



**cryptovision**

**SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with  
ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH,  
version 1.0 –  
Java Card applet configuration providing  
Secure Signature Creation Device with  
Key generation (SSCD)**

**Security Target Lite**

**NSCIB-2400169-01**

**Common Criteria / ISO 15408 / EAL 5+**

**Public**

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## Content

1	Introduction .....	4
1.1	ST/TOE Identification .....	4
1.2	ST overview .....	4
1.3	TOE overview .....	5
1.4	TOE description .....	5
2	Conformance claims .....	15
2.1	CC conformance .....	15
2.2	Statement of Compatibility concerning Composite Security Target .....	16
3	Security problem definition .....	27
3.1	Assets, users and threat agents .....	27
3.2	Threats .....	27
3.3	Organisational Security Policies .....	28
3.4	Assumptions .....	29
4	Security Objectives .....	30
4.1	Security Objectives for the TOE .....	30
4.2	Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .....	31
4.3	Security Objectives Rationale .....	32
5	Extended Component Definition and CC2022 correspondence .....	37
5.1	Family FPT_EMS .....	37
6	IT Security Requirements .....	40
6.1	General .....	40
6.2	TOE Security Functional Requirements .....	40
6.3	TOE Security Assurance Requirements .....	54
6.4	Rationale .....	55
7	TOE summary specification .....	61
7.1	Security Functionality .....	61
7.2	TOE summary specification rationale .....	68
8	References .....	71
	Common Criteria .....	71
	Protection Profiles .....	71
	TOE and Platform References .....	71
	EU regulation .....	72
	The DIRECTIVE .....	72
	Application and Cryptography standards .....	73
	Glossary .....	74

## Version Control

Version	Date	Author	Changes to Previous Version
0.9	2025-04-23	Thomas Zeggel	Security Target Lite based on Security Target version 0.9.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 ST/TOE Identification

Title:	SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Generation (SSCD) – Security Target Lite
Document Version:	v0.9
Origin:	cv cryptovision GmbH
Compliant to:	Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation; English version EN 419211-2:2013, English translation of DIN EN 419211-2:2013-12; PP Registration: BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02; December 2013 [PP0059]
Product identification:	SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0
TOE identification:	SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)
Javacard OS platform:	SECORA™ ID X v2.02, NSCIB-CC-2400063-01 [Cert_Secora]
Security controller:	BSI-DSZ-CC-1169-V4-2024 [ST_IC]
TOE documentation:	Administration and user guide [Guidance]

## 1.2 ST overview

This document contains the security target lite for SSCD compliant configuration of the SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0. SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 is a set of Javacard applications intended to be used exclusively on the SECORA ID X v2 Javacard OS platforms, which is certified according to CC EAL 6+ [Cert\_Secora]. SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 as well as the SECORA ID X v2 operating system are provided on a smart card chip based on an Infineon security controller, which is itself certified according to CC EAL 6+ [Cert\_IC].

This security target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile *Protection profiles for Secure Signature Creation Device — Part 2: Device with key generation* (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02) [PP0059].

The main objectives of this ST are:

- to introduce TOE and the SSCD application,
- to define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
- to describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development, production and usage.
- to describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE.
- to specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functionalities.

The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL5 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2.

### 1.3 TOE overview

The TOE is a Java Card (SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0) configured to provide a secure signature creation device (SSCD) with key generation for the creation of legally binding qualified electronic signatures and qualified electronic seals as defined in the eIDAS regulation [Regulation]<sup>1</sup>. To allow secure access to the signature functionality over the contactless interface, it provides an optional PACE mechanism to build up a secure channel for the signature PIN.

### 1.4 TOE description

#### 1.4.1 Overview of SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0

SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 is a set of Java Card applets for e-ID document applications built upon an underlying core library. The following *Table 1* provides an overview of the individual applications included in SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0:

Product / Application	Specification	Configuration <sup>2</sup>
ICAO MRTD application with Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC)	ICAO Doc 9303	ePasslet4.0/MRTD-BAC
ISO File System application	ISO 7816	ePasslet4.0/ISO-FS
ISO Driving License application with Basic Access Protection (BAP) or Supplemental Access Control (SAC)	ISO 18013	ePasslet4.0/IDL-Basic
ISO Driving License application with Extended Access Protection (EAP) or Extended Access Control (EACv1)	ISO 18013	ePasslet4.0/IDL-Extended
ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access Control (EACv1)	ICAO Doc 9303, TR03110v1.11	ePasslet4.0/MRTD-EAC
Secure Signature Creation Device application supporting PKI utilization – Device with key generation	ISO 7816, PKCS#15	ePasslet4.0/SSCD
Secure Signature Creation Device application supporting PKI utilization – Device with key import	ISO 7816, PKCS#15	ePasslet4.0/SSCD-IMP
EU Electronic Vehicle Registration application	EU Council Directive 1999/37/EC	ePasslet4.0/eVR
EU Electronic Health Insurance application	CWA 15974	ePasslet4.0/eHIC
German eID Document application	ICAO Doc 9303, TR03110v2.11, TR03127 v1.15	ePasslet4.0/GelD

<sup>1</sup> The TOE creates an electronic signature or electronic seal, respectively. The TOE meets the requirements of [PP0059], and with the key certificate created as specified in Annex I and Annex III of the eIDAS regulation [Regulation], the result of the signing process can be used as to create either a qualified electronic signature or a qualified electronic seal.

<sup>2</sup> The names of the configurations reflect that the TOE is based on version 4.0 of ePasslet suite.

Customizable eID Document application	ICAO Doc 09303 and TR03110v2.11	ePasslet4.0/GenID
EU Electronic Residence Permit application	TR03127 v1.15	ePasslet4.0/eRP

*Table 1: Configurations of the SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0. Please note that not all configurations are certified according to Common Criteria. **The TOE of this ST is marked in yellow.***

These configurations are based on one or more predefined applets; different configurations might use the same underlying applet.

The whole applet code resides in the Flash memory; the applets providing these different configurations are instantiated into Flash memory. Multiple configurations (and hence support for different applications) can be present at the same time by instantiating multiple applets with their distinct configurations with some restrictions detailed below. A common combination could be an ICAO MRTD applet and an SSCD applet providing a travel application with LDS data and EAC authentication together with a signature application.

Via configuration the instantiated applets can be tied to the contactless and/or the contact interface, respectively.

#### 1.4.2 TOE definition

The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, use and manage signature-creation data (SCD). The TOE consists of

- the circuitry of the chip (the integrated circuit, IC) including the contact-based interface with hardware for the contactless interface including contacts for the antenna, providing basic cryptographic functionalities,
- the platform with the Java Card operation system SECORA ID X v2.02 (please refer to the platform security target [ST\_SECORA] for details),
- the guidance documentation of SECORA ID X v2.02 according to [ST\_SECORA],
- SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 – Java Card applet configuration providing a secure signature creation device (SSCD) with key generation<sup>3</sup>,
- the associated Administrator and User Guidance [Guidance] in PDF format.

<sup>3</sup> Please note that there are two different options: a configuration for the contact-based interface, or a configuration for the contactless interface with additional PACE mechanism.




Figure 1: Schematic view on the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and its boundaries. The TOE is based on the certified hardware and Javacard OS. Besides the SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH code in non-volatile memory and the applet instantiated from it which forms the TOE of this security target, it may also contain additional applets which are not part of the TOE.

The TOE's functionality claimed by this security target is realized by the SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0 in SSCD with key generation configuration. The SSCD with key generation configuration provides an optional PKCS#15 compliant file structure and a separate DF for the SSCD functionality (DF.Sig). While DF.Sig provides the TOE's functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification.

The optional PKCS15 DF is only used for middleware integration and does not interfere with DF.Sig.

### 1.4.3 TOE package types and forms of delivery

The TOE can be delivered in the following forms:

- Packaged as
  - contact based modules
  - dual interface modules
  - contactless modules
- Packageless as sawn or unsawn wafer

The TOE supports Coil on Module antennas for dual interface modules [ST\_SECORA].

The delivery is carried out in the following form:

TOE component	Delivered format	Delivery method	Comment
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Underlying platform with SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection	Packaged as <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• contact based modules</li> <li>• dual interface modules</li> <li>• contactless modules</li> </ul> Packageless as sawn or unsawn wafer	Postal transfer in cages	All materials are delivered to distribution centers in cages, locked.
All User Guidance documents including the SECORA ID X v2.02 guidance documentation	Personalized PDF	SecureX transfer	

#### 1.4.4 TOE identification

Identification of the platform is performed by the procedure according to [AGD\_PRE].

Once the platform is identified correctly, the correct version of the Java card layer of the TOE (SECORA™ ID X v2 Applet Collection with ePasslet Suite v4.0 by cryptovision GmbH, version 1.0) can be verified as described in [Guidance].

#### 1.4.5 TOE functions

The SSCD protects the SCD during its whole life cycle as to be used in a signature-creation process solely by its signatory. The TOE provides the following functions:

- to generate signature-creation data (SCD) and the correspondent signature-verification data (SVD),
- to export the SVD for certification,
- to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
- to switch the TOE from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
- if in an operational state, to create electronic signatures for data with the following steps:
  - a) select an SCD if multiple are present in the SSCD,
  - b) authenticate the signatory and determine its intent to sign,
  - c) receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R),
  - d) apply an appropriate cryptographic signature-creation function using the selected SCD to the DTBS/R.

The TOE may implement its function for digital signature creation to conform to the specifications in ETSI TS 101 733 (CADES) [CADES], ETSI TS 101 903 (XADES) [XADES] and ETSI TS 101 903 (PADES) [PADES].

The TOE is prepared for the signatory's use by

- generating at least one SCD/SVD pair, and
- personalising for the signatory by storing in the TOE:
  - a) the signatory's reference authentication data (RAD)
  - b) optionally, certificate info for at least one SCD in the TOE.



After preparation the SCD is in a non-operational state. Upon receiving a TOE the signatory shall verify its non-operational state and change the SCD state to operational.

After preparation the intended, legitimate user should be informed of the signatory's verification authentication data (VAD) required for use of the TOE in signing. If the VAD is a password or PIN, providing this information shall protect the confidentiality of the corresponding RAD.

If the use of an SCD is no longer required, then it shall be destroyed (e.g. by erasing it from memory) as well as the associated certificate info, if any exists.

#### 1.4.6 Operation of the TOE

This paragraph presents a functional overview of the TOE in its distinct operational environments:

- The preparation environment, where it interacts with a certification service provider through a certificate-generation application (CGA) to obtain a certificate for the signature validation data (SVD) corresponding with signature creation data (SCD) the TOE has generated. The initialization environment interacts further with the TOE to personalize it with the initial value of the reference-authentication data (RAD).
- The signing environment where it interacts with a signer through a signature-creation application (SCA) to sign data after authenticating the signer as its signatory. The signature-creation application provides the data to be signed, or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R) as input to the TOE signature-creation function and obtains the resulting electronic signature.
- The management environments where it interacts with the user or an SSCD-Provisioning service provider to perform management operations, e.g. for the signatory to reset a blocked RAD. A single device, e.g. a smart card terminal, may provide the required secure environment for management and signing.

The signing environment, the management environment and the preparation environment are secure and protect data exchanged with the TOE.

The TOE stores signature creation data and reference authentication data. The TOE may store multiple instances of SCD. In this case the TOE allows to identify each SCD via object ID and the SCA can provide an interface to the signer to select an SCD for use in the signature creation function of the SSCD. The TOE protects the confidentiality of the SCD and restricts its use in signature creation to its signatory. The electronic signature created with the TOE is a qualified electronic signature as defined in [Directive]<sup>4</sup> if the certificate for the SVD is a qualified certificate ([Directive], Annex I)<sup>5</sup>. Determining the state of the certificate as qualified is beyond the scope of this security target.

The signature creation application shall protect the integrity of the input it provides to the TOE signature-creation function as being consistent with the user data authorized for signing by the signatory. Unless implicitly known to the TOE, the SCA indicates the kind of the signing input (as DTBS/R) it provides and computes any hash values required.

The TOE stores signatory reference authentication data (RAD) to authenticate a user as its signatory. The RAD is a password e.g. PIN.<sup>6</sup> The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of the RAD. The TOE receives

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<sup>4</sup> References to articles and paragraphs in [Directive] follow the style used in the according protection profile [PP0059]: "[Directive]: n.m)". References to one of the Annexes of [Directive] name the Annex explicitly.

<sup>5</sup> Please note that while this security target - following the according protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 - references the [Directive], it also incorporates the requirements of the eIDAS regulation [Regulation] and the according commission implementing regulation [Implementing].

<sup>6</sup> Technically biometry may be supported (depending on the configuration), but using biometry as RAD is not a certified configuration.

the VAD from a signature-creation application. If the signature-creation application handles, is requesting or obtaining a VAD from the user, it is assumed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of this data.

A certification service provider and a SSCD-provisioning service provider interact with the TOE in the secure preparation environment to perform any preparation function of the TOE required before control of the TOE is given to the legitimate user. These functions may include:

- initialising the RAD,
- generating a key pair,
- storing personal information of the legitimate user.

In the case at hand the TOE is a smart card or electronic ID document. In this case a smart-card terminal may be deployed that provides the required secure environment to handle a request for signatory authorization. A signature can be obtained on a document prepared by a signature-creation application component running on personal computer connected to the card terminal. The signature creation application, after presenting the document to the user and after obtaining the authorization PIN initiates the electronic signature creation function of the smart card through the terminal.

The RAD verification is typically performed by direct PIN verification (VERIFY PIN command); to further protect the RAD (password or PIN) – especially in a contactless application scenario – the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol according to [TR03110] can be used.

#### 1.4.7 Major security features of the TOE

The TOE provides the following TOE security functionalities:

- TSF\_Access manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in the applet's file system. It also controls write access of initialization, pre-personalization and personalization data<sup>7</sup>.
- TSF\_Admin manages the storage of manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and personalization data.
- TSF\_Secret ensures secure management of secrets such as cryptographic keys. This covers secure key storage, access to keys as well as secure key deletion. These mechanisms are mainly provided by TSF\_OS.
- TSF\_Crypto performs high level cryptographic operations. The implementation is mainly based on the Security Functionalities provided by TSF\_OS.
- TSF\_SecureMessaging realizes a secure communication channel.
- TSF\_Auth realizes two authentication mechanisms: PIN verification and alternatively authentication with the PACE protocol.
- TSF\_Integrity protects the integrity of internal applet data like the Access control lists.
- TSF\_OS contains all security functionalities provided by the certified platform (IC, Javacard operation system). The cryptographic operations needed for this TOE are provided by the platform:
  - Electronic signature-generation (and key generation) with RSA and key sizes of 1976 up to 4096 bit with CRT and 2048 bit without CRT (key generation up to 2048 bit), or ECDSA with key sizes of key sizes of 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 bit.

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<sup>7</sup> In the context of this security target the three categories are defined as follows: initialization comprises the preparation of the TOE based on proprietary operations of the platform with the Java Card operation system; pre-personalization comprises the configuration of the card manager and security domains as well as the generation of applet instances using Global Platform commands. Personalization is carried out afterwards using commands of the applet layer of the TOE.


- Secure messaging with AES (128, 192 or 256 bit key length).
- PACE authentication with key lengths of 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 bit (ECC).

### 1.4.8 TOE life cycle

This paragraph is based on the protection profile [PP0059].

#### 1.4.8.1 General

The TOE life cycle distinguishes stages for development, production, preparation and operational use. The development and production of the TOE (cf. CC part 1 [CC\_1], para.139) together constitute the development phase of the TOE.



*Figure 2: Overview of the development phase of the TOE, which contains development and production of the TOE. After the secure production following the process certified for the Javacard OS, the chips are delivered to the SSCD provisioning service using the delivery process already established for the OS.*

The development phase ends with the delivery of the TOE to an SSCD-provisioning service provider or a card manufacturer. This is also the end of the scope of the certification according to Common Criteria.




Figure 3: Example of TOE lifecycle following figure 1 of [PP0059]. Note that import of certificate info during TOE preparation and deletion of certificate info when SCD is destroyed are optional. The delivery to the SSCD provisioning service after the development phase is also the end of the scope of the certification according to Common Criteria.

The operational usage of the TOE comprises the preparation stage and the operational use stage. The TOE operational use stage begins when the signatory performs the TOE operation to enable it for use in signing operations. Enabling the TOE for signing requires at least one keyset of SCD stored in its memory.

The TOE life cycle ends when all keys stored in it have been rendered permanently unusable. Rendering a key in the SSCD unusable may include deletion of any stored corresponding certificate info. The lifecycle may allow generation of SCD or SCD/SVD key pairs after delivery to the signatory as well.

#### 1.4.8.2 Preparation stage

An SSCD-provisioning service provider having accepted the TOE from a manufacturer prepares the TOE for use and delivers it to its legitimate user. The preparation phase ends when the legitimate user of the TOE, having received it from an SSCD-provisioning service and any SCD it might already hold have been enabled

for use in signing. During preparation of the TOE, as specified above, an SSCD-provisioning service provider performs the following tasks:

- Create and configure the signature application according to AGD\_PRE; this step involves applet instantiation as well as creation of the file system (card profile).<sup>8</sup>
- Obtain information on the intended recipient of the device as required for the preparation process and for identification as a legitimate user of the TOE.
- Generate a PIN and/or obtain a biometric sample of the legitimate user, store this data as RAD in the TOE and prepare information about the VAD for delivery to the legitimate user.
- Generate a certificate for at least one SCD either by:
  - a) The TOE generating an SCD/SVD pair and obtaining a certificate for the SVD exported from the TOE, or
  - b) Initializing security functions in the TOE for protected export of the SVD and obtaining a certificate for the SVD after receiving a protected request from the TOE,
- Optionally, present certificate info to the SSCD.
- Deliver the TOE and the accompanying VAD info to the legitimate user.

The SVD certification task (fourth list item above) of an SSCD-provisioning service provider as specified in this security target may support a centralised, pre-issuing key generation process, with at least one key generated and certified, before delivery to the legitimate user. Alternatively, or additionally, that task may support key generation by the signatory after delivery and outside the secure preparation environment. A TOE may support both key generation processes, for example with a first key generated centrally and additional keys generated by the signatory in the operational use stage.

Data required for inclusion in the SVD certificate at least includes ([Directive], Annex II):

- the SVD which correspond to SCD under the control of the signatory;
- the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which is to be identified as such;
- an indication of the beginning and end of the period of validity of the certificate.

The data included in the certificate may have been stored in the SSCD during personalization.

Before initiating the actual certificate signature the certificate-generating application verifies the SVD received from the TOE by:

- establishing the sender as genuine SSCD
- establishing the integrity of the SVD to be certified as sent by the originating SSCD,
- establishing that the originating SSCD has been personalized for the legitimate user,
- establishing correspondence between SCD and SVD, and
- an assertion that the signing algorithm and key size for the SVD are approved and appropriate for the type of certificate.

The proof of correspondence between an SCD stored in the TOE and an SVD may be implicit in the security mechanisms applied by the CGA. Optionally, the TOE may support a function to provide an explicit proof of correspondence between an SCD it stores and an SVD realized by self-certification. Such a function may be performed implicitly in the SVD export function and may be invoked in the preparation environment without explicit consent of the signatory. Security requirements to protect the SVD export function and the

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<sup>8</sup> This preparation step has been added to the life cycle definition of the underlying Protection Profile and is necessary to provide the basic functionality (i.e. application and file system) for the following steps. It may be performed by the SSCD-provisioning service provider directly or by a separate entity (card manufacturer).

certification data if the SVD is generated by the signatory and then exported from the SSCD to the CGA are not part of this security target.

Prior to generating the certificate, the certification service provider asserts the identity of the signatory specified in the certification request as the legitimate user of the TOE.

#### **1.4.8.3 Operational use stage**

In this lifecycle stage the signatory can use the TOE to create advanced electronic signatures.

Note that in operational use stage, the TOE can be in open or closed configuration.

The TOE operational use stage begins when the signatory has obtained both the VAD and the TOE. Enabling the TOE for signing requires at least one set of SCD stored in its memory.

The signatory can also interact with the SSCD to perform management tasks, e.g. reset a RAD value or use counter if the password/PIN in the reference data has been lost or blocked. Such management tasks require a secure environment.

The signatory can render an SCD in the TOE permanently unusable. Rendering the last SCD in the TOE permanently unusable ends the life of the TOE as SSCD.

The TOE may support functions to generate additional signing keys. If the TOE supports these functions it will support further functions to securely obtain certificates for the new keys. For an additional key the signatory may be allowed to choose the kind of certificate (qualified, or not) to obtain for the SVD of the new key. The signatory may also be allowed to choose some of the data in the certificate request for instance to use a pseudonym instead of the legal name in the certificate<sup>7</sup>. If the conditions to obtain a qualified certificate are met the new key can also be used to create advanced electronic signatures. The optional TOE functions for additional key generation and certification may require additional security functions in the TOE and an interaction with the SSCD-Provisioning service provider in an environment that is secure.

The TOE life cycle as SSCD ends when all set of SCD stored in the TOE are destructed. This may include deletion of the corresponding certificates.

## 2 Conformance claims

### 2.1 CC conformance

This security target claims conformance<sup>9</sup> to:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-001, [CC\_1],
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-002, [CC\_2],
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-003, [CC\_3],
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-005, [CC\_5],

with

- Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), V1.1, 2024-07-21 [CCErrata],
- Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022, 2023-04-20, CCMC-2023-04-001 [CCTrans],

as follows:

- CC Part 2 Conformant,
- CC Part 3 conformant,
- Package conformant to EAL5 defined in CC part 5 [CC\_5] augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2 defined in CC part 3 [CC\_3].

The

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-004, [CC\_4]
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CEM:2022, Revision 1, November 2022, CCMB-2022-11-006, [CC\_6]

have to be taken into account

This security target is strictly conformant to the protection profile [PP0059]. To cover the additional PACE functionality the following SFR have been added:

- FCS\_COP.1/PACE
- FCS\_RNG.1

Since this security target is based on a CC v3.1 protection profile [PP0059], extended components were – if possible – replaced by components in CC 2022, part 2 or 3. The according overview and analysis can be found in chapter 5.

The evaluation of the TOE uses the result of the CC evaluation of the Infineon chip claiming conformance to the PP [PP0084]. The hardware part of the composite evaluation is covered by the certification report [Cert\_IC]. In addition, the evaluation of the TOE uses the result of the CC evaluation of the SECORA ID X

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<sup>9</sup> The referenced version of the Common Criteria has been updated to CC:2022, Revision 1.

v2.02 Javacard OS. The Javacard OS as part of the composite evaluation is covered by the certification report [Cert\_Secora].

## **2.2 Statement of Compatibility concerning Composite Security Target**

### **2.2.1 Assessment of the Platform TSFs**

The following table lists all Security Functionalities of the underlying Platform ST and shows, which Security Functionalities of the Platform ST are relevant for this Composite ST and which are irrelevant. The first column addresses specific Security Functionality of the underlying platform, which is assigned to Security Functionalities of the Composite ST in the second column. The last column provides additional information on the correspondence if necessary.



Platform TSF-group	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
SF.Firewall	No correspondence, internal Java card mechanism.	This security function provides an applet firewall. Each applet on the TOE must have been passed the Bytecode Verifier in order to ensure correct applet isolation.
SF.RIP	TSF_Secret	This security function ensures that sensitive information are made unavailable after usage by overwriting them with zeros or random values.
SF.Rollback	No correspondence, internal Java card mechanisms.	This security function implements atomicity and rollback mechanism for Global Platform management functions.
SF.SCP	TSF_SecureMessaging, TSF_Crypto (regarding Secure Messaging)	The TOE implements secure channel protocols according to [GP_v23], chapter 10. The protocols SCP02 and SCP03 are supported.
SF.CM	TSF_Access, TSF_Admin	This security function implements an access control policy for Global Platform card management functions according to [GP_v23], chapters 9.3 – 9.6.
SF.Physical	TSF_Integrity, TSF_Secret	This security function provides means to protect SFRs against physical tampering and leakage.
SF.CS	TSF_Crypto	This security function provides the cryptographic services for applets.
SF.PIN	TSF_Access	This security function implements secure PIN compare functions and integrity protection of the PIN.
SF.SAND_BOX	No correspondence, internal Java card mechanisms.	This security function implements a framework to execute the third party native library without harming platform and OS.

Table 2: Relevant platform TSF-groups and their correspondence

### 2.2.2 Assessment of the Platform SFRs

The following table provides an assessment of all Platform SFRs. The Platform SFRs are listed in the order used within the security target of the platform [ST\_Secora].

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
CoreG_LC Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.1 in platform ST)		
FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
		Guidance of the TOE. No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_ACF.1/FIREWALL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User Guidance of the TOE. No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_IFC.1/JCVM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_IFF.1/JCVM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/OBJECTS	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.1/JCRE	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.1/JCVM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL-JCVM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User Guidance of the TOE. No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.3/FIREWALL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User Guidance of the TOE. No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.3/JCVM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMF.1	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMR.1	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). No contradiction to this ST.
FCS_CKM.1 (FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA, FCS_CKM.1.1/EC, FCS_CKM.1.1)	FCS_CKM.1	The requirement in this ST is equivalent to parts of the platform ST.
FCS_CKM.2	No correspondence	Out of scope (managed within Java Card OS). No contradiction to this ST.
FCS_CKM.3	No correspondence	Out of scope (managed within Java Card OS). No contradiction to this ST.
FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.6	No contradiction to this ST. See section 5.2.

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
FCS_COP.1 (FCS_COP.1.1/JCAPI, FCS_COP.1.1/SCP, FCS_COP.1.1/SM)	FCS_COP.1/SIG FCS_COP.1/PACE	The requirement FCS_COP.1/SIG of this ST targets electronic signature generation and is fulfilled by the platform SFR targeting RSA signature generation (FCS_COP.1.1/JCAPI with iteration /RSA-SIG and /ECDSA_SIG).  FCS_COP.1/PACE uses the platform functionality required by FCS_COP.1.1/JCAPI/AES and FCS_COP.1.1/JCAPI/PACE).  The according hash functions of FCS_COP.1/SIG of this ST are provided by FCS_COP.1.1/JCAPI/HASH.  No contradictions to this ST.
FCS_RNG.1 (FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2, FCS_RNG.1/PTG.3, FCS_RNG.1/DRG.4)	FCS_RNG.1	In this ST, random numbers according to AIS20 class PTG.3 are required. The platform generates random numbers with a defined quality metric that can be used directly.
FDP_RIP.1/ABORT	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/APDU	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/GlobalArray	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/bArray	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/KEYS	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card Firewall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User Guidance of the TOE. No contradiction to this ST.
FAU_ARP.1	FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3	Not directly corresponding, but platform SFR is basis of fulfillment of FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3. Internal counter for security violations complement Java Card OS mechanisms- No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_SDI.2	FDP_SDI.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3	Corresponding. In addition, platform SFR is basis of fulfillment of FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3. No contradiction to this ST.

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
FPR_UNO.1	FPT_EMS.1	Not directly corresponding, but relevant for the fulfillment of FPT_EMS.1. No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_FLS.1	FPT_FLS.1	The fulfillment of the platform SFR is part of the basis of the fulfillment of the SFR of this ST. Internal countermeasures for detecting security violations complement Java Card OS mechanisms. No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_TDC.1	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FIA_ATD.1/AID	No correspondence.	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FIA_UID.2/AID	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FIA_USB.1/AID	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MTD.1/JCRE	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MTD.3/JCRE	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
<b>INSTG Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.2 in platform ST)</b> This group consists of the SFRs related to the installation of the applets, which addresses security aspects outside the runtime.		
FDP_ITC.2/Installer	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMR.1/Installer	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_RCV.3/Installer	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_FLS.1/Installer	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
<b>ADELG Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.3 in platform ST)</b> This group consists of the SFRs related to the deletion of applets and/or packages, enforcing the applet deletion manager (ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime.		
FDP_ACC.2/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_ACF.1/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_RIP.1/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
FMT_MSA.1/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.3/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMF.1/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMR.1/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_FLS.1/ADEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
<p>ODELG Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.4 in platform ST)</p> <p>The following requirements concern the object deletion mechanism. This mechanism is triggered by the applet that owns the deleted objects by invoking a specific API method.</p>		
FDP_RIP.1/ODEL	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_FLS.1/ODEL	FPT_FLS.1	The fulfillment of the platform SFR is part of the basis of the fulfillment of the SFR of this ST. Internal counter-measures for detecting security violations complement Java Card OS mechanisms. No contradiction to this ST.
<p>CARG Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.5 in platform ST)</p> <p>This group includes requirements for preventing the installation of packages that has not been bytecode verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification. All SFRs of the platform are mapped to SFRs in CMGRG.</p>		
CMGR Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.6 in platform ST)		
FDP_UIT.1/CCM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_ROL.1/CCM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FTP_ITC.2/CCM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FPT_FLS.1/CCM	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_ACC.1/SD	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_ACF.1/SD	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.1/SD	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.3/SD	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
FMT_SMF.1/SD	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMR.1/SD	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FTP_ITC.1/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FCO_NRO.2/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_IFC.2/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FDP_IFF.1/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.1/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_MSA.3/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FMT_SMF.1/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FIA_UID.1/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FIA_UAU.1/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
FIA_UAU.4/SC	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST.
SCPG Security Functional Requirements (chapter 7.2.7 in platform ST) The group SCPG contains the security requirements from the underlying platform. The following SFRs are taken from [ST_IC]. Their exact definition will not be repeated here. For details, please see [ST_IC].		
FPT_PHP.3	FPT_PHP.3 FPT_EMS.1	The fulfillment of the SFR in this ST is based on the platform SFR (together with additional countermeasures).
FPT_TST.1	FPT_TST.1	Self-testing is provided by the Java Card platform during initial start-up.
SandBoxG security functional requirements (chapter 7.2.8 in platform ST) The group contains the security requirements to separate the native executable code in the SandBox environment from the other parts of the underlying platform.		
FDP_ACC.2/SandBox	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ACF.1/SandBox	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MSA.1/SandBox	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MSA.3/SandBox	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST

Platform SFR	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
FMT_SMF.1/SandBox	No correspondence	Out of scope (internal Java Card functionality). No contradiction to this ST

Table 3: Assessment of the platform SFRs.

### 2.2.3 Assessment of the Platform Objectives

The following table provides an assessment of all relevant Platform objectives.

Platform Objective	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
O.SID	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.FIREWALL	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID	OT.SCD_Secrecy	No contradiction to this ST.
O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG	OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE	No contradiction to this ST.
O.NATIVE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.OPERATE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.REALLOCATION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.RESOURCES	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.ALARM	OT.Tamper_ID OT.Tamper_Resistance	Relevant for the protection against physical tampering. No contradiction to this ST.
O.CIPHER	No correspondence	Indirectly relevant for the correct function of the TOE of this ST, but no corresponding objectives for the TOE of this ST. No contradictions.
O.KEY-MNGT	OT.SCD_Secrecy	Secure key management of the platform leads to secrecy of SCD. No contradiction to this ST.
O.PIN-MNGT	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.TRANSACTION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.OBJ-DELETION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.DELETION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.LOAD	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.

Platform Objective	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
O.INSTALL	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.CARD-MANAGEMENT	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.RNG	OT.SCD_Secrecy: Secrecy	The TOE objective is related to the platform objective. No contradiction to this ST.
O.COMMUNICATION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.SCP.IC	OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, OT.EMSEC_Design	The objectives are related. No contradiction to this ST.
O.SCP.RECOVERY	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.SCP.SUPPORT	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
O.SCP.RNG	OT.SCD_Secrecy: Secrecy	The TOE objective is related to the platform objective. No contradiction to this ST.
O.SAND_BOX	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.

Table 4: Assessment of the platform objectives.

## 2.2.4 Assessment of Platform Threats

The following table provides an assessment of all relevant Platform threats.

Platform Threat	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA	T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive	No contradiction to this ST.
T.CONFID-JCS-CODE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA	T.DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery	No contradiction to this ST.
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.



Platform Threat	Correspondence in this ST	References/Remarks
T.INTEG-JCS-DATA	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.SID.1	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.SID.2	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.EXE-CODE.1	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.EXE-CODE.2	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.NATIVE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.RESOURCES	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.DELETION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.INSTALL	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.COMMUNICATION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.LIFE_CYCLE	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.OBJ-DELETION	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.
T.PHYSICAL	T.Hack_Phys	No contradiction to this ST.
T.RNG	No direct correspondence, but related to T.SCD_Derive	T.SCD_Derive of this ST targets the security of the signature, where the security of the RNG is relevant for key generation and as part of the signature algorithm (e.g. ECDSA ephemeral key). No contradiction to this ST.
T.SAND_BOX	No correspondence	Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST.

Table 5: Threats of the platform ST.

## 2.2.5 Assessment of Platform Organisational Security Policies

The Organisational Security Policy “OSP.VERIFICATION” focuses on the integrity of loaded applets, which is fulfilled by the TOE of this ST since the applet is loaded secured by platform security measures into the flash memory. This policy does not contradict to the policies of this ST.

## 2.2.6 Assessment of Platform Operational Environment

### 2.2.6.1 Assessment of Platform Assumptions

In the first column, the following table lists all assumptions of the Platform ST. The last column provides an explanation of relevance for the Composite TOE.

Platform Assumption	Relevance for Composite ST
A.CAP_FILE	A.CAP_FILE states that cap files loaded post-issuance do not contain native methods. This assumption leads to appropriate directives in the user guidance [Guidance].
A.VERIFICATION	This assumption targets the applet code verification. Regarding post-issuance loading of third party applets, this assumption leads to appropriate directives in the user guidance [Guidance].

*Table 6: Assumptions of the Platform ST.*

### 2.2.6.2 Assessment of Platform Objectives for the Operational Environment

There are the following Platform Objectives for the Operational Environment that have to be considered.

Platform Objective for the Environment	Relevance for Composite ST
OE.CAP_FILE	The platform objective for the environment states that cap files loaded post-issuance do not contain native methods. This objective for the environment leads to appropriate directives in the user guidance [Guidance].
OE.VERIFICATION	The platform objective for the environment targets the applet code verification. This is fulfilled by the TOE of this ST; regarding third-party-code, this objective for the environment leads to appropriate directives in the user guidance [Guidance]. There it is stated that all applets loaded to the TOE have to be verified.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	The platform objective for the environment focuses on application code loaded pre-issuance or post-issuance. It has to be ensured that the loaded application has not been changed since the code verification. This objective for the environment leads to appropriate directives in the user guidance [Guidance].

*Table 7: Platform Security Objectives and SFRs for the Operational Environment*

### 3 Security problem definition

This chapter has been taken from [PP0059] with minor modifications.

#### 3.1 Assets, users and threat agents

The Common Criteria define assets as entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon. The term “asset” is used to describe the threats in the operational environment of the TOE.

##### Assets and objects:

1. SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation. The confidentiality, integrity and signatory's sole control over the use of the SCD must be maintained.
2. SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature verification. The integrity of the SVD when it is exported must be maintained.
3. DTBS and DTBS/R: set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign. Their integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the signatory provided by the electronic signature must be maintained.

##### User and subjects acting for users:

1. User: End user of the TOE who can be identified as Administrator or Signatory. The subject S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
2. Administrator: User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation or other TOE administrative functions. The subject S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this user after successful authentication as Administrator.
3. Signatory: User who hold the TOE and use it on their own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the role R.Sigy for this user after successful authentication as Signatory.

##### Threat agents:

1. Attacker: Human or process acting on their behalf located outside the TOE. The main goal of the attacker is to access the SCD or to falsify the electronic signature. The attacker has got a high attack potential and knows no secret.

#### 3.2 Threats

##### 3.2.1 T.SCD\_Divulg: Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data

An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD during generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.

##### 3.2.2 T.SCD\_Derive: Derive the signature-creation data

An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.

##### 3.2.3 T.Hack\_Phys: Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces

An attacker interacts physically with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary security compromises. This threat is directed against SCD, SVD and DTBS.

### **3.2.4 T.SVD\_Forgery: Forgery of the signature-verification data**

An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD integrity in the certificate of the signatory.

### **3.2.5 T.SigF\_Misuse: Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE**

An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create a SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.

### **3.2.6 T.DTBS\_Forgery: Forgery of the DTBS/R**

An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.

### **3.2.7 T.Sig\_Forgery: Forgery of the electronic signature**

An attacker forges a signed data object, maybe using an electronic signature which has been created by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.

## **3.3 Organisational Security Policies**

### **3.3.1 P.CSP\_QCert: Qualified certificate**

The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate ([Directive]: 2:9, Annex I) for the SVD generated by the SSCD. The certificates contain at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly available information.

### **3.3.2 P.QSign: Qualified electronic signatures**

The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic signature ([Directive]: 1, 2), which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on a valid qualified certificate ([Directive], Annex I). The DTBS are presented to the signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates the electronic signature created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the signatory maintain under their sole control and is linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.

### **3.3.3 P.Sigy\_SSCD: TOE as secure signature-creation device**

The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in [Directive], Annex III This implies the SCD is used for electronic signature creation under sole control of the signatory and the SCD can practically occur only once.

### **3.3.4 P.Sig\_Non-Repud: Non-repudiation of signatures**

The life cycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.

## **3.4 Assumptions**

### **3.4.1 A.CGA: Trustworthy certificate-generation application**

The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory's name or pseudonym and the SVD in the (qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.

### **3.4.2 A.SCA: Trustworthy signature-creation application**

The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of the data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.

## 4 Security Objectives

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

#### 4.1.1 OT.Lifecycle\_Security: Lifecycle security

The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the signatory.

**PP application note 1:** The TOE may contain more than one set of SCD. There is no need to destroy the SCD in case of repeated SCD generation. The signatory shall be able to destroy the SCD stored in the SSCD e.g. after the (qualified) certificate for the corresponding SVD has been expired.

#### 4.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD\_Auth\_Gen: Authorised SCD/SVD generation

The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the generation of the SCD and the SVD.

#### 4.1.3 OT.SCD\_Unique: Uniqueness of the signature-creation data

The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair it creates as suitable for the advanced or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature creation shall practically occur only once and shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. In that context 'practically occur once' means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible.

#### 4.1.4 OT.SCD\_SVD\_Corresp: Correspondence between SVD and SCD

The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of the SVD and in creating an electronic signature creation with the SCD.

#### 4.1.5 OT.SCD\_Secrecy: Secrecy of the signature-creation data

The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably assured against attacks with a high attack potential.

**PP application note 2:** The TOE shall keep the confidentiality of the SCD at all times in particular during SCD/SVD generation, SCD signature creation operation, storage and secure destruction.

#### 4.1.6 OT.Sig\_Secure: Cryptographic security of the electronic signature

The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructable using the digital signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when executed with a high attack potential.

#### 4.1.7 OT.Sigy\_SigF: Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only

The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack potential.

#### **4.1.8 OT.DTBS\_Integrity\_TOE: DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE**

The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process where the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.

#### **4.1.9 OT.EMSEC\_Design: Provide physical-emanation security**

The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits.

#### **4.1.10 OT.Tamper\_ID: Tamper detection**

The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components, and uses those features to limit security breaches.

#### **4.1.11 OT.Tamper\_Resistance: Tamper resistance**

The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and components.

### **4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

#### **4.2.1 OE.SVD\_Auth: Authenticity of the SVD**

The operational environment shall ensure the integrity of the SVD sent to the CGA of the CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.

#### **4.2.2 OE.CGA\_QCert: Generation of qualified certificates**

The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (amongst others)

- (a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
- (b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the signatory,
- (c) the advanced signature of the CSP.

The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding to the SVD is stored in a SSCD.

#### **4.2.3 OE.SSCD\_Prov\_Service: Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service**

The SSCD-provisioning service shall initialise and personalise for the signatory an authentic copy of the TOE and deliver this copy as SSCD to the signatory.

#### **4.2.4 OE.HID\_VAD: Protection of the VAD**

If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed from import through its human interface until import through the TOE interface. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the VAD, the HID shall support usage of this trusted channel.

#### 4.2.5 OE.DTBS\_Intend: SCA sends data intended to be signed

The Signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that

- generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
- sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R by the TOE,
- attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.

**Application note 3:** The SCA should be able to support advanced electronic signatures. Currently, there exist three formats defined by ETSI recognized as meeting the requirements needed by advanced electronic signatures: CAdES, XAdES and PAdES. These three formats mandate to include the hash of the signer's public key certificate in the data to be signed. In order to support for the mobility of the signer, it is recommended to store the certificate info on the SSCD for use by SCA and identification of the corresponding SCD if more than one SCD is stored on the SSCD.

#### 4.2.6 OE.DTBS\_Protect: SCA protects the data intended to be signed

The operational environment shall ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit between the SCA and the TOE. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the DTBS/R, the SCA shall support usage of this trusted channel.

#### 4.2.7 OE.Signatory: Security obligation of the Signatory

The signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD-provisioning service is in non-operational state. The signatory shall keep their VAD confidential.

### 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

#### 4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage

The following table shows the mapping of the Security problem definition to the security objectives.

	OT.Lifecycle_Security	OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen	OT.SCD_Unique	OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp	OT.SCD_Secrecy	OT.Sig_Secure	OT.Sigy_SigF	OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE	OT.FMSEC_Design	OT.Tamper_ID	OT.Tamper_Resistance	OE.CGA_QCert	OE.SVD_Auth	OE.SSCD_Prov_Service	OE.HID_VAD	OE.DTBS_Intend	OE.DTBS_Protect	OE.Signatory
T.SCD_Divulg					x													
T.SCD_Derive		x				x												
T.Hack_Phys					x				x	x	x							
T.SVD_Forgery				x									x					
T.SigF_Misuse	x						x	x							x	x	x	x
T.DTBS_Forgery								x								x	x	



	OT.Lifecycle_Security	OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen	OT.SCD_Unique	OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp	OT.SCD_Secrecy	OT.Sig_Secure	OT.Sigy_SigF	OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE	OT.EMSEC_Design	OT.Tamper_ID	OT.Tamper_Resistance	OE.CGA_QCert	OE.SVD_Auth	OE.SSCD_Prov_Service	OE.HID_VAD	OE.DTBS_Intend	OE.DTBS_Protect	OE.Signatory
T.Sig_Forgery			x			x						x						
P.CSP_QCert	x			x								x						
P.QSign						x	x					x				x		
P.Sigy_SSCD	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x			x				
P.Sig_Non-Repud	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
A.CGA												x	x					
A.SCA																x		

Table 8: Mapping of threats, policies and assumptions to the security objectives.

#### 4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency

##### Countering of threats by security objectives:

**T.SCD\_Divulg** (*Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data*) addresses the threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD outside the TOE, as expressed in recital (18) of [Directive]. This threat is countered by OT.SCD\_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD used for signature creation.

**T.SCD\_Derive** (*Derive the signature creation data*) deals with attacks on the SCD via public known data produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created with the SCD. OT.SCD/SVD\_Auth\_Gen counters this threat by implementing cryptographically secure generation of the SCD/SVD pair. OT.Sig\_Secure ensures cryptographically secure electronic signatures.

**T.Hack\_Phys** (*Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities*) deals with physical attacks exploiting physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD\_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD. OT.EMSEC\_Design counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper\_ID and OT.Tamper\_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack\_Phys by detecting and by resisting tampering attacks.

**T.SVD\_Forgery** (*Forgery of the signature verification data*) deals with the forgery of the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA for certificate generation. T.SVD\_Forgery is addressed by OT.SCD\_SVD\_Corresp, which ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD and unambiguous reference of the SVD/SCD pair for the SVD export and signature creation with the SCD, and OE.SVD\_Auth that ensures the integrity of the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA.

**T.SigF\_Misuse** (*Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE*) addresses the threat of misuse of the TOE signature creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create an electronic signature on data for which the signatory has not expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c) of [Directive], Annex III. OT.Lifecycle\_Security (*Lifecycle security*) requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage including secure destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the signatory. OT.Sigy\_SigF (*Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only*) ensures that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.DTBS\_Intend (*Data intended to be signed*) ensures that the SCA sends the DTBS/R only for data the signatory intends to sign and OE.DTBS\_Protect counters manipulation of the DTBS during transmission over

the channel between the SCA and the TOE. OT.DTBS\_Integrity\_TOE (*DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE*) prevents the DTBS/R from alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA provides a human interface for user authentication, OE.HID\_VAD (*Protection of the VAD*) provides confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed. OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD when received from an SSCD-provisioning service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes control over the SSCD. OE.Signatory ensures also that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.

**T.DTBS\_Forgery** (*Forgery of the DTBS/R*) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the data sent as input to the TOE's signature creation function that does not represent the DTBS as presented to the signatory and for which the signature has expressed its intent to sign. The TOE IT environment addresses T.DTBS\_Forgery by the means of OE.DTBS\_Intend, which ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE, and by means of OE.DTBS\_Protect, which ensures that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters this threat by the means of OT.DTBS\_Integrity\_TOE by ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the TOE.

**T.Sig\_Forgery** (*Forgery of the electronic signature*) deals with non-detectable forgery of the electronic signature. OT.Sig\_Secure, OT.SCD\_Unique and OE.CGA\_QCert address this threat in general. OT.Sig\_Secure (*Cryptographic security of the electronic signature*) ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that the signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD\_Unique and ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding SVD cannot be included in another certificate by chance. OE.CGA\_QCert prevents forgery of the certificate for the corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision concerning a forged signature.

#### Enforcement of OSPs by security objectives:

**P.CSP\_QCert** (*CSP generates qualified certificates*) establishes the CSP generating qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate linking the signatory and the SVD implemented in the SSCD under sole control of this signatory. P.CSP\_QCert is addressed by

- OT.Lifecycle\_Security, which requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage,
- OT.SCD\_SVD\_Corresp, which requires to ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD during their generation,
- OE.CGA\_QCert for generation of qualified certificates or non-qualified certificates, which requires the CGA to certify the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory.

**P.QSign** (*Qualified electronic signatures*) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign data with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified electronic signature if based on a valid qualified certificate. OT.Sigy\_SigF ensures signatory's sole control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others. OT.Sig\_Secure ensures that the TOE creates electronic signatures, which cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA\_QCert addresses the requirement of qualified or non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the electronic signature. OE.DTBS\_Intend ensures that the SCA provides only those DTBS to the TOE, which the signatory intends to sign.

**P.Sigy\_SSCD** (*TOE as secure signature creation device*) requires the TOE to meet [Directive], Annex III. This is ensured as follows:

- OT.SCD\_Unique meets the paragraph 1(a) of [Directive], Annex III, by the requirements that the SCD used for signature creation can practically occur only once;
- OT.SCD\_Unique, OT.SCD\_Secrecy and OT.Sig\_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(a) of [Directive], Annex III by the requirements to ensure secrecy of the SCD. OT.EMSEC\_Design and OT.Tamper\_Resistance address specific objectives to ensure secrecy of the SCD against specific attacks;
- OT.SCD\_Secrecy and OT.Sig\_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the SCD cannot be derived from SVD, the electronic signatures or any other data exported outside the TOE;
- OT.Sigy\_SigF meets the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of [Directive], Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others;
- OT.DTBS\_Integrity\_TOE meets the requirements in paragraph 2 of [Directive], Annex III as the TOE must not alter the DTBS/R.

Paragraph 2 of Annex III, requires that an SSCD does not prevent the data to be signed from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature process is obviously fulfilled by the method of TOE usage: the SCA will present the DTBS to the signatory and send it to the SSCD for signing.

The usage of SCD under sole control of the signatory is ensured by

- OT.Lifecycle\_Security requiring the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage,
- OT.SCD/SVD\_Auth\_Gen, which limits invocation of the generation of the SCD and the SVD to authorised users only, and
- OT.Sigy\_SigF, which requires the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others.

OE.SSCD\_Prov\_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the TOE, initialised and personalised SSCD from an SSCD-provisioning service.

**P.Sig\_Non-Repud** (*Non-repudiation of signatures*) deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, which ensures the aspects of signatory's sole control over and responsibility for the electronic signatures created with the TOE.

OE.SSCD\_Prov\_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the TOE, initialised and personalised as SSCD from the SSCD-provisioning service.

OE.CGA\_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD to the signatory. OE.SVD\_Auth and OE.CGA\_QCert require the environment to ensure authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the signatory. OT.SCD\_SVD\_Corresp ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD\_Unique provides that the signatory's SCD can practically occur just once.

OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD received from an SSCD-provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes into sole control over the SSCD). OT.Sigy\_SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature creation. As prerequisite OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential. OE.DTBS\_Intend, OE.DTBS\_Protect and OT.DTBS\_Integrity\_TOE ensure that the TOE creates electronic signatures only for those DTBS/R, which the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig\_Secure ensure that only this SCD may create a valid electronic signature that

can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for signature verification. The security objective for the TOE OT.Lifecycle\_Security (*Lifecycle security*), OT.SCD\_Secrecy (*Secrecy of the signature creation data*), OT.EMSEC\_Design (*Provide physical emanations security*), OT.Tamper\_ID (*Tamper detection*) and OT.Tamper\_Resistance (*Tamper resistance*) protect the SCD against any compromise.

**Upkeep of assumptions by security objectives:**

**A.SCA** (*Trustworthy signature creation application*) establishes the trustworthiness of the SCA with respect to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by OE.DTBS\_Intend (*Data intended to be signed*) which ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that have been presented to the signatory as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.

**A.CGA** (*Trustworthy certificate generation application*) establishes the protection of the authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA\_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates), which ensures the generation of qualified certificates, and by OE.SVD\_Auth (Authenticity of the SVD), which ensures the protection of the integrity of the received SVD and the verification of the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.

## 5 Extended Component Definition and CC2022 correspondence

This chapter describes the additional SFR families defined in the original protection profile, specifies the CC2022 SFRs that are used as a substitute, and gives a rationale to verify the exchange of the SFR.

### 5.1 Family FPT\_EMS

#### 5.1.1 Introduction

In the original CC v3.1 protection profile, the additional family FPT\_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. The family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. CC 2022 introduces an equivalent, but not identical FPT\_EMS.1.

#### 5.1.2 Comparison

The external component of the original protection profile and the equivalent CC2022 SFR are compared in the following table:

	External component in [PP0059]	CC2022 SFR
Name	FPT_EMS.1	FPT_EMS.1
Management	There are no management activities foreseen.	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit	There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN (Security audit data generation) is included in a protection profile or security target.	There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN (Security audit data generation) is included in a protection profile or security target.
Hierarchical to	No other components.	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.	No dependencies.
Requirement text	<p>FPT_EMS.1.1</p> <p>The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].</p> <p>FPT_EMS.1.2</p> <p>The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].</p>	<p>FPT_EMS.1.1</p> <p>The TSF shall ensure that the TOE does not emit emissions over its attack surface in such amount that these emissions enable access to TSF data and user data as specified in Table 1:</p> <p>Table 1 — with rows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ID</li> <li>• Emissions [assignment: list of types of emissions]</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• attack surface [assignment: list of types of attack surface]</li> <li>• TSF data [assignment: list of types of TSF data]</li> <li>• User data [assignment: list of types of user data]</li> </ul>
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### 5.1.3 Rationale

FPT\_EMS.1 as specified as external component in [PP0059] allows to specify physical limits of emissions (“in excess of [assignment: specified limits]”). This is not possible in the CC2022 version of FPT\_EMS.1. Nonetheless, for practical use the CC2022 SFR is sufficient, since the assignment “specified limits” is usually not used to define exact physical limits, but only to link to the state of the art (e.g. “in excess of non-useful information”).

Thus, within the context of the present protection profile, the CC2022 SFR can be used instead of the extended component in [PP0059].

## 5.2 Other changes due to introduction of CC2022

### 5.2.1 Deprecation of FCS\_CKM.4

In CC2022, FCS\_CKM.4 is deprecated and a new SFR FCS\_CKM.6 introduced instead. The following table shows the comparison:

	<b>FCS_CKM.4 in [PP0059]</b>	<b>FCS_CKM.6 in CC2022</b>
Name	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to	No other components.	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation
Requirement text	FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].	FCS_CKM.6.1 The TSF shall destroy [assignment: list of cryptographic keys (including keying material)] when [selection: no longer needed, [assignment: other circumstances for key or keying material destruction]].

		<b>FCS_CKM.6.2</b> The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
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Thus, all information given in FCS\_CKM.4 can be transferred to FCS\_CKM.6 in this ST.

### 5.2.2 Change of FPT\_TST.1

The CC2022 version of FPT\_TST.1 requests more information compared to the CCv3.1 version, but otherwise contains the same options. This was directly changed in the SFR in chapter 6.2

### 5.2.3 Change of Dependencies

Within CC2022, FCS\_CKM.4 in dependencies of other SFRs is exchanged with FCS\_CKM.6. In addition, the dependencies of FCS\_COP.1 were adapted to CC2022. This was directly done in the SFRs in chapter 6.2.

## 6 IT Security Requirements

### 6.1 General

This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance requirements for the TOE.

Section 6.2 provides the security functional requirements.

The TOE security assurance requirements statement is given in section 6.3.

### 6.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

#### 6.2.1 Use of requirement specifications

The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [CC\_1] of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this ST and the underlying PP.

Operations already performed in the underlying PP [PP0059] are uniformly marked by ***bold italic*** font style; for further information on details of the operation, please refer to [PP0059].

Operations performed within this security target are marked by **bold underlined** font style; further information on details of the operation is provided in foot notes.

#### 6.2.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)

**Application note 4:** Member states of the European Union have specified entities as responsible for accreditation and supervision of the evaluation process for products conforming to this standard and for determining admissible algorithms and algorithm parameters ([Directive]: 1.1b and 3.4).

##### 6.2.2.1 FCS\_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate an ***SCD/SVD*** pair in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm:

- **RSA key generation; or ECDSA key generation**<sup>10</sup>

and specified cryptographic key sizes:

- **between 1976 and 2048 bit with CRT or without CRT; or with 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 or 521 bit corresponding to the used elliptic curves P224, P256, P384, P521, and Brainpool{P224r1, P256r1,**

<sup>10</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]



P320r1, P384r1, P512r1, P224t1, P320t1, P256t1, P384t1, P512t1}

1112

that meet the following:

- PKCS#1v2.2 [PKCS1]; or for elliptic curves according to to chapters 4.3.3 and 4.3.3.2 in the appendix A4.3 in [X9.62], according to section 6.4.2 in “Generation of signature key and verification key” in [ISO14888-3], and according to appendix A.16.9 “An algorithm for generating EC keys” in [IEEE P1363] with elliptic curves defined in [FIPS186-3] and [RFC5639].

**PP application note 5:** <applied>

#### 6.2.2.2 FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or  
FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation]

FCS\_CKM.6.1

The TSF shall destroy **SCD, PACE session keys**<sup>13</sup> when **no longer needed**<sup>14</sup>.

FCS\_CKM.6.2

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS\_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **overwriting the key values**<sup>15</sup> that meets the following: **none**<sup>16</sup>.

**PP application note 6:** <applied>

#### 6.2.2.3 FCS\_COP.1/SIG: Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or  
FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation]  
FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1/SIG

<sup>11</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

<sup>12</sup> The combination of the two cryptographic algorithms with an „or“ is due to the fact that the final TOE may be configured in a way that only one of the two cryptographic algorithms is activated.

<sup>13</sup> [assignment: list of cryptographic keys (including keying material)]

<sup>14</sup> [selection: no longer needed, [assignment: other circumstances for key or keying material destruction]]

<sup>15</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]

<sup>16</sup> [assignment: list of standards]

The TSF shall perform ***digital signature creation*** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

- **RSA (straight and CRT variant) without internal hash calculation, with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512; or ECDSA without internal hash calculation, with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512**<sup>17</sup>

and specified cryptographic key sizes:

- **1976 - 2048 bit (without CRT) or 1976 - 4096 bit (with CRT); with 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 or 521 bit corresponding to the used elliptic curves P224, P256, P384, P521 and Brainpool{P224r1, P256r1, P320r1, P384r1, P512r1, P224t1, P256t1, P320t1, P384t1, P512t1}**<sup>18</sup>

that meet the following:

- **standard PKCS#1v2.2 [PKCS1] (RSASSA-PKCS1-v15 and RSASSA-PSS) chapter 8, and [FIPS180-4]; or standard [SEC1] (ECDSA), and [FIPS180-4], with elliptic curves defined in [FIPS186-3] and [RFC5639]**<sup>1920</sup>

PP application note 7: <applied>

The following SFR is only required for variants with a contactless interface:

#### 6.2.2.4 FCS\_COP.1/PACE: PACE authentication protocol

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation]  
FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1/PACE

The TSF shall perform **an authentication protocol** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

- **PACE version 2**

and specified cryptographic key sizes:

- **224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 bit (ECC); 128, 192, 256 bit (AES)**

that meet the following:

- **BSI-TR-03110 [TR03110].**

<sup>17</sup> [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]

<sup>18</sup> [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

<sup>19</sup> [assignment: list of standards]

<sup>20</sup> The combination of the two cryptographic algorithms with an „or“ is due to the fact that the final TOE may be configured in a way that only one of the two cryptographic algorithms is activated.

**Application note:** It must be underlined that the SFR FCS\_COP.1/PACE SFR is only required for variants with a contactless interface. The specification of the AES can be found in [FIPS197].

**Application note:** The elliptic curves corresponding to the key sizes are defined in FCS\_CKM.1.

**Application note:** BSI-TR-03110 [TR03110] allows arbitrary combinations of ECC key sizes and AES key lengths in the PACE protocol. It should be noted that ECC key lengths smaller than the AES key length will lead to a reduced AES key space (e.g. a 224 bit entropy in a 256 bit AES key).

#### 6.2.2.5 FCS\_RNG.1: Generation of random numbers

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS\_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a hybrid physical<sup>21</sup> random number generator that implements a AIS20/31 class PTG.3 random generator.<sup>22</sup>

FCS\_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide octets of bits<sup>23</sup> that meet the AIS20/31 Class PTG.3 quality metric<sup>24</sup>.

**Application note:** This SFR was added to the standard set of SFRs to address the requirements of the PACE protocol. The random number generation is provided by the underlying SECORA ID X v2 platform.

**Developer note:** The corresponding platform SFR (FCS\_RNG.1/PTG.3) states that the platform provides a hybrid deterministic random number generator (RNG) that fulfills the following:

- A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure has been detected no random numbers will be output.
- If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.
- The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG is started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test and the seeding of the DRG.3 [AIS20] post-processing algorithm have been finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
- The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.
- The online test procedure checks the raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting nontolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.
- The algorithmic post-processing algorithm belongs to Class DRG.3 with cryptographic state transition function and cryptographic output function, and the output data rate of the post-processing algorithm shall not exceed its input data rate.

<sup>21</sup> [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic]

<sup>22</sup> [assignment: list of security capabilities].

<sup>23</sup> [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]

<sup>24</sup> [assignment: a defined quality metric]

- Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The internal random numbers must pass test procedure A.
- The internal random numbers shall use PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source for the post-processing.<sup>7</sup>

Thus the platform RNG implements AIS20/31 [AIS31] class PTG.3.

### 6.2.3 User data protection (FDP)

The security attributes and related status for the subjects and objects are:

Subject or object the security attribute is associated with	Security attribute type	Value of the security attribute
S.User	Role	R.Admin R.Sigy
S.User	SCD / SVD Management	Authorised, not authorised
SCD	SCD Operational	No, yes
SCD	SCD identifier	Arbitrary value
SVD	(This ST does not define security attributes for SVD)	(This ST does not define security attributes for SVD)

Table 9: Security attributes and related status.

**PP application note 8:** <not applicable>

#### 6.2.3.1 FDP\_ACC.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation: Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1/ SCD/SVD\_Generation

The TSF shall enforce the **SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP** on

**(1) subjects: S.User,**

**(2) objects: SCD, SVD,**

**(3) operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair.**

#### 6.2.3.2 FDP\_ACF.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation: Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1/ SCD/SVD\_Generation

The TSF shall enforce the **SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP** to objects based on the following: **the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD / SVD Management”.**

FDP\_ACF.1.2/ SCD/SVD\_Generation

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

***S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD Management” set to “authorised” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.***

#### FDP\_ACF.1.3/ SCD/SVD\_Generation

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

#### FDP\_ACF.1.4/ SCD/SVD\_Generation

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

***S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD management” set to “not authorised” is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.***

#### 6.2.3.3 FDP\_ACC.1/SVD\_Transfer: Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

#### FDP\_ACC.1.1/ SVD\_Transfer

The TSF shall enforce the ***SVD\_Transfer\_SFP*** on

***(1) subjects: S.User,***

***(2) objects: SVD***

***(3) operations: export.***

#### 6.2.3.4 FDP\_ACF.1/SVD\_Transfer: Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

#### FDP\_ACF.1.1/ SVD\_Transfer

The TSF shall enforce ***the SVD\_Transfer\_SFP*** to objects based on the following:

***(1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role,***

***(2) the SVD.***

#### FDP\_ACF.1.2/ SVD\_Transfer

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **R.Sigy and R.Admin<sup>25</sup> is allowed to export SVD.**

#### FDP\_ACF.1.3/ SVD\_Transfer

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

#### FDP\_ACF.1.4/ SVD\_Transfer

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

**PP application note 9: <applied>**

<sup>25</sup> [selection: R.Admin, R.Sigy]

This ST does not require the TOE to protect the integrity and authenticity of the exported SVD public key but requires such protection by the operational environment. If the operational environment does not provide sufficient security measures for the CGA to ensure the authenticity of the public key the TOE shall implement additional security functions to support the export of public keys with integrity and data origin authentication. See section 4.3 for additional requirements for use of an SSCD in an environment that cannot provide such protection.

#### 6.2.3.5 FDP\_ACC.1/Signature-creation: Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1/Signature-creation

The TSF shall enforce the **Signature Creation SFP** on

- (1) subjects: S.User,**
- (2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,**
- (3) operations: signature-creation.**

#### 6.2.3.6 FDP\_ACF.1/Signature-creation: Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1/Signature-creation

The TSF shall enforce the **Signature Creation SFP** to objects based on the following:

- (1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute "Role" and**
- (2) the SCD with the security attribute "SCD Operational".**

FDP\_ACF.1.2/Signature-creation

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

**R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which security attribute "SCD operational" is set to "yes".**

FDP\_ACF.1.3/Signature-creation

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP\_ACF.1.4/Signature-creation

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

**S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which security attribute "SCD operational" is set to "no".**

#### 6.2.3.7 FDP\_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the ***de-allocation of the resource from*** the following objects: ***SCD***.

The following data persistently stored by the TOE shall have the user data attribute “integrity checked persistent stored data”:

1. SCD
2. SVD (if persistently stored by the TOE).

The DTBS/R temporarily stored by the TOE has the user data attribute “integrity checked stored data”:

#### 6.2.3.8 FDP\_SDI.2/Persistent: Stored data integrity monitoring and action

Hierarchical to: FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SDI.2.1/ Persistent

The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for ***integrity error*** on all objects, based on the following attributes: ***integrity checked stored data***.

FDP\_SDI.2.2/ Persistent

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall

***(1) prohibit the use of the altered data***

***(2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.***

#### 6.2.3.9 FDP\_SDI.2/DTBS. Stored data integrity monitoring and action

Hierarchical to: FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SDI.2.1/DTBS

The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for ***integrity error*** on all objects, based on the following attributes: ***integrity checked stored DTBS***.

FDP\_SDI.2.2/DTBS

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall

***(1) prohibit the use of the altered data***

***(2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.***

**PP application note 10:** The integrity of TSF data like RAD shall be protected to ensure the effectiveness of the user authentication. This protection is a specific aspect of the security architecture (cf. ADV\_ARC.1).

### 6.2.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)

#### 6.2.4.1 FIA\_UID.1. Timing of identification

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1

The TSF shall allow

- (1) *Self test according to FPT\_TST.1,*
- (2) Receiving DTBS<sup>26</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**PP application note 11:** <applied>

#### 6.2.4.2 FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FIA\_UAU.1.1

The TSF shall allow

- (1) *Self test according to FPT\_TST.1,*
- (2) *Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1.*
- (3) Receiving DTBS<sup>27</sup>

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA\_UAU.1.2

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**PP application note 12:** <applied>

#### 6.2.4.3 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA\_AFL.1.1

The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 2-16<sup>28</sup> unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *consecutive failed authentication attempts*.

FIA\_AFL.1.2

When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been *met*, the TSF shall *block RAD*.

**PP application note 13:** <applied>

**Application note:** This SFR is met by TSF\_Auth. Note that TSF\_Auth contains two configurable mechanisms (cf. chapter 7) based on the standard ISO7816 Verify\_PIN command (for contact interface only) and on the PACE protocol.

<sup>26</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

<sup>27</sup> [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]

<sup>28</sup> [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]



**Developer note:** The blocking of the RAD after the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts can – depending on the configuration and the specific configuration data – be permanent or unblocked with a personal unblocking key (PUK).

## 6.2.5 Security management (FMT)

### 6.2.5.1 FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FMT\_SMR.1.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles ***R.Admin and R.Sigy.***

FMT\_SMR.1.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### 6.2.5.2 FMT\_SMF.1 Security management functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- (1) ***Creation and modification of RAD,***
- (2) ***Enabling the signature-creation function,***
- (3) ***Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational,***
- (4) ***Change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier,***
- (5) ***none***<sup>29</sup>

PP application note 14: <applied>

### 6.2.5.3 FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MOF.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to ***enable*** the functions ***signature-creation function*** to ***R.Sigy.***

### 6.2.5.4 FMT\_MSA.1/Admin Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
 FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
 FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

<sup>29</sup> [assignment: list of other security management functions to be provided by the TSF]

## FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

## FMT\_MSA.1.1/Admin

The TSF shall enforce the **SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP** to restrict the ability to **modify** the security attributes **SCD / SVD management** to **R.Admin**.

**6.2.5.5 FMT\_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

## FMT\_MSA.1.1/Signatory

The TSF shall enforce the **Signature Creation SFP** to restrict the ability to **modify** the security attributes **SCD operational** to **R.Sigy**.

**6.2.5.6 FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

## FMT\_MSA.2.1

The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for **SCD / SVD Management and SCD operational**.

**PP application note 15:** <applied>

**Application note:** The following values of the security attribute SCD/SVD Management are secure for the TOE and the TOE lifecycle Operational:

Subject	Security Attribute SCD/SVD Management
S.Sigy	No
S. Admin	Yes

**6.2.5.7 FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

## FMT\_MSA.3.1

The TSF shall enforce **the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP, SVD\_Transfer\_SFP and Signature Creation SFP** to provide **restrictive** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

## FMT\_MSA.3.2

The TSF shall allow the **R.Admin** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**6.2.5.8 FMT\_MSA.4 Security attribute value inheritance**

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
 FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT\_MSA.4.1

The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:

- (1) If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy being authenticated the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” as a single operation.*
- (2) If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “yes” as a single operation.*

**PP application note 16:** The TOE may not support generating an SVD/SCD pair by the Signatory alone, in which case rule (2) is not relevant.

**6.2.5.9 FMT\_MTD.1/Admin Management of TSF data**

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1/Admin

The TSF shall restrict the ability to **create** the **RAD** to **R.Admin**.

**6.2.5.10 FMT\_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data**

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1/ Signatory

The TSF shall restrict the ability to **modify** the **RAD** to **R.Sigy**.

**PP application note 17:** No other operation besides “modify” was added as assignment in FMT\_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data.

**6.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)****6.2.6.1 FPT\_EMS.1 TOE Emanation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
 Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_EMS.1

The TSF shall ensure that the TOE does not emit emissions over its at-tack surface in such amount that these emissions enable access to TSF data and user data as specified in Table 10:

Table 10: FPT\_EMS.1.1 Table

ID	Emissions	Attack Surface	TSF data	User data
1	<u>variations in power consumption</u>	Smart card circuit contacts	<b><i>RAD</i></b>	<b><i>SCD</i></b>
2	<u>electromagnetic radiation</u>	Radiation detection	<b><i>RAD</i></b>	<b><i>SCD</i></b>
3	<u>timing during command execution</u>	Smart card circuit contacts or contactless interface	<b><i>RAD</i></b>	<b><i>SCD</i></b>

**PP application note 18:** The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena are variations in the power consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states, electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission.

Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is assumed. Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc.

#### 6.2.6.2 FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

##### FPT\_FLS.1.1

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

- (1) ***Self-test according to FPT\_TST fails,***
- (2) ***none***<sup>30</sup>

**PP application note 19:** <applied>

#### 6.2.6.3 FPT\_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

##### FPT\_PHP.1.1

The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.

##### FPT\_PHP.1.2

The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

<sup>30</sup> [assignment: list of other types of failures in the TSF]

**6.2.6.4 FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FPT\_PHP.3.1**

The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing**<sup>31</sup> to the **security IC**<sup>32</sup> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**PP application note 20:** The TOE implements appropriate measures to continuously counter physical tampering which may compromise the SCD. The “automatic response” in the element FPT\_PHP.3.1 means (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time. Due to the nature of these attacks the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements (e.g. the TOE is destroyed). But physical tampering must not reveal information of the SCD. E.g. the TOE may be physically tampered in power-off state of the TOE (e.g. a smart card), which does not allow TSF for overwriting the SCD but leads to physical destruction of the memory and all information therein about the SCD. In case of physical tampering the TSF may not provide the intended functions for SCD/SVD pair generation or signature-creation but ensures the confidentiality of the SCD by blocking these functions. The SFR FPT\_PHP.1 requires the TSF to react on physical tampering in a way that the signatory is able to determine whether the TOE was physical tampered or not. E.g. the TSF may provide an appropriate message during start-up or the guidance documentation may describe a failure of TOE start-up as indication of physical tampering.

**6.2.6.5 FPT\_TST.1 TSF testing**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FPT\_TST.1.1**

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests **during initial start-up**<sup>33</sup> to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF**<sup>34</sup>: **startup tests of the java card operating system including tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the alarm lines and/or the environmental sensor mechanisms.**

**FPT\_TST.1.2**

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**<sup>35</sup>.

**FPT\_TST.1.3**

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF**<sup>36</sup>.

**PP application note 21:** <applied>

**Developer note:** This SFR was changed to follow the CC2022 definition of FPT\_TST.1.

<sup>31</sup> [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]

<sup>32</sup> [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]

<sup>33</sup> [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]

<sup>34</sup> [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]

<sup>35</sup> [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]

<sup>36</sup> [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]

### 6.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class	Assurance components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Architectural Design with domain separation and non-bypassability
	ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
	ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
	ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
	ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Table 11: Assurance Requirements: EAL5 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2.

## 6.4 Rationale

### 6.4.1 Security Requirements Rationale

#### 6.4.1.1 Security Requirement Coverage

	OT.Lifecycle_Security	OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen	OT.SCD_Unique	OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp	OT.SCD_Secrecy	OT.Sig_Secure	OT.Sigy_SigF	OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE	OT.EMS_Design	OT.Tamper_ID	OT.Tamper_Resistance
FCS_CKM.1	x		x	x	x						
FCS_CKM.6	x				x						
FCS_COP.1/SIG	x					x					
FCS_COP.1/PACE							x				
FCS_RNG.1							x				
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation	x	x									
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD_Transfer	x										
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation	x						x				
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation	x	x									
FDP_ACF.1/ SVD_Transfer	x										
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation	x						x				
FDP_RIP.1					x		x				
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent				x	x	x					
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS							x	x			
FIA_AFL.1							x				
FIA_UAU.1		x					x				
FIA_UID.1		x					x				
FMT_MOF.1	x						x				
FMT_MSA.1/Admin	x	x									
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory	x						x				
FMT_MSA.2	x	x					x				
FMT_MSA.3	x	x					x				
FMT_MSA.4	x	x		x			x				
FMT_MTD.1/Admin	x						x				
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory	x						x				
FMT_SMR.1	x						x				

	OT.Lifecycle_Security	OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen	OT.SCD_Unique	OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp	OT.SCD_Secrecy	OT.Sig_Secure	OT.Sig_SigF	OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE	OT.EMS_Design	OT.Tamper_ID	OT.Tamper_Resistance
FMT_SMF.1	x			x			x				
FPT_EMS.1					x				x		
FPT_FLS.1					x						
FPT_PHP.1										x	
FPT_PHP.3					x						x
FPT_TST.1	x				x	x					

Table 12: Functional Requirement to TOE security objective mapping.

#### 6.4.1.2 TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency

**OT.Lifecycle\_Security** (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFR for SCD/SVD generation FCS\_CKM.1, SCD usage FCS\_COP.1/SIG and SCD destruction FCS\_CKM.6 ensure cryptographically secure lifecycle of the SCD. The SCD/SVD generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP\_ACC.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation and FDP\_ACF.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation. The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP\_ACC.1/SVD\_Transfer and FDP\_ACF.1/SVD\_Transfer. The SCD usage is ensured by access control FDP\_ACC.1/Signature-creation, FDP\_ACF.1/Signature-creation which is based on the security attribute secure TSF management according to FMT\_MOF.1, FMT\_MSA.1/Admin, FMT\_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT\_MSA.2, FMT\_MSA.3, FMT\_MSA.4, FMT\_MTD.1/Admin, FMT\_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1. The test functions FPT\_TST.1 provides failure detection throughout the lifecycle.

**OT.SCD/SVD\_Auth\_Gen** (Authorized SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a SCD/SVD pair requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA\_UID.1 and FIA\_UAU.1 provide user identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to authorised functions. The SFR FDP\_ACC.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation and FDP\_ACF.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation provide access control for the SCD/SVD generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by FMT\_MSA.1/Admin, FMT\_MSA.2, and FMT\_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The SFR FMT\_MSA.4 defines rules for inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.

**OT.SCD\_Unique** (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data) implements the requirement of practically unique SCD as laid down in [Directive], Annex III, paragraph 1(a) of [Directive], which is provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS\_CKM.1.

**OT.SCD\_SVD\_Corresp** (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified by FCS\_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions specified by FDP\_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not modified, so to retain the correspondence. Moreover, the SCD Identifier allows the environment to identify the SCD and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The management functions identified by FMT\_SMF.1 and by FMT\_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to modify the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier.

**OT.SCD\_Secrecy** (Secrecy of signature-creation data) is provided by the security functions specified by the following SFR. FCS\_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD generation.



Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known SVD. The security functions specified by FDP\_RIP.1 and FCS\_CKM.6 ensure that residual information on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been used for signature creation and that destruction of SCD leaves no residual information.

The security functions specified by FDP\_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is modified which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the SCD. FPT\_TST.1 tests the working conditions of the TOE and FPT\_FLS.1 guarantees a secure state when integrity is violated and thus assures that the specified security functions are operational. An example where compromising error conditions are countered by FPT\_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis (DFA).

SFR FPT\_EMS.1 and FPT\_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the SCD.

**OT.Sig\_Secure** (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS\_COP.1/SIG, which ensures the cryptographic robustness of the signature algorithms. FDP\_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE and FPT\_TST.1 ensure self-tests ensuring correct signature-creation..

**OT.Sigy\_SigF** (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided by an SFR for identification authentication and access control.

FIA\_UAU.1 and FIA\_UID.1 ensure that no signature generation function can be invoked before the signatory is identified and authenticated. The security functions specified by FMT\_MTD.1/Admin and FMT\_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function. SFR FIA\_AFL.1 provides protection against a number of attacks, such as cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks against authentication. The security function specified by FDP\_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of stored DTBS and FDP\_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after de-allocation (e.g. after the signature-creation process).

The security functions specified by FDP\_ACC.1/Signature-creation and FDP\_ACF.1/Signature-creation provide access control based on the security attributes managed according to the SFR FMT\_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT\_MSA.2, FMT\_MSA.3 and FMT\_MSA.4. The SFR FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1 list these management functions and the roles. These ensure that the signature process is restricted to the signatory. FMT\_MOF.1 restricts the ability to enable the signature-creation function to the signatory. FMT\_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attributes SCD operational to the signatory.

For variants with a contactless interface, FCS\_COP.1/PACE and FCS\_RNG.1 secure the transmission of the RAD (e.g. PIN) and the set-up of a secure messaging channel. These SFRs are not required for other variants of the TOE.

**OT.DTBS\_Integrity\_TOE** (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is not altered by the TOE. The integrity functions specified by FDP\_SDI.2/DTBS require that the DTBS/R has not been altered by the TOE.

**OT.EMSEC\_Design** (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible information is emanated. This is provided by FPT\_EMS.1.1.

**OT.Tamper\_ID** (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT\_PHP.1 by the means of passive detection of physical attacks.

**OT.Tamper\_Resistance** (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT\_PHP.3 to resist physical attacks.

## 6.4.2 Dependency Rationale for Security functional Requirements

The following table provides an overview how the dependencies of the security functional requirements are solved and a justification why some dependencies are not being satisfied.

Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1], FCS_CKM.6	FCS_COP.1/SIG, FCS_CKM.6
FCS_CKM.6	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.5]	FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SIG	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.5], FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.6
FCS_COP.1/PACE	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.5], FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.6 See justification No. 1 for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_RNG.1	No dependencies	n. a.
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/ Signature-creation	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/Signature-Creation
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD_Transfer	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD/SVD_Generation	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/ Signature-creation	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/ SVD_Transfer	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer, FMT_MSA.3
FDR_RIP.1	No dependencies	n. a.
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent	No dependencies	n. a.
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS	No dependencies	n. a.
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	n.a.
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/ Admin	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1	FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/ Signatory	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1	FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation SFP, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],	FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation SFP,

Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled
	FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.4	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]	FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FDP_ACC.1/ Signature-creation
FMT_MTD.1/ Admin	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/ Signatory	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	n. a.
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1
FPT_EMS.1	No dependencies	n. a.
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	n. a.
FPT_PHP.1	No dependencies	n. a.
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	n. a.
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	n. a.

Table 13: Functional Requirements Dependencies.

Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:

- No. 1: The PACE authentication protocol uses specific RAD (e.g. a PIN) as equivalent of a cryptographic key. Therefore, neither a key generation (FCS\_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP\_ITC.1/2) is necessary.

### 6.4.3 Rationale for EAL 5 Augmented

The assurance level for the protection profile [PP0059] is EAL4 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5. This security target enhances the security level by choosing EAL 5 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2 due to market demands.

Augmentation results from the selection of:

#### **AVA\_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis**

#### **ALC\_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures**

The TOE is intended to function in a variety of signature creation systems for qualified electronic signatures. Due to the nature of its intended application, i.e., the TOE may be issued to users and may not be directly under the control of trained and dedicated administrators. As a result, it is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect.

The TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives OT.SCD\_Secrecy, OT.Sigy\_SigF and OT.Sig\_Secure. The component AVA\_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:

- ADV\_ARC.1 Architectural Design with domain separation and non-bypassability
- ADV\_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
- ADV\_TDS.3 Basic modular design

- ADV\_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
- AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
- AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
- ATE\_DPT.1 Testing: basic design

All of these dependencies are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.

The component ALC\_DVS.2 has no dependencies.

## 7 TOE summary specification

### 7.1 Security Functionality

#### 7.1.1 TSF\_Access: Access rights

This security functionality manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in the applet's file system. It also controls write access of initialization, pre-personalization and personalization data. Access control for initialization and pre-personalization in the preparation phase – while the actual applet is not yet present – is based on platform functionality and on the card manager of the underlying SECORA ID X v2 Java Card platform (SF.CM).

It allows among others the maintenance of different users (Administrator, Signatory). Access is granted (or denied) in accordance to access rights that depend on appropriate identification and authentication mechanisms.

TSF\_Access covers the following SFRs:

- FDP\_ACC.1.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP on the (1) subjects: S.User, the (2) objects: signature creation data (SCD), signature verification data (SVD), and the (3) operations: generation of a SCD/SVD pair. Access to these operations is realized by TSF\_Access (while user authentication is performed by TSF\_Auth).
- FDP\_ACC.1.1/SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall enforce the SVD\_Transfer\_SFP on (1) subjects: S.User, (2) objects: signature verification data (SVD), and (3) operations: export. Access to these operations is realized by TSF\_Access (while user authentication is performed by TSF\_Auth).
- FDP\_ACC.1.1/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP on (1) subjects: S.User, (2) objects: DTBS/R, signature creation data (SCD), and (3) operations: signature-creation. Access to these operations is realized by TSF\_Access (while user authentication is performed by TSF\_Auth).
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP to objects based on the following: the user S.User is associated with the security attribute "SCD/SVD Management ". Access to these operations is realized by TSF\_Access (while user authentication is performed by TSF\_Auth).
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: S.User with the security attribute "SCD / SVD Management" set to "authorised" is allowed to generate a SCD/SVD pair. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.3/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: S.User with the security attribute "SCD / SVD management" set to "not authorized" is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/ SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall enforce the SVD\_Transfer\_SFP to objects based on the following: (1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role, and (2) the signature verification data (SVD). This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/ SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: R.Admin is allowed to export the signature verification data (SVD). This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.

- FDP\_ACF.1.3/SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4/SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on the following: (1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and (2) the signature creation data (SCD) with the security attribute “SCD Operational”. These rules and attributes are controlled by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with signature creation data (SCD) which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”. These rules and attributes are controlled by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.3/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with signature creation data (SCD) which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”. These rules and attributes are controlled by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_RIP.1.1 requires that the TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: signature creation data (SCD). This is realized by TSF\_Access.
- FIA\_AFL.1.2 requires that when the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall block the reference authentication data (RAD). This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FIA\_UID.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow (1) self test according to FPT\_TST.1, and (2) receiving DTBS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FIA\_UID.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FIA\_UAU.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow (1) self test according to FPT\_TST.1, (2) identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1, and (3) receiving DTBS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. This is realized by TSF\_Access, TSF\_Auth and TSF\_SecureMessaging.
- FIA\_UAU.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FMT\_MOF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions signature-creation function to R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Access.
- FMT\_MSA.1.1/Admin requires that the TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP to restrict the ability to modify [assignment: other operations] the security attributes SCD / SVD management to R.Admin. This is realized by TSF\_Access.
- FMT\_MSA.1.1/Signatory requires that the TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes SCD operational to R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Access.

- FMT\_MTD.1.1/Admin requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to create the reference authentication data (RAD) to R.Admin. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FMT\_MTD.1.1/Signatory requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to modify [assignment: none] the reference authentication data (RAD, e.g. a PIN) to R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FMT\_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Admin.

### 7.1.2 TSF\_Admin: Administration

This Security Functionality manages the storage of manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and personalization data. This storage area is a write-only-once area and write access is subject to Manufacturer or Personalization Agent authentication. Management of manufacturing and pre-personalization data in the preparation phase – while the actual applet is not yet present – is based on platform functionality and on the card manager of the underlying SECORA ID X v2 Java Card platform (SF.CM). During Operational Use phase, read access is only possible after successful authentication.

TSF\_Admin covers the following SFRs:

- FIA\_AFL.1.1 requires that the TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: 1-16] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication attempts. This is realized within TSF\_Admin and TSF\_Auth.
- FMT\_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_SMF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: (1) Creation and modification of the reference authentication data (RAD), (2) Enabling the signature-creation function, (3) Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational, (4) Change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier, (5) none. This is realized by TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_MSA.3.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP, SVD\_Transfer\_SFP and Signature Creation SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. This is realized by TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_MSA.3.2 requires that the TSF shall allow the R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. This is realized by TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_MSA.4.1 requires that the TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes: (1) if S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy being authenticated the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “no” as a single operation; (2) if S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “yes” as a single operation. This is realized by TSF\_Admin and TSF\_Crypto.

### 7.1.3 TSF\_Secret: Secret key management

This Security Functionality ensures secure management of secrets such as cryptographic keys. This covers secure key storage, access to keys as well as secure key deletion. These functions make use of SF.CS of the underlying SECORA ID X v2 Java Card OS.

TSF\_Secret covers the following SFRs:



- FCS\_CKM.1 requires that the TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD (Signature creation data / signature verification data) pair in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes: ECDSA or RSA key generation. This is realized by TSF\_Secret (also using TSF\_OS).
- FCS\_CKM.6 requires that the TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method. This is realized by TSF\_Secret (also using TSF\_OS).

#### 7.1.4 TSF\_Crypto: Cryptographic operations

This Security Functionality performs high level cryptographic operations. The implementation is based on the Security Functionalities provided by TSF\_OS.

TSF\_Crypto covers the following SFRs:

- FCS\_COP.1/PACE requires that for variants with a contactless interface the TOE must provide the PACE authentication protocol with AES. This is covered by TSF\_Crypto which itself uses the cryptographic mechanisms realized by TSF\_OS.
- FCS\_COP.1.1/SIG requires that the TSF shall perform electronic signature-generation in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes. This is covered by TSF\_Crypto which itself uses the cryptographic mechanisms realized by TSF\_OS.
- FMT\_MSA.4.1 requires that the TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes: (1) if S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy being authenticated the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “no” as a single operation; (2) if S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “yes” as a single operation. This is realized by TSF\_Admin and TSF\_Crypto.

#### 7.1.5 TSF\_SecureMessaging: Secure Messaging

This Security Functionality realizes a secure communication channel after successful authentication.

TSF\_SecureMessaging covers the following SFRs:

- FIA\_UAU.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow (1) self test according to FPT\_TST.1, (2) identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1, and (3) receiving DTBS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. This is realized by TSF\_SecureMessaging, TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.

#### 7.1.6 TSF\_Auth: Authentication protocols

This security function realizes the following two configurable mechanisms based on the standard ISO7816 Verify\_PIN command (for contact interface only) and on the PACE protocol:

- **TSF\_Auth\_VERIFY\_PIN**

TSF\_Auth\_PIN performs the VERIFY PIN (RAD) authentication mechanism.

- **TSF\_Auth\_PACE**

TSF\_Auth\_PACE provides an additional authentication mechanism based on the PACE protocol [TR03110]. It is used for secure PIN entry especially over contactless interface. To prevent denial of service attacks on the PACE PIN (that could be performed unnoticed via contactless interface), the suspend mode as defined in TR03110 [TR03110] is used. After two consecutive unsuccessful PIN verification attempts the PIN will be suspended and can only be verified after successful verification of an additional PIN (e.g. Card Access Number, CAN).



Note that TSF\_Auth contains two configurable mechanisms (cf. chapter 7) based on the standard ISO7816 Verify\_PIN command (for contact interface only) and on the PACE protocol.

The above two authentication mechanisms cover the following SFRs:

- FCS\_COP.1/PACE requires that for variants with the contactless interface the TOE must provide the PACE authentication protocol.
- FDP\_ACC.1.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP on the (1) subjects: S.User, the (2) objects: signature creation data (SCD), signature verification data (SVD), and the (3) operations: generation of a SCD/SVD pair. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP to objects based on the following: the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management “. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/SCD/SVD\_Generation\_SFP requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD Management” set to “authorized” is allowed to generate a SCD/SVD pair. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.3/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4/SCD/SVD\_Generation requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: S.User with the security attribute “SCD / SVD management” set to “not authorized” is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACC.1.1/SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall enforce the SVD\_Transfer\_SFP on (1) subjects: S.User, (2) objects: signature verification data (SVD), and (3) operations: export. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/ SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall enforce the SVD\_Transfer\_SFP to objects based on the following: (1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role, and (2) the signature verification data (SVD). This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/ SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: R.Admin is allowed to export the signature verification data (SVD). This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.3/ SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Auth.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4/SVD\_Transfer requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACC.1.1/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP on (1) subjects: S.User, (2) objects: DTBS/R, signature creation data (SCD), and (3) operations: signature-creation. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on the following: (1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and (2) the signature creation data (SCD) with the security attribute “SCD Operational”. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: R.Sigy is allowed to

create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with signature creation data (SCD) which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.

- FDP\_ACF.1.3/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4/Signature-creation requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with signature creation data (SCD) which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FIA\_UID.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow (1) self test according to FPT\_TST.1, and (2) receiving DTBS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FIA\_UID.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FIA\_UAU.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow (1) self test according to FPT\_TST.1, (2) identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA\_UID.1, and (3) receiving DTBS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. This is realized by TSF\_Auth, TSF\_Access and TSF\_SecureMessaging.
- FIA\_UAU.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FIA\_AFL.1.1 requires that the TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: 1-16] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication attempts. This is realized by TSF\_Admin and TSF\_Auth.
- FIA\_AFL.1.2 requires that when the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall block the reference authentication data (RAD). This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FMT\_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Access and TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Admin.
- FMT\_MSA.2.1 requires that the TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for SCD / SVD Management and SCD operational. This is realized by TSF\_Auth.
- FMT\_MTD.1.1/Admin requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to create the reference authentication data (RAD) to R.Admin. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.
- FMT\_MTD.1.1/Signatory requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to modify [assignment: none] the reference authentication data (RAD, e.g. a PIN) to R.Sigy. This is realized by TSF\_Auth and TSF\_Access.

### 7.1.7 TSF\_Integrity: Integrity protection

This Security Functionality protects the integrity of internal applet data like the Access control lists.

TSF\_Integrity covers the following SFRs:

- FDP\_SDI.2.1/Persistent requires that the TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored data. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.

- FDP\_SDI.2.2/Persistent requires that upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall (1) prohibit the use of the altered data and (2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FDP\_SDI.2.1/DTBS requires that the TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FDP\_SDI.2.2/DTBS requires that upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall (1) prohibit the use of the altered data and (2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FPT\_PHP.1.1 requires that the TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FPT\_PHP.1.2 requires that the TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.

### 7.1.8 TSF\_OS: Javacard OS security functions

The Javacard operation system (part of the TOE) features the following Security Functionalities. The exact description can be found in the Javacard OS security target [ST\_Secora]. Among other functionality, the cryptographic operations needed for this TOE are provided by the platform:

- Electronic signature-generation (and key generation) with RSA and key sizes of 1976 up to 4096 bit with CRT and 2048 bit without CRT, or ECDSA with key sizes of key sizes of 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 bit.
- Secure messaging with AES (128, 192 or 256 bit key length).
- PACE authentication with key lengths of 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 bit (ECC).

The realization is partly based on the security functions of the certified IC platform:

- Applet firewall (SF.FirewallI)
- Secure overwriting of data (SF.RIP)
- Atomicity and rollback mechanism for Global Platform management functions (SF.Rollback)
- Secure channel protocols (SF.SCP)
- Access control policy for Global Platform card management functions (SF.CM)
- Security measures against physical tampering and leakage (SF.Physical)
- Cryptographic services for applets (SF.CS)
- Secure PIN compare functions and integrity protection of the PIN (SF.PIN)

Since the applet layer of the TOE is based on the Javacard OS, the realization of all TOE security functionalities and thus the fulfillment of all SFRs has dependencies to TSF\_OS. The following items list all SFRs where TSF\_OS has an impact above this level:

- FCS\_CKM.1 requires that the TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD (Signature creation data / signature verification data) pair in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes. This is realized by TSF\_OS.
- FCS\_CKM.6 requires that the TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method. This is realized in the security functions provided by TSF\_OS (and TSF\_Secret).
- FCS\_COP.1/PACE requires that for variants with the contactless interface the TOE must provide the PACE authentication protocol. This is realized using security functionality provided by TSF\_OS.

- FCS\_COP.1.1/SIG requires that the TSF shall perform electronic signature-generation in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes. This is realized by TSF\_OS.
- FCS\_RNG.1 requires that the TSF should provide random numbers with a defined quality metric. This is provided by TSF\_OS.
- FDP\_SDI.2.1/Persistent requires that the TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored data. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FDP\_SDI.2.2/Persistent requires that upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall (1) prohibit the use of the altered data and (2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FDP\_SDI.2.1/DTBS requires that the TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FDP\_SDI.2.2/DTBS requires that upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall (1) prohibit the use of the altered data and (2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error. This is realized by TSF\_Integrity and TSF\_OS.
- FPT\_EMS.1.1 requires that the TOE shall not variations in power consumption, electromagnetic radiation or timing during command execution enabling access to RAD and SCD. This is mainly realized by appropriate measures in TSF\_OS together with the strict following of the security implementation guidelines of the Javacard platform.
- FPT\_FLS.1.1 requires that the TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: (1) self-test according to FPT\_TST fails, or (2) exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur. This is realized by TSF\_OS (together with and TSF\_Integrity).
- FPT\_PHP.1.1 requires that the TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF. This all is realized by TSF\_OS, in parts due to the characteristics of the hardware platform.
- FPT\_PHP.1.2 requires that the TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred. This all is realized by TSF\_OS, in parts due to the characteristics of the hardware platform.
- FPT\_PHP.3.1 requires that the TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. This all is realized by TSF\_OS, in parts due to the characteristics of the hardware platform.
- FPT\_TST.1.1 requires that the TSF shall run a suite of self-tests periodically during normal operation to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF. This is realized by TSF\_OS.
- FPT\_TST.1.2 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. This is realized by TSF\_OS.
- FPT\_TST.1.3 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF. This is realized by TSF\_OS.

## 7.2 TOE summary specification rationale

This summary specification shows that the TSF and assurance measures are appropriate to fulfill the TOE security requirements.

### 7.2.1 Mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities

Each TOE security functional requirement is implemented by at least one security functionality. The mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities is given in the following table. If iterations of a TOE security requirement are covered by the same TOE security functionality the mapping will appear only once. The description of the TSF is given in section 7.1.

	TSF_Access	TSF_Admin	TSF_Secret	TSF_Crypto	TSF_SecureMessaging	TSF_Auth	TSF_Integrity	TSF_OS
FCS_CKM.1			x					x
FCS_CKM.6			x					x
FCS_COP.1/SIG				x				x
FCS_COP.1/PACE				x		x		
FCS_RNG.1								x
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation	x					x		
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer	x					x		
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation	x					x		
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation	x					x		
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer	x					x		
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation	x					x		
FDP_RIP.1	x							
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent							x	x
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS							x	x
FIA_AFL.1	x	x				x		
FIA_UAU.1	x				x	x		
FIA_UID.1	x					x		
FMT_MOF.1	x							
FMT_MSA.1/Admin	x							
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory	x							
FMT_MSA.2						x		
FMT_MSA.3		x						
FMT_MSA.4		x		x				
FMT_MTD.1/Admin	x					x		
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory	x					x		
FMT_SMR.1	x	x				x		

	TSF_Access	TSF_Admin	TSF_Secret	TSF_Crypto	TSF_SecureMessaging	TSF_Auth	TSF_Integrity	TSF_OS
FMT_SMF.1		x						
FPT_EMS.1								x
FPT_FLS.1								x
FPT_PHP.1							x	x
FPT_PHP.3								x
FPT_TST.1								x

Table 14: Mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities.

## 8 References

In the following tables, the references used in this document are summarized.

### Common Criteria

[CC_1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-001.
[CC_2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-002.
[CC_3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-003.
[CC_4]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-004.
[CC_5]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements; CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022; CCMB-2022-11-005.
[CC_6]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CEM:2022, Revision 1, November 2022, CCMB-2022-11-006.
[CCErrata]	Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), V1.1, 2024-07-21.
[CCTrans]	CCMC-2023-04-001, Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022, 2023-04-20.

### Protection Profiles

[PP0059]	Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation; English version EN 419211-2:2013, English translation of DIN EN 419211-2:2013-12; PP Registration: BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02; December 2013.
[PP_Javacard]	Java Card System – Open Configuration Protection Profile, April 2020, Version 3.1, Published by Oracle, Inc.
[PP0006]	Protection Profile Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3, registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0006-2002T, also short SSVG-PPs or CWA14169
[PP0084]	Security IC Platform Protection Profile, registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Rev 1.0, 13 January 2014.

### TOE and Platform References

[ST_Secora]	Security target Infineon SECORA™ ID X v2.02, Rev 1.1, 2024-12-19.			
[Cert_Secora]	Certification Report SECORA™ ID X v2.02, Report number NSCIB-CC-2400063-01-CR, 20 December 2024.			
[ST_IC]	IFX_CCI_00003Bh,	IFX_CCI_000043h,	IFX_CCI_00005Dh,	IFX_CCI_00005Eh,
	IFX_CCI_00005Fh,	IFX_CCI_000060h,	IFX_CCI_000061h,	IFX_CCI_000062h,

	IFX_CCI_000063h, IFX_CCI_000064h S11 Security Target Lite, Revision: v5.9, 2024-08-20
[Cert_IC]	BSI-DSZ-CC-1169-V4-2024 for IFX_CCI_00003Bh, 000043h, 00005Dh, 00005Eh, 00005Fh, 000060h, 000061h, 000062h, 000063h, 000064h, design step S11 with firmware 80.309.05.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.33.003 and v3.34.000 and v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance from Infineon Technologies AG, 13 September 2024.
[Guidance]	[Guidance] consists of three documents: (1) Secora ID X v2 Applet Collection v1.0 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite v4.0 – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications. Guidance Manual. Document Version 1.3, 2025-03-28. (2) Secora ID X v2 Applet Collection v1.0 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite v4.0 – Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation / key import - Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE). Document Version 1.5, 2025-03-28. (3) Secora ID X v2 Applet Collection v1.0 with cryptovision ePasslet Suite v4.0 – Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation / key import - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE). Document Version 1.5, 2025-04-23.
[GP_v23]	GlobalPlatform Card Specification, Version 2.3.1, March 2018
[AGD_PRE]	SECORA ID X v2.02 Administration Guide, Revision 1.2, 2024-09-13.

## EU regulation

[Regulation]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.</li> <li>Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework</li> </ul>
[Implementing]	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1502 of 8 September 2015 on setting out minimum technical specifications and procedures for assurance levels for electronic identification means pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market

## The DIRECTIVE

[Directive]	DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
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## Application and Cryptography standards

[CADES]	ETSI Technical Specification 101 733, CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAAdES), the latest version may be downloaded from the ETSI download page <a href="http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp">http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp</a>
[XADES]	ETSI Technical Specification 101 903, XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAAdES), the latest version may be downloaded from the ETSI download page <a href="http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp">http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp</a>
[PADES]	ETSI Technical Specification 102 778: PDF Advanced Electronic Signatures (PAdES), the latest version may be downloaded from the ETSI download page <a href="http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp">http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp</a>
[TR03110]	Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1, Version 2.20, TR-03110, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[AIS20]	Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS); AIS 20, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[AIS31]	Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS); AIS 31, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[FIPS180-4]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 SECURE HASH STANDARD (SHS), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 2012
[FIPS186-3]	Digital Signature Standard (DSS) - FIPS PUB 186-3, FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, June, 2009
[FIPS197]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001
[PKCS1]	PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard – An RSA Laboratories Technical Note Version 2.2
[RFC5639]	RFC 5639 ECC Brainpool Standard Curves & Curve Generation, March 2010; available at: <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5639">http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5639</a>
[TR03111]	Technical Guideline TR-03111, “Elliptic Curve Cryptography”, Version 2.0, BSI, 2012-06-28.
[SEC1]	Standards for Efficient Cryptography SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Certicom Research, May 21, 2009, Version 2.0. <a href="http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf">http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf</a>
[SEC2]	Standards for efficient cryptography, SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, Certicom Research, September 20, 2000, Version 1. <a href="http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf">http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf</a>
[X9.62]	ANSI X9.62-2005
[ISO14888-3]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006
[IEEE P1363]	IEEE Std 1363-2000

## Glossary

The following glossary lists the main abbreviations and gives terms and definitions. It includes the terms and definitions given in [PP0059], chapter 3.2.3 and 4.

<b>Administrator</b>	User who performs TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation, or other TOE administrative functions
<b>Advanced electronic signature</b>	<p>Electronic signature which meets specific requirements in [Directive]. According to the Directive a electronic signature qualifies as an electronic signature if it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• is uniquely linked to the signatory;</li> <li>• is capable of identifying the signatory;</li> <li>• is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control, and</li> <li>• is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.</li> </ul>
<b>Authentication data</b>	Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user
<b>Authentication</b>	Authentication defines a procedure that verifies the identity of the communication partner. The most elegant method is based on the use of so called electronic signatures.
<b>CA</b>	Certification authority.
<b>CC</b>	Common criteria.
<b>Certificate</b>	Electronic signature used as electronic attestation binding an SVD to a person confirming the identity of that person as legitimate signer ([Directive]: 2.9).
<b>Certificate info</b>	<p>Information associated with a SCD/SVD pair that may be stored in a secure signature creation device. Certificate info is either</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a signer's public key certificate or,</li> <li>• one or more hash values of a signer's public key certificate together with an identifier of the hash function used to compute the hash values.</li> </ul> <p>Certificate info may be combined with information to allow the user to distinguish between several certificates.</p>
<b>Certificate generation application (CGA)</b>	Collection of application components that receive the SVD from the SSCD to generate a certificate obtaining data to be included in the certificate and to create a electronic signature of the certificate
<b>Certificate revocation list</b>	A list of revoked certificates issued by a certificate authority
<b>Certification service provider (CSP)</b>	Entity that issues certificates or provides other services related to electronic signatures ([Directive]: 2.11).
<b>CGA</b>	Certification generation application.
<b>CRL</b>	See Certificate Revocation List.
<b>Data to be signed (DTBS)</b>	All electronic data to be signed including a user message and signature attributes

<b>Data to be signed or its unique representation DTBS/R</b>	<p>Data received by a secure signature creation device as input in a single signature-creation operation. Note: DTBS/R is either</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a hash-value of the data to be signed (DTBS), or</li> <li>• an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS complemented with a remaining part of the DTBS, or</li> <li>• the DTBS.</li> </ul>
<b>DTBS</b>	Data to be signed.
<b>DTBS/R</b>	Data to be signed or its unique representation.
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation assurance level.
<b>ECC</b>	(Elliptic Curve Cryptography) class of procedures providing an attractive alternative for the probably most popular asymmetric procedure, the RSA algorithm.
<b>Hash function</b>	A function which forms the fixed-size result (the hash value) from an arbitrary amount of data (which is the input). These functions are used to generate the electronic equivalent of a fingerprint. The significant factor is that it must be impossible to generate two entries which lead to the same hash value (so called collisions) or even to generate a matching message for a defined hash value.
<b>Integrity</b>	The test on the integrity of data is carried out by checking messages for changes during the transmission by the receiver. Common test procedures employ Hash-functions, MACs (Message Authentication Codes) or – with additional functionality – electronic signatures.
<b>IT</b>	Information technology.
<b>Javacard</b>	A smart card with a Javacard operation system.
<b>Legitimate user</b>	User of a secure signature creation device who gains possession of it from an SSCD-provisioning service provider and who can be authenticated by the SSCD as its signatory.
<b>MAC</b>	Message Authentication Code. Algorithm that expands the message by means of a secret key by special redundant pieces of information, which are stored or transmitted together with the message. To prevent an attacker from targeted modification of the attached redundancy, requires its protection in a suitable way.
<b>Non-repudiation</b>	One of the objectives in the employment of digital signatures. It describes the fact that the sender of a message is prevented from denying the preparation of the message. The problem cannot be simply solved with cryptographic routines, but the entire environment needs to be considered and respective framework conditions need to be provided by pertinent laws.
<b>Notified body</b>	Organizational entity designated by a member state of the European Union as responsible for accreditation and algorithms and algorithm parameters ([Directive]: 1.1b and 3.4).
<b>PP</b>	Protection profile.
<b>Private key</b>	Secret key only known to the receiver of a message, which is used in asymmetric ciphers for encryption or generation of electronic signatures.
<b>Pseudo random number</b>	Many cryptographic mechanisms require random numbers (e.g. in key generation). The problem, however, is that it is difficult to implement true random numbers in software. Therefore, so called pseudo-random number generators are used, which then should be initialized with a real random element (the so called <i>seed</i> ).

<b>Public key</b>	Publicly known key in an asymmetric cipher which is used for encryption and verification of electronic signatures.
<b>Public key infrastructure (PKI)</b>	Combination of hardware and software components, policies, and different procedures used to manage electronic certificates.
<b>Qualified certificate</b>	Public key certificate that meets the requirements laid down in [Directive], Annex I and that is provided by a CSP that fulfils the requirements laid down in [Directive], Annex II.
<b>Qualified electronic signature</b>	advanced electronic signature that has been created with an SSCD with a key certified with a qualified certificate ([Directive]: 5.1).
<b>RAD</b>	Reference authentication data.
<b>Random numbers<sup>a</sup></b>	Many cryptographic algorithms or protocols require a random element, mostly in form of a random number, which is newly generated in each case. In these cases, the security of the procedure depends in part on the suitability of these random numbers. As the generation of real random numbers within computers still imposes a problem (a source for real random events can in fact only be gained by exact observation of physical events, which is not easy to realize for a software), so called pseudo random numbers are used instead.
<b>Reference authentication data (RAD)</b>	Data persistently stored by the TOE for authentication of a user as authorised for a particular role.
<b>SCA</b>	Signature creation application.
<b>SCD</b>	Signature creation data.
<b>SCS</b>	Signature creation system.
<b>SDO</b>	Signed data object.
<b>Secure messaging</b>	Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
<b>Secure signature creation device (SSCD)</b>	Personalized device that meets the requirements laid down in [Directive], Annex III by being evaluated according to a security target conforming to this ST ([Directive]: 2.5 and 2.6).
<b>SFP</b>	Security function policy.
<b>SFR</b>	Security functional requirement.
<b>Signatory</b>	Legitimate user of an SSCD associated with it in the certificate of the signature-verification and who is authorized by the SSCD to operate the signature-creation function ([Directive]: 2.3).
<b>Signature attributes</b>	Additional information that is signed together with a user message.
<b>Signature creation application (SCA)</b>	<p>Application complementing an SSCD with a user interface with the purpose to create an electronic signature. Note: A signature creation application is software consisting of a collection of application components configured to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• present the data to be signed (DTBS) for review by the signatory,</li> <li>• obtain prior to the signature process a decision by the signatory,</li> <li>• if the signatory indicates by specific unambiguous input or action its intent to sign send a DTBS/R to the TOE</li> <li>• process the electronic signature generated by the SSCD as appropriate, e.g. as attachment to the DTBS.</li> </ul>

<b>Signature creation data (SCD)</b>	Private cryptographic key stored in the SSCD under exclusive control by the signatory to create an electronic signature ([Directive]: 2.4).
<b>Signature creation system (SCS)</b>	Complete system that creates an electronic signature consists of the SCA and the SSCD.
<b>Signature verification data (SVD)</b>	Public cryptographic key that can be used to verify an electronic signature ([Directive] 2.7).
<b>Smart card</b>	A smart card is a chip card which contains an internal micro controller with CPU, volatile (RAM) and non-volatile (ROM, EEPROM, Flash) memory, i.e. which can carry out its own calculations in contrast to a simple storage card. Sometimes a smart card has a numerical coprocessor (NPU) to execute public key algorithms efficiently. Smart cards have all of their functionality comprised on a single chip (in contrast to chip cards, which contain several chips wired to each other). Therefore, such a smart card is ideal for use in cryptography as it is almost impossible to manipulate its internal processes.
<b>SSCD</b>	Secure signature creation device.
<b>SSCD provisioning service</b>	Service to prepare and provide an SSCD to a subscriber and to support the signatory with certification of generated keys and administrative functions of the SSCD.
<b>ST</b>	Security target.
<b>SVD</b>	Signature verification data.
<b>TOE</b>	Target of evaluation.
<b>Travel document</b>	A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
<b>TSF</b>	TOE security functionality.
<b>User</b>	Entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
<b>User Message</b>	Data determined by the signatory as the correct input for signing.
<b>VAD</b>	See Verification authentication data.
<b>Verification authentication data (VAD)</b>	Data provided as input to a secure signature creation device for authentication by cognition or by data derived from a user's biometric characteristics.
<b>X.509</b>	Standard for certificates, CRLs and authentication services. It is part of the X.500 standard of the ITU-T for realization of a worldwide distributed directory service realized with open system.