Certification Report

SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)

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Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories”.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

Recognition of the Certificate

The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX). The developer of the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX) is Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The TOE is a Java Card Platform compliant with Java Card Specification (Classic Edition) version 3.0.5 and GlobalPlatform Specification v.2.3.1 and the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration v1.0. The TOE allows post-issuance downloading of applications that have been previously verified by an off-card verifier. It constitutes a secure generic platform that supports multi-application runtime environment and provides facilities for secure loading and interoperability between different applications.

The TOE has been originally evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified on 9 July 2020. The first re-evaluation also took place by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 16 April 2021 with the approval of the ETR. This second re-evaluation also took place by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 02 December 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security *[NSCIB]*.

The second issue of the Certification Report was a result of a “recertification with major changes”.

The major changes were related to the update of the Java Card OS. In addition, there were updates to the Security target and user guidance. The underlying hardware remained unchanged.

The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to date vulnerability analysis was made.

This third issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.

Although there are no changes to the TOE HW and SW, the changes were characterised as ‘major’ due to re-certification of the underlying hardware platform and the related update of the TOE guidance:

- The underlying hardware platform, certified by BSI under reference BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021, was re-evaluated.

- The TOE guidance was updated to reflect the new results from the HW platform re-certification.

The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. However the vulnerability analysis was renewed and penetration testing was performed during this re-certification.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target *[ST]*, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX) are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report *[ETR]*[1] for this product provides sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Flaw Remediation)

[1] The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and *[CEM]* for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 *[CC]* (Parts I, II and III).

TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX) from Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
Hardware	Hardware Platform	IFX_CCI_000010
Firmware	Firmware	80.102.06.1
Software	Asymmetric Crypto Library (ACL), including Base, RSA4096, EC, and Toolbox libraries	2.07.003
Software	Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL)	2.04.002
Software	Hardware Support Library (HSL)	03.12.8812
Software	Embedded OS	1482

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX). Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.

For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the *[ST]*, chapter 1.4.4.

2.2 Security Policy

The TOE is a Java Card Platform compliant with Java Card Specification (Classic Edition) version 3.0.5 and GlobalPlatform Specification v.2.3.1 and the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration v1.0. The TOE allows post-issuance downloading of applications that have been previously verified by an off-card verifier. It constitutes a secure generic platform that supports multi-application runtime environment and provides facilities for secure loading and interoperability between different applications.

2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 5.2 of the *[ST]*.

2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

2.4 Architectural Information

The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target of the TOE can be depicted as follows:



The TOE has the features that are described in Section 1.3.2 of *[ST].* In the following, the JCRE/JCVM/JCAPI v3.0.5 is referred to as JC OS.

2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Identifier	Version
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Administration Guide	1.60
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Data Book	1.50
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Security Guide	1.70
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 SLJ52GxAyyyzX System Release Notes	1.60
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Product API Specification	1.00.1482

2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

During the baseline evaluation, the developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.

The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

For RC3 (OS version 1482), the changed parts are tested by the developer's test cases mainly by automatic testing. The developer provided code coverage test results, showing that changed code parts are covered by newly defined or updated test cases. The assurance obtained for the baseline evaluation of the TOE is valid for the first re-evaluation. No additional tests were added during this re-evaluation as the TOE HW and SW didn't change.

During the baseline evaluation, for the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.

As the developer added sufficient additional test cases for RC3 (OS version 1482) in the first re-evaluation to cover the associated changes to the implementation, no additional independent tests were identified by the evaluator. No additional tests were added during this re-evaluation as the TOE HW and SW didn't change.

2.6.2 Independent penetration testing

The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:

- When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour.
- A thorough implementation representation review (ADV_IMP) was performed. The analysis was driven by the attack methods defined in *[JIL-AAPS]* and *[JIL-AM]*. An important source for assurance in this step was the technical report *[HW-ETRfC]* of the underlying platform.
- All potential vulnerabilities were analysed and a judgment was made on their exploitability. The potential vulnerabilities were addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or code update.

During this and the first re-evaluation, the vulnerability analysis and assurance from penetration testing were refreshed. During first re-evaluation, the methodical analysis was repeated on the basis of a delta code review, resulting in the identification of no additional penetration test. In addition, as the penetration testing campaign for the baseline evaluation had been performed less than one year ago and the Lab considered there were no significant advances in the involved tools and techniques, no testing effort was carried out during the evaluation. As conclusion, it was considered that the results obtained in the baseline evaluation are valid for the recertified TOE. During this re-evaluation, some representative tests were performed to provide ongoing assurance of penetration testing performed in earlier evaluation of the TOE.

The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this re-certification was 3 weeks. During that test campaign, 34% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 33% on side-channel testing, and 33% on logical tests.

2.6.3 Test configuration

The developer tested the TOE in the following configuration during the baseline evaluation:

- HW identifier: 80 03 00 00 10
- EMVCo identifier: 81 06 00 22 00 1C 00 00
- JC OS Build Number: 82 02 13 58
- HCL version: 83 04 00 00 00 00
- ACL version: 84 05 20 70 03 34 20
- SCL version: 85 04 20 40 02 20
- HSL version: 86 04 03 12 88 12
- RSA: 87 02 00 01

The evaluator tested the TOE in the following configuration during the baseline evaluation:

- HW identifier: 80 03 00 00 10
- EMVCo identifier: 81 06 00 22 00 03 00 00, and 81 06 00 22 00 0B 00 00
- JC OS Build Number: 82 02 13 58
- HCL version: 83 04 00 00 00 00

- ACL version: 84 05 20 70 03 34 20
- SCL version: 85 04 20 40 02 20
- HSL version: 86 04 03 12 88 12
- RSA: 87 02 00 01

The developer tested the TOE in the following configuration during the first re-evaluation. The same version was used for the evaluator testing during this re-evaluation:

- HW identifier: 80 03 00 00 10
- EMVCo identifier: 81 06 00 22 00 1C 00 00
- JC OS Build Number: 82 02 14 82
- HCL version: 83 04 00 00 00 00
- ACL version: 84 05 20 70 03 34 20
- SCL version: 85 04 20 40 02 20
- HSL version: 86 04 03 12 88 12
- RSA: 87 02 00 01

This is the same configuration as stated in the *[ST]*.

2.6.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the *[ETR]*, with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its *[ST]* and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

Not all key sizes specified in the *[ST]* have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the AVA_VAN.5 "high attack potential". The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see *[ST]*), including those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).

The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.

For composite evaluations, please consult the *[ETRfC]* for details.

2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of the TOE, by use of 7 Site Technical Audit Reports.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX) as it is defined in the *[ST]* section 1.2.

2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the *[ETR]*, which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to *[COMP]* a derived document *[ETRfC]* was provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “**Pass**”.

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target *[ST]*.

The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile *[PP]*.

2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: none.

Not all key sizes specified in the *[ST]* have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

3 Security Target

The SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Rev 1.6, 28 October 2022 *[ST]* is included here by reference.

4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JCAPI	Java Card Application Programming Interface
JC OS	Java Card Operating System
JCRE	Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM	Java Card Virtual Machine
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP	Protection Profile
TOE	Target of Evaluation

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR]	Evaluation Technical Report “SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)” – EAL6+, 22-RPT-1076, v2.0, 28 October 2022.
[ETRfC]	Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)” – EAL6+, 22-RPT-1077, v2.0, 28 October 2022.
[HW-CERT]	BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3-2021 for Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the designstep G12 and including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware, 12 November 2021.
[HW-ETRfC]	EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP) BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V3, Version 6, 05 November 2021.
[HW-ST]	Public Security Target Common Criteria v3.1 – EAL6 augmented / EAL 6+ IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12, Revision 1.5, 05 November 2021.
[JIL-AAPS]	JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020.
[JIL-AM]	Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution).
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28 March 2019.
[PP]	Javacard Protection Profile Open Configuration, v3.0.5, December 2017, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017.
[ST]	SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Rev 1.6, 28 October 2022.

(This is the end of this report.)