

Maintenance Report

Netezza Performance Server v6.0 running on TwinFin

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Certification Body

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1 Introduction

Netezza Corporation, an IBM Company, has submitted (via EWA-Canada) the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) for Netezza performance Server v6.0 running on TwinFin, satisfying the requirements outlined in Version 1.0 of the Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009: <u>Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements</u>. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to Netezza performance Server v6.0 running on TwinFin (the maintained Target of Evaluation), the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

2 Description of changes to the TOE

The changes in the Netezza performance Server v6.0 running on TwinFin comprise bug fixes and changes to the hardware platforms (as shown in table below). For each change, it was verified that there were no required changes to the security functional requirements in the ST, and thorough functional and regression testing was conducted by the developer to ensure that the assurance in the Target of Evaluation (TOE) was maintained.

Previous Models	New Models	
5200	3,6,12	
10100	18,24,30	
10200	36,42,48	
10400	54,60,66	
10500	72,78,84	
10600	90,96,102	
10580	108,114,120	
	Skimmer 1	

3 Affected developer evidence

Modifications to the product necessitated changes to a subset of the developer evidence that was previously submitted for the TOE. The set of affected developer evidence was identified in the IAR.

4 Conclusions

All changes to the TOE were bug fixes and the addition of new hardware platforms. Through functional and regression testing of the Netezza performance Server v6.0 running on TwinFin, assurance gained in the original TOE certification was maintained. As all of the changes to the TOE have been classified as minor, it is the conclusion of the CB that the maintained TOE is appropriate for assurance continuity and re-evaluation is not required.

5 References

Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, CCIMB-2004-02-009, Version 1.0, February 2004

Technical Oversight for Assurance Continuity of a Certified TOE, Version 1.2, October 2005

Certification Report EAL 4+ Evaluation of Netezza Performance Server 4.6.5