

#### PREMIER MINISTRE

# Secretariat General for National Defence

Central Directorate for Information Systems Security

# **Certification Report DCSSI-2008/05**

# ATMEL Secure Microcontroller AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT rev. M

Paris, 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2008

# **Courtesy Translation**



# Warning

This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in terms of security objectives.

Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from DCSSI (Central Directorate for Information Systems Security), and does not guarantee that the certified product is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.

Any correspondence about this report has to be addressed to:

Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale
Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
Centre de certification
51, boulevard de la Tour Maubourg
75700 PARIS cedex 07 SP
France

certification.dcssi@sgdn.gouv.fr

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Certification report reference

## DCSSI-2008/05

Product name

ATMEL Secure Microcontroller AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT rev. M

Product reference

AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT, reference AT58803 revision M, with Cryptographic software library Toolbox revision: 00.03.01.07

Protection profile conformity

# PP/9806

Evaluation criteria and version

# **Common Criteria version 2.3**

compliant with ISO 15408:2005

Evaluation level

# **EAL 5 augmented**

ALC\_DVS.2, AVA\_MSU.3, AVA\_VLA.4

Developer

### **ATMEL Secure Microcontroller Solutions**

Maxwell Building - Scottish Enterprise technology Park, East Kilbride, Glasgow G75 0QR, Scotland

Sponsor

# **ATMEL Secure Microcontroller Solutions**

Maxwell Building - Scottish Enterprise technology Park, East Kilbride, Glasgow G75 0QR, Scotland

Evaluation facility

# **CEACI (Thales Security Systems – CNES)**

18 avenue Edouard Belin, 31401 Toulouse Cedex 9, France Phone: +33 (0)5 61 28 16 51, email : ceaci@cnes.fr

Recognition arrangements

CCRA

**SOG-IS** 



Security Certified

The product is recognised at EAL4 level.

# Introduction

#### The Certification

Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la République Française". This decree stipulates that:

- The central information system security department draws up **certification reports**. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons. They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the principals desire (article 7).
- The **certificates** issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).

The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.

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# 1. The product

### 1.1. Presentation of the product

The evaluated product is the secure microcontroller AT90SC12872RCFT, reference AT58803 revision M, including the cryptographic software library Toolbox revision: 00.03.01.07. The reference AT90SC12836RCFT identifies the same hardware product but is different for marketing purposes only.

This product belongs to the AVR ASL4 family developed by ATMEL Secure Microcontroller Solutions.

The microcontroller aims to host one or several software applications and can be embedded in a plastic support to create a Smartcard with multiple possible usages (secure identity documents, banking, health card, pay-TV or transport applications...) depending on the Embedded Software applications. However, only the microcontroller is evaluated. The software applications are not in the scope of this evaluation.

### 1.2. Evaluated product description

The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities and its operation environment.

This security target is compliant to [PP9806] protection profile.

#### 1.2.1. Product identification

The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product's constituent elements.

The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:

- Product name: AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT, and product identification number: AT58803. This information can be checked using Serial number register should be hexadecimal 0x1F(see [GUIDES], which content "AT90SC12872RCFT Technical Data Sheet" section 23.1.1). Silicon revision: M. This information can be checked using Serial number register hexadecimal SN 1. which content should be 0x0C(see [GUIDES], "AT90SC12872RCFT Technical Data Sheet" section 23.1.2).
- Toolbox revision: 00.03.01.07. This information can be checked using Toolbox "Selftest" command, which answer should be as defined in guidance "Toolbox 3.x on AT90SCxxxxC Family with AdvX", section 4.1 (see [GUIDES]).
- The TOE can be physically identified by the mask numbers visible on the metal layer, and listed in the "Patern and mask list" document (cf. [CONF]).

#### 1.2.2. Security services

The product provides mainly the following security services:

- Test Mode Entry,
- Protected Test Memory Access,

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- Test Mode Disable,
- TOE Testing,
- Data Error Detection,
- FireWall.
- Event Audit,
- Event Action,
- Unobservability,
- Cryptography,
- Package mode entry,
- Test Memory Access in Package Mode.

#### 1.2.3. Architecture

The product consists of

The AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT microcontroller is made up of:

- AVR Risk processing unit,
- 128Kb of program ROM memory,
- 72Kb of EEPROM program/data memory including 128 bytes of One Time Programmable (OTP) memory and a 384-byte of bit-addressable area,
- 5Kb of static RAM memory,
- a 32bit Checksum Accelerator,
- a CRC-16/32 peripheral,
- a Random Number Generator,
- a fast hardware DES/3DES peripheral,
- a 32bit crypto accelerator (AdvX) with its 32K-byte Crypto ROM that can be loaded with either the ATMEL Toolbox library or the Customer Proprietary crypto library. The Atmel Toolbox software library allows fast cryptographic algorithm implementations (RSA with or without CRT, ECC (elliptic curves), SHA-1, Prime Generation,...) on the AdvX.
- detectors which monitor voltage, frequency and temperature,
- a firewall that protects all memories, peripheral and IO register accesses,
- a power management system (the microcontroller works under a voltage range from 3V to 5V),
- logic peripherals including 2 timers, 2 serial port, an ISO7816 interface and an ISO7816 controller, a contactless interface with full support for ISO/IEC 14443 type A and B,
- a dedicated test structure that can be used only in test mode for production testing, and sawn before IC packaging.

#### 1.2.4. Life cycle

The product's life cycle is organised as follow:




Figure 1 - standard IC life-cycle

The product is designed and tested by:

#### **Atmel East Kilbride**

Maxwell Building Scottish Enterprise technology Park East Kilbride Glasgow G75 0QR, Scotland.

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The database of the product and the manufacturing of the product are performed by:

#### **Atmel Rousset**

Z.I. Rousset Peynier 13106 Rousset Cedex France.

The photo masks of the product are manufactured by:

#### **Toppan Photomasks France**

224, bd John Kennedy 91100 Corbeil Essonnes France.

The product can be in one of its three possible modes:

- "Test" mode: mode in which the microcontroller runs under the control of dedicated test software written to EEPROM via a test interface, and in conjunction with stimulus provided by an external test system. This mode is intended to be used solely by authorized development staff. After the testing activity, the tests interface is definitely deactivated by sawing the wafer and cannot be accessed any more.
- "User" mode: mode, in which the microcontroller runs under control of the smartcard embedded software. It is intended that customers and end-users will always use the microcontroller in user mode.
- "Package" mode: this mode is similar to Test Mode for testing returns from Phases 4-7. Package mode runs a limited subset of test commands via a test interface, and in conjunction with stimulus provided by an external test system. This mode is intended to be used solely by authorized staff.

#### 1.2.5. Evaluated configuration

This certification report applies to the microcontroller only. Any other software used for the evaluation are not part of the scope of certification.

With regard to the life-cycle, the evaluated product is the one at the end of its manufacturing phase (phase 3).

For the evaluation needs, the product AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT was provided to the ITSEF with a dedicated test embedded software, in a mode known as "open".

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> mode that enables to load and execute a native code in EEPROM and also to disable the configurable security mechanisms

### 2. The evaluation

#### 2.1. Evaluation referential

The evaluation has been performed in compliance with **Common Criteria version 2.3** [CC] and with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].

For assurance components above EAL4 level, the evaluation facility own evaluation methods consistent with [AIS 34], validated by DCSSI have been used.

In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CC IC] and [CC AP] guides have been applied.

#### 2.2. Evaluation work

The evaluation relies on the evaluation results of the secure microcontrollers AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT rev. I & J certified the  $16^{th}$  of February 2007 under the reference 2007/04 (cf. [2007/04]). The evaluation also relies on the evaluation results of the ATMEL Cryptographic Toolbox 00.03.01.07 on the AT90SC Family of devices certified the  $20^{th}$  of February 2008 under the reference 2008/03 (cf. [2008/03]).

The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to DCSSI the 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2008, provides details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks are "**pass**".

## 2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis

The evaluated product provides cryptographic services identified §1.2.3, but as these services do not concur to the products security they cannot be analysed from a cryptographic point of view; their robustness depends on the way they are used by the application embedded in the microcontroller.

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### 3. Certification

#### 3.1. Conclusion

The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required competency and impartiality for a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.

This certificate testifies that the "ATMEL Secure Microcontroller AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT rev. M" submitted for evaluation fulfils the security features specified in its security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL 5 augmented.

#### 3.2. Restrictions

This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.

This certificate provides a resistance assessment of the AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT product to a set of attacks which remains generic due to the missing of any specific embedded application. Therefore, the security of a final product based on the evaluated microcontroller would only be assessed through the final product evaluation, which could be performed on the basis of the current evaluation results.

The user of the certified product shall respect the operational environmental security objectives summarized specified in the security target [ST] and shall respect the recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES], in particular:

- Secure communication protocols and procedures shall be used between smartcard and terminal.
- The integrity and the confidentiality of sensitive data stored or handled by the system (terminals, communications....) shall be maintained.

## 3.3. Recognition of the certificate

#### 3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)

This certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-IS].

The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from Signatory States of the agreement<sup>1</sup>, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



#### 3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory countries<sup>2</sup>, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC\_FLR family. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



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<sup>1</sup> The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

<sup>2</sup> The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.



# **Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product**

Class	Family	Components by assurance level			Assurance level of the product					
		EAL 1	EAL 2	EAL 3	EAL 4	EAL 5	EAL 6	EAL 7	EAL 5+	Name of the component
A CINA	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2	1	Partial CM automation
ACM Configuration	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	4	Configuration support and acceptance procedures
management	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3	3	Development tools CM coverage
ADO	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3	2	Detection of modification
Delivery and operation	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Installation, generation and start-up procedures
	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	3	Semiformal functional specification
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5	3	Semiformal high-level design
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3	2	Implementation of the TSF
ADV Development	ADV_INT					1	2	3	1	Modularity
Development	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2	1	Descriptive low-level design
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	Semiformal correspondence demonstration
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3	3	Formal TOE security policy model
AGD	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Administrator guidance
Guidance	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	User guidance
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	2	Sufficiency of security measures
ALC	ALC_FLR									
Life-cycle support	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3	2	Standardised life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	2	Compliance with implementation standards
	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	2	Analysis of coverage
ATE	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3	2	Testing: low-level design
Tests	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	Independent testing – sample
	AVA_CCA					1	2	2	1	Covert channel analysis
AVA Vulnerability	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3	3	Analysis and testing of insecure states
assessment	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Strength of TOE security function evaluation
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4	4	Highly resistant

# **Annex 2. Evaluated product references**

[2007/04]	Certification Report 2007/04 - ATMEL Secure Microcontroller AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT rev. I & J, 16 <sup>th</sup> of February 2007, SGDN/DCSSI
[2008/03]	Certification Report DCSSI-2008/03 - ATMEL Cryptographic Toolbox 00.03.01.07 on the AT90SC Family of devices, 20 <sup>th</sup> of February 2008, SGDN/DCSSI
[ST]	Reference security target for the evaluation:  - Cyclone Security Target, Reference: Cyclone_ST_V3.0_19Feb08, ATMEL  For the needs of publication, the following security target has been provided and validated in the evaluation:  - AT90SC12872RCFT / AT90SC12836RCFT Security Target Lite, Reference: TPG0129D_19Feb08 ATMEL
[ETR]	Evaluation technical report :  - Evaluation Technical Report- Project: Cyclone 5 rev M Re Evaluation, Reference: CYM_ETR_V2.0 CEACI  For the needs of composite evaluation with this microcontroller a technical report for composition has been validated: - ETR LITE for composition - Cyclone 5 rev M Re Evaluation, AT90SC12872RCFT & AT90SC12836RCFT MCU Device (AT58803), Reference: CYM_ETR_Lite_v1.0 CEACI
[CONF]	The configuration list is made of:  - Cyclone Design Configuration List, Reference: Cyclone_DCL_V1.1_12Oct07, ATMEL  - Cyclone Rev M Manufacturing Configuration Liste, Reference: Cyclone Rev M _MCL_V1.0, ATMEL  - Cyclone Process Stage Flow, Reference: Cyclone_RevM_PSF_10Oct07 ATMEL  - Crypto Library Configuration List Library Version 00.03.01.07, Reference: TPR0150FX_01Oct07 ATMEL

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	- Cyclone Rev M Deliverable list, Reference: Cyclone_EDL_RevM_20Feb08 ATMEL
[GUIDES]	Un document générique sert d'interface pour toute la documentation d'utilisation :  - AT90SC AGD Interface Document, Reference: AT90SC_AGD_V2.0_22Sep05, ATMEL  Les documents associés sont :  - AT90SC12872RCFT Technical Data Sheet, Reference: TPR0097A-23Dec04, ATMEL  - AT90SC12872RCFT Errata - Full NVM Erase, Reference: TPG0137AX_19Oct06  ATMEL  - Secure Hardware DES and Triple DES on AT90SC ASL4 Products, Reference: TPR0063IX_05Dec07. ATMEL  - Security Recommendations for AT90SC ASL4 Products, Reference: TPR0066H_31Jan08. ATMEL  - Checksum Accelerator use on the AT90SC ASL4 products, Reference: TPR0065A-02Jul02  ATMEL  - AT90SC Addressing Modes and Instruction Set, Reference: 1323C-03May04  ATMEL  - Using the supervisor and user modes on the AT90SC ASL4 products, Reference: TPR0095A-11Mar03  ATMEL  - Generating unpredictable random numbers on the AT90SC family devices, Reference: 1573CX_SMIC_21mar03  ATMEL  - Generation of Random Numbers with a Controlled Entropy on AT90SC, Reference: TPR0166BX_27Jun06.  ATMEL  - AdvX™ for AT90SC Family Datasheet, Reference: TPR0116BX-12Aug05  ATMEL  - Toolbox 3.x on AT90SCxxxxC Family with AdvX™, Reference: TPR0133DX_01Aug06  ATMEL

	<ul> <li>Toolbox 00.03.01.xx Errata,         Référence: TPR0163DX_10Jul07,         ATMEL</li> <li>Efficient use of AdvX for Implementing Cryptographic         Operations,         Reference: TPR0142CX_14Jun05         ATMEL</li> <li>Securing Cryptographic Operations on AT90SC Products with         Toolbox 3x,         Reference: TPR0141EX_14Aug07.         ATMEL</li> <li>Wafer Saw Recommendations,         Reference: TPG0079A_13Jun05         ATMEL</li> </ul>
[PP/9806]	Protection Profile Smart Card Integrated Circuit Version 2.0, September 1998. <i>Certified by DCSSI under the reference PP/9806</i> .

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# **Annex 3. Certification references**

	er 2002-535 dated 18 <sup>th</sup> April 2002 related to the security evaluations and for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01]	Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model,
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-004. The content of CEM version 2.3 is identical to the international ISO/IEC 18045:2005.
[CC IC]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, reference CCDB-2006-04-003 version 2.0, revision 1, April 2006.
[CC AP]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, reference CCDB-2007-04-001 version 2.3, revision 1, April 2007.
[COMP]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Composite product evaluation for smart cards and similar devices, reference CCDB-2007-09-001 version 1.0, revision 1, September 2007.
[CC RA]	Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS]	«Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management Committee of Agreement Group.
[REF-CRY]	Cryptographic mechanisms - Rules and recommendations about the choice and parameters sizes of cryptographic mechanisms with standard robustness level version 1.10, 14 <sup>th</sup> of September 2007, No. 1904/SGDN/DCSSI/SDS/LCR

Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme - Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, AIS34, Version
1.00, 01 June 2004, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

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