influences or interactions with the TOE also occurs through the chip surface (Number 1 – 6 in Figure 3-3). In Number 1 and 6 galvanic contacts are used. In Number 2 and 5 the influence (arrow directed to the chip) or the measurement (arrow starts from the chip) does not require a contact. Number 3 and 4 refer to specific situations where the TOE and its functional behaviour is not only influenced but definite changes are made by applying mechanical, chemical and other methods (such as 1, 2). Many attacks require a prior inspection and some reverse-engineering (Number 3).
- 79 Examples for specific attacks are given in the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. Section 8.3.

### 3.3.1 Standard Threats (referring to SC1 and SC2)

80 The TOE shall avert the threat “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” as specified below.

T.Leak-Inherent                      Inherent Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the Smartcard in order to disclose confidential data (User Data or TSF data).

No direct contact with the Smartcard internals is required here. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. One example is the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).

This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from direct (contact) measurements (Numbers 6 and 7 in Figure 3-3) or measurement of emanations (Number 5 in Figure 3-3) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.

81 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)” as specified below.

T.Phys-Probing                      Physical Probing

An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order (i) to disclose User Data, (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the Smartcard Embedded Software or (iii) to disclose other critical operational information especially TSF data.

Physical probing requires direct interaction with the Smartcard Integrated Circuit internals (Numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 3-3). Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified (Numbers 3 in Figure 3-3). Determination of software design including treatment of User Data may also be a pre-requisite.

This pertains to “measurements” using galvanic contacts or any type of charge interaction whereas manipulations are considered under the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”. The threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)” may use physical probing but require complex signal processing in addition.

82 The TOE shall avert the threat “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)” as specified below.

T.Malfunction                      Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the Smartcard Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) deactivate or modify security functions of the Smartcard Embedded Software. This may be achieved by operating the Smartcard outside the normal operating conditions (Numbers 1, 2 and 9 in Figure 3-3). To exploit this an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

83 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified below.



## T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation

An attacker may physically modify the Smartcard in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the TOE, (ii) modify security functions of the Smartcard Embedded Software or (iii) to modify User Data.

The modification may be achieved through techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Before that hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.

Determination of software design including treatment of User Data may also be a pre-requisite. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

In contrast to malfunctions (refer to T.Malfunction) the attacker requires to gather significant knowledge about the TOE's internal construction.

- 84 The TOE shall avert the threat "Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)" as specified below:

## T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the Smartcard in order to disclose confidential data (User Data or TSF data) even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker.

This threat pertains to attacks where methods described in "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or "Physical Manipulation" (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets.

- 85 The TOE shall avert the threat "Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)" as specified below.

## T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality

An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery in order to (i) disclose or manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate/change) security features or functions of the TOE or of Smartcard Embedded Software or (iii) to enable an attack.

### 3.3.2 Threats related to Specific Functionality (referring to SC3)

- 86 The TOE shall avert the threat "Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)" as specified below.

## T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers

An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers generated by the TOE for instance because of a lack of entropy of the random numbers provided.

An attacker may gather information about the produced random numbers which might be a problem because they may be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.

Here the attacker is expected to take advantage of statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the TOE without specific knowledge about

the TOE's generator. Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered which may assist in getting information about random numbers.

### 3.3.3 Threats related to additional TOE Specific Functionality (referring to SC1 and SC2)

87 The Smartcard Embedded Software is responsible for its User Data according to the assumption "Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-App)" in *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*. However, the Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise different parts, for instance an operating system and one or more applications. In this case, such parts may accidentally or deliberately access data (including code) of other parts which may result in a security violation.

88 The TOE shall avert the additional threat "Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)" as specified below.

T.Mem-Access                      Memory Access Violation

Parts of the Smartcard Embedded Software may cause security violations by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code). Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific application context and must be implemented by the Smartcard Embedded Software.

## 3.4 Organizational Security Policies

89 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy "Protection during TOE Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)" as specified below.

P.Process-TOE                      Protection during TOE Development and Production

The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the Smartcard Integrated Circuit (Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery, refer to Section 2.2) is secure so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. For example, the confidentiality and integrity of design information and test data shall be guaranteed; access to samples, development tools and other material shall be restricted to authorized persons only; scrap will be destroyed etc. This not only pertains to the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software and therefore especially to the Smartcard Embedded Software itself.

An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.

Samsung will deliver the TOE at the end of phase 3 in form of wafers

90 The TOE provides specific security functionality which can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE's environment because it can only be decided in the context of the smartcard application, against which threats the Smartcard Embedded Software will use the specific security functionality.

91 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality (P.Add-Functions)" as specified below.

P.Add-Functions                      Additional Specific Security Functionality



---

The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple DES (3DES))
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric cryptography
- Hardware parity/CRC calculator

## 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

92 This chapter Security Objectives contains the following sections:

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

4.2 Security Objectives for Environment

### 4.1 Security objectives for the TOE

93 According to the Protection Profile[*Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*] there are the following standard high-level security goals and the minimum strength of function level for the TOE security requirements is SOF-high :

SG1 maintain the integrity of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (when being executed/processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories)

SG2 maintain the confidentiality of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (when being processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories).

SG3 provide random numbers.

94 These standard high-level security goals are refined below by defining security objectives as required by the *Common Criteria*. Note that the integrity of the TOE is a mean to reach these objectives.

#### 4.1.1 Standard Security Objectives (referring to SG1 and SG2)

95 The TOE shall provide "Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)" as specified below.

O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) stored and/or processed in the Smartcard IC

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals (for example on the power, clock, or I/O lines) and
- by measurement and analysis of the time between events found by measuring signals (for instance on the power, clock, or I/O lines).

This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing whereas O.Phys-Probing is about direct measurements on elements on the chip surface. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.

96 The TOE shall provide "Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)" as specified below.

O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of User Data, against the disclosure/reconstruction of the Smartcard Embedded Software or against the disclosure of other critical operational information. This includes protection against

- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)

with a prior

- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

97 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” as specified below.

O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions

The TOE must ensure its correct operation.

The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include voltage, clock frequency, temperature, or external energy fields.

Remark: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective O.Phys-Manipulation) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE’s internal construction is required and the attack is performed in a controlled manner.

98 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified below.

O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation

The TOE must provide protection against manipulation of the TOE (including its software and TSF data), the Smartcard Embedded Software and the User Data. This includes protection against

- reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its properties and functions),
- manipulation of the hardware and any data, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data).

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

99 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)” as specified below:

O.Leak-Forced                      Protection against Forced Information Leakage

The Smartcard must be protected against disclosure of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) processed in the Card (using methods as described under O.Leak-Inherent) even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker

- by forcing a malfunction (refer to “Protection against Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (O.Malfunction))” and/or\
- by a physical manipulation (refer to “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation))”. If this is not the case, signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets could become an information channel for a leakage attack.

100 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Abuse of Functionality (O.Abuse-Func)” as specified below.

O.Abuse-Func                      Protection against Abuse of Functionality

The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

101 The TOE shall provide “TOE Identification (O.Identification)” as specified below:

O.Identification                      TOE Identification

The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.

#### 4.1.2 Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG3)

102 The TOE shall provide “Random Numbers (O.RND)” as specified below.

O.RND                                      Random Numbers

The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy.

The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker since they might be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.

#### 4.1.3 Security Objectives for Added Function

103 The TOE shall provide “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” as specified below.

O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality

The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple DES (3DES))
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric cryptography
- Hardware parity/CRC calculator

104 The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified below.

O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control

The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with the capability to define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the partitioning of such memory areas so that access of software to memory areas is controlled as required, for example, in a multi-application environment.

Subjects are software codes in User mode.

Objects are data stored in ROM, RAM and FLASH memories.

## 4.2 Security objectives for the Environment

### 4.2.1 Phase 1

105 The Smartcard Embedded Software shall provide “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” as specified below.

OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform

To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Smartcard Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met:

- (i) S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP User’s manual
- (ii) S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP Security Application Note
- (iii) TOE application notes, and
- (iv) Results from the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

106 The Smartcard Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.

OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data

Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Smartcard Embedded Software as required by the security needs of the specific application context.

For example the Smartcard Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant user data to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal.

Because the TOE additional specific security functionality (as in O.Add-Functions), OE.Plat-Appl covers the use of these functions by Smartcard Embedded Software as follows:

By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Smartcard Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.

This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is beyond practicality to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment.

#### 4.2.2 Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery

107 The TOE Manufacturer shall ensure the “Protection during TOE Development and Production (OE.Process-TOE)” as specified below.

OE.Process-TOE                      Protection during TOE Development and Production

The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the Smartcard Integrated Circuit (Phases 2 and 3 up to TOE Delivery, refer to Section 2.1) is secure so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. For example, the confidentiality and integrity of design information and test data must be guaranteed, access to samples, development tools and other material must be restricted to authorised persons only, scrap must be destroyed. This not only pertains to the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software and therefore especially to the Smartcard Embedded Software itself. This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures for Phase 1 and the Phases after TOE Delivery as far as they can be controlled by the TOE Manufacturer.

An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification. In order to make this practical, electronic identification shall be possible.

#### 4.2.3 TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6

108 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (OE.Process-Card)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.

OE.Process-Card                      Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 (refer to Section 2.1) must be protected appropriately.

#### 4.2.4 Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”

- 109 Regarding the cryptographic services this objective of the environment has to be clarified. The TOE supports cipher schemes as additional specific security functionality. If required the Smartcard Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software are just being executed, the Smartcard Embedded Software must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data) stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the methods described under “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)”.
- 110 Regarding the area based access control this objective of the environment has to be clarified. For the separation of different applications the Smartcard Embedded Software (Operating System) may implement a memory management scheme based upon security mechanisms of the TOE.
- 111 For the separation of different applications the Smartcard Embedded Software may implement a memory management scheme based upon security mechanisms of the TOE as required by the security policy defined for the specific application context.

#### 4.2.5 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”

- 112 Regarding the cryptographic services this objective of the environment has to be clarified. By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Smartcard Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
- 113 This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is beyond practicality to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment.
- 114 Regarding the area based access control this objective of the environment has to be clarified. The treatment of User Data is also required when a multi-application operating system is implemented as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the multi-application operating system should not disclose security relevant user data of one application to another application when it is processed or stored on the TOE.
- 115 The treatment of User Data is still required when a multi-application operating system is implemented as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the multi-application operating system should not disclose security relevant user data of one application to another application when it is processed or stored on the TOE.

## 5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

116 This chapter 5 IT Security Requirements contains the following sections:

5.1 TOE Security Requirements

5.2 Security Requirements for the Environment

### 5.1 TOE security requirements

#### 5.1.1 TOE security functional requirements

117 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements the Part 2 of the Common Criteria was used. However, some Security Functional Requirements have been newly created and are not taken from Part 2 of the Common Criteria. Therefore, this Security Target is characterized by "Part 2 extended".

118 The minimum strength of function level for the TOE security requirements is SOF-high.

##### 5.1.1.1 Malfunctions

119 The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)" as specified below.

**FRU\_FLT.2** Limited fault tolerance

Hierarchical to: FRU\_FLT.1

Dependencies: FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

FRU\_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following failures occur: *exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)*.

Refinement: The term "failure" above means "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above.

120 The TOE shall meet the requirement "Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)" as specified below.

**FPT\_FLS.1** Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: ADV\_SPM.1 informal TOE security policy model

FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: *exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.*

Refinement: The term "failure" above also covers "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above.

Regarding the Application Note 16 of the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*, the Common Criteria suggest that the TOE generates audit data for the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1). This may be advantageous or even required for the application context. The detection thresholds of SF1 detectors are inside the operating range of the TOE. Therefore



abnormal events/failures are detected before the secure state is compromised. This allows to take User's defined appropriate actions by software or to immediately RESET the TOE.

- 121 The TOE shall meet the requirement "TSF domain separation" state (FPT\_SEP.1)" as specified below.

**FPT\_SEP.1** TSF domain separation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.

FPT\_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.

Refinement: Those parts of the TOE, which support the security functional requirements "Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)" and "Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)" shall be protected from interference of the Smartcard Embedded Software.

#### 5.1.1.2 Abuse of Functionality

- 122 The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FMT\_LIM.1** Limited capabilities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability.

FMT\_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: *Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.*

- 123 The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FMT\_LIM.2** Limited availability

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

FMT\_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: *Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.*

- 124 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU\_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FAU\_SAS.1** Audit storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FAU\_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide test personnel before TOE Delivery with the capability to store the Initialisation Data and/or Prepersonalisation *Data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software s* in the audit records.

### 5.1.1.3 Physical Manipulation and Probing

- 125 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT\_PHP.3)” as specified below.

**FPT\_PHP.3** Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist *physical manipulation and physical probing* <sup>10</sup> to the TSF <sup>11</sup> by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.

Refinement: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

### 5.1.1.4 Leakage

- 126 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal transfer protection (FDP\_ITT.1)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ITT.1** Basic internal transfer protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FDP\_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the *Data Processing Policy* to prevent the *disclosure* of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.

- 127 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT\_ITT.1)” as specified below.

**FPT\_ITT.1** Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from *disclosure* when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.

This requirement is equivalent to FDP\_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same *Data Processing Policy* defined under FDP\_IFC.1 below.

- 128 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP\_IFC.1)” as specified below:

**FDP\_IFC.1** Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on *all confidential data when they are processed or transferred by the TOE or by the Smartcard Embedded Software*.

**Data Processing Policy** User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Smartcard Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the Smartcard Embedded Software.

#### 5.1.1.5 Random Numbers

- 129 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS\_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FCS\_RND.1** Quality metric for random numbers

FCS\_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet *functionality class P2 with SOF-high of AIS31* compliant random number generation

Dependencies: No dependencies.

### 5.1.1.6 Memory access control

- 130 Usage of multiple applications in one Smartcard often requires separating code and data in order to prevent from the access violation. For instance, one application can access code and/or data of another application. To support this feature the TOE provides areas based Memory Access Control.
- 131 The security service is related to the Security Function Policy (SFP) **Memory Access Control Policy**. The security functional requirement “**Complete access control (FDP\_ACC.2)**” requires that enforce the Access Control Policy on all code running on the TOE, all memories and all memory operations. The security functional requirement “**Security attribute based access control (FDP\_ACF.1)**” defines addresses security attribute usage and characteristics of policies. It describes the rules for the function that implements the Security Function Policy (SFP) as identified in FDP\_ACC.2. The decision whether an access is permitted or not is taken based upon an object based upon security attributes. The user software defines the attributes and memory areas.
- 132 The security functional requirement “**Static attribute initialization (FMT\_MSA.3)**” ensures that the property of default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. The security functional requirement “**Management of security attributes (FMT\_MSA.1)**” shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to change default, modify or delete the security attributes permission control information to running.
- 133 From TOE’s point of view the different roles (such as banking or transport application) in the user software can be distinguished according to the memory based access control. However the definition of the roles belongs to the user software.
- 134 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) **Memory Access Control Policy** is defined for the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP\_ACF.1)”:

#### Memory Access Control Policy

The TOE shall control *read, write, delete, execute accesses of software running at user mode on data including code stored in memory areas.*

The TOE shall restrict the ability to define, to change or at least to finally accept the applied rules (as mentioned in FDP\_ACF.1) to *software.*

- 135 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Complete access control (FDP\_ACC.2)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ACC.2** Complete access control

Hierarchical to: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACC.2.1** The TSF shall enforce the *Memory Access Control Policy on all subjects (software codes in user mode), all objects (data stored in memories) and all the operations defined in the Memory Access Control Policy.*

Subjects are software codes in User mode.

Objects are data or software codes stored in ROM, RAM and FLASH memories.

**FDP\_ACC.2.2** The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the TSC and any object within the TSC are covered by an access control SFP.

- 136 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP\_ACF.1)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ACF.1** Security attribute based access control

	The attributes are related to the data stored in memories, which are the <i>read, write, delete</i> and <i>execute</i> operations.
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on the following: <i>Subject:</i> - <i>software running at user mode active during interrupt execution or application mode active during other executing</i> <i>attributes:</i> - <i>the interrupt execution level where the software is executed (interrupt / non-interrupt) and/or</i> <i>Object:</i> - <i>data including code stored in memories</i> <i>attributes:</i> - <i>the memory area where the access is performed to and/or</i> - <i>the operation to be performed.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <i>validate the corresponding permission control information before the access so that accesses to be denied can not be utilised by the subject attempting to perform the operation.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none.</i>
137	The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified below.
<b>FMT_MSA.3</b>	Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> to provide <i>the property of default values</i> for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.  The property of default values is documented in the S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP <i>User’s Manual chapter 11 Memory Protection Unit.</i>
FMT_MSA.3.2	The TSF shall allow <i>any subject (provided that the Memory Access Control Policy is enforced and the necessary access is therefore allowed)</i> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.  The any subject means different CPU modes that shall be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software to realise the required security roles

138 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT\_MSA.1)” as specified below:

**FMT\_MSA.1** Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of management functions  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the *Memory Access Control Policy* to restrict the ability to *change\_default, modify or delete* the security attributes *permission control information to running*.

139 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT\_SMF.1)” as specified below:

**FMT\_SMF.1** Specification of management functions

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: *access the control registers of the MPU*.

### 5.1.1.7 Cryptographic Support

140 FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) Cryptographic operation requires, a cryptographic operation to be performed in accordance with a specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of specified sizes. The specified algorithm and cryptographic key sizes can be based on an assigned standard.

141 The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:

- Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) with 112bits or 168bits key size,
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric cryptography, with key size from 1024bits up to 2048bits with a granularity of 2 bits
- Hardware parity/CRC calculator

#### 5.1.1.7.1 Triple DES (3DES) Operation

142 The Triple DES (3DES) operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS\_COP.1(3DES))” as specified below.

**FCS\_COP.1(3DES)** 3DES Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)* and cryptographic key sizes of *112bits or 168bits* that meet the following

standards: *U.S. Department of Commerce / National Bureau of Standards, Data Encryption Standard (DES), FIPS PUB 46-3, 1999 October 25, keying option 2*

### 5.1.1.7.2 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) operation

143 The RSA cryptographic library v3.9S of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS\_COP.1(RSA))” as specified below.

**FCS\_COP.1(RSA)** RSA Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)* and cryptographic key sizes *from 1024bits up to 2048bits with 2-bits granularity* that meet the following standard: *ISO/IEC 9796-1, Annex A, sections A.4 and A.5, and Annex C.*

### 5.1.1.7.3 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key generation

144 The key generation for the RSA shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1)”

**FCS\_CKM.1** Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or  
FCS\_COP.1(DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)* and cryptographic key sizes *from 1024bits up to 2048bits with 2-bits granularity* that that meet the following standards: *ISO/IEC 9796-1, Annex A, sections A.4 and A.5, and Annex C.*

### 5.1.1.7.4 Hardware parity/CRC calculator

145 The hardware parity/CRC operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS\_COP.1)” as specified below

**FCS\_COP.1** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform *CRC operation* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *CRC-16 and CRC-32* that meets the following standard: *CCITT V.41*

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes]  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes



### 5.1.1.7.5 Summary of Security Functional Requirements

Security Functional Requirements
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
TSF Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1)
Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1 <sup>1</sup> )
Limited capabilities(FMT_LIM.1 <sup>1</sup> )
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2 <sup>1</sup> )
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1 <sup>1</sup> )

**Table3. Security Functional Requirements defined in Smart Card IC Protection Profile**

146 Note 1: Security Functional Requirement coming from Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001, not from Common Criteria version 2.3 Part 2

Security Functional Requirements
Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2)
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3 )
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(3DES)/FCS_COP.1(RSA))
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)

**Table4. Augmented Security Functional Requirements**

### 5.1.2 TOE Assurance Requirements

- 147 The Security Target to be developed based upon this Protection Profile will be evaluated according to  
**Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)**
- 148 The TOE Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken from the  
**Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)**  
 and augmented by the following components  
**ADV\_IMP.2, ALC\_DVS.2, AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4.**
- 149 corresponding to level "EAL4+".
- 150 All refinements from *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001* for the assurance requirements (ACM\_CAP.4, ADO\_DEL.2, ADO\_IGS.1, AGD\_ADM.1, AGD\_USR.1, and ATE\_COV.2) have to be taken into consideration.
- 151 The minimum strength of function is SOF-High. In addition, the quality of the mechanism contributing to the DPA resistance of the Triple DES (3DES) can be analyzed using probabilistic method base on measurement of the power consumption of the TOE – SOF High is also claimed for this mechanism
- 152 The augmentation of the assurance components is given in under-line.

#### Development activities (Class ADV)

Functional Specification (Component ADV\_FSP.2)  
 Security Policy Modelling (Component ADV\_SPM.1)  
 High-Level Design (Component ADV\_HLD.2)  
 Low-Level Design (Component ADV\_LLD.1)  
Implementation Representation (Component ADV\_IMP.2)  
 Representation Correspondence (Component ADV\_RCR.1)

#### Tests activities (Class ATE)

Coverage (Component ATE\_COV.2)  
 Depth (Component ATE\_DPT.1)  
 Functional Tests (Component ATE\_FUN.1)  
 Independent Testing (Component ATE\_IND.2)

#### Delivery and operation activities (Class ADO)

Delivery (Component ADO\_DEL.2)  
 Installation, generation, and start-up (Component ADO\_IGS.1)

#### Guidance documents activities (Class AGD)

Administrator Guidance (Component AGD\_ADM.1)  
 User guidance (Component AGD\_USR.1)

#### Configuration management activities (Class ACM)

CM automation (Component ACM\_AUT.1)  
 CM Capabilities (Component ACM\_CAP.4)  
 CM Scope (Component ACM\_SCP.2)

**Life cycle support activities (Class ALC)**

Development Security (Component ALC\_DVS.2)  
 Life Cycle Definition (Component ALC\_LCD.1)  
 Tools and Techniques (Component ALC\_TAT.1)

**Vulnerability assessment activities (Class AVA)**

Misuse (Component AVA\_MSU.3)  
 Strength of TOE Security Functions (Component AVA\_SOF.1)  
Vulnerability Analysis (Component AVA\_VLA.4)

**5.2 Security Requirements for the Environment****5.2.1 Security Requirements for the IT-Environment**

153 The security functional requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA))” met by TOE has the following dependencies:

[FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],  
 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,  
 FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes.

154 These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified cryptographic function. All requirements concerning key management shall be fulfilled by the environment since the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed for a specific application context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE.

**5.2.1.1 Triple DES (3DES)**

155 The environment shall meet the requirement “Import of user data without security attributes (FDP\_ITC.1)” or “Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1)” or “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS\_CKM.4)” or “Secure security attributes (FMT\_MSA.2)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ITC.1** Import of user data without security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
 FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
 FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the *Access Control Policy or Information Flow Control Policy* when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.

FDP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TSC.

FDP\_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: *Access Control Policy or Information Flow Control Policy*.

**FCS\_CKM.1** Cryptographic keys generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *Triple DES (3DES)* and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits or 168 bits that meet the following: *U.S. Department of Commerce / National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard (DES), FIPS PUB 46-3, 1999 October 25, keying option 2*. The Smartcard Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant user data to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal. Thereby the Smartcard Embedded Software has some countermeasure against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks.

156 The environment shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS\_CKM.4)” as specified below.

**FCS\_CKM.4** Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method *change key and change key with certificate verification* that meets the following: *ISO/IEC 7816*.

157 The environment shall meet the requirement “Secure security attributes (FMT\_MSA.2)” as specified below.

**FMT\_MSA.2** Secure security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: ADV\_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model  
[FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.

### 5.2.1.2 RSA

158 The environment shall meet the requirement “Import of user data without security attributes (FDP\_ITC.1)” or “Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ITC.1** Import of user data without security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Access Control Policy or Information Flow Control Policy</i> when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.3	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: <i>Access Control Policy or Information Flow Control Policy</i> .
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic keys generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1(3DES)/FCS_COP.1(RSA) Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
---------------	--

FCS_CKM.1.1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <i>Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)</i> and cryptographic key sizes <i>from 1024bits up to 2048bits with 2-bits granularity</i> that meet the following standards: <i>ISO/IEC 9796-1, Annex A, sections A.4 and A.5, and Annex C</i> . The Smartcard Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant user data to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal. Thereby the Smartcard Embedded Software has some countermeasure against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks.
-------------	--

159 The environment shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS\_CKM.4)” as specified below.

<b>FCS_CKM.4</b>	Cryptographic key destruction
------------------	-------------------------------

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
---------------	--

FCS_CKM.4.1	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <i>change key and change key with certificate verification</i> that meets the following: <i>ISO/IEC 7816, Part8. Security related interindustry commands</i>
-------------	---

160 The environment shall meet the requirement “Secure security attributes (FMT\_MSA.2)” as specified below.

<b>FMT_MSA.2</b>	Secure security attributes
------------------	----------------------------

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
---------------	---

FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.

The security functional requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1)” met by the TOE has the following dependencies:

[FDP\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or  
FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) Cryptographic operation],  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes.

FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) is fulfilled by the TOE. FCS\_CKM.4 and FMT\_MSA.2 has to be fulfilled by the environment as described above for the RSA algorithm.

## 5.2.2 Security Requirements for the Non-IT-Environment

- 161 In the following security requirements for the Non-IT-Environment are defined. For the development of the Smartcard Embedded Software (in Phase 1) the requirement RE.Phase-1 is valid.

**RE.Phase-1** Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software

The developers shall design and implement the Smartcard Embedded Software in such way that it meets the requirements from the following documents:

- (i) S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP user's manual,
- (ii) S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/S3FS93I with SWP Security application note,
- (iii) TOE-application notes and
- (iv) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

The developers shall implement the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that it protects security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) as required by the security needs of the specific application context.

- 162 The responsible parties for the Phases 4-6 are required to support the security of the TOE by appropriate measures:

**RE.Process-Card** Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

The Card Manufacturer (after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6) shall use adequate security measures to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

- 163 The Smartcard Embedded Software shall meet the requirements "Cipher Schemas (RE.Cipher)" as specified below.

**RE.Cipher** Cipher Schemas

The developers of Smartcard Embedded Software must not implement routines in a way, which may compromise keys when the routines are executed as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. Performing functions, which access cryptographic keys could allow an attacker to misuse these functions to gather information about the key, which is used in the computation of the function.

Keys must be kept confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is not possible to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that an appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment.

## 6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

164 This chapter 6 TOE Summary Specification contains the following sections:

- 6.1 List of Security Functions
- 6.2 Relationship between security functions and functional requirements
- 6.3 Assurances Measures

### 6.1 List of Security Functions

#### SF1: Environmental Security violation recording and reaction

##### 1) Detectors

165 These functions records in register the events notified by the detectors (refer to list below). The software configures the reaction in case of detection:

- The TOE is immediately reset when an event is detected.
- Or, a special function register bit is set.

##### 2) Filters

166 These filters are used for preventing noise, glitches and extremely high frequency in the external reset or clock pad from causing undefined or unpredictable behavior of the chip.

- Reset Noise Filter:
- High Frequency Filter

167 Security Function 1 covers the following Security Functional Requirements:




Figure 6-1. Paradigm regarding Operating Conditions

168 FPT\_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state. The detection thresholds of SF1 detectors are inside the operating range of the TOE. Therefore abnormal events/failures are detected before the



secure state is compromised. This allows to take User's defined appropriate actions by software or to immediately RESET the TOE.

- 169 FRU\_FLT.2: Limited fault tolerance. All operating signals (Clock, RESET and supply voltage) are filtered/regulated in order to prevent malfunction. Reset Noise Filter and High Frequency Filter are remove out of the specification condition and it is shows Table 5. Reset Noise Filter and High Frequency Filter are filtered to prevent malfunction. Reset noise filter is ignore the below 1000ns width as noise and high frequency filter is filtering above 15Mhz frequency. The FRU\_FLT.2 "Limited fault tolerance" requirement is satisfied.
- 170 The security functional component Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) has been selected in order to address the robustness within some limit (as shown by the inner dashed rectangle in Figure 14) before active reaction takes place. Note that the TOE does not (in most cases) actually detect faults or failures and then correct them in order to guarantee further operation of all the TOE's capabilities. This is the way software would implement Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2). Instead the TOE will achieve exactly the same by eliminating the cause for possible faults (by means of filtering for instance) and by being resistant against influences (robustness). In the case of the TOE the "reaction to a failure" is replaced by the "reaction to operating conditions" which could cause a malfunction without the reaction of the TOE's countermeasure.
- 171 FPT\_SEP.1: TSF domain separation. SF1 filters and detectors are implemented by the hardware. The filtering and detection cannot be affected or bypassed by Smartcard Embedded Software. Because the detectors detected the change state and detection circuit automatically sets control register upon detection state. The parameters for the filters and sensors are set during production and not accessible by the Embedded Software. Therefore, FPT\_SEP.1 is implemented by SF1.
- 172 FPT\_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attacks. This requirement is achieved by security feature as the Active shield must be removed and bypassed in order to perform physical intrusive attacks

## **SF2: Access Control**

- 1) Security registers access control
- 2) Invalid address access
- 3) Access rights for the code executed in FLASH

- 173 This security function manages the code execution in FLASH, through access control security attributes. If an invalid access is detected, then a ABORT occurs.
- 174 Security Function 2 covers the following Security Functional Requirements:
- 175 FDP\_ACC.2: Complete access control. The MPU allows defining different memory areas with different access rights.
- 176 FDP\_ACF.1: Security attributes based access control. This is covered by the User modes of the TOE.
- 177 FMT\_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization. All Special Function Registers have DEFAULT values after Power on Reset.
- 178 FMT\_MSA.1: Management of security attributes. This is achieved with the MPU feature.
- 179 FMT\_SMF.1: Specification of management functions. This is achieved via access to Special Function Registers.
- 180 FPT\_SEP.1: TSF domain separation. Security domains are maintained since accesses to the access-prohibited area are trapped by this access control function. Therefore, FPT\_SEP.1 is implemented by this SF.

## **SF3: Non-reversibility of TEST and USER modes**

- 1) Non-reversibility of TEST mode and USER mode
- 181 2) TEST mode communication protocol and data commands

**3) Functional Tests****4) Identification**

182 Security Function 3 covers the following Security Functional Requirements:

183 FAU\_SAS.1: Audit Storage. This is fulfilled by the traceability/identification data written once and for all during the TEST mode of the manufacturing process.

184 FMT\_LIM.1: Limited capabilities. TEST mode can be accessed only by the TEST administrator by supplying an authentication password through a proprietary protocol (TEST mode communication protocol and data commands).

185 FMT\_LIM.2: Limited availability. TEST mode can be accessed only by the TEST administrator by supplying an authentication password through a proprietary protocol (TEST mode communication protocol and data commands). FMT\_LIM.2 following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed for manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

**SF4: Hardware countermeasures for unobservability**

This Security Function is ensured by the combination of the following security features.

**1) Static Address/Data scrambling for bus and memory****2) Dynamic Memory scrambling****3) De-synchronization and signal-to-noise ratio reduction mechanisms**

186 Security Function 4 covers the following Security Functional Requirements:

187 FPT\_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attacks. This requirement is achieved by bypassed in order to perform physical intrusive attacks and by security features 1) that makes the reverse-engineering of the TOE layout unpractical.

188 FDP\_IFC.1: Subset information flow control. This requirement is covered by security feature 2). Because memory scrambling is prevent interpretation of leaked processed or transferred information

189 FDP\_ITT.1: Basic internal transfer protection. This requirement is achieved by the combination of the TOE security features 1) to 3) as it is unpractical to get access to internal signals and interpret them.

190 FPT\_ITT.1: Basic internal TSF data transfer protection. This requirement is achieved by the combination of the TOE features 1) to 3) as it is unpractical to get access to internal signals and interpret them.

**SF5: Cryptography****1) Triple Data Encryption Standard Engine**

191 This function is used for encrypting and decrypting data using the Triple DES (3DES) symmetric algorithm with 112bits or 168bits key size.

**2) Random Number Generator****3) TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3.9S****4) Hardware Parity/CRC calculators**

192 This function is used for hardware parity/CRC block for error detection during data access. Two codes that have found wide use are CRC-16 and CRC-32.

193 Security Function 5 covers the following Security Functional Requirements:

- 194 FCS\_RND.1: Quality metric for random number. This requirement is ensured by the design of the random number generation algorithm that follows the requirements and the metric of the AIS 31.
- 195 FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) : Cryptographic operation. This requirement is provided by the TOE.
- 196 FCS\_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation. This requirement is covered by the TOE for RSA key generation.

**6.2 Relationship between security functions and functional requirements**

197 The following table shows that the set of Security Functions covers all Functional Requirements:

SR SF	FAU_ SAS.1	FDP_ IFC.1	FDP_ ITT.1	FMT_ LIM.1	FMT_ LIM.2	FPT_ FLS.1	FPT_P HP.3	FPT_ ITT.1	FPT_ SEP.1	FRU_ FLT.2	FDP_ ACC.2	FDP_ ACF.1	FMT_ MSA.3	FMT_ MSA.1	FMT_ SMF.1	FCS_ RND.1	FCS_ COP.1 (3DES)	FCS_ COP.1 (RSA)	FCS_ CKM.1
SF1						✓	✓		✓	✓									
SF2									✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				
SF3	✓			✓	✓														
SF4		✓	✓				✓	✓											
SF5																✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 5. Relationship between security function and functional requirement

### 6.3 Assurance Measures

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Component	Assurance measure (document reference)
Security Target	ASE		Security Target
ACM: Configuration Management	ACM_AUT	1	Configuration Management Documentation (Class ACM)
	ACM_CAP	4	
	ACM_SCP	2	
ADO: Delivery and Operation	ADO_DEL	2	Delivery Procedures Documentation (Class ADO)
	ADO_IGS	1	Installation, generation and start-up Procedures (Class ADO)
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP	2	Functional Specification (Class ADV)
	ADV_HLD	2	High Level Design (Class ADV)
	ADV_LLD	1	Low Level Design (Class ADV)
	ADV_IMP	2	Implementation (Class ADV)
	ADV_RCR	1	All representation correspondence analyses are included in the relevant TOE representation documentation (FSP, HLD, LLD, IMP)
	ADV_SPM	1	Security Policy Model (Class ADV)
AGD: Guidance Documents	AGD_ADM	1	Guidance Documentation (Class AGD)
	AGD_USR	1	
ALC: Life Cycle Support	ALC_DVS	2	Development Security Procedures (Class ALC)
	ALC_LCD	1	Life Cycle Definition Documentation (Class ALC)
	ALC_TAT	1	Development Tool Documentation (Class ALC)
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV	2	Test Documentation (Class ATE)
	ATE_DPT	1	
	ATE_FUN	1	
	ATE_IND	2	
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_MSU	3	Analysis of the Guidance Documentation (Class AVA)
	AVA_SOF	1	Strength of TOE SF Analysis (Class AVA)
	AVA_VLA	4	Vulnerability Analysis (Class AVA)

Table 6. Assurance measures table

## 7 PP CLAIMS

198 This chapter 7 PP Claims contains the following sections:

7.1 PP Reference

7.2 PP Tailoring

7.3 PP Auditions

### 7.1 PP reference

199 This security target conforms to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile [*Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*].

### 7.2 PP tailoring

200 The only tailoring made to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001*] is FCS\_RND as described in section 5.1.1.5.

### 7.3 PP additions

201 Additional objectives and security functional requirements are explicitly mentioned in this Security Target:

202 One additional assumption A.Key-Function as described in section 3.2

203 One additional threat T.Mem-Access as described in section 3.3.3

204 One additional security policy P.Add-Functions as described in section ST, 3.4

205 Two additional security objectives O.Add-Functions and O.Mem-Access as described in section 4.1.3,

206 Additional functional requirements FDP\_ACC.2, FDP\_ACF.1, FMT\_MSA.1, FMT\_MSA.3, FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_SMR.1, FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA), and FCS\_CKM.1 as described in section 5.1.1

207 Additional functional requirements for the environment FDP\_ITC.1, FCS\_CKM.1, and FCS\_CKM.4 as described in section 5.1.1.7.5.

208 One additional requirement for the non-IT environment RE.Cipher as described in section 5.2.2.

## 8 RATIONALE

209 This chapter 8 Rational contains the following sections:

8.1 Security Objectives Rationale

8.2 Security Requirements Rationale

8.3 Security Requirements are Mutually Supportive and Internally Consistent

### 8.1 Security Objectives Rationale

Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy	Security Objective	Note
A.Plat-Appl	OE.Plat-Appl	(Phase 1)
A.Resp-Appl	OE.Resp-Appl	(Phase 1)
P.Process-TOE	OE.Process-TOE O.Identification	(Phase 2 - 3)
A.Process	OE.Process-Card	Card (Phase 4 - 6)
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak- Inherent	
T.Phys_Probing	O.Phys-Probing	
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced	
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func	
T.RND	O.RND	
T.Mem-Access	O.Mem-Access	
P.Add-Functions	O.Add-Functions	
A.Key-Function	OE.Plat-Appl OE.Resp-Appl	

**Table 7. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies**

210 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” is as follows:

211 Since OE.Plat-Appl requires the Smartcard Embedded Software developer to implement those measures assumed in A.Plat-Appl, the assumption is covered by the objective.

212 The justification related to the assumption “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” is as follows:

213 Since OE.Resp-Appl requires the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software to implement measures as assumed in A.Resp-Appl, the assumption is covered by the objective.

214 The justification related to the organisational security policy “Protection during TOE Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” is as follows:

215 OE.Process-TOE requires the TOE Manufacturer to implement those measures assumed in P.Process-TOE. Therefore, the organisational security policy is covered by this objective, as far as organisational measures are concerned. The only issue not completely covered by these measures is the fact that the TOE has to support the possibility of unique identification. This is the content of

- O.Identification. Therefore, the organisational security policy is covered by OE.Process-Card and O.Identification.
- 216 The justification related to the assumption “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card)” is as follows:
- 217 Since OE.Process-Card requires the Card Manufacturer to implement those measures assumed in A.Process-Card, the assumption is covered by this objective.
- 218 The justification related to the threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)”, “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)”, “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)”, “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”, “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)”, “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” and “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” is as follows:
- 219 For all threats the corresponding objectives are stated in a way, which directly corresponds to the description of the threat. It is clear from the description of each objective, that the corresponding threat is removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method successfully is countered, if the objective holds.
- 220 The justification related to the threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” is as follows:
- 221 According to O.Mem-Access the TOE must enforce the partitioning of memory areas so that access of software to memory areas is controlled. Any restrictions are to be defined by the Smartcard Embedded Software. Thereby security violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include code) can be prevented (refer to T.Mem-Access). The threat T.Mem-Access is therefore removed if the objective is met.
- 222 The clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” makes clear that it is up to the Smartcard Embedded Software to implement the memory management scheme by appropriately administrating the TSF. This is also expressed both in T.Mem-Access and O.Mem-Access. The TOE shall provide access control functions as a means to be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. This is further emphasised by the clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” which reminds that the Smartcard Embedded Software must not undermine the restrictions it defines. Therefore, the clarifications contribute to the coverage of the threat T.Mem-Access.
- 223 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” is as follows: The organisational security policy is covered by the objective above, since O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-Functions,
- 224 Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions. (Note that these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way as expected from P.Add-Functions.) Especially O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) in general. User Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions.
- 225 Compared to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile a clarification has been made for the security objective “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”: The Smartcard Embedded Software shall use the cryptographic services of the TOE and the interface as specified (cf. chapter 2.6 of this document). In addition, the Smartcard Embedded Software must implement functions which perform operations on keys (if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data. The non disclosure due to leakage A.Key-Function is included in this objective OE.Plat-Appl. This addition ensures that the assumption A.Key-Function is still covered by the objective OE.Plat-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to O.Add-Functions.
- 226 Compared to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile a clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Smartcard Embedded Software will protect such data if required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Quality and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment.

That is expressed by the assumption A.Key – Function which is covered from OE.Resp–Appl. These measures make sure that the assumption A.Key-Function is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp–Appl although additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Functions.

- 227 The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumption show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.



## 8.2 Security Requirements Rationale

### 8.2.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements

Objective	TOE Security Functional Requirements	Security Requirements for the environment
O.Leak-Inherent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FDP_ITT.1 "Basic internal transfer protection"</li> <li>FPT_ITT.1 "Basic internal TSF data transfer protection"</li> <li>FDP_IFC.1 "Subset information flow control"</li> </ul>	RE.Phase-1 "Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software"
O.Phys-Probing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FPT_PHP.3 "Resistance physical attack"</li> </ul>	RE.Phase-1 "Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software"
O.Malfunction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FRU_FLT.2 "Limited fault tolerance"</li> <li>FPT_FLS.1 "Failure with preservation of secure state"</li> <li>FPT_SEP.1 "TSF domain separation"</li> </ul>	
O.Phys-Manipulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FPT_PHP.3 "Resistance to physical attack"</li> </ul>	RE.Phase-1 "Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software"
O.Leak-Forced	<p>All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 plus those listed for O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation</li> <li>FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1, FPT_PHP.3</li> </ul>	RE.Phase-1 "Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software"
O.Abuse-Func	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities"</li> <li>FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability"</li> </ul> <p>plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1</li> </ul>	
O.Identification	- FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage"	
O.RND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FCS_RND.1 "Quality metric for random numbers" plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-manipulation, O.Leak-Forced</li> <li>FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_SEP.1</li> </ul>	RE.Phase-1 "Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software" (e. g. by implementing FPT_AMT.1 "Abstract machine testing")
OE.Process-TOE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage"</li> </ul>	Assurance Components: Delivery (ADO_DEL); Installation, generation, and startup

Objective	TOE Security Functional Requirements	Security Requirements for the environment
		(ADO_IGS) (using Administrator Guidance (AGD_ADM), User guidance (AGD_USR)); CM automation (ACM_AUT); CM Capabilities (ACM_CAP); CM Scope (ACM_SCP); Development Security (ALC_DVS); Life Cycle Definition (ALC_LCD); Tools and Techniques (ALC_TAT)
OE.Process-Card		RE.Process-Card possibly supported by RE.Phase-1
O.Add-Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● FCS_COP.1(3DES)/FCS_COP.1(RSA) „Cryptographic operation“</li> <li>● FCS_CKM.1</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● RE.Phase-1 “Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software” with RE.Cipher</li> </ul>
OE.Plat-Appl		RE.Phase-1 “Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software” RE.Cipher
OE.Resp-Appl		RE.Phase-1 “Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software” RE.Cipher [FDP_ITC.1] (for 3DES and RSA) FCS_CKM.1 (for 3DES and RSA ) FCS_CKM.4 (for 3DES and RSA ) FMT_MSA.2 (for 3DES and RSA )
O.Mem-Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● FDP_ACC.2 “Complete access control”</li> <li>● FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”</li> <li>● FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialisation”</li> <li>● FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”</li> <li>● FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”</li> </ul>	RE.Phase-1 “Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software”

**Table 8. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies**

- 228 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)” is as follows:
- 229 The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT\_ITT.1 and FDP\_ITT.1 together with the policy statement in FDP\_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of disclosure of secret data (TSF data as well as User Data) when transmitted between separate parts of the TOE or while being processed. This includes that attackers cannot reveal such data by measurements of emanations, power consumption or other behaviour of the TOE while data are transmitted between or processed by TOE parts.

- 230 Of course this has also to be supported by the Smartcard Embedded Software. For example timing attacks were possible if the processing time of algorithms implemented in the software would depend on the content of secret variables. The requirement RE.Phase-1 makes sure that this is avoided.
- 231 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)” is as follows:
- 232 The scenario of physical probing as described for this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT\_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.
- 233 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Smartcard Embedded Software (e. g. to send data over certain buses only with appropriate precautions). If necessary this support is provided according to RE.Phase-1. Together with this FPT\_PHP.3 is suitable to meet the objective.
- 234 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” is as follows:
- 235 The definition of this objective shows that it covers a situation, where malfunction of the TOE might be caused by the operating conditions of the TOE (while direct manipulation of the TOE is covered O.Phys-Manipulation). There are two possibilities in this situation: Either the operating conditions are inside of the tolerated range or at least one of them is outside of this range. The second case is covered by FPT\_FLS.1, because it states that a secure state is preserved in this case. The first case is covered by FRU\_FLT.2 because it states that the TOE operates correctly under normal (tolerated) conditions. To support this, FPT\_SEP.1 the functions implementing FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1 must work independently so that their operation can not be affected by the Smartcard Embedded Software (refer to the refinement). Therefore, there is no possible instance of conditions under O.Malfunction, which is not covered.
- 236 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)” is as follows:
- 237 The scenario of physical manipulation as described for this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT\_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.
- 238 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software (e.g. to check data integrity with the help of appropriate checksums). This support is provided according to RE.Phase-1. Together with this FPT\_PHP.3 is suitable to meet the objective.
- 239 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)” is as follows:
- 240 This objective is directed against attacks, where an attacker wants to force an information leakage, which would not occur under normal conditions. In order to achieve this the attacker has to combine a first attack step, which modifies the behaviour of the TOE (either by exposing it to extreme operating conditions or by directly manipulating it) with a second attack step measuring and analysing some output produced by the TOE. The first step is prevented by the same measures which support O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation, respectively. The requirements covering O.Leak-Inherent also support O.Leak-Forced because they prevent the attacker from being successful if he tries the second step directly.
- 241 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Abuse of Functionality (O.Abuse-Func)” is as follows:
- 242 This objective states that abuse of functions (especially provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software, for instance in order to read secret data) must not be possible in Phase 7 of the life-cycle. There are two possibilities to achieve this: (i) They cannot be used by an attacker (i. e. its availability is limited) or (ii) using them would not be of relevant use for an attacker (i. e. its capabilities are limited) since the functions are designed in a specific way. The first possibility is specified by FMT\_LIM.2 and the second one by FMT\_LIM.1. Since these requirements are combined to support the policy, which is

- suitable to fulfil O.Abuse-Func, both security functional requirements together are suitable to meet the objective.
- 243 Other security functional requirements which prevent attackers from circumventing the functions implementing these two security functional requirements (for instance by manipulating the hardware) also support the objective.
- 244 It was chosen to define FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 explicitly (not using Part 2 of the Common Criteria) for the following reason: Though taking components from the Common Criteria catalogue makes it easier to recognise functions, any selection from Part 2 of the Common Criteria would have made it harder for the reader to understand the special situation meant here. As a consequence, the statement of explicit security functional requirements was chosen to provide more clarity.
- 245 The justification related to the security objective “TOE Identification (O.Identification)” is as follows:
- 246 Obviously the operations for FAU\_SAS.1 are chosen in a way that they require the TOE to provide the functionality needed for O.Identification. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.
- 247 It was chosen to define FAU\_SAS.1 explicitly (not using a given security functional requirement from Part 2 of the Common Criteria) for the following reason: The security functional requirement FAU\_GEN.1 in Part 2 of the CC requires the TOE to generate the audit data and gives details on the content of the audit records (for instance data and time). The possibility to use the functions in order to store securityrelevant data which are generated outside of the TOE, is not covered by the family FAU\_GEN or by other families in Part 2. Moreover, the TOE cannot add time information to the records, because it has no real time clock. Therefore, the new family FAU\_SAS was defined for this situation.
- 248 The justification related to the security objective “Random Numbers (O.RND)” is as follows:
- 249 FCS\_RND.1 requires the TOE to provide random numbers of good quality.
- 250 Other security functional requirements, which prevent physical manipulation and malfunction of the TOE (see the corresponding objectives listed in the table) support this objective because they prevent attackers from manipulating or otherwise affecting the random number generator.
- 251 Random numbers are often used by the Smartcard Embedded Software to generate cryptographic keys for internal use. Therefore, the TOE must prevent the unauthorised disclosure of random numbers. Other security functional requirements which prevent inherent leakage attacks, probing and forced leakage attacks ensure the confidentiality of the random numbers provided by the TOE.
- 252 Depending on the functionality of specific TOEs the Smartcard Embedded Software will have to support the objective by providing runtime-tests of the random number generator .Together, these requirements allow the TOE to provide cryptographically good random numbers and to ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.
- 253 It was chosen to define FCS\_RND.1 explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not contain generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation. (Note that there are security functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria, which refer to random numbers. However, they define requirements only for the authentication context, which is only one of the possible applications of random numbers.)
- 254 The justification related to the security objective “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” is as follows:
- 255 RE.Phase-1 requires the Smartcard Embedded Software developer to design and implement the software in a way, which is suitable to meet OE.Plat-Appl.
- 256 The justification related to the security objective “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” is as follows:
- 257 RE.Phase-1 requires the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software to design and implement the software in a way, which is suitable to meet OE.Resp-Appl.

- 258 The justification related to the security objective “Protection during TOE Development and Production (OE.Process-TOE)” is as follows:
- 259 The objective OE.Process-TOE has mainly to be fulfilled by organisational and other measures, which the TOE Manufacturer has to implement. These measures are a subset of those measures, which are examined during the evaluation of the assurance requirements of the classes ACM, AGD, ALC and ADO. The technical capability of the TOE to store Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data is provided according to FAU\_SAS.1. Together these security requirements are suitable to meet the objective.
- 260 The justification related to the security objective “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (OE.Process-Card)” is as follows:
- 261 RE.Process-Card requires the Card Manufacturer to use adequate measures to fulfil OE.Process-Card. Depending on the security needs of the application, the Smartcard Embedded Software may have to support this for instance by using appropriate authentication mechanisms for personalisation functions. Therefore, RE.Phase-1 may support RE.Process-Card in fulfilling the objective in addition.
- 262 The justification related to the security objective “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” is as follows:
- 263 The security functional requirement “Complete access control (FDP\_ACC.2)” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly requires the implementation of an area based memory access control, which is a requirement from O.Mem-Access. Therefore, FDP\_ACC.2 with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
- 264 Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the application context. These issues are addressed by the requirement RE.Phase-1. The TOE only provides the tool to implement the policy defined in the context of the application.
- 265 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
- 266 The security functional requirement(s) “Cryptographic operation (FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA))” exactly require those functions to be implemented which are demanded by O.Add-Functions. FCS\_CKM.1 supports the generation of RSA keys needed for this cryptographic operations. Therefore, FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) and FCS\_CKM.1 are suitable to meet the security objective.
- 267 Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the application context. These issues are addressed by the requirement RE.Phase-1 and more specific by the security functional requirements
- 268 [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,  
FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes.
- 269 to be met by the environment.
- 270 All these requirements have to be fulfilled to support OE.Resp-Appl for the Triple DES (3DES) algorithms. The RSA algorithm FCS\_CKM.1 is fulfilled by the TOE. Nevertheless the user can generate keys externally additionally
- 271 The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality. However, key-dependent functions could be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software. In this case RE.Cipher requires that these functions ensure that confidential data (User Data) can not be disclosed while they are just being processed by the Smartcard Embedded Software. Therefore, with respect to the Smartcard Embedded Software the issues addressed by the objectives just mentioned are addressed by the requirement RE.Cipher.

- 272 The usage of cryptographic algorithms requires using appropriate keys. Otherwise they do not provide security. The requirement RE.Cipher addresses these specific issues since cryptographic keys and other data are provided by the Smartcard Embedded Software. RE.Cipher requires that keys must be kept confidential. They must be unique with a very high probability, cryptographically strong etc. If keys are imported into the TOE (usually after TOE Delivery), it must be ensured that quality and confidentiality is maintained. Therefore, with respect to the environment the issues addressed (i) by the objectives just mentioned and (ii) implicitly by O.Add-Functions are addressed by the requirement RE.Cipher.
- 273 All these requirements have to be fulfilled to support OE.Resp-Appl for the Triple DES (3DES) algorithms. The RSA algorithm FCS\_CKM.1 is fulfilled by the TOE. Nevertheless the user can generate keys externally additionally.
- 274 In this ST the objectives for the environment OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl have been clarified. The requirement for the environment Re.Cipher has been introduced to cover the objectives OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl (in addition to O.Add-Functions). The Smartcard Embedded Software defines the use of the cryptographic functions FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA) provided by the TOE. RE.Phase-1, which is assigned to OE. Resp-Appl in the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, requires the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer to design and implement the software that it protects security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys). The requirements for the environment FDP\_ITC.1, FCS\_CKM.1, FCS\_CKM.4, and FMT\_MSA.2 support an appropriate key management. These security requirements are suitable to meet OE.Resp-Appl.
- 275 The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements (both for the TOE and its environment) show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.



## 8.2.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements
FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1	Yes
FPT_FLS.1	ADV_SPM.1	Yes (Part of EAL4)
FPT_SEP.1	None	No dependency
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	Yes
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1	Yes
FAU_SAS.1	None	No dependency
FPT_PHP.3	None	No dependency
FDP_ITT.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	See discussion below
FPT_ITT.1	None	No dependency
FCS_RND.1	None	No dependency
FCS_COP.1(3DES)	FCS_CKM.1	Yes (by the environment)
	FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1	Yes (by the environment)
	FCS_CKM.4 FMT_MSA.2	
FCS_COP.1(RSA)	FCS_CKM.1	Yes (additionally it can be fulfilled by the environment)
	FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 FMT_MSA.2	Yes (by the environment)
FDP_ACC.2	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	Yes Yes
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1	Yes See discussion below
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	Yes See discussion below Yes
FMT_SMF.1	None	No dependency
FCS_CKM.1	FCS_COP.1(RSA) or FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.4 FMT_MSA.2	Yes See discussion below See discussion below

**Table 9. Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements**

276 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of FDP\_IFC.1 (information flow control policy statement) on FDP\_IFF.1 (Simple security attributes). The specification of FDP\_IFF.1 would not capture the nature of the security functional requirement nor add any detail. As stated in the *Data*

*Processing Policy* referred to in FDP\_IFC.1 there are no attributes necessary. The security functional requirement for the TOE is sufficiently described using FDP\_ITT.1 and its *Data Processing Policy* (FDP\_IFC.1). Therefore the dependency is considered satisfied.

- 277 As Table 8 shows, all other dependencies are fulfilled by security requirements defined in this Protection Profile. The dependencies FCS\_CKM.1, FCS\_CKM.4 and FMT\_MSA.2 must be covered from the environment (the smartcard embedded software).
- 278 Concerning the requirement FPT\_FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state) the TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement FRU\_FLT.2 (Limited fault tolerance) and where therefore a malfunction could occur. Here the term "failure" above also covers "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above. In this context the detection thresholds of detectors are inside the operating range of the TOE. Therefore abnormal events/failures are detected before the secure state is compromised. This allows to take user defined appropriate actions by software or to immediately RESET the TOE (also cf. FPT\_FLS.1 related information in the TSP model).
- 279 The dependency FMT\_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3 is considered to be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is enforced for each subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security functional requirement FMT\_SMR.1.

### 8.2.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements and the Strength of Function Level

- 280 The assurance level EAL4 and the augmentation with the requirements ADV\_IMP.2, ALC\_DVS.2, AVA\_MSU.3, and AVA\_VLA.4 were chosen in order to meet assurance expectations explained in the following paragraphs.
- 281 An assurance level of EAL4 is required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against highly sophisticated attacks without a protected environment. This evaluation assurance level was selected since it provides even formal evidence on the conducted vulnerability assessment. In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defense against such attacks, the evaluators have access to all information regarding the TOE including the low level design and source code.
- 282 The rationale for the strength of function level from the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile is used as the level is not changed.
- 283 This ST follows the rationale given in the *Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 version 1.0, July 2001* for the choice of EAL4, assurance augmentations and the strength of function SOF-high.

#### ADV\_IMP.2 Sufficiency of security measures

- 284 This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL 4 (which only requires ADV\_IMP.1). It is important for a smartcard IC that the evaluation includes the implementation representation of the entire TSF and determines whether the functional requirements in the Security Target are addressed by the representation of the TSF. IC dedicated software source code and IC hardware drawings are examples of TSF implementation representation.
- 285 The implementation representation is used to express the notion of the least abstract representation of the TSF, specifically the one that is used to create the TSF itself without further design refinement.
- 286 ADV\_IMP.2 has dependencies with ADV\_LLD.1 "Descriptive Low-Level design", ADV\_RCR.1 "Informal correspondence demonstration", ALC\_TAT.1 "Well defined development tools". These assurance components are included in EAL4, then these dependencies are satisfied.

#### ALC\_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

- 287 Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE.



- 288 In the particular case of a Smartcard Integrated Circuit the TOE is developed and produced within a complex and distributed industrial process which must especially be protected. Details about the implementation, (e.g. from design, test and development tools as well as Initialization Data) may make such attacks easier. Therefore, in the case of a Smartcard Integrated Circuit, maintaining the confidentiality of the design is very important.
- 289 This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL4 (which only requires ALC\_DVS.1). ALC\_DVS.2 has no dependencies.

#### **AVA\_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states**

- 290 The user guidance must be correct and sufficient to ensure that the TOE can be used in a secure way and that vulnerabilities are not introduced.
- 291 This component is included to ensure that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect. In this component, an analysis of the guidance documentation provided by the developer is validated and confirmed through testing by the evaluator to provide additional assurance.
- 292 This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL4 (which only requires AVA\_MSU.2).
- 293 AVA\_MSU.3 has dependencies with ADO\_IGS.1 "Installation, generation, and start-up procedures", ADV\_FSP.2 "Informal functional specification", AGD\_ADM.1 "Administrator guidance" and AGD\_USR.1 "User guidance". The dependencies are satisfied in EAL4.

#### **AVA\_VLA.4 Highly resistant**

- 294 Due to the intended use of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA\_VLA.4 component.
- 295 Independent vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information and goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential.
- 296 AVA\_VLA.4 has dependencies with ADV\_FSP.2 "Informal functional specification", ADV\_HLD.2 "Security enforcing high-level design", ADV\_LLD.1 "Descriptive low-level design", ADV\_IMP.1 "Subset of the implementation of the TSF", AGD\_ADM.1 "Administrator Guidance", AGD\_USR.1 "User Guidance".
- 297 All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL4.

### **8.3 Security Requirements are Mutually Supportive and Internally Consistent**

- 298 The discussion of security functional requirements and assurance components in the preceding sections has shown that mutual support and consistency are given for both groups of requirements. The arguments given for the fact that the assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE also shows that the security functional requirements and assurance requirements support each other and that there are no inconsistencies between these groups.
- 299 The security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 makes it harder to manipulate User Data and TSF Data. This protects the primary assets identified in Section 3.1 and other security features or functions which use these data.
- 300 Though a manipulation of the TOE (refer to FPT\_PHP.3) is not of great value for an attacker in itself, it can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets identified in Section 3.1. Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 is not only required to meet the security objective O.Phys-Manipulation. Instead it protects other security features or functions of both the TOE and the Smartcard Embedded Software from being bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this may pertain to the security features or functions being specified using FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FPT\_FLS.1, FMT\_LIM.2, FCS\_RND.1, and those implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software.

- 301 A malfunction of TSF (refer to FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1) can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets identified in Section 3.1. Therefore, the security functional requirements FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1 are not only required to meet the security objective O.Malfunction. Instead they protect other security features or functions of both the TOE and the Smartcard Embedded Software from being bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this pertains to the security features or functions being specified using FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FMT\_LIM.1, FMT\_LIM.2, FCS\_RND.1, and those implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software.
- 302 In a forced leakage attack the methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets. Therefore, in order to avert the disclosure of primary assets identified in Section 3.1 it is important that the security functional requirements averting leakage (FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1) and those against malfunction (FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1) and physical manipulation (FPT\_PHP.3) are effective and bind well. The security features and functions against malfunction ensure correct operation of other security functions (refer to above) and help to avert forced leakage themselves in other attack scenarios. The security features and functions against physical manipulation make it harder to manipulate the other security functions (refer to above).
- 303 Physical probing (refer to FPT\_PHP.3) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets identified in Section 3.1. In addition, physical probing can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT\_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 (against probing) help to protect other security features or functions including those being implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software. Details depend on the implementation.
- 304 Leakage (refer to FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets identified in Section 3.1. In addition, inherent leakage and forced leakage (refer to above) can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT\_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirements FDP\_ITT.1 and FPT\_ITT.1 help to protect other security features or functions implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software (FDP\_ITT.1) or provided by the TOE (FPT\_ITT.1). Details depend on the implementation.
- 305 According to the assumption Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl) the Smartcard Embedded Software will correctly use the functions provided by the TOE. Hereby the User Data are treated as required to meet the requirements defined for the specific application context (refer to Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)). However, the TOE may implement additional functions. This can be a risk if their interface can not completely be controlled by the Smartcard Embedded Software. Therefore, the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 are very important. They ensure that appropriate control is applied to the interface of these functions (limited availability) and that these functions, if being usable, provide limited capabilities only.
- 306 The combination of the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 ensures that (especially after TOE Delivery) these additional functions can not be abused by an attacker to (i) disclose or manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or of the Smartcard Embedded Software or (iii) to enable an attack. Hereby the binding between these two security functional requirements is very important:
- 307 The security functional requirement Limited Capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) must close gaps which could be left by the control being applied to the function’s interface (Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2)). Note that the security feature or function which limits the availability can be bypassed, deactivated or changed by physical manipulation or a malfunction caused by an attacker. Therefore, if Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2) is vulnerable, it is important to limit the capabilities of the functions in order to limit the possible benefit for an attacker.
- 308 The security functional requirement Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2) must close gaps which could result from the fact that the function’s kernel in principle would allow to perform attacks. The TOE must limit the availability of functions which potentially provide the capability to disclose or manipulate User Data, to manipulate security features or functions of the TOE or of the Smartcard

Embedded Software or to enable an attack. Therefore, if an attacker could benefit from using such functions, it is important to limit their availability so that an attacker is not able to use them.

- 309 No perfect solution to limit the capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) is required if the limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. No perfect solution to limit the availability (FMT\_LIM.2) is required if the limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. Therefore, it is correct that both requirements are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security.
- 310 It is important to avert malfunctions of TSF and of security functions implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software (refer to above). There are two security functional requirements which ensure that malfunctions can not be caused by exposing the TOE to environmental stress. First it must be ensured that the TOE operates correctly within some limits (Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)). Second the TOE must prevent its operation outside these limits (Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)). Both security functional requirements together prevent malfunctions. The two functional requirements must define the "limits". Otherwise there could be some range of operating conditions which is not covered so that malfunctions may occur. Consequently, the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1) are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security.
- 311 The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the cryptographic algorithms implemented according to the security functional requirement FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA). Therefore, these security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS\_COP.1(3DES)/FCS\_COP.1(RSA).
- 312 The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the area based memory access control function implemented according to the security functional requirement described in the security functional requirement FDP\_ACC.2 with reference to the Memory Access Control Policy and details given in FDP\_ACF.1. Therefore, those security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FDP\_ACF.1 with its dependent security functional requirements.

## 9 ANNEX

### Glossary

#### AIS31

Is the functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generator.

#### Application Software (AS)

Is the part of ES in charge of the Application of the Smart Card IC.

#### Basic Software (BS)

Is the part of ES in charge of the generic functions of the Smart Card IC such as Operating System, general routines and Interpreters.

#### DAC

Discretionary Access Control

#### Dedicated Software (DS)

Is defined as the part of ES provided to test the component and/or to manage specific functions of the component.

#### Embedded Software (ES)

Is defined as the software embedded in the Smart Card Integrated Circuit. The ES may be in any part of the non-volatile memories of the Smart Card IC.

#### Embedded software developer

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the Smart Card embedded software development and the specification of pre-personalization requirements.

#### Initialization

Is the process to write specific information in the NVM during IC manufacturing and testing (phase 3) as well as to execute security protection procedures by the IC manufacturer. The information could contain protection codes or cryptographic keys.

#### Initialization Data

Specific information written during manufacturing or testing of the TOE

#### Integrated Circuit (IC)

Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.

#### IC designer

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.

#### IC firmware

IC proprietary software in the IC (also known as IC Dedicated Software) and developed by the IC Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support

Software).

**IC manufacturer**

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre-personalization.

**IC packaging manufacturer**

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing.

**ISO7816**

Is the international standard related to electronic identification cards, especially smart cards, managed jointly by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

**Personaliser**

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the Smart Card personalization and final testing.

**Personalization data**

Specific information in the NVM during personalization phase

**RBAC**

Role-Based Access Control

**Security Information**

Secret data, initialization data or control parameters for protection system)

**Smart Card**

A credit sized plastic card, which has a non-volatile memory and a processing unit embedded within it.

**Smart Card Issuer**

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the Smart Card product delivery to the Smart Card end-user.

**Smart Card product manufacturer**

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the Smart Card product finishing process and testing.

**Smart Card Application Software (AS)**

Is the part of ES dedicated to the applications

**Abbreviations****CC**

Common Criteria

**EAL**

Evaluation Assurance Level

**FIQ**

Fast Interrupt

**IRQ**

Interrupt

**IT**

Information Technology

**MASCON**

Memory Access Control Register

**PP**

Protection Profile

**SECCON**

Security Control Register

**SF**

Security Function

**SOF**

Strength of Function

**ST**

Security Target

**SWP**

Simple Wire Protocol

**TOE**

Target of Evaluation

**TSC**

TSF Scope of Control

**TSF**

TOE Security Functions

**TSFI**

TSF Interface

**TSP**

TOE Security Policy

**Literature**

[EESSI] *Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures, EESSI-SG, V.1.44 DRAFT, 4.5.2001*

---