

Certification Report

Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB

Sponsor and developer: ***NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH***
Business Unit Security & Connectivity
Tropfowitzstrasse 20, 22529 Hamburg
Germany

Evaluation facility: ***SGS Brightsight B.V.***
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands

Report number: **NSCIB-CC-66030-CR6**

Report version: **1**

Project number: **66030_6**

Author(s): **Jordi Mujal**

Date: **16 February 2023**

Number of pages: **14**

Number of appendices: **0**

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Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories”.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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Recognition of the Certificate

The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see <https://www.sogis.eu>.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB. The developer of the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of the Crypto Library V3.1.x and the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB Secure Smart Card Controller. For ease of reading the TOE is often called “Crypto Library on SmartMX2”.

The Crypto Library on SmartMX2 is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic functions that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. The NXP SmartMX2 smart card processor provides the computing platform and cryptographic support by means of co-processors for the Crypto Library on SmartMX2.

The TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA, ECC key generation, ECDH, ECC point addition, and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms.

In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.

Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, a secure modular multiply routine, a secure modular add and subtract routine, and includes internal security measures for residual information protection. For more details refer to the [ST], chapter 1.3.2.

Note that in the [ST] the “Crypto Library V3.1.x” represents the Crypto Library V3.1.1 and Crypto Library V3.1.2. Both these minor versions are covered by this certificate.

In case of a composite evaluation the used minor version of the CL should be explicitly checked and mentioned.

The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified on 28 July 2016, and re-certified on 17 November 2017, 29 May 2018, 7 January 2020, and 7 July 2021. This re-evaluation also took place by SGS Brightsight and was completed on 16 February 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

This sixth issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”. The major change is the recertification of the underlying HW.

Note that in the second certification of this TOE, the ST was updated to remove all claims regarding the security of ECC parameter verification. If the security of a composite or end product relies on this functionality, appropriate evaluation of the security properties of this functionality is required.

Note that in the third certification of this TOE, the scope of the underlying platform certification was updated: MIFARE is now out of all scopes, production sites were added and an additional variant was included.

Note that in the fourth certification of this TOE, there were changes on the underlying platform certification guidance and production sites and an additional variant, and subsequent recertification.

Note that in the fifth certification of this TOE, there were changes in some IT and Datacenter sites which were removed from [ETRIC] as they were either already considered in the scope of the hardware platform certification or no longer in use.

The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target *[ST]*, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report *[ETR]*¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation) and ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary specification with architectural design summary).

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 *[CEM]* for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 *[CC]* (Parts I, II and III).

TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

¹ The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Type	Name	Release		Date		Form of delivery
		V3.1.1	V3.1.2	V3.1.1	V3.1.2	
Library File	phSmx2Cides.lib	1.4	1.5	2015-03-26	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIAes.lib	1.5	1.6	2015-03-26	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsa.lib	1.9	1.10	2015-04-28	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsaKg.lib	2.6	2.7	2015-04-28	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIEccGfp.lib	2.6	2.7	2015-04-28	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha.lib	1.6	1.7	2015-03-26	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha512.lib	1.7	1.8	2015-03-26	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRng.lib	2.7	2.8	2015-04-28	2015-09-14	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils.lib	2.1	2.2	2015-06-09	2015-09-14	Electronic file
phSmx2CISymCfg.lib	1.7	1.8	2015-03-26	2015-09-14	Electronic file	
Header file	phSmx2Cides.h	1.4		2015-03-26		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIAes.h	1.5		2015-03-26		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsa.h	1.9		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsaKg.h	2.6		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIEccGfp.h	2.6		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha.h	1.6		2015-03-26		Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha512.h	1.7		2015-03-26		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRng.h	2.7		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils.h	2.0		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils_ImportExportFcts.h	2.0		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils_RngAccess.h	2.0		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CITypes.h	1.1		2013-11-15		Electronic file
	phSmx2CISymCfg.h	1.7		2015-03-26		Electronic file
	phSmx2CISymCfg_Aes.h	1.7		2015-03-26		Electronic file
phSmx2CISymCfg_Des.h	1.7		2015-03-26		Electronic file	
Source code	phSmx2CIUtils_ImportExportFcts.a51	2.0		2015-04-28		Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils_RngAccess.a51	2.0		2015-04-28		Electronic file

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB. For details, see section 2.5 "Documentation" of this report.

The hardware part of the TOE is delivered by NXP as described in the hardware guidance.

The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 of the TOE lifecycle (for a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.2.2.) as a software package (a set of binary files) to the developers of the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise

in this case an operating system and/or other smart card software (applications). The Software developers can incorporate the Crypto Library into their product.

As explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall verify the correctness of the delivered files by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the delivered files and comparing them to reference values provided in the user guidance.

For the identification of the Hardware please refer to the hardware certification.

2.2 Security Policy

The TOE provides the cryptographic algorithms AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann key-exchange, full point addition (ECC over GF(p)), standard security level SHA 1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the hardware platform. The cryptographic algorithms (except SHA) are resistant against Side Channel Attacks, including Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) and timing attacks. SHA is only resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing attacks. Details on the resistance claims are provided in the Security Target [ST], relevant details are provided in the user guidance documents.

The TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.

The TOE also a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, secure modular multiply routine, a secure modular add and subtract routine and includes internal security measures for residual information protection.

Note that the TOE does not restrict access to the functions provided by the hardware: these functions are still directly accessible to the Smartcard embedded Software.

2.2.1 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

2.3 Architectural Information

This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled "TOE design (ADV_TDS)". The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the major components and to show dependencies between the TOE and products using the TOE in a composition (e.g. dependencies between HW and SW).

The TOE contains a Crypto Library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. Please note that the crypto functions are supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may include only those functions that are actually required. However, some dependencies exist; details are described in the User Guidance.

The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen according to the cryptographic algorithms provided. The whole TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann) key-exchange, full point addition (ECC over GF(p)), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the hardware platform. In addition, the TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.

Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, a secure modular multiply routine, a secure modular add and subtract routine, and includes internal security measures for residual information protection.

2.4 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Type	Name	Release		Date		Form of delivery
		V3.1.1	V3.1.2	V3.1.1	V3.1.2	
Documents	User Guidance Manual	1.5	1.5	2018-02-28	2018-02-28	Electronic document
	User Guidance: DES	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: AES	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: RSA	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: RSA Key Generation	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: ECC over GF(p)	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: SHA	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: SHA512	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: RNG	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: Utils	1.0		2015-11-23		Electronic document
	User Guidance: SymCfg	1.1		2016-03-16		Electronic document

2.5 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

2.5.1 Testing approach and depth

For the Crypto Library, the developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem and module level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using a test-OS that allows access to the functionalities. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.

The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, as the hardware is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided a testing environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.

2.5.2 Independent penetration testing

The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing approach:

1. Inventory of required resistance

This step uses the JIL attack list [*JIL-AM*] as a reference for completeness and studies the ST claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the NXP Crypto Library. In addition, both external (*[BSI-RSA]*, *[BSI-ECC]*) and internal attack lists are used to augment the JIL attack

list.

2. *Validation of security functionalities*

This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs tests to verify implementation and to validate proper functioning. (ATE)

3. *Vulnerability analysis*

This step first gives an overview against which attacks the implemented security functionalities are meant to provide protection. Secondly in this step the design of the implemented security functionalities is studied. Thirdly, an analysis is performed to determine whether the design contains vulnerabilities against the respective attacks of step 1. (AVA)

4. *Analysis of input from other evaluation activities*

This step first analyses the input from other CC-evaluation classes expressed as possible vulnerabilities. Secondly, the evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis provides sufficient assurance or whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. (AVA)

5. *Design assurance evaluation*

This step analyses the results from an attack perspective as defined in step 1. Based on this design analysis the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. (AVA)

6. *Penetration testing*

This step performs the penetration tests identified in step 4 and step 5. (AVA)

7. *Conclusions on resistance*

This step performs a [JIL-AM] compliant rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation with the assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the evaluators draw conclusions on the resistance of NXP Crypto Library against attackers possessing a high attack potential.

During this re-certification the vulnerability analysis was refreshed. As a result, some representative tests were performed to provide ongoing assurance of penetration testing performed in earlier evaluation of the TOE.

The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this recertification was 5 weeks. During that test campaign, 17% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 83% on side-channel testing.

2.5.3 Test configuration

Since the TOE is not an end-user product it is not possible to perform testing without first embedding it in a testable configuration. To this end, the developer has created a proprietary test operating system. The main purpose of the test OS is to provide access to the crypto library's functionality. The test OS, and its documentation, was provided to the evaluators, and was used in all the testing.

The following items were used to provide support during the tests:

- A set of card samples (the TOE) containing the following:
 - Hardware sample: P6022P VB and P6021P VB in contact mode.
 - Crypto library loaded into the hardware sample.
 - CryptOS loaded into the hardware sample.
- A toolset provided by the developer in order to facilitate recreation of the Cryptographic library, and loading the library and the CryptOS into samples.

- CryptOS documentation.

2.5.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the AVA_VAN.5 "high attack potential". The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).

The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. The remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits, so this is considered sufficient. Therefore, no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRFc] for details.

2.6 Reused Evaluation Results

This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been re-used, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of the TOE, by use of 4 site certificates and 4 Site Technical Audit Reports.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

2.7 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB.

The TOE consists of a hardware part and a software part. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE identified as follows:

- The authenticity of the hardware part of the TOE is checked following the guidance and certification report of the hardware.
- The reference of the software part of the TOE is checked by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the delivered files and comparing them to reference values provided in the user guidance.

2.8 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRFc] was provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is "Pass".

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB, to be **CC Part 2 extended**, **CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL**

6 augmented with ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

The Security Target claims 'strict' conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].

2.9 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 0 "This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled "TOE design (ADV_TDS)". The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the major components and to show dependencies between the TOE and products using the TOE in a composition (e.g. dependencies between HW and SW).

The TOE contains a Crypto Library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. Please note that the crypto functions are supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may include only those functions that are actually required. However, some dependencies exist; details are described in the User Guidance.

The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen according to the cryptographic algorithms provided. The whole TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann) key-exchange, full point addition (ECC over GF(p)), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the hardware platform. In addition, the TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.

Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine, a secure compare routine, a secure modular multiply routine, a secure modular add and subtract routine, and includes internal security measures for residual information protection.

Documentation" contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE's security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations MIFARE (out of scope).

Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5 "high attack potential". To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

3 Security Target

The Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB Security Target, Rev. 2.0, 12 December 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.

4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC	Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DFA	Differential Fault Analysis
ECB	Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA	Electromagnetic Analysis
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
IC	Integrated Circuit
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NSCIB	Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP	Protection Profile
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA	Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE	Target of Evaluation

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

- [BSI-ECC] Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations Version 2.0 (DRAFT2).
- [BSI-RSA] Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations Version 1.0.
- [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
- [ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Crypto Library 3.1.x on the NXP P6021y VB”– EAL6+, 22-RPT-1422, v2.0, 2 February 2023.
- [ETRFC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “Crypto Library 3.1.x on the NXP P6021y VB”– EAL6+, 22-RPT-1425, v2.0, 2 February 2023.
- [HW-CERT] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1072-V5-2022 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB* including IC Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, BSI, V1.0, 12 December 2022.
- [ST-HW] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB Security Target Lite, Rev 1.11, 23 August 2019
- [JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
- [JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
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(This is the end of this report.)