

# NXP JCOP4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element

## Security Target Lite

Rev. 4.2 — 28 September 2022

Product evaluation document

NSCIB CC-22-156530\_4

### Document information

Information	Content
Keywords	ASE, JCOP, Common Criteria, EAL5 augmented
Abstract	This document contains information to fulfill the requirements of the Common Criteria component ASE (Security Target) for the Evaluation of the JCOP product developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Security & Connectivity, according to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 at EAL5 augmented



## Revision History

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Rev	Date	Description
4.2	2022-09-28	First Release based on ST Rev. 4.2

## 1 ST Introduction (ASE\_INT)

The TOE consists of a software stack (JCOP), which is stored and executed on a certified Secure Element, including an associated Crypto Library and Security Software.

### 1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference

Table 1. ST Reference

Title	NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element Security Target Lite
ST Version	Revision 4.2
Date	28 September 2022
Product Type	Java Card
TOE name	NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element
Certificate nbr	NSCIB CC-22-156530_4
CC version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 (Part 1 <a href="#">[1]</a> , Part 2 <a href="#">[2]</a> and Part 3 <a href="#">[3]</a> )

Table 2. TOE References

JCOP ID	Revision	Hardware Version	Platform ID
JCOP 4.2	R1.10.0	P73N2M0B0.2C2	J5Q2M00148750000
JCOP 4.5	R1.07.0	P73N2M0B0.2C6	J5Q2M001C1A10000
JCOP 4.6	R1.04.0	P73N2M0B0.2C6	J5Q2M002242B0000
JCOP 4.8	R1.01.0	P73N2M0B0.2C6	J5Q2M0027B840000
JCOP 4.10	R1.05.0	P73N2M0B0.2C6	J5Q2M00386040000

### 1.2 TOE Overview

The TOE consists of the Micro Controller and a software stack which is stored on the Micro Controller and which can be executed by the Micro Controller. The software stack can be further split into the following components:

- Firmware for booting and low level functionality of the Micro Controller, called MC FW.
- Software for implementing cryptographic operations on the Micro Controller, called Security Software.
- Software to update the JCOP or UpdaterOS, called OS Update Component.
- Software to transfer personalization applet data from an old to a new version of an applet on applet update time, called Applet Migration.
- Software that provides control on the Applet Migration and OS Update processes and ensures that only allowed OS updates can be performed in predefined states of the TOE. This software feature is called IM4.
- Software for implementing the JCOP:
  - Software that implements low level functionality, called Native OS.
  - Software that implements the Java Card Virtual Machine [\[30\]](#) and a Java Card Runtime Environment [\[31\]](#) called JCVM and JCRE.
  - Software that implements the Java Card Application Programming Interface [\[28\]](#), called JCAPI.

- Software for implementing content management according to GlobalPlatform [34], called GP.
- Software that implements a proprietary programming interface, called Extension API.
- Software that handles personalization and configuration, called Config Applet.
- Software for implementing third party functionality, called Native Applications.

The TOE is JCOP which consists of the software stack without the Security Software and the MC FW. The TOE

uses one or more communication interfaces to communicate with its environment.

The complete TOE is depicted in Figure 1. The elements are described in more detail in Section 1.3.




Figure 1 also shows applets. The applets are small Java programs which can be executed by the TOE, but are not part of the TOE. The Config Applet has special privileges and is used to personalise and configure the TOE. Customer applets are not part of the TOE. The Config Applet is part of the TOE.

### 1.2.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE

The usage of the TOE is focused on security critical applications in small form factors. One main usage scenario is the use in mobile phones, which can use the TOE to enable mobile payment or mobile ticketing with the phone based on the security of the TOE.

The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect manipulations and by processing data in ways which protect against leakage of data by side channel analysis. With the software stack the TOE provides many cryptographic

primitives for encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, key generation, secure management of PINs and secure storage of confidential data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also the software stack implements several countermeasures to protect the TOE against attacks.

The following list contains the features of this TOE:

- Cryptographic algorithms and functionality:
  1. 3DES for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (2-key 3DES, 3-key 3DES, Retail-MAC, CMAC and CBC-MAC).
  2. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) for en-/decryption (GCM, CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (CMAC, CBC-MAC).
  3. RSA and RSA CRT for en-/decryption and signature generation and verification.
  4. RSA and RSA CRT key generation.
  5. SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithm.
  6. Secure SHA-1, Secure SHA-224, Secure SHA-256, Secure SHA-384, Secure SHA-512 hash algorithm.
  7. HMAC
  8. ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and verification (ECDSA).
  9. ECC over GF(p) key generation for key agreement.
  10. Random number generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20 [\[46\]](#).
- Java Card 3.0.4 functionality:
  1. Executing Java Card bytecodes.
  2. Managing memory allocation of code and data of applets.
  3. Enforcing access rules between applets and the JCRE.
  4. Mapping of Java method calls to native implementations of e.g. cryptographic operation.
  5. Garbage Collection fully implemented with complete memory reclamation including compactification.
  6. Support for Extended Length APDUs.
  7. Persistent Memory Management and Transaction Mechanism.
  8. Additional Java Card v3.0.5 APIs [\[29\]](#) are present for future use and exist as a stage in the 3.0.5 integration. Normally an exception should be thrown by using these APIs, however some implement some functionality. They are not documented in the UGM and should not be used by Application Developers.
- GlobalPlatform 2.2.1 functionality:
  1. Loading of Java Card packages.
  2. Instantiating applet instances.
  3. Java package deletion.
  4. Java applet instance deletion.
  5. Creating Supplementary Security Domains.
  6. Associating applets to Security Domains.
  7. Installation of keys.
  8. Verification of signatures of signed applets.
  9. CVM Management (Global PIN) fully implemented.
  10. Secure Channel Protocol is supported.
  11. Delegated Management, DAP (RSA 1024 and ECC 256).

12. Compliance to Secure Element configuration.
- NXP Proprietary Functionality
  1. Config Applet: The TOE includes a Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the TOE.
  2. OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP or UpdaterOS.
  3. Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
  4. Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available such as, e.g.: reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
  5. Error Detection Code (EDC) API.

## 1.2.2 TOE Type

The TOE is a Java Card with GP functionality. It can be used to load, install, instantiate and execute off-card verified Java Card applets.

## 1.2.3 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware

Three groups of users shall be distinguished here.

1. The first group is the **end-users** group, which uses the TOE with one or more loaded applets in the final form factor as an embedded Secure Element. These users only require a communication device to be able to communicate with the TOE. The TOE supports 2 communication interfaces: SWP or DWP supporting
  - Card Emulation Type A, Type B and Type F according to ETSI 102 622 [41].
  - Wired Mode by using the APDUCard Gate according to ETSI 102 622 [42].
2. The second group of users are **administrators of cards**. They can configure the TOE by using the Config Applet or install additional applets. These users require the same equipment as end-users.
3. The third group of users develops Java Card applets and executes them on the TOE. These **applet developers** need in addition to the communication device a set of tools for the development of applets. This set of tools can be obtained from the TOE vendor and comprises elements such as PC development environment, byte code verifier, compiler, linker and debugger.

## 1.3 TOE Description

### 1.3.1 TOE Components and Composite Certification

The certification of this TOE is a composite certification. This means that for the certification of this TOE other certifications of components which are part of this TOE are re-used. In the following sections more detailed descriptions of the components of [Figure 1](#) are provided. In the description it is also made clear whether a component is covered by a previous certification or whether it is covered in the certification of this TOE.

#### 1.3.1.1 Micro Controller

The Micro Controller is a secure smart card controller from NXP based on ARM architecture. The Micro Controller contains a co-processor for symmetric cipher, supporting AES and DES operations, and a co-processor for asymmetric algorithms. It contains volatile (RAM) memory and non-volatile Flash memory.

The Micro Controller has been certified in a previous certification and the results are re-used for this certification. The exact reference to the previous certification is given in the following [Table 3](#):

**Table 3. Reference to Certified Micro Controller**

Name	P73N2M0B0.202
Certification ID	ANSSI-CC-2018/52-S03 <a href="#">[9]</a>

### 1.3.1.2 IC Firmware

#### 1.3.1.2.1 MC FW (Micro Controller Firmware)

The Micro Controller Firmware is used for testing of the Micro Controller at production, for booting of the Micro Controller after power-up or after reset, for configuration of communication devices. It has been certified together with the Micro Controller and the same references ([\[9\]](#)) as given for the Micro Controller also apply for the MC FW.

#### 1.3.1.2.2 Security Software

The Security Software and Security Services are used by the IC Embedded Software and provides cryptographic functionality (CryptoLib) but also an interface for memory erasing and programming (Flash Services). The Security Software is certified in a previous certification and the results are re-used for this certification. The exact reference to the certification is given in the following Table:

**Table 4. Reference to the Security Software**

Name	Certification ID
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6	ANSSI-2019/62-S02 <a href="#">[10]</a>

### 1.3.1.3 IC Embedded Software

#### 1.3.1.3.1 JCOP

The JCOP consists of Native OS, JCVM, JCRE, GP framework, JCAPI, Extension API, Config Applet, Applet Migration and IM4. JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and GP framework are implemented according to the Java Card Specification 3.0.4 with a limited implementation of JCAPI 3.0.5 and the GlobalPlatform Specifications listed below.

**Table 5. Java Card Specification Version**

JCVM and JCRE version	Version 3.0.4 Classic Edition <a href="#">[30]</a> <a href="#">[31]</a>
JC API version	Version 3.0.4 Classic Edition <a href="#">[28]</a>
JC API version	Version 3.0.5 Classic Edition <a href="#">[29]</a> (not for customer use)

**Table 6. Global Platform and Amendments**

Name	Version	Security Claimed
GP Framework	Version 2.2.1 <a href="#">[34]</a>	yes
Amendment A, Confidential Card Content Management	Version 1.0.1 <a href="#">[35]</a>	yes

**Table 6. Global Platform and Amendments...continued**

Amendment C, Contactless Services	Version 1.1 <a href="#">[36]</a>	yes
Amendment D, Secure Channel Protocol 03	Version 1.1 <a href="#">[37]</a>	yes
Amendment E, Security Upgrade for Card Content Management	Version 1.0.1 <a href="#">[38]</a>	yes
UICC Configuration	Version 1.0.1 <a href="#">[26]</a>	no
UICC Configuration - Contactless Extension	Version 1.0 <a href="#">[27]</a>	no
Secure Element Configuration	Version 1.0 <a href="#">[40]</a>	no

JCOP components version can be identified by using the GET PLATFORM IDENTIFIER command (see relevant UGM). This command returns the card identification data, which includes the Hardware Type, JCOP Version, Build Number, Mask ID, a Patch ID and Non-Volatile Memory Size. The Platform ID is a data string that allows to identify the JCOP component. [Table 8](#) in [Section 1.3.3](#) lists all possible values for the Platform ID that are valid for this TOE.

#### 1.3.1.3.1.1 Applet Migration Component

The new Applet Migration feature allows to perform an applet update while preserving the personalization data. From a functional perspective there are two logical APDUs commands that trigger the Applet Migration process:

- an export APDU command containing a migration plan which identifies uniquely the package and the applet instance to export data and the respective new applet instance to import it. This identification is based on the packages' and applets' AIDs. As per the migration plan the applets are triggered to export their data. The packages, applets and instances are then deleted.
- an import APDU command instructing the new applet instances to import the previously exported data.

The authenticity of the Applet Migration APDUs is always guaranteed:

- either by including a signature and chained hash, similar to the APDUs used for OS update.
- or by sending the APDUs over a Secure Channel protocol established with the ISD.

The main components of the Applet Migration feature are:

- a predefined Java interface `MigratableApplet` to be implemented by applets so that those are enabled for applet data migration. The JCRE notifies the applet for the import/export events via this interface.
- the `ArchiveManager` which is responsible to handle migrated data. The `ArchiveManager` receives and handles the migration plan from the Export APDU and ensures that the exported data can be imported by an applet with an AID as specified in the migration plan. The `ArchiveManager` allows setting and personalizing the SSD hierarchy during import or export phases.

The underlying mechanism of Applet Migration has the following steps:

- the off card entity sends an export APDU commands over SCP or with a valid signature and chained hashes. The export APDU command is handled by the `ArchiveManager` which triggers the data export according to the migration plan conveyed in the export APDUs. `ArchiveManager` triggers applets whose AIDs are in the migration plan to export their respective personalization data. The exported data is stored in a data



structure called data store. The packages, Applets and instances are deleted and removed from the registry.

- the off card entity sends an import APDU. The ArchiveManager triggers the new applet instances identified by their AID to import the previously exported data as specified in the migration plan.

Applet Migration may be combined with the OS update process. In this use case scenario applet export and import phases take place respectively before and after the OS update.

#### 1.3.1.3.1.2 IM4 Feature

The new IM4 feature provides control over the Applet Migration and OS update processes. This control consists in enforcing that

- Applet Migration and OS update steps can be performed only in a particular state of the TOE.
- only allowed OS update plans can be applied to the TOE.

No security claims are made for IM4. The use of IM4 does not compromise any of the security of the OS update or the Applet Migration mechanisms and all restrictions implied by these mechanisms remain in force. The IM4 implementation does not replace or modify the existing mechanisms by which the SE decrypts, authenticates and authorizes JCOP updates. Rather, the purpose of IM4 is to facilitate a counter-signature scheme designed to verify the customer authorization of the updates with minimum impact to the update implementation.

#### 1.3.1.3.2 Native Applications

The Native Applications extend the available cryptographic algorithms for the Security Software. These Native Applications are proprietary implementations (e.g. Felica) which make use of the Security Software's security mechanisms. Native Applications are provided to the JCOP via the Security Software. No security functionality claimed for Native Applications, it is an extension to the Crypto Lib.

#### 1.3.1.3.3 OS Update Component

The OS Update Component can update the JCOP and UpdaterOS and contains two main components:

- OsSelector (no security claimed): After a hardware reset it provides the functionality to either boot UpdaterOS or JCOP. OsSelector also ensures that
  - only one OS is active (running) at a time.
  - at any time, at least one OS can be booted.
  - an invalid OS (e.g. partly flashed) can never be booted.
- UpdaterOS:
  - it handles APDUs to write a new OS (either JCOP or UpdaterOS) to flash.
  - it verifies the integrity of the new OS before updating.
  - it decrypts the new OS before updating.
  - it checks if the new OS can be authenticated and checks if the update can be authorized.
  - it ensures that the activation and setting of the information that identifies the new OS is done atomically.
  - if the update fails the system stays in a secure state.

The UpdaterOS is a standalone operating system that can only be active when JCOP is not active. Besides the capability to update JCOP, UpdaterOS is also capable of

updating itself. The UpdaterOS version can be queried by using a SELECT OS Update AID Command (see relevant UGM). UpdaterOS shares parts of the Native OS with JCOP, e.g.: communication interface, wrapper to Security Software (Flash Services and CryptoLib).

1.3.2 TOE Life Cycle

The life cycle for this Java Card is based on the general smart card life cycle defined in the Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration [6], see Figure 2.




Figure 2. TOE Life Cycle within Product Life Cycle

Table 7. Life-cycle

Phase	Name	Description
1	Security IC Embedded Software Development	The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• smartcard embedded software development including the development of Java Card applets and</li> <li>• specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, though the actual data for IC pre-personalization comes from phase 4, 5, or 6.</li> </ul>

Table 7. Life-cycle...continued

Phase	Name	Description
2	Security IC Development	The IC Developer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• designs the IC,</li> <li>• develops IC Dedicated Software,</li> <li>• provides information, software or tools to the IC Embedded Software Developer, and</li> <li>• receives the embedded software from the developer, through trusted delivery and verification procedures.</li> </ul> From the IC design, IC Dedicated Software and Smartcard Embedded Software, the IC Developer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• constructs the smartcard IC database, necessary for the IC photomask fabrication.</li> </ul>
3	Security IC Manufacturing	The IC Manufacturer is responsible for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• producing the IC through three main steps: IC manufacturing, IC testing, and IC pre-personalization.</li> </ul> The IC Mask Manufacturer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• generates the masks for the IC manufacturing based upon an output from the smarcard IC database. Configuration items may be changed/deleted.</li> </ul>
4	Security IC Packaging	The IC Packaging Manufacturer is responsible for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IC packaging and testing.</li> </ul>
5	Composite Product Integration	The Composite Product Manufacturer is responsible for the smartcard product finishing process.
6	Personalization	The Personalizer is responsible for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• smartcard (including applet) personalization and final tests. User Applets may be loaded onto the chip at the personalization process and configuration items may be changed/deleted. The Config Applet can be used to set Configuration Items.</li> </ul>
7	Operational Usage	The Consumer (e.g. Original Equipment Manufacturer) of Composite Product is responsible for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• smartcard product delivery to the smartcard end-user, and the end of life process.</li> <li>• applets may be loaded onto the chip.</li> <li>• triggering an OS update.</li> <li>• Applet Migration.</li> <li>• Config Applet: changing Config Items.</li> <li>• perform card content management according to Global Platform and Amendments specifications.</li> </ul>

The evaluation process is limited to phases 1 to 5. User Applet development is outside the scope of this evaluation. Applets can be loaded into Flash memory. Applet loading into Flash memory can be done in phases 3, 4, 5, and 6. Applet loading in phase 7 is also allowed. This means post-issuance loading of applets can be done for a certified TOE. The certification is only valid for platforms that return the Platform Identifier as stated in [Table 8](#). The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the TOE as outlined above. TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form (encrypted according to defined mailing procedures).

*Note: Phases 1 to 3 are under the TOE developer scope of control. Therefore, the objectives for the environment related to phase 1 to 3 are covered by Assurance measures, which are materialized by documents, process and procedures evaluated through the TOE evaluation process. During phases 4 to 7 the TOE is no more under the developer control. In this environment, the TOE protects itself with its own Security functions. But some additional usage recommendation must also be followed in order to ensure that the TOE is correctly and securely handled, and that shall be not damaged or comprised. This ST assumes (A.USE\_DIAG, A.USE\_KEYS) that users handle securely the TOE and related Objectives for the environment are defined (OE.USE\_DIAG, OE.USE\_KEYS).*

**1.3.3 TOE Identification & Delivery items**

The delivery comprises :

- NXP P73.2C2/2C6 Secure Element (see [Section 1.3.1.1](#)) in plastic package form (see [Section 1.3.4](#)) including its dedicated software (see [Section 1.3.1.2](#)) and with embedded software JCOP 4.x (see [Section 1.3.1.3](#)) identifiable by its platform ID (see [Table 8](#)). The SEs are delivered by secure invoice with seals and tracking according to defined packaging and delivery procedure.
- The associated JCOP User Guidance Manuals under .pdf form as defined in [Table 10](#) (JCOP 4.2), [Table 11](#) (JCOP 4.5), [Table 12](#) (JCOP 4.6), [Table 13](#) (JCOP 4.8), [Table 14](#) (JCOP 4.10). TOE documentation is delivered in electronic encrypted form according to defined mailing procedures.

The TOE can be identified by the Platform ID. See [Table 8](#). The Platform ID can be obtained by using the GET PLATFORM IDENTIFIER command (see Section 1.2 of JCOP specific UGM [\[11\]](#) [\[14\]](#) [\[17\]](#) [\[20\]](#) or [\[23\]](#)).

**Table 8. Product Identification**

OS	Platform ID
JCOP4.2	J5Q2M00148750000
JCOP4.5	J5Q2M001C1A10000
JCOP4.6	J5Q2M002242B0000
JCOP4.8	J5Q2M0027B840000
JCOP4.10	J5Q2M00386040000

The Platform ID has the following form: **JxyeeeABCDEFmmp**

The "J" is constant, the other letters are variables. For a detailed description of these variables, please see [Table 9](#).

**Table 9. Platform ID Format**

Variable	Meaning	Value	Parameter Settings
x	Hardware Type	5	NFC hardware
y	JCOP OS Version	Q	JCOP4.x
eee	Non-Volatile Memory Size	2M0	2.0MB

**Table 9. Platform ID Format...continued**

ABCDEF	Build Number in hexadecimal notation	014875 01C1A1 02242B 027B84 038604	SVN rev. used to build JCOP4.2 SVN rev. used to build JCOP4.5 SVN rev. used to build JCOP4.6 SVN rev. used to build JCOP4.8 SVN rev. used to build JCOP4.10
mm	Mask ID	00	Customer specific
pp	Patch ID	00	Reserved for future use.

The following tables identify the specific UGMs belonging to each JCOP4.x minor revision

**Table 10. JCOP4.2 configuration Delivery Items**

Type	Name	Version	Delivery form
Document	JCOP 4.2 User Guidance Manual	[11]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.2 User Guidance Manual Addendum	[12]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.2 User Guidance Anomaly	[13]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	Common Criteria Requirements for PN8xy Products	[8]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)

**Table 11. JCOP4.5 configuration Delivery Items**

Type	Name	Version	Delivery form
Document	JCOP 4.5 User Guidance Manual	[14]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.5 User Guidance Manual Addendum	[15]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.5 User Guidance Manual Anomaly	[16]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	Common Criteria Requirements for PN8xy Products	[8]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)

**Table 12. JCOP4.6 configuration Delivery Items**

Type	Name	Version	Delivery form
Document	JCOP 4.6 User Guidance Manual	[17]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.6 User Guidance Manual Addendum	[18]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.6 User Guidance Manual Anomaly	[19]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	Common Criteria Requirements for PN8xy Products	[8]	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)

Table 13. JCOP4.8 configuration Delivery Items

Type	Name	Version	Delivery form
Document	JCOP 4.8 User Guidance Manual	<a href="#">[20]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.8 User Guidance Manual Addendum	<a href="#">[21]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.8 User Guidance Manual Anomaly	<a href="#">[22]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	Common Criteria Requirements for PN8xy Products	<a href="#">[8]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)

Table 14. JCOP4.10 configuration Delivery Items

Type	Name	Version	Delivery form
Document	JCOP 4.10 User Guidance Manual	<a href="#">[23]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.10 User Guidance Manual Addendum	<a href="#">[24]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 4.10 User Guidance Manual Anomaly	<a href="#">[25]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	Common Criteria Requirements for PN8xy Products	<a href="#">[8]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)

Additionally to the Platform Identifier the TOE can also be identified by its sequence number:

1. If UpdaterOS is active then the "SELECT OS Update AID" command will return the Current Sequence Number of UpdaterOS and the Reference Sequence Number.
2. If JCOP is active then the "Get OS Info" command will return the Current Sequence Number of the JCOP (Final Sequence Number).

### 1.3.4 Evaluated Package Types

The TOE is delivered in a plastic package combined with a communication chip. All (enabled) pins of the TOE are externally accessible. Any additional security provided by the plastic package is ignored for the security of the TOE and therefore the package type is not security relevant. Common Criteria requirements for the acceptance of this package type are detailed in [\[8\]](#).

## 2 Conformance Claims (ASE\_CCL)

This chapter is divided into the following sections: "CC Conformance Claim", "Package Claim", "PP Claim", and "Conformance Claim Rationale".

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

This Security Target claims to be conformant to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to

- "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017" [1].
- "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017" [2].
- "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017" [3].

The following methodology will be used for the evaluation:

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017" [4].

This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in [Section 6](#).

### 2.2 Package Claim

This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL5 augmented. The augmentation to EAL5 is AVA\_VAN.5 "Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis", ASE\_TSS.2 "TOE summary specification with architectural design summary", ALC\_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures" and ALC\_FLR.1 "Basic flaw remediation".

### 2.3 PP Claim

The Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version 3.1 (April 2020), (BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020) [6]. The TOE does not support Java Card RMI nor "Extended Memory (EXT-MEM)". This ST is more restrictive than the PP [6] which [Section 2.4](#) provides a rationale for.

### 2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale

#### 2.4.1 TOE Type

The TOE type as stated in [Section 1.2](#) of this ST corresponds to the TOE type of the PP as stated in Section 1.2 of [6] namely a Java Card platform, implementing the Java Card Specification Version 3.0.4 [30] [31] [28].

This Security Target claims conformance to the following packages of security requirements out of those for Cryptographic Services defined in the Smartcard IC Platform Protection profile [5]:

- Package "TDES"
- Package "AES"

## 2.4.2 SPD Statement

The SPD statement that is presented in [Section 4](#) includes the threats as presented in the PP [\[6\]](#), but also includes additional threats. These threats are:

- T.RND
- T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
- T.INTERRUPT-OSU
- T.CONFIG
- T.COM\_EXPLOIT
- T.LIFE\_CYCLE
- T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT
- T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED]
- T.ATTACK-COUNTER
- T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS

The threat T.RND is taken from the Security IC PP [\[5\]](#).

The threats T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD, T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD, T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE and T.INTERRUPT-OSU are included for the OS Update which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The threat T.CONFIG is an additional threat to cover unauthorized modifications and read access of the configuration area in the TOE. It is an addition to the threats defined in the PP [\[6\]](#). The threat T.ATTACK-COUNTER is included for the Restricted Mode which is additional functionality the PP allows. The threat T.COM\_EXPLOIT is included to cover communication channels attacks and it is an addition to the threats in the PP [\[6\]](#).

The threat T.LIFE\_CYCLE is included to cover content management attacks and it is an addition to the threats in the PP [\[6\]](#).

The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT refines the threats T.INSTALL and T.DELETION from the PP [\[6\]](#).

The threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED] refines the threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA in the PP [\[6\]](#).

The threat T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS is included for Applet Migration which is additional functionality the PP allows.

Note that the threat T.EXE-CODE-REMOTE is not included, since the TOE does not support Java Card RMI. The Java Card Protection Profile [\[6\]](#) makes the use of Java Card RMI optional.

The SPD statement presented in [Section 4](#), copies the OSP from the PP [\[6\]](#), and adds the following additional OSPs:

- OSP.PROCESS-TOE
- OSP.KEY-CHANGE
- OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS

The OSP OSP.PROCESS-TOE is introduced for the pre-personalisation feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [\[6\]](#). The OSP OSP.KEY-CHANGE is introduced for the SD feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [\[6\]](#). The OSP OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS is introduced for the SD feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [\[6\]](#).



The SPD statement includes two of the three assumptions from the PP [6]. The assumption A.Deletion is excluded. The Card Manager is part of the TOE and therefore the assumption is no longer relevant. Leaving out the assumption, makes the SPD of this ST more restrictive than the SPD in the PP [6]. As the Card Manager is part of the TOE, it is ensuring that the deletion of applets through the Card Manager is secure, instead of assuming that it is handled by the Card Manager in the environment of the TOE.

Besides the assumptions from the PP [6], five additional assumptions are added:

- A.PROCESS-SEC-IC
- A.USE\_DIAG
- A.USE\_KEYS
- A.APPS-PROVIDER
- A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY

The assumption A.PROCESS-SEC-IC is taken from the underlying certified Micro Controller [9], which is compliant to the Security IC PP [5].

The assumptions A.USE\_DIAG and A.USE\_KEYS are included because the Card Manager is part of the TOE and no longer part of the environment.

The assumptions A.APPS-PROVIDER and A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY are added because Security Domains from the GlobalPlatform Specification are introduced. All the applets and packages are signed by the APSD and the correctness is verified on the TOE by VASD before the package or applet is installed or loaded. A.APPS-PROVIDER and A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY are additions to PP [6] for card content management environment.

### 2.4.3 Security Objectives Statement

The statement of security objectives in the ST presented in [Section 5](#) includes all security objectives as presented in the PP [6], but also includes a number of additional security objectives. These security objectives are:

- OT.IDENTIFICATION
- OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
- OT.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE
- OT.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION
- OT.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION
- OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION
- OT.ATTACK-COUNTER
- OT.RESTRICTED-MODE
- OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
- OT.APPLI-AUTH
- OT.COMM\_AUTH
- OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY
- OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY
- OT.DATASTORE\_ACCESS

The security objective OT.IDENTIFICATION is part of the security objectives of the certified Micro Controller [9](see also [Section 1.3.1.1](#)) and Security Software [10](see also [Section 1.3.1.2.2](#)), which are also components of this composite certification. Therefore the security objective statement is equivalent to the PP [6] for these two

security objectives. OT.IDENTIFICATION is also included for the pre-personalisation feature of the TOE, which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD, OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE, OT.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE, OT.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION, OT.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION are included for the OS Update which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION is included for the Config Applet which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives OT.ATTACK-COUNTER and OT.RESTRICTED-MODE are included for the restricted mode which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS, OT.APPLI-AUTH, OT.COMM\_AUTH, OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY, OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY are objectives for the TOE as the GlobalPlatform API and the definitions for Secure Channel, Security Domains and Card Content Management are used from it.

The ST contains OE.CAP\_FILE, OE.VERIFICATION and OE.CODE-EVIDENCE from Security Objectives for the Operational Environment from [6]. Additionally, some of the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment from [6] are listed as TOE Security Objectives in this ST:

- OT.SCP.RECOVERY instead of OE.SCP.RECOVERY
- OT.SCP.SUPPORT instead of OE.SCP.SUPPORT
- OT.SCP.IC instead of OE.SCP.IC
- OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT instead of OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT

OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC are objectives for the TOE as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT is an objective for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. Moving objectives from the environment to the TOE, adds objectives to the TOE without changing the overall objectives. The statement of security objectives is therefore equivalent to the security objectives in the PP [6] to which conformance is claimed. The security objective OT.DATASTORE\_ACCESS addresses the need for access control policy to be enforced for the Applet Migration feature.

The security objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from the PP [6] are not included since these functionality and objectives are covered by the refined OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT.

Note that the objective O.REMOTE is not included, since the TOE does not support Java Card RMI. The Java Card Protection Profile makes the use of Java Card RMI optional.

Note that the objective O.EXT-MEM is not included, since the TOE does not support "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)". The Java Card Protection Profile makes the use of "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)" optional.

A part of the security objectives for the environment defined in the PP [6] has been included in this ST. The other part of security objectives for the environment, which is present in the PP [6], is used as part of the security objectives for the TOE in this ST. The ST also introduces eight additional security objectives for the environment.

The additional objectives for the environment are:

- OE.USE\_DIAG
- OE.USE\_KEYS
- OE.PROCESS\_SEC\_IC

- OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE
- OE.APPS-PROVIDER
- OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY
- OE.KEY-CHANGE
- OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS

The security objective for the environment OE.PROCESS\_SEC\_IC is from the hardware platform (Micro Controller [9]see also [Section 1.3.1.1](#)) that is part of this composite product evaluation. Therefore the statement of security objectives for the environment is equivalent to the statement in the Security IC PP [5].

OE.USE\_KEYS and OE.USE\_DIAG are included because the Card Manager is part of the TOE and not a security objective for the environment as in PP [6].

The security objective for the environment OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE is to cover the confidentiality during creation and transmission phase of D.UPDATE\_IMAGE and therefore partly covers the threats introduced by the update mechanism which is additional functionality.

OE.APPS-PROVIDER and OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY cover trusted actors which enable the creation, distribution and verification of secure applications. OE.KEY-CHANGE covers the switch to trusted keys for the AP.

OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS covers the management of security domains in the context of the GlobalPlatform Specification.

The statement of security objectives for the environment is therefore considered to be equivalent to the security objectives in the PP [6] to which conformance is claimed.

#### 2.4.4 Security Functional Requirements Statement

The Security Functional Requirements Statement copies most SFRs as defined in the PP [6], with the exception of a number of options. For the copied set of SFRs the ST is considered equivalent to the statement of SFRs in the PP [6]. Moreover as requested by the PP [6] the ST adds additional threats, objectives and SFRs to fully cover and describe additional security functionality implemented in the TOE.

The TOE restricts remote access from the CAD to the services implemented by the applets on the card to none, and as a result the SFRs concerning Java Card RMI (FDP\_ACF.1[JCRMI], SFRs FDP\_IFC.1/JCRMI, FDP\_IFF.1/JCRMI, FMT\_MSA.1/EXPORT, FMT\_MSA.1/REM\_REFS, FMT\_MSA.3/JCRMI, FMT\_SMF.1/JCRMI, FMT\_REV.1/JCRMI, and FMT\_SMR.1/JCRMI) are not included in the ST. In the PP [6] the use of the Java Card RMI is optional. The TOE does not implement Java Card RMI.

The TOE does not allow external memory access to the services implemented by the applets on the card, and as a result the SFRs concerning "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)" (FDP\_ACC.1/EXT\_MEM, FDP\_ACF.1/EXT\_MEM, FMT\_MSA.1/EXT\_MEM, FMT\_MSA.3/EXT\_MEM and FMT\_SMF.1/EXT\_MEM) are not included in the ST. In the PP [6] the use of the "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)" is optional. The TOE does not implement "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)".

The SFR FDP\_ITC.2/INSTALLER from the PP [6] is replaced by FDP\_ITC.2[CCM] which enforces the Firewall access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy and which is more restrictive than the PACKAGE LOADING information flow control SFP from PP [6].

The set of SFRs that define the card content management mechanism CarG are partly replaced or refined and are considered to be equivalent or more restrictive because of the newly introduced SFPs:

1. Security Domain access control policy
2. Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy

These SFPs provide a concrete and more restrictive implementation of the PACKAGE LOADING information flow control SFP from PP [6] by following the information flow policy defined by Global Platform specifications. The table below lists the SFRs from CarG of PP [6] and their corresponding refinements in this ST.

**Table 15. CarG SFRs refinements**

SFR from PP [6]	Refinement
FCO_NRO.2/CM	FCO_NRO.2[SC]
FDP_IFC.2/CM	FDP_IFC.2[SC]
FDP_IFF.1/CM	FDP_IFF.1[SC]
FDP_UIT.1/CM	FDP_UIT.1[CCM]
FIA_UID.1/CM	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.1/CM	FMT_MSA.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.3/CM	FMT_MSA.3[SC]
FMT_SMF.1/CM	FMT_SMF.1[SC]
FMT_SMR.1/CM	FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FTP_ITC.1/CM	FTP_ITC.1[SC]

The following SFRs realize refinements of SFRs from PP [6] and add functionality to the TOE making the Security Functional Requirements Statement more restrictive than the PP [6]:

FDP\_ROL.1[CCM] and FPT\_FLS.1[CCM] realize additional security functionality for the card manager which is allowed by the PP [6].

The set of SFRs that define the security domains mechanism as specified by GlobalPlatform, realize refinements of SFRs from PP [6] (see above Table 15) and additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [6]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_ACC.1[SD], FDP\_ACF.1[SD], FMT\_MSA.1[SD], FMT\_MSA.3[SD], FMT\_SMF.1[SD], and FMT\_SMR.1[SD].

The set of SFRs that define the secure channel mechanism as specified by GlobalPlatform, realize refinements of SFRs from PP [6] (see above Table 15) and additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [6]. This set of SFRs comprise FCO\_NRO.2[SC], FDP\_IFC.2[SC], FDP\_IFF.1[SC], FMT\_MSA.1[SC], FMT\_MSA.3[SC], FMT\_SMF.1[SC], FIA\_UID.1[SC], FIA\_UAU.1[SC], FIA\_UAU.4[SC] and FTP\_ITC.1[SC].

The SFRs FAU\_SAS.1[SCP], FIA\_AFL.1[PIN] realize additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [6].

The set of SFRs that define the Config Applet realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [6]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_IFC.2[CFG], FDP\_IFF.1[CFG], FIA\_UID.1[CFG], FMT\_MSA.1[CFG], FMT\_MSA.3[CFG], FMT\_SMF.1[CFG], FMT\_SMR.1[CFG].

The set of SFRs that define the OS Update realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [6]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_IFC.2[OSU], FDP\_IFF.1[OSU], FMT\_MSA.3[OSU], FMT\_MSA.1[OSU], FMT\_SMR.1[OSU], FMT\_SMF.1[OSU], FIA\_UID.1[OSU], FIA\_UAU.1[OSU], FIA\_UAU.4[OSU] and FPT\_FLS.1[OSU].

The set of SFRs that define the Restricted Mode realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [6]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_ACC.2[RM], FDP\_ACF.1[RM], FMT\_MSA.3[RM], FMT\_MSA.1[RM], FMT\_SMF.1[RM], FIA\_UID.1[RM] and FIA\_UAU.1[RM].

The set of SFRs that define the Applet Migration realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [6]. This set of SFRs comprise

- FDP\_IFF.1[AMD]
- FDP\_IFC.2[AMD]
- FDP\_ACC.1[AMD]
- FDP\_ACF.1[AMD]
- FMT\_MSA.1[AMD]
- FMT\_MSA.3[AMD]
- FMT\_SMF.1[AMD]
- FMT\_SMR.1[AMD]
- FIA\_UID.1[AMD]

## 3 Security Aspects

This chapter describes the main security issues of the Java Card System and its environment addressed in this ST, called "security aspects", in a CC-independent way. In addition to this, the security aspects also give a semi-formal framework to express the CC security environment and objectives of the TOE. They can be instantiated as assumptions, threats, objectives (for the TOE and the environment) or organizational security policies. The description is based on [6].

### 3.1 Confidentiality

<b>SA.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Update Image</b> The update image must be kept confidential. This concerns the non disclosure of the update image in transit to the card.
<b>SA.CONFID-APPLI-DATA</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Application Data</b> Application data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain read access to other application's data.
<b>SA.CONFID-JCS-CODE</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Java Card System Code</b> Java Card System code must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Knowledge of the Java Card System code may allow bypassing the TSF. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain a read access to executable code, typically by executing an application that tries to read the memory area where a piece of Java Card System code is stored.
<b>SA.CONFID-JCS-DATA</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Java Card System Data</b> Java Card System data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain a read access to Java Card System data. Java Card System data includes the data managed by the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM and the internal data of Java Card platform API classes as well.

### 3.2 Integrity

<b>SA.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE</b>	<b>Integrity of Update Image</b> The update image must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns the modification of the image in transit to the card.
<b>SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Code</b> Application code must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access to the memory zone where executable code is stored. In post-issuance application loading, this threat also concerns the modification of application code in transit to the card.
<b>SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Data</b> Application data must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain unauthorized write access to application data. In post-issuance application loading, this threat also concerns the modification of application data contained in a CAP file in transit to the card. For instance, a CAP file contains the values to be used for initializing the static fields of the CAP file.

**SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE Integrity of Java Card System Code**

Java Card System code must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access to executable code.

**SA.INTEG-JCS-DATA Integrity of Java Card System Data**

Java Card System data must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access to Java Card System data. Java Card System data includes the data managed by the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM and the internal data of Java Card API classes as well.

### 3.3 Unauthorized Executions

**SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE Execution of Application Code**

Application (byte)code must be protected against unauthorized execution. This concerns:

1. invoking a method outside the scope of the accessibility rules provided by the access modifiers of the Java programming language ([\[32\]](#))
2. jumping inside a method fragment or interpreting the contents of a data memory area as if it was executable code
3. unauthorized execution of a remote method from the CAD (if the TOE provides JCRMI functionality).

**SA.EXE-JCS-CODE Execution of Java Card System Code**

Java Card System bytecode must be protected against unauthorized execution. Java Card System bytecode includes any code of the Java Card RE or API. This concerns:

1. invoking a method outside the scope of the accessibility rules provided by the access modifiers of the Java programming language ([\[32\]](#))
2. jumping inside a method fragment or interpreting the contents of a data memory area as if it was executable code. Note that execute access to native code of the Java Card System and applications is the concern of SA.NATIVE.

**SA.FIREWALL Firewall**

The Firewall shall ensure controlled sharing of class instances<sup>[1]</sup>, and isolation of their data and code between CAP files (that is, controlled execution contexts) as well as between CAP files and the JCRE context. An applet shall not read, write, compare a piece of data belonging to an applet that is not in the same context, or execute one of the methods of an applet in another context without its authorization.

**SA.NATIVE Native Code Execution**

Because the execution of native code is outside of the JCS TSF scope, it must be secured so as to not provide ways to bypass the TSFs of the JCS. Loading of native code, which is as well outside those TSFs, is submitted to the same requirements. Should native software be privileged in this respect, exceptions to the policies must include a rationale for the new security framework they introduce.

[1] This concerns in particular the arrays, which are considered as instances of the Object class in the Java programming language.

### 3.4 Bytecode Verification

**SA.VERIFICATION**

**Bytecode Verification**

Bytecode must be verified prior to being executed. Bytecode verification includes:

1. how well-formed CAP file is and the verification of the typing constraints on the bytecode,
2. binary compatibility with installed CAP files and the assurance that the export files used to check the CAP file correspond to those that will be present on the card when loading occurs.

### 3.5 Card Management

**SA.CARD-MANAGEMENT**

**Card Management**

1. The card manager (CM) shall control the access to card management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of applets.
2. The card manager shall implement the card issuer’s policy on the card.

**SA.INSTALL**

**Installation**

1. The TOE must be able to return to a safe and consistent state when the installation of a CAP file or an applet fails or be cancelled (whatever the reasons).
2. Installing an applet must have no effect on the code and data of already installed applets. The installation procedure should not be used to bypass the TSFs. In short, it is an atomic operation, free of harmful effects on the state of the other applets.
3. The procedure of loading and installing a CAP file shall ensure its integrity and authenticity. In case of Extended CAP files, installation of a CAP shall ensure installation of all packages in the CAP file.

**SA.SID**

**Subject Identification**

1. Users and subjects of the TOE must be identified.
2. The identity of sensitive users and subjects associated with administrative and privileged roles must be particularly protected; this concerns the Java Card RE, the applets registered on the card, and especially the default applet and the currently selected applet (and all other active applets in Java Card System). A change of identity, especially standing for an administrative role (like an applet impersonating the Java Card RE), is a severe violation of the SFR. Selection controls the access to any data exchange between the TOE and the CAD and therefore, must be protected as well. The loading of a CAP file or any exchange of data through the APDU buffer (which can be accessed by any applet) can lead to disclosure of keys, application code or data, and so on.

**SA.OBJ-DELETION**

**Object Deletion**

1. Deallocation of objects should not introduce security holes in the form of references pointing to memory zones that are no longer in use, or have been reused for other purposes. Deletion of collection of objects should not be maliciously used to circumvent the TSFs.
2. Erasure, if deemed successful, shall ensure that the deleted class instance is no longer accessible.



**SA.DELETION****Deletion**

1. Deletion of installed applets (or CAP file) should not introduce security holes in the form of broken references to garbage collected code or data, nor should they alter integrity or confidentiality of remaining applets. The deletion procedure should not be maliciously used to bypass the TSFs.
2. Erasure, if deemed successful, shall ensure that any data owned by the deleted applet is no longer accessible (shared objects shall either prevent deletion or be made inaccessible). A deleted applet cannot be selected or receive APDU commands. CAP file deletion shall make the code of the package no longer available for execution. In case of Extended CAP files, deletion of a CAP shall ensure that code and data for all the packages in the CAP file is no longer available for execution.
3. Power failure or other failures during the process shall be taken into account in the implementation so as to preserve the SFRs. This does not mandate, however, the process to be atomic. For instance, an interrupted deletion may result in the loss of user data, as long as it does not violate the SFRs.

The deletion procedure and its characteristics (whether deletion is either physical or logical, what happens if the deleted application was the default applet, the order to be observed on the deletion steps) are implementation-dependent. The only commitment is that deletion shall not jeopardize the TOE (or its assets) in case of failure (such as power shortage).

Deletion of a single applet instance and deletion of a whole CAP file are functionally different operations and may obey different security rules. For instance, specific CAP files or packages can be declared to be undeletable (for instance, the Java Card API packages), or the dependency between installed CAP files may forbid the deletion (like a CAP file using super classes or super interfaces declared in another CAP file).

**3.6 Services****SA.ALARM****Alarm**

The TOE shall provide appropriate feedback upon detection of a potential security violation. This particularly concerns the type errors detected by the bytecode verifier, the security exceptions thrown by the Java Card VM, or any other security-related event occurring during the execution of a TSF.

**SA.OPERATE****Operate**

1. The TOE must ensure continued correct operation of its security functions.
2. In case of failure during its operation, the TOE must also return to a well-defined valid state before the next service request.

**SA.RESOURCES****Resources**

The TOE controls the availability of resources for the applications and enforces quotas and limitations in order to prevent unauthorized denial of service or malfunction of the TSFs. This concerns both execution (dynamic memory allocation) and installation (static memory allocation) of applications and CAP files.

<b>SA.CIPHER</b>	<b>Cipher</b> The TOE shall provide a means to the applications for ciphering sensitive data, for instance, through a programming interface to low-level, highly secure cryptographic services. In particular, those services must support cryptographic algorithms consistent with cryptographic usage policies and standards.
<b>SA.KEY-MNGT</b>	<b>Key Management</b> The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage cryptographic keys. This includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Keys shall be generated in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes,</li><li>2. Keys must be distributed in accordance with specified cryptographic key distribution methods,</li><li>3. Keys must be initialized before being used,</li><li>4. Keys shall be destroyed in accordance with specified cryptographic key destruction methods.</li></ol>
<b>SA.PIN-MNGT</b>	<b>PIN Management</b> The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage PIN objects. This includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Atomic update of PIN value and try counter,</li><li>2. No rollback on the PIN-checking function,</li><li>3. Keeping the PIN value (once initialized) secret (for instance, no clear-PIN-reading function),</li><li>4. Enhanced protection of PIN's security attributes (state, try counter ...) in confidentiality and integrity.</li></ol>

**SA.SCP****Smart Card Platform**

The smart card platform must be secure with respect to the SFRs. Then:

1. After a power loss, RF signal loss or sudden card removal prior to completion of some communication protocol, the SCP will allow the TOE on the next power up to either complete the interrupted operation or revert to a secure state.
2. It does not allow the SFRs to be bypassed or altered and does not allow access to other low-level functions than those made available by packages of Java Card API. That includes the protection of its private data and code (against disclosure or modification) from the Java Card System.
3. It provides secure low-level cryptographic processing to the Java Card System.
4. It supports the needs for any update to a single persistent object or class field to be atomic, and possibly a low-level transaction mechanism.
5. It allows the Java Card System to store data in a "persistent technology memory" or in volatile memory, depending on its needs (for instance, transient objects must not be stored in non-volatile memory). The memory model is structured and allows for low-level control accesses (segmentation fault detection).
6. It safely transmits low-level exceptions to the TOE (arithmetic exceptions, checksum errors), when applicable.
7. Finally, it is required that the IC is designed in accordance with a well-defined set of policies and standards (for instance, those specified in [5]), and will be tamper resistant to actually prevent an attacker from extracting or altering security data (like cryptographic keys) by using commonly employed techniques (physical probing and sophisticated analysis of the chip). This especially matters to the management (storage and operation) of confidential application data such as cryptographic keys.

**SA.TRANSACTION****Transaction**

The TOE must provide a means to execute a set of operations atomically. This mechanism must not jeopardise the execution of the user applications. The transaction status at the beginning of an applet session must be closed (no pending updates).

### 3.7 Config Applet

**SA.CONFIG-APPLET****Config Applet**

The Config Applet is a JCOP functionality which allows to:

1. Read and modify configuration items in the configuration area of the TOE,
2. Disable Access to configuration item.

### 3.8 OS Update

**SA.OSU****OS Update**

The UpdaterOS allows to update JCOP OS and the UpdaterOS itself. It ensures that only valid updates can be installed on the TOE.

### 3.9 Restricted Mode

**SA.RM****Restricted Mode**

If the Attack Counter reaches its limit the TOE goes into Restricted Mode. In this mode it is possible to perform a limited set of functions, like authenticate against the ISD, reset the Attack Counter or read logging information.

### 3.10 Applet Migration

**SA.APPLET-MIGR****Applet Migration**

In case an applet gets updated it can keep its User Data: Keys, PIN and byte arrays. The data is exported by the applet instances to be updated in a datastore and is imported by the new applet instance.

## 4 Security Problem Definition (ASE\_SPD)

### 4.1 Assets

Assets are security-relevant elements to be directly protected by the TOE. Confidentiality of assets is always intended with respect to un-trusted people or software, as various parties are involved during the first stages of the smart card product life-cycle. Details concerning the threats are given in [Section 4.2](#) hereafter.

Assets have to be protected, some in terms of confidentiality and some in terms of integrity or both integrity and confidentiality. These assets might get compromised by the threats that the TOE is exposed to.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are listed below. They are grouped according to whether it is data created by and for the user (User data) or data created by and for the TOE (TSF data). This definition of grouping is taken from Section 5.1 of [\[6\]](#).

#### 4.1.1 User data

**Table 16. User Data Assets**

D.APP_CODE	The code of the applets and libraries loaded on the card. To be protected from unauthorized modification.
D.APP_C_DATA	Confidential sensitive data of the applications, like the data contained in an object, an array view, a static field of a package, a local variable of the currently executed method, or a position of the operand stack. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure.
D.APP_I_DATA	Integrity sensitive data of the applications, like the data contained in an object, an array view and the PIN security attributes (PIN Try limit, PIN Try counter and State). To be protected from unauthorized modification.
D.APP_KEYS	Cryptographic keys owned by the applets. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.PIN	Any end-user’s PIN. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.APSD_KEYS	Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of <a href="#">[6]</a> . Application Provider Security Domains cryptographic keys needed to establish secure channels with the AP. These keys can be used to load and install applications on the card if the Security Domain has the appropriate privileges. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.ISD_KEYS	Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of <a href="#">[6]</a> . Issuer Security Domain cryptographic keys needed to perform card management operations on the card. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.VASD_KEYS	Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of <a href="#">[6]</a> . Verification Authority Security Domain cryptographic keys needed to verify applications Mandated DAP signature. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.CARD_MNGT_DATA	The data of the card management environment, like for instance, the identifiers, the privileges, life cycle states, the memory resource quotas of applets and security domains. To be protected from unauthorized modification.

## 4.1.2 TSF Data

Table 17. TSF Data Assets

D.API_DATA	Private data of the API, like the contents of its private fields. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.CRYPTO	Cryptographic data used in runtime cryptographic computations, like a seed used to generate a key. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.JCS_CODE	The code of the Java Card System. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.JCS_DATA	The internal runtime data areas necessary for the execution of the JVM, such as, for instance, the frame stack, the program counter, the class of an object, the length allocated for an array, any pointer used to chain data-structures. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification.
D.SEC_DATA	The runtime security data of the JCRE, like, for instance, the AIDs used to identify the installed applets, the currently selected applet, the current context of execution and the owner of each object. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.UPDATE_IMAGE	Can be an update for JCOP OS and UpdaterOS. It is sent to the TOE, received by the UpdaterOS. It includes executable code, configuration data, as well as a Sequence Number (Received Sequence Number) and Image Type. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. It is decrypted using the CAP file Decryption Key and its signature is verified using the Verification Key. Is also referred to as Additional Code, see [7].
D.CONFIG_ITEM	A configuration that can be changed using the Config Applet.
D.ATTACK_COUNTER	The Attack Counter is incremented when a potential attack is detected. When the Attack Counter reaches its limit, the card goes into restricted mode.
D.TOE_IDENTIFIER	Identification Data to identify the TOE.

## 4.2 Threats

### 4.2.1 Confidentiality

- T.CONFID-APPLI-DA TA Confidentiality of Application Data**  
The attacker executes an application to disclose data belonging to another application. See SA.CONFID-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_C\_DATA, D.PIN and D.APP\_KEYS.
- T.CONFID-JCS-CODE Confidentiality of Java Card System Code**  
The attacker executes an application to disclose the Java Card System code. See SA.CONFID-JCS-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_CODE.
- T.CONFID-JCS-DATA Confidentiality of Java Card System Data**  
The attacker executes an application to disclose data belonging to the Java Card System. See SA.CONFID-JCS-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.API\_DATA, D.SEC\_DATA, D.JCS\_DATA and D.CRYPTO.

## 4.2.2 Integrity

<b>T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE</b> <b>E</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Code</b> The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) its own code or another application's code. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.
<b>T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE</b> <b>E.LOAD</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Code - Load</b> The attacker modifies (part of) its own or another application code when an application CAP file is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.
<b>T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA</b> <b>[REFINED]</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Data</b> The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) another application's data. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_I_DATA, D.PIN, D.APP_KEYS, D.ISD_KEYS, D.VASD_KEYS and S.APSD_KEYS. This threat is a refinement of the Threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA from [6].
<b>T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA</b> <b>.LOAD</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Data - Load</b> The attacker modifies (part of) the initialization data contained in an application CAP file when the CAP file is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_I_DATA and D.APP_KEYS.
<b>T.INTEG-JCS-CODE</b>	<b>Integrity of Java Card System Code</b> The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) the Java Card System code. See SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS_CODE.
<b>T.INTEG-JCS-DATA</b>	<b>Integrity of Java Card System Data</b> The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) Java Card System or API data. See SA.INTEG-JCS-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.API_DATA, D.SEC_DATA, D.JCS_DATA and D.CRYPTO.

## 4.2.3 Identity Usurpation

<b>T.SID.1</b>	<b>Subject Identification 1</b> An applet impersonates another application, or even the Java Card RE, in order to gain illegal access to some resources of the card or with respect to the end user or the terminal. See SA.SID for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.SEC_DATA (other assets may be jeopardized should this attack succeed, for instance, if the identity of the JCRE is usurped), D.PIN and D.APP_KEYS.
<b>T.SID.2</b>	<b>Subject Identification 2</b> The attacker modifies the TOE's attribution of a privileged role (e.g. default applet and currently selected applet), which allows illegal impersonation of this role. See SA.SID for further details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.SEC_DATA (any other asset may be jeopardized should this attack succeed, depending on whose identity was forged).

4.2.4 Unauthorized Execution

<b>T.EXE-CODE.1</b>	<p><b>Code Execution 1</b></p> <p>An applet performs an unauthorized execution of a method. See SA.EXE-JCS-CODE and SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.</p>
<b>T.EXE-CODE.2</b>	<p><b>Code Execution 2</b></p> <p>An applet performs an execution of a method fragment or arbitrary data. See SA.EXE-JCS-CODE and SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.</p>
<b>T.NATIVE</b>	<p><b>Native Code Execution</b></p> <p>An applet executes a native method to bypass a TOE Security Function such as the firewall. See SA.NATIVE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS_DATA.</p>

4.2.5 Denial of Service

<b>T.RESOURCES</b>	<p><b>Consumption of Resources</b></p> <p>An attacker prevents correct operation of the Java Card System through consumption of some resources of the card: RAM or NVRAM. See SA.RESOURCES for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS_DATA.</p>
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4.2.6 Card Management

<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT</b>	<p><b>Unauthorized Card Management</b></p> <p>The attacker performs unauthorized card management operations (for instance impersonates one of the actor represented on the card) in order to take benefit of the privileges or services granted to this actor on the card such as fraudulent:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• load of a CAP file</li> <li>• installation of a CAP file</li> <li>• extradition of a CAP file or an applet</li> <li>• personalization of an applet or a Security Domain</li> <li>• deletion of a CAP file or an applet</li> <li>• privileges update of an applet or a Security Domain</li> </ul> <p>Directly threatened asset(s): D.ISD_KEYS, D.APSD_KEYS, D.APP_C_DATA, D.APP_I_DATA, D.APP_CODE, D.SEC_DATA, and D.CARD_MNGT_DATA (any other asset may be jeopardized should this attack succeed, depending on the virulence of the installed application).</p> <p>This security objective is a refinement of the Threats T.INSTALL and T.DELETION from <a href="#">[6]</a>.</p>
<b>T.COM_EXPLOIT</b>	<p><b>Communication Channel Remote Exploit</b></p> <p>An attacker remotely exploits the communication channels established between a third party and the TOE in order to modify or disclose confidential data. All assets are threatened.</p>
<b>T.LIFE_CYCLE</b>	<p><b>Life Cycle</b></p> <p>An attacker accesses to an application outside of its expected availability range thus violating irreversible life cycle phases of the application (for instance, an attacker repersonalizes the application). Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_I_DATA, D.APP_C_DATA, and D.CARD_MNGT_DATA.</p>



#### 4.2.7 Services

##### T.OBJ-DELETION

##### Object Deletion

The attacker keeps a reference to a garbage collected object in order to force the TOE to execute an unavailable method, to make it to crash, or to gain access to a memory containing data that is now being used by another application. See SA.OBJ-DELETION for further details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_C\_DATA, D.APP\_I\_DATA and D.APP\_KEYS.

#### 4.2.8 Miscellaneous

##### T.PHYSICAL

##### Physical Tampering

The attacker discloses or modifies the design of the TOE, its sensitive data or application code by physical (opposed to logical) tampering means. This threat includes IC failure analysis, electrical probing, unexpected tearing, and DPA. That also includes the modification of the runtime execution of Java Card System or SCP software through alteration of the intended execution order of (set of) instructions through physical tampering techniques. This threatens all the identified assets. This threat refers to the point (7) of the security aspect SA.SCP, and all aspects related to confidentiality and integrity of code and data.

#### 4.2.9 Random Numbers

##### T.RND

##### Deficiency of Random Numbers

An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers generated by the TOE for instance because of a lack of entropy of the random numbers provided. An attacker may gather information about the produced random numbers which might be a problem because they may be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys. Here the attacker is expected to take advantage of statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the TOE without specific knowledge about the TOE's generator. Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered which may assist in getting information about random numbers.

#### 4.2.10 Config Applet

##### T.CONFIG

##### Unauthorized configuration

The attacker tries to change configuration items without authorization. Directly threatened asset(s): D.CONFIG\_ITEM.

#### 4.2.11 OS Update

##### T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD

##### Confidentiality of Update Image - Load

The attacker discloses (part of) the image used to update the TOE in the field while the image is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.UPDATE\_IMAGE, D.JCS\_CODE, and D.JCS\_DATA.

##### T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

##### Load unauthorized version of Update Image

The attacker tries to upload an unauthorized Update Image. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_CODE, D.JCS\_DATA, D.UPDATE\_IMAGE.

<b>T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD</b>	<b>Integrity of Update Image - Load</b> The attacker modifies (part of) the image used to update the TOE in the field while the image is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.UPDATE_IMAGE, D.JCS_CODE, and D.JCS_DATA
<b>T.INTERRUPT-OSU</b>	<b>OS Update procedure interrupted</b> The attacker tries to interrupt the OS Update procedure (Load Phase through activation of additional code) leaving the TOE in a partially functional state . Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS_CODE, D.JCS_DATA, D.UPDATE_IMAGE, D.TOE_IDENTIFIER.

#### 4.2.12 Restricted Mode

<b>T.ATTACK-COUNTER</b>	<b>Modification of the Attack Counter</b> The attacker tries to modify the attack counter without authorization. Directly threatened asset: D.ATTACK_COUNTER.
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#### 4.2.13 Applet Migration

<b>T.AM_DATASTORE_ACCESS</b>	<b>Unauthorized access to applet datastore</b> An attacker tries to import illegally data to an applet to which this data does not belong to. Directly threatened assets: D.APP_C_DATA, D.APP_I_DATA, D.APP_KEYS, D.PIN.
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### 4.3 Organisational Security Policies

<b>OSP.VERIFICATION</b>	<b>File Verification</b> This policy shall ensure the consistency between the export files used in the verification and those used for installing the verified file. The policy must also ensure that no modification of the file is performed in between its verification and the signing by the verification authority. See SA.VERIFICATION for details.  If the application development guidance provided by the platform developer contains recommendations related to the isolation property of the platform, this policy shall also ensure that the verification authority checks that these recommendations are applied in the application code
<b>OSP.PROCESS-TOE</b>	<b>Identification of the TOE</b> An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this identification.
<b>OSP.KEY-CHANGE</b>	<b>Security Domain Keys Change</b> The AP shall change its initial security domain keys (APSD) before any operation on its Security Domain.
<b>OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS</b>	<b>Security Domains</b> Security domains can be dynamically created, deleted and blocked during usage phase in post-issuance mode.

### 4.4 Assumptions

Note that the assumption A.DELETION is excluded. The Card Manager is part of the TOE and therefore the assumption is no longer relevant.

<b>A.CAP_FILE</b>	<p><b>CAP file without Native Methods</b></p> <p>Applets loaded post-issuance do not contain native methods. The Java Card specification explicitly "does not include support for native methods" ([30]) outside the API.</p>
<b>A.VERIFICATION</b>	<p><b>Bytecode Verification</b></p> <p>All the bytecodes are verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.</p>
<b>A.USE_DIAG</b>	<p><b>Usage of TOE's Secure Communication Protocol by OE</b></p> <p>It is assumed that the operational environment supports and uses the secure communication protocols offered by the TOE.</p>
<b>A.USE_KEYS</b>	<p><b>Protected Storage of Keys Outside of TOE</b></p> <p>It is assumed that the keys which are stored outside the TOE and which are used for secure communication and authentication between Smart Card and terminals are protected for confidentiality and integrity in their own storage environment. This is especially true for D.APSD_KEYS, D.ISD_KEYS, and D.VASD_KEYS.</p> <p><b>Info:</b> This is to assume that the keys used in terminals or systems are correctly protected for confidentiality and integrity in their own environment, as the disclosure of such information which is shared with the TOE but is not under the TOE control, may compromise the security of the TOE.</p>
<b>A.PROCESS-SEC-IC</b>	<p><b>Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation</b></p> <p>It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately. The assets to be protected are: The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related documentation,</li> <li>2. pre-personalisation and personalisation data including specifications of formats and memory areas, test related data,</li> <li>3. the User Data and related documentation, and</li> <li>4. material for software development support</li> </ol> <p>as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer.</p>
<b>A.APPS-PROVIDER</b>	<p><b>Application Provider</b></p> <p>The AP is a trusted actor that provides basic or secure applications. He is responsible for his security domain keys (D.APSD_KEYS).</p> <p><b>Info:</b> An AP generally refers to the entity that issues the application. For instance it can be a financial institution for a payment application such as EMV or a transport operator for a transport application.</p>
<b>A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY</b>	<p><b>Verification Authority</b></p> <p>The VA is a trusted actor who is able to verify bytecode of an application loaded on the card, guarantee and generate the digital signature attached to an application and ensure that its public key for verifying the application signature is on the TOE.</p> <p><b>Info:</b> As a consequence, it guarantees the success of the application validation upon loading.</p>

## 5 Security Objectives

### 5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

#### 5.1.1 Identification

<b>OT.SID</b>	<b>Subject Identification</b> The TOE shall uniquely identify every subject (applet, or CAP file) before granting it access to any service.
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#### 5.1.2 Execution

<b>OT.FIREWALL</b>	<b>Firewall</b> The TOE shall ensure controlled sharing of data containers owned by applets of different CAP files or the JCRE and between applets and the TSFs. See SA.FIREWALL for details.
<b>OT.GLOBAL_ ARRAYS_ CONFID</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Global Arrays</b> The TOE shall ensure that the APDU buffer that is shared by all applications is always cleaned upon applet selection. The TOE shall ensure that the global byte array used for the invocation of the install method of the selected applet is always cleaned after the return from the install method.
<b>OT.GLOBAL_ ARRAYS_ INTEG</b>	<b>Integrity of Global Arrays</b> The TOE shall ensure that only the currently selected applications may have a write access to the APDU buffer and the global byte array used for the invocation of the install method of the selected applet.
<b>OT.ARRAY_ VIEW_ CONFID</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Array View</b> The TOE shall ensure that no application can read elements of an array view not having array view security attribute ATTR_READABLE_VIEW. The TOE shall ensure that an application can only read the elements of the array view within the bounds of the array view.
<b>OT_ ARRAY_ VIEW_ INTEG</b>	<b>Integrity of Array View</b> The TOE shall ensure that no application can write to an array view not having array view security attribute ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW. The TOE shall ensure that an application can only write within the bounds of the array view.
<b>OT.NATIVE</b>	<b>Native Code</b> The only means that the Java Card VM shall provide for an application to execute native code is the invocation of a method of the Java Card API, or any additional API. See SA.NATIVE for details.
<b>OT.OPERATE</b>	<b>Correct Operation</b> The TOE must ensure continued correct operation of its security functions. See SA.OPERATE for details.
<b>OT.REALLOCATION</b>	<b>Secure Re-Allocation</b> The TOE shall ensure that the re-allocation of a memory block for the runtime areas of the Java Card VM does not disclose any information that was previously stored in that block.

**OT.RESOURCES****Resources availability**

The TOE shall control the availability of resources for the applications. See SA.RESOURCES for details.

**5.1.3 Services****OT.ALARM****Alarm**

The TOE shall provide appropriate feedback information upon detection of a potential security violation. See SA.ALARM for details.

**OT.CIPHER****Cipher**

The TOE shall provide a means to cipher sensitive data for applications in a secure way. In particular, the TOE must support cryptographic algorithms consistent with cryptographic usage policies and standards. See SA.CIPHER for details.

**OT.KEY-MNGT****Key Management**

The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage cryptographic keys. This concerns the correct generation, distribution, access and destruction of cryptographic keys. See SA.KEY-MNGT.

**OT.RNG****Quality of random numbers**

The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy. The TOE shall ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker since they might be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.

**OT.PIN-MNGT****Pin Management**

The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage PIN objects. See SA.PIN-MNGT for details.

AppNote: PIN objects may play key roles in the security architecture of client applications. The way they are stored and managed in the memory of the smart card must be carefully considered, and this applies to the whole object rather than the sole value of the PIN.

**OT.TRANSACTION****Transaction**

The TOE must provide a means to execute a set of operations atomically. See SA.TRANSACTION for details.

**5.1.4 Object Deletion****OT.OBJ-DELETION****Object Deletion**

The TOE shall ensure the object deletion shall not break references to objects. See SA.OBJ-DELETION for further details.

### 5.1.5 Applet Management

<b>OT.APPLI-AUTH</b>	<b>Application Authentication</b> <p>The card manager shall enforce the application security policies established by the card issuer by requiring application authentication during application loading on the card. This security objective is a refinement of the Security Objective O.LOAD from [6].</p> <p>AppNote: Each application loaded onto the TOE has been signed by a VA. The VA will guarantee that the security policies established by the card issuer on applications are enforced. For example this authority (DAP) or a third party (Mandated DAP) can be present on the TOE as a Security Domain whose role is to verify each signature at application loading.</p>
<b>OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS</b>	<b>Domain Rights</b> <p>The Card issuer shall not get access or change personalized AP Security Domain keys which belong to the AP. Modification of a Security Domain keyset is restricted to the AP who owns the security domain.</p> <p>AppNote: APs have a set of keys that allows them to establish a secure channel between them and the platform. These keys sets are not known by the TOE issuer. The security domain initial keys are changed before any operation on the SD (OE.KEY-CHANGE).</p>
<b>OT.COMM_AUTH</b>	<b>Communication Mutual Authentication</b> <p>The TOE shall authenticate the origin of the card management requests that the card receives, and authenticate itself to the remote actor.</p>
<b>OT.COMM_INTEGRITY</b>	<b>Communication Request Integrity</b> <p>The TOE shall verify the integrity of the card management requests that the card receives.</p>
<b>OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY</b>	<b>Communication Request Confidentiality</b> <p>The TOE shall be able to process card management requests containing encrypted data.</p>

## 5.1.6 Card Management

### OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT Card Management

The TOE shall provide card management functionalities (loading, installation, extradition, deletion of applications and GP registry updates) in charge of the life cycle of the whole device and installed applications (applets). The card manager, the application with specific rights responsible for the administration of the smart card, shall control the access to card management functions. It shall also implement the card issuer's policy on card management.

The Security Objective from [6] for the environment OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT is listed as TOE Security Objective OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. This security objective is a refinement for the Security Objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from [6]. Thus, the following objectives are also covered:

- The TOE shall ensure that the installation of an applet performs as expected (See SA.INSTALL for details).
- The TOE shall ensure that the loading of a CAP file into the card is secure.
- The TOE shall ensure that the deletion of a CAP file from the TOE is secure.

AppNote: The card manager will be tightly connected in practice with the rest of the TOE, which in return shall very likely rely on the card manager for the effective enforcement of some of its security functions. The mechanism used to ensure authentication of the TOE issuer, that manages the TOE, or of the Service Providers owning a Security Domain with card management privileges is a secure channel. This channel will be used afterwards to protect commands exchanged with the TOE in confidentiality and integrity. The platform guarantees that only the ISD or the Service Providers owning a Security Domain with the appropriate privilege (Delegated Management) can manage the applications on the card associated with its Security Domain. This is done accordingly with the card issuer's policy on card management. The actor performing the operation must beforehand authenticate with the Security Domain. In the case of Delegated Management, the card management command will be associated with an electronic signature (GlobalPlatform token) verified by the ISD before execution.

The Security Objective from [6] for the environment OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT is listed as TOE Security Objective OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. This security objective is a refinement for the Security Objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from [6]. Thus, the following AppNote applicable to O.DELETION applies also:

- Usurpation of identity resulting from a malicious installation of an applet on the card may also be the result of perturbing the communication channel linking the CAD and the card. Even if the CAD is placed in a secure environment, the attacker may try to capture, duplicate, permute or modify the CAP file sent to the card. He may also try to send one of its own applications as if it came from the card issuer. Thus, this objective is intended to ensure the integrity and authenticity of loaded CAP files.

### 5.1.7 Smart Card Platform

<b>OT.SCP.IC</b>	<p><b>IC Physical Protection</b></p> <p>The SCP shall provide all IC security features against physical attacks. This security objective for the environment refers to the point (7) of the security aspect SA.SCP.</p> <p>AppNote: The Security Objectives from [6] for the environment OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.</p>
<b>OT.SCP.RECOVERY</b>	<p><b>SCP Recovery</b></p> <p>If there is a loss of power, or if the smart card is withdrawn from the CAD while an operation is in progress, the SCP must allow the TOE to eventually complete the interrupted operation successfully, or recover to a consistent and secure state. This security objective for the environment refers to the security aspect SA.SCP</p> <p>AppNote: The Security Objectives from [6] for the environment OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.</p>
<b>OT.SCP.SUPPORT</b>	<p><b>SCP Support</b></p> <p>The SCP shall support the TSFs of the TOE. This security objective refers to the security aspects 2, 3, 4 and 5 of SA.SCP</p> <p>AppNote: The Security Objectives from [6] for the environment OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.</p>
<b>OT.IDENTIFICATION</b>	<p><b>TOE identification</b></p> <p>The TOE must provide means to store Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialization Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.</p>

### 5.1.8 OS Update Mechanism

<b>OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD</b>	<p><b>Confidentiality of Update Image - Load</b></p> <p>The TOE shall ensure that the encrypted image transferred to the device is not disclosed during the installation. The keys used for decrypting the image shall be kept confidential.</p>
<b>OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE</b>	<p><b>Authorization of Update Image - Load</b></p> <p>The TOE shall ensure that it is only possible to load an authorized image.</p>

The following Security Objectives have been added to comply to JIL "Security requirements for post-delivery code loading" [7].



<b>OT.SECURE_LOAD_ ACODE</b>	<b>Secure loading of the Additional Code</b> The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.
<b>OT.SECURE_AC_ ACTIVATION</b>	<b>Secure activation of the Additional Code</b> Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure.
<b>OT.TOE_ IDENTIFICATION</b>	<b>Secure identification of the TOE</b> The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user shall be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE.

### 5.1.9 Config Applet

<b>OT.CARD-CONFIGUR ATION</b>	<b>Card Configuration</b> The TOE shall ensure that the customer can only configure customer configuration items and that NXP can configure customer and NXP configuration items. Additionally, the customer can only disable the customer configuration and NXP can disable customer and NXP configuration.
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### 5.1.10 Restricted Mode

<b>OT.ATTACK-COUNT ER</b>	<b>Attack Counter</b> The TOE shall ensure that only the ISD can reset the Attack Counter.
<b>OT.RESTRICTED-MO DE</b>	<b>Restricted Mode</b> The TOE shall ensure that in Restricted Mode all operations return an error except for the limited set of commands that are allowed by the TOE when in Restricted Mode.

### 5.1.11 Applet Migration

<b>OT.DATASTORE_ ACCESS</b>	<b>Datstore Access</b> The TOE shall ensure that only an authorized applet instance can access data from the datastore based on its AID. An applet instance is triggered to import/export data in the datastore only by authentic commands
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## 5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

<b>OE.CAP_FILE</b>	<p><b>CAP file</b></p> <p>No CAP file loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.</p>
<b>OE.VERIFICATION</b>	<p><b>Bytecode Verification</b></p> <p>All the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time. See SA.VERIFICATION for details.</p> <p>Additionally, the applet shall follow all the recommendations, if any, mandated in the platform guidance for maintaining the isolation property of the platform.</p> <p>Application Note:</p> <p>Constraints to maintain the isolation property of the platform are provided by the platform developer in application development guidance. The constraints apply to all application code loaded in the platform.</p>
<b>OE.CODE-EVIDENCE</b>	<p><b>Code Evidence</b></p> <p>For application code loaded pre-issuance, evaluated technical measures implemented by the TOE or audited organizational measures must ensure that loaded application has not been changed since the code verifications required in OE.VERIFICATION.</p> <p>For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card according to the requirements of OE.VERIFICATION, the verification authority shall provide digital evidence to the TOE that the application code has not been modified after the code verification and that he is the actor who performed code verification.</p> <p>For application code loaded post-issuance and partially or entirely verified on-card, technical measures must ensure that the verification required in OE.VERIFICATION are performed. On-card bytecode verifier is out of the scope of this Protection Profile.</p> <p>Application Note: For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card, the integrity and authenticity evidence can be achieved by electronic signature of the application code, after code verification, by the actor who performed verification.</p>
<b>OE.APPS-PROVIDER</b>	<p><b>Application Provider</b></p> <p>The AP shall be a trusted actor that provides applications. The AP is responsible for its security domain keys.</p>
<b>OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY</b>	<p><b>Verification Authority</b></p> <p>The VA should be a trusted actor who is able to verify bytecode of an application loaded on the card, guarantee and generate the digital signature attached to an application and ensure that its public key for verifying the application signature is on the TOE.</p>
<b>OE.KEY-CHANGE</b>	<p><b>Security Domain Key Change</b></p> <p>The AP must change its security domain initial keys before any operation on it.</p>
<b>OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS</b>	<p><b>Security Domains</b></p> <p>Security domains can be dynamically created, deleted and blocked during usage phase in post-issuance mode.</p>
<b>OE.USE_DIAG</b>	<p><b>Secure TOE communication protocols</b></p> <p>Secure TOE communication protocols shall be supported and used by the environment.</p>

<b>OE.USE_KEYS</b>	<p><b>Protection of OPE keys</b></p> <p>During the TOE usage, the terminal or system in interaction with the TOE, shall ensure the protection (integrity and confidentiality) of their own keys by operational means and/or procedures.</p>
<b>OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC</b>	<p><b>Protection during composite product manufacturing</b></p> <p>Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 must be protected appropriately.</p>
<b>OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE</b>	<p><b>Confidentiality of Update Image - CREATE</b></p> <p>The off-card Update Image Creator ensures that the image is signed and transferred encrypted to the device and is not disclosed during the creation and transfer. The keys used for signing and encrypting the image are kept confidential.</p>

### 5.3 Security Objectives Rationale

In this section it is proven that the security objectives described in [Section 4](#) can be traced for all aspects identified in the TOE-security environment and that they are suited to cover them. At least one security objective results from each assumption, OSP, and each threat. At least one threat, one OSP or assumption exists for each security objective.

Table 18. SPDs of the TOE vs. Objectives

Security Problem Definition	Security Objective
T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD	OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA	OT.SID OT.FIREWALL OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID OT.OPERATE OT.REALLOCATION OT.ALARM OT.CIPHER OT.RNG OT.KEY-MNGT OT.PIN-MNGT OT.TRANSACTION OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.SCP.RECOVERY OT.SCP.SUPPORT
T.CONFID-JCS-CODE	OT.NATIVE OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT

Table 18. SPDs of the TOE vs. Objectives...continued

Security Problem Definition	Security Objective
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA	OT.SID OT.FIREWALL OT.OPERATE OT.ALARM OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.SCP.RECOVERY OT.SCP.SUPPORT
T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD	OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE	OT.NATIVE OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD	OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE OT.APPLI-AUTH
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA [REFINED]	OT.SID OT.FIREWALL OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG OT.OPERATE OT.REALLOCATION OT.ALARM OT.CIPHER OT.RNG OT.KEY-MNGT OT.PIN-MNGT OT.TRANSACTION OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.SCP.RECOVERY OT.SCP.SUPPORT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD	OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE OT.APPLI-AUTH
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE	OT.NATIVE OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE

Table 18. SPDs of the TOE vs. Objectives...continued

Security Problem Definition	Security Objective
T.INTEG-JCS-DATA	OT.SID OT.FIREWALL OT.OPERATE OT.ALARM OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.SCP.RECOVERY OT.SCP.SUPPORT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE
T.SID.1	OT.SID OT.FIREWALL OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT
T.SID.2	OT.SID OT.FIREWALL OT.OPERATE OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.SCP.RECOVERY OT.SCP.SUPPORT
T.EXE-CODE.1	OT.FIREWALL OE.VERIFICATION
T.EXE-CODE.2	OE.VERIFICATION
T.NATIVE	OT.NATIVE OE.CAP_FILE OE.VERIFICATION
T.RESOURCES	OT.OPERATE OT.RESOURCES OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.SCP.RECOVERY OT.SCP.SUPPORT
T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT	OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS OT.COMM_AUTH OT.COMM_INTEGRITY OT.APPLI-AUTH
T.LIFE_CYCLE	OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
T.COM_EXPLOIT	OT.COMM_AUTH OT.COMM_INTEGRITY OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY
T.OBJ-DELETION	OT.OBJ-DELETION
T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UP DATE-IMAGE	OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

Table 18. SPDs of the TOE vs. Objectives...continued

Security Problem Definition	Security Objective
T.INTERRUPT-OSU	OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE OT.TOE_IDENTIFICATION OT.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION
T.CONFIG	OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION
T.ATTACK-COUNTER	OT.ATTACK-COUNTER OT.RESTRICTED-MODE
T.PHYSICAL	OT.SCP.IC OT.RESTRICTED-MODE
T.RND	OT.RNG
T.AM_DATASTORE_ACCESS	OT.DATASTORE_ACCESS
OSP.VERIFICATION	OE.VERIFICATION OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT OE.CODE-EVIDENCE OT.APPLI-AUTH
OSP.PROCESS-TOE	OT.IDENTIFICATION
OSP.KEY-CHANGE	OE.KEY-CHANGE
OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS	OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS
A.CAP_FILE	OE.CAP_FILE
A.VERIFICATION	OE.VERIFICATION OE.CODE-EVIDENCE
A.USE_DIAG	OE.USE_DIAG
A.USE_KEYS	OE.USE_KEYS
A.PROCESS-SEC-IC	OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC
A.APPS-PROVIDER	OE.APPS-PROVIDER
A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY	OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY

### 5.3.1 Threats

#### 5.3.1.1 Confidentiality

##### T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD	Counters the threat by ensuring the confidentiality of D.UPDATE_IMAGE during installing it on the TOE.
OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the D.UPDATE_IMAGE is not transferred in plain and that the keys are kept secret.

##### T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Counters this threat by providing the Java Card Virtual Machine Firewall as specified in [31].
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the information stored in the APDU buffer.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.REALLOCATION	Counters this threat by preventing any attempt to read a piece of information that was previously used by an application but has been logically deleted. It states that any information that was formerly stored in a memory block shall be cleared before the block is reused.
OT.ALARM	Counters this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CIPHER	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or information communicated between applets and the CAD using cryptographic functions.
OT.RNG	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or information communicated between applets and the CAD using cryptographic functions.
OT.KEY-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN's which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.PIN-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN's which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.TRANSACTION	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN's which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_CONFID	Prevents disclosure of data of the applet creating the array view.

#### T.CONFID-JCS-CODE

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that no native applications can be run to modify a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.

**T.CONFID-JCS-DATA**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separating data.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.ALARM	Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.

**5.3.1.2 Integrity****T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring the authenticity and integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that no native code can be run to modify a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	The objective OE.CODE-EVIDENCE contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that integrity and authenticity evidences exist for the application code loaded into the platform.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD**



Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of applets.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of CAP files is done securely and thus preserves the integrity of CAP files code.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED]**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separating data.
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG	Counters this threat by ensuring the integrity of the information stored in the APDU buffer. Application data that is sent to the applet as clear text arrives in the APDU buffer, which is a resource shared by all applications.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.REALLOCATION	Counters the threat by preventing any attempt to read a piece of information that was previously used by an application but has been logically deleted. It states that any information that was formerly stored in a memory block shall be cleared before the block is reused.
OT.ALARM	Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CIPHER	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or information communicated between applets and the CAD using cryptographic functions.
OT.RNG	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or information communicated between applets and the CAD using cryptographic functions.
OT.KEY-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.PIN-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.TRANSACTION	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.

Objective	Rationale
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that personalization of the application by its associated security domain is only performed by the authorized AP.
OT_ARRAY_VIEWS_INTEG	Prevents modification of data of the applet creating the array view.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of applets.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of CAP files is done securely and thus preserves the integrity of CAP files code.

**T.INTEG-JCS-CODE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that no native code can be run to modify a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.

**T.INTEG-JCS-DATA**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separation.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall shall never stop operating.

Objective	Rationale
OT.ALARM	Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytcodes.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.

### 5.3.1.3 Identity Usurpation

#### T.SID.1

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing unique subject identification.
OT.FIREWALL	Counters the threat by providing separation of application data (like PINs).
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the installation parameters of an applet (like its name). These parameters are loaded into a global array that is also shared by all the applications. The disclosure of those parameters could be used to impersonate the applet.
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the installation parameters of an applet (like its name). These parameters are loaded into a global array that is also shared by all the applications. The disclosure of those parameters could be used to impersonate the applet.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing usurpation of identity resulting from a malicious installation of an applet on the card.

#### T.SID.2

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing unique subject identification.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separation.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall shall never stop operating.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that installing an applet has no effect on the state of other applets and thus can't change the TOE's attribution of privileged roles.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.

Objective	Rationale
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these latter objectives contribute to counter.

#### 5.3.1.4 Unauthorized Execution

##### T.EXE-CODE.1

Objective	Rationale
OT.FIREWALL	Counters the threat by preventing the execution of non-shareable methods of a class instance by any subject apart from the class instance owner.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece of code.

##### T.EXE-CODE.2

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. Especially the control flow confinement and the validity of the method references used in the bytecodes are guaranteed.

##### T.NATIVE

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that a Java Card applet can only access native methods indirectly that is, through an API.
OE.CAP_FILE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that no CAP files containing native code shall be loaded in post-issuance.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode verification also prevents the program counter of an applet to jump into a piece of native code by confining the control flow to the currently executed method.

#### 5.3.1.5 Denial of Service

##### T.RESOURCES

Objective	Rationale
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring correct working order.
OT.RESOURCES	Counters the threat directly by objectives on resource-management.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Counters this threat by controlling the consumption of resources during installation and other card management operations.

Objective	Rationale
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.RESOURCES objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.RESOURCES objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.

**5.3.1.6 Card Management**

**T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the loading, installation, extradition or deletion of applets.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS	Contributes to counter this threat by restricting the modification of an AP security domain keyset to the AP who owns it.
OT.COMM_AUTH	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing unauthorized users from initiating a malicious card management operation.
OT.COMM_INTEGRITY	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the integrity of the card management data while it is in transit to the TOE.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of a CAP file is safe.

**T.COM\_EXPLOIT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.COMM_AUTH	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing unauthorized users from initiating a malicious card management operation.
OT.COMM_INTEGRITY	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the integrity of the card management data while it is in transit to the TOE
OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing from disclosing encrypted data transiting to the TOE

**T.LIFE\_CYCLE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the loading, installation, extradition or deletion of applets
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS	Contributes to counter this threat by restricting the use of an AP security domain keysets, and thus the management of the applications related to this SD, to the AP who owns it

**5.3.1.7 Services**

**T.OBJ-DELETION**

Objective	Rationale
OT.OBJ-DELETION	Counters this threat by ensuring that object deletion shall not break references to objects.

5.3.1.8 Miscellaneous

T.PHYSICAL

Objective	Rationale
OT.SCP.IC	Counters physical attacks. Physical protections rely on the underlying platform and are therefore an environmental issue.
OT.RESTRICTED-MODE	Contributes to counter the threat by ensuring that if the limit of the Attack Counter is reached only limited functionality is available.

5.3.1.9 Random Numbers

T.RND

Objective	Rationale
OT.RNG	Counters the threat by ensuring the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy. Furthermore, the TOE ensures that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.

5.3.1.10 Config Applet

T.CONFIG

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION	Counters the threat by ensuring that the customer can only read and write customer configuration items using the Customer Configuration Token and NXP can read and write configuration items using the NXP Configuration Token. If access is disabled configuration items can not be read or written.

5.3.1.11 OS Update

T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

Objective	Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that only authorized (allowed version) images can be installed.
OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that only authorized (allowed version) images can be loaded.

T.INTERRUPT-OSU

Objective	Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that the TOE remains in a secure state after interruption of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).

Objective	Rationale
OT.TOE_IDENTIFICATION	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that D.TOE_IDENTIFICATION is only updated after successful OS Update procedure.
OT.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that the update OS is only activated after successful (atomic) OS Update procedure.

### 5.3.1.12 Restricted Mode

#### T.ATTACK-COUNTER

Objective	Rationale
OT.ATTACK-COUNTER	Counters the threat by ensuring that the Attack Counter can only be modified according to specified rules.
OT.RESTRICTED-MODE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the Attack Counter can only be modified according to the specified conditions.

### 5.3.1.13 Applet Migration

#### T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS

Objective	Rationale
OT.DATASTORE_ACCESS	Counters the threat by verifying that only an authorized applet instance is able to import data from the datastore. The verification is based on the AID of the applet. Data import from the datastore by an applet instance can be done only by a trusted entity authenticated either by sending the import command via a scp or via untrusted channel using signature and chained hashes.

## 5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies

#### OSP.VERIFICATION

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION	Enforces the OSP by guaranteeing that all the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributing to enforce the OSP by ensuring that the loading of a CAP file into the card is safe.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	This policy is enforced by the security objective of the environment OE.CODE-EVIDENCE which ensures that evidences exist that the application code has been verified and not changed after verification.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Contributing to enforce the OSP by ensuring that the loading of a CAP file into the card is safe.

#### OSP.PROCESS-TOE

Objective	Rationale
OT.IDENTIFICATION	Enforces this organisational security policy by ensuring that the TOE can be uniquely identified.

**OSP.KEY-CHANGE**

Objective	Rationale
OE.KEY-CHANGE	Enforces the OSP by ensuring that the initial keys of the security domain are changed before any operation on them are performed.

**OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS**

Objective	Rationale
OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS	Enforces the OSP by dynamically create, delete, and block the security domain during usage phase in post-issuance mode.

**5.3.3 Assumptions****A.CAP\_FILE**

Objective	Rationale
OE.CAP_FILE	Upholds the assumption by ensuring that no CAP file loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.

**A.VERIFICATION**

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION	Upholds the assumption by guaranteeing that all the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	This assumption is also upheld by the security objective of the environment OE.CODE-EVIDENCE which ensures that evidences exist that the application code has been verified and not changed after verification.

**A.USE\_DIAG**

Objective	Rationale
OE.USE_DIAG	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.USE\_KEYS**

Objective	Rationale
OE.USE_KEYS	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.PROCESS-SEC-IC**

Objective	Rationale
OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.APPS-PROVIDER**



Objective	Rationale
OE.APPS-PROVIDER	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A. VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY**

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY	Directly upholds this assumption.


## 6 Extended Components Definition (ASE\_ECD)

### 6.1 Definition of Family "Generation of random numbers (FCS\_RNG)"

#### 6.1.1 Family behavior

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be use for cryptographic purposes.

Component leveling:



FCS\_RNG Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.

Management: FCS\_RNG.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS\_RNG.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

**FCS\_RNG.1            Random Number Generation.**

Hierarchical to:        No other components.

Dependencies            No dependencies.

FCS\_RNG.1.1            The TSF shall provide a [selection: *physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic*] random number generator [selection: *DRG.2, DRG.3, DRG.4, PTG.2, PTG.3, NTG.1*][AIS20][AIS31] that implements: [assignment: *list of security capabilities*].

FCS\_RNG.1.2            The TSF shall provide [selection: *bits, octets of bits, numbers*] [assignment: *format of the numbers*] that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

### 6.2 Definition of Family "Audit Data Storage (FAU\_SAS)"


This section has been taken over from the certified (BSI-PP-0084-2014) Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile [5]. To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family ("Audit Data Storage (FAU\_SAS)") of the Class "Security audit (FAU)" is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU\_GEN, because it does not necessarily

require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

**6.2.1 Family behavior**

This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.

Component leveling:



FAU\_SAS Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.

Management: FAU\_SAS.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FAU\_SAS.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

**FAU\_SAS.1            Audit storage.**

Hierarchical to:    No other components.

Dependencies        No dependencies.

FAU\_SAS.1.1        The TSF shall provide [assignment: *list of subjects*] with the capability to store [assignment: *list of audit information*] in the [assignment: *type of persistent memory*].

## 7 Security Requirements (ASE\_REQ)

This section states the security functional requirements for the TOE. For readability requirements are arranged into groups taken from [6]. The permitted operations (assignment, iteration, selection and refinement) of the SFRs taken from Common Criteria [3] are printed in bold. Completed operations related to the PP are additionally marked within [ ] where assignments are additionally marked with the keyword "assignment".

Table 19. Requirement Groups

Group	Description
Core with Logical Channels (CoreG_LC)	The CoreG_LC contains the requirements concerning the runtime environment of the Java Card System implementing logical channels. This includes the firewall policy and the requirements related to the Java Card API. Logical channels are a Java Card specification version 2.2 feature.
Installation (InstG)	The InstG contains the security requirements concerning the installation of post-issuance applications. It does not address card management issues in the broad sense, but only those security aspects of the installation procedure that are related to applet execution.
Applet deletion (ADELG)	The ADELG contains the security requirements for erasing installed applets from the card, a feature introduced in Java Card specification version 2.2.
Remote Method Invocation (RMIG)	The RMIG contains the security requirements for the remote method invocation feature, which provides a new protocol of communication between the terminal and the applets. This was introduced in Java Card specification version 2.2.
Object deletion (ODELG)	The ODELG contains the security requirements for the object deletion capability. This provides a safe memory recovering mechanism. This is a Java Card specification version 2.2 feature.
Secure carrier (CarG)	The CarG group contains minimal requirements for secure downloading of applications on the card. This group contains the security requirements for preventing, in those configurations that do not support on-card static or dynamic bytecode verification, the installation of a CAP file that has not been bytecode verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification.
External Memory (EMG)	The EMG group contains security requirements for the management of external memory.

Subjects are active components of the TOE that (essentially) act on the behalf of users. The users of the TOE include people or institutions (like the applet developer, the card issuer, the verification authority), hardware (like the CAD where the card is inserted or the PCD) and software components (like the application packages installed on the card). Some of the users may just be aliases for other users. For instance, the verification authority in charge of the bytecode verification of the applications may be just an alias for the card issuer. Subjects (prefixed with an "S") are described in the following table:

Table 20. Subject Descriptions

Subject	Description
S.ADEL	The applet deletion manager which also acts on behalf of the card issuer. It may be an applet ([31], §11), but its role asks anyway for a specific treatment from the security viewpoint. This subject is unique and is involved in the ADEL security policy.
S.CAD	The CAD represents the actor that requests services by issuing commands to the card. It also plays the role of the off-card entity that communicates with the S.INSTALLER.
S.INSTALLER	The installer is the on-card entity which acts on behalf of the card issuer. This subject is involved in the loading of CAP files and installation of applets.
S.JCRE	The runtime environment under which Java programs in a smart card are executed.
S.JCVM	The bytecode interpreter that enforces the firewall at runtime.
S.LOCAL	Operand stack of a JCVM frame, or local variable of a JCVM frame containing an object or an array of references.
S.SD	A GlobalPlatform Security Domain representing on the card a off-card entity. This entity can be the Issuer, an Application Provider, the Controlling Authority or the Verification Authority.
S.MEMBER	Any object's field, static field or array position.
S.PACKAGE	A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain classes and interfaces, and in the context of Java Card technology, it defines either a user library, or one or several applets.
S.CAP_FILE	A CAP file may contain multiple Java language packages. A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain classes and interfaces. A CAP file may contain packages that define either user library, or one or several applets. A CAP file compliant with Java Card Specifications version 3.1 may contain multiple Java language packages. An EXTENDED CAP file as specified in Java Card Specifications version 3.1 may contain only applet packages, only library packages or a combination of library packages. A COMPACT CAP file as specified in Java Card Specifications version 3.1 or CAP files compliant to previous versions of Java Card Specification, MUST contain only a single package representing a library or one or more applets.
S.OSU	OSU provides secure functionality to update the TOE operating system with an image created by a trusted off-card entity (S.UpdateImageCreator)
S.UpdateImageCreator	The off-card Update Image Creator ensures that the image is signed and transferred encrypted to the device and is not disclosed during the creation and transfer. The keys used for signing and encrypting the image are kept confidential.
S.Archive_Manager	Handles incoming Applet Migration APDU Commands and access to the O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE.
S.Customer	The subject that has the Customer Configuration Token.
S.NXP	The subject that has the NXP Configuration Token.
S.ConfigurationMechanism	On card entity which can read and write configuration items.

Objects (prefixed with an "O") are described in the following table:

**Table 21. Object Groups**

Objects	Description
O.APPLET	Any installed applet, its code and data.
O.CODE_CAP_FILE	The code of a CAP file, including all linking information. On the Java Card platform, a CAP file is the installation unit.
O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE	Saves User Data: byte arrays, Key Data and PIN Data in the datastore.
O.APPLET_CURRENT	The Applet instance on the TOE that is to be updated.
O.APPLET_LOADED	The new Applet that is loaded and installed onto to TOE and updates O.APPLET_CURRENT.
O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN	The migration plan which maps the AID of the exporting applet instance to the AID of the importing applet instance.
O.JAVAOBJECT	Java class instance or array. It should be noticed that KEYS, PIN, arrays and applet instances are specific objects in the Java programming language.

Information (prefixed with an "I") is described in the following table:

**Table 22. Information Groups**

Information	Description
I.DATA	JCVM Reference Data: objectref addresses of APDU buffer, JCRE-owned instances of APDU class and byte array for install method.

Security attributes linked to these subjects, objects and information are described in the following table:

**Table 23. Security attribute description**

Security attributes	Description
Active Applets	The set of the active applets' AIDs. An active applet is an applet that is selected on at least one of the logical channels.
Applet Selection Status	"Selected" or "Deselected".
Applet's Version Number	The version number of an applet indicated in the export file.
CAP File AID	The AID of a CAP file
Attack Counter	Attack Counter
Context	CAP file AID or "Java Card RE".
Currently Active Context	CAP file AID or "Java Card RE".
Current Sequence Number	The current number of a valid OS installed on the TOE or current number of a OS update step during update process.
Dependent Package AID	Allows the retrieval of the CAP file AID and applet's version number.
Final Sequence Number	The sequence number which is reached after completing the update process. This is uniquely linked to the JCOP version of the final TOE.
Image Type	Type of D.UPDATE_IMAGE. Can be either Upgrade, Self Update or Downgrade.

Table 23. Security attribute description...continued

Security attributes	Description
LC Selection Status	Multiselectable, Non-multiselectable or "None".
LifeTime	CLEAR_ON_DESELECT or PERSISTENT <sup>[1]</sup>
Owner	The Owner of an object is either the applet instance that created the object or the CAP file (library) where it has been defined (these latter objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of the CAP file). The owner of a remote object is the applet instance that created the object.
Package AID	The AID of each package indicated in the export file.
Reference Sequence Number	Is the sequence number which the TOE has before the update process is started. This is uniquely linked to the JCOP version of the initial TOE.
Registered Applets	The set of AID of the applet instances registered on the card.
Remote	An object is Remote if it is an instance of a class that directly or indirectly implements the interface java.rmi.Remote. It applies only if the TOE provides JCRMI functionality.
Resident CAP file	The set of AIDs of the CAP file already loaded on the card.
Selected Applet Context	CAP file AID or "None".
Sharing	Standards, SIO, Array View, Java Card RE Entry Point or global array.
Static References	Static fields of a CAP file may contain references to objects. The Static References attribute records those references.
Address Space	Accessible memory portion.
Verification Key	Key to verify integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Decryption Key	Key for decrypting D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Customer Configuration Token generation key	The customer key to generate tokens for product configuration.
NXP Configuration Token generation key	The NXP key to generate tokens for product configuration.
NXP Configuration Access	The NXP Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.
Customer Configuration Access	The Customer Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.
access privilege	For each configuration item the access privilege attribute defines who (Customer and/or NXP) is allowed to read/write the item.
Key Set	Key Set for Secure Channel.
Received Sequence Number	Sequence number of the uploaded D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Security Level	Secure Communication Security Level defined in Section 10.6 of [34].
Secure Channel Protocol	Secure Channel Protocol version used.
Session Key	Secure Channel's session key.
Sequence Counter	Secure Channel Session's Sequence Counter.
ICV	Secure Channel Session's ICV.

Table 23. Security attribute description...continued

Security attributes	Description
Card Life Cycle	defined in Section 5.1.1 of [34].
Privileges	defined in Section 6.6.1 of [34].
Loaded Applet AID	AID of O.APPLET_LOADED.
Current Instance AID	The AID of O.APPLET_CURRENT that is to be updated.
New Instance AID	The AID of O.APPLET_LOADED that is loaded onto the TOE and replaces O.APPLET_CURRENT.
Life-cycle Status	defined in Section 5.3.2 of [34]

[1] Transient objects of type CLEAR\_ON\_RESET behave like persistent objects in that they can be accessed only when the Currently Active Context is the object's context.

Operations (prefixed with "OP") are described in the following table. Each operation has parameters given between brackets, among which there is the "accessed object", the first one, when applicable. Parameters may be seen as security attributes that are under the control of the subject performing the operation.

Table 24. Operation Description

Operations	Description
OP.ARRAY_ACCESS (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Read/Write an array component.
OP.ARRAY_LENGTH (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Get Length of an array component.
OP.ARRAY_AASTORE (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Store into reference array component.
OP.CREATE (Sharing, LifeTime)(*) <sup>[1]</sup>	Creation of an object (new or makeTransient call).
OP.DELETE_APPLET (O.APPLET,...)	Delete an installed applet and its objects, either logically or physically.
OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE (O.CODE_CAP_FILE,...)	Delete a CAP file, either logically or physically.
OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE_APPLET (O.CODE_CAP_FILE,...)	Delete a CAP file and its installed applets, either logically or physically.
OP.INSTANCE_FIELD (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Read/Write a field of an instance of a class in the Java programming language.
OP.INVK_VIRTUAL (O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1,...)	Invoke a virtual method (either on a class instance or an array object).
OP.INVK_INTERFACE (O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1,...)	Invoke an interface method.
OP.JAVA (...)	Any access in the sense of [31], §6.2.8. It stands for one of the operations OP.ARRAY_ACCESS, OP.INSTANCE_FIELD, OP.INVK_VIRTUAL, OP.INVK_INTERFACE, OP.THROW, OP.TYPE_ACCESS.



Table 24. Operation Description...continued

Operations	Description
OP.PUT (S1,S2,I)	Transfer a piece of information I from S1 to S2.
OP.THROW (O.JAVAOBJECT)	Throwing of an object (athrow, see [31], §6.2.8.7).
OP.TYPE_ACCESS (O.JAVAOBJECT, class)	Invoke checkcast or instanceof on an object in order to access to classes (standard or shareable interfaces objects).
OP.READ_CONFIG_ITEM	Reading a Config Item from the configuration area.
OP.MODIFY_CONFIG_ITEM	Writing of a Config Item.
OP.USE_CONFIG_ITEM	Operational usage of Config Items by subjects inside the TOE.
OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE	APDU Command that initializes the OS Update procedure.
OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA	Access O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE to write User Data: byte array, PIN and Key Data and the corresponding Current Instance AID. Also Loaded Applet AID is saved to identify the Applet instance that can import the data.
OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA	Access O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE to retrieve personalisation data: byte array, PIN and Key Data.

[1] For this operation, there is no accessed object. This rule enforces that shareable transient objects are not allowed. For instance, during the creation of an object, the JavaCardClass attribute's value is chosen by the creator.

## 7.1 Security Functional Requirements

### 7.1.1 COREG\_LC Security Functional Requirements

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [6].

#### 7.1.1.1 Firewall Policy

##### FDP\_ACC.2 [FIREWALL]

##### Complete access control (FIREWALL)

Hierarchical-To

FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

Dependencies

FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

##### FDP\_ACC.2.1 [FIREWALL]

The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP] on [assignment: S.CAP\_FILE, S.JCRE, S.JCVM, O.JAVAOBJECT] and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

Refinement:

The operations involved in the policy are:

- OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*),
- OP.INVK\_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...),

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...),</li> <li>• OP.JAVA(...),</li> <li>• OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT),</li> <li>• OP.TYPE_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)</li> </ul>
FDP_ACC.2.2 [FIREWALL]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
AppNote	It should be noticed that accessing array's components of a static array, and more generally fields and methods of static objects, is an access to the corresponding O.JAVAOBJECT.
<b>FDP_ACF.1</b> <b>[FIREWALL]</b>	<b>Security attribute based access control (FIREWALL)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 [FIREWALL]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]</b> to objects based on the following <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.CAP_FILE: security attributes LC Selection Status</li> <li>• S.JCVM: security attributes Active Applets, Currently Active Context</li> <li>• S.JCRE: security attributes Selected Applet Context</li> <li>• O.JAVAOBJECT: security attributes Sharing, Context, LifeTime</li> </ul>
FDP_ACF.1.2 [FIREWALL]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• R.JAVA.1 (<a href="#">[31]</a>, §6.2.8): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)</li> <li>– OP.TYPE_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)</li> </ul> upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "JCRE entry point" or "global array".</li> <li>• R.JAVA.2 (<a href="#">[31]</a>, §6.2.8): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– OP.ARRAY_ACCESS</li> <li>– OP.INSTANCE_FIELD</li> <li>– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)</li> </ul> upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "Standard" and whose LifeTime attribute has value</li> </ul>

- "PERSISTENT" only if O.JAVAOBJECT's Context attribute has the same value as the active context.
- R.JAVA.3 ([31], §6.2.8.10): S.CAP\_FILE may perform
    - OP.TYPE\_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)
 upon an O.JAVAOBJECT with Context attribute different from the currently active context, whose Sharing attribute has value "SIO" only if O.JAVAOBJECT is being cast into (checkcast) or is being verified as being an instance of (instanceof) an interface that extends the Shareable interface.
  - R.JAVA.4 ([31], §6.2.8.6): S.CAP\_FILE may perform
    - OP.INVK\_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
 upon an O.JAVAOBJECT with Context attribute different from the currently active context, whose Sharing attribute has the value "SIO", and whose Context attribute has the value "CAP File AID", only if the invoked interface method extends the Shareable interface and one of the following conditions applies:
    - The value of the attribute LC Selection Status of the CAP file whose AID is "CAP file AID" is "Multiselectable",
    - The value of the attribute LC Selection Status of the CAP file whose AID is "CAP file AID" is "Non-multiselectable", and either "CAP file AID" is the value of the currently selected applet or otherwise "CAP file AID" does not occur in the attribute Active Applets.
  - R.JAVA.5: S.CAP\_FILE may perform OP.CREATE upon O.JAVAOBJECT only if the value of the Sharing parameter is "Standard" or "SIO".
  - R.JAVA.6 ([31], §6.2.8): S.CAP\_FILE may freely perform OP.ARRAY\_ACCESS or OP.ARRAY\_LENGTH upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "global array".

]

FDP\_ACF.1.3  
 [FIREWALL]

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment:**

- The subject S.JCRE can freely perform OP.JAVA(...) and OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*), with the exception given in FDP\_ACF.1.4[FIREWALL], provided it is the Currently Active Context.
- The only means that the subject S.JCVM shall provide for an application to execute native code is the invocation of a Java Card API method (through
  - OP.INVK\_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
  - OP.INVK\_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)

]

FDP\_ACF.1.4  
 [FIREWALL]

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment:**

- Any subject with OP.JAVA(...) upon an O.JAVAOBJECT whose LifeTime attribute has value "CLEAR\_ON\_DESELECT" if

O.JAVAOBJECT's Context attribute is not the same as the Selected Applet Context.

- Any subject attempting to create an object by the means of OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*) and a "CLEAR\_ON\_DESELECT" LifeTime parameter if the active context is not the same as the Selected Applet Context.
- S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.ARRAY\_AASTORE of the reference of an O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "global array" or "Temporary".
- S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.PUTFIELD or OP.PUTSTATIC of the reference of an O.JAVAOBJECT whose sharing attribute has value "global array" or "Temporary".
- R.JAVA7 ([31], §6.2.8.2): S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.ARRAY\_T\_ASTORE into an array view without ATTR\_WRITABLE\_VIEW access attribute
- R.JAVA8 ([31], §6.2.8.2):S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.ARRAY\_T\_ALOAD into an array view without ATTR\_READABLE\_VIEW access attribute."

]

#### AppNote

#### FDP\_ACF.1.4[FIREWALL]

- The deletion of applets may render some O.JAVAOBJECT inaccessible, and the Java Card RE may be in charge of this aspect. This can be done, for instance, by ensuring that references to objects belonging to a deleted application are considered as a null reference.

In the case of an array type, fields are components of the array ([33], §2.14, §2.7.7), as well as the length; the only methods of an array object are those inherited from the Object class.

The Sharing attribute defines five categories of objects:

- Standard ones, whose both fields and methods are under the firewall policy,
- Shareable interface Objects (SIO), which provide a secure mechanism for inter-applet communication,
- JCRE entry points (Temporary or Permanent), who have freely accessible methods but protected fields,
- Global arrays, having both unprotected fields (including components; refer to JavaCardClass discussion above) and methods.
- Array Views, having fields/elements access controlled by access control attributes, ATTR\_READABLE\_VIEW and ATTR\_WRITABLE\_VIEW and methods.

When a new object is created, it is associated with the Currently Active Context. But the object is owned by the applet instance within the Currently Active Context when the object is instantiated ([31], §6.1.3). An object is owned by an applet instance, by the JCRE or by the library where it has been defined (these latter objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of CAP files).

([31], Glossary) Selected Applet Context. The Java Card RE keeps track of the currently selected Java Card applet. Upon receiving a SELECT command with this applet's AID, the Java Card RE makes this applet the Selected Applet Context. The Java Card RE sends all APDU commands to the Selected Applet Context.

While the expression "Selected Applet Context" refers to a specific installed applet, the relevant aspect of the policy is the context (CAP file AID) of the selected applet. In this policy, the "Selected Applet Context" is the AID of the selected CAP file.

([31], §6.1.2.1) At any point in time, there is only one active context within the Java Card VM (this is called the Currently Active Context).

It should be noticed that the invocation of static methods (or access to a static field) is not considered by this policy, as there are no firewall rules. They have no effect on the active context as well and the "acting CAP file" is not the one to which the static method belongs to in this case.

It should be noticed that the Java Card platform, version 2.2.x and version 3.x.x Classic Edition, introduces the possibility for an applet instance to be selected on multiple logical channels at the same time, or accepting other applets belonging to the same CAP file being selected simultaneously. These applets are referred to as multiselectable applets. Applets that belong to a same CAP file are either all multiselectable or not ([30], §2.2.5). Therefore, the selection mode can be regarded as an attribute of CAP files. No selection mode is defined for a library CAP file.

An applet instance will be considered an active applet instance if it is currently selected in at least one logical channel. An applet instance is the currently selected applet instance only if it is processing the current command. There can only be one currently selected applet instance at a given time. ([31], §4).

**FDP\_IFC.1[JCVM] Subset information flow control (JCVM)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP\_IFC.1.1[JCVM] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: JCVM information flow control SFP]** on **[assignment: S.JCVM, S.LOCAL, S.MEMBER, I.DATA and OP.PUT(S1,S2,I)]**.

AppNote It should be noticed that references of temporary Java Card RE entry points, which cannot be stored in class variables, instance variables or array components, are transferred from the internal memory of the Java Card RE (TSF data) to some stack through specific APIs (Java Card RE owned exceptions) or Java Card RE

invoked methods (such as the process(APDU apdu)); these are causes of OP.PUT(S1,S2,I) operations as well.

<b>FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes (JCVM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1[JCVM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: JCVM information flow control SFP]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes <b>[assignment: :</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.JCVM: security attributes Currently Active Context</li> </ul>
FDP_IFF.1.2[JCVM]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An operation OP.PUT(S1, S.MEMBER, I.DATA) is allowed if and only if the Currently Active Context is "Java Card RE".</li> <li>• other OP.PUT operations are allowed regardless of the Currently Active Context's value.</li> </ul> <b>]</b>
FDP_IFF.1.3[JCVM]	The TSF shall enforce <b>[assignment: no additional information flow control SFP rules]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.4[JCVM]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.5[JCVM]	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
AppNote	<p>The storage of temporary Java Card RE-owned objects references is runtime-enforced (<a href="#">[31]</a>, §6.2.8.1-3).</p> <p>It should be noticed that this policy essentially applies to the execution of bytecode. Native methods, the Java Card RE itself and possibly some API methods can be granted specific rights or limitations through the FDP_IFF.1.3[JCVM] to FDP_IFF.1.5[JCVM] elements. The way the Java Card virtual machine manages the transfer of values on the stack and local variables (returned values, uncaught exceptions) from and to internal registers is implementation dependent. For instance, a returned reference, depending on the implementation of the stack frame, may transit through an internal register prior to being pushed on the stack of the invoker. The returned bytecode would cause more than one OP.PUT operation under this scheme.</p>

<b>FDP_RIP.1 [OBJECTS]</b>	<b>Subset residual information protection (OBJECTS)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [OBJECTS]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <b>[selection: allocation of the resource to]</b> the following objects: <b>[assignment: class instances and arrays]</b> .
AppNote	The semantics of the Java programming language requires for any object field and array position to be initialized with default values when the resource is allocated <a href="#">[33]</a> , §2.5.1.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (JCRE)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[JCRE]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Selected Applet Context]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.JCRE]</b> .
AppNote	The modification of the Selected Applet Context should be performed in accordance with the rules given in <a href="#">[31]</a> , §4 and <a href="#">[30]</a> , §3.4.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[JCVN]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (JCVN)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[JCVN]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVN information flow control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Currently Active Context and Active Applets]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.JCVN]</b> .

AppNote	The modification of the Currently Active Context should be performed in accordance with the rules given in [31], §4 and [30], §3.4.
<b>FMT_MSA.2 [FIREWALL-JCVM]</b>	<b>Secure security attributes (FIREWALL-JCVM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1 [FIREWALL-JCVM]	The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for <b>[assignment: all the security attributes of subjects and objects defined in the FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP]</b> .
AppNote	<p>The following rules are given as examples only. For instance, the last two rules are motivated by the fact that the Java Card API defines only transient arrays factory methods. Future versions may allow the creation of transient objects belonging to arbitrary classes; such evolution will naturally change the range of "secure values" for this component.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Context attribute of an O.JAVAOBJECT must correspond to that of an installed applet or be "Java Card RE".</li> <li>• An O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute is a Java Card RE entry point or a global array necessarily has "Java Card RE" as the value for its Context security attribute.</li> <li>• An O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute value is a global array necessarily has "array of primitive type" as a JavaCardClass security attribute's value.</li> <li>• Any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute value is not "Standard" has a PERSISTENT-LifeTime attribute's value.</li> <li>• Any O.JAVAOBJECT whose LifeTime attribute value is not PERSISTENT has an array type as JavaCardClass attribute's value.</li> </ul>
<b>FMT_MSA.3 [FIREWALL]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (FIREWALL)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles



FMT_MSA.3.1 [FIREWALL]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [FIREWALL Editorially Refined]	The TSF shall not allow <b>[assignment: any role]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
AppNote	<p>FMT_MSA.3.1[FIREWALL]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objects' security attributes of the access control policy are created and initialized at the creation of the object or the subject. Afterwards, these attributes are no longer mutable (FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]). At the creation of an object (OP.CREATE), the newly created object, assuming that the FIREWALL access control SFP permits the operation, gets its Lifetime and Sharing attributes from the parameters of the operation; on the contrary, its Context attribute has a default value, which is its creator's Context attribute and AID respectively ([31], §6.1.3). There is one default value for the Selected Applet Context that is the default applet identifier's Context, and one default value for the Currently Active Context that is "Java Card RE".</li> <li>• The knowledge of which reference corresponds to a temporary entry point object or a global array and which does not is solely available to the Java Card RE (and the Java Card virtual machine).</li> </ul> <p>FMT_MSA.3.2[FIREWALL Editorially Refined]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The intent is that none of the identified roles has privileges with regard to the default values of the security attributes. It should be noticed that creation of objects is an operation controlled by the FIREWALL access control SFP. The operation shall fail anyway if the created object would have had security attributes whose value violates FMT_MSA.2.1[FIREWALL-JCVM].</li> </ul>
<b>FMT_MSA.3[JCVM] Static attribute initialisation (JCVM)</b>	
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1[JCVM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: JCVM information flow control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [JCVM- Editorially Refined]	The TSF shall not allow <b>[assignment: any role]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

<b>FMT_SMF.1</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• modify the Currently Active Context, the Selected Applet Context and the Active Applets</li> </ul> <b>]</b>
<b>FMT_SMR.1</b>	<b>Security roles</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Java Card RE (JCRE),</li> <li>• Java Card VM (JCVM).</li> </ul> <b>]</b> .
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

#### 7.1.1.2 Application Programming Interface

The following SFRs are related to the Java Card API. The whole set of cryptographic algorithms is generally not implemented because of limited memory resources and/or limitations due to exportation. Therefore, the following requirements only apply to the implemented subset. It should be noticed that the execution of the additional native code is not within the TSF. Nevertheless, access to API native methods from the Java Card System is controlled by TSF because there is no difference between native and interpreted methods in their interface or invocation mechanism.

<b>FCS_CKM.1</b>	<b>Cryptographic key generation</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <b>[assignment: JCOP RNG]</b> and specified cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: DES: Key lengths - LENGTH_DES3_2KEY,</b>

**LENGTH\_DES3\_3KEY bit, AES: Key lengths - LENGTH\_AES\_128, LENGTH\_AES\_192, LENGTH\_AES\_256 bit RSA-CRT and RSA: Any length that is a multiple of 32 from 512 to 2048 bits, ECC: Key lengths - Any length from 128 to 528 bits ]** that meet the following: [assignment: [\[43\]](#)].

- AppNote
- The keys can be generated and diversified in accordance with [\[28\]](#) specification in class KeyBuilder.
  - This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the implemented algorithms ([\[28\]](#)).

### **FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment: **methods: set keys and components of DES, AES, RSA, RSA-CRT, ECC and secure messaging**] that meets the following: [assignment: [\[28\]](#), JCOP 4.2 UGM [\[11\]](#), JCOP 4.5 UGM [\[14\]](#), JCOP 4.6 UGM [\[17\]](#), JCOP 4.8 UGM [\[20\]](#), JCOP 4.10 UGM [\[23\]](#)].

- AppNote
- The keys can be accessed as specified in [\[28\]](#) Key class and JCOP 4.2 UGM [\[11\]](#), JCOP 4.5 UGM [\[14\]](#), JCOP 4.6 UGM [\[17\]](#), JCOP 4.8 UGM [\[20\]](#), JCOP 4.10 UGM [\[23\]](#) for proprietary classes.
  - This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the implemented algorithms [\[28\]](#) and JCOP 4.2 UGM [\[11\]](#), JCOP 4.5 UGM [\[14\]](#), JCOP 4.6 UGM [\[17\]](#), JCOP 4.8 UGM [\[20\]](#), JCOP 4.10 UGM [\[23\]](#) for proprietary classes.

### **FCS\_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.3.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: **management of DES, AES, RSA, RSA-CRT, ECC**] in accordance with a specified

cryptographic key access method **[assignment: methods/ commands defined in packages javacard.security of [28] and the UGM for proprietary classes]** that meets the following: **[assignment: [28], the UGM ]**.

- AppNote
- The keys can be accessed as specified in [28] Key class and JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23] for proprietary classes.
  - This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applicable to the security target and the implemented algorithms ([28]) and JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23] for proprietary classes.

**FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **[assignment: physically overwriting the keys in a randomized manner]** that meets the following: **[assignment: none]**.

- AppNote
- The keys are reset as specified in [28] Key class, with the method clearKey(). Any access to a cleared key for ciphering or signing shall throw an exception.
  - This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applicable to the security target and the implemented algorithms ([28]).

**FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

FCS\_COP.1.1[GCM] The TSF shall perform **[assignment: decryption and encryption]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[assignment: AES in GCM mode]** and cryptographic key size **[assignment: 128 bits]** that meets the following:

[assignment: FIPS 197 [44], NIST Special Publication 800-38D Recommendation for BlockCipher [45]].

- FCS\_COP.1.1 [TriplerDES]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: data encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: ALG\_DES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M1, ALG\_DES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M2, ALG\_DES\_CBC\_NOPAD, ALG\_DES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M1, ALG\_DES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M2, ALG\_DES\_ECB\_NOPAD, ] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: LENGTH\_DES3\_2KEY, LENGTH\_DES3\_3KEY bit] that meet the following: [assignment: for ALG\_DES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M2 see Java Card API Spec [28], for the rest see both [28] and JCOPX API JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]]
- FCS\_COP.1.1[AES]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: data encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_CBC\_NOPAD, ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_CBC\_NOPAD\_STANDARD, ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_ECB\_NOPAD, ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M1, ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M2, ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M2\_STANDARD, ALG\_AES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M1, ALG\_AES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M2] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: LENGTH\_AES\_128, LENGTH\_AES\_192, and LENGTH\_AES\_256 bit] that meet the following: [assignment: for ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_CBC\_NOPAD\_STANDARD, ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M2\_STANDARD see API specified in JCOPX JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23], for the rest see Java Card API Spec [28]].
- FCS\_COP.1.1 [RSACipher]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: data encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: ALG\_RSA\_NOPAD, ALG\_RSA\_PKCS1, ALG\_RSA\_PKCS1\_OAEP] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: Any key length that is a multiple of 32 between 512 and 2048 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [28] and for the 32 bit step range see API specified in JCOPX JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].
- FCS\_COP.1.1 [ECDH\_P1363]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH, ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_KDF, ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_PLAIN, ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DHC, ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DHC\_KDF, ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DHC\_PLAIN, ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_PLAIN\_XY] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_224, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_256,

**LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_384, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_521 and from 224 bit to 528 bit in 1 bit steps]** that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [28] and for **ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_PLAIN\_XY** or 1 bit step range key size see API specified in JCOPX JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]]

FCS\_COP.1.1  
 [DESMAC]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: **MAC generation and verification**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **Triple-DES in outer CBC for Mode: ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_ISO9797\_1\_M2\_ALG3, ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_ISO9797\_M2, ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_1\_M1\_ALG3, ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_1\_M2\_ALG3, ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_M2, ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_NOPAD**] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_DES3\_2KEY, LENGTH\_DES3\_3KEY**] that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [28] and JCOPX API JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].

FCS\_COP.1.1  
 [AESMAC]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: **16 byte MAC generation and verification**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **AES in CBC Mode ALG\_AES\_MAC\_128\_NOPAD**] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_AES\_128, LENGTH\_AES\_192 and LENGTH\_AES\_256 bit**] that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [28]].

FCS\_COP.1.1  
 [RSASignaturePKCS1]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: **digital signature generation and verification**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_224\_PKCS1, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_224\_PKCS1\_PSS, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_256\_PKCS1, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_256\_PKCS1\_PSS, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_384\_PKCS1, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_384\_PKCS1\_PSS, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_512\_PKCS1, ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_512\_PKCS1\_PSS** or **SIG\_CIPHER\_RSA** in combination with **MessageDigest.ALG\_SHA\_256, MessageDigest.ALG\_SHA\_384, MessageDigest.ALG\_SHA\_512** and in combination with **Cipher.PAD\_PKCS1\_OAEP**] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **Any key length that is a multiple of 32 between 512 and 2048 bits**] that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [28] and for the 32 bit step range see API specified in JCOPX JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].

FCS_COP.1.1 [ECSignature]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: digital signature generation and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_ECDSA_SHA_224, ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256, ALG_ECDSA_SHA_384, ALG_ECDSA_SHA_512 or SIG_CIPHER_ECDSA in combination with MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256 or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_384 or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_512]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_EC_FP_224, LENGTH_EC_FP_256, LENGTH_EC_FP_384, LENGTH_EC_FP_521 and from 224 bit to 528 bit in 1 bit steps]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: Java Card API Spec [28] and for 1 bit step range key size see API specified in JCOPX JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].</b>
FCS_COP.1.1[SHA]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: secure hash computation]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_SHA<sup>1</sup>, ALG_SHA_224, ALG_SHA_256, ALG_SHA_384, ALG_SHA_512]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_SHA, LENGTH_SHA_224, LENGTH_SHA_256, LENGTH_SHA_384, LENGTH_SHA_512]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: Java Card API Spec [28] and JCOPX API specified in JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].</b>
FCS_COP.1.1 [AES_CMAC]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: CMAC generation and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_AES_CMAC16, SIG_CIPHER_AES_CMAC16, ALG_AES_CMAC16_STANDARD, SIG_CIPHER_AES_MAC128]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_AES_128, LENGTH_AES_192 and LENGTH_AES_256 bit]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: see Java Card API Spec [28] for SIG_CIPHER_AES_MAC128 and for the other modes see the JCOPX API specified in JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].</b>
FCS_COP.1.1 [HMAC]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: HMAC generation and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_HMAC_SHA_256, ALG_HMAC_SHA_384, ALG_HMAC_SHA_512]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_SHA_256, LENGTH_SHA_384 and LENGTH_SHA_512 bit]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: Java Card specification [28] and JCOPX API JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].</b>

1 Due to mathematical weakness only resistant against AVA\_VAN.5 for temporary data (e.g. as used for generating session keys), but not if repeatedly applied to the same input data.

FCS_COP.1.1 [TDES_CMAC]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: message authentication and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_DES_CMAC8, SIG_CIPHER_DES_CMAC8]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_DES3_2KEY and LENGTH_DES3_3KEY bit ]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: see API specified in JCOPX JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]].</b>
FCS_COP.1.1[DAP]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: verification of the DAP signature attached to Executable Load Applications]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_RSA_1024, LENGTH_EC_FP_256]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: GP Spec [38] and JCOPX API JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23] ]</b> .
AppNote	For resistance against attackers with High Attack Potential, the user should always refer to the guidance given by the Certification Body in the jurisdiction. The website <a href="http://www.keylength.com">www.keylength.com</a> provides a good reference to recommended key lengths.
<b>FCS_RNG.1</b>	<b>Quality metric for random numbers</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1.1	The TSF shall provide a <b>[selection: deterministic]</b> random number generator <b>[selection: DRG.3][46]</b> that implements <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (DRG.3.1) If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [46]) as random source, the internal state of the RNG shall have at least 256 bit of entropy.</li> <li>• (DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in [46]).</li> <li>• (DRG.3.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known (as defined in [46])</li> </ul> <b>]</b>
FCS_RNG.1.2	The TSF shall provide <b>[selection: octets of bits]</b> that meet <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (DRG.3.4) The RNG, initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [46]) as random source, generates output for which for AES-mode <math>2^{48}</math> and for TDEA-</li> </ul> <b>]</b>



mode  $2^{35}$  strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability at least  $1-2^{-24}$ .

- (DRG.3.5) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A (as defined in [\[46\]](#))

]

#### FDP\_RIP.1[ABORT] Subset residual information protection (ABORT)

Hierarchical\_To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1[ABORT] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: any reference to an object instance created during an aborted transaction]**

AppNote The events that provoke the de-allocation of a transient object are described in [\[31\]](#), §5.1.

#### FDP\_RIP.1[APDU] Subset residual information protection (APDU)

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1[APDU] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: allocation of the resource to]** the following objects: **[assignment: the APDU buffer]**.

AppNote The allocation of a resource to the APDU buffer is typically performed as the result of a call to the process() method of an applet.

#### FDP\_RIP.1 [GlobalArray-Refined] Subset residual information protection (GlobalArray)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1 [GlobalArray-Refined] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** *the applet as a result of returning from the process method* to the following objects: **[assignment: a user Global Array]**

Application Note An array resource is allocated when a call to the API method JCSYSTEM.makeGlobalArray is performed. The Global Array is created as a transient JCRE Entry Point Object ensuring that reference to it cannot be retained by any application. On return from the method which called JCSYSTEM.makeGlobalArray, the array is no longer available to any applet and is deleted and the memory in use by the array is cleared and reclaimed in the next object deletion cycle.

**FDP\_RIP.1[bArray] Subset residual information protection (bArray)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1[bArray] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: the bArray object]**.

AppNote A resource is allocated to the bArray object when a call to an applet's install() method is performed. There is no conflict with FDP\_ROL.1 here because of the bounds on the rollback mechanism (FDP\_ROL.1.2[FIREWALL]): the scope of the rollback does not extend outside the execution of the install() method, and the de-allocation occurs precisely right after the return of it.

**FDP\_RIP.1[KEYS] Subset residual information protection (KEYS)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1[KEYS] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: the cryptographic buffer (D.CRYPTO)]**.

AppNote

- The javacard.security and javacardx.crypto packages do provide secure interfaces to the cryptographic buffer in a

transparent way. See javacard.security.KeyBuilder and Key interface of [28].

<b>FDP_RIP.1</b> <b>[TRANSIENT]</b>	<b>Subset residual information protection (TRANSIENT)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [TRANSIENT]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <b>[selection: deallocation of the resource from]</b> the following objects: <b>[assignment: any transient object]</b> .
AppNote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The events that provoke the de-allocation of any transient object are described in [31], §5.1.</li> <li>• The clearing of CLEAR_ON_DESELECT objects is not necessarily performed when the owner of the objects is deselected. In the presence of multiselectable applet instances, CLEAR_ON_DESELECT memory segments may be attached to applets that are active in different logical channels. Multiselectable applet instances within a same CAP file must share the transient memory segment if they are concurrently active ([31], §4.2.)</li> </ul>
<b>FDP_ROL.1</b> <b>[FIREWALL]</b>	<b>Basic rollback (FIREWALL)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ROL.1.1 [FIREWALL]	The TSF shall enforce <b>[assignment: the FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP]</b> to permit the rollback of the <b>[assignment: operations OP.JAVA(...) and OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*)]</b> on the <b>[assignment: object O.JAVAOBJECT]</b> .
FDP_ROL.1.2 [FIREWALL]	The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the <b>[assignment: scope of a select(), deselect(), process(), install() or uninstall() call, notwithstanding the restrictions given in [31], §7.7, within the bounds of the Commit Capacity ([31], §7.8), and those described in [28]].</b>
AppNote	Transactions are a service offered by the APIs to applets. It is also used by some APIs to guarantee the atomicity of some operation. This mechanism is either implemented in Java Card platform or relies on the transaction mechanism offered by

the underlying platform. Some operations of the API are not conditionally updated, as documented in [28] (see for instance, PIN-blocking, PIN-checking, update of Transient objects).

7.1.1.3 Card Security Management

<b>FAU_ARP.1</b>	<b>Security alarms</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1	<p>The TSF shall take <b>[assignment: one of the following actions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>throw an exception,</b></li> <li>• <b>lock the card session (after a predefined number of resetted sessions the card shall switch to Restricted Mode),</b></li> <li>• <b>reinitialize the Java Card System and its data,</b></li> <li>• <b>[assignment: response with error code to S.CAD]</b></li> </ul> <p><b>] upon detection of a potential security violation.</b></p>
Refinement	<p>The "potential security violation" stands for one of the following events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>CAP:</b> CAP file inconsistency (<b>response with error code to S.CAD</b>),</li> <li>• <b>LFC:</b> applet life cycle inconsistency (<b>throw an exception</b>),</li> <li>• <b>CHP:</b> card tearing (unexpected removal of the Card out of the CAD) and power failure (<b>reset the card session</b>),</li> <li>• <b>ABT:</b> abort of a transaction in an unexpected context (<b>throw an exception</b>),</li> <li>• <b>FWL:</b> violation of the Firewall or JCVM SFPs (<b>throw an exception</b>),</li> <li>• <b>RSC:</b> unavailability of memory (<b>throw an exception</b>),</li> <li>• <b>OFL:</b> array overflow (<b>throw an exception</b>),</li> <li>• <b>EDC:</b> checksum mismatch of EDC arrays (<b>throw an exception</b>),</li> <li>• assignment:                         <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <b>CHP:</b> Abnormal environmental condition (Frequency, Voltage, Temperature) (<b>reset the card session</b>),</li> <li>– Physical Tampering                                 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <b>CLC:</b> Card Manager Life Cycle inconsistency (<b>reset the card session</b>),</li> <li>– <b>CHP:</b> General Fault Injection Detection (<b>reset the card session</b>)</li> </ul> </li> <li>– <b>CHP:</b> Memory defects (<b>reset the card session</b>),</li> <li>– <b>CHP:</b> Integrity protected persistent data inconsistency (<b>reset the card session</b>),</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

- CHP: Integrity protected transient data inconsistency (**reset the card session**),
- Memory Access Violation
  - CHP: Others (**reset the card session**)

<b>FDP_SDI.2[DATA]</b>	<b>Stored data integrity monitoring and action</b>
Hierarchical-To	FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1[DATA]	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <b>[assignment: integrity errors]</b> on all objects, based on the following attributes: <b>[assignment: integrity protected data]</b> .
FDP_SDI.2.2[DATA]	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall <b>[assignment: reset the card session for integrity errors ]</b> .
Refinement	<p>The following data elements have the user data attribute "integrity protected data":</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>D.APP_KEYS</b></li> <li>• <b>D.PIN</b></li> <li>• <b>D.TOE_IDENTIFIER</b></li> </ul>
AppNote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Although no such requirement is mandatory in the Java Card specification, at least an exception shall be raised upon integrity errors detection on cryptographic keys, PIN values and their associated security attributes. Even if all the objects cannot be monitored, cryptographic keys and PIN objects shall be considered with particular attention by ST authors as they play a key role in the overall security.</li> <li>• It is also recommended to monitor integrity errors in the code of the native applications and Java Card applets.</li> <li>• For integrity sensitive application, their data shall be monitored (D.APP_I_DATA): applications may need to protect information against unexpected modifications, and explicitly control whether a piece of information has been changed between two accesses. For example, maintaining the integrity of an electronic purse's balance is extremely important because this value represents real money. Its modification must be controlled, for illegal ones would denote an important failure of the payment system.</li> <li>• A dedicated library could be implemented and made available to developers to achieve better security for specific objects, following the same pattern that already exists in cryptographic APIs, for instance.</li> </ul>

<b>FPR_UNO.1</b>	<b>Unobservability</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPR_UNO.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that <b>[assignment: all users]</b> are unable to observe the operation <b>[assignment: all operations]</b> on <b>[assignment: D.APP_KEYS, D.PIN]</b> by <b>[assignment: another user]</b> .
AppNote	Although it is not required in [31] specifications, the non-observability of operations on sensitive information such as keys appears as impossible to circumvent in the smart card world. The precise list of operations and objects is left unspecified, but should at least concern secret keys and PIN codes when they exist on the card, as well as the cryptographic operations and comparisons performed on them.
<b>FPT_FLS.1</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment: those associated to the potential security violations described in FAU_ARP.1]</b>
AppNote	The Java Card RE Context is the Current context when the Java Card VM begins running after a card reset ([31], §6.2.3) or after a proximity card (PICC) activation sequence ([31]). Behavior of the TOE on power loss and reset is described in [31], §3.6 and §7.1. Behavior of the TOE on RF signal loss is described in [31], §3.6.1.
<b>FPT_TDC.1</b>	<b>Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1.1	The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret <b>[assignment: the CAP files, the bytecode and its data arguments]</b> when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2	The TSF shall use <b>[assignment:</b>

- the rules defined in [30] specification
  - the API tokens defined in the export files of reference implementation
  - [assignment: none]
- ]. when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.

AppNote Concerning the interpretation of data between the TOE and the underlying Java Card platform, it is assumed that the TOE is developed consistently with the SCP functions, including memory management, I/O functions and cryptographic functions.

7.1.1.4 AID Management

<b>FIA_ATD.1[AID]</b>	<b>User attribute definition (AID)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1[AID]	<p>The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAP File AID,</li> <li>• Applet’s Version Number,</li> <li>• Registered Applets,</li> <li>• Applet Selection Status ([31], §4.6)</li> </ul> <p>].</p>
Refinement	”Individual users” stands for applets.
<b>FIA_UID.2[AID]</b>	<b>User identification before any action (AID)</b>
Hierarchical-To	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1[AID]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
AppNote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By users here it must be understood the ones associated to the CAP file (or applets) that act as subjects of policies. In the Java Card System, every action is always performed by an identified user interpreted here as the currently selected applet or the CAP file that is the subject’s owner. Means of identification are provided during the loading procedure of the CAP file and the registration of applet instances.</li> <li>• The role Java Card RE defined in FMT_SMR.1 is attached to an IT security function rather than to a ”use” of the CC</li> </ul>

terminology. The Java Card RE does not "identify" itself to the TOE, but it is part of it.

<b>FIA_USB.1[AID]</b>	<b>User-subject binding (AID)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1[AID]	The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: <b>[assignment: CAP file AID]</b> .
FIA_USB.1.2[AID]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: <b>[assignment: Each uploaded CAP file is associated with an unique CAP file AID]</b> .
FIA_USB.1.3[AID]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: <b>[assignment: The initially assigned CAP file AID is unchangeable]</b> .
AppNote	The user is the applet and the subject is the S.CAP_FILE. The subject security attribute Context shall hold the user security attribute CAP file AID.
<b>FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]</b>	<b>Management of TSF data (JCRE)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1[JCRE]	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the <b>[assignment: list of registered applets' AIDs]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.JCRE]</b> .
AppNote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The installer and the Java Card RE manage other TSF data such as the applet life cycle or CAP files, but this management is implementation specific. Objects in the Java programming language may also try to query AIDs of installed applets through the lookupAID(...) API method.</li> <li>• The installer, applet deletion manager or even the card manager may be granted the right to modify the list of registered applets' AIDs in specific implementations (possibly needed for installation and deletion; see #.DELETION and #.INSTALL).</li> </ul>



**FMT\_MTD.3[JCRE] Secure TSF data (JCRE)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT\_MTD.3.1[JCRE] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for **[assignment: the registered applet AIDs]**.**7.1.2 INSTG Security Functional Requirements**

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [6]. The SFR FDP\_ITC.2[INSTALLER] has been refined and is now part of the card management SFRs (FDP\_ITC.2[CCM]) in [Section 7.1.6](#).

**FMT\_SMR.1 [INSTALLER] Security roles (INSTALLER)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1 [INSTALLER] The TSF shall maintain the roles: **[assignment: Installer]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2 [INSTALLER] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FPT\_FLS.1 [INSTALLER] Failure with preservation of secure state (INSTALLER)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 [INSTALLER] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment: the installer fails to load/install a CAP file/applet as described in [31], §11.1.5]**.

AppNote The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card manager in case of potential security violations (see FAU\_ARP.1).

**FPT\_RCV.3 [INSTALLER] Automated recovery without undue loss (INSTALLER)**

Hierarchical-To FPT\_RCV.2 Automated recovery

Dependencies	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
FPT_RCV.3.1 [INSTALLER]	When automated recovery from <b>[assignment: none]</b> is not possible, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is provided.
FPT_RCV.3.2 [INSTALLER]	For <b>[assignment: a failure during load/installation of a CAP file/applet and deletion of a CAP file/applet/object]</b> , the TSF shall ensure the return of the TOE to a secure state using automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.3.3 [INSTALLER]	The functions provided by the TSF to recover from failure or service discontinuity shall ensure that the secure initial state is restored without exceeding <b>[assignment: 0%]</b> for loss of TSF data or objects under the control of the TSF.
FPT_RCV.3.4 [INSTALLER]	The TSF shall provide the capability to determine the objects that were or were not capable of being recovered.
AppNote	<p>FPT_RCV.3.1[Installer]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• This element is not within the scope of the Java Card specification, which only mandates the behavior of the Java Card System in good working order. Further details on the "maintenance mode" shall be provided in specific implementations. The following is an excerpt from [2], p298: In this maintenance mode normal operation might be impossible or severely restricted, as otherwise insecure situations might occur. Typically, only authorised users should be allowed access to this mode but the real details of who can access this mode is a function of FMT: Security management. If FMT: Security management does not put any controls on who can access this mode, then it may be acceptable to allow any user to restore the system if the TOE enters such a state. However, in practice, this is probably not desirable as the user restoring the system has an opportunity to configure the TOE in such a way as to violate the SFRs.</li></ul> <p>FPT_RCV.3.2[Installer]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Should the installer fail during loading/installation of a CAP file/applet, it has to revert to a "consistent and secure state". The Java Card RE has some clean up duties as well; see [31], §11.1.5 for possible scenarios. Precise behavior is left to implementers. This component shall include among the listed failures the deletion of a CAP file/applet. See ([31], §11.3.4) for possible scenarios. Precise behavior is left to implementers.</li><li>• Other events such as the unexpected tearing of the card, power loss, and so on, are partially handled by the underlying hardware platform (see [5] and, from the TOE's side, by events "that clear transient objects" and transactional features. See FPT_FLS.1.1, FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT], FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] and FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL].</li></ul>

FPT\_RCV.3.3[Installer]:

- The quantification is implementation dependent, but some facts can be recalled here. First, the SCP ensures the atomicity of updates for fields and objects, and a power-failure during a transaction or the normal runtime does not create the loss of otherwise permanent data, in the sense that memory on a smart card is essentially persistent with this respect (EEPROM). Data stored on the RAM and subject to such failure is intended to have a limited lifetime anyway (runtime data on the stack, transient objects' contents). According to this, the loss of data within the TSF scope should be limited to the same restrictions of the transaction mechanism.

### 7.1.3 ADELG Security Functional Requirements

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [6].

#### FDP\_ACC.2[ADEL] Complete access control (ADEL)

Hierarchical-To FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

Dependencies FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.2.1[ADEL] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]** on **[assignment: S.ADEL, S.JCRE, S.JCVM, O.JAVAOBJECT, O.APPLET and O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE]** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP\_ACC.2.2[ADEL] The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

Refinement The operations involved in the policy are:

- OP.DELETE\_APPLET,
- OP.DELETE\_CAP\_FILE,
- OP.DELETE\_CAP\_FILE\_APPLET.

#### FDP\_ACF.1[ADEL] Security attribute based access control (ADEL)

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1[ADEL] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]** to objects based on the following **[assignment:**

- S.JCVM: security attributes Active Applets

- S.JCRE: security attributes Selected Applet Context, Registered Applets, Resident CAP file
- O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE: security attributes CAP file AID, AID of packages within a CAP file, Dependent Package AID, Static References
- O.APPLET: security attributes Applet Selection Status
- O.JAVAOBJECT: security attributes Owner, Remote

]

FDP\_ACF.1.2[ADEL] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **[assignment:**

In the context of this policy, an object O is reachable if and only one of the following conditions hold:

1. the owner of O is a registered applet instance A (O is reachable from A),
2. a static field of a resident package P contains a reference to O (O is reachable from P),
3. there exists a valid remote reference to O (O is remote reachable),
4. there exists an object O' that is reachable according to either (1) or (2) or (3) above and O' contains a reference to O (the reachability status of O is that of O').

The following access control rules determine when an operation among controlled subjects and objects is allowed by the policy:

- R.JAVA.14 ([31], §11.3.4.2, Applet Instance Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_APPLET upon an O.APPLET only if,
  1. S.ADEL is currently selected,
  2. there is no instance in the context of O.APPLET that is active in any logical channel and
  3. there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by O.APPLET such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance distinct from O.APPLET, or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a package P, or ([31], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.
- R.JAVA.15 ([31], §11.3.4.2.1, Multiple Applet Instance Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_APPLET upon several O.APPLET only if,
  1. S.ADEL is currently selected,
  2. there is no instance of any of the O.APPLET being deleted that is active in any logical channel and
  3. there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by any of the O.APPLET being deleted such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance distinct from any of those O.APPLET, or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from

- a CAP file P, or ([31], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.
- R.JAVA.16 ([31], §11.3.4.3, Applet/Library CAP file Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_CAP\_FILE upon an O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE only if,
    1. S.ADEL is currently selected,
    2. no reachable O.JAVAOBJECT, from a CAP file distinct from O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE that is an instance of a class that belongs to O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE, exists on the card and
    3. there is no resident package on the card that depends on O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE.
  - R.JAVA.17 ([31], §11.3.4.4, Applet CAP file and Contained Instances Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_CAP\_FILE\_APPLET upon an O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE only if,
    1. S.ADEL is currently selected,
    2. no reachable O.JAVAOBJECT, from a CAP file distinct from O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE, which is an instance of a class that belongs to O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE exists on the card,
    3. there is no CAP file loaded on the card that depends on O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE, and
    4. for every O.APPLET of those being deleted it holds that: (i) there is no instance in the context of O.APPLET that is active in any logical channel and (ii) there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by O.APPLET such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance not being deleted, or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a CAP file not being deleted, or ([31], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.

]

FDP\_ACF.1.3[ADEL] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: none]**.

FDP\_ACF.1.4 [ADEL-EditoriallyRefined] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of **[assignment: any subject but S.ADEL to O.CODE\_PKG or O.APPLET for the purpose of deleting them from the card]**.

AppNote FDP\_ACF.1.2[ADEL]:

- This policy introduces the notion of reachability, which provides a general means to describe objects that are referenced from a certain applet instance or CAP file.
- S.ADEL calls the "uninstall" method of the applet instance to be deleted, if implemented by the applet, to inform it of the deletion request. The order in which these calls and the dependencies checks are performed are out of the scope of this protection profile.

**FDP\_RIP.1[ADEL] Subset residual information protection (ADEL)**

Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1[ADEL]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: <b>[assignment: applet instances and/or CAP file when one of the deletion operations in FDP_ACC.2.1[ADEL] is performed on them]</b> .
AppNote	Deleted freed resources (both code and data) may be reused, depending on the way they were deleted (logically or physically). Requirements on de-allocation during applet/CAP file deletion are described in <a href="#">[31]</a> , §11.3.4.1, §11.3.4.2 and §11.3.4.3.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] Management of security attributes (ADEL)</b>	
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[ADEL]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Registered Applets and Resident CAP file]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.JCRE]</b> .
<b>FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] Static attribute initialisation (ADEL)</b>	
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1[ADEL]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2[ADEL]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: none]</b> , to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] Specification of Management Functions (ADEL)</b>	
Hierarchical-To	No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1[ADEL] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: **[assignment: modify the list of registered applets' AIDs and the Resident CAP file]**

**FMT\_SMR.1[ADEL] Security roles (ADEL)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1[ADEL] The TSF shall maintain the roles: **[assignment: applet deletion manager]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2[ADEL] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FPT\_FLS.1[ADEL] Failure with preservation of secure state (ADEL)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1[ADEL] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment: the applet deletion manager fails to delete a CAP file/applet as described in [31], §11.3.4]**.

- AppNote
- The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card manager in case of potential security violation (see FAU\_ARP.1).
  - The CAP file/applet instance deletion must be atomic. The "secure state" referred to in the requirement must comply with Java Card specification ([31], §11.3.4.)

**7.1.4 RMIG Security Functional Requirements**

Not used in this ST because RMI is optional in PP [6] and the TOE does not support RMI.

**7.1.5 ODELG Security Functional Requirements**

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [6].

**FDP\_RIP.1[ODEL] Subset residual information protection (ODEL)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FDP_RIP.1.1[ODEL]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <b>[selection: deallocation of the resource from]</b> the following objects: <b>[assignment: the objects owned by the context of an applet instance which triggered the execution of the method javacard.framework.JCSystem.requestObjectDeletion()]</b> .
AppNote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freed data resources resulting from the invocation of the method <code>javacard.framework.JCSystem.requestObjectDeletion()</code> may be reused. Requirements on de-allocation after the invocation of the method are described in <a href="#">[28]</a>.</li> <li>• There is no conflict with FDP_ROL.1 here because of the bounds on the rollback mechanism: the execution of <code>requestObjectDeletion()</code> is not in the scope of the rollback because it must be performed in between APDU command processing, and therefore no transaction can be in progress.</li> </ul>
<b>FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state (ODEL)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1[ODEL]	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment: the object deletion functions fail to delete all the unreferenced objects owned by the applet that requested the execution of the method]</b> .
AppNote	The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card manager in case of potential security violation (see FAU_ARP.1).

### 7.1.6 CarG Security Functional Requirements

The card management SFRs from the PP [\[6\]](#) are refined and replaced by the following SFRs.

<b>FDP_UIT.1[CCM]</b>	<b>Data exchange integrity (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1[CCM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy and the Security Domain access control policy]</b> to <b>[selection: receive]</b> user data in a manner protected from <b>[selection: modification, deletion, insertion and replay]</b> errors.



FDP_UIT.1.2[CCM]	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether <b>[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]</b> has occurred.
<b>FDP_ROL.1[CCM]</b>	<b>Basic rollback (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ROL.1.1[CCM]	The TSF shall enforce <b>[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]</b> to permit the rollback of the <b>[assignment: installation operation]</b> on the <b>[assignment: executable files and application instances]</b> .
FDP_ROL.1.2[CCM]	The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the <b>[assignment: boundaries of available memory before the card content management function started]</b> .
<b>FDP_ITC.2[CCM]</b>	<b>Import of user data with security attributes (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1[CCM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Security Domain access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy]</b> when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2[CCM]	The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3[CCM]	The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4[CCM]	The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5[CCM]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: <b>[assignment: CAP file loading is allowed only if, for each dependent package, its AID attribute is equal to a resident</b>

**package AID attribute, the major version attribute associated to the dependent package file is equal to the major version attribute associated of the resident package and the minor version attribute is equal to or less than the minor version attribute associated to the resident package ([30], §4.5.2).]**

AppNote This SFR also covers security functionality required by Amendment A of the GP specification [35], i.e. personalizing SDs and loading ciphered load files.

**FPT\_FLS.1[CCM] Failure with preservation of secure state (CCM)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1[CCM] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment: the Security Domain fails to load/install an Executable File/application instance as described in [31], Section 11.1.5]**

**FDP\_ACC.1[SD] Subset access control (SD)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1[SD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]** on: **[assignment:**

- Subjects: S.INSTALLER, S.ADEL, S.CAD (from [6]) and S.SD
- Objects: Delegation Token, DAP Block and Load File
- Operations: GlobalPlatform’s card content management APDU commands and API methods]

**FDP\_ACF.1[SD] Security attribute based access control (SD)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1[SD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]** to objects based on the following: **[assignment:**

- Subjects:
  - S.INSTALLER, defined in [6] and represented by the GlobalPlatform Environment (OPEN) on the card, the Card Life Cycle attributes (defined in Section 5.1.1 of [34])
  - S.ADEL, also defined in [6] and represented by the GlobalPlatform Environment (OPEN) on the card
  - S.SD receiving the Card Content Management commands (through APDUs or APIs) with a set of Privileges (defined in Section 6.6.1 of [34]), a Life-cycle Status (defined in Section 5.3.2 of [34]) and a Secure Communication Security Level (defined in Section 10.6 of [34])
  - S.CAD, defined in [6], the off-card entity that communicates with the S.INSTALLER and S.ADEL through S.SD
- Objects:
  - The Delegation Token, in case of Delegated Management operations, with the attributes Present or Not Present
  - The DAP Block, in case of application loading, with the attributes Present or Not Present
  - The Load File or Executable File, in case of application loading, installation, extradition or registry update, with a set of intended privileges and its targeted associated SD AID.
- Mapping subjects/objects to security attributes:
  - S.INSTALLER: Security Level, Card Life Cycle, Life-cycle Status, Privileges, Resident CAP files, Registered Applets
  - S.ADEL: Active Applets, Static References, Card Life Cycle, Life-cycle Status, Privileges, Applet Selection Status, Security Level
  - S.SD: Privileges, Life-cycle Status, Security Level
  - S.CAD: Security Level]

FDP\_ACF.1.2[SD] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **[assignment: Runtime behavior rules defined by GlobalPlatform for:**

- loading (Section 9.3.5 of [34])
- installation (Section 9.3.6 of [34])
- extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [34])
- registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [34])
- content removal (Section 9.5 of [34]).]

FDP\_ACF.1.3[SD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: none].**

FDP\_ACF.1.4[SD] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: when at least one of the rules defined by GlobalPlatform does not hold.]**

**FMT\_MSA.1[SD] Management of security attributes (SD)**

Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[SD]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[assignment: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Card Life Cycle,</li> <li>• Privileges,</li> <li>• Life-cycle Status,</li> <li>• Security Level.]</li> </ul> <p>to <b>[assignment: the Security Domain and the application instance itself]</b>.</p>
<b>FMT_MSA.3[SD]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (SD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1[SD]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2[SD]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: Card Issuer or the Application Provider]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Refinement	Alternative initial values shall be at least as restrictive as the default values defined in FMT_MSA.3.1[SD].
<b>FMT_SMF.1[SD]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (SD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1[SD]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b>

- Management functions specified in GlobalPlatform specifications [GP]:
  - card locking (Section 9.6.3 of [34])
  - application locking and unlocking (Section 9.6.2 of [34])
  - card termination (Section 9.6.4 of [34])
  - card status interrogation (Section 9.6.6 of [34])
  - application status interrogation (Section 9.6.5 of [34]).]

**FMT\_SMR.1[SD] Security roles (SD)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1[SD] The TSF shall maintain the roles **[assignment: ISD, SSD]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2[SD] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FCO\_NRO.2[SC] Enforced proof of origin (SC)**

Hierarchical-To FCO\_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin.

Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FCO\_NRO.2.1[SC] The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted **[assignment: Executable load files]** at all times.

FCO\_NRO.2.2[SC] The TSF shall be able to relate the **[assignment: DAP Block]** of the originator of the information, and the **[assignment: identity]** of the information to which the evidence applies.

FCO\_NRO.2.3[SC] The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to **[selection: originator]** given **[assignment: at the time the Executable load files are received as no evidence is kept on the card for future verification]**.

AppNote FCO\_NRO.2.1[SC]:

- Upon reception of a new application CAP file for installation, the card manager shall first check that it actually comes from the verification authority. The verification authority is the entity responsible for bytecode verification.

FCO\_NRO.2.3[SC]:

- The exact limitations on the evidence of origin are implementation dependent. In most of the implementations, the card manager performs an immediate verification of the origin of the CAP file using an electronic signature mechanism, and no evidence is kept on the card for future verifications.

<b>FDP_IFC.2[SC]</b>	<b>Complete information flow control (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Dependencies	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.2.1[SC]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> on <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the subjects S.CAD and S.SD, involved in the exchange of messages between the TOE and the CAD through a potentially unsafe communication channel,</li> <li>• the information controlled by this policy are the card content management commands, including personalization commands, in the APDUs sent to the card and their associated responses returned to the CAD]</li> </ul> <p>and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.</p>
FDP_IFC.2.2[SC]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
<b>FDP_IFF.1[SC]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1[SC]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subjects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– S.SD receiving the Card Content Management commands (through APDUs or APIs).</li> <li>– S.CAD the off-card entity that communicates with the S.SD.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– executable load file, in case of application loading;</li> <li>– applications or SD privileges, in case of application installation or registry update;</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>]</p>
FDP_IFF.1.2[SC]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Runtime behavior rules defined by GlobalPlatform for:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– loading (Section 9.3.5 of [34]);</li> <li>– installation (Section 9.3.6 of [34]);</li> <li>– extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [34]);</li> <li>– registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [34]);</li> <li>– content removal (Section 9.5 of [34]).]</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
FDP_IFF.1.3[SC]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: no additional information flow control SFP rules]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.4[SC]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.5[SC]	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• When none of the conditions listed in the element FDP_IFF.1.4 of this component hold and at least one of those listed in the element FDP_IFF.1.2 does not hold.]</li> </ul>
AppNote	The subject S.SD can be the ISD or APSD.
AppNote	The on-card and the off-card subjects have security attributes such as MAC, Cryptogram, Challenge, Key Set, Static Keys, etc.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[SC]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[SC]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key Set,</li> <li>• Security Level,</li> <li>• Secure Channel Protocol,</li> <li>• Session Keys,</li> <li>• Sequence Counter,</li> <li>• ICV,]</li> </ul> <p>to <b>[assignment: the actor associated with the according security domain]</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Card Issuer for ISD,</li> <li>• The Application Provider for APSD.]</li> </ul>

AppNote	The key data used for setting up a secure channel is according to GP spec [34], Amendment D [37] and Amendmend F [39].
<b>FMT_MSA.3[SC]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1[SC]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2[SC]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: Card Issuer, Application Provider]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_SMF.1[SC]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1[SC]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management functions specified in GlobalPlatform specifications [GP]: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– loading (Section 9.3.5 of [34])</li> <li>– installation (Section 9.3.6 of [34])</li> <li>– extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [34])</li> <li>– registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [34])</li> <li>– content removal (Section 9.5 of [34]).]</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
AppNote	All management functions related to secure channel protocols shall be relevant.
<b>FIA_UID.1[SC]</b>	<b>Timing of identification (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1[SC]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• application selection</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initializing a secure channel with the card</li> <li>• requesting data that identifies the card or the Card Issuer]</li> </ul> <p>on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.</p>
FIA_UID.1.2[SC]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
AppNote	The GlobalPlatform TSF mediated actions listed in [GP] such as selecting an application, requesting data, initializing, etc.
<b>FIA_UAU.1[SC]</b>	<b>Timing of authentication (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1[SC]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment: the TSF mediated actions listed in FIA_UID.1[SC]]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2[SC]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
<b>FIA_UAU.4[SC]</b>	<b>Single-use authentication mechanisms</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1[SC]	The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to <b>[assignment: the authentication mechanism used to open a secure communication channel with the card.]</b>
<b>FTP_ITC.1[SC]</b>	<b>Inter-TSF trusted channel (SC)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1[SC]	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2[SC]	The TSF shall permit <b>[selection: another trusted IT product]</b> to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3[SC]	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for <b>[assignment: all card management functions:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• loading</li> <li>• installation</li> <li>• extradition</li> <li>• registry update</li> <li>• content removal</li> <li>• changing the Application Life Cycle or Card Life Cycle.</li> </ul> <b>]</b>

### 7.1.7 Further Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs in this section provide additional proprietary features.

<b>FAU_SAS.1[SCP]</b>	<b>Audit Data Storage (SCP)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1[SCP]	The TSF shall provide <b>[assignment: test personnel before TOE Delivery]</b> with the capability to store the <b>[assignment: Initialisation Data and/or Prepersonalisation Data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software]</b> in the <b>[assignment: audit records]</b> .
<b>FIA_AFL.1[PIN]</b>	<b>Basic Authentication Failure Handling (PIN)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.1[PIN]	The TSF shall detect when <b>[selection: an administrator configurable positive integer within [1 and 127]]</b> unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to <b>[assignment: any user authentication using D.PIN]</b> .
FIA_AFL.1.2[PIN]	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <b>[selection: surpassed]</b> , the TSF shall <b>[assignment: block the authentication with D.PIN]</b> .
AppNote	The dependency with FIA_UAU.1 is not applicable. The TOE implements the firewall access control SFP, based on which access to the object implementing FIA_AFL.1[PIN] is organized.

## 7.1.8 Configuration Security Functional Requirements

<b>FDP_IFC.2[CFG]</b>	<b>Complete information flow control (CFG)</b>
Hierarchical-To	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Dependencies	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.2.1[CFG]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: S.Customer, S.NXP, S.ConfigurationMechanism, and D.CONFIG_ITEM]</b> and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2[CFG]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
<b>FDP_IFF.1[CFG]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes (CFG)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1[CFG]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.Customer: security attributes Customer Configuration Token</li> <li>• S.NXP: security attributes NXP Configuration Token</li> <li>• S.ConfigurationMechanism: security attributes NXP Configuration Access, Customer Configuration Access</li> <li>• D.CONFIG_ITEM: security attributes access privilege</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.2[CFG]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Read and write operations of D.CONFIG_ITEM between S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.NXP shall only be possible when S.NXP is authenticated with its token using the NXP Configuration Token.</li> <li>• Read and write operations of D.CONFIG_ITEM between S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.Customer shall only be possible when S.Customer is authenticated with its token using the Customer Configuration Token and if access privilege allows it.</li> </ul> <b>].</b>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enabling or disabling of NXP Configuration Access between S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.NXP shall only be possible when S.NXP is authenticated with its token using the NXP Configuration Token.</li> </ul>
	].
FDP_IFF.1.3[CFG]	The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.4[CFG]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.5[CFG]	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If the NXP Configuration Access is disabled then nobody can read or write D.CONFIG_ITEM.</li> <li>If the Customer Configuration Access is disabled then S.Customer can not read or write D.CONFIG_ITEM.</li> </ul>
	].
AppNote	GlobalPlatform Framework authentication mechanism is used to authenticate the tokens.
<b>FIA_UID.1[CFG]</b>	<b>Timing of identification (CFG)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1[CFG]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment: to select the configuration applet]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2[CFG]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[CFG]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (CFG)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[CFG]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: NXP</b>

**Configuration Access and Customer Configuration Access]** to **[assignment: S.NXP and S.Customer]** respectively.

**FMT\_MSA.3[CFG] Static attribute initialisation (CFG)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MSA.3.1[CFG] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]** to provide **[selection: restrictive]** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2[CFG] The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: nobody]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**FMT\_SMF.1[CFG] Specification of Management Functions (CFG)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1[CFG] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: **[assignment: disable the NXP Configuration Access, disable the Customer Configuration Access.]**

**FMT\_SMR.1[CFG] Security roles (CFG)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1[CFG] The TSF shall maintain the roles **[assignment: S.NXP and S.Customer]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2[CFG] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

AppNote The roles of the CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP are defined by the NXP Configuration Token and the Customer Configuration Token.

### 7.1.9 OS update Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.

<b>FDP_IFC.2[OSU]</b>	<b>Complete information flow control (OSU)</b>
Hierarchical-To	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Dependencies	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.2.1[OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: S.OSU and D.UPDATE_IMAGE]</b> and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2[OSU]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
<b>FDP_IFF.1[OSU]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes (OSU)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1[OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.OSU: security attributes Current Sequence Number, Verification Key, CAP file Decryption Key</li> <li>• D.UPDATE_IMAGE: security attributes Received Sequence Number, Image Type</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.2[OSU]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.OSU shall only accept D.UPDATE_IMAGE which signature can be verified with Verification Key.</li> <li>• S.OSU shall only accept D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process that can be decrypted with CAP file Decryption Key.</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.3[OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules <b>[assignment: S.OSU shall only authorize D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process if the following rules apply:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If Image Type equals Reset then Received Sequence Number shall equal Current Sequence Number.</li> </ul>

- If Image Type equals Upgrade then Received Sequence Number shall be higher than Current Sequence Number.
- If Image Type equals Downgrade then Received Sequence Number shall be lower than Current Sequence Number.

].

FDP_IFF.1.4[OSU]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.5[OSU]	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: D.Update_image which is not included in the pre-loaded OS Update plan]</b> .
AppNote	The on-card S.OSU role interacts with the off-card S.UpdateImageCreator via OSU commands. The D.UPDATE_IMAGE is split up into smaller chunks and transmitted as payload within the OSU Commands to the TOE.
AppNote	Decrypting the D.UPDATE_IMAGE with the CAP file Decryption Key prevents the authorization of the D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process on a not certified system. The CAP file Decryption Key is only available on a certified TOE.
<b>FMT_MSA.3[OSU] Static attribute initialisation (OSU)</b>	
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1[OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2[OSU]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: S.OSU]</b> specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[OSU] Management of security attributes (OSU)</b>	
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to

**[selection: modify]** the security attributes **[assignment: Current Sequence Number]** to **[assignment: S.OSU]**.

**FMT\_SMR.1[OSU] Security roles (OSU)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1[OSU] The TSF shall maintain the roles **[assignment: S.OSU]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2[OSU] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FMT\_SMF.1[OSU] Specification of Management Functions (OSU)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1[OSU] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: **[assignment:**

- query Current Sequence Number
- query Reference Sequence Number

**]**

AppNote After the atomic activation of the additional code the Final Sequence Number is returned on querying the Current Sequence Number.

**FIA\_UID.1[OSU] Timing of identification (OSU)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1[OSU] The TSF shall allow **[assignment: OP.TRIGGER\_UPDATE]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2[OSU] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**FIA\_UAU.1[OSU] Timing of authentication (OSU)**

Hierarchical-To No other components.



Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1[OSU]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment: OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2[OSU]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
<b>FIA_UAU.4[OSU]</b>	<b>Single-use authentication mechanisms (OSU)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1[OSU]	The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to <b>[assignment: the authentication mechanism used to load D.UPDATE_IMAGE.]</b>
<b>FPT_FLS.1[OSU]</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state (OSU)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1[OSU]	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Corrupted D.UPDATE_IMAGE is received</li> <li>• Unauthorized D.UPDATE_IMAGE is received.</li> <li>• The OS Update Process is interrupted.</li> <li>• The activation of the additional code failed.</li> </ul> <b>].</b>

#### 7.1.10 Restricted Mode Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.

<b>FDP_ACC.2[RM]</b>	<b>Complete access control (Restricted Mode)</b>
Hierarchical-To	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Dependencies	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.2.1[RM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Restricted Mode access control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: S.SD]</b> and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2[RM]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
<b>FDP_ACF.1[RM]</b>	<b>Security attribute based access control (Restricted Mode)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1[RM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Restricted Mode access control SFP]</b> to objects based on the following <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.SD: security attributes D.ATTACK_COUNTER</li> </ul> <b>]</b>
FDP_ACF.1.2[RM]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <b>[assignment: The D.ATTACK_COUNTER can be reset by ISD]</b> .
FDP_ACF.1.3[RM]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_ACF.1.4[RM]	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment: Deny all operations on all objects if the D.ATTACK_COUNTER has reached its limit (restricted mode), except for operations listed in FMT_SMF.1[RM]]</b> .
<b>FMT_MSA.3[RM]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (Restricted Mode)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1[RM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Restricted Mode access control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2[RM]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: nobody]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_MSA.1[RM]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (Restricted Mode)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[RM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Restricted Mode access control policy]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: D.ATTACK_COUNTER]</b> to <b>[assignment: ISD]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMF.1[RM]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (Restricted Mode)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1[RM]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reset D.ATTACK_COUNTER.</li> <li>• select ISD.</li> <li>• authentication against the ISD.</li> <li>• initialize a Secure Channel with the card.</li> <li>• query the Serial Number (Unique ID for chip).</li> <li>• read Platform Identifier.</li> <li>• query the logging information.</li> <li>• read Secure Channel Sequence Counter.</li> <li>• read Current Sequence Number.</li> </ul> <b>]</b>
<b>FIA_UID.1[RM]</b>	<b>Timing of identification (RM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1[RM]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• select ISD</li> </ul>

	] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2[RM]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
<b>FIA_UAU.1[RM]</b>	<b>Timing of authentication (RM)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1[RM]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• select ISD</li> </ul> ] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2[RM]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### 7.1.11 Applet Migration Requirements

The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.

<b>FDP_ACC.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Subset access control (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1[AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Applet Migration Data access control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: subject S.ArchiveManager object O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE, O.APPLET_CURRENT, O.APPLET_LOADED and operations OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA, OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA ]</b> .
<b>FDP_ACF.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Security attribute based access control (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

- FDP\_ACF.1.1[AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration Data access control SFP]** to objects based on the following: **[assignment:**
- O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE: security attributes Current Instance AID, New Instance AID
  - O.APPLET\_CURRENT: Security attributes Current Instance AID
  - O.APPLET\_LOADED: Security attributes Loaded Applet AID
- ]**
- FDP\_ACF.1.2[AMD] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **[assignment:**
- S.ArchiveManager shall only perform OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA if an applet with Current Instance AID is installed.
  - S.ArchiveManager shall delete O.APPLET\_CURRENT after OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA has finished.
  - S.ArchiveManager shall perform OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA if Loaded Applet AID of O.APPLET\_LOADED is equal to New Instance AID in O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE.
  - Upon completion of OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA the O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE is deleted by S.ArchiveManager.
- ]**
- FDP\_ACF.1.3[AMD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: none]**.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4[AMD] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: none]**.
- FMT\_MSA.3[AMD] Static attribute initialisation (AMD)**
- Hierarchical-To No other components.
- Dependencies FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles
- FMT\_MSA.3.1[AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration access control SFP]** to provide **[assignment: restrictive]** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
- FMT\_MSA.3.2[AMD] The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: S.ArchiveManager]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

<b>FMT_MSA.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1[AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Applet Migration Data access control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[assignment: set]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Current Instance AID and New Instance AID]</b> to <b>[assignment: the S.ArchiveManager]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMF.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1[AMD]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA, OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMR.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Security roles (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1[AMD]	The TSF shall maintain the roles <b>[assignment: S.ArchiveManager]</b> .
FMT_SMR.1.2[AMD]	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
<b>FIA_UID.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Timing of identification (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1[AMD]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment: OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE or Select ISD and Initiate Secure Channel]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2[AMD]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
<b>FDP_IFC.2[AMD]</b>	<b>Complete information flow control (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Dependencies	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.2.1[AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Applet Migration information flow control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: S.ArchiveManager and O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN]</b> and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2[AMD]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
<b>FDP_IFF.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1[AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Applet Migration information flow control SFP]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.ArchiveManager: Security attribute Verification key</li> <li>• O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN: Security attribute Applet Migration Plan Signature</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.2[AMD]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.ArchiveManager shall only accept O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN transmitted either via a secure channel or via unsecured channel where in the latter case the APDUs commands are protected for integrity and authenticity by an electronic signature verified by the Verification Key.</li> </ul> <b>].</b>

FDP_IFF.1.3[AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.4[AMD]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.5[AMD]	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
AppNote	The operations OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA and OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA are triggered by proprietary Applet Migration APDU Commands that are transmitted via a Secure Channel with authentication against the ISD or a proprietary protocol which uses a signature based authentication.
<b>FIA_UAU.5[AMD]</b>	<b>Timing of authentication (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1[AMD]	The TSF shall provide <b>[assignment: secure channel protocol or a proprietary communication protocol using a cryptographic signature]</b> to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2[AMD]	The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the <b>[assignment: secure channel protocol mutual authentication phase, or proprietary communication protocol where in the latter case the APDUs commands are protected for integrity and authenticity by an electronic signature verified by the Verification Key ]</b> .
AppNote	The operations OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA and OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA are triggered by proprietary Applet Migration APDU Commands that are transmitted via a Secure Channel with authentication against the ISD or a proprietary protocol which uses a signature based authentication.
<b>FPT_FLS.1[AMD]</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical-To	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1[AMD]	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the applet data export phase or the applet data import phase are interrupted or fail.</li> </ul>



].

## 7.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The assurance requirements of this evaluation are EAL5 augmented by AVA\_VAN.5, ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2, and ALC\_FLR.1. The assurance requirements ensure, among others, the security of the TOE during its development and production.

## 7.3 Security Requirements Rationale for the TOE

### 7.3.1 Identification

#### OT.SID

SFR	Rationale
FIA_UID.2[AID]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR. Installation procedures ensure protection against forgery (the AID of an applet is under the control of the TSFs) or re-use of identities and is met by the SFR.
FIA_USB.1[AID]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR. Installation procedures ensure protection against forgery (the AID of an applet is under the control of the TSFs) or re-use of identities and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[JCVN]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[JCVN]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FIA_ATD.1[AID]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, CAP file) and is met by the SFR.

7.3.2 Execution

**OT.FIREWALL**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[JCVM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[JCVM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.

**OT.GLOBAL\_ARRAYS\_CONFID**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to a shared buffer, which could be used to read its contents when the buffer is being used by another application.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy meets this objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to a shared buffer, which could be used to read its contents when the buffer is being used by another application.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of remotely invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of remotely invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte array input parameter (bArray) to an applet's install method. Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray-Refined]	Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte array input parameter (bArray) to an applet's install method. Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte array input parameter (bArray) to an applet's install method. Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.

**OT.GLOBAL\_ARRAYS\_INTEG**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to the APDU buffer of the card or to the global byte array of the applet's install method. Such a pointer could be used to access and modify it when the buffer is being used by another application.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to the APDU buffer of the card or to the global byte array of the applet's install method. Such a pointer could be used to access and modify it when the buffer is being used by another application.

**OT.ARRAY\_VIEWS\_CONFID**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view object (Array views have security attributes of temporary objects). Furthermore, array views may not have ATTR_READABLE_VIEW security attribute which ensures that no application can read the contents of the array view.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view object (Array views have security attributes of temporary objects). Furthermore, array views may not have ATTR_READABLE_VIEW security attribute which ensures that no application can read the contents of the array view.
FDP_ACC.2[Firewall]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access attributes.
FDP_ACF.2[Firewall]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access attributes.

**OT.ARRAY\_VIEWS\_INTEG**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view object (Array views have security attributes of temporary objects). Furthermore, array views may not have ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW security attribute which ensures that no application can alter the contents of the array view.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view object (Array views have security attributes of temporary objects). Furthermore, array views may not have ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW security attribute which ensures that no application can alter the contents of the array view.
FDP_ACC.2[Firewall]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access attributes.
FDP_ACF.2[Firewall]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access attributes.

**OT.NATIVE**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	Covers this objective by ensuring that the only means to execute native code is the invocation of a Java Card API method. This objective mainly relies on the environmental objective OE.CAP_FILE, which uphold the assumption A.CAP_FILE.

**OT.OPERATE**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by protecting the TOE through the FIREWALL access control policy.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by protecting the TOE through the FIREWALL access control policy.
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by providing support for cleanly abort applets' installation, which belongs to the category security-critical parts and procedures protection.
FIA_AFL.1[PIN]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the authentication.
FIA_USB.1[AID]	Contributes to meet this objective by controlling the communication with external users and their internal subjects to prevent alteration of TSF data.
FPT_TDC.1	Contributes to meet this objective by protection in various ways against applets' actions.
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by providing safe recovery from failure, which belongs to the category of security-critical parts and procedures protection.
FIA_ATD.1[AID]	Contributes to meet this objective by controlling the communication with external users and their internal subjects to prevent alteration of TSF data.
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.

**OT.REALLOCATION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray-Refined]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.

**OT.RESOURCES**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by preventing that failed installations create memory leaks
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_SMF.1	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_SMR.1	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by preventing that failed installations create memory leaks
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications

SFR	Rationale
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management

### 7.3.3 Services

#### OT.ALARM

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by defining TSF reaction upon detection of a potential security violation
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur

#### OT.CIPHER

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.1	Covers the objective directly
FCS_CKM.2	Covers the objective directly
FCS_CKM.3	Covers the objective directly
FCS_CKM.4	Covers the objective directly
FCS_COP.1	Covers the objective directly
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the observation of the cryptographic operations which may be used to disclose the keys

#### OT.RNG

SFR	Rationale
FCS_RNG.1	Covers the objective by providing random numbers of good quality by specifying class DRG.3 of AIS 20. It was chosen to define FCS_RNG.1 explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not contain generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation. (Note that there are security functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria, which refer to random numbers. However, they define requirements only for the authentication context, which is only one of the possible applications of random numbers.)

#### OT.KEY-MNGT

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.1	Covers the objective directly
FCS_CKM.2	Covers the objective directly
FCS_CKM.3	Covers the objective directly
FCS_CKM.4	Covers the objective directly
FCS_COP.1	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray-Refined]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	Covers the objective directly
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to meet objective by controlling the observation of the cryptographic operations which may be used to disclose the keys

**OT.PIN-MNGT**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the access to private and internal data of the objects
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the access to private and internal data of the objects
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray-Refined]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective



SFR	Rationale
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	Contributes to meet the objective
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to meet the objective.

**OT.TRANSACTION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray-Refined]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Covers the objective directly
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Covers the objective directly

**7.3.4 Object Deletion****OT.OBJ-DELETION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective

**7.3.5 Applet Management****OT.APPLI-AUTH**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Refinement: applies to FCS_COP.1[DAP]. Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring that the loaded Executable Application is legitimate by specifying the algorithm to be used in order to verify the DAP signature of the Verification Authority.
FDP_ROL.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet this security objective by ensures that card management operations may be cleanly aborted.
FPT_FLS.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet the security objective by preserving a secure state when failures occur.

**OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FDP_ACF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.3[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FCO_NRO.2[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UID.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.

SFR	Rationale
FIA_UAU.4[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.

**OT.COMM\_AUTH**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying secure cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to determine the origin of the card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management commands.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring the origin of card administration commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management commands.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management commands.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to authenticate card management requests.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to authenticate card management requests.
FIA_UID.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions that can be performed before authenticating the origin of the APDU commands that the TOE receives.
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions that can be performed before authenticating the origin of the APDU commands that the TOE receives.

**OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet the security objective by by specifying secure cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to ensure the integrity of the card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by defining the roles enabling to send and authenticate the card management requests for which the integrity has to be ensured.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring the integrity of card management commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the integrity of administration requests.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the integrity of administration requests.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the integrity of card management requests.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the integrity of card management requests.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions activating the integrity check on the card management commands.

**OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by specifying secure cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to ensure the confidentiality of the card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover the security objective by defining the roles enabling to send and authenticate the card management requests for which the confidentiality has to be ensured.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by ensuring the confidentiality of card management commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the confidentiality of administration requests.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the confidentiality of administration requests.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the confidentiality of card management requests by decrypting those requests and imposing management conditions on that attributes.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the confidentiality of card management requests by decrypting those requests and imposing management conditions on that attributes.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying the actions ensuring the confidentiality of the card management commands.

**7.3.6 Card Management**

**OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by the ADEL access control policy which ensures the non-introduction of security holes. The integrity and confidentiality of data that does not belong to the deleted applet or CAP file is a by-product of this policy as well

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACF.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by the ADEL access control policy which ensures the non-introduction of security holes. The integrity and confidentiality of data that does not belong to the deleted applet or CAP file is a by-product of this policy as well
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by ensuring the non-accessibility of deleted data
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the ADEL access control SFP
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the ADEL access control SFP
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by maintaining the role applet deletion manager
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against possible failures of the deletion procedures
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against possible failures of the installer
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against possible failures of the deletion procedures
FDP_UIT.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy and the Security Domain access control policy which controls the integrity of the corresponding data
FDP_ROL.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet this security objective by ensures that card management operations may be cleanly aborted.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Contributes to meet the security objective by enforcing the Firewall access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy when importing card management data.
FPT_FLS.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet the security objective by preserving a secure state when failures occur.
FDP_ACC.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FDP_ACF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.3[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.

SFR	Rationale
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FCO_NRO.2[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UID.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.4[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.

### 7.3.7 Smart Card Platform

#### OT.SCP.IC

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by resetting the card session or terminating the card in case of physical tampering.
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring leakage resistant implementations of the unobservable operations

#### OT.SCP.RECOVERY

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring reinitialization of the Java Card System and its data after card tearing and power failure
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by preserving a secure state after failure

**OT.SCP.SUPPORT**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.1	Contributes to meet the objective
FCS_CKM.2	Contributes to meet the objective
FCS_CKM.3	Contributes to meet the objective
FCS_CKM.4	Contributes to meet the objective
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet the objective
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective

**OT.IDENTIFICATION**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_SAS.1[SCP]	Covers the objective. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification

**7.3.8 Config Applet****OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FDP_IFF.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_MSA.3[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_MSA.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_SMR.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_SMF.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FIA_UID.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by requiring identification before modifying configuration items.

**7.3.9 OS Update Mechanism****OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD**

SFR	Rationale
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring the unobservability of the S.OSU decryption key
FIA_UID.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring identification.
FIA_UAU.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring authentication.

**OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by applying the rules of the Information Flow Control policy.
FDP_IFF.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by applying the rules of the Information Flow Control policy.
FMT_MSA.3[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by enforcing restrictive default values for the attributes of the OS Update information flow control SFP.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the OS Update procedure.
FIA_UID.1[OSU]	Contributes to the objective by requiring identification of the authorized images.
FIA_UAU.1[OSU]	Contributes to the objective by requiring authentication of the authorized images.

**OT.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring that only allowed versions of the D.UPDATE_IMAGE are accepted and by checking the evidence data of authenticity and integrity.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the OS Update procedure.
FPT_FLS.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring a secure state after interruption of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).
FIA_UAU.4[OSU]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing authenticity and integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE (i.e. Additional Code).

**OT.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION**

SFR	Rationale
FMT_MSA.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by allowing to modify the Current Sequence Number only after successful OS Update procedure.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the OS Update procedure.
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]	Contributes to the objective by providing information on the currently activated software (Current Sequence Number).
FPT_FLS.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring atomicity of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).

**OT.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	Contributes to cover the objective by storing the identification data (D.TOE_IDENTIFICATION) in an integrity protected store.



SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]	Contributes to cover the objective by providing the ability to query the identification data (Current Sequence Number, Reference Sequence Number, Final Sequence Number) of the TOE.

### 7.3.10 Applet Migration Mechanism

#### OT.DATASTORE\_ACCESS

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by applying access control rules to the datastore.
FDP_ACF.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by applying access control rules to the datastore.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by ensuring that only the ArchiveManager sets the respective AID couples of the exporting and importing applets.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing access only to ArchiveManager to read/write the datastore and the respective exporting and importing applet AID.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing import and export functions from/to the datastore.
FDP_IFC.2[AMD]	This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only from an authenticated off card entity
FDP_IFF.1[AMD]	This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only from an authenticated off card entity.
FMT_SMR.1[AMD]	Contributes to cover the objective by letting S.ArchiveManager handle the Applet Migration process
FPT_FLS.1[AMD]	Enforces the security objective by preserving a secure state in case the applet migration is not performed successfully.
FIA_UAU.5[AMD]	This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only from an authenticated off card entity
FIA_UID.1[AMD]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring identification.

### 7.3.11 Restricted Mode

#### OT.ATTACK-COUNTER

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the security role ISD.
FMT_MSA.3[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by restricting the initial value of the Attack Counter and allowing nobody to change the initial value.
FMT_MSA.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by only allowing the ISD to modify the Attack Counter.
FIA_UAU.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring authentication before resetting the Attack Counter.

SFR	Rationale
FIA_UID.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring identification before resetting the Attack Counter.

**OT.RESTRICTED-MODE**

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the security role ISD.
FDP_ACC.2[RM]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by defining the subject of the Restricted Mode access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by controlling access to objects for all operations.
FMT_SMF.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the management functions of the restricted mode.
FIA_UAU.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring authentication before resetting the Attack Counter.
FIA_UID.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring identification before resetting the Attack Counter.

**7.4 SFR Dependencies**

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FAU_ARP.1	FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FAU_SAS.1[SCP]	No other components.	
FCO_NRO.2[SC]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies...continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.3	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FCS_COP.1	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FCS_RNG.1	No dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1[AMD]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[AMD]
FDP_ACC.1[SD]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[SD]
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FDP_ACC.2[ADEL]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FDP_ACC.2[RM]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[RM]
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FDP_ACF.1[ADEL]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FDP_ACF.1[AMD]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.1[AMD] FMT_MSA.3[AMD]
FDP_ACF.1[SD]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FMT_MSA.3[SD]
FDP_ACF.1[RM]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.2[RM] FMT_MSA.3[RM]

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies...continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FDP_IFC.1[JCVm]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[SC]
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[OSU]
FDP_IFC.2[AMD]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[AMD]
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[CFG]
FDP_IFF.1[JCVm]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[SC] FMT_MSA.3[SC]
FDP_IFF.1[OSU]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[OSU] FMT_MSA.3[OSU]
FDP_IFF.1[AMD]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[AMD] FMT_MSA.3[AMD]
FDP_IFF.1[CFG]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[CFG] FMT_MSA.3[CFG]
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FTP_ITC.1[SC]
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	No dependencies.	
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	No dependencies.	
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies...continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FDP_ROL.1[CCM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	No dependencies.	
FDP_UIT.1[CCM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FTP_ITC.1[SC]
FIA_AFL.1[PIN]	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.	see AppNote in FIA_AFL.1[PIN]
FIA_ATD.1[AID]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.1[SC]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.1[OSU]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.1[AMD]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.1[CFG]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.1[RM]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.2[AID]	No dependencies.	
FIA_USB.1[AID]	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FIA_UAU.5[AMD]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UAU.1[RM]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[RM]
FIA_UAU.1[OSU]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[OSU]
FIA_UAU.4[SC]	No dependencies.	
FIA_UAU.4[OSU]	No dependencies.	
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_MSA.1[JCVVM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies...continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FMT_SMR.1[SD] FMT_SMF.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.1[AMD] FMT_SMR.1[AMD] FMT_SMF.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.1[OSU]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_IFC.2[OSU] FMT_SMR.1[OSU] FMT_SMF.1[OSU]
FMT_MSA.1[CFG]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_IFC.2[CFG] FMT_SMR.1[CFG] FMT_SMF.1[CFG]
FMT_MSA.1[SD]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FMT_SMR.1[SD] FMT_SMF.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.1[RM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.2[RM] FMT_SMR.1[SD] FMT_SMF.1[RM]
FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies...continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MSA.3[JCVM]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[AMD] FMT_SMR.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.3[OSU]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[OSU] FMT_SMR.1[OSU]
FMT_MSA.3[CFG]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[CFG] FMT_SMR.1[CFG]
FMT_MSA.3[SD]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[SD] FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[SC] FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[RM]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[RM] FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[CFG]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[SD]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMF.1[RM]	No dependencies.	
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]

Table 25. SFRs Dependencies...continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[OSU]
FMT_SMR.1[AMD]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[AMD]
FMT_SMR.1[CFG]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[CFG]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FPR_UNO.1	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1[OSU]	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1[AMD]	No dependencies.	
FPT_FLS.1[CCM]	No dependencies.	
FPT_TDC.1	No dependencies.	
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	see §7.4.3.1 of [6]
FPT_ITC.1[SC]	No dependencies.	

#### 7.4.1 Rationale for Exclusion of Dependencies

**The dependency FIA\_UID.1 of FMT\_SMR.1[INSTALLER] is unsupported.** This ST does not require the identification of the "installer" since it can be considered as part of the TSF.

**The dependency FIA\_UID.1 of FMT\_SMR.1[ADEL] is unsupported.** This ST does not require the identification of the "deletion manager" since it can be considered as part of the TSF.

**The dependency FMT\_SMF.1 of FMT\_MSA.1[JCRE] is unsupported.** The dependency between FMT\_MSA.1[JCRE] and FMT\_SMF.1 is not satisfied because no management functions are required for the Java Card RE.

**The dependency FAU\_SAA.1 of FAU\_ARP.1 is unsupported.** The dependency of FAU\_ARP.1 on FAU\_SAA.1 assumes that a "potential security violation" generates an audit event. On the contrary, the events listed in FAU\_ARP.1 are self-contained (arithmetic exception, ill-formed bytecodes, access failure) and ask for a straightforward reaction of the TSFs on their occurrence at runtime. The JCVM or other components of the TOE detect these events during their usual working order. Thus, there is no mandatory audit recording in this ST.

**The dependency FIA\_UAU.1 of FIA\_AFL.1[PIN] is unsupported.** The TOE implements the firewall access control SFP, based on which access to the object Implementing FIA\_AFL.1[PIN] is organized.



## 7.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The selection of assurance components is based on the underlying PP [6].

The Security Target uses the augmentations from the PP, chooses EAL5 and adds the components AVA\_VAN.5, ASE\_TSS.2, ALC\_DVS.2 and ALC\_FLR.1. The requirement of the PP [6] to choose at least EAL4 is fulfilled.

The rationale for the augmentations is the same as in the PP.

The assurance level EAL5 is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [3]. The assurance components in an EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The additional requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, the components AVA\_VAN.5, ASE\_TSS.2, ALC\_DVS.2 and ALC\_FLR.1 add additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements is still guaranteed.

## 8 TOE summary specification (ASE\_TSS)

### 8.1 Introduction

The Security Functions (SF) introduced in this section realize the SFRs of the TOE. See [Table 26](#) for list of all Security Functions. Each SF consists of components spread over several TOE modules to provide a security functionality and fulfill SFRs.

### 8.2 Security Functionality

Table 26. Overview of Security Functionality

Name	Title
SF.JCVM	Java Card Virtual Machine
SF.AM	Applet Migration
SF.CONFIG	Configuration Management
SF.OPEN	Card Content Management
SF.CRYPTO	Cryptographic Functionality
SF.RNG	Random Number Generator
SF.DATA_STORAGE	Secure Data Storage
SF.OSU	Operating System Update
SF.OM	Java Object Management
SF.MM	Memory Management
SF.PIN	PIN Management
SF.PERS_MEM	Persistent Memory Management
SF.EDC	Error Detection Code API
SF.HW_EXC	Hardware Exception Handling
SF.RM	Restricted Mode
SF.PID	Platform Identification

<p><b>SF.JCVM</b></p>	<p><b>Java Card Virtual Machine</b></p> <p>SF.JCVM provides the Java Card Virtual Machine including byte code interpretation and the Java Card Firewall according to the specifications [31] and [30]. This fulfills the SFRs FDP_IFC.1[JCVM], FDP_IFF.1[JCVM], FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL], FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL], FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL] and FIA_UID.2[AID]. SF.JCVM supports FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1 by throwing Java Exceptions according to these specifications. Additionally it supports these SFRs by verification of the integrity of used Java object headers.</p> <p>Security attributes in SF.JCVM are separated from user data and not accessible by applets to fulfill FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] and FMT_MSA.1[JCVM]. All values for security attributes are initialized and assigned by the system itself which fulfills FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM], FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL], and FMT_MSA.3[JCVM].</p> <p>SF.JCVM ensures together with SF.PERS_MEM that the system is halted in case non existing Java objects could be referenced after an aborted transaction to fulfill FDP_RIP.1[ABORT].</p>
<p><b>SF.AM</b></p>	<p><b>Applet Migration</b></p> <p>The SF.AM enables applet update while applet personalization data is preserved. In particular, the implementation of the Applet Migration feature supports the functions for export and import of applet data and thus, covers the SFR FMT_SMF.1[AMD].</p> <p>The Applet Migration feature relies on the ArchiveManager component which controls and manages the data import and export steps and so, stores the AIDs of the exporting and importing applets instances. Thus, it enforces the SFR FMT_SMR.1[AMD].</p> <p>The Applet Migration process relies on an access control policy based on old/new applet AIDs which controls the access of applet instances to the migrated data. This enforces the SFRs FDP_ACC.1[AMD] and FDP_ACF.1[AMD]. The AID of the exporting and importing applet instances used in the access control policy can be set only by the ArchiveManager and thus, the Applet Migration covers the SFR FMT_MSA.3[AMD] and FMT_MSA.1[AMD]. The ArchiveManager is also the component setting the Applet Migration Plan and so satisfies FMT_MSA.3[AMD] and FDP_IFC.2[AMD].</p> <p>The Applet Migration process also requires authentication of the off card entity that sends the Applet Migration commands for import and export. The import/export steps are performed either via a secure channel protocol with authentication or via a proprietary protocol which uses an electronic signature that is verified by a public key residing on the TOE. These measures satisfy the SFRs FIA_UAU.5[AMD], FDP_IFF.1[AMD], FDP_IFC.2[AMD] and FIA_UID.1[AMD].</p> <p>In case the export or import phase fail then the an exception is thrown and the system preserves secure state. Thus, the Applet Migration functionality fulfills the SFR FPT_FLS.1[AMD].</p>

<p><b>SF.CONFIG</b></p>	<p><b>Configuration Management</b></p> <p>SF.CONFIG provides means to store Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data before TOE delivery FAU_SAS.1[SCP].</p> <p>SF.CONFIG provides means to change configurations of the card. Some configurations can be changed by the customer and some can only be changed by NXP (FDP_IFC.2[CFG], FDP_IFF.1[CFG], FMT_MSA.3[CFG], FMT_MSA.1[CFG], FMT_SMR.1[CFG], FMT_SMF.1[CFG], FIA_UID.1[CFG]). SF.CONFIG supports FCS_COP.1 by configuring the behavior of cryptographic operations.</p> <p>Additionally, SF.CONFIG provides proprietary commands to select (FIA_UID.1[SC]) the OS update mechanism SF.OSU and to reset the OS to an initial state (FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1).</p>
<p><b>SF.OPEN</b></p>	<p><b>Card Content Management</b></p> <p>SF.OPEN provides the card content management functionality according the GlobalPlatform Specification [34] and GlobalPlatform Amendments A [35], D [37], E [38] and F [39]. This supports FCO_NRO.2[SC], FDP_ACC.1[SD], FDP_ACF.1[SD], FDP_UIT.1[CCM], FDP_IFF.1[SC], FDP_IFC.2[SC], FIA_UID.1[SC], FIA_UID.2[AID], FIA_USB.1[AID], FMT_MSA.1[SC], FMT_MSA.1[SD], FMT_MSA.3[SC], FMT_MSA.3[SD], FMT_SMF.1[ADEL], FMT_SMR.1[SD], FMT_SMF.1[SC], FMT_SMF.1[SD], FTP_ITC.1[SC], FMT_MSA.3[ADEL], FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER], FMT_SMR.1[ADEL], FDP_ITC.2[CCM], FDP_ROL.1[CCM], FIA_UAU.1[SC], FIA_UAU.4[SC] and FCS_COP.1 (for DAP verification). In addition to the GP specification, the Java Card Runtime Environment specification [4] is followed to support FDP_ACC.2[ADEL], FDP_ACF.1[ADEL], FMT_MSA.3[SC], FMT_MSA.3[SD], FMT_MTD.1[JCRE], FMT_MTD.3[JCRE], FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER], FDP_RIP.1[bArray], FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray], FDP_RIP.1[ADEL], FPT_TDC.1, FPT_FLS.1[ADEL], and FPT_FLS.1[CCM] for application loading, installation, and deletion.</p> <p>AID management is provided by SF.OPEN according to the GlobalPlatform Specification [25], the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [31], and the Java Card API Specification [28] to support FIA_ATD.1[AID].</p> <p>SF.OPEN is part of the TOE runtime environment and thus separated from other applications to fulfill FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]. It supports FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1 by responding with error messages and fulfills FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER] by inherent memory cleanup in case of aborted loading and installation.</p>
<p><b>SF.CRYPTO</b></p>	<p><b>Cryptographic Functionality</b></p> <p>SF.CRYPTO provides key creation, key management, key deletion and cryptographic functionality. It provides the API in accordance to the Java Card API Specification [28] to fulfill FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.3, FCS_CKM.4, and FCS_COP.1. Proprietary solutions (e.g., key lengths not supported by the Java Card API) are supported following the Java Card API. SF.CRYPTO uses SF.DATA_STORAGE to support FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.3, FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1[KEYS], and FDP_SDI.2[DATA]. The Security Software certified with the TOE hardware supports FCS_COP.1 and FPR_UNO.1.</p>
<p><b>SF.RNG</b></p>	<p><b>Random Number Generator</b></p> <p>SF.RNG provides secure random number generation to fulfill FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_RNG.1. Random numbers are generated by the Security Software certified with the TOE hardware. SF.RNG provides an API according to the Java Card API Specification [28] to generate random numbers according to FCS_RNG.1.</p>

<b>SF.DATA_STORAGE</b>	<p><b>Secure Data Storage</b></p> <p>SF.DATA_STORAGE provides a secure data storage for confidential data. It is used to store cryptographic keys (supports FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.3 and FCS_CKM.4) and to store PINs (supports FIA_AFL.1[PIN]). All data stored by SF.DATA_STORAGE is CRC32 integrity protected to fulfill FDP_SDI.2[DATA], FAU_ARP.1, and FPT_FLS.1. The stored data is AES encrypted to fulfill FPR_UNO.1.</p>
<b>SF.OSU</b>	<p><b>Operating System Update</b></p> <p>SF.OSU provides secure functionality to update the JCOP OS or UpdaterOS itself with an image created by a trusted off-card entity (FMT_SMR.1[OSU], FMT_SMF.1[OSU]). SF.OSU allows an authenticated OSU command (FIA_UAU.4[OSU]) to upload an integrity and confidentiality protected update image to update to another operating system version(FDP_IFC.2[OSU], FDP_IFF.1[OSU]). User authentication is based on the verification of signed OSU commands to fulfill FIA_UAU.1[OSU] and FIA_UID.1[OSU]. Integrity protection of OSU commands uses ECDSA, SHA-256 and CRC verification to fulfill FDP_IFF.1[OSU]. Confidentiality of the update image is ensured by ECDH and AES encryption to fulfill FDP_IFF.1[OSU]. SF.OSU ensures that the system stays in a secure state in case of invalid or aborted update procedures to fulfill FPT_FLS.1[OSU] and ensures that the information identifying the currently running OS is modified and the updated code is activated only after successful OS Update procedure FMT_MSA.3[OSU], FMT_MSA.1[OSU].</p>
<b>SF.OM</b>	<p><b>Java Object Management</b></p> <p>SF.OM provides the object management for Java objects which are processed by SF.JCVM. It provides object creation (FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]) and garbage collection according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [31] to fulfill FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] and FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]. SF.OM throws a Java Exception in case an object cannot be created as requested due to too less available memory. This fulfills FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1.</p>
<b>SF.MM</b>	<p><b>Memory Management</b></p> <p>SF.MM provides deletion of memory for transient arrays, global arrays, and logical channels according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [31]. Thus, it fulfills FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT] by granting access to and erasing of CLEAR_ON_RESET and CLEAR_ON_DESELECT transient arrays. It supports FIA_ATD.1[AID] when using logical channels and it fulfills FDP_RIP.1[APDU] and FDP_RIP.1[bArray]/FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray] by clearing the APDU buffers for new incoming data and by clearing the bArray/GlobalArray during application installation.</p>
<b>SF.PIN</b>	<p><b>PIN Management</b></p> <p>SF.PIN provides secure PIN management by using SF.DATA_STORAGE for PIN objects specified in the Java Card API Specification [28] and the GlobalPlatform Specification [34]. Thus, it fulfills FDP_SDI.2[DATA], FIA_AFL.1[PIN], and FPR_UNO.1.</p>

<p><b>SF.PERS_MEM</b></p>	<p><b>Persistent Memory Management</b>                  SF.PERS_MEM provides atomic write operations and transaction management according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [31]. This supports FAU_ARP.1, FPT_FLS.1, and FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL].                  SF.PERS_MEM supports FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] together with SF.JCVM by halting the system in case of object creation in aborted transactions.                  Low level write routines to persistent memory in SF.PERS_MEM perform checks for defect memory cells to fulfill FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1.</p>
<p><b>SF.EDC</b></p>	<p><b>Error Detection Code API</b>                  SF.EDC provides an Java API for user applications to perform high performing integrity checks based on a checksum on Java arrays JCOP 4.2 UGM [11], JCOP 4.5 UGM [14], JCOP 4.6 UGM [17], JCOP 4.8 UGM [20], JCOP 4.10 UGM [23]. The API throws a Java Exception in case the checksum is invalid. This supports FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1.</p>
<p><b>SF.HW_EXC</b></p>	<p><b>Hardware Exception Handling</b>                  SF.HW_EXC provides software exception handler to react on unforeseen events captured by the hardware (hardware exceptions). SF.HW_EXC catches the hardware exceptions and ensure the system goes to a secure state to fulfill FAU_ARP.1 and FPT_FLS.1.</p>
<p><b>SF.RM</b></p>	<p><b>Restricted Mode</b>                  SF.RM provides a restricted mode that is entered when the Attack Counter reaches its limit. In restricted mode only limited functionality is available. Only the issuer is able to reset the Attack Counter to leave the restricted mode. This supports FDP_ACC.2[RM], FDP_ACF.1[RM], FMT_MSA.3[RM], FMT_MSA.1[RM], and FMT_SMF.1[RM]. SF.RM only allows a limited set of operations to not identified and not authenticated users when in restricted mode. All other operations require identification and authentication (FIA_UID.1[RM], FIA_UAU.1[RM]).</p>
<p><b>SF.PID</b></p>	<p><b>Platform Identification</b>                  SF.PID provides a platform identifier. For elements that can be identified see Section 1.3.3. This feature supports FAU_SAS.1.1[SCP] by using initialization data that is used for platform identification.</p>

### 8.3 Protection against Interference and Logical Tampering

The protection of JCOP against Interference and Logical Tampering is implemented in software within the TOE and supported by the hardware of the micro controller.

The software protection of the TOE makes use of software security services which allow to detect and react on manipulation of the TOE. Two types of reactions are used: If invalid data from outside the TOE is detected then it is assumed that the TOE was used in a wrong way. This is indicated by an appropriate Status Word or Exception.

Detected deviations from the physical operating conditions and inconsistencies of internal states and program flow however are considered to be an attack to the TOE. In such cases an internal Attack Counter is increased. Once the Attack Counter reaches the maximum value, the TOE will go into Restricted Mode.

Typical software security mechanisms implemented in the TOE are e.g.:

- Complex patterned values are used instead of boolean values which are sensible to tampering (only one bit needs to be changed to manipulate a false into a true).
- Small random delays are inserted in the program flow to make successful physical interfering more difficult.

- Secret information like Keys or PINs are stored encrypted in the TOE. The Masterkey to decrypt these is not accessible during normal operation.
- Critical data is read after it has been written to non volatile memory.
- Enhanced cryptographic support is based on the certified Security Software for DES, AES, ECC and RSA including protection against fault injection and random number generation.
- Critical values (like PINs) are compared timing-invariant. This prevents from side channel attacks.

A full list of software countermeasures is contained in ADV\_ARC.

Further protection against Tampering and Logical Interference is realized by the MMU implemented in hardware. The MMU is able to perform access control to all types of memory. The special function registers access can be restricted by the bridges between the CPU and the peripherals.

JCOP defines several MMU contexts which restrict access to memory areas. The Master key is stored in specific coprocessor registers and blocked for reading/writing during JCOP operation. Additionally Interference and Logical Tampering is prevented by hardware security services. The JCOP runs on a certified smart card HW platform which protects against bypass by physical and logical means such as:

- cryptographic coprocessors (for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography) protected against DPA and DFA,
- enhanced security sensors for clock frequency range, low and high temperature sensor, supply voltage sensors Single Fault Injection (SFI) attack detection, light sensors, and
- encryption of data stored in persistent and transient memory.

## 8.4 Protection against Bypass of Security Related Actions

JCOP prevents bypassing security related actions by several software counter measures. Different mechanisms are used depending on the software environment.

Generally all input parameter are validated and in case of incorrect parameters the program flow is interrupted. Such event is indicated by an appropriate Status Word or Exception. This prevents the TOE from being attacked by undefined or unauthorized commands or data.

Basic protection is contributed by implementation of following standards within the TOE:

- Java Applets are separated from each other as defined in the Java Card specifications [\[28\]](#) [\[31\]](#) [\[30\]](#). The separation is achieved by implementation of the firewall which prevents Applets to access data belonging to a different Java Card context. Sharing information between different contexts is possible by supervision of the well defined Java Card Firewall mechanism implemented in the TOE.
- Access to security relevant Applications in the TOE (like Security Domains) is protected by the Secure Channel mechanism defined by Global platform [\[34\]](#). The secure channel allows access to Applications only if the secret keys are known. Further protection implemented in JCOP prevents brute force attacks to the secret keys of the Secure Channel.

The following mechanisms ensure that it is not possible to access information from the Java Layer without being authorized to do so.

- Status informations like Life Cycle of Applets or the Authentication State of a Secure Channel are stored in complex patterned values which protects them from manipulation.
- Correct order of Java Card Byte Code execution is ensured by the Virtual Machine which detects if Byte Code of a wrong context is executed.
- Correct processing of Byte Codes is ensured by checking at the beginning and end of Byte Code execution that the same Byte Code is executed.

Execution of native code in the JCOP is protected by following mechanisms:

- Critical execution paths of the TOE functionality are protected by program flow and call tree protection. This ensures that it is not possible to bypass security relevant checks and verifications.
- Critical conditions are evaluated twice. This ensures that physical attacks on the compared values are detected during security relevant checks and verifications.
- The true case in if-conditions leads to the less critical program flow or to an error case. This prevents attacks on the program flow during security relevant checks and verifications.
- At the exit of critical loops it is checked that the whole loop was processed. This prevents from manipulation of the program flow and jumping out of the loop.
- Critical parameters are checked for consistency. This prevents from attacks with manipulated parameters.

Further protection is achieved by using different buffers for APDUs in case more than one physical interface is supported. This prevents bypassing the state machine on one physical interface by the other interface.



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## 10 Glossary

Table 27. Glossary

Name	Definition
Additional Code	Code activated by the Atomic Activation on the Initial TOE to generate the final TOE. For instance, Additional Code could: correct flaws, add new functionalities, update the operating system. Also referred to as D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
APDU buffer	The APDU buffer is the buffer where the messages sent (received) by the card depart from (arrive to). The JCRE owns an APDU object (which is a JCRE Entry Point and an instance of the javacard.framework.APDU class) that encapsulates APDU messages in an internal byte array, called the APDU buffer. This object is made accessible to the currently selected applet when needed, but any permanent access (out-of-selection-scope) is strictly prohibited for security reasons.
applet deletion manager	The on-card component that embodies the mechanisms necessary to delete an applet or library and its associated data on smart cards using Java Card technology.
Atomic Activation	The Loader guarantees at activation time that the loaded Additional Code is activated and that the Identification Data of the TOE is updated. This functionality is called Atomic Activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure.
context	A context is an object-space partition associated to a package. Applets within the same Java technology-based package belong to the same context. The firewall is the boundary between contexts (see "current context").
current context	The JCRE keeps track of the current Java Card System context (also called "the active context"). When a virtual method is invoked on an object, and a context switch is required and permitted, the current context is changed to correspond to the context of the applet that owns the object. When that method returns, the previous context is restored. Invocations of static methods have no effect on the current context. The current context and sharing status of an object together determine if access to an object is permissible.
currently selected applet	The applet has been selected for execution in the current session. The Java Card RE keeps track of the currently selected Java Card applet. Upon receiving a SELECT command from the CAD or PCD with this applet's AID, the Java Card RE makes this applet the currently selected applet over the I/O interface that received the command. The Java Card RE sends all further APDU commands received over each interface to the currently selected applet on this interface ([31], Glossary).
default applet	The applet that is selected after a card reset ([31], §4.1).
Final TOE	The Final TOE is generated from the Initial TOE and the Additional Code. It is the resulting product of the Atomic Activation of the Additional Code onto the Initial TOE.
Initial TOE	The Initial TOE is the product on which the Additional Code is loaded and with the Loader as part of the embedded software.

Table 27. Glossary...continued

Name	Definition
installer	The installer is the on-card application responsible for the installation of applets on the card. It may perform (or delegate) mandatory security checks according to the card issuer policy (for bytecode-verification, for instance), loads and link packages (CAP file(s)) on the card to a suitable form for the Java Card VM to execute the code they contain. It is a subsystem of what is usually called "card manager"; as such, it can be seen as the portion of the card manager that belongs to the TOE. The installer has an AID that uniquely identifies him, and may be implemented as a Java Card applet. However, it is granted specific privileges on an implementation-specific manner ( <a href="#">[31]</a> , §10).
interface	A special kind of Java programming language class, which declares methods, but provides no implementation for them. A class may be declared as being the implementation of an interface, and in this case must contain an implementation for each of the methods declared by the interface (See also shareable interface).
Java Card RE	The runtime environment under which Java programs in a smart card are executed. It is in charge of all the management features such as applet lifetime, applet isolation, object sharing, applet loading, applet initializing, transient objects, the transaction mechanism and so on.
Java Card RE Entry Point	An object owned by the Java Card RE context but accessible by any application. These methods are the gateways through which applets request privileged Java Card RE services: the instance methods associated to those objects may be invoked from any context, and when that occurs, a context switch to the Java Card RE context is performed. There are two categories of Java Card RE Entry Point Objects: Temporary ones and Permanent ones. As part of the firewall functionality, the Java Card RE detects and restricts attempts to store references to these objects.
Java Card RMI	Java Card Remote Method Invocation is the Java Card System version 2.2 and 3 Classic Edition mechanism enabling a client application running on the CAD platform to invoke a method on a remote object on the card. Notice that in Java Card System, version 2.1.1, the only method that may be invoked from the CAD is the process method of the applet class and that in Java Card System, version 3 Classic Edition, this functionality is optional.
Java Card System	Java Card System includes the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM, the Java Card API and the installer.
Java Card VM	The embedded interpreter of bytecodes. The Java Card VM is the component that enforces separation between applications (firewall) and enables secure data sharing.
Load Phase	The Load Phase is starting at the beginning of the Additional Code loading and ending at the end of Atomic Activation. During the Load Phase, the Initial TOE shall be in a secure state.
Loader	The Loader is the software developed by the Product Manufacturer. It is used to load and activate the Additional Code into the Product FLASH or EEPROM memory. The Loader is included in the embedded software and is considered as part of the Initial TOE. see also UpdaterOS.

Table 27. Glossary...continued

Name	Definition
logical channel	A logical link to an application on the card. A new feature of the Java Card System, version 2.2 and 3 Classic Edition, that enables the opening of simultaneous sessions with the card, one per logical channel. Commands issued to a specific logical channel are forwarded to the active applet on that logical channel. Java Card platform, version 2.2.2 and 3 Classic Edition, enables opening up to twenty logical channels over each I/O interface (contacted or contactless).
MC FW	Microcontroller Firmware. Firmware for booting and low level functionality of the Micro Controller.
NVRAM	Non-Volatile Random Access Memory, a type of memory that retains its contents when power is turned off.
object deletion	The Java Card System version 2.2 and 3 Classic Edition mechanism ensures that any unreferenced persistent (transient) object owned by the current context is deleted. The associated memory space is recovered for reuse prior to the next card reset.
OS Update	OS Update process/mechanism of JCOP.
package	A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain classes and interfaces. A package defines either a user library, or one or more applet definitions. A package is divided in two sets of files: export files (which exclusively contain the public interface information for an entire package of classes, for external linking purposes; export files are not used directly in a Java Card virtual machine) and CAP files.
shareable interface	An interface declaring a collection of methods that an applet accepts to share with other applets. These interface methods can be invoked from an applet in a context different from the context of the object implementing the methods, thus "traversing" the firewall.
subject	An active entity within the TOE that causes information to flow among objects or change the system's status. It usually acts on the behalf of a user. Objects can be active and thus are also subjects of the TOE.
transient object	An object whose contents are not preserved across CAD sessions. The contents of these objects are cleared at the end of the current CAD session or when a card reset is performed. Writes to the fields of a transient object are not affected by transactions.
UpdaterOS	OS that implements the OS Update.
user	Any application interpretable by the Java Card RE. That also covers the packages. The associated subject(s), if applicable, is (are) an object(s) belonging to the javacard.framework.applet class.

## 11 Acronyms

Table 28. Acronyms

Name	Definition
AID	<p><u>A</u>pplication <u>I</u>dentifier, an ISO-7816 data format used for unique identification of Java Card applications (and certain kinds of files in card file systems). The Java Card platform uses the AID data format to identify applets and packages. AIDs are administered by the International Standards Organization (ISO), so they can be used as unique identifiers.</p> <p>AIDs are also used in the security policies (see 'Context' below): applets' AIDs are related to the selection mechanisms, packages' AIDs are used in the enforcement of the firewall.</p> <p>Note: although they serve different purposes, they share the same name space.</p>
AP	Application Provider.
applet	The name is given to a Java Card technology-based user application. An applet is the basic piece of code that can be selected for execution from outside the card. Each applet on the card is uniquely identified by its AID.
APSD	Application Provider Security Domain.
ARM	Advanced RISC Machine.
CAD	<u>C</u> ard <u>A</u> cceptance <u>D</u> evice, or card reader. The device where the card is inserted, and which is used to communicate with the card.
DFA	Differential Fault Analysis, a side channel attack that induces faults into cryptographic implementations, to reveal their internal states.
DPA	Differential Power Analysis is a form of side channel attack in which an attacker studies the power consumption of a cryptographic hardware device such as a smart card.
GP	GlobalPlatform.
ICV	Initial Chaining Vector.
ISD	Issuer Security Domain.
JCOP	Java Card OpenPlatform Version 4.2 is the TOE (short for NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6).
JCOP OS	Java Card OpenPlatform Operating System is the software stack without the MC FW.
OSP	Organizational Security Policy.
PCD	Proximity Coupling Device. The PCD is a contactless card reader device.
PICC	Proximity Card. The PICC is a card with contactless capabilities.
RAM	Random Access Memory, is a type of computer memory that can be accessed randomly.
RNG	Random Number Generator.
SCP	Smart Card Platform. It is comprised of the integrated circuit, the operating system and the dedicated software of the smart card.
SD	Security Domain.
Security Software	Certified Software that consists of Service Software and Crypto Library.

Table 28. Acronyms...continued

Name	Definition
SFR	Security Functional Requirement.
SIO	An object of a class implementing a shareable interface.
SPD	Security Problem Definition.
SSD	Supplementary Security Domain.
VASD	Verification Authority Security Domain.

## 12 Legal information

### 12.1 Definitions

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